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THE DILEMMA ACTION:ANALYSIS OF AN ACTIVIST
TECHNIQUE
by Majken Jul Sørensen and Brian Martin
When nonviolent activists design an action that poses a dilemma for oppo-
nents—for example whether to allow protesters to achieve their objective
or to use force against them with consequent bad publicity—this is called
a dilemma action. These sorts of actions have been discussed among acti-
vists and in activist writings, but not systematically analyzed. We present
a preliminary classification of different aspects of dilemma actions and
apply it to three case studies: the 1930 salt march in India, a jail-in used
in the Norwegian total resistance movement in the 1980s, and the free-
dom flotillas to Gaza in 2010 and 2011. In addition to defining what is
the core of a dilemma action, we identify five factors that can make the
dilemma more difficult for opponents to “solve.” Dilemma actions derive
some of their effectiveness from careful planning and creativity that push
opponents in unaccustomed directions.
INTRODUCTION
In 1967, during the Indochinese war, a U.S. Quaker activist group
organized a ship to deliver medical supplies to North Vietnam. The
U.S. government was placed in a dilemma: either allow the ship to
deliver goods to its then-enemy, or use force to stop it, causing adverse
publicity from stopping humanitarian action. U.S. nonviolent activist
George Lakey used this example in his book Powerful Peacemaking to
illustrate what he called “dilemma demonstrations.”
1
He presented the
dilemma as between two options for authorities: Either let protesters
continue with their demonstration, which would achieve an immediate
goal, including educating the public, or use force to stop them, thereby
revealing their harsh side and generating popular concern.
Dilemma actions have been discussed within activist circles, with
occasional commentary in print. For example, the manual Nonviolent
PEACE & CHANGE, Vol. 39, No. 1, January 2014
©2014 Peace History Society and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
73
Struggle: 50 Crucial Points, written by Otpor activists involved in the
struggle that brought down Slobodan Milosevic’s government in Serbia
in 2000, includes a two-page treatment of dilemma actions.
2
Their for-
mulation is slightly different from Lakey’s. They recommend identifying
a government policy that conflicts with widely held beliefs and then
designing an action that requires the government to choose either doing
nothing or applying sanctions that violate the widely held beliefs. For
example, the policy might be censorship, the widely held belief be that
people should have access to information, and the action be publishing
Buddhist literature. “In either case the government loses, because doing
nothing means allowing its policies and laws to be disobeyed, and react-
ing with sanctions means violating what most of the population feels
are important beliefs and values.”
3
The idea of appealing to widely held
beliefs is not unique to Otpor: It was also emphasized by Bill Moyer in
his writings about how social movements should strategize to win.
4
Philippe Duhamel offers this description:
A dilemma demonstration is a tactical framework that puts power
holders in a dilemma: if the action is allowed to go forward, it
accomplishes something worthwhile related to the issue or posi-
tion being asserted. If the power holders repress the action, they
put themselves in a bad light, and the public is educated about
the issue or position.
5
Duhamel provides a comprehensive analysis of a dilemma action
in 2001 in Ottawa, Canada, which was part of a citizens’ campaign
against the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.
Dilemma actions are worthy of interest for both activists and aca-
demics. For activists, they provide an approach for increasing the effec-
tiveness of nonviolent action strategies. Knowing more about
the dynamics of dilemma actions and their core features can enable
activists to design their actions to pose difficult dilemmas to opponents,
leading opponents to make inferior decisions or waste their efforts pre-
paring for several possible responses. Below we will show that activists
and scholars have sometimes talked about an important element of a
particular dilemma action as if it was a core feature of the phenome-
non of dilemma actions. In our analysis, we list five factors that can
make a dilemma more acute, but are not core features of dilemma
actions generally. Being aware that elements can be important without
being central ought to make it easier for activists to conceptualize a
74 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
wider variety of dilemma actions. At the same time, understanding the
range of elements that can contribute to a dilemma can inspire acti-
vists. Nonviolence scholars should pay attention to themes and con-
cepts that activists discuss and care about; that dilemma actions have
not been more carefully analyzed before is a major gap in nonviolence
theory. In addition, understanding dilemma actions within nonviolent
action arenas has the potential to give peace researchers insights into
dealing with or posing dilemmas in other domains, such as negotia-
tions, peacebuilding, or ways to challenge structural violence.
Many dilemma actions derive their potency from the possibility
that force used against nonviolent protesters may generate a backlash.
The dynamics of this backlash were first conceptualized by Richard
Gregg, based on his observations of campaigns led by Gandhi in
India.
6
Gregg coined the expression “moral jiu-jitsu”: Violence by the
authorities rebounds against them like the force of an opponent in
the sport of jiu-jitsu. Gregg attributed moral jiu-jitsu to psychological
effects on attackers, although Weber later showed that the effect was
due to influences on third parties, not on the police who beat protest-
ers.
7
Nonviolence scholar Gene Sharp generalized Gregg’s concept to
include social and political processes for generating a backlash when
authorities use force against peaceful protesters, calling this “political
jiu-jitsu.” Sharp used examples such as the Sharpeville massacre in
South Africa in 1960 and the bloody Sunday killings in Russia in
1905.
8
Brian Martin has developed the backfire model, a generaliza-
tion of Sharp’s political jiu-jitsu that includes methods used by attack-
ers to reduce outrage from their actions and countermethods by which
protesters can increase outrage.
9
In all these frameworks, a jiu-jitsu or
backfire effect is less likely when protesters use violence, because more
observers will judge that violence by the authorities is legitimate.
A question then arises: Is every nonviolent action a dilemma
action? After all, authorities always have a choice between allowing
the action to proceed and using force to stop it. Nonviolent action
does not pose a dilemma to authorities in at least two circumstances.
The first is when the action can be ignored or tolerated because it has
little credibility, only a small audience or is considered harmless. The
second is when countermeasures such as repression do not generate
popular concern. This can happen when authorities inhibit outrage,
for example by operating in secret.
A dilemma action is therefore a special kind of action in which
the choices for the opponent are not easy, as assessed at the time or in
The Dilemma Action 75
hindsight. A conventional expression of social concern, such as an
antiwar rally on Hiroshima Day in a liberal democracy, poses no
dilemma: Authorities may tolerate or even facilitate the event because
it poses little threat to vested interests, whereas banning it would
arouse antagonism. Some forms of civil disobedience, such as plow-
share actions involving damaging military equipment, also pose no
dilemma, because authorities know exactly what to do: arrest the acti-
vists, who willingly surrender to police. Nevertheless, it is more useful
to think of dilemma actions as a matter of degree rather than dichoto-
mously present or absent. In the ideal type of a dilemma action, the
optimal choice for the opponent is not obvious to anyone.
The concept of dilemma, namely a difficult choice between
options, each of which has advantages and disadvantages, is generic.
However, there appears not to be any standard classification of types
of dilemmas. In philosophy, there is discussion of moral dilemmas,
which, while of limited direct applicability to dilemma actions, raises
some relevant concepts.
10
Many nonviolent activists are motivated by
moral considerations, so it is useful to survey what philosophers say
about moral dilemmas.
The moral dilemmas faced by individuals who must make a
choice within a single moral framework are the ones most commonly
analyzed. Philosophers disagree about whether moral systems should
allow dilemmas or whether every set of choices has a unique correct
answer. However, these matters are irrelevant for the practicalities of
most dilemmas involving nonviolent action, because they are multiper-
son interactions, and the different participants may be, and often are,
operating with different moral frameworks.
Philosophers have analyzed moral dilemmas imposed by others
where an individual has to decide what to do, a famous example being
in William Styron’s novel Sophie’s Choice, in which Nazis tell a
mother to choose which one of her two children will live; if she
refuses to choose, both will be killed.
11
However, the perspective of
those constructing dilemmas to be imposed on others is lacking from
the literature. This also brings up another point of difference. Philoso-
phers have analyzed dilemmas imposed by “bad guys” such as Nazis.
Nonviolent activists, in opposing repression and injustice, might be
seen as the “good guys,” at least by many outside observers, a config-
uration not addressed in studies of moral dilemmas.
James Jasper, a sociologist and social movement researcher, offers
another approach to dilemmas. Using the concept of games (but being
76 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
critical of game theory), he emphasizes the complexities of problems
people face in everyday life, and the importance of the interactions
and relationships between everyone involved in the dilemma, rather
than seeking solutions to the problems.
12
Like philosophers, Jasper
distinguishes dilemmas involving individuals (single players) from
those involving “compound players” such as organizations. Another
term used by Jasper is the “arena” where a dilemma takes place. The
concepts of single player, compound player, and arena are useful for
studying dilemma actions, as is Jasper’s emphasis on the question of
who initiates the engagement.
Jasper lists a wide range of dilemmas, such as whether to think
about immediate objectives or long-term goals
13
or whether to treat
followers as resources or as players.
14
However, he does not address
the question of trying to impose dilemmas on others.
Game theory provides another approach to dilemmas. The most
well-known configuration is the prisoner’s dilemma, which is an inter-
active scenario: a prisoner’s payoff depends on the choice made by the
other prisoner as well the prisoner’s own choice. The configuration of
a dilemma action is different, in that activists intend their opponent to
experience a dilemma, although sometimes activists face dilemmas
too. In game theory, dilemma actions can be accommodated by having
payoffs in two different domains that cannot be combined quantita-
tively. However, not allowing quantitative combination negates most
of the mathematical apparatus of game theory.
To illustrate the potential complexity of dilemmas, it is useful to
divide them into types. We propose a framework with three domains
and multiple types within each domain.
Domain of Individuals
Moral dilemmas
Ideological dilemmas
Domain of Relationships
Interpersonal dilemmas (involving, for example, friendship)
Intra-organizational dilemmas (involving relationships between groups
within organizations)
Interorganizational dilemmas (involving relationships between differ-
ent organizations)
The Dilemma Action 77
Domain of Structures and Systems
Political dilemmas
Economic dilemmas
Social dilemmas
A solely moral dilemma could involve a choice between two
moral principles, for example between protecting a child and pro-
tecting the mother (as in a dangerous birth). An interorganizational
dilemma might involve whether to placate one of two rival groups
in a coalition when this is highly likely to antagonize the other
group.
In addition, there are mixed dilemmas involving combinations of
different types of dilemmas, especially between different domains. A
moral–interpersonal dilemma could involve a choice between a moral
principle and a friend, for example whether to support a friend for a
position over someone who is better qualified. An ideological-
economic dilemma might involve a choice between a belief system and
economic interests, for example whether to support subsidies for an
industry that clash with a belief in free markets.
In game theory formalism, a dilemma can be presented as in
Table 1, which illustrates a political dilemma for the U.S. government.
Allowing the ship to deliver goods to North Vietnam is a political loss
of magnitude a, but there are no adverse consequences from using
force (a, 0); using force to stop the ship means no political conse-
quences from a delivery, but there is a political loss of magnitude b
from adverse publicity (0, b).
The dilemma arises because there is no simple or commonly
agreed way of amalgamating the two types of payoffs to a single
measure. Sometimes, the dilemma is posed to a single opponent, for
example a political leader, who is torn between ordering the use of
force or not; in many cases, the dilemma is posed to a compound
player, such as a committee in which different individuals have differ-
ent preferences. Often, there are both short-term and long-term
aspects of the dilemma to be taken into consideration for all sides.
Table 1 A Political Dilemma for the US Government
US government Allow the ship to deliver goods (a, 0)
Use force to stop the ship (0, b)
78 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
With this background, we can lay out the features of a dilemma
action. First, the other side must have choices. Second, the outcomes
of different choices have mixtures of benefits and costs that are quali-
tatively different or in different domains. No choice by the opponent
can be obviously better by all criteria or according to all decision-
makers.
Uncertainty is probably involved in most cases. No one knows for
sure exactly what will happen following a choice of action, or perhaps
there are disagreements about what will happen. However, strategy is
about making decisions under uncertainty, taking into account the
relative likelihood of different outcomes. Uncertainty does not mean
absence of knowledge: There can be knowledge about what things are
more likely to occur, and nonviolent activists planning a dilemma
action are likely to benefit from thinking along these lines. First, they
could consider possible opponent responses and assess the likely
effects of those responses. Then, they could choose a different action,
modify their chosen action or make preparations to increase the bene-
fits to the activists if the opponents make their best response. If oppo-
nents make a second-best choice, the benefits to the activists are even
greater.
Taking Jasper’s concepts of players, arenas and initiatives, as well
as the theoretical background of domains as our starting point, we
developed a set of questions to apply to potential case studies of
dilemma actions. The intention with these questions is to be able to
compare the case studies and find elements that contribute to the
dilemma without being core features.
Who are the players?
Who initiates the engagement?
Which arenas are available?
Which arena do the activists try to play on?
What types of dilemmas are involved?
What choices does the opponent have in the short and long run?
What are the consequences of the action in the short and long
run?
How does the dilemma action differ from other possible actions?
Specifically, how does the choice or design of the dilemma action
affect the attractiveness of the opponent’s responses?
In the following sections, we examine three nonviolent actions with
characteristics of a dilemma action: the 1930 salt march in India, a
The Dilemma Action 79
humorous intervention in the Norwegian total resistance campaign in
the 1980s, and the 2010 and 2011 freedom flotillas to Gaza. In selecting
these cases out of many possible ones, we aimed for diversity in terms
of time, place, numbers involved, and context. The three case studies,
spanning more than eighty years, include an anticolonial struggle, a
national case in a democratic setting, and an international solidarity
action. We also picked cases that illustrate that what might seem to be a
core feature in a particular case (for instance the constructive element in
the Freedom Flotilla or the surprise element in the jail-in) turns out to
be absent in other cases, meaning that it cannot be a core feature of all
dilemma actions. Each action was one episode in a longer-running cam-
paign. We describe the action and attempt to answer the questions
above. Afterward, we identify the characteristics of dilemma actions,
and in the conclusion, we spell out the implications for understanding
dilemma actions and their relevance in nonviolence campaigns.
THE SALT MARCH
In 1930, the Indian independence movement faced many chal-
lenges. Gandhi was the acknowledged leader, but there were critics on
the left and, more importantly, caste, class, religion, and sex splintered
the population, so it was difficult to find a way to unite Indians
against the British colonial rulers. Gandhi came up with the idea of a
campaign against British salt laws. The salt tax was a minor matter in
the scheme of British rule, but Gandhi realized it had the potential of
mobilizing Indians from all walks of life. The plan was to march to
the sea with the intention of undertaking civil disobedience by making
salt from seawater. The march was an elaborate affair, designed to
maximize popular support through a slow buildup. Starting in March,
the marchers took twenty-four days to reach the Dandi on the coast.
Stopping at towns along the way, Gandhi gave talks and the marchers
gained more support and publicity.
15
The British rulers were faced by a dilemma: arrest Gandhi and
other movement leaders as the march proceeded, or wait until they
had broken the law. Arresting Gandhi early in the march had the
advantage of restricting the mobilization of support the march was
engendering; waiting until later meant the campaign achieved many of
its goals. However, arresting Gandhi early could be counterproductive,
because it contravened the rule of law: Gandhi, merely by walking
and talking, did nothing illegal. British rule maintained much of its
80 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
legitimacy, in India and Britain, from its adherence to its own norms.
Because Gandhi was so famous, illegitimate action against him would
inflame public opinion far beyond arresting a lesser figure. Further-
more, the issue of the salt laws seemed trivial at one level—therefore
making arrests over violating the laws seemed excessive—and, at
another level, a powerful basis for mobilization, because it was so easy
to understand the issues and participate in civil disobedience.
The salt march thus was a dilemma action, although this concept
did not exist at the time. A nationalist newspaper clearly expressed
the dilemma:
To arrest Gandhi is to set fire to the whole of India. Not to arrest
him is to allow him to set the prairie on fire. To arrest Gandhi is
to court a war. Not to arrest him is to confess defeat before the
war is begun.…In either case, Government stands to lose, and
Gandhi stands to gain.…That is because Gandhi’s cause is righ-
teous and the Government’s is not.
16
A history of the independence struggle describes the situation this
way:
The Government was placed in a classic “damned if you do,
damned if you don’t” fix, i.e., if it did not suppress a movement
that brazenly defied its laws, its administrative authority would be
seen to be undermined and its control would be shown to be weak,
and if it did suppress it, it would be seen as a brutal, anti-people
administration that used violence on non-violent agitators.
17
J. C. Kumarappa expressed the problem facing the British:
Dharasana raid was decided upon not to get salt, which was only
the means. Our expectations was that the Government would
open fire on unarmed crowds.…Our primary object was to show
the world at large the fangs and claws of the Government in all
its ugliness and ferocity. In this we have succeeded beyond mea-
sure.
18
How to respond to the salt march was experienced as a moral
dilemma by the viceroy, Lord Edward Irwin. In letters written at the
time, he expressed his difficulty in deciding whether to arrest Gan-
dhi.
19
The Dilemma Action 81
John Court Curry, a British police officer, encountered Gandhi in
both 1919 and 1930. So great was the tension he experienced
in responding to nonviolent action that he felt “severe physical nausea.”
From the beginning I had strongly disliked the necessity of dis-
persing these non-violent crowds and although the injuries
inflicted on the law-breakers were almost invariably very slight
the idea of using force against such men was very different from
the more cogent need for using it against violent rioters who were
endangering other men’s lives. At the same time I realized that
the law-breakers could not be allowed to continue their deliberate
misbehavior without any action by the police.
20
Curry’s response suggests the power of nonviolent action to create
a dilemma among officials charged with responding to it.
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT DILEMMA ACTIONS
The players were the independence movement, led by Gandhi,
and the British raj, led by the viceroy, Lord Irwin. Note that particu-
larly significant individual players—Gandhi and Irwin—stand out
from, while being part of, the compound players. Gandhi initiated the
engagement.
Available arenas included private interactions, courts, media,
and public spaces. The activists chose to play on the arena of
public space, amplified by word-of-mouth and media coverage.
However, Gandhi began by writing to Irwin—ostensibly a private
interaction—to allow him to respond appropriately and avoid civil
disobedience.
Types of dilemmas involved included moral (for example, for the
policeman Curry), interpersonal (Gandhi corresponding with Irwin),
interorganizational (the salt march organizers versus the British rulers),
political (challenge to British rule), and economic (challenge to the salt
monopoly).
The opponent’s choices included letting the march proceed and
arresting Gandhi. In the longer term, another choice was offering
negotiations or concessions.
The consequences of the salt march included arrests and beatings
(in the short term) and massive mobilization of support for Indian
independence (both short and long term).
82 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
How did the salt march dilemma action differ from other possible
actions? One feature that made it powerful was the choice to focus on
the salt tax and salt monopoly. In objective terms, this was hardly the
more serious issue experienced by the Indian people, given massive
economic exploitation, lack of self-determination, and occasionally
brutal treatment. In the spectrum of oppression, the salt laws were a
minor matter—but they symbolized British rule and affected nearly
everyone. Second, the salt march was designed to begin small and
gradually build. This meant there was no single point along the way
to provide a pretext for arrests or controls. To follow his own laws,
the Viceroy had to wait for civil disobedience to occur, at the end of
the march. Third, Gandhi’s central role in the march heightened the
dilemma. If some other figure with less stature had led the march, it
would not have attracted the same attention throughout India. Irwin
could have ignored the march without Gandhi, treating it as unthreat-
ening, or arrested the leader at an early stage without the opprobrium
of arresting Gandhi.
NORWEGIAN TOTAL OBJECTORS
In the early 1980s, conscientious objectors created a number of
dilemmas for the Norwegian government. All were what Jasper calls
single players, namely individuals who refused conscription based on
strong objections against participating in war, individually confronting
an apparently almighty compound player. Most conscientious objec-
tors fit into the system of the time—they had no trouble explaining
their strong pacifist convictions, their objection to participating in any
wars, and their willingness to undertake substitute civil service. Some
men became “situation-dependent objectors” because they did not
want to fight in wars under the present system, frequently referring to
Norway’s membership in NATO and the threat of nuclear war. Other
men were “principled total objectors” who also refused civil service,
stating that the substitute service was part of the military system, and
it was against their conscience to support any part of this system. Both
types of objectors presented a dilemma for the Norwegian state.
For refusing to obey orders, the situation-dependent objectors
were usually convicted twice to three-month prison sentences. During
social democratic governments, they were usually pardoned the second
time, but not during conservative governments. The situation for the
total objectors was even harsher: sixteen months in prison, a treatment
The Dilemma Action 83
unlike anywhere else in Europe. Officially, it was not considered
punishment: The total objectors had to carry out their substitute
service in an “institution under the administration of the prison
Administration.” This contradiction—that what appeared to be a pun-
ishment was called something else—became the core of the total
objectors’ spectacular protests, revolving around their court hearings
and prison time and generating newspaper headlines like, “Prison is
not punishment.” Even their court hearings were not real court cases,
because their only purpose was to establish their identity. They were
not charged with anything criminal, and their service in prison was
not entered into the criminal record. Nevertheless, media frequently
reported as if this presented a serious criminal offense, giving total
objectors a right to compensation and showing that the Norwegian
state had a difficult time explaining its practice.
During the early 1980s, the plight of total objectors and situation-
dependent objectors became widely known, largely due to their own
efforts to place it on the political agenda. Their visibility also stimu-
lated more men to object. Many objectors and their supporters had
experience in other political movements for peace, justice, and the
environment. The objectors’ main compound player was Kampanjen
Mot Verneplikt (KMV), which means “Campaign Against Conscrip-
tion.” It was a network of total resisters launched in November 1981
and part of an international campaign for total objection originating in
1974.
21
Between 1981 and 1989, KMV undertook many spectacular
actions. To better accommodate the situation-dependent objectors, it
was sometimes performed in the name of an even more informal
network called “Samvittighetsfanger i Norge” (S.I.N), “Prisoners of
Conscience in Norway.” One of the objectors, Jørgen Johansen,
produced a poster in connection with his court hearing in 1982 where
he would be given sixteen months in prison. He invited the public to
come and watch this “drama in several acts arranged by the court and
KMV.”
22
In 1984, another young man set fire to his conscription
book during his court hearing and said,
This is not a court case. I will be told that I’m going to prison for
16 months, but I could have received that in a letter. Instead they
dress this in a legal frame. The only thing the judge is to do is to
establish that I’m Harald Eraker and that I refuse substitute
service.
23
84 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
When another young man was about to receive his sixteen-
month sentence, Johansen “borrowed” a prosecutor robe and pre-
tended to be the prosecutor in the case: The real prosecutor seldom
bothered to show up in these cases where the result was foregone.
24
Johansen also applied to have his case tried before the European
Commission of Human Rights in Strasburg, and a hearing was held
in October 1985.
25
Although the commission decided that “Johan-
sen vs. Norway” was inadmissible, it was only the second case
against the Norwegian state to even be considered for admission
and with all likelihood was an embarrassment for the Norwegian
state.
On three occasions, KMV and S.I.N created dilemma actions by
staging a “jail-in”: They jumped the fence and into the prison or sat
on the prison wall, demanding to be with their imprisoned friend. The
first jail-in took place on midsummer night in June 1983, when situa-
tion-dependent objector Johan R
aum was in prison. Twelve people
managed to climb up on the prison wall of Oslo Kretsfengsel with lad-
ders, and ten of them then jumped into the prison yard. Their demand
was that either Johan R
aum should be let out of prison or they should
all be locked up together with him because they had the same
beliefs.
26
Similar jail-ins were organized in 1984 and 1987.
27
On the
day of the jail-in, the prison authorities and then the police faced
the dilemma of how to deal with the protestors on the spot, in partic-
ular whether to carry them away or let them stay in the prison as they
demanded. The prisoners were allowed to hold a press conference
together with their friend, and when they left the prison, they were
arrested and carried away by the police.
28
Afterward, a new dilemma arose for the prison authorities and
prosecutor: charge them for trespassing or pretend that nothing
happened. In spite of a written confession, the case was “dismissed for
lack of evidence”—the same thing that happened in the prosecutor
case.
29
KMV interpreted this to mean that the authorities did not
want any further publicity about the incident. Nevertheless, the long-
term dilemma remained for the politicians: Should the law regarding
total resisters be changed or should they hold their ground? KMV
could be expected to carry out every imaginable action, had shown
ability in inventing new ideas, and kept growing. Although still a tiny
proportion of all conscripts, there were more total resisters than ever
thanks to their organizing and the publicity they received. Total resis-
tance was on the agenda as never before, being discussed in parlia-
The Dilemma Action 85
ment and debated in major newspapers, with journalists questioning
parliamentarians about the issue.
30
The Norwegian state had to
defend its practice in front of the commission to decide on “Johansen
vs. Norway,” an issue it took so seriously that no total objectors were
imprisoned while the case was pending. Amnesty International
debated whether it should adopt them as prisoners of conscience.
Toward the end of the 1980s, the law was in fact changed; KMV felt
certain that it had had a huge influence.
The KMV’s dramatic and provocative actions were effective in
gaining attention and attracting support. In comparison, traditional
forms of protest such as rallies and letter-writing campaigns, which
are common in liberal democracies, would have been very unlikely to
have had the same effect, because the total objectors were so few.
Without the spectacular action to create attention, hardly anyone
would have heard about their fate. Had there been large numbers of
total resisters, the burden on the court and prison systems might have
pressured the government to change the law. But although the number
of total resisters grew, they remained a tiny proportion of the consci-
entious objectors and were never likely to become a substantial part
of the prison population.
Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt’s actions were clearly focused on the
legal system, which from their perspective appeared to be an obvious
choice. By choosing prisons and courts as arenas for their action, they
were proactive, because the authorities traditionally dominate these
institutions. Many other arenas traditionally used for protest were also
available, but using them would have been less spectacular. If KMV
had been interested in the arena of words rather than actions, they
could have put more focus on the irony of their prison time being a
“service to society,” but they did not go down this path in their actions.
The authorities actually admitted that the reason for the sixteen-month
prison “service” was to uphold respect for military service and
convince most citizens to comply with the military and civil service.
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT DILEMMA ACTIONS
The players were individual objectors, KMV, and the Norwegian
government. KMV initiated the engagements.
Available arenas included courts, prisons, media, and public
arenas. The activists chose to play in the courts and prisons as a way
to generate media coverage.
86 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
The main type of dilemma involved was political (challenge to
Norwegian government policy). The opponent’s choices included
ignoring the protesters or legally charging them. In the longer term,
another choice was changing the conscription law.
The consequences of the KMV actions included publicity for total
resistance and situation-dependent objection (in the short term) and
changing the law (long term).
How did the KMV dilemma actions differ from other possible
actions? By using spectacular strategies, the protesters generated more
publicity than conventional sorts of protest and complaint, and more
sharply highlighted the contradictions in the government’s rationale
for its policy.
FREEDOM FLOTILLA TO GAZA
In 2010, a convoy of six ships set out to challenge the blockade of
the Gaza strip, posing a dilemma for the Israeli authorities imposing
the blockade. On board the ships were around 700 unarmed civilians
from around the world, including some well-known personalities, like
the Swedish crime novelist Henning Mankell and parliamentarians
from a number of countries. In addition to the passengers and represen-
tatives from the media, the ships also carried 10,000 tons of humani-
tarian aid, such as building materials and medical equipment like
X-ray machines and ultrasound scanners.
31
The long journey meant
that the pressure built while the ships approached Gaza, making this a
drama for the world to watch.
In this case, there were two major compound players, the state of
Israel and the freedom flotilla, each with its own internal struggles
about how to handle the situation. However, this case also involved
many other players and illustrates how other players can have key
roles in a dilemma without being either the initiator of the engagement
or the target.
The dilemma the activists created for the representatives of Israel
at first sight has two “solutions.” One option was to let the ships
arrive in Gaza with their passengers and cargo, which in the eyes of
many Israeli citizens would mean giving in to pressure. The other
option was to stop the vessels, and in that case, the next dilemma
arose: what means should be used and when? In the end, commando
soldiers from the Israeli Defense Force attacked early in the morning
on May 31, while the ships were still in international waters. On
The Dilemma Action 87
board the Mavi Marmara, nine Turkish citizens were killed, some of
them shot dead at close range.
32
The killings created an enormous
public relations disaster for the Israeli government and were con-
demned around the world. Martin has shown how the use of force
backfired on the Israeli government despite its efforts to inhibit public
outrage.
33
Many governments summoned the Israeli ambassadors or
recalled their own.
34
The relationship with the Turkish government,
for decades one of the Israeli government’s few allies in the Middle
East, was damaged for more than a year. Although the Obama admin-
istration in the United States was very restrained in its reactions, it
expressed criticism of the Israeli government. A UN commission was
established to investigate the attacks, and in August 2011 reached the
controversial conclusion that the blockade of Gaza was not illegal, but
that the use of force had been excessive and unreasonable.
35
Stellan Vinthagen, a nonviolent scholar and himself active in the
Swedish part of the freedom flotilla, has analyzed the 2010 flotilla as
a dilemma action using Lakey’s definition.
36
Vinthagen shows what
makes this a dilemma action in contrast to previous actions. On New
Year’s Eve 2009, 1,300 activists from forty-three different countries
tried to break the blockade by marching into Gaza. This initiative was
just as international as the flotilla, but only carried symbolic amounts
of humanitarian aid. Israeli authorities stopped it. Unlike Vinthagen,
we consider this a dilemma action; it was just not as successful as the
2010 flotilla. Since 2008, the Free Gaza Movement had sent several
passenger boats to Gaza, some of which arrived successfully. How-
ever, they could only carry a small amount of humanitarian aid. Viva
Palestina represented an initiative that tried to break the blockade by
land on three occasions during 2009. However, Vinthagen found that
they could not break the blockade because they relied on cooperation
with Egyptian authorities, which at that time meant being dependent
on the Israeli and U.S. governments.
Vinthagen concluded that two aspects of the 2010 flotilla
combined to make this a more powerful dilemma action: (1) it was
ordinary humanitarian assistance, not just symbolic amounts, and (2)
the delivery by ship meant that the activists were not depending on
the Israeli authorities to break the blockade. He writes: “A ship is not
‘on its way’ to do an action. The departure itself marks the beginning
of the action: the challenge of the blockade. The action had already
been going on for several days before Israel had a realistic chance of
88 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
stopping it.”
37
By making the sea the arena instead of the land, Vint-
hagen thinks the flotilla gained much more control.
Within the freedom flotilla movement, there has been discussion
about how to make the dilemma even more difficult. The following
year in 2011, the campaign planned to repeat the journey, and twelve
ships were ready to travel toward Gaza, ten of them from Greek
waters.
38
More ships with passengers from even more countries were
chosen as a means for raising the pressure.
However, the Israeli government avoided a repeat of the 2010
scenario using more subtle ways of stopping the ships. They cultivated
relationships with the Greek government and launched a successful
diplomatic offensive which resulted in UN General Secretary Ban
Ki-moon calling on all governments to urge their citizens not to partic-
ipate in a second flotilla.
39
The Greek authorities banned the ships
from leaving their ports; the Greek coast guard intercepted those that
attempted to leave anyway.
40
Two of the ships had similar propeller
damage, leading to suspicion that they had been sabotaged by the
Israeli secret service.
41
The Turkish authorities also prevented the
Mavi Mamara from leaving Turkey—in spite of the Turkish govern-
ment’s criticism of the blockade of Gaza. Israeli commando soldiers
boarded only one ship, leaving from France.
42
These events prevented
a potential public relations disaster for the Israeli government. The
Israeli authorities, by proactive lobbying, dealt with the potential
dilemma before it landed on their doorstep. They managed to keep
the issue in the arena of permissions to leave ports, thus preventing
the activists from reaching their preferred arena, international waters.
Bureaucratic obstacles are less newsworthy than a military attack in
international waters.
The 2011 attempt to break the blockade is a classic example of
how difficult it is to foresee what an opponent facing a dilemma will
do when actions and reactions are not routine. The activists had
prepared for many different Israeli government reactions, but had not
foreseen the possibility of bureaucratic obstacles of this kind. One
way to surmount such obstacles would have been for the ships to start
from different ports in different countries. However, this would have
increased the organizational challenge of arriving in Gaza at the same
time. It could have been a way of establishing the dilemma over a
longer period of time, thereby increasing the pressure; however, it
might have been easier to stop them separately using force, without
the media drama of the first journey.
The Dilemma Action 89
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT DILEMMA ACTIONS
The players were the freedom flotilla and the Israeli government.
The flotilla organizers initiated the engagements.
Available arenas included the sea, ships, borders, and the media.
The activists aimed to use ships in international waters as the basis for
media coverage.
The main types of dilemma involved were political (challenge to
Israeli government policy) and economic (challenge to the blockade of
Gaza). The opponent’s immediate choices included allowing the ships
to deliver their goods and stopping them forcibly. In the longer term,
other choices were easing the blockade and preventing the ships from
leaving port.
The consequences of the flotilla actions included publicity for the
cause of Gaza, publicity about Israeli government’s use of force (in the
short term) and reducing international support for Israeli policy on
Gaza (longer term).
How did the flotilla dilemma actions differ from other possible
actions? Most Israeli use of force, on behalf of its policies on Pales-
tine, is against Palestinians and hidden from international audiences.
The flotilla put an international spotlight on Israeli use of force
against non-Palestinians undertaking a political-humanitarian action.
ANALYSIS
Based on our examination of three dilemma actions, plus other
instances,
43
the essential feature of such an action is that the opponent
has no obvious best response, with the most attractive responses
having mixes of advantages and disadvantages that are not directly
comparable. In addition, we have been able to identify five factors
frequently found in actual dilemma actions that add to the difficulty
for opponents in making choices: (1) the action has a constructive,
positive element; (2) activists use surprise or unpredictability; and (3)
opponents’ prime choices are in different domains. Dilemma actions
can also construct a timing that (4) appeals to mass media coverage,
making it difficult for authorities to ignore them. Additionally, as
Popovic, Milovojevic, and Djinovic suggest, (5) appealing to widely
held beliefs can increase the pressure.
44
These factors contribute to
making the dilemma more difficult to “solve,” but are not essential in
constructing it. In both the literature and in the cases we have
90 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
presented here, it is governments and their agents, such as police and
prison officials, that are forced to deal with dilemmas. However, this
is not a core feature of a dilemma action, because it can be directed
toward private companies, for example banks or other financial insti-
tutions.
When we began this study of dilemma actions, we suspected that
some of the five factors that can contribute to creating the dilemma
would be a necessary part of a dilemma action. Looking at the case
studies revealed that they were not. The flotillas had constructive,
positive elements but the total resistance campaign did not. The total
resistance movement used surprise, but the salt march did not. In the
salt march, the opponent’s prime choices were in different domains
(including moral, interpersonal, and political), but in the total resis-
tance campaign, they were in the same domain (political). All three
case studies involved mass media coverage, but media coverage was
less crucial to the salt march dilemma action. The flotillas appealed to
widely held beliefs, but the total resistance campaign did not. The
three case studies thus illustrate that the five factors can contribute to
the acuteness of dilemma actions but are not essential components of
them. Activists, when constructing dilemma actions, can consider
whether the factors could be useful. Future research might expand this
list of additional factors.
Usually, the best option for the opponents is to stop the action
without anybody noticing. The activists’ strategy is then to make it as
public as possible. In the freedom flotilla, organizers increased atten-
tion by involving people from different countries, including journalists,
authors, and parliamentarians. The Norwegian total resisters did
things so unexpected and newsworthy that the prison authorities felt
they could not ignore them.
Many nonviolent actions are reactions to what authorities or
multinational companies do: activists respond to agendas set by
others. In dilemma actions, activists are proactive, which is one reason
why dilemma actions interest activists both theoretically and practi-
cally. Although the colonization of India, conscription in Norway, and
the blockade of Gaza were the initial starting points for the engage-
ments in the case studies, activists initiated the salt march, the jail-in,
and the freedom flotilla. They chose the arenas and the timing, forcing
authorities to make difficult choices. This also means that for the
opponent, preparation becomes more difficult: Rather than preparing
for a single contingency, for example arresting protesters, authorities
The Dilemma Action 91
might need to prepare for handling fallout from not arresting protest-
ers, if that is the response chosen.
Prior to 1930, salt was just one issue among many in India; it
was a routine facet of imperial rule. The salt march created a new
agenda, with the arena and timing set by independence campaigners.
Prior to the 1980s, the Norwegian state dealt with total resisters on
an individual basis: Each individual made the choice in his own home.
KMV moved the struggle to public arenas such as courts and prison
walls. By the mid-1980s, it appeared that the Norwegian total resisters
were directing the show, forcing Norwegian authorities to react. On
land, the Israeli government controlled access to Gaza. The freedom
flotilla organizers made a conscious choice to make the sea their
arena. They could decide when to set out. However, by 2011, they
had lost the element of surprise and were unable to foresee the Israeli
government’s method of responding.
In all three cases, activists framed what they did as something posi-
tive and valued. They made salt, went to be with their friend in prison,
and delivered humanitarian aid. It became a contest over what was
really going on—a framing contest. Authorities could choose to inter-
pret the actions in the same ways as the activists. Alternatively, if they
chose not to accept this positive and constructive framing, and insisted
on treating the activists as provocateurs and law breakers, they faced
the challenge of explaining what was wrong with making salt, support-
ing a friend who is in prison but not being punished, and sending emer-
gency aid to a disaster area. Popovic, Milovojevic, and Djinovic
suggested that forcing an authority to go against a widely held belief or
give in to activist demands is the essential part of a dilemma action;
45
here, we find examples of how the emphasis on widely held positive
values helps make the dilemma more difficult. However, we do not
consider this an essential feature of a dilemma action.
Regarding the freedom flotilla, Vinthagen suggests that two key
aspects were that by choosing the sea, the activists were much more in
control and that the amount of humanitarian aid was more than
symbolic. These accord, respectively, with an essential characteristic of
dilemma actions, initiating the engagement, and more frequently, a
constructive element. However, the two other cases do not include
any equivalent to humanitarian aid: In the case of the Norwegian total
resisters, the constructive element of supporting a friend does not
appear to be essential for that action. It is possible to imagine other
powerful dilemma actions that do not include any such element.
92 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
Creating a dilemma for opponents is, naturally enough, a key
feature of dilemma actions. Dilemmas can be more difficult when they
involve different domains; for example when one choice has ideologi-
cal consequences and another has political consequences, because
these consequences are not readily compared. Regarding the salt
march, Lord Irwin had a choice between arresting someone who had
not performed anything illegal—which included a moral component—
and allowing the march to proceed, with a political impact on Indian
and international public opinion.
One thing to take into consideration is different audiences. It is
frequently difficult to compare the benefit of an approving reaction
from supporters with negative feedback from a different audience.
Israeli authorities had to compare their image of themselves as uphold-
ing a blockade meant to protect Israel with the outrage generated when
international audiences saw this as an assault on humanitarian aid
workers in international waters. A special audience is the mass media,
which are often crucial in spreading the news of the action to other
audiences. Unpredictability was also a factor hindering the process of
comparing choices. Neither the Israelis nor the freedom flotilla could
readily predict or control how the Turkish government or people would
react and what consequences their reaction would have in the long run.
Timing is another aspect of dilemma actions highlighted by the
case studies. A challenging dilemma not only means that the players
have to make choices between incomparable realms, but also that
there are short-, middle-, and long-term consequences to take into
consideration. What seems to be a good solution in the short run
might backfire in the long run. Additionally, we notice that in both
the salt march and the freedom flotilla, there was a long build up
before the climax of the direct confrontation. Everyone involved,
including mass media, was aware that something dramatic was going
to happen.
All of these characteristics can also be found in other nonviolent
actions, which is why we do not want to draw a sharp line between
what is a dilemma action and what is not. Earlier we mentioned that
plowshare actions involving damage to weapons are not dilemma
actions. Looking at the characteristics we have identified, we see that
the plowshare actions often involve surprise regarding when and
where. But it is not difficult for the authorities to compare the conse-
quences of arresting versus not arresting the activists, so the essential
feature is lacking. However, creating dilemmas for the opponent is not
The Dilemma Action 93
necessary for nonviolent actions to be successful in the eyes of their
organizers or bystanders.
Experience in responding to dilemma actions can change the
opponent’s calculation: As opponents learn more about a particular
type of action, they prepare, so the dilemma is different or not pres-
ent; therefore, activists need to change their plans and preparation to
ensure that there is a dilemma. The freedom flotilla experience from
2011 reveals how Israeli authorities learned how to defuse a potential
repetition of the 2010 experience; this provides additional evidence
that the 2010 events backfired on the Israeli government.
So far, we have discussed nonviolent dilemma actions targeted at
governments, but dilemma actions are not automatically for a just
cause. It is also possible for governments and others with power to
undertake dilemma actions, aiming to split movements, defuse
protests, mislead public opinion, and discredit protesters. Most
commonly, these involve violence or the threat of violence.
During the Nazi occupation of Denmark between 1940 and 1945,
the occupiers created dilemmas for the resistance movement. When the
resistance movement carried out liquidation of informers or acts of sab-
otage, the Nazis in revenge organized so-called clearing murders: extra-
judicial killings of members or suspected members of the resistance,
prominent Danes or randomly chosen civilians. The first to be killed this
way was the well-known priest and poet Kaj Munk. Another form of
“countersabotage” was blowing up well-respected businesses or build-
ings, such as the amusement park Tivoli’s concert hall. The situation
was not presented as a dilemma officially, because in contrast to other
places in occupied Europe, the Nazis in Denmark never admitted being
behind the countersabotage. Nevertheless, within the resistance move-
ment and the general public, there was no doubt about the dilemma
involved: The resistance movement had to compare the effect of sabo-
tage and informer liquidation to the loss of people like Kaj Munk, and
the possibility of loss of support from the general population.
46
A comparable dilemma arose for the members of the organization
Peace Brigades International (PBI) in Sri Lanka in 1993. They had
been carrying out unarmed accompaniment as protection to local
human rights activists threatened by the Sri Lankan government. Both
they and those they accompanied felt that their presence provided
some protection and made a difference. They also tried to support a
group of Tamil refugees living in Colombo about to be relocated by
the government to the war-torn Northeast Province against their will
94 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
and managed to prevent the first group of refugees from being force-
fully relocated. But then the Sri Lankan authorities created a dilemma
for PBI. Via foreign embassies, they let it be known that if PBI insisted
on involving itself in the refugee issue, the organization would lose its
permission to work in the country. PBI was then faced with the
dilemma of withdrawing from this particular case (which it did) to be
able to continue other parts of its work.
47
Finally, there are some rare instances in which authorities have
used nonviolent methods against peaceful protesters. In 1930 during
the Indian independence struggle,
... a huge procession of Satyagrahis was stopped by armed police
on one of Bombay’s main streets. About 30,000 men, women and
children sat down wherever they were on the street. Facing them
sat the police. Hours passed but neither party would give in. Soon
it was night and it began to rain. The onlooking citizens organ-
ized themselves into volunteer units to supply the Satyagrahis
with food, water and blankets. The Satyagrahis, instead of keep-
ing the supplies for themselves, passed them on to the obstructing
policemen as a token of their good will. Finally the police gave
in, and the procession culminated in a triumphant midnight
march.
48
For the Satyagrahis, stepping on the police to reach their goal was
not a viable option, so instead they sat down and waited as well: There
was no real dilemma for those committed to nonviolence. When the
police were treated with respect and kindness, it was they who faced a
dilemma, namely whether or not to continue to block the Satyagrahis.
CONCLUSION
Dilemma actions are a type of action in which opponents have to
make a choice between two or more responses, each of which has
significant negative aspects; the responses are not readily comparable,
which is the nub of the dilemma. Dilemma actions can be characterized
by the players involved, the initiator of the engagement, the arena cho-
sen for the action, the domain of the dilemma, the choices made, and
the location of the action within the “option space” of possible actions.
Dilemma actions are not easy to analyze in depth using game
theory or other sorts of strategic frameworks, because usually com-
The Dilemma Action 95
pound players are involved, whose members differ in their judgments
about the attractiveness of options. Furthermore, players can change
the payoffs from different options by investigating new possibilities,
making preparations, or playing unexpected moves. As a result, the
same game is seldom played repeatedly without change. The changes
in the freedom flotilla scenarios between 2010 and 2011 are a case
in point.
For activists, dilemma actions can seem attractive because they
seem to offer the prospect of success no matter what the opponent
does. In a typical dilemma action involving nonviolent action, the
opponent can either let the activists proceed to achieve their immedi-
ate goals or use force to stop them with the risk of adverse publicity.
However, on the surface, there seems no obvious reason why dilemma
actions are superior to actions in which the opponent has a single best
option.
One way to see the advantage of planning dilemmas is illustrated
in Figure 1. Of four main options, A through D, A is clearly superior
for the opponent. Preparation by activists—for example, by arranging
publicity so that the opponent’s use of force will be more counterpro-
ductive—changes the payoff for A so that it is similar to the payoff
for D: The opponent’s previous best option is no longer clearly supe-
rior. Figure 1 presents options as different in one dimension, with a
clear-cut payoff for each that can be compared; in reality, options and
payoffs may vary across several dimensions, including diverse
domains, and payoffs may be uncertain and noncomparable. The crea-
tion of a dilemma action can be considered a process of designing an
action in which the normal or default response by the opponent is
made less attractive than it might otherwise be. Planning to put the
opponent in a dilemma can be a way of stimulating thinking about
how to reduce the attractiveness of the opponent’s regular or most
attractive response.
Starting with the limited amount of writing about dilemma
actions, we have extracted the essential characteristic of such actions,
presented a range of domains in which dilemmas can be posed, and
shown the value of a series of questions for analyzing actual dilemma
actions. Much remains to be studied concerning dilemma actions.
Investigating more case studies, including ones involving different
domains, could enable assessment and refinement of our essential fea-
tures and typical but nonessential features. This should also include
comparisons with cases of nonviolent action that do not include a
96 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
dilemma. The use of dilemma actions by authorities against activists
would also be a fruitful area for study to understand both nonviolent
and violent dilemmas better. Yet, another area worth investigation is
the possibility of creative responses to dilemma actions, including
counterdilemmas.
More generally, the study of dilemma actions means looking at
tactics on both sides of strategic encounters involving activists and
authorities. Nonviolent action theory in the tradition of Sharp has
focused on what activists do and seldom looks at a full range of
actions by authorities. Examining dilemma actions thus provides a
way of expanding nonviolent action theory.
NOTES
We thank Jørgen Johansen, George Lakey, Stellan Vinthagen, Tom Weber, and
two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on drafts.
1. George Lakey, Powerful Peacemaking: A Strategy for a Living Revolution
(Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers, 1987 [1973]).
2. Srdja Popovic, Andrej Milovojevic, and Slobodan Djinovic, Nonviolent
Struggle: 50 Crucial Points, 2d ed. (Belgrade: Center for Applied Non Violent
Action and Strategies, 2007), 70–71.
3. Ibid., 71.
Figure 1. Opponent payoffs for four options, A through D. Following
activist preparations to reduce the attractiveness of option A (dotted
line), the opponent faces a dilemma in choosing between A and D.
The Dilemma Action 97
4. Bill Moyer, with JoAnn McAllister, Mary Lou Finley, and Steven Soifer,
Doing Democracy: The MAP Model for Organizing Social Movements (Gabriola
Island, BC, Canada: New Society Publishers, 2001).
5. Philippe Duhamel, The Dilemma Demonstration: Using Nonviolent Civil
Disobedience to Put the Government between a Rock and a Hard Place (Minneap-
olis, MN: Center for Victims of Torture, 2004), 6.
6. Richard B. Gregg, The Power of Nonviolence, 2d rev. ed. (New York:
Schocken Books, 1966 [1934]).
7. Thomas Weber, “‘The Marchers Simply Walked Forward until Struck
Down’: Nonviolent Suffering and Conversion,” Peace & Change, 18, no. 3 (1993):
267–89.
8. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent
Publisher, 1973).
9. Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
10. Christopher W. Gowans, Moral Dilemmas (New York: Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987); H. E. Mason, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Terrance McConnell, “Moral Dilemmas,”
http://plato.stanford/entries/moral-dilemmas/.
11. William Styron, Sophie’s Choice (London: Vintage, 2000, 1979).
12. James M. Jasper, Getting Your Way: Strategic Dilemmas in the Real
World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
13. Ibid., 83.
14. Ibid., 92.
15. Thomas Weber, On the Salt March: The Historiography of Gandhi’s
March to Dandi (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 1997).
16. Dennis Dalton, Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 112.
17. Bipan Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence, 1857–1947 (New
Delhi: Viking, 1988), 273–274.
18.Young India, May 29, 1930, quoted in Weber, “The Marchers Simply
Walked Forward until Struck Down,” 281.
19. Dalton, Mahatma Gandhi, 130.
20. Ibid., 133.
21. ICR Skandinavia, Verneplikt: Statlig Tvangsarbeid: Et Hefte Fra ICR-
Skandinavia (Conscription: State Forced Labour: A Booklet from ICR-Scandinavia),
(Bergin: Fmks Fredspolitiske Skriftserie, 1981), 4.
22. HA, “Totalnekter (Total Objector),” Halden Arbeiderblad (April 21,
1982).
23. Kirsten Offerdal, “Brann Vernepliktsboka Si I Rettssalen (Burned His
Conscription Book in Court),” V
art Land (May 11, 1984).
24. Jørgen Johansen, “Humor as a Political Force, or How to Open the Eyes
of Ordinary People in Social Democratic Countries,” Philosophy and Social Action,
17, no. 3–4 (1991): 23–29.
25. Kjell Eriksson, “Klagen Avvist I Strassbourg (The Complaint Dismissed in
Strasbourg),” Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad, October 15 1985.
98 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
26. Gunnar Fortun, “Rømning—Feil Vei,” Arbeiderbladet (June 24, 1983);
Johansen, “Humor as a Political Force.”
27. Aftenposten, “Aksjon P
a Fengselsmurer,” Aftenposten (May 4, 1987);
Stig Grimelid, “Ex-Fange Tilbake,” VG (August 28, 1984); Esther Nordland,
“Inntok Fengselsmurene,” Arbeiderbladet (August 28, 1984).
28. Johansen, “Humor as a Political Force,” 28.
29. Ibid.;
Asne Berre Persen and Jørgen Johansen, Den Nødvendige Ulydighe-
ten [The Necessary Civil Disobedience] (Oslo: Fmk, 1998).
30. KMV, “Rundbrev 9,” Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt (November 1984).
31. Moustafa edt Bayoumi, Midnight on the Mavi Marmara: The Attack on
the Gaza Freedom Flotilla and How It Changed the Course of the Israel/Palestine
Conflict (New York: OR Books, 2010).
32. Paul McGeough, “Prayers, Tear Gas and Terror,” Sydney Morning
Herald, June 4, 2010.
33. Brian Martin, “Flotilla Tactics: How an Israeli Attack Backfired,” Truth-
out.org (July 27, 2010).
34. Bayoumi, Midnight on the Mavi Marmara.
35. BBC, “Gaza Ship Raid Excessive but Blockade Legal, Says UN,” BBC
News (September 2, 2011); Geoffrey Palmer et al., Report of the Secretary-
General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (United Nations,
2011).
36. Stellan Vinthagen, “En Ny Sorts Dilemma-Aktion [A New Kind of
Dilemma Action],” in Ship to Gaza: Bakgrunden, Resan, Framtiden (Ship to Gaza:
The Background, the Journey, the Future), ed. Mikael L€
ofgren (Stockholm: Leop-
ard, 2010).
37. Ibid., 186.
38. Jack Shenker and Conal Urquhart, “Activists’ Plan to Break Gaza Block-
ade with Aid Flotilla Is Sunk,” The Guardian, July 5, 2011.
39. Ann Wright, “The Israelis Mount a Diplomatic Offensive to Stop the
Gaza Flotilla,” Truth-out.org (April 16, 2011); Joshua Mitnick, “Israel’s New
Friend: Why Greece Is Thwarting Gaza Flotilla,” Christian Science Monitor, July 5,
2011; Reuters, “UN Chief: Discourage New Gaza Flotilla,” ynetnews.com (May
27, 2011).
40. Postmedia, “Activist Flotilla Stopped in Greece,” Canada.com (July 1,
2011).
41. Richard Falk, “Sabotaging Freedom Flotilla II,” Aljazeera.com (July 2,
2011).
42. BBC, “Israel Troops Board Gaza Protest Boat Dignite-Al Karama,” BBC
(July 19, 2011).
43. Duhamel, Dilemma Demonstration; Lakey, Powerful Peacemaking; Popo-
vic et al., Nonviolent Struggle; Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action.
44. Popovic et al., Nonviolent Struggle.
45. Ibid.
46. Claus Bundg
ard Christensen, Danmark Besat: Krig Og Hverdag 1940–45
(Denmark Occupied : War and Everyday Life 1940–45), 3. reviderede udgave
(Ny revideret udgave), 1. oplag. ed. (Kbh.: Information, 2009), 539–552.
The Dilemma Action 99
47. Patrick G. Coy, “Shared Risks and Research Dilemmas on a Peace
Brigades International Team in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography,
30, no. 5 (2001): 594–599.
48. Krishnalal Shridharani, War without Violence: A Study of Gandhi’s
Method and its Accomplishments (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939), 22.
100 PEACE & CHANGE / January 2014
