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Island Studies Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2006, pp. 223-238
The Faroe Islands: Options for Independence
Maria Ackrén
PhD Candidate
Åbo Akademi University
Åbo, Finland
maria.ackren@abo.fi
Abstract
The Faroe Islands are currently at a crossroads in their constitutional status. Discussions
concerning changes in the current constitutional status are ongoing and several analyses
about possible trajectories of future development are being proposed. Argued in a context
of Faroese nationalism, this article tries to assess these trajectories in the future
jurisdictional and political development of the Faroe Islands in terms of three possible
scenarios: independence or full sovereignty (as is Iceland); a freely associated statehood
(as are Niue and the Cook Islands in relation to New Zealand); or a confederation,
probably involving changes at both the central level of the Danish state and the European
Union level. This article argues that the most likely future development is that of a state in
free association with Denmark. Meanwhile, island politics can change very quickly and the
traditional cleavages in Faroese politics are liable to changing degrees of public support.
Key Words: Nationalism, Sovereignty, Free Association, Confederation, Faroe Islands
Copyright © 2006. Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, Canada.
Introduction
While the Faroese are a very old European nation, they nevertheless remain essentially
unknown to the outside world. This paper, while critically reviewing the current political
and economic development options of this island people, hopes to make their situation
better known, while hopefully also encouraging more scholarly work in this area of
comparative island politics.
The Faroe Islands became an integral part of the Danish Realm from their very first
constitution in 1849. This meant that the island people were represented in the Danish
Parliament and that the civic rights of the Constitution were directly applicable in the
islands, while all major decisions concerning the Faroe Islands were taken in Copenhagen
(Jensen, 2003: 171).
The Faroes are currently at a crossroads in their political and economical development as
negotiations continue with Copenhagen on their future status. In the sections below, three
different scenarios for the future of the Faroe Islands will be examined. The first scenario
M. Ackrén
224
would be independence or full sovereignty, with Iceland as the key model. The second
scenario investigates the conditions for a state in free association and compares the Faroe
Islands with such island territories as Niue and the Cook Islands. The third and last
scenario to be explored would be the option for confederation, with the Faroes being a
constituent member, along with Greenland and Denmark. The three options are theoretical
assumptions and represent by and large the full spectrum of current jurisdictional and
constitutional possibilities for the Faroe Islands’ future. Before considering these scenarios
however, an overview of Faroese nationalism and its development is relevant and provides
a better understanding of the case at hand.
Faroese Nationalism: Background and Recent Development
‘Nationalism’ is often an indication of a state of mind, a consciousness manifested by
members of a group that they belong to a particular nation, an awareness of sharing a
common culture or identity, a sense of fellow-feeling towards those recognized as co-
nationals. Some scholars associate nationalism with a universal human need to ‘belong’ or
‘identify’; others with negative psychological attitudes towards outsiders (Jay, 1994: 153-
154).
The Faroese consider themselves a Scandinavian people; but their language, history and
economy are quite different from those of mainland Denmark. Faroese nationalism was
institutionalized in the 1880s through the Faroese National Movement. In common with
similar movements around Europe at this time, the movement was romantic in its outlook
and tended to emphasize the importance of Faroese history, culture and language. It has
been argued that this movement was a reaction against the dramatic changes taking place
in Faroese society at this time. The traditional agrarian society was disintegrating, while a
class of full-time specialist fishers was emerging (Goodlad, 1987: 2). The Faroese National
Movement represents the beginnings of the struggle for Faroese political autonomy. The
Danish reaction to this movement was initially rather hostile since Denmark was facing
increasing demands for independence from Iceland; while, nearer home, the duchies of
Schleswig-Holstein had been lost to Germany in 1864 (Goodlad, 1987: 2).
During the 1890s, the Faroese National Movement split into a conservative group and a
more radical group. The conservative group sought support from the Danish Government
and officials, while the radical group was seen as the champion of Faroese autonomy, and
formed links with several other similar radical opposition groups in Denmark. In 1901, the
radical leader Joannes Patursson (1866-1946) was elected as one of the two Faroese
representatives to the Danish Parliament, from which position he worked to promote
Faroese self-rule policy within the Danish Parliament. (As a young man in 1888, Patursson
had attended and composed a poem for the so-called “Christmas meeting” whose mandate
was to proactively defend Faroese language and culture from the threat of Danish
incorporation and which kick-started the movement for Faroese Nationalism.) His efforts
quickly bore fruit: by 1903, the Danish Government had accepted a programme for the
The Faroe Islands: Options for Independence
225
economic development of the Faroe Islands based on the devolution of considerable fiscal
powers, including passing the responsibility for the administration of the taxation system to
the Faroese Løgting (Goodlad, 1987: 3).
A policy over Faroese self-rule was the main issue of the 1906 election. The movement led
by Patursson was now called Sjálvstýrisflokkurin (the Autonomist Party), while the
conservatives set up Sambandsflokkurin (the Unionist Party). The Autonomists argued for
Faroese devolution within the Danish State; while the Unionists argued that the status quo
should be retained. The outcome of the election was a defeat for the Autonomists
(Goodlad, 1987: 3; Mørkøre, 1991: 58-59). Already a century ago, the basic split in
Faroese politics was taking shape: the nationalist and unionist constituencies, whose
relevance would ebb and flow in different epochs to follow; as would that of the more
conventional, left and right wing ideological positions.
The Faroese fishing industry experienced major problems with the collapse of the
traditional Spanish and Italian salt fish markets in the 1930s. The resulting economic crisis
reduced wages and led to much hardship, all of which contributed to a dramatic growth of
support for the Social Democratic Party (Javnaðarflokkurin). During the 1930s, the Social
Democrats were not in favour of Faroese autonomy: instead they supported the status quo.
In 1940, a new party was established as a reaction to the growth of the Social Democrats.
This party was called Vinnuflokkurin and was a splinter from the Autonomists: it
developed a conservative social and economic programme and was mainly representing
private business and the fishing industry (Goodlad, 1987: 4-5; Mørkøre, 1991: 62). It
changed its name to Fólkaflokkurin (the People’s Party) in 1940 (Goodlad, 1987: 6).
The People’s Party adopted a policy programme based on the need for the Faroese
economy to fully exploit local resources in order to reduce financial dependence on
Denmark. Sjóvinnubankin had been formed in 1932 as an independent Faroese bank in
competition to the established Føroya Banki, which was wholly owned by one of the main
Danish banks. It was argued that only a Faroese bank would ensure that Faroese savings
were retained in the Islands for investment in the local economy. Sjóvinnubankin became a
success and the People’s Party demonstrated what could be achieved independently of
Denmark (Goodlad, 1987: 7).
With the German occupation of Denmark on 9
th
April 1940, and the British occupation of
the Faroe Islands three days later, all connections between Denmark and the Faroes were
severed. Faced with this situation, the Faroese Løgting adopted a new constitution on May
10
th
empowering it to act as the Faroese Government for as long as the war lasted. As a
result, the executive powers were transferred from the Danish Government to the Danish
Governor of the Faroes, and a form of legislative power was transferred to the Løgting.
The Danish Governor retained the right to veto (Goodlad, 1987: 9; Mørkøre, 1991: 62;
Jensen, 2003: 171).
M. Ackrén
226
During the war years, the Faroese economy boomed due to the very high fish prices
obtained in the British ports. The war years had effectively forced the Faroes to control
their own affairs; by the end of the war, it was unthinkable that there could be a return to
the pre-war constitutional status. Discussions took place at different levels, but no
agreement on a new political setting could be reached. Eventually, a referendum was
adopted as a way out of the impasse (Goodlad, 1987: 9; Mørkøre, 1991: 62). For a time, it
appeared that the Faroes would be joining Iceland (which had become a fully independent
state in 1944), both island territories having exploited the political vacuum created by the
war years.
The options in the referendum were that of either the status quo of 1940 or outright
independence. Held on 14
th
September in 1946, the result was a narrow majority in favour
of the independence option: with 11,640 valid votes cast, 48.7% voted in favour of
secession and 47.2% voted to maintain the status quo. The remaining 4% were spoilt
ballots. This came as a surprise to the Danish Government, which was totally unprepared
for such an eventuality. There had been no agreement as to whether the referendum should
be considered as binding or simply consultative. The Danish Government (via the Danish
Crown) panicked, dissolved the Løgting and demanded a new election (Goodlad, 1987: 10;
Mørkøre, 1991: 62; Olafsson, 2000: 124-125). Held in November 1946, this time the
election produced a clear majority against secession. The new coalition continued
negotiations on the question of Faroese autonomy with the Danish Government. These
negotiations eventually resulted in the implementation of the Home Rule Act of 1948,
which established the constitutional arrangements under which the Faroe Islands continue
to be governed today (with an amendment since 1991) (Goodlad, 1987: 12; Mørkøre,
1991: 62).
The 1948 Home Rule Act recognized the Faroe Islands as a “self-governing community
within the Kingdom of Denmark”. Specific fields of responsibility may accordingly be
devolved to the Faroese Løgting while other matters remain entrenched within the Danish
Parliament. The 1948 Act listed those areas for which the Faroese Løgting would, upon
request, assume entire legislative, fiscal and administrative responsibility. These include
agriculture, fisheries, education, culture, all taxation, health and social services, all
planning matters and internal administration. In addition, a number of other areas were
recognized as matters for which the Faroese Løgting could assume responsibility after
further negotiations with the Danish Government. These include the state (Lutheran)
church, the police, trade controls, state radio, aviation and mineral rights (Goodlad, 1987:
12; Mørkøre, 1991: 62). Since 1991, several of these areas have been transferred (Hannum,
1999). The 1948 Act also listed those areas for which the Danish Government would
continue to have sole responsibility. These include foreign policy, defence, the courts, civil
rights, civil and criminal law and general fiscal policy. However, on all these matters, it
was agreed that any legislation proposed by the Danish Parliament should be submitted to
the Faroese Løgting for comment before entering into force for the Faroe Islands (Goodlad,
1987: 13).
The Faroe Islands: Options for Independence
227
From 1948 and for the following 40 years, a rather stable political period ensued in the
Faroe Islands. The Republican Party formed in 1948 was based on the dissatisfaction
among separatist Social Democrats and Conservatives. The Party succeeded in taking over
these socialist voters, who had supported the Autonomists before the war. The Republican
Party took the guise of a populist party, but was more radical in questions concerning the
relationship with Denmark (Goodlad, 1987: 14-15). Its objective was total independence
and the setting up of a Faroese republic (Mørkøre, 1991: 58).
In 1989, with the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the Faroe Islands
lost their strategic importance and became a forlorn outpost again. This coincided with the
collapse of the fisheries in 1992, at which point the Faroes requested assistance from
Copenhagen. The Banking scandal in 1993 exacerbated the situation, since most of the
fishery industry was connected to the banks and there had been a loose policy with loan
allocations. This time, however, Denmark was unwilling to simply oblige. The Danes
demanded sweeping changes to the Faroese political system. Denmark enforced a clearer
division between the legislative and the administrative branches. The Government itself
was divided into ministries with each minister to be held responsible for his/her own
department. The civil service was strengthened. Economic legislation was modernized and
laws concerning fishing rights were also changed (Justinussen, 1999: 20).
The relationship with Denmark was up for debate again. Left versus right issues
reappeared along with independence versus unionism as the key modalities of Faroese
politics (Justinussen, 1999: 20). Public opinion is also liable to fairly radical changes of
opinion, indicative of fluidity and uncertainty: so, in a survey carried out in 1998, 43%
expressed themselves in favour of extended autonomy within the union and 27% were in
favour of total secession. 15% supported the existing home rule system and 10% wanted
closer relations with Denmark. In a similar survey in the following year (1999), a
staggering 50% were in favour of secession and 25% favoured an extension of autonomy
within the union. Only 3% wanted closer relations with Denmark and 13% were in favour
of the existing system (Thomas & Jákubsstovu, 2000).
What appeared to be a decisive step in the political process towards independence was
taken by the Faroese people on 30
th
April 1998, when voters elected a new Parliament
where the three parties which had called for a change in the political status quo with
Denmark received a majority of the votes. The coalition consisted of Fólkaflokkurin (the
People’s Party), Sjálvstyrisflokkurin (the Autonomists), and Tjóðveldisflokkurin (the
Republican Party) (Føroyskt Fullveldi, 11
th
June 2003). The Faroese government declared
the objective of sovereign status for the Islands (with Iceland as the obvious model). A
government-appointed committee drafted the ‘White Book’, a report about the Faroe
Islands in an international context, which was delivered in 1999 (Thomas & Jákubsstovu,
2000). A referendum was meant to be held on May 26
th
2001, but was cancelled due to
disagreements between the parties and the Danish government.
M. Ackrén
228
A key chapter in the ‘White Book’ looked to the future overseas representation of an
independent Faroese state, embodied in 6 embassies and 1 permanent mission:
Reykjavik: Embassy.
Oslo: Embassy, accredited to Moscow.
Copenhagen: Embassy, accredited to Stockholm, consular office in Helsinki.
London: Embassy, accredited to Dublin.
Washington: Embassy, accredited to Canada, Mexico and Central & South
American states.
Brussels: Embassy, accredited to all European states, except Norway, Russia, Great
Britain and Ireland; accredited to the European Union, OECD, WTO, NATO,
OSCE.
New York: Permanent Mission to the UN, accredited to Asian and African states
(Government of Faroes, 1999: 75-77; also Bartmann, 2006).
The democratic process towards independence was decided to encompass four stages: (1)
an agreement upon overall political objectives; (2) preparation of relevant reports and
discussion papers; (3) negotiations with the Danish authorities; and (4) a parliamentary
ratification and people’s referendum. The first two steps have been completed.
Negotiations between Faroese authorities and Danish authorities are ongoing. The
independence process outlined in the proposal establishes a timetable for the Faroe Islands
to assume responsibility for all areas still administered by Denmark under the Home Rule
Act, with the exception of those few areas deemed to be strictly connected to sovereignty.
This process should be completed according to a predetermined schedule by 1
st
January
2012 at the latest, after which sovereignty will be decided upon via a referendum (Føroyskt
Fullveldi, 11
th
June 2003).
Danish authorities are generally inclined to accept Faroese independence; but, at the same
time, they have made it clear to the Faroese government that independence would mean
that the economic support for the islands would disappear within a short period of time (4
years). The Faroese government, on the other hand, wants economic grants from
Copenhagen to be phased out over a 15-year period. An agreement on this issue has yet to
be reached (Jensen, 2003: 176-178).
The Faroe Islands: Options for Independence
229
In the latest elections of 2004, a coalition government between the Unionist Party, the
People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party was formed. Its aims are to form a broad
collaborative front in order to definitely settle the relationship between the Islands and
Denmark. Their goal is not independence, but a development towards more autonomy for
the Islands within a relationship with Denmark, maturing into either a freely associated
state or a federal form of government (Løgmannsskrivstovan, 19
th
January 2005).
Three Scenarios
The current situation will be further analyzed below through what current international
relations practices (and particularly those concerning metropolitan states and sub-national
island jurisdictions) suggest are the most likely three possible scenarios for the medium-
term future of the Faroes: independence, free association, or confederation (Baldacchino &
Milne, 2006). Each of these three scenarios will be first outlined through a theoretical
perspective; the specific case of the Faroes is then analyzed accordingly.
Independence or Full Sovereignty
The case of Iceland figures prominently in considering this option, since it has developed
into a fully sovereign state. The country shares the same history as the Faroese, since
Iceland has been a dependency belonging to Denmark.
In 1871, Iceland gained a special constitutional assembly, known as the National
Convention, where the Danish Government set out proposals for Iceland’s constitutional
status. The National Convention was dissolved without concluding its task to solve the
legal status of Iceland (Government of Faroes, 1999: 39, 49-50). Iceland did not acquire a
constitution until 1874. This gave Althingi (the Icelandic Parliament) legislative powers
together with the Danish crown: a special Ministry of Icelandic Affairs was established in
Denmark, with the Danish Minister of Justice taking up this role (ibid.: 52).
Executive power was subsequently transferred to Iceland by the Home Rule Act in 1904.
This provided the Minister of Icelandic Affairs with the responsibility for internal
governance and gave Althingi power to prosecute him for his/her actions in office (ibid.:
40-41). With the change of government in 1909, the principle of parliamentarianism was
established. According to this principle, no government can hold power without the active
or tacit support of a majority in the Althingi (Kristinsson, 2000: 143).
Iceland gained home rule under a bilateral treaty with Denmark in 1918. The treaty stated
that Denmark accepted Iceland as a sovereign state within its realm. The treaty had the
status of an interstate agreement and was therefore interpreted as an international treaty
(Larsen, 2002). However, even if Denmark had accepted Iceland as a sovereign country, it
still maintained responsibility over foreign policy (Larsen, 2002). 1930 was the millennium
celebration of the Althingi’s establishment: in that year, Iceland signed an international
M. Ackrén
230
agreement (with other Nordic countries) as an independent country for the first time
(Government of Faroes, 1999: 115). The special status that Iceland had during this period
could also be discerned in trade agreements, which Iceland set up with such countries as
Italy in 1936 (Larsen, 2002).
The development towards full sovereignty in Iceland was a step-by-step, incremental
affair. The major developments in a chronological order included: a consultative assembly,
legislative and budgetary powers, a domestic executive, sovereignty within a joint
kingdom and an Icelandic High Court (Kristinsson, 2000: 142-143). Under the Danish-
Icelandic Treaty of 1918, Iceland received the right to formulate its own foreign policy, but
the administration of foreign affairs remained in the hands of the Danish state. Iceland also
received the right to establish a high court, which was established in 1920 (Kristinsson,
2000: 146). The emergence of Iceland as a sovereign state in 1944 was also facilitated by
the circumstances of the Second World War. The British had occupied Iceland (as they did
the Faroes) and Denmark was under German occupation, so the links between the states
were interrupted. The timing for the declaration of full Icelandic independence was thus
fortuitous. Since Iceland already was accepted as a sovereign part of the Danish Kingdom,
it had all the characteristics of an independent state.
Free Association
The question of free association could be seen as a second option for the Faroe Islands.
The concept of “free association” was set forth in 1960 by the UN General Assembly.
There are two key elements of free association. The first is the right to determine one’s
constitution without outside interference; the second is the right by the associated territory
to modify its status, that is, to unilaterally opt out of a current situation in favour of
independence (Hannum, 1999).
A state in free association can be dissolved ‘freely’: meaning by either of the units acting
alone on prearranged terms established in the constituting document or treaty (Hannum &
Lillich, 1980: 888). In essence, associated states have all the powers and prerogatives of
sovereign independent states, except for those powers they unilaterally choose to delegate
to the principal government. The latter powers are typically just two: foreign affairs and
defence. A relationship of association in contemporary international law is characterized
by recognition of the significant subordination of, and delegation of competence by, one of
the parties (the associate) to the other (the principal), but with the maintenance of the
continuing international status of statehood of each component (Reisman & Keitner, 2001).
The most common indicators of integration into associated statehood refer to common
citizenship or nationality, common trade agreements or common currency agreements,
delegation of foreign affairs competence and subordination to the highest judicial instance
of the principal state (Reisman & Keitner, 2001). Associated states take part in the
international community. They might have concluded treaties and are associate members
The Faroe Islands: Options for Independence
231
of special agencies in the United Nations or other inter-governmental bodies. Free
association can provide a framework for a range of state relationships on the spectrum
between full independence and integration (Watts, 1999: 8; Elazar, 1987).
The classic examples of such an arrangement are the relationship between the Cook Islands
and Niue in relation to New Zealand. Both island jurisdictions are self-governing in all
internal affairs except for the overall defence and external matters, where New Zealand
today maintains an increasingly diminished responsibility. The residents of the islands
enjoy New Zealand citizenship (Watts, 1999: 8). The Cooks and Niue are not members of
the United Nations, though they are members of its agencies and other inter-governmental
bodies. They do sign treaties with other states on their own and they have independent
powers of legation as they send (or accredit) and receive representatives on their own with
sovereign states and other players with international legal personality like the EU. Since
1992, all legislative and executive powers, whether in the fields of defence, external affairs
or any other, are vested exclusively in the Government of the Cook Islands (Aldrich &
Connell, 1998: 54-55). The Cooks became a self-governing territory in 1965; they have a
constitutional right to independence (Watts, 1999; Aldrich & Connell, 1998: 54-55). Niue,
which is run under a similar system, was granted self-government in 1974.
Confederation
A confederation occurs where several pre-existing polities join together to form a common
government for certain limited purposes (such as foreign affairs, defence or economic
cooperation). The common government is dependent upon the constituent governments,
being composed of delegates from constituent governments, and therefore having only an
indirect electoral and fiscal base. Examples of confederations are the European Union, the
Benelux Countries, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (Watts, 1999: 8, 13).
The Netherlands Antilles (NA) is one example of a confederal system that could prove a
model to the eventual relationship between the Faroes and Denmark (with or without
Greenland involved). The NA (until now) consists of Curaçao, Bonaire, Saba, St. Maarten
and St. Eustatius as equal partners in relation to the Netherlands by the constitutional
Charter of 1954 (Premdas, 2006: 175). Both Suriname and Aruba opted out from the
confederation: the first secured independence in 1975; the second – formerly part of the
NA - gaining status aparte in 1986 (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2003).
The NA were a creature of the Statuut or Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
proclaimed in 1954. The Statuut defined the Kingdom as a voluntary relationship between
three equal and internally autonomous countries: the Netherlands, Suriname and the six
Caribbean islands forming the Netherlands Antilles. Oostindie (2006, passim) describes
the set-up as follows:
M. Ackrén
232
“As stated in the preamble of the Statuut, the three countries would ‘take care of
their own interests autonomously, manage communal affairs on an equal footing,
and accord each other assistance’. The Charter defined foreign policy, defence,
citizenship, and the safeguarding of proper governmental administration as matters
of common interest to be governed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This
Kingdom government was simply delineated as the ruling Dutch cabinet, expanded
to include one plenipotentiary minister for each of the two Caribbean territories ...
The Statute rests on notions of ‘equality’ and ‘reciprocal assistance’ which, because
of the asymmetrical balance of power, are totally fictitious ... As the Charter itself
posits, no change whatsoever can be implemented unless all partners agree.”
Following various referenda in recent years, all the NA islands have rejected independence
(ibid.: 220-21); but the NA is now likely to be dismantled and each constituent island will
secure, like Aruba in 1986, a direct relationship (status aparte) with Amsterdam, leading to
the break-up of the NA. The Dutch government is likely to remain responsible only for the
defence and foreign affairs of each of its ‘dependencies’; otherwise, each island will
manage and be responsible for its own internal affairs (Oostindie, 2006).
The Case of the Faroe Islands
What are the prospects for a change in the status of the Faroe Islands in relation to either of
these three routes?
Independence or Full Sovereignty
The Faroe Islands could exercise a formal right to independence. According to the Danish
constitution, it is possible for the Danish government to conclude treaties diminishing the
territory of the realm, and such treaties only require the acceptance of the National
Parliament to be ratified (Hannum, 1999). The Home Rule Acts can be changed only with
the consent of, and after negotiations with, the home rule authorities. At the same time, one
could say that the powers of the home rule authorities are delegated by the Danish
legislature, and they could therefore be replaced by the same authority that delegated them
(Lyck, 1996a: 124). According to a legal standpoint, it is possible for the Faroe Islands to
achieve independence, if Denmark is willing to acquiesce.
Home Rule already provides broad competences in internal affairs and it is also possible
for the Home Rule Government to take part in international negotiations with other states.
The Faroe Islands are a permanent member of the Nordic Council and have free trade
agreements with the European Union; they also take part in the International Maritime
Organization as an associate member; and they are members of the Nordic Investment
Bank (Lyck, 1996b: 138). This situation could be compared with Iceland in 1918-1944,
The Faroe Islands: Options for Independence
233
where Iceland took part in international relations as a sovereign entity, even before it
secured full political independence.
Recent developments show more international involvement since the Faroes have signed
an agreement with Iceland 31
st
August 2005 on a common market between the areas.
Another agreement has been struck between the Faroes and Russia concerning customs
duty on goods. Negotiations for membership in EFTA (European Free Trade Association)
are also underway (Løgmansskrivstovan, 8
th
June 2006). These developments show that
the Faroe Islands are already acting like a fully-fledged state.
Free Association
There are three key areas in which expanded powers might be sought to establish free
association with Denmark from a Faroese perspective.
First, the ability to adopt Home Rule Acts or laws independently would be a development
towards more independent power of legislation without interference from Copenhagen.
This would require a more formal recognition of the legal validity of Home Rule
Acts/laws, as well as judicial means of determining whether or not Home Rule Acts/laws
are within Faroese legislative competence (Hannum, 1999).
Another factor is to establish an own, self-contained administration of justice. At the
moment, all cases in the Faroe Islands may be heard in the first instance with a ’Board of
Complaint’ instead of a fully-fledged court (À Rógvi, 2002: 24-25). However, decisions
currently reached by the Faroese High Court in appeal cases may be brought before the
Danish Supreme Court. Meanwhile, discussions with a view to the establishment of
Faroese courts are ongoing (Justitsministeriet, Lovafdelningen, 31
st
March 2005). Under
free association, this right of appeal may be withdrawn and the Faroese would then be
subjected solely to Faroese law. The future lower courts’ competence would extend to any
matters that fall within Faroese legislative competence and might be subjected solely to
Faroese law (Hannum, 1999). This could be compared to Iceland, which gained a High
Court as early as 1920.
A third area of possible expansion of Faroese authority is foreign affairs. Membership in
many international organizations is limited to independent states, and even with a broad
autonomy, the Faroes would not qualify to join, say, the United Nations. However, the
Faroes do enjoy a basic framework of overseas representation, including an office in
London which is officially part of the Danish Enbassy (www.faroeislands.org.uk/
). Such
an arrangement is in keeping with the Danish practice of providing means and channels for
Faroese representatives to speak directly to third parties on issues of importance to the
Faroes (Olafsson, 2000: 127-29). There are also costs associated with maintaining foreign
missions. Here, a mutually agreed relationship with Denmark may be sought (Hannum,
1999). Greater control over currency and the banking system should also be pursued.
M. Ackrén
234
Better communication between Faroese and Danish authorities, as well as closer
monitoring of the economic situation, would seem to be a promising path of reform
(Hannum, 1999).
The Faroe Islands are quite near a free association status or associated statehood, since the
Islands have the possibility to secede from Denmark and have full responsibility over
internal affairs. More and more responsibilities are distributed to the Islands. As with the
case of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba in relation to The Hague, the Faroe Islands
could be seen as an example of Aruba in this sense to be able to reach a status aparte for a
transitional phase – whether this leads to outright independence or not.
Confederation
The Faroe Islands are currently in a union with Denmark, consisting of three parties: the
Faroe Islands, Greenland and Denmark. One could argue that the two peripheral island
regions are in an asymmetrical relationship with Denmark, since Denmark maintains
overall power, whereas the island regions have approximately the same functions in
relation to each other.
The Danish Home Rule model grants specific rights and powers to the population living in
a specific territory. It is not primarily based on ethnicity but is the type of model in which
rights are transferred via delegation to the population in a specific territory (Lyck, 1996a;
1996b).
A Faroese is understood to mean a person who is a citizen or a national of Denmark and
resident of the Faroe Islands. The right of voting and eligibility for institutions of the
Faroese government may, however, be made conditional on the person concerned being a
Faroese. No Faroese citizen is obliged to serve in the Danish army (Dam, 1996). This
could be compared to the situation in the Åland Islands, which are totally demilitarized;
Ålanders can serve in the Finnish army; but only should they volunteer to do so.
There are two dimensions of the Home Rule Act: one deals with the possible areas of
competence to be transferred; the other being the economic principle that all areas taken
over should be financed by the Faroese. List A
handles the special Faroese affairs and List
B deals with areas that might be transferred after negotiations (Mørkøre, 1996).
If the Faroe Islands were to mutate into the members of a confederative troika, a new self-
government act would need to be drafted, and would need to remain in accordance with
what one may call “the Danish Home Rule” within the European Union
(Løgmansskrivstovan, 2005). A confederation would be possible if all three parties decided
to have a confederation, where for example, foreign affairs, defence and economical issues
were mutually agreed upon.
The Faroe Islands: Options for Independence
235
A Fourth Scenario?
There is actually a fourth constitutional option that may be entertained for and by the Faroe
Islands in the near future: that of a federation. Such a step would, however, be far more
complex in nature than any of the other three options considered in this paper. The whole
Danish constitution should then go under revision. It is not a realistic option, while the
union already is a loose construction. Denmark may not be interested to reform the
government structure in such a radical way. Denmark has a decentralized system of
government according to the Nordic model and the municipalities hold strong powers, so
another level of government would be superfluous and cumbersome in Danish eyes. It
would also complicate relations with the European Union.
Demands for a revision of the Danish constitution are raised intermittently within
Denmark. In recent years, a widespread consensus has grown that changes in society over
the past 50 years justify a constitutional revision (e.g. State of Denmark, 2003). This might
include the codification of changes in parliamentary and governmental practices enacted
since 1953 (the last time the Danish Constitution was amended), and the inclusion of
guidelines for handling internal ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, as well as a
formalised adherence to principles of human rights (The Economist, Country Briefings,
2005). If such a revision were on the political agenda, then one could imagine that both the
Faroes and Greenland would have an interest in being involved in any revision process to
meet their goals and ensure that their specific interests are safeguarded.
Conclusion
If we look at the notion of a state according to Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo
Convention, the Faroe Islands fulfil all four basic criteria: The Faroe Islands have a
permanent population (currently of about 47,000); the territory is separate from Denmark
and, as a distinct island archipelago, is very well defined; there is an own government with
both legislative and administrative capacities; and the islands enjoy formal international
relations with other states. Admittedly, the Faroe Islands lack full responsibility over
international affairs, as long as Denmark is responsible for the islands’ security and
defence.
The Faroes are considering different options with regards to the terms of their current
union with Denmark. There appear to be all necessary grounds to enable the Faroe Islands
to move to becoming an independent state, should there be the political will to do so. The
political will should, of course, be the outcome of a mutual agreement between the Faroes
and Denmark; otherwise, the situation would not be realistic.
The support in the Løgting (the Faroese Parliament) for the different options remains
divided into two main blocs; one for independence and one for confederation. In the
current political line-up, 15 out of 32 members of the Løgting support independence, while
M. Ackrén
236
14 members support the confederation option. The remaining 3 occupy a fuzzy middle
ground, and could be said to support the free association option (Løgting, 8
th
June 2006).
In the long run, the Faroes might secure independence; but the islands are certainly in no
hurry to do so. Moreover, new elections and resulting new coalitions could usher in a
different approach to Faroese politics, and developments could take different turns.
For the time being, the autonomy of the Faroe Islands continues in a state of flux, and
subject to negotiation. The most likely outcome appears to be an increase over current
levels of ‘self-rule’, but the actual format that this would take remains uncertain for the
moment. The most plausible scenario remains, however, not that of full sovereignty (as in
the case of Iceland) but that of an eventual statehood “in free association” with Denmark,
just like Niue and the Cook Islands are in relation to New Zealand.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Dag Anckar, Lauri Karvonen (Åbo Akademi University, Finland), Barry
Bartmann (University of Prince Edward Island, Canada), other colleagues and anonymous
reviewers for useful comments and constructive criticism on earlier drafts of this article.
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