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Contemporary Security Policy
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Philippine Strategic Culture:
Continuity in the Face of
Changing Regional Dynamics
Renato Cruz de Castro
Published online: 20 Jun 2014.
To cite this article: Renato Cruz de Castro (2014): Philippine Strategic Culture:
Continuity in the Face of Changing Regional Dynamics, Contemporary Security Policy,
DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2014.927673
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.927673
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Philippine Strategic Culture: Continuity in the
Face of Changing Regional Dynamics
RENATO CRUZ DE CASTRO
Abstract: Philippine strategic culture has traditionally been characterized by its emphasis on
internal security through asymmetrical warfare in confronting military challenges and a reliance
on alliance in addressing the country’s strategic inadequacies. Philippine strategic culture is
rooted in the country’s archipelagic geography and isolation from continental Asia, its colonial
history, and liberal-democratic political system. It is a culture long shaped by the strategic
decisions of a small group of elites – about 400 families that have dominated local politics,
economy, and society since the Philippines became independent in 1946. Their preferences
have been reflected in the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) seven-decade campaign
against insurgent groups, lack of conventional capabilities, low defence budget, and dependence
on the United States for military assistance and security guarantees. The changing dynamics of
security in the Asia-Pacific region and strained Philippine–China relations due to the South
China Sea dispute suggest the possibility of erosion of these strategic preferences. The doctrinal
shift from internal security to territorial defence has gained momentum. Careful analysis of the
Aquino administration’s efforts to refocus the AFP from internal security to external defence
shows greater continuity than discontinuity in Philippine strategic culture. Despite grand
claims, government plans to acquire a new weapons system and to build up the navy and the
air force are designed only to achieve a modest deterrence posture. Philippines policy remains
consistent with deeply embedded strategic cultural orientations.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have expended tremendous effort and
resources in combatting domestic insurgencies. In early 2009, however, the country
was suddenly jolted by a large Chinese naval presence in Philippine territorial
waters and China’s greater assertiveness over the question of control of the Spratly
Islands. This confrontation began when President Gloria Arroyo’s government
passed Republic Act No. 9522 of March 2009, the Philippine Baseline Act, an exten-
sion of the country’s maritime boundaries to incorporate the Spratlys. Soon after the
president signed the law, China deployed a fishery patrol vessel and sent six more
patrol vessels allegedly to curb illegal fishing in the disputed area. To the Philippines,
however, these moves signalled China’s efforts to consolidate its jurisdictional claims,
expand its naval reach, and attempt to undermine the positions of other claimant states
through coercive diplomacy.
1
Belatedly, the Arroyo government realized the need to
develop the capability to protect its vast maritime borders as well as its territorial
claim over some islands in the Spratlys.
The AFP’s doctrinal shift from internal security to territorial defence gained
momentum with the ascendancy of Benigno Aquino III to the Philippine presidency.
Contemporary Security Policy, 2014, pp.1–21
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.927673 #2014 Taylor & Francis
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Aquino vowed to pursue the modernization of the armed forces, and a joint commit-
tee of the Department of National Defense (DND) and the AFP was established to
formulate the armed forces ‘Long-Term Capability Development Plan’.
2
The plan
requires the appropriation of Php 421 billion (USD 8.5 billion), with the lion’s
share going to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and the Philippine Navy (PN)
instead of the Philippine Army (PA). Of this budget, Php 200 billion (USD 4
billion) is earmarked for the PAF’s acquisition of multi-role and lead-in fighter
planes, surface attack aircraft, and long-range reconnaissance planes. It also envisions
the navy obtaining multi-role attack vessels, offshore patrol craft, and advanced
surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. The plan rationalizes the upgrade of
the navy’s materiel for the purpose of ‘joint maritime surveillance, defense, and inter-
diction operations in the South China Sea’.
3
The government claimed that this would
establish a modest but ‘comprehensive border protection program’, anchored in sur-
veillance, deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the PAF, the navy and the
Coast Guard that will extend from Philippine territorial waters to its contiguous
and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
4
Beyond these claims of modesty, however,
this move appears to signal a doctrinal shift away from the Philippine military’s tra-
ditional focus on internal security/counter-insurgency to external/conventional
defence.
This article examines the Aquino administration’s efforts to focus on territorial
defence through the lens of strategic culture. It catalogues the transition underway
from a focus on guerrilla or low-intensity warfare, coupled with a heavy reliance
on alliance to make up for the country’s strategic limitations, to something new.
The article addresses whether there are emerging persistent patterns in 21
st
-century
Philippine strategic policy and goals, in relation to key features, sources, and the
country’s military history, and whether these changes represent a fundamental
break from the past or simply another facet of its existing strategic orientation. A
survey of how Philippine strategic culture has influenced major security decisions
and policies over time also offers valuable insights on prospects for regional conflict
and cooperation.
Historical Background: The ‘Guerrilla Tradition’ and Reliance on Alliance
In the fields of strategic studies and military history, strategic culture refers to deeply
embedded conceptions and notions of national security that take root among the elite
and the masses alike. As noted in the introductory article, theorists argue that strategic
culture encapsulates a country’s security posture, its place in the international hierar-
chy of power, and the nature and scope of its external ambition.
5
In the formulation of
a national strategy, strategic culture establishes pervasive and long-lasting prefer-
ences by providing ideas on the role of military force in international politics and
clothing them in an aura of factuality, reality, and efficacy.
6
These preferences,
however, are also affected by changes in other areas such as technology, threat, or
social organization.
7
Thus, strategic culture both reflects and moulds public attitudes
and becomes institutionalized in the structure and process of decision-making. It
determines how political leaders, bureaucrats, and even military services define
2CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
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central roles and missions in the national security domain. Strategic culture shapes
military policies in peacetime, as well as in times of conflict, thereby demonstrating
definitive national styles that may be reflected in propensities regarding the use of
force in international affairs.
8
Guerrilla Warfare/Asymmetric Conflict
Shaped by centuries of colonial domination and rocked by internal conflicts, Philip-
pine strategic culture has been characterized by the preference to defend national
security by any means possible. Historically, this has involved a reliance on guerrilla
or low-intensity, or asymmetric warfare, as well as the need for allies to address stra-
tegic gaps brought about by the society’s limited resources for national defence.
Guerrilla warfare is defined by ‘military and paramilitary operations conducted in
enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominately indigenous forces’.
9
Guerrilla warfare, however, does not refer to the nature of the combatants but to
how warfare is conducted. In interstate conflicts, guerrilla warfare might be waged
by a weaker state’s application of asymmetric strategy against a more powerful
one. A weaker state might avoid battles it could not win, divide its military forces
into small groups, and at the appropriate time concentrate them to make a quick
but decisive attack on a superior enemy force. An asymmetric strategy also
depends on mobility, stealth, knowledge of the terrain, and deception to make up
for lack in numbers and war materiel.
10
Philippine strategic culture is also partly a function of the country’s peculiar geo-
graphic characteristics. The Philippines is composed of 7,100 islands (only 1,000 of
which are inhabited) that occupy a wide maritime area, stretching for 1,850 km from
about the fifth to the twentieth parallels north latitude. Topographically, the country is
fragmented by inland waters and it has one of the longest coastlines in the world
(about 10,850 miles, or twice as long as that of the continental United States). All
the islands are of volcanic origin, with hilly or mountainous centres and limited
arable lands located either in the narrow strips of coastal plain or central valleys.
Because of the country’s harsh terrain, pre-Spanish colonial societies existed as
primitive economic units with a system of subsistence agriculture producing barely
enough to develop and sustain a highly stratified and more complex community
with larger and centralized military organization. Moreover, these fragmented fea-
tures make the country difficult to defend against a determined invader controlling
the archipelago’s maritime surroundings.
The Philippines’ propensity for asymmetric warfare stems, in part, from the
failure of the pre-Spanish societies to evolve into a central government with either
an organized military force or a distinct warrior class. Since there was no centralized
political organization before the Spanish colonial period, low-intensity warfare
through raiding rather than pitch decisive battles was the preferred form of fighting
among the pre-colonial tribes. Studying the Philippines’ pre-colonial tribal armed
encounters, American anthropologist Laura Lee Junker noted that ‘maritime
raiding aimed at the seizures of slaves, rather than territories, was the primary
motive for this form of warfare’.
11
Accordingly, a highly fragmented geography, a
high degree of ecological and cultural heterogeneity, and low population densities
PHILIPPINE STRATEGIC CULTURE 3
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relative to productive agricultural land discouraged military seizure and long-term
occupation of territories. Maritime raiding was the preferred military tactic to
accumulate wealth and earn prestige. Archaeological evidence suggests that when
the Spaniards arrived in the 16th century, internal conflicts were rife, with raids con-
ducted by the various villages against each other ‘for the slightest reason, to avenge
an attack, treachery, or robbery, to capture wives, or to extract debts’.
12
Military his-
torian Cesar Pobre has observed that in low-intensity pre-colonial warfare, ‘luring the
enemy into an ambush while at sea, quick and sudden raids by several vessels, and
plundering of or sacking of coastal communities and ships were common’.
13
In summary, the Filipino response to a series of invasions and occupations by
great powers with technologically advanced and professional armies – from
Spanish colonialism to Japanese conquest during World War II – was often asym-
metric or low-intensity warfare. This involved deployments of insurgents or irregu-
lars who employed deceit, secrecy, sudden mass uprising followed by a resort to
hit-and-run tactics, ambush, mobility, and raids against well-trained and larger colo-
nial armies. These insurgents used the tactical advantage provided by the archipela-
go’s fragmented and sometimes inaccessible topography and mountainous rainforest
to elude their more powerful opponents and avoid major battles against superior foes.
Thus, the country has a deep historical tradition of resistance and even insurgency in
the interest of national security.
Reliance on Alliance
Perhaps ironically, another dimension of Philippine strategic culture over time has
been a distinct preference for alliance with a foreign power. The underdeveloped
economy, the colonial origins of the Philippine state, and military needs have fostered
dependence on alliances to fill the gaps in the country’s strategic requirements.
14
The
Philippine military tradition can be traced to the late 19th century when the Spanish
colonial administration integrated Filipino units into the Spanish army.
15
In its four
decades of American colonial rule, the United States established two military organ-
izations, the Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Scouts, which became the
foundations of the modern Philippine military.
16
In 1935, the creation of the Com-
monwealth government of President Manuel Quezon committed a quarter of the
country’s budget to the formation of a national army and designated General
Douglas MacArthur to formulate the national defence plan.
Traumatized by the Japanese invasion and occupation, and cognisant of its
inability to deter external aggression, the newly proclaimed Philippine Republic
forged close security ties with the United States. Manila and Washington signed
the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, formalizing ties that had existed for decades
with several military facilities in the Philippines providing a de facto security guar-
antee to the former US colony. During the Cold War, American military facilities in
the Philippines provided logistical support to American forward deployed forces
operating in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and even the Persian Gulf. Specifi-
cally, the storage and transit servicing capabilities of these facilities were vital for
American forces throughout the East Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, American
air and naval assets in those facilities served as de facto armed forces against external
4CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
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threats since the Philippine military was preoccupied with counter-insurgency
operations.
Prior to 1992, the presence of the American forces was an effective deterrent
against any external attack on the country. The Philippines also received base-
related economic and security assistance packages under the Military Assistance
Program (MAP) of 1947 in the form of the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit. Were it not for the presence of the American
forces, the Philippine government would have had to spend a fortune on external
defence. Some estimates claim that the Philippines saved more than USD 7 billion
over a ten-year period (1980 – 1989) because of base-related economic and military
assistance and reduced defence expenditures.
17
Consequently, the Philippine military
neglected the development of any external defence capability, and instead focused on
the more pressing matter of counter-insurgency.
18
After the withdrawal of the American forces in 1992, the Philippine government
appeared to rethink the necessity of the alliance for its internal and external defence.
In 1997, the two countries signed the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which
resumed the large-scale joint military training and exercises. Invoking the 1951
Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), Manila continues to rely on Washington to
enhance the armed forces’ skill in internal security operations, develop a better
trained and well-equipped Rapid Deployment Force with counter-terrorism/
counter-insurgency capabilities, and attain military competence in leading Combined
Joint Task Force Operations.
19
The Keepers of Philippine Strategic Culture
Strategic culture tends to be transmitted from one generation to another through the
socialization of preferences, values, and goals. It generates images and symbols that
mould public attitudes and become institutionalized, routine, and procedural in
decision-making. They also determine the vision and goals of political leaders, gov-
ernment bureaucracies, and the military define their central roles and missions.
20
As
such, human agents are crucial in these political and strategic processes. The elite
may serve as primary keepers and generational conveyers of a state’s strategic
culture. Their interests and views are considered as givens to maximize the country’s
wealth and security. Elite interests influence how key decision-makers choose from
competing options to secure national interests. In turn, as a ‘negotiated reality’
among the politico-strategic elite, strategic culture sets the parameters of politically
legitimate preferences in security policies, affects how the society conceives its stra-
tegic interests, and determines strategic priorities.
21
The 400 families who have dominated Philippine politics and government since
1946 constitute the country’s politico-strategic elite.
22
They fund individual candi-
dates for elected office (many of whom are members of their clans) and political
parties, and buy the loyalty of government bureaucrats and military officers in a
variety of ways.
23
The elite act as rent-seeking political powerbrokers who support
successive Philippine presidents and members of the Congress. In return, they
require national officials to provide them with local and national largesse, thereby
PHILIPPINE STRATEGIC CULTURE 5
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compromising the state’s integrity and autonomy and diminishing its resources.
24
The
elite exercise their influence on the country’s defence affairs and armed forces by
wielding power and influence over the state’s principal means of coercion legally
through the military and police force, who in turn hold in check non-state armies,
militias, and insurgents. Historically, they also have taken decisions that reshape,
ignore, or circumvent the strategic interests of the military establishment.
Taking into account the country’s limited agricultural resources and challenging
topography, Filipino elites tend to believe that the government will never have suffi-
cient funds on its own to enable the country to defend itself against external threat.
Lending credence to this view is the Philippines’ geographic isolation from the rest
of Asia which, not unlike the Australian experience, nurtures a widespread but erro-
neous notion that its country’s maritime borders are an impenetrable moat against
external threat. As a result, the elite tend to show little interest in strategic matters
and concentrate on extracting rents by manipulating regulations to reallocate the
state’s limited resources earmarked for defence spending to their socio-political pri-
orities.
25
Their control over the country’s legislative institutions and local govern-
ment units has enabled them to cut the defence budget considerably and to create
significant checks against the military.
After World War II, the Philippines signed four security agreements with the
United States to ensure that the country remained under the American security
umbrella and with the concomitant military assistance to the Philippine armed
forces. The elite were thus able to channel scarce public funds to their own priorities,
primarily public works and education. They also influenced defence policies through
their control of the bicameral Philippine Congress. Likewise, they controlled
appropriation and budgetary matters, as well as the country’s defence programmes.
Generally, these legislators devoted their time in office to the pursuit of electoral
success – public works projects and patronage – and remained suspicious of the mili-
tary by subjecting defence budgets to minute scrutiny.
26
One expert has observed that
while the Philippine civil-military record bears considerable similarity to those of its
Southeast Asian neighbours, the AFP does not have the influence or actual clout of
the militaries in Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma.
27
Currently, the Philippine elite’s control of the Philippine Congress enables them
to exercise important checks on the military through the creation of a separate Philip-
pine National Police (PNP) under a separate civilian agency. They have institutiona-
lized a ban on active military personnel holding civilian government positions, thus
insulating the military from partisan politics. The result has been that top-ranking
military officers, including the Chief of Staff, are beholden to the concurrence of
the powerful Commission on Appointments, which scrutinizes the defence budget
to the minutest detail and places sharp limits on spending.
Aside from restricting the allocation of resources for national defence, the elite
historically have perceived internal security challenges as the main strategic
concern of the state. As two scholars note:
The discourse on national security in the Philippines is rooted in conflicts and
identity of the nation-state, over regime legitimacy, and over socio-economic
6CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
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inequality, which continue to create tension between state and society. Unlike
more established states, the Philippine state has not achieved an effective mon-
opoly of means of coercion within its boundaries and is still engaged in a
process of nation-building ...
28
Thus, despite being a maritime and an archipelagic state in a volatile region of the
world, the Philippine government’s primary security concern has been the contain-
ment of the social unrest attributed largely to the widening gap between the rich
and the poor.
29
The AFP has focused its attentions, efforts, and resources on contain-
ing various domestic insurgency movements since World War II. In the 1970s, the
Philippines experienced two separate, enduring insurgencies that have cyclically
flared and abated resulting in more than 50,000 deaths – the communist New
People’s Army (NPA) in the main island of Luzon, and the secessionist Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF). This resulted in the primacy of counter-insur-
gency/Internal Security Operations (ISOs) over maritime security. The situation
was further reinforced by the absence of any viable external security threat and the
Philippines’ reliance on the United States for its territorial defence requirements.
30
Strategic Culture and Philippine Security Policy
In the early 1990s, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) began an ambitious
modernization programme to transform the Philippine military into a conventional
armed force comparable to other Southeast Asian militaries, but the outcome of
this programme was more of the same: a continued focus on counter-insurgency at
home, complicated by limited resources. This plan originated from strategic rethink-
ing at the end of the Cold War and the AFP’s tactical successes against the communist
insurgency. In the late 1980s, the AFP had adopted the Lambat Bitag (Fishing Net)
strategy consisting of three components: (1) the deployment of elite army units
Special Operations Team (SOT) to conduct psychological/military operations in
communist-influenced hamlets; (2) a territorial security scheme forming local mili-
tias to defend the village against mobile insurgent groups; and (3) stay-behind or con-
solidation operations to facilitate the entry of civilian agencies bringing basic services
and generating economic activities in the targeted village.
This AFP strategy required the use of the ‘whole government approach’ in which
all state agencies were to be involved in the counter-insurgency efforts. Operation-
ally, the military would ensure that the insurgents were pushed out of the areas
under their control or induced to capitulate so that civilian agencies could bring
back basic services to the people. However, after neutralizing the insurgents, the
AFP units themselves stayed on to deliver social services to the people since the
local government could not function effectively in former insurgent-controlled terri-
tories. Thus, AFP units were deployed for longer than expected, and in time this pres-
ence increased the military’s political and administrative clout, enabling it to
constrain or challenge other state institutions operating in the countryside. Even-
tually, the SOT halted the expansion of the communist movement in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.
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Perhaps more importantly, this proposed transformation also was a function of the
Philippine Senate’s non-concurrence with the Philippine – United States Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation of 1991 (PACT), and the subsequent withdrawal of
American military forces from the country. Many believed that in light of these cir-
cumstances the Philippines simply had to develop at least rudimentary external
defence capabilities. The plan envisioned the acquisition of multi-role fighter
planes, off-shore patrol vessels, long-range maritime patrol craft, naval multi-role
helicopters, coastal patrol boats, and naval missile systems.
31
However, through their control of the Congress the Philippine elite used the
‘power of the purse’ to micromanage and delay this modernization programme,
and it was shelved during the Asian financial crisis in 1997.
32
Six years after the
passage of the AFP modernization law, the Philippine Congress had released only
Php 5.4 billion. This figure was well below the promised Php 50 billion for the
planned military modernization. This lull enabled the AFP and the Philippine Depart-
ment of National Defense (DND) to address the legal, administrative, and financial
issues of the programme.
33
Then, in mid 1998, newly elected president Joseph
Estrada declared a one-year moratorium on government funding to AFP moderniz-
ation, citing more pressing domestic concerns such as the Asian financial meltdown
and the national budget deficit.
Paradoxically, the aborted AFP modernization programme was primarily an off-
shoot of legislative acts – Republic Act No. 7898 of 1995 (an Act Providing for the
Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines) and Joint Resolution No. 28 of
1996 (the Joint Declaration of the Philippine Congress Approving the AFP Modern-
ization Program) – and not of a strategic exigency faced by the Philippine military
during the post-American bases period. Congressional reluctance to support any
major AFP reform involving an increase in defence budgets and arms modernization
sprang from two factors: a dominant view among the Philippine elite that addressing
internal security threats that directly challenge their traditional authority and property
rights rather than external defence is the more urgent task for the AFP;
34
and a senti-
ment within the civilian government that any dramatic increase in defence spending is
a ‘guns-versus-butter issue’.
In February 1996, the Philippines discovered Chinese military structures on Mis-
chief Reef, 130 miles west of the island of Palawan. Lacking viable air and naval capa-
bilities and growing increasingly apprehensive about Chinese naval presence in the
South China Sea, the Philippines revived its dormant alliance with the United States.
In late 1996, Washington and Manila entered into negotiations on an agreement that
would provide legal guarantees to American servicemen deployed in the Philippines
during military exercises and ship visits. It took the allies two years to conclude an
accord; both sides found themselves locked in very tense, protracted, and passionate
negotiations. In February 1998, the two allies finally signed the Visiting Forces Agree-
ment (VFA), and in the following year the Philippine Senate concurred with the treaty.
The VFA regulates the circumstances and conditions under which American
forces may enter Philippine territory for bilateral military exercises. It also establishes
a legal procedure for resolving differences between the allies regarding the
implementation of the agreement. The VFA facilitates large-scale military exercises
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between the allies, which in turn enhance military-to-military cooperation at the staff
level, and combat readiness for combined operations and long-term interoperabil-
ity.
35
The VFA is deemed important to the revival of post-American bases and Phi-
lippine–United States security relations for at least two reasons. Firstly, it paved the
way for the resumption of large-scale military exercises between the allies’ armed
forces. Secondly, it provided the political framework for American involvement in
the AFP’s programme to modernize and later upgrade its military hardware.
Strategic Culture and Counter-insurgency
Without resources to modernize its military and confront the perennial security chal-
lenge of insurgency, the Arroyo administration directed the AFP to focus on internal
security that bore heavily on the military and deteriorated itsterritorial defence capabili-
ties. In late 2001, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 21 or the National
Internal Security Plan (NISP). It called for a holistic approach, consisting of political,
socio-economic/psychological, security, and information components to stamp out
the root causes of the armed violence engendered by the insurgent movements. The
NISP identified three major internal security threats: the CPP-New People’s Army
(CPP-NPA), the secessionist groups in Mindanao, and terrorist groups like the Abu
Sayyaff. The AFP formulated the 2002 Operational Plan Bantay Laya (Freedom
Watch) to ‘intensify the conduct of counterinsurgency operations’ and eradicate the
Abu Sayyaff and the NPA. The anti-insurgency programme also tasked the military
with neutralizing the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) to create a secure environment in Mindanao conducive for
national development. Consequently, the AFP was drawn into ‘fighting on two
fronts’ (the communist insurgents in Luzon and the Visayas islands, and the MILF/
Abu Sayyaff in Mindanao). In the process, it quickly recognized that its combat capa-
bilities and government support were inadequate to end the communist insurgency by
2010, and to effect the disarmament, demobilization, and integration of the MILF.
36
Focused on internal security, the AFP’s territorial defence development efforts
were relegated to the sidelines. Materiel intended for territorial defence was used
for internal security purposes. Furthermore, scarce financial resources for AFP mod-
ernization were diverted to personnel costs and to the combat operations against
insurgent groups. An average of 70 per cent of the defence budget went to personnel
services, while only about 29 per cent was allotted to maintenance and other operat-
ing expenses (MOE).
37
At the same time, capital outlay for the acquisition of new
equipment was less than 1 per cent of the budget. An internal AFP paper from this
period bemoaned: ‘Unfortunately, this proportion for personnel and MOE leaves
nothing for capital outlay which is necessary for the organizational development of
the armed forces’.
38
Furthermore, the participation in internal security operations
exposed AFP officers and men to the culture of graft and corruption from its larger
environment (the civil society).
39
This, in turn, resulted in the drain of valuable
resources, compromising the military’s overall combat efficiency and effectiveness.
40
Setting aside its modernization plan, the AFP merely upgraded existing capabili-
ties through the AFP Capability Upgrade Program (CUP). The programme involved
refurbishment of transportation, upgrade of military firepower, and improvement of
PHILIPPINE STRATEGIC CULTURE 9
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communication facilities for internal security operations.
41
From 2002 to 2011, the
AFP’s shopping list consisted of combat helmets, body armour, squad-machine
guns, combat life-saver kits, ground attack planes, and night-capable attack helicop-
ters. Instead of replacing its aging F-5A fighter planes with F-16 Falcons or Torna-
does, the military prioritized the acquisition or reconditioning of Killer Medium
patrol crafts from South Korea, OV-10s from Thailand, and UH-1H Huey helicopters
from the United States. These capability upgrade projects were undertaken on the
assumption that the Philippines would not face any external security challenge
until 2018. Acquisition of a weapons system for territorial defence was never con-
sidered, and plans to purchase military hardware and to conduct training for external
defence remained dormant.
42
The remaining scarce military resources were concentrated on internal security
operations in the mid 2000s. The DND formally determined that there was ‘no
immediate external security threat to the Philippines’.
43
In 2005, the AFP leadership
decommissioned the Philippine Air Force’s (PAF’s) remaining F-5A/B fighters,
leaving the country devoid of any external defence capabilities. Because there
were no fighter planes, the PAF also deactivated the Air Defense Command as part
of its restructuring plan.
44
Moreover, the AFP was forced to utilize its military materiel continuously under
‘adverse combat conditions’, causing excessive wear and tear that reduced their
effectiveness and reliability.
45
The September 2007 AFP Capability Assessment pro-
vided a thorough and revealing analysis of the AFP’s deteriorating materiel and
combat capabilities. The report stated that the poor condition of the equipment
severely affected the military’s effectiveness and efficiency in counter-insurgency
operations and that the emphasis on low-intensity conflicts (LICs) diverted the
AFP’s attention and resources away from external defence-related modernization
projects.
46
Regarding territorial defence, it noted that the ‘PN lacks the assets for
conduct of maritime patrols over territorial waters, since it does not have any
anti-air capability and is incapable of conducting anti-submarine and mine warfare
operations’.
47
Similarly, it underscored the PAF’s inadequacy in air defence, surveil-
lance, air-lift, and ground attack capabilities. Consequently, even the limited military
resources for internal security operations became inadequate given the AFP’s hercu-
lean tasks of eradicating three insurgent movements by 2010.
The shock of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the
subsequent global campaign against terrorism gave Manila a new opening to
enlist Washington’s support for its internal security agenda. In the aftermath of its
quasi-constitutional seizure of political power in early 2001, the fledgling Arroyo
administration sorely needed American military assistance to strengthen the
Philippine military’s counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism capabilities. Thus,
the president immediately declared her support for Washington’s war on terror by
offering American forces access to the country’s airspace and allowing US Special
Forces to conduct training operations with the AFP in the southern island of
Basilan. It is important to emphasize, however, that for the Arroyo administration,
the urgency of substantially improving the Philippine military’s counter-terrorism/
counter-insurgency capabilities remained the primary rationale behind heightened
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political-military ties with the United States.
48
Indeed, shortly after opening ties for
the war on terrorism, the AFP was granted access to the American military’s excess
hardware. More importantly, the Philippine military participated in several large-
scale training exercises with American forces. Training exercises between the AFP
and American armed forces generally focused on counter-insurgency and counter-ter-
rorism warfare, logistics and equipment maintenance, intelligence training, and civic-
military operations. In time, the Philippines became one of the largest recipients of
American security assistance.
Strategic Cultural Change?
By the late 2000s, circumstances appeared ripe for a shift in Philippine strategic
culture. Throughout his 2010 election campaign, presidential candidate Benigno
Simeon Aquino III promoted a shift in military doctrine from a focus on internal
security to maritime/territorial defence. Aquino also alleged that the Arroyo admin-
istration and the AFP colluded in various questionable practices. These included
massive electoral fraud in Mindanao in 2004, misuse of public funds, and extra-judi-
cial killings of political activists when the military intensified its internal security
operations against domestic insurgent groups. Upon assuming the presidency in
June 2010, Aquino vowed to pursue transparency and accountability in governance,
as well as to modernize the AFP in line with its shifting focus. The renewal of Amer-
ican ties and the legacy of the Aquino families’ links to the West suggested the
country could operate from a position of strength. At the same time, developments
in the South China Sea strained Philippine – China relations and provided further
impetus for modernization and doctrinal changes for the AFP.
On 2 March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats harassed a survey ship commissioned
by the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct oil exploration in the Reed
Bank (now called Recto Bank), approximately 150 km east of the Spratly Islands and
250 km west of the Philippine island of Palawan. The Aquino administration was
stunned by the Chinese action since this maritime encounter happened east of the
Spratlys archipelago and its adjacent waters. Two days after the incident, the Philip-
pine government filed a protest before the Chinese embassy in Manila. A Department
of Foreign Affairs spokesperson commented, ‘the Philippines is (simply) seeking an
explanation for the incident’.
49
Brushing aside the Philippine complaint, a Chinese
embassy official insisted that China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha
Islands and their adjacent territory.
In early June 2011, the Philippines sought clarification on the sightings of China
Marine Surveillance (CMS) and People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) ships
near the Kalayaan group of islands. The Philippine defence and foreign secretaries
publicly expressed the Aquino administration’s serious concerns over the alleged
Chinese intrusion into the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to stake
China’s territorial claim and to conduct possible construction of an oil rig on the unin-
habited Iroquois Bank. They asserted that these were ‘clear violations of the China–
ASEAN 2001 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea’.
50
In
response, the Chinese foreign ministry sternly told the Philippines to stop ‘harming
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China’s sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, which leads to unilateral
actions that can expand and complicate [the] South China Sea dispute’.
51
Beijing
then went on to demand that Manila first seek Chinese permission before it conducts
oil exploration activities, even within the Philippines EEZ. China, in fact, was bad-
gering the Philippines and other claimant states to recognize China’s sovereign
claim over the South China Sea.
52
China’s heavy-handed attitude and seeming dis-
missal of claims by the Philippines and Vietnam in the first half of 2011 escalated
the territorial dispute. By then, President Aquino clearly recognized that the Philip-
pines was on a collision course with China in the South China Sea.
The 2 March 2011 incident in the Reed Bank and China’s brusque response to the
Philippine diplomatic queries prompted the Aquino administration to hasten the
development of the AFP’s territorial defence capabilities. In June 2011, the executive
branch of the government and the AFP agreed on a multi-year, multi-billion peso
defence upgrade spending and military build-up. The Department of Budget Manage-
ment (DBM) released a Multi-Year Obligation Authority (MOA) to the Department
of National Defense, allowing the AFP to enter into multi-year contracts with other
governments or private arms and military hardware manufacturers. The DBM also
committed Php 40 billion (estimated USD 800 million) in the next five years
(2012–2016) to develop the AFP’s capabilities for greater domain awareness of
the Philippine territorial waters and EEZ.
In the proposed ‘rolling’ programme, the executive branch would ask the Philip-
pine Congress to allocate Php 8 billion (or USD 160 million) annually for the pro-
curement of air defence surveillance radar, surface attack aircraft, close air support
aircraft, combat utility helicopters, and long-range patrol aircraft.
53
Also covered
are current upgrade programmes such as installation of a radar and communication
network along the coast of Palawan and East Mindanao under the Coast Watch
System and the acquisition of three refurbished US Coast Guard Hamilton class
cutters for the Philippine Navy. These undertakings, according to former AFP
Chief of Staff General Eduardo Oban Jr., clearly prioritize territorial defence over
domestic security.
In October 2011, Department of National Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin
released the Defense Planning Guidance, 2013 – 2018, restructuring the AFP as a
‘lean but fully capable’ armed force to confront the challenges to the country’s terri-
torial integrity and maritime security. This envisioned the development of an effec-
tive force projection capability to monitor the Philippines’ territorial waters and EEZ.
It contained the following measures:
54
1. Reduction of infantry and marine battalions and the redirection of limited
financial resources to key priorities such as theatre mobility, close air
support, air surveillance, and air defence.
2. Acquisition of naval assets for off-shore patrol, strategic sea-lift, and accompa-
nying base support system and platform to sustain the deployed maritime assets.
3. Development of the AFP’s long-range maritime air patrol and surveillance
through the acquisition of assets for long-range maritime air patrol, and
accompanying base support system.
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4. Reactivation of the Philippine Air Defense System (PADS) through the acqui-
sition of air surveillance radar and a squadron of air defence/surface attack air-
craft to provide air defence coverage over areas of high concern.
In its first 17 months in office, the Aquino administration spent Php 33.596 billion
(USD 387 million) to boost the AFP’s internal security and territorial defence capa-
bility.
55
According to Secretary Gazmin, the DND and AFP signed 138 defence con-
tracts that will be implemented in the next five years to improve the AFP’s force
protection, maritime surveillance, transportation, and combat support systems.
56
General Oban’s successor, Lieutenant-General Jessie Dellosa (of the Philippine
Army), promised to support the AFP’s shift to territorial defence. His major concerns
include the full implementation of the Internal Peace and Security Plan; organiz-
ational reforms to ensure fiscal transparency within the military establishment;
strengthening the AFP’s territorial defence capabilities; and development of the Phi-
lippine Navy to enhance maritime security in the West Philippine Sea.
57
In January
2012, the DND reduced the number of army and marine battalions to divert resources
and personnel for internal security and civil-military operations to maritime and ter-
ritorial defence priorities.
58
Officially, the Philippines’ territorial defence goal is to establish a modest but
‘comprehensive border protection program’. This programme is anchored in the sur-
veillance, deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the Philippine Air Force, navy
and Coast Guard that extend from the country’s territorial waters to its contiguous and
Exclusive Economic Zone.
59
This objective would require enhancing the AFP’s capa-
bilities, prioritizing its needs, and gradually restructuring its forces for territorial
defence. The long-term goal, according to the AFP’s 2011 Strategic Intent,isto
maintain a ‘credible deterrent posture against foreign intrusion or external aggression,
and other illegal activities while allowing free navigation to prosper’.
60
If deterrence
fails, the last resort is to rely on hit-and-run tactics against the vastly superior Chinese
navy and air force.
Based on the 2008 Defense Plan Aguila (Hawk), AFP units will only engage
enemy forces if they penetrate deep into the Philippine Defense Area of Interest
(PDAI), not to destroy but simply to delay them.
61
In this scenario, the AFP’s inter-
diction efforts will not be directed against the enemy’s main attack force but against
its command and control and communication, and support elements.
62
It is a form of
guerrilla/asymmetric warfare focused on: (1) luring any potential adversary deep into
the country’s maritime territory; and (2) launching punitive hit-and-run tactics. The
tactic takes advantage of the country’s archipelagic features and geographic depth
to attack the opponent’s vulnerable lines of communication and supply. It is
similar to the tactics attempted by the Argentine Air Force against the vastly superior
and modern British invasion fleet during the Falklands War in the 1980s. Clearly, this
is a case of applying asymmetric warfare in a low-intensity conflict conducted in the
context of territorial defence.
To develop the Philippine military’s asymmetric capabilities against China, the
AFP stated that it needed to develop the following capabilities:
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1. Enhancing maritime domain awareness. The AFP’s capability for maritime
surveillance is extremely limited. The establishment of the National Coast
Watch System in September 2011 to monitor the country’s vast maritime
environment requires air assets, trained personnel, and radars. The PAF acqui-
sition of a long-range patrol aircraft, lead-in fighter jets, and surface attack air-
craft addresses the need for maritime awareness and limited naval interdiction
capability, particularly within Philippine territorial waters to the 200 nautical
mile EEZ.
2. Joint operations between the PAF and navy for limited naval interdiction
capabilities. Given the Philippines’ inadequate defence budget and defence
capabilities, the PAF will support the Philippine Navy’s (PN’s) limited
naval interdiction operations. The PAF’s Air Defense System and the PN’s
Coast Watch System will provide coverage and augment the over-the-
horizon reconnaissance and targeting capabilities.
63
Its maritime patrol and
surveillance aircraft will serve as the primary platforms of patrols, surveil-
lance, and interdiction, while the PN’s surface combatants will conduct heli-
copter patrol and provide longer on-station time, and visible and enhanced
naval presence/deterrence.
64
The PAF’s air defence and coastal missile
system will be linked with the navy’s surface and underwater interdiction
capabilities, and will constitute the first layer of maritime defence for the
Philippines.
‘Guns versus Butter’?
Today, the Aquino administration is constrained by limited financial resources, even
with modest defence acquisition goals. In fact, the Philippine government could only
acquire two former American Coast Guard Cutters. It could not immediately afford to
purchase other war materiel such as blue-water missile-armed ships, search and
rescue vessels, naval helicopters, strategic sea-lift ships, and top-of-the-line intercep-
tors that can be used to protect its oil exploration projects and territorial claims in the
South China Sea. As a case in point, in November 2011, President Aquino announced
the planned acquisition by the PAF of two squadrons of second-hand F-16C/D air-
craft through the US Excess Defense Articles.
65
However, purchasing these fighter
aircraft planes might cause tremendous financial strain for the AFP, which is still
actively engaged in internal security operations. In May 2012, President Aquino
hinted that the PAF might buy brand new lead-in jet trainers that can be converted
into fighter planes by modifying their air-frame.
66
He admitted in an interview that
it was too expensive to buy, let alone maintain, second-hand, fourth-generation jet
fighters that only have five serviceable years.
67
Hence, he raised the possibility of
buying cheaper, new fighter aircraft from the United Kingdom, France, Italy, or
even South Korea. Meanwhile, some Aquino administration insiders expressed scep-
ticism that China poses a security threat to the Philippines, and were strongly against
the projected increase in the defence budget.
68
They pointed out that no amount of
defence build-up would enable the AFP to stand up against a modern and nuclear-
armed PLA. To them, challenging China’s maritime claim could even mean losses
14 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
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for the Philippines in terms of trade and investments with the second largest economy
in the world.
69
To acquire necessary equipment for territorial defence, the AFP had to wait for
the Philippine Congress to legislate the extension of the AFP modernization law
(Republic Act 7898) after it expired in February 2010. In December 2012, the Philip-
pine Congress passed and President Aquino signed Republic Act No. 10349 author-
izing the extension of the original AFP modernization law. The law, however, allots
only Php 75 billion (USD 1.5 billion) for the next five years. This amount is miniscule
for the acquisition of modern fighter planes, missile-armed frigates, sea- and land-
based missile systems, patrol vessels, and long-range reconnaissance planes along
with support facilities such as radar sites, forward operating bases, hangars, com-
munication, maintenance, and command and control facilities. Moreover, as in the
case of RA 7898, RA 10349 stipulates that Congress has to annually appropriate
the funds for the AFP modernization and to exercise oversight functions in the
implementation of the law and in the lease or development of military reservations
to raise the funds for the programme.
Back to the Alliance
A significant factor behind the Aquino administration’s posture against China in the
South China Sea dispute is the country’s alliance with the United States. The Amer-
ican Global War on Terror in 2001, and later tensions in American – Chinese
relations, actually augured well for the Philippines’ strategic agenda. Philippine–
American security relations were revitalized, and the alliance achieved two politi-
cal/strategic objectives. First, the Philippine government received American
support for its counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency campaign. Second, Washington
deepened its alliance with Manila not only to neutralize terrorist groups but also to
counter Beijing’s political and economic influence in the country.
In hindsight, no level of military build-up could enable the Philippines to confront
China’s naval prowess and assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Aquino admin-
istration’s efforts to redirect the AFP’s focus from internal security to territorial
defence aim for a simple yet effective border patrol system but not naval war-fighting
capabilities. Capabilities for early warning, surveillance, and command, control and
communication plus limited deterrence are being developed for ‘joint operations
capabilities’ in maritime defence and interdiction operations. This build-up merely
complements the deterrence provided by American forward deployment and bilateral
alliances in East Asia. In the final analysis, the Philippines’ territorial defence posture
is predicated on the American assertion of its position as the dominant naval power in
the Pacific.
70
During the height of the Philippines’ territorial row with China in mid June 2011,
the Aquino administration acknowledged the need for American diplomatic support
and military assistance. Executive Secretary Pacquito Ochoa expressed hope that
Washington would come to Manila’s assistance in case an armed confrontation
breaks out in the Spratlys. He then said that the Philippines might invoke the 60-
year-old Philippine – United States Mutual Defense Treaty if the Spratly dispute
becomes a military problem.
71
The US Ambassador to the Philippines, Harry
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Thomas, readily pledged American. support to the Philippines, stating: ‘The Philip-
pines and the United States are longstanding treaty allies. We are strategic partners.
We will continue to consult each other closely on the South China Sea, Spratly
Islands, and other issues’.
72
Further expression of support came from US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton. During her meeting in Washington, DC with Philippine
Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, she expressed American wariness about
China’s intrusion into the Philippines’ EEZ and declared that the United States
honours the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and strategic alliance with its Southeast
Asian ally.
73
She reaffirmed American support to the Philippines, even if it meant
providing ‘affordable’ materiel and equipment to enable the AFP to defend the
country. She also suggested the two allies work together to identify the military hard-
ware needed by the AFP. Secretary Del Rosario later announced that American mili-
tary and defence officials would visit the Philippines this year (2011) to assess the
country’s territorial/maritime defence requirements.
Undoubtedly, the Philippine military needs new arms and equipment to develop its
territorial defence capability. American assistance includes the transfer of three former
US Coast Guard Hamilton class cutters to the Philippine Navy through the Foreign
Military Sales credit.
74
Once transferred to the Philippines, these cutters would be
the largest vessels in its inventory and would replace vintage World War II destroyer
escorts still used by the PN for patrolling the high seas.
75
Furthermore, these cutters
would be the most modern ships in the PN inventory and could be used to protect
the country’s oil exploration ventures and territorial claims in the South China Sea.
The PN plans to retrofit the vessels with modern electronics and surveillance equipment
and to deploy them to monitor all surface activities in the South China Sea.
76
Interest-
ingly, this transfer fits into Manila’s scheme of enhancing its capability for internal
security operations, disaster response, and effective long-range patrol of the country’s
maritime territories, but not naval warfare or expeditionary operations.
77
Because of its underfunded and weak military, Manila has asked for unequivocal
American commitment to Philippine defence and security as provided by the 1951
Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Since June 2011, the Philippines has sought Ameri-
can naval/air support in the Spratlys. Philippine officials maintain that an armed
attack on Philippine metropolitan territory and forces anywhere in the Pacific, includ-
ing the South China Sea, should trigger an American armed response. However, the
1951 MDT does not call for any automatic response from either the Philippines or the
United States. It merely obligates the allies to consult each other and determine what
military action, if any, both would take. In point of fact, the American position
remained vague on the treaty’s commitment in case of an armed attack against the
Philippines. Likewise, the State Department stops short of making any reference to
any automatic response in a crisis situation in the South China Sea. When pressed
on the issue, spokespersons fall back on the ambiguous stance that since the
United States is a treaty ally of the Philippines, ‘China cannot simply assert that
events in the disputed South China Sea are not any of Washington’s business’.
78
In reality, the American ability to guarantee the Philippines’ external defence
depends primarily on whether American forces are physically prepositioned to
provide immediate and timely assistance. The United States can defend its ally
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only if it has access to facilities near the South China Sea from where it could respond
during an armed confrontation. During an August 2011 meeting of the Mutual
Defense Board (MDB) and the Security Engagement Board (SEB), the allies
agreed to develop a framework for heightened bilateral and multilateral security,
and domain awareness. The board considered the following measures: (1) rotational
presence of US maritime defence assets in the Philippines to support MDB and SEB
activities while the AFP develops its own capability for territorial defence; (2)
increased joint bilateral maritime security activities in the South China Sea/West Phi-
lippine Sea; (3) development of joint-use maritime security support facilities; (4)
improved information-sharing between American and Philippine forces; and (5)
the conduct of integrated maritime security initiatives involving the US Pacific
Command and the armed forces.
79
The Philippine– American bilateral security dialogue in Washington, DC in
January 2012 was another venue where Philippine foreign and defence officials
raised the necessity of an expanded American military presence in the country.
80
This presence was proposed in conjunction with the increase in China’s naval capa-
bilities and assertiveness in East Asia, and in line with the Obama administration’s
strategy guidance. As noted in the opening article, this strategic move provides for
a rebalancing of the American force structure and investments to meet persistent
and potential threats in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, and to advance capabili-
ties for maintaining access and projecting power globally.
81
Labelled as a ‘strategic
pivot’ to the Pacific, this strategy guidance provides for stronger American military
presence in the region that is ‘geographically distributed, operationally resilient
and politically sustainable’.
82
Unlike in the Cold War, the Pentagon does not want
any permanent bases for shifting its American air and naval assets in the
Asia-Pacific region. Rather, the current emphasis is on access arrangements and
rotational deployments that will allow American forces to conduct exercises and
operations that demonstrate its commitment and help to protect allies and security
partners.
83
In 2013–2014, Manila and Washington were negotiating a framework agreement
for an increased rotational presence of American forces in the Philippines and
enhanced Philippine– American defence cooperation, in line with the American stra-
tegic pivot to Asia. Under this proposed framework agreement, the Philippines would
allow American units to be stationed for longer periods of time in Philippine military
bases.
84
Manila would also permit American forces to preposition their equipment in
the country. American forces temporarily deployed in the Philippines would help the
military to develop a minimum credible defence to secure Philippine maritime terri-
tory in the face of China’s expansive claim in the South China Sea and help the Phi-
lippine government in humanitarian disaster response operations.
85
The proposed
agreement provides that American forces would have access to and use of AFP mili-
tary facilities. These forces, in turn, will conduct high-impact and high-value joint
exercises with the Philippine military to promote interoperability and capacity build-
ing that will bolster the AFP’s maritime domain awareness, deterrence, and humani-
tarian assistance and disaster response capabilities.
PHILIPPINE STRATEGIC CULTURE 17
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Conclusion
A review of the Philippine strategic policy and goals since 1946 reveals the fairly
constant attributes of its strategic culture, including the propensity for asymmetric
warfare over conventional, high-intensity and decisive engagements, and preference
for alliance. As noted above, this strategic culture is a product of various factors,
including the country’s archipelagic and fragmented topography, the lack of agricul-
tural resources, absence of a centralized political system prior to the arrival of the
Spanish colonizers, numerous local uprisings and the colonizers’ concomitant pacifi-
cation campaigns using native auxiliaries, and Filipinos’ experience during the Phi-
lippine Revolution/Insurrection, and later World War II. The elite reflected on
Filipino historical experience and transformed discourse into negotiated reality. In
turn, this negotiated reality finds expression in the current national defence prefer-
ences and goals.
A careful analysis of the Aquino administration’s efforts to refocus the Armed
Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP’s) attention from internal security to external
defence shows greater continuity than discontinuity in Philippine strategic culture.
Despite grand claims, government plans to acquire a new weapons system and to
build up the navy and air force are designed only to achieve a modest deterrence
posture. If deterrence fails, then the AFP are preparing to conduct asymmetric
warfare against superior Chinese naval and air forces. While the Philippine military
waited two years for Congress to amend the 1995 AFP Modernization Law, RA
10349 stipulates that funding military modernization will come mainly from the
annual Congressional appropriation subject to a ceiling of only Php 75 billion
(USD 5 billion) annually for the next five years. The law also gives Congress over-
sight function on its implementation and in the concomitant measures in raising more
funds for the programme.
Given the limited goals of its defence policy and the expected lukewarm financial
support (or lack thereof) from the Philippine Congress, the Aquino administration
needs to strengthen the country’s security ties with the United States through
further requests for military assistance. It also requires clearer security guarantees
from its ally under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, and needs to facilitate the
access of American forces to Philippine military facilities. These efforts would rep-
resent continuity more than change, suggesting that Philippine strategic culture con-
tinues to influence and shape the 21st-century defence policy and goals of the Aquino
administration.
NOTES
1. Chin-Hao Huang and Robert Sutter, ‘China–Southeast Asia Relations: ASEAN and Asian Regional
Diplomacy’, Comparative Connection: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations,
Vol. 11, No. 2 (October 2009), p. 5.
2. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans (J-5), DND-AFP Thrust for Capability Upgrade: The AFP
Long-Term Capability Development Plan (Quezon City: Camp Aguinaldo, 2010).
3. Ibid., p. 8.
4. National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011 – 2016 (Quezon City: National Security
Council, April 2011), p. 39.
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5. Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 5.
6. Ibid., p. 46.
7. Ibid., p. 48.
8. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (London: The Belknap Press, 2001), p. 118.
9. Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Warfare and the Third World (New York: Palgrave,
2011), p. 192.
10. Ibid., p. 192.
11. Laura Lee Junker, Raiding, Trading, and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdom
(Honolulu, Hawai’i: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999).
12. Linda Newson, Conquest and Pestilence in the Early Spanish Philippines (Honolulu, Hawai’i: Univer-
sity of Hawai’i Press, 2009), p. 58.
13. Cesar Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Manila: New Day, 2000), p. 2.
14. See Alfred McCoy, ‘The Colonial Origins of Philippine Military Traditions’, in Florentino Rodao
Garcia and Felice Noelle Rodriquez (eds), The Philippine Revolution of 1896: Ordinary Lives in Extra-
ordinary Times (Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila University, 2001), pp. 83–124.
15. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces (note 13), p. 13.
16. McCoy, ‘The Colonial Origins’ (note 14), pp. 91 – 106.
17. Kathline Anne S. Tolosa, ‘Owning Sovereignty’, Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues (4th
Quarter 2008), p. 6.
18. AFP Modernization Board, Annual Accomplishment Report 2006 (Quezon City: General Headquarters
Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2007), p. 1.
19. Tolosa, ‘Owning Sovereignty’ (note 17), p. 6.
20. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (note 5), p. 6.
21. Jeffrey S. Lantis and Darryl Howlett, ‘Strategic Culture’, in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin
Gray (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 96.
22. David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics (Pasir
Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 44.
23. Ibid., p. 44.
24. Alfred McCoy, ‘Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and Family in the Philippines’, in
Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines (Madison, WI:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), p. 13.
25. Timberman, A Changeless Land (note 22), pp. 44 –5.
26. Ibid., p. 45.
27. Donald J. Berlin, Before Gringo: History of the Philippine Military: 1830 –1972 (Manila: Anvil Press,
2008), p. 145.
28. Noel M. Morada and Christopher Collier, ‘The Philippines: State versus Society’, in Muthiah Alagappa
(ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2001), p. 550.
29. Commodore Ronnie Gil L. Gavan (Philippine Coast Guard), ‘Organized National Engagement
(ONE) at Sea: Optimizing the State’s Option for Maritime Security’, Digest, Vol. 19. No. 1
(2012), p. 10.
30. Ibid., p. 10.
31. AFP Modernization Board, Annual Accomplishment Report 2006 (note 18), p. 1.
32. This can be grasped from Senate hearings and proceedings of the AFP Modernization Program.
See Liaison Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, ‘AFP Modernization Act’, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, General Headquarters, AFP, November 1996.
33. AFP Modernization Board, Annual Accomplishment Report 2007 (note 18), p. 5.
34. Morada and Collier, ‘The Philippines’ (note 28), p. 53.
35. Raymond G. Quilop, ‘Revisiting the Visiting Forces Agreement’, Digest: A Forum for Security and
Defense Issues (2nd and 3rd Quarter 2010), pp. 17–18.
36. Herrboy Aquino, ‘An Analysis of Two Key Security Challenges Facing the Philippine Republic over
the Next Ten Years’, Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues (3rd Quarter 2010), p. 51.
37. Tolosa, ‘Owing Sovereignty’ (note 17), p. 7.
38. Noel L. Patajo, ‘Measuring the Cost of Insurgency’, Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues
(3rd Quarter 2006), p. 8.
39. Dencio S. Acop, ‘Assessing the Expanded Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Nation
Building’, Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2006), p. 146.
40. Ibid., p. 146.
41. Patajo, ‘Measuring the Cost of Insurgency’ (note 38), p. 10.
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42. Kathleen Mae M. Villamin, ‘Defending Philippine Territorial Integrity in the 21st Century’, Digest: A
Forum for Security and Defense Issues (1st and 2nd Quarter 2009), p. 8.
43. ‘Philippine Air Defense Compromised by Fighter Decommissioning Officer’, BBC Monitoring
Asia-Pacific, 3 October 2005, p. 1.
44. ‘Philippine Air Force Restructured to Focus on Internal Security’, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific,
3 April 2005.
45. Raymond G. Quilop, Darwin Moya, and Czarina Ordinario-Ducusin, Putting an End to Insurgency: An
Assessment of the AFP’s Internal Security Operations (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Office of
Strategic and Special Studies, 2007), pp. 42 – 3.
46. Office of Plans and Program, ‘AFP’s Capability Assessment’, presented at the National Defense and
Security Review Module Priming Session, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, National Defense College
of the Philippines, 3–6 September 2007, p. 25.
47. Ibid., p. 23.
48. Ben Reid, ‘Bush and the Philippines after September 11: Hegemony, Mutual Opportunism and Demo-
cratic Retreat’, in Mark Besson (ed.), Bush and Asia: America’s Evolving Relations with East Asia
(New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 135.
49. Anonymous, ‘China Says Philippines Harming Sovereignty, Interests in the Spratlys’, BBC Monitor-
ing Asia-Pacific (9 June 2011), 1, at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=64&did=2369715781&
Src
50. Carl Thayer, ‘China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, International
Journal of China Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (December 2011), p. 563.
51. ‘China Says Philippines Harming Sovereignty, Interests in Spratlys’, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific,9
June 2011, p. 1.
52. ‘China Wants Philippines to Seek Permission before Spratlys Oil Search’, BBC Monitoring Asia-
Pacific, 10 June 2011, p. 1.
53. William B. Depasupil, ‘Armed Forces to Spend P14b to Upgrade Naval, Aerial Defense’, Tribune
Business News, 29 June 2011, p. 1.
54. Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, Defense Planning Guidance, 2013 –2018 (Quezon
City: Department of National Defense, 11 October 2011), pp. 11–16.
55. ‘Philippines Spends US$387 million on Armed Forces Upgrade’, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific,16
January 2012, p. 1.
56. ‘AFP Modernization Program in Full Swing-Gazmin’, The Philippines News Agency, 18 March 2012,
p. 1.
57. ‘New AFP Chief Vows to Focus on Territorial Defense, MILF Peace Talks’, Philippine News Agency,
13 December 2011, p. 1.
58. ‘Philippines Mulls Reorganization of Military to Boost Territorial Defense’, BBC Monitoring
Asia-Pacific, 2 January 2012, p. 1.
59. National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011 – 2016 (Quezon City: National Security
Council, April 2011), p. 39.
60. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon City:
Camp Aguinaldo, 2011), p. 27.
61. Interview with AFP Officers, Foreign Service Institute, 17 September 2010.
62. Ibid.
63. Jose Renan C. Suarez, ‘The Imperatives of Defending the Philippines and Air-Defense Partnership’,
Paper presented at the Air Power Symposium 2012, SMX Convention Center, Pasay City, Philippines,
21 June 2012, p. 6 (unpublished material).
64. Ibid., p. 6.
65. Jon Grevatt, ‘Philippines to Hasten Recreation of Dedicated Combat Wing with Ex-USAF F-16
Purchase’, Jane Defense Industry, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 2012), p. 1.
66. Aurea Calica, ‘Aquino: Government Can Now Afford to Buy New Fighter Jets’, The Philippine Star,
17 May 2012, p. 2.
67. Aurea Calica, A
¨quino, ‘Government Can Now Afford to buy New Fighter Jets’, The Philippine Star
(17 May 2012), p. 2.
68. Interview with a ranking official of the National Security Council, National Security Council, Quezon
City, 12 February 2013.
69. Ibid.
70. Enhanced strategic engagements with Washington also enabled Manila to establish de facto security
relations with other American alliance partners in East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
Japan will provide the Philippine Coast Guard with 12 patrol boats to strengthen the country’s maritime
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security. The Philippines is buying 12 F/A Golden Eagles fighter planes from South Korea through a
government-to-government procurement. The Philippines recently signed a Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) with Australia to boost security operations with Australian defence forces in
conducting joint training and operations such as Coast Watch South and Maritime Training Activity
Lumbas. For details on the AFP engagement with other US bilateral allies, see Gazmin, Defense
Planning Guidance, 2013– 2018 (note 53), p. 18 and Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
of the Philippines (note 59), p. 34.
71. Alastair McIndoe, ‘Manila Ups the Ante in Spratly Tussle’, Tribune Business News, 14 June 2011, p. 2.
72. Greg Torode, ‘US under Pressure over Sea Dispute: Washington Has Stopped Short of Specifics on its
Position under a Defense Pact with Manila on Recent Incursion by China in the South China Sea’,
South China Morning Post, 17 June 2011, p. 2.
73. Bernice Camille V. Bauzon, ‘US Ready to Arm Philippines’, Tribune Business News, 27 June 2011,
p. 1.
74. ‘Philippine Navy to Acquire Largest Ship in Inventory’, GMA News, 23 January 2011, p. 1.
75. Sheldon Simon, ‘US –Southeast Asia Relations: Dismay at Thai –Cambodia Skirmishes’, Comparative
Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (May 2011), p. 5.
76. ‘Philippine Military Looks Forward to Arrival of New Warship’, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific,25
August 2011, p. 2.
77. P. Ervin A. Manalo, ‘A Multi-Purpose Vessel for the Philippine Navy: Options and Prospects’, Digest:
A Forum for Security and Defense Issues (4th Quarter 2008), p. 15.
78. Sheldon Simon, ‘US –Southeast Asia Relations: Deep in South China Sea Diplomacy’, Comparative
Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (September 2011), p. 5.
79. Philippine– US Mutual Defense Board/Security Engagement Board Co-Chairman, 2011 Mutual
Defense Board/Engagement Board Strategic Guidelines, 16 August 2011, p. 1 (unpublished material).
80. Floyd Whaley, ‘Philippines in Talk to Expand US Military Ties’, The International Herald Tribune,27
January 2012, pp. 1 and 3.
81. Cheryl Pellerin, ‘Carter: Strategic Guidance is Compass for 2013’, American Forces Press Service,13
February 2012, p. 2.
82. Phillip C. Saunders, ‘The Rebalance to Asia: US – China Relations and Regional Security’, Strategic
Forum, No. 281 (August 2013), p. 7.
83. Ibid., p. 9.
84. Floyd Whaley, ‘US is Negotiating Expanded Military Role in the Philippines’, International Herald
Tribune, 13 July 2013, p. 3.
85. ‘Philippines/United States: Philippines–US Negotiations on Increased US Troops Not Yet a Done
Deal’, Asia-News Monitor, 15 August 2013, p. 1.
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