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Society & Natural Resources
ISSN: 0894-1920 (Print) 1521-0723 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/usnr20
Collective Action in Common-Pool Resource
Management : The Contribution of a Social
Constructivist Perspective to Existing Theory
Nathalie A. Steins, Victoria M . Edwards
To cite this article: Nathalie A. Steins, Victoria M . Edwards (1999) Collective Action in Common-
Pool Resource Management : The Contribution of a Social Constructivist Perspective to Existing
Theory, Society & Natural Resources, 12:6, 539-557, DOI: 10.1080/089419299279434
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/089419299279434
Published online: 15 Dec 2010.
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Collective Action in Common-Pool Resource
M anagement : The Contribution of a Social
Constructivist Perspective to Existing Theory
NATHALIE A. STEIN S
Dutch Fish Board
Rijswijk, The Netherland s
VIC TORI A M . EDW ARDS
Department of Land and Construction M anagem ent
University of Portsmouth
Portsmouth, United Kingom
T he question of how to organize the sustainable ex ploitation of common±pool
resources (CPRs) is an important issue on a global environmental agenda.We
argue that the current approach to collective action in CPR management has a
number of shortcomings related to (1) t he focus on single±use CPRs and (2) the
formulation of a priori design principles for successful collective act ion,which
hinders rather than facilitates CPR research and policies.W e propose a social
constructivist perspective for the st udy of CPRs,and discuss its implications for
research and policy programs.This approach studies the CPR as an entity within a
wider external environment,focusing on resource users’ motivations for certain
action strategies.T he outcome of collective management is considered to be the
result of interact ions between stakeholders and nonhuman entit ies,which depends
on t he way social actors ‘‘socially construct’’ their everyday reality.A case study of
Irish shermen,who felt alienated from their shery as a result of the ex pansion of
commercial n sh farms,and who created common property rights to secure access
to t he shery,forms the empirical basis for this study.
Keywords collective action, common±pool resources, design principles, sheries
management, social constructivism
The study of common±pool resources has gained increasing popularity in the dis±
cussion on the sustainable exploitation of our natural resource base. Common±pool
resources (CP Rs) are resources for which exclusion of users is difficult to achieve
and for which joint use reduces the availability of benets derived from the resource
for others. The debate on thei r sustainable management has been driven by the
‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ thesis, which predicts the overexploitatio n and eventual
ruin of all common resources due to individua l users’ rational incentive to maximiz e
utility (Hardin 1968 ). The thesis has been applied to a variety of resource manage±
ment issues and policy decisions, most notably in sheries, forestry, and w atershed
management (Feeny et al. 1990 ; F eeny et al. 1996 ; P enning±Row sell 1994 ; T aylor
Received 10 December 199 7 ; accepted 15 October 1998.
We are indebted to the Irish shing com munity for its openness an d cooperation, and to Berry
Lekann e dit Deprez, Jan den Ouden, and Gerard Versch oor of the Department o f Socio logy a t W agen±
ingen Agricult ural Un iversity (the Netherlands) for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this
article. We also wish to acknowledge the anonym ous r eviewers of Society and Natural Resources.
Address correspond ence to Nathalie Steins, Dutch Fish Board, P O Box 72 , 2280 AB Rijswijk , The
Netherlands. E±mai l : n steins@pvis.nl
Soc iet y & Na tural Res ources, 12: 539 557, 1999
Cop yright 1999 Taylo r & F rancis
Ó
0894±1 920/ 99 $12.0 0 1.00 539
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540 N.A.Steins and V.M.Edwards
1998). Traditionally, privatization and government control have been regarded as
solutions to the tragedy (Hardin 1968 ; Olson 1965). Recently, however, there has
been a shift toward the potentia l of community±based management, driven by
empirical evidence that CPR users are capable of creatin g eVective governanc e rules
(Bromley et al. 199 2 ; Ostrom 1990 ).
The ‘‘commons debate’’ has been complicated by a conceptual misunder±
standing about the nature of common±poo l resources, exacerbated by Hardin’s
unfortunate use of the term ‘‘common’’ to describe an ‘‘open access’’ regime. CP Rs
are variously referred to as ‘‘open access,’’ ‘‘common property,’’ and ‘‘the commons.’’
Edwards and Steins (1998a) point out that a wide range of resources might be used
in common by more than one person, thus comprising a common pool from which
individuals might draw products or benets. Such resources may or may not be
characterized by the presence of formal or informal decision±making arrangements
to gover n their use. CPRs can be managed under four basic types of regimes : (1)
‘‘open access,’’ which refers to a ‘‘free for all’’ situation, where rules regulatin g access
to and allocation of benets from the resource are absent; (2) ‘‘public property,’’
where access rights for the public are held in trust by the Crown or state; (3)
‘‘private property,’’ where tradable rights are owned by an individual, household, or
company ; and (4) ‘‘common property,’’ where a set of rules is present to govern
access to, allocation of, and control over the CP R. The presence of decision±making
arrangements is of particular importance, since it is these rules that m ay prevent the
common±pool resource from degrading (ibid.).
In com mon±property regimes, some form of organized collective action between
the individual s constituting the user community is essential, since a collective eVort
is required to manage access to the CPR and the allocation of the benets it pro±
duces. The question on the voluntariness of collective action has resulted in a tre±
mendou s body of literature. The em pirical basis for collective action theories is laid
either by research in controlled, laboratory circumstances (Mannix 1991) or, as is
the case for this article, by research into real±life cases of CPR m anagement
(Bromley et al. 199 2 ; McCay and Acheson 1987 ).
This article has two objectives . First, we critically review the current approach
to the study of collective action processes in common±pool resource management
(CPRM ) scenarios. Our argument is that CP R theory is too limited to explai n either
the persistence or the failure of collective action processes, since (1) it is based on the
assumption that CP Rs are single±use resources; (2) it tends to focus on ‘‘internal’’
factors contributing to collective management, thereby disregarding external factors
in¯uencing stakeholders’ decision s; and (3) it draws heavily on a postpositivist
ontology in assuming that outcom es of collectiv e action processes are determined by
a number of predened design principles, takin g attentio n away from the process
through which collective action is constructed (and reconstructed) by the stake±
holders.
Our second objective is to discuss the contribution of a social constructivist
approach to deal with these shortcomings. This perspective studies the state of
aVairs in an action arena as the outcome of interaction s between stakeholders, other
people, and nonhuman entities, and assumes that these interaction processes are
based on the way actors ‘‘socially construct’’ their every day reality (Berger and
Luckmann 1967 ; Callo n and Law 1995; Guba and Lincoln 1989 ; Knorr±Cetina
1981; Verschoor 1997). We argue that this approac h has two benets for the study
of CP RM. First, it explicitly focuses on the resource users’ construction and percep±
tions of the CPR and its externa l environment, which will assist researchers and
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Collective Action in Resource M anagement 541
practitioners to be sensitive to both internal and contextual factors in¯uencing
resource users’ motivations to adopt certain action strategies regarding CPRM .
Second, it puts aside any predened conditions for successful collective action,
which obscure the complexities involved in the evolution of collective action and
hinder the understanding of its dynamic nature. Rather than describing the out±
comes of CPRM, a social constructivist perspective helps to explain such outcomes.
A case study of CPRM by a group of Irish shermen forms the basis to support our
main arguments.
The article is organized into six subsequent sections. The following section pre±
sents a critical re¯ection on CP R theory and, in particular, its use of design prin±
ciples to prescribe ‘‘successful’’ collective action. The third section presents a brief
introduction to the social constructivist approach. Section four presents the case
study of the establishm ent of a shell sh cooperative in Northwest Connemara , start±
ing with a description of the research setting and research methodology. The case
study has two goals. F irst, it demonstrates that the presence of design principles for
collective action does not necessarily lead to what CP R theorists would call ‘‘suc±
cessful collec tive action’’ and that the meaning of ‘‘success’’ (and ‘‘failure’’) is con±
structed diVerently by diVeren t stakeholders . It supports our critique on CPR theory
by illustratin g how the collective action of the Irish shermen prevented the expan±
sion of commercial salmon farms in their shing grounds and explainin g the sub±
sequent collective action problems they faced. Second, the case study forms the basis
for a discussion of the potential of a social constructivist perspective to the study of
collective action in CPRM . The fth section evaluates the social constructivist per±
spective in light of the analysis presented in the case study. The nal section of the
article concludes with recommendations for future research and policy regarding the
management of CP Rs.
CPR Theory and Design Principles
In a CPR sc enario, collective action typically occurs if resource users seek to over±
come the problems associated with the ‘‘the tragedy of open access’’ and agree on
decision±making arrangements governing CPR use. Collective action processes,
however, always go hand±in±han d with the free±rider problem. A free±rider is an
individual who chooses to receive a higher payoVfor a socially defectin g choice than
for a cooperative choice, even though all individuals will get a higher pay oVif they
all coop er ate (Hardi n 196 8 ; M ann ix 1 991 ; O lson 1965 ).
CP R scholars have developed a large body of literature about the organization
of collective action in natural resource management. Two critical themes, which are
based on extensive empirical studies, can be identied. F irst, based on Oakerson’s
work (1992), analytical frameworks have been developed. These frameworks are
tools to study the outcomes of CPRM by exploring patterns of interaction between
(1) the physical and technical characteristics of the CP R; (2) the institutiona l frame±
work for CPRM ; and (3) the social characteristics of the user community. We refer
to Edwards and Steins (1998a) for a detailed discussion of such frameworks. Second,
CP R scholars have started to focus on the formulation of conditions or design prin±
ciples underlying successful collectiv e action. This practice was initiated at the Panel
on Common Property Resource Management at the National Research Council
Conference in 1986, where Elinor Ostrom, based on discussions w ith participants,
produced a list of variables ‘‘associated with the establishm ent of coordinated or
organized strategies for managing common±pool resources’’ (Ostrom 1992, 294). The
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542 N.A.Steins and V.M.Edwards
original list has since been further developed, based on CPRM studies world±wide
(Hanna et al. 1995 ; Libecap 1995 ; Ostrom 1990 ; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995 ;
Wade 1988; White and Runge 1995). Table 1 gives an overview of these principles.
The design principles are increasingly considered to be requirements for the
organization of collective action1; tha t is, if governing institutions meet these cri±
teria, ‘‘successful’’ collective action is likely to prevail and the institutions will then
form ‘‘a critical component of environmental outcome’’ (Hanna et al. 1995, 20).
Although Ostrom (1995, 43) stresses that ‘‘there is no blueprint that can be used to
create eVective local institutions,’’ she recommends that ‘‘[design] principles can be
taugh t as part of extensio n programs. Associations of local units can be created to
learn more from one another about how successes have been achieved or how to
TABLE 1 Design P rinciples for Collective Action as Developed in CPR Theory
Wade’s conditions for successful CPRM (1988):
1. The natur e of the resource
2. The costs of exclusion technology
3. The relationship between resources and user groups
4. The characteristics of the user group
5. N oticeability of cheating
6. The relationship between users and the state
Ostrom’s design principles characterizing robust, simple common±pool resource
systems (1990):
1. Clearly dened boundaries
2. Congruence between allocation and access rules and local conditions
3. User’s ability to modify the operationa l rules through collective±choice
arrangements
4. M onitoring of management system
5. Graduated sanctions
6. Con¯ict resolution mechanisms
7. M anagement rights of resource users are not challenged by external agents
Hanna et al. design principles of property rights regim es (1995):
1. Denition of legitimate interests in the CPR
2. Articulation of rules for user participation
3. Congruence of rights and responsibilities
4. Incentive structure of rules re¯ects long±term sustainability of CPR
5. Congruence of boundaries
6. Distribution of decision±making authority
7. Provision of monitoring, sanction, and enforcement mechanisms
Pinkerton and Weinstein’s basic criteria for fruitful collective resource
management (1995) :
1. Accountability
2. EVectiveness
3. Representativenes s
4. Adaptability
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Collective Action in Resource M anagement 543
avoid some kinds of failures,’’ thereb y granting design principles a prescriptive
status.
On the basis of our own experiences of applying CPR theory in eld settings,
we have been able to identify three problems. First, much of the empirical w ork
underlyin g CP R theory has focused on resources that are subject to one single,
extractive resource use (Bromley et al. 1992 ; McCay and Acheson 1987 ; Ostrom
1990 ), which is problematic. Natural resources produce a multitude of resource
units; it is unrealistic to assume that people demand only one use of a resource, such
as cutting timber, if the same forest can be used for grazin g cattle. This implies that
present theoretica l notion s are based on an oversimpli ed representation of the
internal characteristics of use and management of CPRs. Contemporary CPRs have
evolved through demographic changes, technological developments, and their inte±
gratio n into the market, to form complex , multiple±use resources. Since theoretical
notions originally developed for single±use CP Rs are increasingly being applied to
complex, multiple±use resources, these notion s must be further developed in order to
deal with the complexities involved in multiple±use CP RM.
Second, the study of collective action processes in CPR theory focuses on the
internal dynamics of resource management ; that is, the resource system is studied in
isolation from the wider political economy in which it is embedded. In the list of
design principles in Table 1, variables linking collective action and the ‘‘external
world’’ are remarkably absent. Although , for example, the external world has been
recognized as one of the sources of uncertainty that make the organization of collec±
tive action processes regarding CP Rs a complex undertaking (Hanna et al. 199 5 ;
Ostrom 1990 ), the external world is regarded as a given fact in CPR analysis.2The
explicit absence of external or ‘‘contextual’’ factors in conceptual tools for the
analysis of CP R management seriously limits our understandin g of collectiv e action
processes, since local resource users will base their decision to cooperat e or defect
not only on the expected social and economic costs and benets generated by the
CP R, but will also consider the expected costs and benets from opting for ‘‘alterna±
tives.’’
Third, in addition to the aforementioned methodological problems, a philo±
sophical dilemm a is embedded in CPR theory. The organization of collective action
is studied in terms of ‘‘successes’’ and ‘‘failures.’’ This raises questions related to
norm ativity: (1) What is ‘‘successful CP RM ’’; (2) are the researcher ’s or poli±
cymaker’s denition of ‘‘success’’ the same as those of the local resource users ; and
(3) for whom is a certain outcome desirable ? Part of the ‘‘normativity problem’’ is
directly linked to the formulation of design principles. Although we acknowledg e
that any form of evaluation of CPRM is necessarily value laden, the development
and use of prescriptive design principles inevitabl y results in the establishment of
norm ative criteria for measuring outcomes, taking attention away from the users’
construction and perception of CP RM and the process through which collective
action evolves.
The Social Constructivist Approach
The term ‘‘social constructivism’’ entered sociology through Berger and Luckmann’s
work The Social Construction of Realit y (1967). Society, the object of sociological
inquiry, is perceived ‘‘as part of a human world, m ade by men, inhabited by m en,
and, in turn, making men, in an ongoing historical process’’ (ibid., 189). Thus,
human reality is conceived as a socially constructed reality, rather than naturally
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544 N.A.Steins and V.M.Edwards
given or merely taken for granted, as is the case in traditiona l positivist approaches.
Later, Berger and Luckmann’s ‘‘men’’ were called ‘‘social actors.’’ A key property of
a social actor is his or her ‘‘agency,’’ the ability to make decisions based on social
experience combined with the capacity to manipulate social relations and to enroll
others into his or her projects3(Verschoor 1997 ).
What distinguishes a contemporary social constructivist perspective from other
sociological perspectives that consider human beings to be social actors is that it
studies the state of aVairs in an action arena as the outcomes of interaction s
between social actors and nonhuman entities,4thereby breakin g with the essentially
humanist sociology proposed by Berger and Luckmann (1967).
In a (contemporary) social constructivist perspective, collective action is con±
sidered to be a sociotechnical process ; collectiv e action involves not only people and
their obligations , dreams, desires, and priorities, but also a variety of nonhuma n
resources, such as a common good or problem, a certain technology, paperwork ,
money, and so on. Interactions between individual stakeholder s and the nonhum an
entities in their environment, as well as agreements between resource users and
other people, are key factors underlying cooperation and other actions in everyda y
life (cf. Callon and Law 1995). The stakeholder’s choice for a certain course of
action, such as the size of the contribution to the CPR, will be in¯uenced by (1)
network s of social relations and sociotechnica l network s ; (2) the meaning that is
attributed to the collective management system; (3) perceptions of the wider
environment in which the collective action process is embedded ; and (4) social expe±
rience. Over time, these networks, meanings, perceptions, and social experience will
be ‘‘reshaped ’’ through the process of collective action itself (cf. Long and Van der
Ploeg 1995). H owever, both the ‘‘abider’’ and the ‘‘free±rider’’ will remain an
outcome, product, or eVect of the interaction between the individua l and his
environment (cf. Callon and Law 1995). A social constructivist approach makes no a
priori assumptions about the nature of collective action ; that is, it does not pred e±
ne categories of ‘‘success’’ and ‘‘failure.’’ From such a perspective, both compliance
and free±riding require explanation and, more particularly, their explanatio n should
be approached in the same way : the so±called principle of symmetry.5
Having introduced the basic assumptions underlying social constructivism, we
next discuss its potentia l for CPR theory on the basis of empirical work. The follow±
ing section sets the scene for the case study and discusses the methodology.
Case Study: Collective Action at a Shellsh Cooperative in Northwest
Connemara
Research Setting
Northwestern Connem ara is an isolated, sparsely populated region on the Irish west
coast. The majority of its population lives in small villages. Since the area , for infra±
structural reasons, has been relatively isolated from the rest of the country and since
villages are separated by large geographica l distances, community members tradi±
tionally feel very dependent on each other. The principal source of livelihoo d is
agriculture (sheep farm ing), followed by inshore shing. The area’s breathtakin g
scenery attracts many tourists, who provide crucial supplementary income. The lack
of permanen t employment opportunities has resulted in high emigration levels
(Ruddy and Varley 1991).
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Collective Action in Resource M anagement 545
The government has long attempted to bring about socioeconomic development
in this peripheral area, with social, economic, and infrastructural problems being
tackled through the implementatio n of community development projects and by
creating favorable conditions for new entrepreneurs . Aquaculture developmen t is
considered to be an important mechanism and, since the 1980s , the government,
assisted by the European Union (EU), has encouraged aquaculture development by
providing grants, tax incentives , training programs, and research and development .
Aquaculture, and particularly salmon farming, has important advantages : (1) It pro±
vides jobs in areas of the country where job opportunities are scarce; (2) it makes
use of existing resources; (3) it supplements depleting natural sh stocks, free from
quota restrictions from the EU’s Comm on Fisheries Policy ; and (4) it generates a
substantial expor t income (Board Iascaigh Mhara 1992 ; Ruddy and Varley 1991).
How ever, such advantages are not widely appreciated. During the past decade,
nationwide con¯icts between salmon farms, shermen, and freshwater sheries have
emerged (Phyne 1996 ; S teins 199 8).
Over the past two decades , three salmon farm s have been established in north±
western Connemara. The expansion of these farms causes two main concerns for
local communities, particularly among shermen. A primary concern for the sh±
ermen is the loss of shing territory to the farms, which operate in licensed areas
inaccessibl e to shermen. A second concern is marine pollution, which may be
caused by the accumulatio n of waste matter on the seabed below the cages, nutrien t
release, and the use of antibiotics and pesticides (Phyne 1996). The adverse environ±
mental eVects of salmon farming became a national concern when the wild sea trout
stocks in Northwest Connemara (and other regions) collapsed due to an explosion
in the sea lice populatio n in 1989. Salmon farms became the national sc apegoat.
How ever, despite extensive scientic research, it remains controversia l whether or
not the sea trout collapse is caused by the practices of the farms (Phyne 1996 ; Steins
1998 ). L ocal frustration is aggravated by the feeling that the economic benets of
salmon farming do not remain w ithin the region and by the lack of local partici±
pation in the designatio n of areas now used by the farms.
The presence of the salmon farms has resulted in the formation of a strong
‘‘anti±sh farm’’ lobby, reachin g a peak in April 1996, when one of the farms
obtained permission to move its sh cages to a new site, despite local opposition .
The new sh cages were sabotaged , resulting in a loss of IR£250,000 worth of juve±
nile s almon :
There was a major investigatio n but nobody was charged althoug h every-
bod y knew w ho had don e it. . . . T her e w as an element o f territo rial pro tec±
tion in their act, people t hough t they’d lost their territory t o u s. . . . T he
Government should have had more communication with the locals. N ow
they’ve learned a lesson , but it put us nearly out of business. (Manager,
Salm on Farm)
In one area, however, opposition is characterized by a more strategic response to
prevent the local salmon farm from expanding. In 1991, local shermen organized
themselves to form a shell sh cooperative and created common property rights to a
local bay. However, after this initia l ‘‘successful’’ collective action, the cooperative
now nds itself in a commons dilemma: Two±thirds of its mem bers hav e bec ome
free±riders who do not contribute to collective resource management. The case study
focuses on the collective action problems facing the cooperative and explain s why
the members have chosen certain action strategies.
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546 N.A.Steins and V.M.Edwards
Research Methodology
Fieldwork for this case study was conducted from M ay to September 1994 and from
July to mid August 1996. Primary data were collected through a range of sociologi±
cal research methods, including (1) participant observation ; (2) Participatory Rural
Appraisal techniques, such as m apping exercises and identi cation of critical inci±
dents ; (3) two focus groups with shermen discussing their perceptions on salmon
farming and their motivations and expectations when joining the cooperativ e; (4)
informal conversations ; and (5) 65 formal, unstructured, open±ended interviews w ith
shermen (34), their families (3), other local people (4), n sh farm operators (4),
tourism operators (5), community development workers (5), the Irish Sea F isheries
Board (6), the Western Regional F isheries Board (2), and sea sheries officers (2).
Throughou t the eldwork a ‘‘sensitive methodology ’’ (Knorr±Cetina 1981 , 17),
in which the researcher is engaged in the inquiry process rather than being a neutral
observer, was adopted. This position is embedded in our belief that objectivity as an
epistemological ideal does not do justice to the complexities of social and socio±
technica l interaction in ‘‘the world out there.’’ Furthermore, previous eldwork had
shown us that research outcomes are ‘‘shaped during the course of the inquiry by
the interaction of the investigator and the object of inquiry’’ (Guba and Lincoln
1989 , 99). By adopting a social constructivist position, which makes no a priori
assumptions about the organization of collective action, we were able to further our
understanding of how collective action processes in this one particular community
are shaped.
Consolidating Fishing Grounds: A ‘‘Successful’’ Case of Collective Action?
The rst public meeting to discuss the establishment of a cooperativ e was held in
1990 , initiated by a m arine biologist working in the area and a group of shermen.
After a few meetings, a business plan w as written to attract funds and to support the
license application . In 1991, the Connem ara Shellsh F arming Cooperativ e6(CSFC)
was established. The revitalization of the derelict native oyster (Ostrea edulis) beds in
the local bay was its rst priority. Problems with restocking, the collapse of the
market price for native oysters in 1992, and a disease scare in 1992/ 1993 prompted
CSFC to diversify, resulting in the production of P acic oysters (Crassostrea gigas)
and experiment s with scallop (Pecten maximus) cultivation.
The cooperative’s hidden objective, however, was to keep the local salmon farm,
which started the procedur e for a new site in 1989, from expanding. According to
the farm’s manager, the site was intended to be used for rotation and fallowing,
which is recomm ended by the Irish Salmon Grow ers Association to alleviate
environmental im pacts (P hyne 1996). However, the locals perceived that ‘‘[the
salmon farm] says that they need it for rotation, but that’s not true, they are going
to use it to produce more salm on, we all know that.’’ Moreover, the proposed site
would be located in an important shing ground. Fishermen’s statements such as
‘‘the rst objective for the cooperative was to create our own territory which the
salmon farm couldn’t get’’ and ‘‘[ it] is a good way to stop the shfarms and big
foreign companies from taking over the whole bay’’ provide a clear illustration of
the shermen’s strategic action.
In accordance with the 1959 and 1980 F isheries Acts, the cooperativ e was
granted aquacultur e licenses for parts of the bay. Consequently, the sites where the
native oyster beds, P aci c oysters, and scallops are located became a common pro±
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Collective Action in Resource M anagement 547
perty resource, accessible to shareholders only. The Irish Sea Fisheries Board (BIM)
and an EU±sponsored comm unity development projec t provide CSF C with nan±
cial, administrative, educational , and technical support. Between 1991 and 1995 ,
CSFC received an estimated gran t aid of IR£77,500 .
CSFC is managed by a Board of Management, elected by its members on the
annua l general m eeting. In 1996 , the cooperative had a total of 92 members, who
paid an annual fee of IR£20. Seventy±ve members have a share in the restocking
project, referred to hereafter as shareholders. Their share consists of a cash payment
of IR£150 plus 18 days of voluntary work valued at IR£25 a day. The democra±
tically formulated rules certify that only those shareholder s who are fully paid up
will receive dredgin g permits. In 1991 , it was forecasted that the rst output would
be in the fall of 1995.
If we compare the design principles formulated in CP Rs theory (see Table 1)
with the shermen’s collective action through the CSF C, the cooperative’s future
seems to be promising. First, the shermen have a common interest, considered vital
for successful cooperation (W ade 1988). Scarcity (a decreasing number of shing
grounds) and the risk of eventually losing the resource to outsiders were, for the
Connemara shermen, the main incentives to establish a cooperative. The net col±
lective bene t of the group ’s initiative is twofold. The shermen need the licensed
areas to secure access to a more vital resource, their shing grounds . Access is
guaranteed through their membership of CSFC. In addition, shareholders will get
an extra income from oyster sales.
Second, a set of decision±making arrangements was negotiated, with the basi c
starting point being accountability of the shareholders to common property
resource management. The rules are mutually agreed upon by all members ; they are
simple, democ ratically formulated, and considered legitimate. These factors are con±
sidered to be important prerequisites for eVective regulations (cf. Table 1 ; Galjart
1992).
Third, the nature of the resource and the relation between resource and user
group are characterized by favorable factors : (a) the boundaries of the resource are
small and clearly (visibly) dened ; (b) the distance between the location of the oyster
beds and residence of the majority of the shareholders is sm all, increasing the
noticeabilit y of rule violation ; and (c) indirectly, the shellsh resource is very signi±
cant, since the users need the licensed beds to secure access to vital shing grounds
(cf. Table 1).
Fourth, the boundaries of the group are clearly dened and shareholder s know
each other well. Although only a small number of shareholders visit the general
meeting, discussions and negotiations with representatives of the board frequently
take place in the local pub. N oticeability of cheatin g on agreements is very high,
since contributions are recorded and defectors are well known through the grape±
vine (cf. Table 1).
Finally, a number of external agencies and specialists work closely together with
representatives from the cooperative. The former are prepared to adapt their
support if the representatives feel that CSFC’s needs are changing (c f. White and
Runge 1995).
Notwithstandi ng the presence of these design principles , ‘‘successful’’ collective
action was granted only a short life. Soon after the cooperative’s inception , the rst
collective action problems emerged: The voluntar y work scheme failed. In 1994,
two±thirds of the shareholders had become free±riders, who are identied as
shareholders who ‘‘don’t show up for work at the oyster sites, [ so that] the work
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548 N.A.Steins and V.M.Edwards
alway s comes down to the same group of people’’ or who ‘‘still have to pay loads of
mon ey t o the [ co operative] and ha ve to ful ll th eir l abor obliga tion. ’’7In order to
keep the work at the resource going, the Board of M anagement applied for a
government±sponsored Social Em ployment Schem e. In the years between 1992 and
1996 , the work at the native oyster beds and P aci c oysters site (that was supposed
to be done as part of the members’ shares) has been done by a team of locals paid
by the government.
The case study clearly challenges the assum ptions in CPR theory concerning
the application of design principles. Why is collective action such an uphill battle?
The explanatio n must be sought in the way that shareholder s perceive and construct
their everyday reality.
Collective Action Problems Explained
Restocking the native oyster bed s was carried out through an experimental tech±
nique, which on a small scale had proved successful. Soon after the cooperative’s
inception , a newsletter (05.09.91) informed the members that only a few seed trans±
fers had been successful due to problems with the spat collectors, bad weather, and
adverse eVects caused by silt and seaweed. In early 1992, bonamiasi s was identied
in the bay, aVecting its production capacity. These setbacks caused much disap±
pointment : ‘‘Lots of the spat died. . . . The expected survival rate of one oyster per
mussel shell becam e one on every ten shells. . .. The aims were set too high from the
start’’ [Shareholder] and ‘‘T he Business P lan was written to get grants, but it gave
the members a very optimistic feelin g about the potential of the cooperative. When
the expectations didn’t become true they became demoralized’’ [ BIM eld staV] .
The frustratio n caused by these physical and technical problems was an impor±
tant reason for a number of shareholders to renege on their agreements , resulting in
a ‘‘knock on eVect,’’ or as on e of them said :‘‘listen, why should I do the work
voluntarily if the others don’t do it.’’ This was aggravated by the collapse of the
native oyster price by 50%: ‘‘My expectatio n was to m ake fast money. It just didn’t
happen.’’ When an independent survey revealed that the bay’s carrying capacity was
only an annual 70 tons of oysters, rather than the 200 tons projected in the business
plan, a large number of the remainder of the committed shareholders decided to call
it a day.
Besides the disappointm ent caused by physical and technica l problems and the
collapse of the market price, another factor in¯uenced collective action. M any
shareholders felt that once the cooperativ e was established, they had achieved their
hidden objective.
Collective action is also complicated by socioeconomic factors. The period
when the shareholders’ labor at the oyster sites is needed concurs with the tourist
season. One of the shareholders put it like this : ‘‘If O’Donaghue can make some
money by taking some tourists on an inshore shing trip, he will not take us on his
boat to check the scallops even though he is a very active shareholder. He needs the
money.’’ The problem of seasonalit y is aggravated by the fact that while tourism±
related activities result in direct economic rewards, returns from the cooperative
were not expected until 1995. In the end, many shareholders preferred a direct
reward over a postponed one (cf. Galjart 1992; Ostrom 1990). Furthermore, they
could only speculate abou t the size of their future reward: There was no indication
about the quantit y of the rst yield in 1995, while the market price for nativ e oysters
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Collective Action in Resource M anagement 549
collapsed. In terms of socioeconomic considerations, the shareholder s perceive the
net collectiv e benet of collectiv e action to be minor.
When the cooperative was established, the shareholders agreed on management
rules, some of which were related to sanctioning non±contributors and poachers.
How ever, in reality none of the free±riders have been punished. P eople perceive that
sanctioning a fellow community member will turn them into the scapegoat rather
than th e defector :
‘‘My house overlooks the bay and I have seen people picking oysters, but
what can I do ? It’s the bailiV’s jo b to w atch the b ay a nd c atch them. . . . It is
difficult to tell other peopl e what to do or not to do in a community like
this ; we depend on each other.
Even though the actual dependence on fellow community mem bers has reduced due
to infrastructural and socioeconomic developments, the traditional dependence on
others is a social construction that is used as an excuse to back out of one’s obli±
gation s despite the existence of a framework of universalisti c rules and regulations
(cf. Callon and Law 1989). Although the community is loosely structured in the
sense that corporate groups are not present, people’s social networks±such as close
or distant kinship, neighbors , friends, colleagues±still form a constraint to execute
the rules. The eVects of social control mechanisms as a w ay to back up the executio n
of the rules (cf. Taylo r 1987) are minor, since people are not willing to do thing s that
will make them unpopular, despite their action being legitimate and fair. F or these
reasons, sanctioning free±riders can only be done by bailiVs w ho, by law , are legiti±
mized to do so.8
Free±riding must also be considered in a historical context. In the late 1970s,
there was a very successful service cooperative for shermen in the region. Members
sold their sh through this cooperativ e and also beneted from other services it
provided. In the early 1980s , the service cooperative collapsed . At the time of its
breakdown, it was managed by some of the initiator s and current Board m embers of
CSFC. When the shareholders were asked about this past experience, they were
reluctan t to tell why the cooperativ e failed. The answers were always related to the
lack of nancial resources. However, in a number of conversations with nonmem±
bers of CSF C another perception emerged, summarized by the following statement :
‘‘There was a lot of struggle within the committee. They didn’t listen to [ the
employ ed ma nager] . . . t hey w anted it th ei r wa y. On e o f it s m em bers
wanted to become chairm an, the others didn’t agree but in the end he won.
. . . The comm ittee became greedy and wanted to make a prot. They
became careless. After [ the manager] left, they did not check anymore if
buyers had enough money but sold on credit.
The prevailin g feeling within the community is that the service cooperativ e was
managed badly by its Board of M anagement once the employed manager had left.
This negative past experience aVects shareholders’ willingness to contribut e: ‘‘Look
at w hat happened to the shermen’s cooperative, the same may happen again.’’ The
fact that there are some people in CSFC’s Board of Managem ent who were heavily
involved in the collapsed service cooperativ e in¯uences shareholders ’ trust in the
board ’s capability and, as a result, their willingnes s to becom e actively involved in
CSF C.
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550 N.A.Steins and V.M.Edwards
The lack of trust also negativel y aVects the board’s authority to enforce the
rules. Even if the universalistic rules of an association are formulated democra±
tically , this will not guarantee their automatic execution±particularly not in this
setting, which is characterized by particularistic behavior and multistranded rela±
tions. An authority structure is vital to protect the individual’s contribution to the
collective managem ent system9(Ostrom 1 990 ; W ade 1 988).
A nal set of factors in¯uencing collective action is constituted in the political±
institutional environment. The interventions of the external agencies supporting the
cooperative are characterized by a so±called ‘‘cargo image’’ (Long and Van der
Ploeg 1989 , 230), the idea that, without externa l aid, target groups cannot m anage
their own life circumstances and solve the problematic situations they face.
Although shareholders do not value their dependence on externa l agents positively,
a certain opportunism can be identied. The supportive organizations cannot with±
draw since the cooperative is not yet able to stand on its own, in which case a large
sum of developmen t money and personal eVorts would be wasted.1 0 The
shareholders exert this knowledge. In the case of nancial, administrative, or techni±
cal problems, they immediately call for assistance. There is a particularly opportun±
istic attitude toward the provision of grant aid, related to the extensive experience
Connemara communities have with development projects; while extracting as m any
benets from these projects as possible, people’s prevailin g attitude is ‘‘wait and
see.’’
The government±sponsored Socia l Employment Schemes are another example
of shareholders’ expedient behavio r regarding their political±institutional environ±
ment. W hile the scheme has the advantage that ‘‘it keeps the cooperative going ’’ and
‘‘provides training facilities for our future benet,’’ a number of shareholder s per±
ceive that ‘‘[it] demotivated the members who were still com mitted since the work
was going to be done anyway.’’ The possibilit y of applyin g for a Social Employment
Scheme was already mentioned in the business plan ; the shareholders knew that if
the work obligatio n was not fullled, they could probably rely on an Employment
Scheme. The reluctance of the committed shareholders to sanction the free±riding
community members lies at the heart of this calculation.
The Future of Collective Action at the Cooperative
CSFC’s licenses to the bay need to be retained to secure future access to the bay. In
the current national institutional context, which is discussed elsewhere (Phyne 1996 ;
Steins 1998), the problems associated with both salmon farming and the lack of
public participation in the marine planning system are not likely to be tackled .
CSFC’s future, however, does not look very bright. The free±rider problem has not
been solved, and althoug h the most obvious solution is to buy them out, the co±
operative’s poor nancial position and the fact that the free±riders are fellow com±
munity members hinder this solution . In 1995 , the Board of Management, advised
by the external agencies, decided to focuses on P aci c oyster cultivatio n only. Its
continuation depends on the successful growth of 500,000 spat, which were pur±
chased in 1996, and an increase of the market price. Two committed shareholder s
have decided not to take chances and have obtained individual (private) licenses for
the cultivation of this species. However, potential future success will also cause new
problems, since many free±riders expect to receive their share, and do not want to be
bough t out of a venture that has proven to be economically viable.
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Collective Action in Resource M anagement 551
The Contribution of a Social Constructivist Perspective
In collective action research±be it in a controlled , experimental situation or a real
case±there is a tendency to determine the conditions under which individual actors
are willing to work together. The case study suggests, however , that these condition s
or design principles alone are not sufficient to explain or establish ‘‘successful’’ col±
lective action.
In the rst place, many studies about ‘‘successful’’ CPRM extensively describe
the organization of the management system itself, but tend to consider the externa l
ecological, socioeconomic and political±institutional environment and historical
context of the CPR as a ‘‘black box.’’ However, as this study demonstrates, the
external environment forms an integral part of the stakeholders’ everyday reality
and signicantly in¯uences decision s to either cooperate or defect.
The problem that often surfaces, however, is that such contextual factors are
barely visible. We believe that this ‘‘invisibility’’ is complicated by the use of design
principles as an analytical starting point. Predened distinctions between categories
of ‘‘successful’’ (e.g., cooperation) and ‘‘unsuccessful’’ (e.g., free±riding) are of little
help, since they hinder rather than facilitate an examination of the contingencies
involved in the complex processes by which, for example, ‘‘success’’ is rst dened
and later achieved (or obstructed) (cf. Verschoor 1997). For example, the collective
action problem s that emerged after the initial ‘‘success’’ of the cooperative’s estab±
lishment cannot be fully understood without a consideratio n of the relationship
between salmon farms and local shing communities in Northwest Connemara. As
Law and Callon (1992, 22 ) make clear, these contingencies tend to be more readily
apparen t in situations of controversy surrounding failure. In view of this, we turned
a situation of unwillingness of Irish shermen to work together into a ‘‘method±
ological convenience,’’ one that helped us to display the contextua l factors that are
more easily hidden in the case of ‘‘successful’’ collectiv e action.
A second risk of using design principles is that researchers and practitioners
may easily lapse into generalizations . They should acknowledge, however, that what
may be a design principle in one situation is not necessarily one in another. Here we
meet again with the interactive nature of the CPRM and the contextua l character±
istics of its environment. The externa l environment within which the management
system is located in¯uences the actors’ priorities and, consequently, to what extent
they are prepared to fulll the demands made by the collective management system.
These priorities not only vary between geographica l settings and over time, but also
diVer between actors who are engaged in the same management system, as the case
study indicated.
M oreover, individual stakeholders’ priorities will be reshaped through inter±
actions with other stakeholders, other individuals, and nonhuman entities. F or
example, in the case of the shell sh cooperative, it is likely that once the shell sh
cooperative reaches the production and sales phase, the shareholders and other
community members will give a diVerent meanin g to the cooperative. As a result,
their willingness to sustain the oyster resource may increase. In this light , the notion
of critical mass is important ; it seems that collective action is dependent on the
willingness and skills of a small group of active shareholders. Once their eVorts have
much reward to show, other shareholders may follow their example.
In the third place, the use of prescriptive design principles raises questions
related to normativity. What is ‘‘successful,’’ what is ‘‘a failure’’? When we look at
the cooperative, it becomes clear tha t the shareholders are facing a commons
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552 N.A.Steins and V.M.Edwards
dilemma. The facts that two±thirds of the shareholders hav e become free±riders and
that the cooperativ e only survives because of the eVorts of a sm all group of peopl e
and externa l support would tempt many of us to say that collective action has
failed. However, if we look at the hidden objective of the CSFC, namely, securing
access to the local shing grounds, the cooperative can be considered extremely
successful in realizing this aim. Does the cooperative need the universal cooperation
of every oyster sherman, or is it perhaps rational to cooperate just enoug h to keep
the cooperativ e going?
To avoid the ‘‘traps’’ associated with the use of a priori identi ed categories
leading to ‘‘success’’ and, for that matter ‘‘failure,’’ we advocate the study of collec±
tive action processes in CPRM scenarios from a social constructivist perspective.
This perspectiv e adds an important dimension to the study of CPRs in that it exam±
ines how CP RM is constructed by the various stakeholders and how it operates
over time. Adopting a social constructivist perspective will, rst, help researchers
and practitioners to be sensitive to both internal and contextual factors in¯uencing
the actor’s motivations to adopt a certain strategy, by explainin g the process
resulting in certain outcomes of CPRM rather than merely describing such out±
comes. F or example, the presence of ‘‘good’’ design principles in the formation of the
cooperativ e did not preven t free±riding behavior. A consideration of the con¯ict
between salmon farming and the cooperativ e per se w as indispensable in under±
standing why ‘‘successful’’ cooperatio n failed, drawing attentio n to multiple±use
problems and the external environment. Thus, by narrowly focusing on the descrip±
tion of CP RM outcomes and prescribing design principles , the process of collective
action cannot be fully understood. In this context, a second contribution of the
social constructivist perspective to CP R theory is through the adoptio n of the prin±
ciple of symmetry. The fact that collectiv e action is ‘‘successful’’ does not make it
exempt from in±depth analysis ; that is, ‘‘success’’ cannot itself be oVered as an expla±
nation (for exam ple, by ‘‘dening’’ design principles on the basis of successful cases),
but is that which needs to be explained (cf. Verschoor 1997). The reason for adopt±
ing the symmetry principle in CP R theory is that judgments about ‘‘success’’ and
‘‘failure’’ are socially constructed, by both the C PR scholar and the CPR users. Any
research that starts with the assumption that some form of collective action is ‘‘suc±
cessful’’ while another is a ‘‘failure’’ ‘‘will never get to analyze how the distinction is
constructed and used’’ (L aw 1994, 10). Thus, each individua l case, whether or not it
is ‘‘succ essful,’’ will have to be analyzed in order to assess the factors contributing to
the process that leads to the specic outcome.
Does this imply that the design principles identied in CP R theory are not
useful ? The answer has to be ‘‘yes’’ if they are tacitly used as prescriptions for estab±
lishing cooperation in CPRM situations . The answer is ‘‘no’’ if researchers and prac±
titioners use them as a starting point for the formulation of questions that help to
explain the state of a particular CP R, and if they acknowledg e the interdependent
relationship between these questions. For example, conditions for ‘‘success’’ such as
‘‘high noticeability of cheating’’ and ‘‘sanctions’’ can be reformulated into questions
such as, ‘‘to what extent is cheating noticeable ?’’ and ‘‘do the management rules
includ e sanctions for defector s ?’’ The question that should then logically follow is,
‘‘do a high noticeabilit y of cheating and the presence of sanctions explai n collective
action?’’ In the case of the shellsh cooperative, high noticeability of cheatin g an d
the presence of sanctions still resulted in collective action problems. These could
only be explained when a link was made with the questions ‘‘how can the socioeco±
nomic rewards of the cooperative be explained,’’ ‘‘what is the nature of the social
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Collective Action in Resource M anagement 553
network s within the user community,’’ and ‘‘how can the sociotechnical networks
(e.g., the experimental restocking program) be described?’’ In addition, we strongly
recomm end that analysts should not narrowly focus on interdependent relationships
among internal variables, but also should seek the explanatio n for the occurrence or
absence of collective action in the CPR’s external environment.
Conclusion
The sustainable management of CPRs is an importan t priority on a worldwide
environmental agenda . Many CPRs are in a threatened state as a result of the
transition from a single±use resourc e into more complex, multiple±use systems,
where diVerent types of use are demanded by increasing numbers of actors on a
single±resource system. The issue of how to organize their sustainable exploitation
has become of increasing importance.
In this article, we challenged assumptions concerning the applicatio n of design
principles to CP RM by showing, through an empirical case study, the need to con±
sider contextual factors in CPR analysis. We argued that the formulation of a priori
distinctions between factors contributing either to ‘‘success’’ or ‘‘failure’’ does not
facilitate CPRM research . First, they may hinder the researcher’s sensitivity to con±
textual factors aVecting stakeholders’ perceptions of the CP R and their motivations
to participate in collective action. Second, prescriptive design principles do not do
justice to both the uniquenes s of the collective action setting and the stakeholders’
perceptions concerning ‘‘success’’ of management. In a social constructivist per±
spective such a priori assumptions are not made. The CPR is studied as an entity
within a wider physical, technological, socioeconomic, cultural, historical, and
political±institutional environment, in which stakeholders are making decisions to
optim ize the space for their own projects. The state of aVairs in a CPR setting is
considered to be the outcome, product, or eVect of the interaction between stake±
holders, other social actors, and nonhuman entities (cf. Callon and Law 1995).
The analysis in this paper has four im portant implications for future research
and policy regarding the management of CP Rs. First, we have to let go of the
prevailin g idea that the formulation of design principles will result in policies that
eventually lead to successful and sustainable CPRM situations. It is essential to
acknowledge that in research and policy programs such design principles should,with
due caution,be used as a heuristic t ool to formulate research questions rather t han as
prescriptive guidelines for development .
Second, the externa l environment can no longer be regarded as a black box.
The case study demonstrates that despite the presence of ‘‘good’’ design principles,
cooperatio n was thw arted by contextual factors on the basis of which shareholders
socially constructed their everyda y reality. Future research on CPRM will have to
focus on the problem of how to integrate the interaction processes between the collec±
tive management system and the contex tual factors embedded in its wider environment.
The adaptation of existing heuristic tools in CPR literature is vital to increase our
understanding of collective action in CPRM situations.11
Third, CPR theory tends to build on empirical studies of single±use common
property regimes in non±Western societies, and neglects complex CP Rs character±
ized by multiple, extractive, and nonextractiv e uses. Even if the design principles are
to be used as a heuristic tool to organize information about cooperation in multiple±
use situations, they will hav e to be adapted for the more complex demands placed
on the researcher in the study of multiple±u se C PRs. M o re emp irical stud ies on t he
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554 N.A.Steins and V.M.Edwards
complex interactio n proc esses between diVerent user groups within the same CP RM
system are needed to develop heurist ic t ools t hat help us organize informat ion about
collective action processes in complex ,mult iple±use scenarios.
Fourth, the pot ential of a social constructivist perspective t o study CPRM
syste ms needs to be further explored. Hitherto, this approach has mainly been used in
the elds of sociology of knowledge, the sociology of science, philosophy, rural soci±
ology, and agric ultura l science (Berger and Luckmann 1967 ; Callon and Law 1995 ;
Gub a a nd Li ncoln 1 989 ; K norr±Cetina 1981 ; Verschoor 1997 ). N ew methods and
techniques will have to be developed that can deal with the analysis of the contin±
gencies involved in the complex processes underlying an individual ’s decision to
adopt certain collectiv e action strategies, and, in particular, the way stakeholders
socially construct the arena in which they have to take these decisions. In this
process, CP R scholars and policymakers may benet from developments in the eld
of agricultural extension, where methodologies based on the social constructivist
perspective have been developed to support collective action s for sustainable natural
resource management and policy decisions (P retty 1995 ; Ro
Èling and Wagemakers
1998).
The social construction of the natural, social, and technical environment and
the variou s uniqu e management regimes for natura l resources should be a core
aspect in any research project or policy program regarding natural resource man±
agement. This is especially important in situations where some form of collective
action is required. A comparison of the perspectives of resource users, other direct
stakeholders, researchers, and policymaker s on resource management, will help the
variou s actors involved to understand each other’s agenda, and will facilitate nego±
tiations on the organization of resource management.
Notes
1. W hen th e idea of design principles was introduced in the late 1980s, CP R scholars
were reluctan t to identify them as requirement s for ‘‘success.’’ F or example, in a footn ote to
the original list o f variables associated w ith organized coordination of CPRM , Ostro m (1992)
emphasizes that none o f them were a required and sufficient condition either for or against
the emergence and con tinuation of CPRM organizations. Elsewhere she emphasized that she
‘‘is not willin g to argue that these design principles are n ecessary conditions for achieving
institu tional rob ustness in CP R settings,’’ but sh e ‘‘is willing to specu late . .. that after further
scholarly wo rk is completed, it will be possible to identify a set of necessary design principles
and that such a set will contain the core of what h as been identied here’’ (Ostrom 1990, 90).
2. The role of con textual factors was furth er explored by the authors at a P anel on
Con textual Factors at the 7th Conference of the International Association for the Study of
Com mon P roperty, held in Vancouver, 10 14 June 1998. We refer to Edwards and Steins
(1998b ) for a detailed discussion o n contextual factors.
3. In CPR th eory, ratio nal individuals who extrac t resource units from a CPR are gener±
ally referred to as ‘‘appropriators’’ (Ostro m 1990, 30). The notion of ‘‘social actor’’ will do
more justice to the complexities and uncertain ties resource users face w hen making d ecisions
on the level of contribution to the collective.
4. Th is approac h b uilds heavily on acto r±network th eory, which was developed in
Europe in the context of the socio logy of science. Inherent in actor±network theory is that
reality cannot be den ed in terms of a single socia l order ; rather sociologist s have to be
concerned with multiple an d incomplete processes of social ordering (Law 1994 ). In th is social
world, agents are building ‘‘disorderly networks composed of social, eco nomic, politica l and
technica l elements’’ (Verscho or 1997, 26). Actor±network scho lars explo re the tactics through
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Collective Action in Resource M anagement 555
which the materially h eterogeneou s agen ts attempt to constitute themselves as social actors,
the tactics of ‘‘translatio n’’ (L aw 1994, 101 ).
5. T he symm etry principle was d evelo ped by sociologists of science, who op posed the
conventional belief that only false scientic knowledge needed sociologica l explanation. This
belief stems from the assumption tha t if scienti c kn owledge is false, this is caused at th e end
of the trajectory, when something w ent wrong. The very n ature o f true scienti c knowledge
thus made it exemp t for sociological analysis. The opp onents of this belief argued against this
asymm etric explan ation (Law 1994 ).
6. T o protect the identity of those concerned, the n ames in this articl e are ctitious.
7. Th e free±riders represent full±and part±time shermen of all ag e ca tegories. T he
majority of the committed memb ers are (1) fo rmer shermen, (2) self±em ployed , or (3) unem±
ployed.
8. T he sam e observatio n is made by T aylor (1987), who was told by Irish salmo n sh±
ermen that ‘‘the river would run red with blood’’ if they had to punish the defecto rs them±
selves.
9. C omp are Wade’s Indian villages, which are not characterized by dem ocrati c decision±
making structures, but where the authority to execute the rules is ensu red by the existing
local elite (1988 ).
10. The dependen ce on support from external agencies has an im portan t disadvantage :
It often ruins cooperation (Leh mann 1990 ; Ostrom 1995).
11. We refer to Edwards and Steins (1998a) for an adapted version of the Oakerson
framework for th e analysi s of single use CP Rs (Oakerson 1992 ), to facilitate the analysis of
multiple±use commons and con textual factors.
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