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Leadership and implementing a safety culture

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While it takes time to change the culture of an organisation, there are plenty of simple measures that strong leaders can implement to achieve some 'quick wins' as first steps towards advancing patient safety in primary care Building a patient safety and improvement climate in primary care is now a major concern. Having considered the potential scale of the problem, and how systems fail and mistakes are made (Practice Nurse 2010; 40( 8): 38-40), and looked at incident reporting systems and ways of preventing potential harm (Practice Nurse 2010; 40( 9): 38-41), this article presents some tips for leaders implementing a strong safety culture.
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10 December 2010
32 in practice
uilding a patient safety
and improvement climate
in primary care is now a
major concern. Having
considered the potential
scale of the problem, and how systems
fail and mistakes are made (Practice
Nurse 2010; 40(8): 38–40), and looked at
incident reporting systems and ways of
preventing potential harm (Practice
Nurse 2010; 40(9): 38–41), this article
presents some tips for leaders
implementing a strong safety culture.
STRONG LEADERSHIP
‘When leaders begin to change their
responses to mistakes and failure,
asking what happened instead of
who made the error, the culture
within healthcare institutions will
begin to change.1
In the UK, building a safety culture is the
first step of the National Patient Safety
Agency’s (NPSA) seven-step guide to
improving patient safety (Box 1). The
‘safety culture’ of a healthcare team or
organisation is commonly defined as the
combined individual and group values,
attitudes, perceptions, competencies
and patterns of behaviour that
B
While it takes time to change the culture of an organisation, there are plenty of simple
measures that strong leaders can implement to achieve some ‘quick wins’ as rst steps
towards advancing patient safety in primary care
Leadership and
implementing
a safety culture
determine the overall commitment to
patient safety. The prevailing safety
culture influences the level of safe
healthcare by motivating clinicians and
staff to choose behaviours that enhance
– rather than compromise – safety
practices and thinking. The leadership
commitment to patient safety within a
practice is strongly linked to the maturity
level of the prevailing safety culture.
Establishing a ‘just’ culture that enables
the whole team to support and advance
patient safety is only possible with strong
leaders (Table 1). It is for the practice
leader ship – GPs, management and
senior nursing staff – to facilitate and
build a culture of trust that encourages
effective teamworking, collective
learning from significant events and
strong communication across the clinical
disciplines and administrative staff. They
have both the responsibility and the
authority to ensure that there is a
continued focus on improving the safety
of patient care – in essence to
establishing safety as a cultural ‘value’ as
well as a practice ‘priority’.
STRONG AND WEAK SAFETY
CULTURES
Assessing, reflecting on and improving
the safety culture (or climate) among
the healthcare workforce are key
elements in developing a focused
approach to patient safety (Box 2). This
is important because healthcare teams
and organisations with a positive safety
culture are more likely to learn openly
and effectively from failure and adapt
their working practices and systems
appropriately. The opposite is true for
those with a weak safety culture.
In many high-profile organisational
failures a poorly developed safety culture
was implicated as an underlying causal
factor in the catastrophic incidents that
Paul Bowie, PhD, associate adviser in postgraduate GP education, NHS Education for Scotland, Glasgow
Bowie P. Leadership and implementing a safety culture. Practice Nurse 2010; 40(10): 32-5
 Buildasafetyculture
 Leadandsupportyourstaff
 Integrateyourriskmanagement
activity
 Promotereporting
 Involveandcommunicatewith
patientsandthepublic
 Learnandsharesafetylessons
 Implementsolutionstopreventharm
BOX 1. THE NATIONAL PATIENT
SAFETY AGENCY FRAMEWORK:
SEVEN STEPS TO PATIENT
SAFETY
24
4
safety and improvement33
10 December 2010
 Safety‘culture’and‘climate’are
interlinkedconceptsandtheterms
areoftenusedinterchangeably.
Thereisongoingdebateabouttheir
differencesandsimilarities.
 Safetyculturehasbeendened
simplyas‘thewaywedothings
aroundhere’andisthoughttohelp
shapethediscretionarybehaviourof
healthcareworkers.
 Safetyclimateisconsideredtobe
themeasurable,surfacecomponents
thatprovidea‘snapshot’ofthe
underlyingsafetyculture.Ithasbeen
denedasthesharedperceptions
ofsafetypolicies,proceduresand
practicesheldbyaworkgroup.
BOX 2. DEFINITIONS OF SAFETY
‘CULTURE’ AND ‘CLIMATE’
Element of safety culture Characteristics
Openculture Cliniciansandstafffeelcomfortablediscussingpatientsafetyincidentsandraisingsafetyissues
withbothcolleaguesandseniorstaff
Justculture Clinicians,staff,patientsandcarersaretreatedfairly,withempathyandconsiderationwhenthey
havebeeninvolvedinapatientsafetyincidentorhaveraisedasafetyissue
Reportingculture  Cliniciansandstaffhavecondenceinthelocalincidentreportingsystemanduseittonotify
healthcaremanagersofincidentsthatareoccurring,includingnearmisses
 Barrierstoincidentreportinghavebeenidentiedandremoved:
–cliniciansandstaffarenotblamedandpunishedwhentheyreportincidents
–theyreceiveconstructivefeedbackaftersubmittinganincidentreport
–thereportingprocessitselfiseasy
Learningculture  Thepractice:
–iscommittedtolearningsafetylessons
–communicatesthemtocolleagues
–remembersthemovertime
Informedculture Thepracticehaslearnedfrompastexperienceandhastheabilitytoidentifyandmitigatefuture
incidents,becauseitlearnsfromeventsthathavealreadyhappened(egincidentreportsand
investigations)
TABLE 1. LEADERSHIP INFLUENCE ON SAFETY CULTURE
unfolded, for example the Piper
Alpha oil-platform explosion, the
space shuttle Challenger disaster, and the
Zeebrugge ferry incident. Comparable
NHS incidents would include the failings
highlighted in Stafford hospital (high
mortality rates from emergency
admissions), Bristol Royal Infirmary
(high infant surgical mortality rates) and
the Vale of Leven hospital (deaths
associated with Clostridium difficile).
Numerous media-highlighted failings in
safety are commonplace in primary care,
but are often related to individuals rather
than to groups or organisations. It is
really only in the past decade that we
have begun to look seriously at how we
can assess safety culture in healthcare
settings to identify related issues (team
working, communication, leadership,
commitment to safety and so on) and
consider their implications. Two
different, but complementary, methods
exist specifically to enable UK primary
care teams to measure, reflect upon and
improve their safety culture maturity: the
Manchester Patient Safety Framework
(MaPSaF)2 and PC-SafeQuest, which
was developed by NHS Education for
Scotland.3,4
GET STARTED QUICKLY
Introduce some ‘quick wins’
So how do you go about considering
and improving the safety culture in your
team? The first realisation should be that
this is an evolving journey, often fraught
with multiple challenges and obstacles –
it can take time for attitudes to shift,
behaviours to alter and cultural changes
to embed.
But there is the possibility of
introducing some ‘quick wins’ to your
practice by keeping things simple.
Offering pragmatic solutions to issues
that most would judge to be
commonsense interventions will help
you to gain the trust of colleagues.
Consider a few or all of the following
examples of hazards or risks and their
potential solutions, and how they relate
to your practice:
ensure that messages are taken
safely through the use of a message
system
ensure that patients’ records are
accessed by date of birth and then
full name
in consulting rooms, place sharps
boxes on a shelf out of the reach of
children
offer patients who do not attend for
their warfarin checks a safer
alternative
make sure GP bags and on-call/
emergency bags contain a sharps
box
search your practice information
system for events that should rarely, if
ever, happen (eg patients being
34 safety and improvement
4
10 December 2010
co-prescribed warfarin and aspirin
or those who are co-prescribed two
different non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs).
Are you confident that your team’s
patient care in these areas is completely
safe and reliable? Given what we know
about significant events and preventable
harm in primary care, it is possible but
probably unlikely that your supreme
confidence is matched by the front-line
reality in each of these areas. Why not
consider taking one or more of these
issues to colleagues – formally or
informally – as a first stepping stone to
engaging the team more explicitly with
the patient safety agenda? Of course,
you may have your own specific safety
issue you wish to tackle.
Put ‘patient safety’ on the agenda
Increasingly in hospital-based
care we are seeing a cultural
change in the way NHS leaders and
managers perceive the issue of patient
safety. One manifestation of this is the
introduction of ‘patient safety’ as a
standing agenda item at board and other
committee meetings. This conveys the
very real message to patients, staff and
the wider public that safety is taken
seriously and that accountability for this
issue goes straight to the top of the
organisation.
It may be the case that your
team has placed significant event
analysis (SEA) as a standing item
on the agenda at business or practice
team meetings. Although this is
commendable, the patient safety issue –
as we have seen – is much broader than
just SEA and therefore deserves greater
recognition and respect. In the next
12 months – and with patient safety
firmly established as a standing agenda
item – the practice could consider some
of the following tasks as one way of
quick feedback on specific
aspects of the services provided.
However, there are other effective
methods of interacting with our
patients and gathering arguably
more meaningful – even emotionally
powerful – feedback that can act as the
catalyst for care teams to transform the
way they deliver services, treat patients
or interact with the public. Table 2
outlines some of the different levels and
ways in which we can inform, consult
and involve our patients. The
Department of Health and others have
published an abundance of guidance on
creative ways for healthcare teams to
engage with patients and the public as
part of continuous improvement
efforts.7–9
CONCLUSION
Primary care is only now beginning to
draw upon some of the safety-related
ideas, concepts and techniques that
have been introduced into many
secondary care settings in the past
decade. Much of what is described here
and in the previous articles10–28 may
appear new to readers, but it is either an
innovative twist on a familiar theme or
largely common sense.
It is not proposed that the approaches
highlighted are undertaken in addition
to the safety and improvement efforts
that you are already contractually
obliged to deliver on. However, you may
find that some of these proactive tools
and concepts are more suitable for the
task at hand. For example, two safety-
focused approaches to clinical audit (a
compulsory practice activity) have been
described in part 2 – the ‘trigger tool
method’ and ‘care bundles’ – which can
be adapted to your needs at no
opportunity cost. Similarly, most
modern practices have routine team
meetings and dedicated learning time
slots – assessing and reflecting on local
safety culture during these sessions
should not be difficult.
The big challenge is to think
more critically and smartly about how
the issues of patient safety and
improvement are perceived and
approached in the practice, and perhaps
draw some inspiration from the
principles and ideas outlined in this
series of articles.
Inform Feedback Involve
Individual
level
Letter/email/
website
Survey/patientstory/
interviews
Patientshadowing/
ExpertPatient
Programme
Collective
level
Newsletter  Focusgroups
 Interactive(online
community)
 Criticalfriendgroups
 Citizen’sjury
TABLE 2. WAYS TO ENGAGE PATIENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT
slowly developing the prevailing safety
culture:
create a manual or intranet-based log
to capture significant events or
important near misses
gain the commitment of all clinicians
to formally report at least one patient
safety incident in the next 12 months
begin to assess practice safety
culture using a suitable instrument,
repeating every 12–18 months
appoint a ‘patient safety champion
to galvanise and lead the team,
eg the practice nurse
try out a primary care trigger too5
(see part 2) on 15 electronic patient
records to identify safety-related
learning needs
interview a few regular patients or set
up small focus groups (eg those
taking warfarin) to enable you to
begin exploring and capturing their
experiences of healthcare.
ASSESS THE PATIENT
EXPERIENCE
‘We must step back from measuring
everything that moves to measuring
less but with a relentless focus on
what matters: clinical quality, patient
safety and, particularly, patient
satisfaction with services.
Andy Burnham
(Health Secretary, 2009)
Learning about our patients’
experiences of primary care in
order to better understand their
needs and priorities is now viewed
as an essential component of improving
the quality and safety of healthcare.
The evidence for involving patients in
how we plan, monitor and improve the
care we provide is strong.6 We already
survey some patients as part of the
Quality and Outcomes Framework and
this can be a useful way to get some
safety and improvement35
10 December 2010
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POINTS FOR PRACTICE
•Thepracticeleadershipultimatelycreatesthenecessaryworkplace
conditionstoensurethatpatientsafetyandcareimprovementare
valuedaseverybody’sbusiness
•Youcanmakesimplechangesandchecksimmediatelytoimprove
localsafetyculture
•Gainingvaluable–andsometimesunique–insightsfrompatients’
experiencesisessentialtoimprovingsafetyandcarequality
Theothertwoarticlesinthisshort
seriesonsafetyinprimarycareare:
•BowieP.Buildingasafetyand
improvementcultureinprimarycare.
Practice Nurse2010;40(8):38–40
•BowieP.Reportingandlearning
fromharmfulincidents.Practice
Nurse2010;40(9):38–41
... Patient safety culture is reflected in the beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, values and patterns of behaviour of an organisation and its employees toward safety (Bowie, 2010;Muls et al., 2015). As recently evidenced in such investigations as the Mid Staffordshire Trust inquiry (Francis, 2013), healthcare environments have been acknowledged as high-risk and a lack of a safety culture has major effects on patient outcomes. ...
... To overcome system faults, setting patient safety as an organisational priority assists in fostering a culture of safety (Auer et al., 2014). A strong safety culture will use failings to adapt work practices aiming to improve and enhance patient care, thus increasing positive outcomes (Bowie, 2010). Development of a safety culture relies upon engagement at all levels, communication between executive and unit levels, and trust in organisational leaders and management (Ammouri, Tailakh, Muliira, Geethakrishnan & Al Kindi, 2014;Auer et al., 2014). ...
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Aims and objectives: To explore the connection between+6 nursing leadership and enhanced patient safety. Background: Critical reports from the Institute of Medicine in 1999 and Francis QC report of 2013 indicate that healthcare organisations, inclusive of nursing leadership, were remiss or inconsistent in fostering a culture of safety. The factors required to foster organisational safety culture include supportive leadership, effective communication, an orientation program and ongoing training, appropriate staffing, open communication regarding errors, compliance to policy and procedure, and environmental safety and security. As nurses have the highest patient interaction, and leadership is discernible at all levels of nursing, nurse leaders are the nexus to influencing organisational culture toward safer practices. Design: The position of this paper is to explore the need to form a nexus between safety culture and leadership for the provision of safe care. Conclusions: Safety is crucial in healthcare for patient safety and patient outcomes. A culture of safety has been exposed as a major influence on patient safety practices, heavily influenced by leadership behaviours. The relationship between leadership and safety plays a pivotal role in creating positive safety outcomes for patient care. A safe culture is one nurtured by effective leadership. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
... To support patient safety in organisations, leaders have a significant role in developing a workforce learning culture, generating a shared commitment to learning, sharing safety lessons and remembering these lessons over time through creation of an organisational memory. 26 With the aim to improve patient safety outcomes in maternity services, the evolution of the Early Notification Scheme' publication1 cites four national workstreams. These are: ...
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This is the first of a series of four co-written papers for the Advancing Practice series. In this paper we briefly explore the relevance of patient safety within the context of NHS Resolution’s publication The second report: The evolution of the Early Notification Scheme.1 In this series, we hope to support Midwives’ understanding of the current maternity safety landscape.
... Over the last decade the United Kingdom's (UK) National Health Service (NHS) has recognised the importance and challenges of developing a culture that prioritises and maximises the safety of the care it provides [16][17][18][19]. Facilitating this within such a diverse organisation is a difficult task, particularly so in primary care where a diverse range of general practices are expected to provide equitable and consistently safe care for their patients despite evolving and complex demands on their services [20,21]. ...
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Background The NHS has recognised the importance of a high quality patient safety culture in the delivery of primary health care in the rapidly evolving environment of general practice. Two tools, PC-SafeQuest and MapSaf, were developed with the intention of assessing and improving patient safety culture in this setting. Both have been made widely available through their inclusion in the Royal College of General Practitioners’ Patient Safety Toolkit and our work offerss a timely exploration of the tools to inform practice staff as to how each might be usefully applied and in which circumstances. Here we present a comparative analysis of their content, and describe the perspectives of staff on their design, outputs and the feasibility of their sustained use. Methods We have used a content analysis to provide the context for the qualitative study of staff experiences of using the tools at a representative range of practices recruited from across the Midlands (UK). Data was collected through moderated focus groups using an identical topic guide. Results A total of nine practices used the PC-SafeQuest tool and four the MapSaf tool. A total of 159 staff completed the PC-SafeQuest tool 52 of whom took part in the subsequent focus group discussions, and 25 staff completed the MapSaf tool all of whom contributed to the focus group discussions. PC-SafeQuest was perceived as quick and easy to use with direct questions pertinent to the work of GP practices providing useful quantitative insight into important areas of safety culture. Though MaPSaF was more logistically challenging, it created a forum for synchronous cross- practice discussions raising awareness of perceptions of safety culture across the practice team. Conclusions Both tools were able to promote reflective and reflexive practice either in individual staff members or across the broader practice team and the oversight they granted provided useful direction for senior staff looking to improve patient safety. Because PC SafeQuest can be easily disseminated and independently completed it is logistically suited to larger practice organisations, whereas the MapSaf tool lends itself to smaller practices where assembling staff in a single workshop is more readily achieved.
... One aspect of patient safety culture is reporting incidents of patient safety (NPSA, 2004). Incidents of patient safety reports are accurate data for evaluation and improvement of service systems oriented to patient safety (Bowie, 2010). SEPTEMBER 2018 Anna Rahmawati, Achmad Rudijanto, Asti Melani Astari patient safety. ...
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This study was conducted to determine the influence of organizational factor, individual factor towards safety patient incident reports, and the influence of organizational factor toward PSI reports through individual factors. This study method was a quantitative cross-sectional. The population is nurses. The sample is determined by purposive sampling, with its quantity is determined based on Slovin formula. The data was analyzed by Partial Least Square (PLS) using SMART PLS program. The result shows that organizational factor has a positive effect toward individual factor, individual factor have a positive effect towards PSI reports, organizational factors have a positive effect towards PSI report, and organizational factors have a positive effect towards PSI report through individual factor. The organizational factor is the most dominant. Manajemen can improve the policies related to the organizational factors by not excluding individual factors.
... Thus, hospital leaders play an essential role in transforming individual thinking, organizational culture and professional hierarchy in medicine. While it takes time for attitudes and behaviors to alter, and organizational cultural changes to be embedded, hospital leaders can introduce some quick wins as the first steps towards garnering support and acceptance from stakeholders of the RRS [87]. ...
... Thus, hospital leaders play an essential role in transforming individual thinking, organizational culture and professional hierarchy in medicine. While it takes time for attitudes and behaviors to alter, and organizational cultural changes to be embedded, hospital leaders can introduce some quick wins as the first steps towards garnering support and acceptance from stakeholders of the RRS [87]. ...
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... The incident report becomes the basis of evaluation and improvement of the health care system, especially patient safety. 2 Huge numbers of PSI in the world and in Indonesia reflect the magnitude of this problem. A study conducted by World Health Organization (WHO) in 2004 in many developed countries including the United State, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Australia found that adverse events ranging from 3.2 to 16.6%. ...
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To develop an international taxonomy describing errors reported by general practitioners in Australia and five other countries. GPs in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States reported errors in an observational pilot study. Anonymous reports were electronically transferred to a central database. Data were analysed by Australian and international investigators. Non-randomly selected GPs: 23 in Australia, and between 8 and 20 in the other participating countries. Error categories, and consequences. In Australia, 17 doctors reported 134 errors, compared with 301 reports by 63 doctors in the other five countries. The final taxonomy was a five-level system encompassing 171 error types. The first-level classification was "process errors" and "knowledge and skills errors". The proportion of errors in each of these primary groups was similar in Australia (79% process; 21% knowledge and skills) and the other countries (80% process; 20% knowledge and skills). Patient harm was reported in 32% of reports from Australia and 30% from other countries. Participants considered the harm "very serious" in 9% of Australian reports and 3% of other countries' reports. This pilot study indicates that errors are likely to affect primary care patients in similar ways in countries with similar primary healthcare systems. Further comparative studies are required to improve our understanding of general practice error differences between Australia and other countries.
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The identification and reduction of medical error has become a major priority for all health care providers, including primary care. Understanding the frequency and nature of medical error in primary care is a first step in developing a policy to reduce harm and improve patient safety. There has been scant research into this area. This review had two objectives; first, to identify the frequency and nature of error in primary care, and, secondly, to consider the possible causes for the diversity in the stated rates and nature of error in primary care. Literature searches of English language studies identified in the National Patient Safety Foundation bibliography database, in Medline and in Embase were carried out. Studies that were relevant to the purpose of the study were included. Additional information was obtained from a specialist medico-legal database. Studies identified that medical error occurs between five and 80 times per 100000 consultations, mainly related to the processes involved in diagnosis and treatment. Prescribing and prescription errors have been identified to occur in up to 11% of all prescriptions, mainly related to errors in dose. There are a wide variety of definitions and methods used to identify the frequency and nature of medical error. Incident reporting, systematic identification and medico-legal databases reveal differing aspects, and there are additional perspectives obtained from GPs, primary health care workers and patients. An understanding of the true frequency and nature of medical error is complicated by the different definitions and methods used in the studies. Further research is warranted to understand the complex nature and causes of such errors that occur in primary care so that appropriate policy decisions to improve patient safety can be made.
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Rationale, aims and objectives: Building a strong and positive safety culture in health care teams and organizations is essential for patient safety. Measuring individual perceptions of safety climate is an integral part of this process. Evidence of the successful application and potential usefulness of this approach is increasingly available for secondary care settings but little is known about the safety climate in UK primary care. We therefore aimed to measure perceptions of safety climate in primary care. Further aims were to determine whether perceptions varied significantly between practice teams and according to specific participant and practice characteristics. Method: We undertook a cross-sectional, anonymous postal questionnaire survey of randomly selected west of Scotland primary care teams. Safety climate mean scores with standard deviations were calculated for respondents, practice teams and the region. Results: A total of 563 (84%) team members from 49 practices (24.5%) returned questionnaires. The overall safety climate mean score was 5.48 (0.78). Significant differences in safety climate perceptions were found at the practice team level (P < 0.001) and for specific characteristics: respondents' years of experience, whether they were community or practice based, their professional roles and practices' training status. Practice managers and general practitioners perceived the safety climate more positive than other respondents (P < 0.001). Conclusion: This was the first known attempt to measure perceptions of safety climate in UK primary care with a validated instrument specifically developed for that purpose. Reported perceptions of the prevailing safety climate were generally positive. This may reflect ongoing efforts to build a strong safety culture in primary care or alternatively point to an overestimation of the effectiveness of local safety systems. The significant variation in perception between certain staff groups has potential safety implications and may have to be aligned for a positive and strong safety culture to be built. While safety climate measurement has various benefits at the individual, practice team and regional level, further research of its association with specific safety outcomes is required.