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Marriage immigration and multicultural families: Policy implications for
the Philippines and South Korea
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Authors:
Junmo Kim, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Public Administration
Konkuk University
120 Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul 143-701, South Korea
Phone: 82-2-450-3579
E-mail: junmokim@unitel.co.kr
Seung-Bum Yang, Ph.D.*
Associate Professor
Department of Public Administration
Konkuk University
120 Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul 143-701, South Korea
Phone: 82-2-450-3371
E-mail: sbyang@konkuk.ac.kr
Ador Torneo, MPA
Ph.D. Candidate and Research Fellow
Department of Public Administration
Konkuk University
120 Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul 143-701, South Korea
Phone: 82-2-450-3927
Email: artorneo@yahoo.com
This is a draft version of a manuscript published in Asian Politics & Policy. To download the
copy and cite the final printed manuscript, please see:
Kim, J., Yang, S. B., & Torneo, A. (2014). Marriage Immigration and Multicultural Families:
Public Policies and Their Implications for the Philippines and South Korea. Asian
Politics & Policy, 6(1), 97-119.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/aspp.12091
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government
(NRF 2010-330-B00251).
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop, “Outward and Upward Mobilities: Families from
South Korea in a Transnational Era,” at York University, Toronto, in September 2012.
The workshop was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies Grant (AKS-2012-C03), the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council, the Population Change and Lifecourse Cluster, the York Centre for Asian Research
and the York Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies.
*Corresponding author: sbyang@konkuk.ac.kr
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Marriage immigration and multicultural families: Public policies and
implications for the Philippines and South Korea
Abstract:
This article surveys marriage immigration from the Philippines to South Korea,
the public policies of both governments, and ongoing developments, challenges,
and their implications for future policy developments. Public policies in both
countries provide the context in which international marriages occur and impact
the socio-cultural, political, economic life of marriage immigrants and their
“multicultural families.” Philippine policies are still limited to a ban on
commercial brokerage and pre-departure orientation programs for migrant
brides. The Korean government adopted policies to support these groups and
transform South Korea into a “more mature, multicultural society” but the
results have so far been mixed. Socio-demographic, economic, and political
trends suggest that marriage immigration will persist with the following
implications: continued emphasis on rights and welfare in future policies; more
stringent regulation of marriage agencies; increasingly important role of
marriage immigrants in policy making and implementation; and necessity of
policy adjustments and international cooperation from stakeholders.
Keywords: marriage immigration, migration, international marriages, public policy,
Asian migration
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Introduction
Large scale international marriage immigration from developing countries to South
Korea began only in the early 1990s but it has increased rapidly. Since 2004, at least 10 % of
all annual marriages and a third of all marriages in rural areas involved foreign nationals.
Majority of foreign brides are women. Marriage immigration in large numbers can have
profound effects on a society. In contrast to temporary labor migration, this form of migration
is usually long-term or permanent. Unlike temporary migrants, marriage immigrants become
embedded into and are often expected to integrate into the host society.
“Multicultural families” are defined by the government as families composed of a
Korean national and a marriage immigrant or a naturalized person. Consequences of the
increasing numbers of multicultural families include social and political tensions as ethnic-
based notions of Korean identity, nationality, family, and society are slowly being
challenged. As such, the Korean government has adopted and mandated “multiculturalism”
and various support policies in order to manage the impacts of marriage immigration.
Marriage immigration brings public policy challenges for the governments of both
origin and host countries. Foreign brides from developing countries are especially susceptible
to exploitative, deceptive, and sometimes degrading practices of commercial marriage
agencies and even human trafficking. They are also vulnerable to language, adaptation,
discrimination, domestic violence, economic hardship, social integration and other problems
(e.g., see MOJ, 2008; H.K. Lee, 2008; Lim, 2010; Nho, Park, Kim, Choi, & Ahn, 2008).
Because individual members of multicultural families are citizens of different countries,
applicable public policies and the responsibility for ensuring their rights and welfare overlap.
While many scholars have offered their insights on marriage immigration in South
Korea, most studies have generally focused only on the internal dynamics, policies and
programs of the country (e.g. see H.M. Kim, 2007; H.J. Kim, 2008; H.K. Lee, 2008; Lim,
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2010; J.K. Kim, 2011). Little attempt has been made to both take into consideration the
public policies of both origin and destination countries, to examine where these policies
conflict, complement, or otherwise interact, and its possible implications.
Citizenship and nationality constructions and ideologies as manifested in state
imposed legal restrictions and immigration policies of the host society impact the social and
political life of marriage immigrants (e.g., see Yeoh, Chee, & Vu, 2013). Public policies of
both origin and host countries shape and provide the context in which international marriages
occur and direct how those nation-states deal with issues concerning migrants. It is therefore,
imperative that studies of marriage immigration examine not only the public policies of the
host country but also take into account that of the country of origin.
This article surveys relevant Philippine and South Korean public policies that affect
marriage immigrants and multicultural families. It also surveys recent developments and
explores their possible implications to future public policy discourse and advancement. In
some sections, it also offers public options and considerations. In so doing, the authors hope
to improve understanding of marriage immigration in the context of national policies and an
evolving discourse that both shapes and is being shaped by different stakeholders.
The Philippines was selected as the subject of this article due to its relative
prominence in the marriage immigration discourse. It is the third largest source of marriage
immigrant women in South Korea after China and Vietnam. It has a relatively advanced level
of bilateral cooperation with the government of South Korea on marriage immigration
matters; it has a memorandum of understanding covering labor migrants and a separate
agreement concerning marriage immigrants. A number of Philippine marriage immigrants
have also been actively involved in Korean national politics. Finally, it has a relatively better
accessible information (e.g., policies, data on marriage immigrants, etc.) compared to others.
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Marriage immigration from the Philippines to South Korea
Since the 1960s, the Korean Unification Church have organized marriages between
Korean men and foreign women (Lee, Seol, & Cho, 2006; H.K. Lee, 2008). Nevertheless,
large scale marriage immigration to South Korea did not take off until the early 1990s, when
politicians and agricultural associations in rural areas began to arrange marriage tours and
marriages with ethnic Korean women from China (H.J. Kim, 2008; Lim, 2010). Concern with
fake marriages and the massive wave of migrants prompted the Korean government to adopt
restrictions and sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the government of China
complicating marriage procedures between Chinese and Koreans from 1996 to 2003.
The MOU increased the requirements and complicated the procedures of marriage
for Korean and Chinese nationals. For example, it required additional proof that the person
was single, authentication of marriage, registration of the marriage in China, a separate
marriage registration in Korea, visa application for the spouse, and more. The result of this
policy was a drop in the number of Chinese-Korean marriages and the entry of women from
Southeast Asia (H.K. Lee, 2008; Kim, Yang, & Torneo, 2012).
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From 1990 to 2010, there
were a total of 420,098 registered international marriages in South Korea; almost 70 percent
involved a foreign wife (Statistics Korea, 2006, 2011). Ethnic Korean-Chinese and women
from Southeast Asia comprise nearly three quarters of all marriage immigrants.
Beyond trade and historical ties as allies during the Korean War, substantial people-
to-people exchanges characterize the relationship between the Philippines and South Korea.
In 2011, 925,000 Koreans visited the Philippines and around 100,000 reside there comprising
the largest Korean diaspora community in Southeast Asia. Thousands of Korean students also
come to the Philippines to study English. In the same year, 337,000 Filipinos visited and
around 39,525 Filipinos reside in South Korea comprising 3.7% of the foreign resident
population according to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).
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Marriage immigration of Filipino nationals is by no means a recent phenomenon.
Women from the Philippines, hereinafter referred to as “Filipina” (singular) or “Filipinas”
(plural) are historically, among the most geographically mobile of Asian women (Lauby &
Stark, 1988). Until the 1980s, Asians and Filipinas in particular were dominant in the
international marriages, especially in the West (Simmons, 2001). Compared to western
destinations, marriage immigration from the Philippines to South Korea is a relatively more
recent phenomenon that began only in the 1990s.
Filipinas comprise the third largest group of non-ethnic Korean marriage immigrants
after ethnic Korean-Chinese and Vietnamese. From 1990-1999, there were a total of 1,593
registered marriages between Filipino and Korean nationals but this rose tenfold in the next
decade (H.K. Lee, 2008). Statistics Korea (2006, 2012) data show that from 2000 to 2010,
there were 13,700 such marriages with 97.72 % involving Filipinas. By the late 2000s, the
number of Filipina marriage immigrants to South Korea averaged 1,800 to 2,000 annually
and show no signs of decreasing (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Marriage Immigrant Women From the Philippines to South Korea 2000–2011
Source: Statistics Korea (2006, 2012).
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Drivers of Marriage Immigration
Economic theories generally look at migration as a result of the substantial wage
difference between developing counties and industrialized countries. Migration may be
explained as a result of “push factors” from sending countries and “pull factors” from
receiving countries. Push factors can include lack of employment opportunities, low wages,
low living standards, political instability; pull factors can include employment opportunities,
high wages, higher living standards, and political environment among others (A.E. Kim,
2009). Migrants decide based on the perceived potential costs and benefits of migrating.
“Hypergamy” and material considerations factor in international marriage decisions
(e.g., see Palriwala & Uberoi, 2008). The concept of hypergamy pertains to the practice of
marrying upwards of one’s socio-economic class. Initially, the concept was explained as
marriage between a woman of a lower caste and a man of the upper caste. The woman would
benefit in improving her status while the man might benefit from her beauty and youth or
other attributes (Crester & de Leon, 1982). From this perspective, marriage immigration can
be seen an opportunity for a woman from a developing country to improve her socio-
economic status while the man gains a wife, who bears and rears his children.
The large gap in income and standards of living between the Philippines (2011
nominal per capita GDP US$2,230) and South Korea (2011 nominal per capita GDP
US$22,424) World Bank (2012) is an obvious consideration but not necessarily the sole nor
the most important one. Various researches show that Filipinas are driven by a host of
complex personal, social, and economic considerations. Many immigrate in search of jobs, to
escape restricting social norms in their home country, improve their social status, and to
support their families (e.g., see Lauby & Stark, 1988; Simmons, 2001; Lauser, 2008).
“Marriage squeeze,” the imbalanced sex composition of the marriage-eligible
population is one of the factors that drive marriage immigration to South Korea. Since the
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1970s, the birth sex ratio has generally stayed above 106 males for every 100 female babies.
When the last few generation of males reached marrying age, they found that eligible Korean
brides were fewer than grooms (H.J. Kim, 2008). This was further exacerbated by the sharp
decline of birth rates since the 1970s. The current 1.2 births per woman is one of the lowest in
the world. The decline is attributed to economic growth and government population
management policies that encouraged couples to limit their children (T.H. Kwon, 2001).
Churches, local governments, agricultural associations, and commercial marriage
brokers have all been instrumental in the rise of multicultural families. Likewise, marriage
immigration is also supported and maintained by migrant networks. Migrant networks are
“sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin
and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin.”
These networks contribute to migration (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, &
Taylor, 1993, p. 448). Marriage immigrants themselves, their families, and their communities
occasionally act like networks and facilitators helping find spouses for friends or relatives
from their home country (e.g., see H.K. Lee, 2008; Tseng, 2010).
Marriage immigrants are especially important to rural Korean communities, many of
which have thinning populations due to the migration of young people to the cities. Many
Korean women migrate from rural to urban areas, delay marriages, bear fewer children, and
are more aware of gender equality. Thus, finding Korean brides in rural areas is increasingly
becoming more difficult. Korean men from rural areas, who are relatively low-income, have
lower social status, and who tend to subscribe to conservative patriarchal norms often find
themselves at the low-end of the marriage market. Finding brides from developing countries
is one of their few available options (e.g., see D.S. Kim, 2010).
Marriage immigration and its accompanying challenges are also being experienced by
other developed Asian countries including Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Hongkong, and China.
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Their situation is similar to South Korea in many aspects. Economic development have been
accompanied by demographic transitions that include declining birthrates, rapidly ageing
populations, internal migration, delay in marriages, and population sex imbalances that have
led to marriage squeeze (e.g., see Yang & Lu, 2010; Palriwala & Uberoi, 2008). The need for
marriage immigrants is rooted in the economic and demographic structure of these countries.
In most of these countries, majority of immigrant brides come from less developed
Asian neighbors. Accordingly, social mobility and material considerations are part of the
discourse on marriage decisions. In these countries, there are elements of racial tensions
underlying social dynamics; marriage immigrants face various socio-cultural, economic, and
political issues; states attempt to regulate international marriages and differentiate
immigration citizenship and welfare policies for marriage immigrants (e.g., see Lu, 2008;
Wang & Bélanger, 2008; Palriwala & Uberoi, 2008; Yang & Lu, 2010).
A Survey of Relevant Policies of the Korean Government
While South Korea does not have an explicit national policy promoting marriage
immigration, an examination of recent policies in the last decade reveals that the government
is both directly and indirectly encouraging it as a means of addressing socio-demographic
problems such as the shortages of Korean brides in rural areas, low birth rates, and the rapidly
ageing population that threaten the country’s sustained growth. From the national to the local
level, various state policies provide legal basis and support marriage immigration.
The “Act on Aging and Low Birth Rate” of 2005 sought to ensure the reproduction of
the Korean nation, maintain “proper population composition” and to “improve its quality in
view of maintaining the state’s growth.” It directs ministries and state and regional
governments to “implement appropriate population policies on the basis of reasoned
prediction on population change” (H.J. Kim, 2008). Many regional and local governments in
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rural areas have enacted support ordinances providing financial support to subsidize the costs
(e.g., marriage agency costs) involved in finding and bringing foreign spouses to South
Korea. One law states that single farmers or fishermen aged 35-50 can apply for financial
assistance to find a foreign bride. The financial assistance or subsidy provided by the local
government can range from USD 3,000 to 8,600 (H.M. Kim, 2007).
The 1998 “Nationality Act” amendments, among others, extended the eligibility for
acquisition of Korean citizenship to children of foreign men and Korean women. The 2004
amendments eased the process of citizenship acquisition for marriage immigrants, especially
those who have borne children. Compared to general naturalization requirements which
require 5 years of legal residency in Korea, the ability to speak Korean and understanding of
Korean culture, marriage immigrants need only to satisfy one of two sets of less demanding
requirements: a) 2 years of legal residency in Korea with their Korean spouses or b) a
minimum 1-year legal residency in Korea after 3 years of marriage (H.M. Kim, 2007).
Marriage immigrants whose Korean spouses have died or got separated or divorced
before they were naturalized as Korean citizens risk losing their resident status and may be
deported. In 2003, the immigration policy was revised and women who are able to prove they
were separated or divorced because of their husband’s imputation
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those who have to take
care of children, and those whose husbands died were allowed to apply for naturalization
even if they get divorced or availed of legal separation (H.K. Lee, 2008). The government
also eased the burden of proof (e.g., for divorce or separation) and the requirements for the
naturalization of divorced immigrant brides (Go & Kim, 2008). In 2005, “denizenship” was
also made available for those who did not want to avail of naturalization.
On May 4 2010, the lobbying of various groups which included, the Filipino-Korean
Spouses Association (FKSA), among others, persuaded the legislature to amend the
“Nationality Act” and allow marriage immigrants and others to avail of dual-citizenship after
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60 years; a clear deviation from a long tradition of a closed legal concept. Prior to this
amendment, people were forced to choose and retain only one citizenship: Korean citizenship
or another. The amendment allowed eligible persons to have dual citizenship; they can now
acquire Korean citizenship and still maintain their original one. Eligible are marriage
immigrants, talented naturalized foreigners, and those who surrendered their citizenship.
The “Marriage immigrants” category was added to the annual immigration report in
2005 to help implement policies specifically for the sector. The “Social Support Measures
for Mixed Race and Immigrants” in 2006 outlined and introduced comprehensive
multicultural policies including tax incentives and child allowances as well as explicit
assimilation policies to assist foreign wives to produce and rear “Korean” children (H.J. Kim,
2008). The “Grand Plan” of 2006 outlined a comprehensive set of policies to support the
“social integration” of foreign wives and the attainment of a “multicultural society.”
The “Grand Plan” included among others: the protection of marriage immigrants and
the regulation of marriage agencies; establishment of hotlines, support services, and shelters
for victims of domestic violence; a new law to protect marriage immigrants in case of
divorce; support programs for language and cultural adaptation for new marriage immigrants;
welfare services including health care especially for those who married into in poor families;
raising social awareness of “multicultural issues” and eliminating prejudice; programs to
address racism and promote sensitivity in the educational system; strengthening the network
among government agencies and opening centers to provide effective services (A.E. Kim,
2010).
The “First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy” (FBPIP) 2008-2012 formalized and
institutionalized elements of the Grand Plan. It envisioned a “world class Korea where
foreigners lived in harmony with Koreans” (MOJ, 2008, p. 14). It outlined immigration
policy as part of the national development strategy. The country will be opened to invite
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people with capital and technology in order to “tap into the talent and capital of the rest of the
world.” It also aimed to provide “foreigners with the proper environment conducive for their
political, economic, social, and cultural participation” (MOJ, 2008, p. 2).
The FBPIP 2008-2012 aimed to enhance national competitiveness through an “open-
door” policy for foreign professionals, investors, highly skilled persons, and marriage
immigrants. It also restricted low skilled labor and their sojourn and gave ethnic Koreans
preference. It aimed to pursue quality social integration to ensure that Korea develops into a
more mature, multicultural society where human rights are respected by helping immigrants
to adapt, eradicating discrimination, and promoting the public's understanding of a
multicultural society. It also aims to ensure that immigration laws are respected and strictly
enforced and human rights of foreigners are protected (MOJ, 2008, p. 12).
In 2007, the "Act on Treatment of Foreigners in Korea" was enacted, partly in
international pressure to comply with international conventions on human rights and against
discrimination. The law aimed to eliminate discrimination against foreigners and to facilitate
their integration in Korean society. The “Act on Regulation of Marriage Brokerage Industry”
was passed in 2007 to regulate marriage agencies. Operators were required to report and get
certifications, posting marriage brokerage fees, membership fees, maintaining registers, etc. It
also prohibited brokers from making claims that are “false or exaggerated or that may be
interpreted as encouraging discrimination or prejudice against countries, races, sex, age
groups, occupations, etc.” Penalties include imprisonment and fines of up to 20 million won
as well as payment for damages were levied under this law.
The “Support for Multicultural Families Act” of 2008 mandated the establishment of
social support services for marriage immigrants and multicultural families. These include
programs for language and cultural adaptation, employment, assisting victims of domestic
violence, and support for child rearing and education, among others. The “Marriage
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immigrants Total Support Program” assists and encourages marriage immigrants to give birth
to and to raise “Korean children.” Under these programs, they were granted several benefits
such as minimum living support and mother/child support if with children even if they have
not yet acquired citizenship. Prior to the expansion of these programs, these types of benefits
were generally limited only to Korean citizens (H.J. Kim, 2008).
As of 2012, 159 “Multicultural Family Support Centers” have been established
nationwide to provide marriage immigrants and multicultural families with integrated
services including education in Korean language and culture, education on multicultural
society, counseling on family education, interpretation and translation service, support for
employment, and support for language development and education of children. Multilingual
hotlines, emergency centers, and shelters were also established to provide migrant women in
distress with emergency relief, counseling, medical, legal, and departure support service.
South Korea is the first country in Asia that granted voting rights to foreigners. The
amendment of the “Public Official Election Act” in 2010 granted rights to foreign spouses of
Korean nationals to engage in various election campaign activities, activities previously not
allowed. Furthermore, permanent residents, including foreign spouses who did not avail
Korean citizenship but meet certain eligibility requirements (e.g. minimum 19 years of age,
have had 3 years of residence after obtaining permanent residency, etc.) were granted several
options for political participation. These include the right to vote in local elections and
elections for education superintendents (J.W. Lee, 2011).
A Survey of the Relevant Policies of the Philippine Government
The three pillars of Philippine foreign policy are: (1) the preservation and
enhancement of national security (2) the promotion and attainment of economic security and
(3) the protection and rights and the promotion of the welfare and interest of all Filipinos
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overseas according to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA, 2012). Protecting the rights
and welfare of migrant workers is the core focus of “The Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act” of 1995. In 2012, the law was amended by Republic Act (RA) 10022 which
enhances protection by limiting deployments to countries that have existing laws protecting
the rights of workers, ratified international treaties for protection of workers, has bilateral
arrangements with the Philippines or taking measures to this effect.
Migrant remittances are a key component of the Philippine economy and various
programs and policies both explicitly and implicitly support migration. Almost 10 % of the
Philippines 92 million population are working overseas. Remittances reached at least
US$21.391 Billion or about 8 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012, according to
Philippine Central Bank (BSP, 2013) estimates. Remittances from Filipinos based in South
Korea were estimated at US$112.22 million or approximately 5.5 % of the total remittances
in 2010. Data does not distinguish what portion of this is from marriage immigrants.
Subsequent laws extended the rights and benefits of Filipino migrant workers and
returnees. The “Overseas Absentee Voting Act” of 2003 allowed migrants to vote in national
elections even while overseas. The “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act” of 2003 on
allowed those who have surrendered their Philippine citizenship to become dual-citizens. The
“Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program” of 1998 and its amendment in 2002 provided for a
comprehensive support program for migrant workers returning to the Philippines.
The Philippines does not have specific legislation for marriage immigrants except
one: the ban on commercially brokered marriages. The rest are administrative policies like
the mandatory orientation seminars of the CFO and the programs of the embassies overseas.
Marriage immigrants are generally subsumed under the policies governing OFWs and
migrants overseas. With regards to marriages between Filipinos and foreigners, the
requirements are set in the general “Family Code” which defines and sets the requisites and
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procedures for all marriages as well as the grounds for revocation. The basic requisites
include: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties; and (2) consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing officer; a marriage license is also necessary in most cases. For
marriages with foreign nationals, the only additional requisite is a certificate of legal capacity
to contract marriage, issued by diplomatic or consular officials.
Although the phenomenon already existed at the time, the government did not yet see
marriage immigration as a problem in the 1970s. By the 1980s, however, it became apparent
that “mail-order brides,” an arrangement wherein women, usually from developing countries,
are advertised and offered as prospective brides for men from developed countries by
commercial brokers was associated with violence and exploitation. Negative publicity on
mail-order brides and press coverage of the exploitation, trafficking, abuse, and other
problems experienced by marriage immigrants in western countries like the US prompted the
government to adopt a blanket ban on mail-order bride arrangements (Simmons, 2001).
In 1990, the Philippine legislature enacted the “Anti-Mail-Order Bride Law”. The law
banned matching Filipinas for marriage to foreign nationals either on a mail-order basis or
through personal introduction in exchange for a fee and imposed penalties. The “Anti-human
Trafficking Act” of 2003 banned and imposed heavy penalties for human trafficking
including those masquerading as legitimate marriages. Despite these laws, marriage
immigration has increased and there are indications that commercially brokered marriages
still continue (Lloyd, 2000; Simmons, 2001). From only 7,819 in 1989, the number of
Filipinas leaving the country due to marriage with foreign nationals has risen to an average of
16,000 to 19,000 annually from 1990 to 2004. From 2005 to 2010, the average number has
risen to more than 20,000 per year according to CFO (2012) data.
Several key government agencies are involved in migration. The Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA) regulates labor migration. The Bureau of Immigration (BOI)
17
enforces immigration laws. The DFA is in charge of foreign policy and assistance to
nationals. The Technical Education and Skills Development Authority provide skills training
and offer foreign language and culture education programs (e.g., Korean, Japanese, and
French). The National Reintegration Center for OFWs is in charge of reintegration services.
The Overseas Workers Welfare Association provides social services for OFW members and
their families. The Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) is mandated to promote and
uphold the interest especially of Filipinos permanently residing overseas. Along with the
DFA, it is the main agency overseeing the welfare of marriage immigrants.
The CFO and the Philippine embassies under the DFA are the primary government
institutions involved in the welfare of overseas migrants, including marriage immigrants in
South Korea. The CFO conducts mandatory pre-departure registration and orientation
seminars for Filipinos spouses and partners of foreign nationals. Under an agreement with the
Korean government, it operates a pre-departure center that helps Filipina marriage
immigrants understand the life and culture of Korea and basic Korean language. The CFO
publishes materials aimed at helping marriage immigrants become familiar with relevant laws
and government programs to help them adapt to their married life overseas.
The CFO also operates a hotline for reporting human trafficking and dialogues with
its counterpart, the MOGEF, on how to address the rights and welfare issues of marriage
immigrants. The CFO also have ongoing discussions with various NGOs and the Korean and
Philippine government agencies for gathering data and policy proposals for the abandoned
biracial children of Koreans and Filipinos referred to as kopinos. It also has a partnership with
the International Office of Migration – Migration Training and Research Center to research
better policies for marriage immigrants in South Korea.
In addition to providing consular affairs, the Philippine embassies in Seoul and Busan
in South Korea are also involved in activities that support the welfare of marriage
18
immigrants. The embassy registers Filipino migrants and provides pertinent information on
existing policies and programs of both the Philippine and the South Korean government that
affects its nationals. It also operates an Assistance-to-Nationals hotline and an Emergency
hotline which can be contacted in cases of arrests, detention, criminal investigation, physical
abuse, or death of Filipino nationals. It also maintains linkages with Filipino organizations in
South Korea and on occasion, supports the activities of some organizations. It also supports
cultural exchanges to foster better relations and familiarize Koreans with Filipino culture.
The ambassador also maintains links and engages in dialogue with his Korean counterpart on
a broad range of topics, which include the welfare of Filipina marriage immigrants.
The Philippine embassy lists a total of 114 Filipino organizations in South Korea.
These include 39 religious organizations and 75 community organizations. These
organizations cater to a broad array of interests and engage in a wide range of activities.
Some organizations support marriage immigrants by organizing them, representing them
during dialogues with employers and Philippine and Korean government agencies. They also
provide information, language education, skills training, shelter, health, legal assistance,
referral, or other forms of support. They also popularize migrant concerns and press for
action through protests and mass mobilization, networking with other organizations,
lobbying, through the courts, and through mass media (e.g., see Lim, 2010; Moon, 2012).
The Korean Multiculturalism Discourse
Broadly speaking, multiculturalism pertains to a set of ideas, policies, and ideology
that promotes the mutual recognition and acceptance of the diversity of cultures of various
ethnic groups within a society (Elliot & Fleras, 1996; Henry, 2002; J.K. Kim, 2011). The
term “multiculturalism” is widely used in South Korea, but the term is used with varying and
sometimes conflicting meanings. It has become a catch-all phrase used to describe both the
19
reality of the increasing number of foreigners and a plethora of policies and programs, many
of which are aimed at the assimilation of select groups of foreigners into Korean society.
These range from those that promote the Korean language and culture to those that promote
the welfare and the social integration of marriage immigrant women and mixed-race Korean
children. Multiculturalism per se, is not explicitly defined but plenty of references can be
found in the Grand Plan of 2006 and the FBPIP (MOJ, 2008, p. 14).
According to J.K. Kim (2011, p. 1583), multiculturalism in South Korea is the
government’s response to the “accumulated societal pressure from below that sought to
improve the precarious social conditions of international migrants and to embrace
multiculturalism as an inevitable, but positive, social force.” With an increasing number of
foreign residents, an aging economy that is slowly but increasingly depending on migrant
labor and its biological and cultural reproduction, partially dependent on women marriage
immigrants, the multicultural discourse is inevitable. The multiculturalism discourse is
driven by competing narratives between policy makers, the media, academics, and the public.
The rapidly growing number of foreign residents, racial riots in France in 2005, the
well-publicized visit of Hines Ward, a top American professional football player born to a
Korean mother and African-American father (in Korean commonly referred to as honhyol or
“mixed blood,” a commonly discriminated group), various media reports about “human-
trafficking” and negative practices of marriage agencies, and sensational cases in which
Korean husbands abused their foreign wives triggered a discourse on the difficult plight of
such groups especially in the mid-2000s (H.K. Lee, 2008; A.E. Kim, 2010; Lim, 2010).
This marked a turning point in terms of policies and attitudes and led to the adoption
of a series of comprehensive multicultural policies and programs especially after 2005. South
Korea began describing itself as a “multicultural” society, referring to the increasing number
of foreigners. The government adopted a succession of policies that include among others the
20
drafting of a “Grand Plan,” followed by the FBPIP, and a succession of laws and programs
regulating marriage agencies, protecting against discrimination of foreigners, and providing
support for marriage immigrants and their families (H.K. Lee, 2008; A.E. Kim, 2010; Lim,
2010). These programs are subsumed under the broad umbrella of “multiculturalism.”
The recent Korean Multicultural Acceptability Index (KMAI) survey conducted by
MOGEF between December 2011 and January 2012 reveals that only 36.2 % of Koreans
surveyed had positive views on the coexistence of various cultures. It reaffirmed the use of
the Korean language, the feeling of being Korean, and 86 % of those surveyed stressed the
importance on having Korean ancestors as part of the nation’s identity. One third each was
concerned about foreigners taking their jobs away, increasing the crime rate, and/or
increasing government spending. Curiously, those with immigrant family members and
experiences in multicultural training demonstrated lower levels of acceptability.
The MOGEF posits that frequent meetings in “superficial contact” with immigrants
may improve multicultural acceptability but “actual contact based on mutual interests” can
possibly lower this (MOGEF, 2012).
3
This finding has not been adequately explained in the
survey but given the ethno-centric standards of Korean society, there is good reason to
suspect that foreign-born marriage immigrants who are unfamiliar and struggle with the
language, the food, and the culture will likely fall short of the idealized standards of a ‘good
Korean wife.’ This may in turn, affect their multicultural acceptability among the relatives of
their spouse. More research studies need to be conducted to investigate this finding.
Occasionally, media reports and internet discussions reflect underlying tensions,
domestic fears, and anxieties. In one incident, the brutal rape and murder of a Korean woman
at the hands of an ethnic Korean-Chinese man in 2012 went as far as prompting calls from
some local groups to expel all Korean-Chinese in the country. News reports in major
newspapers like The Chosun Ilbo and The Korea Times with titles like “Korea Must Beware
21
of Growing Crime by Foreigners,” and “Foreign Drug Crime in Korea on the Rise” are also
fairly common. These articles when taken out of context (e.g. vis-à-vis the domestic crime
rate) could support notions that foreigners bring crime and illegal activities.
While respondents in the KMAI survey generally demonstrated negative responses
regarding affirmative action for foreign immigrants and policies that cause a big tax burden,
they offered mostly positive responses in terms of reflecting foreign immigrants' opinions in
policy-making, allowing citizenship, and providing medical insurance. Although low income
groups like farmers, fishermen, blue-collar workers, and salesmen showed lower levels of
multicultural acceptability, younger people, single people, better educated groups, and men
displayed a relatively more positive takes on multicultural acceptability. Those who have had
more overseas travel and frequently encounter foreigners in their neighborhood, workplaces,
and schools also showed higher levels of multicultural acceptability (MOGEF, 2012).
The Korean government has borrowed elements of the different models of
multiculturalism from other countries: it has combined elements of the “assimilation model”
often linked to American multiculturalism, the “functionalist social-integrationist”
multicultural-pluralism model used in Europe, and the “equal respect for cultural plurality”
models of official multicultural-states like Canada and Australia. There are, however,
observable disconnect between the multicultural narratives and policies being peddled by
policy makers and the civil society, and the Korean public. Reactions to multicultural policies
have been mixed and not a few sectors have been critical of them (Watson, 2012).
The Korean government has created special facilities and support programs for
foreigners and multicultural families and also mandated multicultural education. Its top-down
approach while clearly intended to aid and respect foreigners, however, also creates and
reinforces social and political divisions within Korean society. It has also had unintended
consequences, which include among others: emphasizing the outsider status of the foreigner,
22
inconsistent treatment of foreigners as either “objects of fun” or as “problems,” and backlash
from those that see special programs as reverse-discrimination (e.g., see Watson, 2012).
South Korea’s multiculturalism approach has never lacked critics from the public,
academics, civil society, and even from political parties. J.K. Kim, (2011) criticized its
underlying attitudes of cultural fetishism and cultural paternalism; superficial; reinforcing the
primacy of Korean culture; turning other cultures into exotic objects even fetishes; and
reifying cultural homogeneity even while preaching diversity. Similar critical views are
shared by other academics. Watson (2012) points out that multiple ambiguities,
inconsistencies, and tensions within Korea’s multicultural concept and between policy
makers, the public, academics, and NGOs create these unexpected and counterproductive
consequences. He argues that at the root of this conflict is the continuing and underlying
belief in exclusive racial and ethnic homogeneity among many Koreans.
The appointment of Jasmine Lee, a Philippine born naturalized marriage immigrant,
as a representative in the National Assembly was lauded by some groups as progress in
multiculturalism. Public reactions were more mixed. Lee’s appointment, while lauded by
some, was also met with a slew of negative, at times racist and xenophobic remarks in the
internet. Some Korean netizens accused her of being a ringleader for illegal immigrants, of
encouraging marriages for money, and of providing welfare for foreigners at the Korean
public’s expense (H.K. Lee, 2012). On the positive side, other Korean commentators,
celebrities, and netizens have also come to the defense of the lawmaker and chastised the
racist and xenophobic attitudes displayed by others. Others were skeptical and/or ambivalent.
Despite its limitations, the attention on multiculturalism has paved the way for
numerous and rapid improvements in programs, policies, services, and facilities for
foreigners, migrants, marriage immigrants, and their families (e.g., see Kim, et al., 2012).
And while it has yet to attend to other serious issues like racism, labor laws, and the
23
economic vulnerability of migrants, it is slowly opening opportunities for such discussions.
The results of the KMAI survey and the granting of limited voting rights to foreign residents
in 2010 suggest that attention is starting to touch on migrants’ political participation.
Filipina Marriage Immigrants in the Korean Multicultural Discourse
Filipino migrants have been among the active participants in the migrant labor
movement is South Korea since the 1990s. Filipino workers took part in the very first public
sit-in protest by foreign workers in Myong-dong Cathedral in 1994, which drew pledges from
the MOEL to address the rights and welfare of workers (see Lee & Park, 2005; Lim, 2010).
There are several active formal Filipino marriage immigrant associations in South Korea.
These include the FKSA, the Korea Filipino Wives’ Association (KFWA), the Filipina Circle
for Empowerment (FCE), and the Damayan of AIDA village, among others.
Filipino organizations assist other marriage immigrants and network with other
migrant groups, Korean NGOs, religious organizations, and government agencies. They also
sometimes join migrant labor unions, human-rights groups, and other cause-oriented groups
in activities and causes. Some of these organizations lobbied for the amendment of South
Korea’s dual-citizenship law. There are also non-formalized communities of Filipina
marriage immigrants that operate in similar capacity. Korean government organizations
occasionally provide assistance to these groups by providing meeting venues, information
and education services, and financial support (Moon, 2012).
Jasmine Lee from the Philippines is arguably the most popular immigrant in the
country. Having distinct Southeast Asian features, fluent in the Korean language, and active
in the community, she has appeared on movies, various TV programs, in government
information campaigns, programs, and lectures on multiculturalism. She was also the
Secretary General of Waterdrop, a charity established by foreign spouses of Koreans, and
24
served in the Seoul Global Center’s Foreign Residents Assistance Division. She also
appeared beside President Lee Myung-bak in the 2010 G20 summit (Stuart-Leach, 2011).
In 2012, Jasmine Lee was nominated by the administration Saenuri Dang (New
World Party formerly the Grand National Party) as a proportional representative in the
National Assembly, the first non-ethnic Korean in the country’s history. Ms. Lee is not the
first non-ethnic Korean to be nominated for the position. In 2008, another Filipina marriage
immigrant, Judith Alegre Fernandez was nominated by the Changjo Hanguk Dang (Creative
Korea Party) and campaigned with them (Yonhap News, 2008). They did not get enough
votes, however. Another Filipina, Anabelle Castro was the second naturalized immigrant to
be hired as a police officer in South Korea (The Philippine embassy in Seoul, 2008). There is
not enough data for comparisons with other groups at this point, but it is safe to say that
Filipina marriage immigrants are actively tapping opportunities to engage Korean society and
improve migrant welfare.
An exploratory study by Yang, Lee, and Torneo (2012) found that Filipina women
marriage immigrants have the second highest self-reported levels of political efficacy and
political trust among the various nationalities surveyed, second only to ethnic Koreans from
China. This suggests that relative to other groups of marriage immigrants, they have higher
trust in the political institutions and belief in their ability to influence the political process.
Political efficacy is described as a feeling or belief in the possibility of social change and
one’s ability to influence the political process and evoke response from political institutions
(Campbell, Gurin, & Miller 1954; Wu 2003; Anderson, 2010).
This relatively high self-reported level of political efficacy among Filipina marriage
migrants has not yet been adequately explained. Political efficacy may reflect individual
confidence, confidence in the group or community (internal), or belief in the responsiveness
of government institutions (external) (Anderson, 2010). Political efficacy impacts the
25
political participation and the actions of citizens. This could translate to opposition or support
of existing policies, authorities, or structure, or change (Wu 2003). Higher political efficacy
raises the possibility of active political participation. Although evidence is still scant, this is
one possible explanation for the active participation of Filipinas. They can potentially be
among the most active participants in the Korean multiculturalism and policy discourse.
Policy Implications
Given South Korea’s demographic structure and trends, marriage immigration will
likely persist in the near future. The persistent shortages of Korean brides in rural areas, the
need to ensure reproduction in the face of low birth rates, the small but growing labor
shortage
4
, and a rapidly ageing population which partially drives both labor and marriage
immigration is rooted firmly in the Korean demographic and economic structure. Unless
these can be reversed or addressed, the country will continue to need both labor and marriage
immigrants in the medium term. This provides a strong motivation for the Korean
government to support marriage immigration despite numerous issues (e.g., see H.J. Kim,
2008; H.K. Lee, 2008). At this juncture, the authors identify several policy implications based
on recent policies and developments.
First, sans any major internal or external developments, the trajectory of Korean
policies and programs will not be the abolition of marriage immigration or the banning of
marriage agencies but further improving the rights and welfare of marriage immigrants. At
present, rights and welfare issues continue to receive plenty of attention from the media, from
the academe, and are at the core of the policies of sending countries like the Philippines. For
now, many of the policies focus on the adaptation of newly arrived migrants but there are
also other pressing issues that need to be addressed.
26
One survey in 2005 showed that “53% of the families of immigrant women live below
the poverty line,” 15.5% “have experienced starvation,” but “only 14% receive basic aid”
(Lee, 2008: 114). According to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF),
marriage immigrant women that experienced domestic violence reached 69.1% in 2009,
higher than the 58.6% rate among Korean households. It notes that several Vietnamese
brides died from escaping their husbands, from suicide, and/or as direct results of domestic
violence. In 2011, a Filipina died in what is suspected as a result of domestic abuse by her
husband and mother in law (Kollenberg, 2012).
In one report of The Chosun Ilbo (2012), 22.8 % of callers to migrant support centers
expressed difficulty of adapting and 17.3 % had grievances on mistreatment/prejudice in
workplace. An official notes that discrimination is one of the main causes of divorce.
According to the FBPIP 2008-2012, about half of surveyed marriage immigrant experience
culture related problems including culture, language, loneliness, etc. (MOJ, 2008, p.46). The
plan states that “high-quality social integration of marriage immigrants” is a priority (MOJ,
2008: 39); “the failure of immigrants through marriage to adapt to Korean society
undermines the foundation of families and incurs major social costs” (MOJ, 2008, p.46).
The caveat is that support policies and programs must not be seen as unduly causing a
big tax burden or unfair. While many Koreans believe that multicultural families are
disadvantaged and need support, some sectors have expressed concern that certain benefits
are becoming “unfair” and results into a form of reverse discrimination against Koreans.
According to one commentator, the attitude among both policy makers and the public appear
to be increased welfare for the general population rather than reduced welfare for minorities
like marriage immigrants (Power, 2011). While some sectors voice displeasure with some of
the special support programs for multicultural families, there are no serious arguments
against their necessity or efforts for their abolishment. Actual developments point to an
27
increase in both multicultural support programs and government welfare programs for the
Korean elderly, youth, women, disabled, and the unemployed (MOEL, 2010, 2011).
Second, policies will likely tend towards more stringent regulation of the marriage
brokerage industry due to domestic and international pressures. Exploitative and degrading
practices of marriage brokers like bride guarantees (i.e., “if the bride runs away, they will be
replaced”), the deaths of brides, and human trafficking is a source of embarrassment for the
Korean government. The US Department of State 2008 Report noted that some women
recruited for legal and brokered marriages in South Korea are “misled about living
conditions, financial status, and expectations of their Korean husbands” and ended up being
victims of “sexual exploitation, debt bondage and involuntary servitude once married.”
Such concerns have led the Cambodian government to ban marriages with Korean
men in 2008 and 2010. The murder of a Vietnamese bride by her mentally-ill husband just
days after her arrival in 2010 also provoked a sharp response from Vietnam (M.Y. Kwon,
2010; Shay, 2010). Afterwards, the Korean government imposed a new requirement for
brokers to provide the potential foreign brides information about the prospective groom's
marital status, occupation, health and criminal record in the brides’ own language. Proposals
were made for tighter regulations, screening, and pre-marriage education for Korean men
(Shay, 2010). The one that appears to have the most support has been tighter regulation.
Third, participation and representation of marriage immigrants in policy making and
implementation is increasing and will likely increase further in scope and importance. Public
support for reflecting migrant concerns in policy in the KMAI survey and increased political
opportunities as seen in the amended election laws, the election of Lee Ra, a naturalized
marriage immigrant from Mongolia into the Gyeonggi Province Local Council in 2010, the
nomination of Judith Alegre Fernandez in 2010 and the appointment of Jasmine Lee in the
National Assembly in 2012 demonstrates increasing recognition of the importance of
28
representation of the sector by policy makers. Including migrants in tickets is also a possible
strategy to get support from multicultural families and those sympathetic to their cause. It is
likely that more marriage immigrants will be elected and/or appointed in the future.
Marriage immigrants exhibit a high degree of agency. Nho. et al. (2008) and
Constable (2003) found that Filipina immigrants in South Korea are generally better educated
and more ambitious than their Korean husbands. If their own agency and motivations clashes
with the restrictions imposed on them, they are unlikely to remain passive. They are also not
entirely powerless; they can threaten divorce or abandonment (H.K. Lee, 2008). The
increasing number of migrant spouses associations also demonstrates this agency. Filipina
and other marriage immigrants are now actively organizing and mobilizing (Moon, 2012).
Filipina marriage immigrants are transitioning from passive recipients to more active
participants in government programs, projects, and activities. They are increasingly visible in
the activities of government institutions like the Seoul Global Center, Multicultural Support
Centers, the MOJ, the MOGEF, and even in national politics. Partnerships and joint activities
between Korean government organizations and NGOs and Filipino marriage immigrant
organizations are also evident (e.g., Moon, 2012). While the current relationship may still be
largely described as sponsor-beneficiary and largely-top down, the increasing involvement
and role of marriage immigrants themselves is bound to change these dynamics.
Fourth, the Korean government’s assimilative framework of multiculturalism will
increasingly be challenged as multicultural families and multiracial children increase in
number and importance. There is evidence that marriage immigrants are beginning to
challenge the hegemony of Korean culture in the multiculturalism discourse. Some are
advancing for fairness in recognizing their own unique culture and identity and that social
integration should not mean that they should abandon them. Lim (2010) cites May Cordova, a
29
Filipina immigrant bride-turned activist, who finds that the pressure to follow Korean culture
and forget their own is a major cause of problem in the multicultural household.
Existing policies of the Korean governments still frame the issues of marriage
immigrants largely as a problem of adaptation and understanding. The FBPIP itself states that
“insufficient understanding of Korean society exposes immigrants through marriage to
discrimination and human rights abuse” (MOJ, 2008, p. 46). The underlying attitude to this
framing has been pointed out as the main problematic by Watson (2012), Lim (2009, 2010),
A.E. Kim (2009, 2010), and J.K. Kim (2011) and it will definitely take time to change.
Unfortunately, Philippine policies and programs also do little to detract from this framing.
Orientation programs for immigrant brides also emphasize adaptation to Korean language
and culture. The idea of mutual cultural adaptation is not yet manifest in official discourse.
Marriage immigrants are not alone in challenging the current framing of the
multiculturalism and related policies. Watson (2012) points out that academics and civil
society organizations in South Korea are also challenging the government’s multiculturalism
approach, challenging basic assumptions (e.g., the Korean as a single race myth) and pressing
for a rethinking of multiculturalism concepts and narratives (e.g., moving from one-way and
paternalist approach). In the past, partnerships between labor migrant groups, civil society,
and supporters from the Korean government have led to changes in labor policies. Whether
they will also be successful in reforming multicultural policies remains to be seen.
Given the projected increase in multicultural families, and multi-racial children,
changes are inevitable. Already amendments have seen the once closed, blood-based and
patrilineal legal concept of Korean citizenship change. At least 10 % of all marriages in the
country now involve a foreign spouse and a projected one fourth of all students entering
elementary schools by 2012 are multi-racial Korean children. As these groups becomes tax
paying and voting members of society, they are unlikely to remain passive in the issues that
30
affect them and as shown by recent developments, they can be expected to challenge the
social structures that isolate and discriminate against them.
Fifth, the Philippine government requires major policy adjustments to fully address
issues affecting its marriage immigrants. Laws primarily intended for migrant workers clearly
cannot address their unique issues. The issues of human trafficking, mail to order bride
arrangements, and domestic abuse continue to dominate discourse from the Philippines side.
However, the 1987 Philippine Constitution and laws like the “Anti-Mail Order Bride Act”
and the “Family Code” limit the range of interventions that the Philippine government can
take. The blanket ban on brokered marriages creates a serious impediment in adopting
protective measures and cooperating with the governments of destination countries where the
practice is legal. Commercially brokered marriages are illegal but the practice continues
anyway. The ban has only driven the practice underground where hopes of regulation are nil.
The DFA, its embassies overseas, the CFO, and the BOI have several programs aimed
at departing women bound for marriage. Consistent with Philippine laws, they try to ascertain
if the women are under-age, victims of human trafficking, or involved in mail to order bride
schemes. But there are indications that mail order bride arrangements persist. Although
banning marriages with Koreans might seem an attractive option, it is likely unconstitutional
and difficult to implement. For example, despite a Cambodian blanket ban on marriages with
Koreans from 2008 to 2011, Cambodian marriage immigrants continued to increase from 659
in 2008, 851 in 2009, 1205 in 2010, and 1372 in 2011 (Statistics Korea, 2006,2012).
Sixth, bilateral cooperation between the Korean and the Philippine governments will
increasingly become important in addressing marriage immigrants’ issues and concerns.
Despite differences in policies, both have a stake in ensuring that the rights and welfare of
marriage immigrants are protected before, during, and after they migrate. Several types of
policy interventions can only be made possible if the two aligned their policies. Coordination
31
in screening, pre-departure, social integration, emergency support, legal, and repatriation can
significantly reduce the problems associated with human trafficking, adaptation, domestic
violence, and associated problems. Thus, a cooperative legal framework is necessary.
One option for the Philippines is to repeal the “Anti-Mail Order Bride Act” and adopt
a law regulating the brokerage of international marriages. This will allow for the adoption of
monitoring and regulatory measures and allow better bilateral cooperation, an option not
available given the blanket ban on brokered marriages from the Philippine side. South
Korea’s law regulating marriage agencies is compatible to such a development. Article 11 of
South Korea’s Act on Regulation of Marriage Brokerage Industry requires international
marriage brokers to “conform to foreign local Acts and subordinate statutes in their
engagement in the international marriage brokerage business.” If both governments require
marriages to go through accredited agencies for monitoring and regulatory purposes, the
practice can be driven aboveground where it can be monitored and regulated.
Another option is to restrict the procedure for international marriages in a manner
similar to that arranged by the Korean and Chinese governments in the mid-1990s which led
to a substantial decline in the number of marriages between Chinese and Koreans. This would
entail increasing requirements and complicating procedures to discourage marriages. In order
to accomplish this, the Philippine government will have to coordinate policies with the
Korean government. Moreover, such a policy will not necessarily solve the problems being
experienced by the remaining Filipina marriage immigrants or those who still marry illegally.
On March 13, 2012, the two governments through the MOGEF and the CFO signed
the “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation in Developing Capacities for
the Resettlement and Adaptation of Filipino Marriage immigrants and Promoting the
Empowerment of Immigrant Women for the Philippines.” The MOU promotes better
information for newly arrived migrants, further development of programs and projects for
32
their welfare and protection, and more joint research and dialogues on related issues among
experts, frontline service personnel and marriage immigrants themselves. While this MOU is
certainly a step in the right direction it is limited in scope and only covers administrative
agencies. Aligning legislation in both countries may have a deeper more substantial impact.
Conclusion
The case of South Korea and the Philippines show how marriage immigration and the
rise of multicultural families has caused rapid and unprecedented changes and raised
substantive issues and serious policy challenges to both sending and receiving governments
in Asia. These issues include rights and welfare issues, adaptation, and integration among
others. It also includes changes to ethnic composition which challenge the blood-based ethno-
nationalist notions of the Korean family, citizenship and identity. These issues have resulted
in the adoption of numerous public policies and spawned a thriving discourse on
multiculturalism among academics, the media, civil society, policy makers, and the public.
Our analysis of Korean policies on marriage immigration reveals three major policy
themes and priorities: implicit support for marriage immigration, concern with protecting the
rights and welfare of marriage immigrants, and a special emphasis on the social integration of
marriage immigrants and their children. In contrast, Philippine policies are primarily focused
on protecting the rights and welfare of its migrant workers but have little specific provisions
for marriage immigrants. Policies conflict with regards to commercial marriage brokers: the
practice is banned in the Philippines while it is legal and merely regulated in South Korea.
Recent developments reveal the following policy trends and implications. First,
Korean government policies will likely continue to emphasize the improvement of the rights
and welfare of marriage immigrants and their families. Second, there is movement towards
more stringent regulation of the marriage brokerage industry. Third, there is a trend towards
33
increased participation and representation of marriage immigrants in Korean policy making
and implementation. Fourth, South Korea’s assimilative framework of multiculturalism will
be challenged as marriage immigrants and multiracial children increase in number and
importance. Fifth, major policy adjustments by the Philippine government will be necessary
in order to fully address issues affecting its marriage immigrants. Sixth, bilateral cooperation
will be necessary in order to fully address migrant issues and concerns. On their own, the
efforts of these countries are likely to have limited impact. Cooperation and collaboration
between their governments may be necessary to accomplish their mutual goals and interests.
It is well to remember that there are 13 other developing countries where women
marriage immigrants to South Korea come from in substantial numbers. These include
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal,
Russia, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. The situation between these countries and South
Korea and the Philippines have similarities but also plenty of differences owing to socio,
economic, political, and policy differences. While studying common issues of all these
groups as have been done in previous studies are important, studying the particularities of
each group may also be necessary to understand and address their specific situation.
The case of South Korea and the Philippines offers several insights that could be
useful for other countries in similar situations. First, it affirms that public policies of both
origin and host countries should be taken into account in policy development as these provide
the context in which international marriages occur and how they deal with issues concerning
migrants. Second, it demonstrates the importance of active policy dialogue between the
government of origin and host countries in order to address issues that concern marriage
migrants. Third, it demonstrates that individual and organized marriage immigrants and
NGOs can also take an active role in shaping discourse as well as public policy.
South Korea’s multiculturalism discourse is part of an incremental and evolving
34
process that may change over time. Like migrant workers and their Korean supporters who
engaged in continuous mobilization, advocacy campaigns, lobbies, and court cases in the
pursuit of their rights before substantial reforms were made, marriage immigrants also need
to actively participate and pursue necessary reforms both in policy and the multiculturalism
discourse. Korean policy makers have, in the recent past, proven to be quite sensitive to
public opinion and the country’s image and quick to enact policy measures to address them.
This gives room for migrant groups and their supporters to press for reforms. Changing deep-
seated social attitudes will be more challenging.
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HTML
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43
Figure 1. Marriage immigrant Women from the Philippines to South Korea 2000-2011
Source: Statistics Korea (2006, 2012)
Notes
1
From 1990 to 1996, the number of ethnic-Korean Chinese brides was increasing (i.e., 88 in 1990 and
9,271 in 1996). By 1997, however, the numbers started to decrease (i.e., 7,362 in 1997 and 2,833 in
1999). Ethnic Korean-Chinese brides did not exceed 7,000 again until the policy was rescinded in 2003
(e.g., see Statistics Korea, 2006; Kim, et al., 2012).
2
Proving the husband’s imputation means proving that the husband was at fault. In South Korea,
divorce is a fault-based contest. Courts generally rule that spouses cannot be forced into an unwanted
divorce unless it can be proven he/she is at fault. Grounds for divorce include engaging in unchaste
acts, malicious desertion, maltreatment, or any other serious reason (e.g., see Morley)
3
The frequency of contact does not result in improved multicultural acceptability among Koreans with
relatives married to marriage immigrants. In fact, their multicultural acceptability is lower. The term
“actual contact based on mutual interests” was stated in the context of shared living space among
Koreans with relatives married to marriage migrants. We take this to mean the home or similar settings.
The survey only observes the self-rated multicultural acceptability among different groups of Koreans
but provides no further explanation.
4
Despite importing migrant workers, the labor shortage in South Korea has grown from only 1.117%
of the total labor force in 1999 to 3.017% of the labor force in 2012 (e.g., see E-Nara Index a, b)
