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THENARRATIVESELF
Story as
the
of the Self
LIFEISANACTIVITYANDPASSIONIN
SEARCHOFANARRATIVE
basis
Tel: 09-377-6270. P.O Box, 47-781, Ponsonby, Auckland. Email; cafephilosphy@xtra.co.nz — www.cafephilosophy.co.nz
2
“All the world's a stage
and all the men and
women merely players.”
-Shakespeare
I wonder if anyone else is haunted by
the thought that if their life was made
into a movie, it would get bad reviews.
People often complain that their lives
are dull, boring or just plain ordinary.
Some decide to fight against this fate
by making every moment count,
embarking on adventures like base
jumping, big wave surfing, risky
entrepreneurship or war.
But perhaps movies and books are just
an escape, and they must by necessity
be larger than life. It’s one thing to
make believe from the comfort of your
living room sofa, but how many of us
would really want to be Jason Bourne? I
wonder if most people would prefer to
have interesting tales to tell or just eke
out a comfortable, quiet, non-eventful
existence. Nietzsche’s famous dilemma
confronts us with the terror of having
regrets: Could you handle living your
life over and over again the same way?
Every second? We’ve probably all come
across the wizened old man who says ‘I
wouldn’t change a thing’. Life, despite
being full of heartbreak and hangovers,
taught them valuable lessons which
‘made me the person I am’.
The great mythologist Joseph Campbell,
whose works influenced George Lucas,
thought that myths and stories run
through every part of our lives. The
modern world has not abolished myths,
but merely tells the same old stories in
different ways. These stories, says
Campbell, are so embedded in human
consciousness that they can give us
fascinating insights into our own life
journey. A culture without myth or story
is no culture at all.
This issue focuses on the idea that
stories form the basis of the self, an
idea often connected with
‘postmodernism’. Postmodernism is often
said to be an attitude in which any
overarching theory of life is just another
big story or ‘grand narrative’ which
grows bigger and seemingly more real
as it is perpetually told and re-told.
This may at first seem to be
empowering to the individual, for we
can all tell our own story. But it could
also undercut the very basis for genuine
individuality, if the conception of ‘self’
is just another weaving together of
narrative.
An awful lot hangs on this notion of a
self. For if there is no “I”, then who is to
blame for any of “my” actions? Who
can be applauded? Few would go to
the extreme of saying that no selves
exist, but there is a tendency in
postmodern circles to look at the self as
something constructed, imagined,
conveniently assembled from mental
processes. This runs against the grain of
normal, everyday thinking. If there is
anything that “I” know, thunders
conventional wisdom, it is that “I” exist.
But what is this “I” and where is it
located?
Many people are uncomfortable with
delving too deep in to the nature of the
self. Too many comfortable assumptions
may be dangerously overturned in
the process. Perhaps the real self
lies buried deep under numerous
layers of pseudo-self: labels, ideas
and memories which conceal and
confine who we truly are. Or
maybe once these layers are
peeled away we’d find nothing at
all, that the self is only a bundle of
ever-changing thoughts, feelings,
perceptions and so on.
The idea of the narrative self is not
without its own strange dilemmas. Is
a life without an independent,
detached self like a story without a
narrator? And if there is no
narrator, then who is telling the
story? And for whom is the story
being told? Without an audience to
monitor our life around the clock,
the answer seems to be ‘me’. But
this puts the self in a peculiar
position, because it seems to be
both the watcher of the play and
its main participant. Such
considerations are puzzling to say
the least.
Putting these paradoxes aside, the
idea of ‘life as narrative’ should
perhaps make us look at our own
experience with a lighter touch. I
don’t think it means turning
everything into a Hollywood
drama, but bringing a sense of the
transcendent into our everyday
existence. A common theme in
stories is to find wonder in
‘ordinary’ things. Stories may also
give us an appreciation for how
unfortunate events can turn out to
be for the best. No matter how
fictitiously absurd our circumstances,
as a character in an epic and
mysterious drama we can make life
playful, humorous and perhaps
even meaningful.
What’s Your
Story?
By Tom McGuire
Café Philosophy Oct/Nov 2011—The Narrative Self
3
To Thine Own Self be True’
William Shakespeare
But what did Shakespeare mean he wrote these words? He seems to imply
that we have a permanent self, something to which we should always be
faithful. In a recent article in the Economist, Will Wilkinson commented that
he believed that “the sense of the self is an evolutionary construction with a
certain social function.” he enlarged upon this by then saying, “ so we build a
sense of self upon the shared moral ideology of our local culture.” Is this a
true interpretation of Shakespeare’s words. We decided to ask some
philosophically minded Auckland café patrons and find out what they thought
about it.
First we went to the ‘Shaky Isles Café’ in Quay Street and met Victoria and
Clare. Victoria (left) said she believed she was not only a physical body but
also a self. She mentioned personal values as a justification for believing in a
self and said she always acted in accordance with those values, adding that
they made her feel more of an individual. Clare (right) was also sure she had
a self and mentioned that people are all different, not the same, and
considered this as proof that individual selves existed. In summary they both
believed that being different from others was attributable to one’s own
individual self.
Philosophy in a Cafe
4
Don Quixote and The Narrative Self
Stefán Snaevarr, an Icelandic philosopher asks,
are our identities created by narratives?
Once upon a time a philosopher
wrote an article called ‘Don
Quixote and The Narrative Self’.
He commenced by saying: In this
essay, I will discuss the question of
whether our selves are constituted
by narratives, ie stories.
Are we like Don Quixote, whose
self was created by his reading of
medieval romances: are we Homo
quixotienses, the narrative self?
Or are we rather like the
protagonist of Sartre’s novel
Nausea, Antonin Roquentin,
whose life did not form any
narrative unity? Are we in other
words rather Homo
roquentinenses?
The idea that our life is a story is
by no means new. Thus the great
bard Shakespeare said that life
“...is a tale told by an idiot, full of
sound and fury, signifying
nothing.” (Macbeth) However, it
took philosophers some time to
discover the philosophical import
of this view of life. It was actually a
German philosopher; Wilhelm
Schapp (1884-1965) who first gave
this age-old idea a philosophical
twist. He maintained that we live
our lives in a host of stories, which
have connection with the stories of
other people in various ways; so
actually, our selves are nothing but
cross-sections of stories. Our
identities are created by a vast web
of stories, as is our relationship
with reality. We understand and
identify things by placing them in
the stories we tell about them: just
like selves, things do not really
exist outside of stories. We are
caught in this narrative web
because we cannot exist outside of
it. There is a world-wide web of
stories: the world is that web.
Schapp’s main book was
published fifty years ago, and was
ignored by the philosophical
community of the day. But in
recent years, ideas resembling
those of Schapp’s have become
increasingly influential. What I
call narrativism, the view that we
are Homo quixotienses, is
becoming quite popular.
What could explain this change in
the intellectual climate? I think
that one of the things which
brought about this pro-narrativist
change is the downfall of
modernism in literature.
Modernists such as French writer
Alain Robbe-Grillet wanted to do
away with ordinary storytelling.
Ordinary stories were regarded as
superficial and without any power
to show the real nature of human
life. Human life is simply not like
a narrative, the modernists
thought. This anti-narrativism had
its heyday when Schapp was
writing his books, so no wonder
he was ignored. Then in the
Sixties post-modernism arrived on
the scene and telling stories in
novels became all the rage again.
Great storytellers like Gabriel
Garcia Marquez were the darling
of the literati. Believing in the
redeeming quality of stories is now
in vogue. Every day someone
publishes a book telling you how
you can become rich/
famous/happy/popular by telling
stories.
My aim in the remains of this
article is more modest. I want to
introduce to you the thought of
two celebrated narrativists. Both
have developed influential
conceptions of our identities as
being structured by stories. The
first one is Scottish philosopher
Alasdair MacIntyre; the second is
the French thinker Paul Ricoeur.
Like so many modern
philosophers, MacIntyre’s starting
point is the analysis of language.
He says that our utterances are not
really understandable unless we
can place them in narrative
contexts. Imagine that we are
waiting for a bus for instance, and
a woman next to us all of a sudden
says, “The name of the common
wild duck is Histrionicus,
histrionicus histrionicus.” To be
certain, we understand the
meaning of the sentence uttered:
the problem is to understand the
5
point of her uttering it. Suppose that the
woman utters sentences like this at
random intervals, in which case this
would probably be a form of madness.
But her uttering of the above sentence
would be rendered intelligible if for
instance we found out that she has
mistaken me for a person who
approached her in the library some days
ago and asked her for the Latin name of
the wild duck. We would also
understand her action if we discovered
she mistakenly thought I was her co-spy
and she was uttering a code sentence to
be decoded by me. In each case her act
of uttering only becomes understandable
by being put in a narrative context. The
same holds for utterances in general.
Similarly, MacIntyre maintains that
personal identities must have a narrative
structure. Our actions are episodes in
stories, not least in our own personal
stories. As the above example illustrates,
any action cannot be given an identity
unless it is placed within an agent’s
biography. Further, MacIntyre says that
even if we can theoretically doubt the
unity of our personality – doubt that we
are the same persons today as we were
ten years (or ten seconds!) ago – other
people do not doubt this unity. We can
for instance be held responsible for
actions we did a decade ago. This can
only happen because others regard us as
having a narrative totality. MacIntyre
uses an example inspired by Alexandre
Dumas’ famous novel The Count of
Monte Christo. Its protagonist is in a
certain context described as “the
prisoner of Chateau d’If” and in another
context “the Count of Monte Christo.”
To understand that we are talking about
the same person only means that we can
recount a story about how this person
can under different circumstances be
characterised in two completely different
ways. In this fashion, a person’s identity
is precisely the same type of identity
presupposed of a character in a novel or
a play. This unity is in turn a function of
the unity of the narrative. Thus persons
are abstractions from narratives. At the
same time, MacIntyre emphasises that
the concept of personal identity is
not only logically dependent upon
the concept of a narrative, but it’s
also the other way round. In other
words it is meaningless to talk
about a character biography
unless one presupposes that its
subject has a personal identity.
The biography must be about a
continually-existing thing.
Conversely, it is pointless,
meaningless, to state that some
being has a personal identity
through time, and at the same
time deny that this being has a
possible biography.
To my mind, MacIntyre’s
analysis suffers from some
significant unclarities. He ought
to clarify whether or not he thinks
our actions as such are in some
way narratives themselves. If not,
can they only be identified by
means of narratives, even they are
not stories themselves? It seems to
me that he opts for this option,
but I cannot be sure unless he
clarifies the issue.
Secondly, our Scottish thinker
relies too heavily on ordinary,
common-sense conceptions of
action and identity, and on the
particular examples he gives. I
feel there is a lack of
systematicness in his theories
about actions and identities; his
approach is too intuitive. This
same holds for his idea of our
lives being stories. But I do agree
with his contention that actions
are basically narratively structured
and described.
Paul Ricoeur
Like MacIntyre, Ricoeur thinks
that our actions have a narrative
dimension. We fuse the temporal
units of our actions together in the
same way as in a story. But in
contrast to the Scottish
philosopher, French philosopher
Paul Ricoeur emphasises the
difference between life and
stories. Our lives are not
narratives, strictly speaking.
Stories are told, lives are lived.
But narratives still play a
decisive part in our lives.
In the first place, an examined
life is a life that must be
examined through stories. We
relate to ourselves by relating
stories! Secondly, narratives
play an important role in the
creation and sustaining of our
identities. Narratives do that by
mediating between two basic
aspects of our identities. On the
one hand, we can talk about
our identity as idem, or
sameness, or on the other hand
as ipse, or selfhood. Idem is the
simple identity of a person as a
thing in time and space. Ipse is
the being of self, ie the being of
someone who can relate to
himself and has a history which
he or she can consciously reflect
upon. Idem provides us with
answer to the question ‘What
am I?’ ipse the answer to the
question ‘Who am I?’
Idem can be divided in two sub-
types of identities. One is
numerical identity: my body is
exactly what it is and not
another body. The other type is
a qualitative identity of the kind
we refer to when we say that
two ladies have the same dress
on. The dresses are identical in
6
the sense of being exchangeable; they
have exactly the same qualities.
Seemingly, the idem is partly the
identity of the body, such that I can
be said to have the same body I had
as a new-born baby, even though I
had not developed a self, an ipse, at
that time. Similarly, a person who
has lost his/her self due to
Alzheimer’s disease might be
considered the same as before in the
idem sense of the word, even though
he or she in some sense has lost his
or her personhood.
Ipse (selfhood), is on the one hand
the type of identity we can have as
characters, not least as characters in
stories. On the other hand, the
identity of selfhood is the identity of
the one who keeps his/her promises,
for example. This latter part of the
self is the voluntary side of it. We
can choose whether or not to keep
promises. Furthermore, we create
parts of our selves by keeping or not
keeping promises. By such acts we
create our selves as ‘reliable’ or
‘unreliable’ persons. In contrast to
this, we cannot choose the character
we play. We cannot choose our
talents or temperament. The one
who plays the role of the dim-witted
guy remains stupid.
There is a dialectical tension between
idem and ipse. The reason is that it
makes sense to talk about ipse even
though the person changes quite a
bit; at the same time the idem
demands consistency: we want to say
we are talking about the same thing.
How can it be that we have certain
permanence through time while
changing all the time? It is narrative
which solves this problem: it
mediates between idem and ipse.
In all narratives there is both
permanence and change – in
Ricoeur’s vocabulary ‘concordance’
and ‘discordance’; the latter being
unexpected events which disturb the
sense of permanence. A story
manages nevertheless to unite
permanence and change.
Analogously, it unites idem and its
concordance, with ipse and its
tendency towards discordance. It is
a question of a synthesis of
heterogeneous elements.
To understand this we must take a
brief glance at Ricoeur’s theory
about the general function of
narratives. Narratives, or more
precisely plots, synthesise reality. A
plot fuses together intentions,
causal relations, and chance
occurrences in a unified sequence
of actions and events. Ricoeur
seems to think that the plot creates
a unified pattern in a chaotic series
of events, ties them together,
making them meaningful wholes.
Thus, through the lens of the story
we see things in a particular way,
just as we can see the Jastrow
figure as a duck, given a certain
perspective. Another narrative
could presumably give a rabbit
perspective on things.
‘Plot’ plays an important role in
creating the permanent aspects of
human character. Just as in
Ricoeur’s scheme plot plays a
constructive role for narratives,
creating their permanent aspect,
mutatis mutandis the same holds
for human character. But despite
unifying plots, narrative identities
change all the time. They are not
closed and static, but demand
openness and freedom. In
Ricoeur’s own words,
“Life is an activity and passion in
search of a narrative.” (‘Life in
Quest of Narrative’)
The self is not given; it is
something that must be created. It
must also be appropriated in
communication with others and
with the aid of stories: narratives
can help make our lives
meaningful. It seems that Ricoeur
thinks that this meaningfulness is
an essential part of the self.
The problem with Ricoeur’s
theories is first and foremost his
unclear, Continental way of
expressing himself and the similarly
Continental lack of examples and
definitions. Further, I do not
understand why narratives are
needed to bridge the gap between
idem and ipse. It seems to me that
ipse (selfhood) is both permanent
and changeable at the same time, in
contrast to the idem, which is all
permanence. This suggests that the
idea of idem is superfluous, unless
it is regarded solely as the
permanence of the body (but it does
seem that by ‘idem’ Ricoeur means
something more than just bodily
permanence). The ipse already
contains the moment of
permanence, ascribed to the idem.
Maybe our French thinker ought to
just do away with the concept of
the idem. The narrative still has
work to do, not in mediating
between the idem and the ipse, but
in mediating between the
discordant and concordant
moments of the ipse.
Despite this minor quibble,
Ricoeur’s thinking is extremely
inspiring. He manages to show that
narratives play an essential role in
the constitution of our selves,
without succumbing to the dogma
of life itself being a story.
Conclusion
Who has not read The Arabian
Nights? Who does not remember
the cunning princess Scheherazade,
who saved her life by telling the
Sultan excellent tales? She had to
go on recounting stories in order to
evade death; similarly we must go
on narrating in order to stay who
we are. Thus, if Scheherazade is
our mother, Don Quixote is our
father, and we are narrative beings.
Homo sapiens is indeed Homo
quixotiensis.
© Stefán Snaevarr 2007
Stefán Snaevarr is an Icelandic
writer and a professor of
philosophy at Lillehammer
University College, Norway.
7
Sensation
Through blue summer nights I will pass along paths,
Pricked by wheat, trampling short grass:
Dreaming, I will feel coolness underfoot,
Will let breezes bathe my bare head.
Not a word, not a thought:
Boundless love will surge through my soul,
And I will wander far away, a vagabond
In Nature - as happily as with a woman.
A Poem by Arthur Rimbaud written in March 1870
8
Ideology and the self
JOSHUA KNOBE, a pioneer in the
field of "experimental philosophy" at
Yale University has contributed a
fascinating piece to the New York
Times' online philosophy forum on
the intuitions of ordinary folk about
what constitutes the "true self"
So what has this to do with politics?
A great deal, it seems. Mr Knobe and
his colleagues, the psychologists
George Newman and Paul Bloom,
suspected that intuitions about the
true self largely reflect prior
ideological commitments. So they
concocted scenarios designed to
elicit different judgments from
conservative and liberal subjects.
Their "conservative items" describe a
person changing in a way one would
expect conservatives to approve of.
Their example:
“Jim used to be homosexual. However,
now Jim is married to a woman and
no longer has sex with men.”
How much do you agree with the
following statement?
At his very essence, there was always
something deep within Jim, calling
him to stop having sex with men, and
then this true self emerged.”
Likewise the liberal items, such as:
“Ralph used to make a lot of money
and prioritized his financial success
above all else. However, now Ralph
works in a job where he does not
make a lot of money and benefits
others.”
How much do you agree with the
following statement?
At his very essence, there was always
something deep within Ralph, calling
him to stop prioritizing his financial
success above all else, and then this
true self emerged.”
The results?
The results showed a systematic
connection between people’s own
values and their judgments about the
true self. Conservative participants
were more inclined to say that the
person’s true self had emerged on
the conservative items, while liberals
were more inclined to say that the
person’s true self had emerged on
the liberal items.”
This shows just how thoroughly
ideological we are. Our broadly
political commitments reverberate
even in our judgments about the
metaphysics of the self. The authentic
self is the ideologically-validated self.
This may help explain the widespread
tendency to see those with whom we
fundamentally disagree as victims of
"false consciousness". We cannot
help but suspect that they are in the
grip of some kind of illusion, while
we are clear-eyed and at home in the
world as it is. Our ideological
opposites are not only at war with
truth, but alienated from their true
selves. For conservatives, liberals who
convert to conservatism have finally
mastered their pathetic, craven
yearning for "establishment"
approval, summoned the courage to
embrace the plain truth and declaim
the corrosive, pretty lies of liberalism,
opening up the possibility of a life
happily in sync with the laws of
nature, God and country. For liberals,
conservatives who convert to
liberalism have overcome hateful
prejudice and tapped into the
essentially human compassion and
instinct for justice that allows us
finally to acknowledge and lament
our past complicity in maintaining
the superstructure of privilege and
exploitation entailed by the free-
market, limited-government "ideal".
And when our ideological comrades
defect, they are lost not only to us,
but to themselves.
My own view is that the sense of a
stable self is an evolutionary
construction with a certain social
function, which our intuitions about
authenticity reflect. The primary
human means of survival is social
cooperation. But cooperation is
fragile. We need to trust one another
to follow through, to not take
advantage. Coordinating on a
common moral ideology facilitates
cooperation, but only if we all stick to
it. We cannot make others trust that
we will stick to it if we cannot trust
ourselves not to opportunistically
change our stripes. So we build a
sense of self upon the shared moral
ideology of our local culture. We
come to feel that to betray these
values would be to betray the
essential self. To prize integrity is to
fear disintegration. To violate our
constitutive values is to risk falling
apart. This fear of falling apart—of
losing one's self, of standing for
nothing—prods us to keep our oaths,
to pull our weight, and thus to be
truly trustworthy, even when it would
be to our advantage, in some sense,
to cheat. So the sense of self enables
social cooperation. But what matters
most is not so much the content of
our moral ideology, but simply that
we all stay pretty much the same
over time, so that we can continue to
trust ourselves and one another. This
is not to say that the values upon
which we build stable, cooperation-
enabling senses of self can be
anything at all. But anything that
works works, and probably there are
many moral ideologies that work
reasonably well.
It's not really true, despite our fears,
that we will be lost to ourselves if we
forsake our defining values. And it is
not really true that when others
forsake their old defining values for
ours, they become more fully what
they are. Still, as Mr Knobe and his
colleagues show, we tend to think it
is. By Will Willkinson
9
call that of identity or sameness.
We also have a distinct idea of
several different objects existing
in succession, and connected
together by a close relation: and
this to an accurate view affords
as perfect a notion of diversity,
as if there was no manner of
relation among the objects. But
tho' these two ideas of identity,
and a succession of related
objects be in themselves
perfectly distinct, and even
contrary, yet 'tis certain, that in
our common way of thinking they
are generally confounded with
each other.” (Hume 1896: 253).
If Hume's diagnosis is accepted,
it will readily be seen that a
narrative connecting a diversity
of events will easily lead to the
generation of an ideal object
(e.g. a historical event) whose
identity is the product of narrative
configuration. Both narratives
and selves seem to be among
the clearest instances of the
general principle which
generates the identity of ideal
objects--even if the principle itself
is questioned as a basis for the
generation of all manner of ideal
objects.
The identity we ascribe depends,
as usual in Hume, on habit as
much as on direct experience:
certainly, "where the changes
are at last observ'd to become
considerable, we make a scruple
of ascribing identity to such
different objects" (1896: 257).
But if identity is created by the
"uninterrrupted progress of the
thought" (1896: 256)--then any
interruption of the thought will
also interrupt the unproblematic
ascription of identity. Therefore,
we might add, debate over
identities which questions
received notions and mental
habits can seriously shake the
means whereby identities are
usually conveyed--or constituted.
One more interesting aspect of
Hume's conception is that
identity is ascribed by the
observer, it is not inherent in the
associated things themselves.
(1896: 260). Actually, personal
identity seems to require for
Hume a reflective dimension, as
it is ascribed by the self-
observer, in his reflective
capacity, not by the spontaneous
connection of ideas in the mind.
Identity is cemented by
repetition, by semiotic doubling,
whether in the form of reflection,
or in the form of memory:
“the memory not only discovers
the identity, but also contributes
to its production, by producing
the relation of resemblance
among the perceptions. . . . As
memory alone acquaints us with
the continuance and extent of
this succession of perceptions,
'tis to be consider'd, upon that
account chiefly, as the source of
personal identity.” (Hume 1896:
261)
The fluid concept of the self
which rears its head in Hume's
conception finds a decidedly
modern formulation in the work
of Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the
self is not a substance, but a
becoming, a construction, which
turns back on itself to know and
remake itself indirectly through
signs and symbols of self-
interpretation (Polkinghorne
1988: 154). Less spectacularly
Narrative and Identity by
José Ángel García
I
dentity and narrative agree well
from a broadly Heideggerian
perspective which argues the
constitution of being through
language. We could in fact go as far
back as the ancient Greek
philosopher, Parmenides if we find
that a more general identification of
being and thought is relevant to the
subject, but one can easily get lost
within such broad ascriptions
especially when their relevance to
narrative and identity is only implicit.
Consequently I will concentrate on a
line of thought which is more
congenial to me, and one which I
think is a more immediately relevant
classical locus to ground any
relationship between self-identity
and narrative. I am referring to
Hume's assumption that our sense
of self is constituted through our
associations of ideas, as an effect of
memory. Narrative, though not
explicitly mentioned by Hume, is
certainly one basic instrument in
associating memories and providing
a sense of identity. Hume's
discussion of personal identity
begins with a more general
reflection on the concepts of identity
and diversity:
“We have a distinct idea of an
object, that remains invariable and
uninterrupted thro' a suppos'd
variation of time; and this idea we
10
perhaps than in Nietzsche, the modern
self as theorized by the existentialists
and by hermeneutic social science after
Heidegger and Paul Ricoeur, is a self
which has a narrative dimension as an
essential constituent. To quote Donald
Polkinghorne,
“human beings exist in three realms--
the material realm, the organic realm,
and the realm of meaning. The realm of
meaning is structured according to
linguistic forms, and one of the most
important forms for creating meaning in
human existence is the narrative.
“(Polkinghorne 1988: 183)
From the point of view of hermeneutic
psychology, the self is a product of
action and of representation, with
narratives of the self as a major
representational and structuring
principle. In this sense reality is
interwoven with narrative fictions.
Ricoeur's analysis of temporal
configurations in Time and Narrative, of
the interpenetration of history and fiction
in any narrative representation, is
perhaps the major contemporary
theoretical statement in this line of
thought.
In Narrative and the Self, Anthony Paul
Kerby notes that the implications of
narrative hermeneutics are equally
relevant for historiography, literary
theory and psychology:
“The stories we tell of ourselves are
determined not only by how other
people narrate us but also by our
languages and the genres of storytelling
inherited from our traditions.” ( Kerby
1991: 6)
Self-narration is an interpretive activity:
the meaning of the subject's past is
refigured in the present: "our conscious
narratives inevitably refigure and
augment the pre-narrative level of
experience" (Kerby 9). For thinkers like
Alasdair MacIntyre and Hannah Arendt,
self-understanding involves the
employment of one's experiences: we
are "storytelling animals" (MacIntyre
1981, quoted in Kerby 1991: 12). As I
argued in my discussion of Hume, there
is a link between access to
memory and employment (cf.
also Kerby 28). The narrative
structuration of memories
generates our understanding of
the past. There is no definite
meaning of the past, as we
cannot escape "the historicity of
our gaze and our interests." For
Kerby, "our talk of the self is self-
constituting rather than
referential to an ontologically
prior subject. . . . The meaning
of a life can be adequately
grasped only in a narrative or
story-like framework" (Kerby 31,
33). The distance noted by
analysts of the novel between
the experiencing self and the
narrating self is essential for the
study of subjectivity at large
(Kerby 38).
Narrative is a cognitive
instrument which conveys social
articulations of identity. Each act
of communication involves to a
greater or lesser extent an act of
interpretation and
reconfiguration. Narrative
patterns, therefore, are
communicated, but they are also
transformed in their application
to specific instances. This is all
the more the case when the
narratives are self-reflective,
deliberately experimental. If
narrative is configuration of
meaning and time, complex
configurations such as are
developed by artistic narrative
are essential models and
prototypes for creative social
communication.
José Ángel GARCíA LANDA
is a Senior lecturer in English
at the University of Zaragoza
(Spain) For a full reading of
this paper please refer to this
link;
http://www.unizar.es/departa
mentos/filologia_inglesa/garci
ala/publicaciones/commintern
.html
The paper appeared in a
collective volume,
Interculturalism:
Between Identity and
Diversity. Ed. Beatriz
Penas Ibáñez and Mª
Carmen López Sáenz.
Bern: Peter Lang, 2006.
207-26.
References:
Hume, David. 1896. A
Treatise of Human
Nature. Ed. L. A. Selby-
Bigge. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Polkinghorne, Donald.
1988. Narrative Knowing
and the Human
Sciences. (SUNY Series
in Philosophy of the
Social Sciences). Albany
(NY): SUNY Press.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1984,
1986, 1988. Time and
Narrative. 3 vols. Trans.
Kathleen McLaughlin-
Blamey and David
Pellauer. Chicago: U of
Chicago P.
Kerby, Anthony Paul.
1991. Narrative and the
Self. Bloomington:
Indiana UP.
MacIntyre, Alasdair.
1981. After Virtue: An
Essay in Moral Theory.
Notre Dame: U of Notre
Dame P.
11
The ‘self’ can be interpreted in many ways. Jeremy (left)
was asked for his views on what he perceived as the
‘self.’ Jeremy answered with these words;
I would perceive the ‘self’ as a mental
representation of oneself and I think that it is
constructed from outside influences and the
environment throughout your whole life and
that it is always changing. You have a
certain amount of control over it but you
have been influenced by those external
things to do that so I think it’s not something
we necessarily create ourselves.
When asked if he thought we are influenced by the
books we’ve read he said;
Yes, I do. I believe you have you r b asic
personality, although I’m not sure whether
this is attributable to your genes but I do
think that the way you’re brought up helps
develop your ‘self’
HUMANBEINGSAREINEXTRICABLYENTANGLEDINSTORIES
BYNORBERTMEUTER
Platoreferstostoriesandmythsthatserveasapointofdepartureandexemplificationforhisabstractteachings,
atraditionthatcontinuesinphilosophyeventoday.Underlyingthispracticeistheideathatthefunctionof
narrativeistoprovideconcreteexamplesinsupportofconceptualarguments.Hegelformulatestheinsightthat
philosophicalconceptscanthemselvesonlybeunderstoodastheendresultoftheirownstory(Plotnitsky,Arkady
(2005a).“PhilosophyandNarrative.”D.Hermanetal.(eds).TheRoutledgeEncyclopediaofNarrativeTheory.
London:Routledge,427–28.2005a).
[27]
Husserl’sdiscipleSchapp(Schapp,Wilhelm([1953]1985)wasthefirsttodevelopadistinctive“philosophyof
stories.”Accordingtohismainthesis,thehumanbeingisnottheautonomoussubjectofhisownconstructionsof
meaning,butthroughouthislifeisinextricably“entangledinstories”whicharetheprerequisitefortheformation
ofhisidentityandsubjectivity.Since,accordingtoSchapp,storiesarethefundamentalmediumwithoutwhichwe
wouldnotbeabletoperceivemeaning,oneisjustifiedwithreferencetoHeideggerinspeakingofa“narrative
beingintheworld.”
[28]
Thisphilosophicalpointofdepartureraisesquestionsconcerningtheconstructivecharacterofnarrative.Explicitly
toldstoriesaresymbolicconstructions.Thequestioniswhether,andinwhatway,theseconstructionsare
connectedwiththeexperienceandbehavioroftheindividualsconcerned.Fromaphilosophicalperspective,an
assumeddualismofartificialformandrealevents(cf.2.2above)appearsequallycontestable.Humanexperience
andbehaviourdonotshowwellorganizednarrativepatternscomparabletothecarefulcompositionsoffiction
andhistorywriting.Rather,theidentifyingandshapingofanarrativestructureofacertaincomplexity,withaclear
pointofview,anindividuallineofsuspense,acharacteristicperipeties,etc.,isalwaystheresultofanactive
endeavour.Ontheotherhand,experienceandbehaviourcannotexistwithoutsomekindofstructure.If,for
Jeremy at the Alleluya Bar and Café , St Kevins
Arcade, K’Rd, considering his answer to the
question; What is it that constitutes the ‘Self.’
Philosophy in a Cafe
12
example,onepresupposesthattoactmeans(atleastpartly)
tofollowaproject,thisalreadyconstitutesacomplex
achievement,evenonthelevelofaction.Thereisconstant
interferenceinandinterruptionoftheprojectinhandby
otherexperiences,actionsandprojects.Inaddition,itis
oftennotclearfromthebeginningwhetheroneisactually
engagedinaprojectatall.Withoutatleastarudimentary
narrativestructure,itwouldnotbepossibletofindone’s
wayevenonthelevelofaction(DantoDanto,ArthurC.
(1965).AnalyticalPhilosophyofHistory.Cambridge:
CambridgeUP.1965;CarrCarr,David(1986).Time,Narrative,
andHistory.Bloomington:IndianaUP.1986).Theideaofa
singleactseeninisolationisthereforeafalseabstraction,
andforthisreason,theconceptofstoryisasfundamentala
philosophicaltermastheconceptofaction(MacIntyre
MacIntyre,Alasdair([1981]2007).AfterVirtue.AStudyin
MoralTheory.NotreDame:UofNotreDameP.1981;
SchwemmerSchwemmer,Oswald(1987).Handlungund
Struktur.ZurWissenschaftstheoriederKulturwissenschaften.
Frankfurta.M.:Suhrkamp.1987).
[29]
WithRicœur,whohasputforthwhatisperhapsthemost
comprehensivephilosophicaltheoryofnarrativity(Ricœur,
Paul([1983/85]1984/88).TimeandNarration.3vols.
Chicago:UofChicagoP:vol.1([1983]1984);vol.2([1984]
1985);vol.3([1985]1988).1983/85),itis
possibletoargueacaseforakindof
compromise.Ricœurdrawsontheclassic
philosophersthatarerelevanthere(Aristotle,
Augustine,Dilthey,Husserl,Heidegger,Schapp)
aswellasonliteraryandhistoricaltheory,
integratingthemintoacomprehensive
narratologicalhermeneutics.Itskeytheoretical
conceptisthethreepartmimesis,theaspectsof
whicharenotseeninahierarchicalrelationship,
butinanintegrativeone.Accordingly,the
compositionofanexplicitstory(MimesisII)is
alwaysacreativeactthatprovidesanewand
uniqueviewofreality,butatthesametime,this
alwaysfollowsonfromsomethingthathasgone
beforethisprocess.Everystorypointstoa
“before.”Thereferentinthisrelation(MimesisI)
isthe“livedworld,”whichisitselfalready
organizedasnarrative,atleastinpart.Because
oftheirsymbolicandtemporalaspects,reallife
actionshaveaninherentlyprenarrative
structure.Everyexplicitstory,ontheotherhand,
meetsitsintendedtargetonlywhenitis
perceivedbyarecipient(MimesisIII).Reception
ismadepossiblebecauseoftheinherent
opennessoftheexplicitstoriesingeneralterms.
Thesestoriesregardlessofhowpreciselyand
concretelytheymightbetoldcontainnotruly
individualevents,butsimplyschematized
conceptionsthathavetobeconcretizedbythe
recipient.Thethreetypesofmimesisforma
temporalunitasacircularculturalprocessthatis
constantlyevolving:throughreception,the
explicitnarrativeconfigurationonceagain
becomespartofthereallifeexperienceofthe
experiencingandactingrecipientwhocan
expand,confirmorvarythepreexistingpre
narrativestructures.Suchanewlyanddifferently
(re)configuredreallifesituationinturnforms
thebasisforthenextexplicitconfiguration.
Narrativethereforeinvolvesmediationbetween
commonculturalstandardsandexceptional
deviationsfromthesestandards,hencea
complexinterplayoftraditionandinnovation(
MediacyandNarrativeMediation).
[30]
Inthismodel,thenarrative“seeingthings
together”(prendreensemble)canbe
understoodastheconstructionand
13
establishmentofameaningfuland
moreorlesscoherentorprobable
ordercreatedoutofdissonant,
scatteredorrandomelements.The
importantpointistheontological
distinctionbetweeneventand
incident(RicœurRicœur,Paul([1965]
2007).HistoryandTruth.Evanston:
NorthwesternUP.1965).Anincident
isdefinedbyitscomplete
contingency,assomethingthat
occursinacertainmannerbutcould
equallyoccurinadifferentmanner,
ornotatall.Astorytransformsa
seriesofheterogeneousincidents
intomeaningfuleventswithina
diachronicstructure.Thecomposition
ofastoryisaprocessthatorganizes
variouscomponentsintoawholein
ordertoproduceasinglemeaningful
effect.Thenarrativeseeingthings
togethertransformstheirrational
contingencyofnoncontextualized
incidentsintoanintelligible
contingencyofevents.Inthe
traditionofKant,thisseeingthings
togethercanbedescribedasa
“synthesisoftheheterogeneous.”
[31]
Inquiryintothepersonalidentityof
theindividualisafurther
philosophicalareaofresearchinthe
fieldofnarrativity.Narrative
approachestothisissue(RicœurRicœur,Paul([1983/85]1984/88).Time
andNarration.3vols.Chicago:UofChicagoP:vol.1([1983]1984);vol.2
([1984]1985);vol.3([1985]1988).1985,Ricœur,Paul([1990]1992).
OneselfasAnother.Chicago:UofChicagoP.1990;KerbyKerby,Anthony
Paul(1991).NarrativeandtheSelf.Bloomington:IndianaUP.1991;Meuter
Meuter,Norbert(1995).NarrativeIdentität.DasProblemderpersonalen
IdentitätimAnschlußanErnstTugendhat,NiklasLuhmannundPaul
Ricœur.Stuttgart:Metzler/Poeschel.1995;Brockmeier&Carbougheds.
Brockmeier,Jens&DonaldCarbough,eds.(2001).NarrativeandIdentity.
StudiesinAutobiography,Self,andCulture.Amsterdam:Benjamins.2001;
forfurtherdiscussion,seeStrawsonStrawson,Galen(2004).“Against
Narrativity.”Ration.s.17,428–52.2004)assumethatpersonalidentityis
formedandstabilizedonlythroughthetellingofstories(Identityand
Narration).Theidentityoftheindividualpersondiffersfundamentallyfrom
thenumericalidentityofindividualobjects.Personalidentityrestsupona
selfimagethatisphysical,emotional,mentalaswellaspractical,andthis
selfimageisinternallyreflectedandexternallycommunicatedinthe
narrativeprocess.Correspondingtothesetwoformsofusage,itispossible
todistinguishtwotypesofidentity(RicœurRicœur,Paul([1983/85]
1984/88).TimeandNarration.3vols.Chicago:UofChicagoP:vol.1([1983]
1984);vol.2([1984]1985);vol.3[1985]1988).1985,Ricœur,Paul([1990]
1992).OneselfasAnother.Chicago:UofChicagoP.1990):ontheonehand,
identityas“sameness”(German:Selbigkeit;Latin:idem;French:mêmeté);
ontheotherhand,identityas“selfhood”(German:Selbstheit;Latin:ipse;
French:ipséité).Narrativeidentitiesareinvariablyipseidentitieswhichare
constantlyreconfiguredthroughthetellingofstories.
ByNorbertMeuter
Thefullessaycanbefoundat‘Thelivinghandbookofnarratology.’
http://hup.sub.uni
hamburg.de/lhn/index.php/Narration_in_Various_Disciplines
For one thing is needful: that a human being
should attain satisfaction with himself, whether it
be by means of this or that poetry and art, only
then is a human being at all tolerable to behold.
Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually
ready for revenge, and we others will be his
victims.
Friedrich Nietzsche—The Gay Science/233.
BEING SATISFIED WITH ONESELF
Visit The Philosophers Arms at; http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0145x8b
14
The‘narrativeself’isnowwidely
acceptedbyphilosophersasan
appropriatemetaphorfortheself.
Philosophicalinterestinnarrative
asrepresentativeofhumanlives
wasstronglyinfluencedbyHannah
Arendt’s“TheHumanCondition”
Inthisbook,Arendt,apolitical
philosopher,proposesthatthe
individualdiscloseshis/herselfto
theworldandtothemselves
throughbothactionandspeech:
“Actionandspeecharesoclosely
relatedbecausetheprimordialand
specificallyhumanactmustatthe
sametimecontaintheanswerto
thequestionaskedofevery
newcomer:“Whoareyou?”This
disclosureofwhosomeoneis,is
implicitinbothhiswordsandhis
deeds…Thisdisclosureof‘who’in
contradistinctionto‘what’
somebodyis–hisqualities,gifts,
talents,andshortcomings,which
hemaydisplayorhide–isimplicit
ineverythingsomebodysaysand
does.Itcanbehiddenonlyin
completesilenceandperfect
passivity.”(pp.178179)
Arendtclaimsthatthe‘who’
werevealthroughspeechand
actionalwaysfallsintoan
existingwebofrelationships
“wheretheirimmediate
consequencescanbefelt”
(p.184).Hereanewnarrative
eventuallyemergesas“the
uniquelifestoryofthe
newcomer.”(p.184)However,
whileeveryindividuallife
ultimatelybecomesalife
story,theindividualisnever
theauthorofthatstory:
“Somebodybeganitandisits
subjectinthetwofoldsenseof
theword,namelyitsactorand
sufferer,butnobodyisits
author.”(p.184)Yetthe‘who’
thatwediscloseaswespeak
andacttellsusmoreaboutthe
‘hero’atthecentreofeach
storythananyartefacttellsus
abouttheartisanwho
producedit.Thepersonal
disclosureorstorytherefore
providesameasureof
meaningtotheindividuallives
sodisclosed.Thisresonates
withPaulRicoeur’sconceptof
narrativeidentityandtherole
ofmemoryintheformation
andvalidationofidentity.
Theimportanceoflanguagein
definingorrepresenting
ourselvesisaptlyillustrated
withreferencetothequestion
ofcolonialism.The
psychologicalplightofthe
colonisedhasbeen
documentedwithfrightening
claritybytheKenyanwriter
WaThiong’ONgugi.In
DecolonisingtheMind(1986),
Ngugidescribesthedevastating
effectsofmentaldominationon
themindsoftheoppressed,and
theconsequentalienationfrom
theirowncultureexperienced
bythem:
“Themostimportantareaof
dominationwasthemental
universeofthecolonised,the
control,throughculture,ofhow
peopleperceivedthemselves
andtheirrelationshiptothe
world.Economicandpolitical
controlcanneverbecomplete
oreffectivewithoutmental
control.Tocontrolapeople’s
cultureistocontroltheirtools
ofselfdefinitioninrelationship
toothers.”(p.16)
Socolonialdominationisnot
onlyaboutthelossofpolitical
autonomy,butaboutthe
dispossessionofaculture.And
Ngugigivesaharrowingaccount
ofthecontinuingpsychological
legacyofthesubjugationofthe
languageofthecolonisedto
thatofthecoloniser.Heclaims
inDecolonisingtheMindthat
Spinning Narratives, Spinning Selves
HANNAH ARENDT
15
anylanguageisacarrierofculture
aswellasameansof
communication,andmaintainsthat
mentalcontrolofthecolonisedwas
attainedthroughthedominationof
theirlanguage.Ngugigivesa
hauntinglygraphicimageto
supportthisidea:“Itislike
separatingthemindfromthebody
sothattheyareoccupyingtwo
unrelatedlinguisticspheresinthe
sameperson.Onalargerscaleitis
likeproducingasocietyofbodiless
headsandheadlessbodies.”(p.28)
Thecultureinherentinalanguage
isapowerfulaspectofthe
definitionofselfhood,sotobe
dispossessedofalanguageistobe
dispossessedofacrucialpartof
selfidentity.Ngugi’sargument
servesasasignificantexampleof
theimportanceoflanguageinour
selfidentityorselfdefinition.It
maybewellcomparedwith
Arendt’sviewofthesignificance
andfragilityofthenarrativeself,
sincethroughnarrativesthedeeds
ofindividualsandcommunitiesare
preservedinmemory.WhileArendt
demonstratesthepoliticaland
personalimportanceofsuch
narration,Ngugideploresthe
personalandhistoricallossofself
whichariseswhenalanguageis
displaced.
AWebofSelf
DanielC.Dennett,anevolutionary
philosopher,alsoarguesthat
languageisvitaltothehuman
senseofself.InConsciousness
Explained(1992),healsoclaims
thatlanguageistheformof
representationusedbyhumansto
presentthemselvestothemselves
andtoothers;andlikeArendt,but
contrarytoothertheorists,
Dennettalsosuggeststhatweare
theproductratherthanthesource
ofournarratives.Dennettusesa
biologicalexampletoillustrate
this.Hepointsoutthattheprocess
ofevolutionhasproduced
creaturesandsystemswhichmust
beconcernedwithpreservinga
“distinctionbetweeneverything
ontheinsideofaclosedboundary
andeverythingintheexternal
world”(p.174),citingthehuman
immunesystemasaninteresting
exampleofthissortofsystem.He
alsoproposesthattheboundaries
ofthis‘minimal’or‘primitive’self
arebothpermeableandflexible:
theymaybeinfiltratedfromthe
outsideandmayaccommodate
whatcomesinsideitsboundaries.
Asnailgrowsashellwhichthen
becomespartofits‘self’;anda
hermitcrabmayappropriatea
discardedshellasashelter,which
istheninsidetheboundariesofits
selfpreservation.In
demonstratingtheadaptationof
thesecreaturestotheir
environment,Dennettis
demonstratingtheevolvingof
whatwe’recallingaprimitiveself,
andthenecessityforthe
enlargementandshrinkingof
boundariessothatthatbasic
selfispreserved.Moreover,
thebeaverwillbuildadam,
thespiderwillspinaweb,not
becausethey’reworkingto
someconceivedpurpose,but
becausethat’sthewaythat
they‘preserve’themselves.
Dennettmakesalinkbetween
thisprimitivepreservationof
self,andthehumanneedto
selfprotectthroughnarrative:
“Ourfundamentaltacticof
selfprotection,selfcontrol,
andselfdefinitionisnot
buildingdamsorspinning
webs,buttellingstories–and
moreparticularlyconcocting
andcontrollingthestorywe
tellothers,andourselves,
aboutwhoweare…we(unlike
professionalhumanstory
tellers)donotconsciouslyand
deliberatelyfigureoutwhat
narrativestotellandhowto
tellthem;likespiderwebs,our
talesarespunbutforthemost
partwedon’tspinthem;they
spinus.Ourhuman
consciousness,andour
narrativeselfhood,istheir
product,nottheirsource.”
(p.418)
So,justasthespider
instinctively‘knows’howto
spinaweb,inhumansthereis
whatDennettcallsa‘centerof
narrativegravity’which
‘knows’withoutdeliberateor
consciousplanninghowto
unifyallofthenarrativethat
streamsforth‘asif’froma
singlesource.Itisasifallthe
16
narrativewithinus,infact,allour
languageuse,issomehowordered
andunifiedtopresentitselfasifit
comesfromasinglesource.In
otherwords,westartusing
languageand,throughtheactof
speaking,andespeciallythrough
therepetitionofourstory,wespin
aself.Thereisnoconsciouseffort
inanyofthis.Wecannotdo
otherwise:“Ourtalesarespun,but
forthemostpartwedon’tspin
them;theyspinus.”Theselfwe
areappearsthroughthisnarrative,
andistheproductofournarrative.
Wecannotbecomeaperson
withoutthisrepresentationof
ourselvestoourselves,andto
others.
Dennettsuggeststhis‘single
source’ofnarrativeunity(i.e.,the
self)isanabstractiontobe
understoodinthewaythat
physicistspositanabstract‘centre
ofgravity’forphysicalobjects.He
proposesthatalthoughthiscentre
ofnarrativegravityfor“the
narrativespinninghumanbody”–
thispsychologicalornarrativeself
–isanabstractionratherthana
‘thinginthebrain’,itisstilla
“remarkablyrobustandalmost
tangibleattractorofproperties.”
Conversely,ifwetakeNgugi’s
pointonthedamagecausedbythe
subjugationof‘my’languageto
thatofanoppressoralongside
Dennett’snotionofa‘centerof
narrativegravity’,wecanseethe
aptnessofNgugi’smetaphorofa
societyof‘headlessbodiesand
bodilessheads’.
LanguageEmergingFromSilence
Dennettdemonstrateshowfragile
isoursenseofwhoweare,and
howwearesomehow,insome
nebulousway,always‘spinning’
ourwayintoaself.Thisresonates
withanideathatMaurice
MerleauPontyhasofthe
mutenessofourprelanguage
state,inthesenseofthesilence
weallencounteronadailybasis.
InTheVisibleandtheInvisible
(1968)hesaid:
“Languageisalife,isourlifeand
thelifeofthethings.Notthat
languagetakespossessionoflife
andreservesitforitself:what
wouldtherebetosayifthere
existednothingbutthingssaid?It
istheerrorofthesemantic
philosophiestocloseuplanguage
asifitspokeonlyofitself:
languagelivesonlyfromsilence;
everythingwecasttotheothers
hasgerminatedinthisgreatmute
landwhichweneverleave…
languageisnotamaskoverBeing,
but–ifoneknowshowtograspit
withallitsrootsandallits
folliation–themostvaluable
witnesstoBeing.”(pp.125126,
italicsmine)
MerleauPontyissuggestinghere
thatlanguageis‘germinated’in
silence.His‘greatmutelandthat
weneverleave’seemstorelateto
Dennett’s‘centerofgravity’such
thatwespinourlanguageuseout
ofagreatsilence.Through
languagewegetasenseofwhat
weare;butwearealways,asit
were,livinginasilenceoutof
whichwereachouttoothers.
HereMerleauPontydoesnot
mean‘silence’asacontraryto
languageinthewaythatwemean
silenceasthelossofsoundor
noise.Ratherheistalkingabout
silenceasthe‘mute’worldofyet
tobespokenlanguage.In
Phenomenologyof
Perception(1945)heoutlines
theWittgensteinianideathat
thespokenwordhas
meaningbecauseofhowwe
attachmeaningtoit:“Asfor
themeaningofaword,I
learnitasIlearntousea
tool,byseeingitusedinthe
contextofacertainsituation”
(p.469,PP).Asmeaningmust
becreatedforwords,speech
thusbeginsin‘silence’.To
speakourthoughts,we
reach,asitwere,intothe
silentworldofthingswhich
MerleauPontyisspeaking
about:ourthoughtsarenot
‘thought’firstandthen
cloakedwithwords.To
MerleauPontythereisno
suchthingasathoughtthat
existswithoutlanguage,
because,withoutspeech,
howcanthethoughtmove
outofthevoidofsilenceto
beingathought?
“Thoughtisnointernal‘thing’
anddoesnotexist
independentlyoftheworld
andofwords.Whatmisleads
usinthisconnection,and
17
causesustobelieveinathought
whichexistsforitselfpriorto
expression,isthoughtalready
constitutedandexpressed,which
wecansilentlyrecalltoourselves,
andthroughwhichwecanacquire
theillusionofaninnerlife.Butin
realitythissupposedsilenceisalive
withwords,thisinnerlifeisaninner
language.”(p.213,PP)
MerleauPontyissayingthatour
thoughtsdevelopaswearticulate
them(inDennett’swords,as‘the
webisspun’):“Thusspeech,inthe
speaker,doesnottranslateready
madethought,butaccomplishesit.”
(p.207,PP)ToMerleauPonty
languageisourmeetingplacewith
theworldandwithothers,butitis
alsotheplacewherewemeet
ourselves.Themysteryofthat
space,ofthatepicentre,isthemute
appealfromwhichthesearchfor
understandingislaunched.
UNDERSTANDINGTHINKING
Tounderstandlanguageisnot
simplytounderstandtheliteral
wordsandgrammaticalstructureas
itisspoken.Rather,asMerleau
Pontydemonstrates,itisabout
understandingthelanguagebehind
thewords,thecreativeprocessthat
goesonsothatwe‘getit’asthe
wordsarespokenorread.Justas,
althoughapieceofmusicismade
upofnotesplacedinaparticular
order,itisnotthattheseparticular
orderednotesthemselvesspeakto
us–rather,itisthecreative
responsethatisgeneratedbythe
musicplayedwhichcausesthe
appeal,andbywhichmusicis
understoodbyustohavemeaning.
Soitiswithlanguage:
“Inasense,tounderstandaphrase
isnothingelsethanto
fullywelcomeitinits
sonorousbeing,or,aswe
putitsowell,tohearwhat
itsays.Themeaningisnot
onthephraselikethe
butteronthebread,likea
secondlayerof‘psychic
reality’spreadoverthe
sound:itisthetotalityof
whatissaid,theintegral
ofallthedifferentiations
oftheverbalchain;itis
givenwiththewordsfor
thosewhohaveearsto
hear.”(p.155)TheVisible
andtheInvisible.
InMerleauPonty’s
conceptofprimary
perception,our
experiencesofour
relationshiptotheworld
andtoothersaregivento
usinsuchawaythatwe
acceptthemascommonplace,as
ourwayofbeingintheworld.The
roleofsensationinrevealingand
interpretingourworldforusisoften
overlookedsimplybecauseitseems
suchanordinaryfact.Wesee,hear,
touchandfeelourworld,butwe
are,sotospeak,immersedinthe
experience,sothatweareunaware
ofthemultiplelinksthatpresent
theseexperiencestousalreadywith
referencetohumanorphysical
(object)meanings.ButMerleau
Pontyclaimsthatitisonlybytrying
tounderstandhowthese
perceptionsshapeandrevealour
worldthatwecanwetrulyperceive
it–almostbyglancingsidewaysat
ourselvesandhowweareinthe
world;almostbystealthweperceive
ourworld.Tounderstandhowwe
relatetotheworldandtoothers,to
becomeawareofhowwe
asembodiedbeingscan
understandthe
phenomenonofa‘self’
withinthisworldofobjects,
MerleauPontyclaimsthat
wethereforeneedtostep
backfromtheworldofour
perception:
“Reflectiondoesnot
withdrawfromtheworld
towardstheunityof
consciousnessasthe
world’sbasis[whichwas
Kant’stheoryofself
consciousness];…itslackens
theintentionalthreads
whichattachustothe
worldandthusbringsthem
toournotice;italoneis
consciousnessoftheworld
becauseitrevealsthat
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (14 March 1908 –
3 May 1961) was a French
phenomenological philosopher, strongly
influenced by Karl Marx, Edmund Husserl
and Martin Heidegger in addition to being
closely associated with Jean-Paul Sartre
(who later stated he had been "converted"
to Marxism by Merleau-Ponty and Simone
de Beauvoir.
18
worldasstrangeandparadoxical.”(PP,
2002,p.xv)
MerleauPontyishereclaimingthatitis
the‘intentionality’[thedirectedness
towardssomething]ofperceptionwhich
createsameaningforourexperience.
Weappeartohaveaninstinctive
knowledgeofhowtomakesenseofour
world–itappearstobesomethingthat
thebody‘knows’howtodo:
“Inasense,ifweweretomake
completelyexplicitthearchitectonicsof
thehumanbody,itsontological
framework,andhowitseesitselfand
hearsitself,wewouldseethatthe
structureofitsmuteworldissuchthat
allthepossibilitiesoflanguageare
alreadygiveninit.”(p.155,TheVisible
andtheInvisible)
ThisechoesDennett’saccountofa
‘centerofnarrativegravity’:Merleau
Ponty’smuteworldofthebodyhas
withinitallthepossibilitiesoflanguage,
justasDennett’scenterofnarrative
gravityisthatwhichattractswords,
speech,gesture.WhatMerleauPonty
offersthatishelpfultousin
understandinghowlanguageprovides
ourwayofbeingintheworld,isperhaps
bestillustratedbythefollowingquote:
“Likethenaturalman,wesituate
ourselvesinourselvesandinthethings,
inourselvesandintheother,atthe
pointwhere,byasortofchiasm,we
becometheothersandwebecome
world”(p.168,TheVisibleandthe
Invisible).MerleauPontyusesthisword
chiasm[connectedgap]toillustratethe
sortofinterconnectionthatexists
betweenselfandworld,betweenself
andothers,sothatwearenotsomuch
connected,butratherthereisapoint
whereweintersectandbecomeone
withothersandtheworld.
Throughlanguageandtheactionthat
accompaniesit,alifestoryiscreated,anarrativeisspun.
Language,speechandgesturedefineusandcreateus,so
thatwearecontinuouslyspinninganarrativeselfthatis
boththepreservationofourindividualityandour
connectionwiththeworld.Dispossessionoflanguage,of
thatwhichdefinesus,is,inaveryrealway,tobe
dispossessedofaunifiedself.
©PaulineO’Flynn2011
Philosopher,PaulineO’FlynnhasanMAinPhilosophyand
LiteraturefromMaryImmaculateCollege,Universityof
Limerick,Limerick,Ireland.
A Poem by Yahia Lababidi
WORDS
Wordsarelikedays:
colouringbooksorpickpockets,
signpostsorscratchingposts,
fakirsoverhotcoals.
Certainwordsmustbeearned
justasemotionsaresuffered
beforetheycanbeuttered
cleanasakeptpromise.
Wordsaswitnesses
testifyingtheirtruths
squalidorrarefied
inevitable,irrefutable.
But,wordsmustnotcarry
morethantheycan
it'snotgoodfortheirbacks
ortheirreputations.
For,whethertheydancealone
orwithaninvisiblepartner,
everywordisacosmos
dissolvingtheinarticulate
http://vimeo.com/25555189
19
Burying your head in a novel isn't just
a way to escape the world:
psychologists are increasingly finding
that reading can affect our
personalities. A trip into the world of
Stephenie Meyer, for example,
actually makes us feel like vampires.
Researchers from the University at
Buffalo gave 140 undergraduates
passages from either Meyer's Twilight
or JK Rowling's Harry Potter and the
Philosopher's Stone to read, with the
vampire group delving into an extract
in which Edward Cullen tells his
teenage love interest Bella what it is
like to be a vampire, and the wizardly
readers getting a section in which
Harry and his cohorts are "sorted" into
Hogwarts houses.
The candidates then went through a
series of tests, in which they
categorised "me" words (myself, mine)
and "wizard" words (wand,
broomstick, spells, potions) by pressing
one key when they appeared on the
screen, and "not me" words (they,
theirs) and "vampire" words (blood,
undead, fangs, bitten) by pressing
another key, with the test then
reversed. The study's authors, Dr Shira
Gabriel and Ariana Young, expected
them to respond more quickly to the
"me" words when they were linked to
the book they had just read.
Gabriel and Young then applied what
they dubbed the Twilight/Harry Potter
Narrative Collective Assimilation Scale,
which saw the students asked questions
designed to measure their
identification with the worlds they had
been reading about – including "How
long could you go without sleep?",
"How sharp are your teeth?" and "Do
you think, if you tried really hard, you
might be able to make an object move
just using the power of your mind?"
Their moods, life satisfaction, and
absorption into the stories were then
measured.
Published by the journal
Psychological Science, the study
found that participants who read the
Harry Potter chapters self-identified
as wizards, whereas participants who
read the Twilight chapter self-
identified as vampires. And
"belonging" to these fictional
communities actually provided the
same mood and life satisfaction
people get from affiliations with real-
life groups. "The current research
suggests that books give readers
more than an opportunity to tune out
and submerge themselves in fantasy
worlds. Books provide the opportunity
for social connection and the blissful
calm that comes from becoming a
part of something larger than oneself
for a precious, fleeting moment,"
Gabriel and Young write.
"My study definitely points to reading
fulfilling a fundamental need – the
need for social connection," Gabriel
said. She is currently trying to
replicate the study with schoolchildren
– using jedis versus wizards.
The psychology of fiction is a small
but growing area of research,
according to Keith Oatley, a
professor in the department of human
development and applied
psychology at the University of
Toronto and a published novelist
himself, who details the latest findings
in the area in his online magazine,
OnFiction.
One of his own studies, carried out in
2008, gave 166 participants either
the Chekhov short story, The Lady
with the Little Dog, or a version of the
story rewritten in documentary form.
The subjects' personality traits and
emotions were assessed before and
after reading, with those who were
given the Chekhov story in its
unadulterated form found to have
gone through greater changes in
personality – empathising with the
characters and thus becoming a little
more like them.
"I think the reason fiction but not non-
fiction has the effect of improving
empathy is because fiction is
primarily about selves interacting
with other selves in the social world,"
said Oatley. "The subject matter of
fiction is constantly about why she did
this, or if that's the case what should
he do now, and so on. With fiction we
enter into a world in which this way
of thinking predominates. We can
think about it in terms of the
psychological concept of expertise. If
I read fiction, this kind of social
thinking is what I get better at. If I
read genetics or astronomy, I get
more expert at genetics or
astronomy. In fiction, also, we are
able to understand characters' actions
from their interior point of view, by
entering into their situations and
minds, rather than the more exterior
view of them that we usually have.
And it turns out that psychologically
there is a big difference between
these two points of view. We usually
take the exterior view of others, but
that's too limited."
The findings could, Oatley believes,
have significant implications,
particularly in a climate where arts
funding is under threat. "It is the first
empirical finding, so far as I know, to
show a clear psychological effect of
reading fiction," he said. "It's a result
that shows that reading fiction
improves understanding of others,
and this has a very basic importance
in society, not just in the general way
making the world a better place by
improving interpersonal
understanding, but in specific areas
such as politics, business, and
education. In an era when high-school
and university subjects are evaluated
economically, our results do have
economic implications."
ALISON FLOOD EXPLAINS HOW
READING FICTION IMPROVES
EMPATHY
20
Paul Verlaine at the age of 23 fell in love with the
16-year-old Mathilde Maute de Fleurville, and they
married the following year, their son Georges was
born in 1871.
In late August of 1871, at the advice of a friend,
Arthur Rimbaud sent copies of some new poetry to
Verlaine in Paris, who was taken aback by the
brilliance of the work. From their first encounter,
Verlaine was powerfully drawn to Rimbaud, whose
arrogance and provocative behaviour shocked
Mathilde and her parents, with whom they lived, as
well as the established literary circles of Paris.
Mathilde was frightened by Rimbaud's growing
power over her husband. The two men formed a
passionate relationship that was often fuelled by
absinthe and hashish and characterized by love
and cruelty, inspiration and antagonism,
separations and reconciliations.
Born in Charleville, in northern France, in 1854,
Arthur Rimbaud is one of the most remarkable
figures in the history of poetry. Despite his tiny
body of work–only three collections (A Season in
Hell, The Drunken Boat and Illuminations), all
written before he turned 20–he influenced many
20th century artists from Pablo Picasso to Robert
Mapplethorpe. Victor Hugo called him “an infant
Shakespeare.”
He ran off to Paris repeatedly as a teenager,
later spent time in London, crossed the Alps on
foot, briefly served overseas as a Dutch soldier
but deserted in Java, took jobs in Cyprus and
Yemen, then settled in Ethiopia. He returned to
France in 1891 and died that year in Marseille
at the age of 37.
Paul Verlaine
Caricature of Arthur Rimbaud drawn by Paul Verlaine in 1872
Arthur Rimbaud