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Conservatism and Personality
Abstract
If justification were needed for taking notice once again of the liberal-conservative distinction, it would be sufficient, I suppose, merely to observe that this division has been injected into the politics of Western nations for at least two centuries and, depending on the nature of one's criteria, perhaps longer.
The distinction between the two camps has not always been sharply drawn, of course, for both have been compelled, as a condition for survival, to hold important beliefs in common. Moreover, each has reversed itself on certain issues, such as government regulation of the economy, casting off old views in favor of beliefs previously cherished by the other. Competing for popular support in elections, and succeeding one another in office, the two camps have, of necessity, taken on many values in common, tempering their programs and adjusting their courses to the practical requirements of political contest. In a system like ours, where the parties have functioned less as ideological movements than as brokerage organizations hoping to attract majority support from almost every segment of the electorate, the distinction has tended to be dulled even further, until, at the actual scenes of daily political struggle, it has often faded entirely.
... 265). Similarly, McClosky (1958) argued that "[c]onservatism, in our society at least, appears to be far more characteristic of social isolates, of people who think poorly of themselves," and that conservatives "tend to be aggressively critical of the shortcomings of others" and "unusually defensive and armored in the protection of their own ego needs" (p. 37). ...
... Taken together, these studies shed light on the classic problem of the role of self-worth in political orientation. They suggest that feelings of superiority (rather than of unworthiness, as was initially suspected; McClosky, 1958;Sniderman & Citrin, 1971) may attract people to right-wing ideologies, at least those characterized by power strivings and dominance. Social conservatism as well as extremist right-wing populism, especially its flavors that call for superiority of certain social groups over others, tend to be especially appealing to those scoring high in narcissism. ...
One of the classic questions in political psychology has been whether feelings of self‐worth are relevant for politics. In this review, we summarize seven decades of research attempting to address this question, focusing on three sets of political outcomes: (1) political ideology, (2) political interest and engagement, and (3) intergroup relations. We rely on the distinction between self‐esteem (feelings of adequacy and satisfaction with oneself) and narcissism (feelings of entitled self‐importance and superiority over others). We argue that this distinction allows us to integrate the literature and explain the mixed effects observed in past research on self‐evaluation and politics. Our review points to a key role of narcissistic status pursuit and psychological defensiveness in predicting potentially problematic political attitudes and behaviors. We discuss practical implications these associations might have for democratic functioning and for understanding political leaders. We conclude by identifying outstanding questions and promising new research directions.
... As procrastination prevents change from happening, it can reasonably be expected that not all employees will experience negative consequences because of such delays. Change brings uncertainty, and people seem to differ in how comfortable and receptive they are towards uncertain and new situations, displaying individual differences in resistance to change (McClosky, 1958;Oreg, 2003). ...
... Employees' resistance to change was probed with a different measure than in Study 1. More specifically, in the present study we used a three-item scale of which the items are adapted from McClosky (1958). A sample item is: "It is better to stick by what you have than to be trying new things you really don't know about" (M = 2.74, SD = 0.73, Cronbach's α = .64). ...
Most prior research has examined procrastination as a type of self-defeating behavior. The present research, however, focused on the social consequences of procrastination, by investigating how decisional leader procrastination as a leader trait affects others in the workplace. We specifically developed the argument that the way in which employees deal with changes plays a critical moderating role in the relationship between leader procrastination and employee innovation. More precisely, we hypothesized that decisional leader procrastination negatively impacts employee innovation, but only so for employees who are low (compared to high) in resistance to change. This prediction was tested in an experimental study (Study 1) and two double-source survey studies (Studies 2 and 3). In support of our prediction, the results showed that an indecisive leader indeed undermines the innovation of those employees who embrace—rather than resist—changes. Critically, however, our findings also illustrated that when being supervised by a decisive leader, these particular employees are actually most likely to bring forward the process of innovation. Theoretical and practical implications of our results are discussed.
... According to Jost (2017), conservative values are crucial to people's motives for maintaining the status quo. Conservatism is a way of thinking (a belief system) that aims to keep things as they are in society, especially by upholding social norms, preserving order and stability in the community, opposing change, honoring authority, and punishing those who are acting outside of social norms (McClosky, 1958). ...
INTRODUCTION: The current study examines how conservative social ideologies and religiosity interact to predict lower levels of knowledge, social intolerance, and negative attitudes toward interacting with transgender and gender nonbinary (TGNB) individuals. METHOD: An online cross-sectional research was conducted between March 2 and June 2, 2021. Two hundred and sixty-six participants were recruited for this study. The mean age was 29.30 (_SD_ = 11.98, age range: 18-60 years). The study used a between-subject correlational design. A multiple regression model was used to predict participants’ TGNB Knowledge, Attitudes, and Beliefs from the other research variables based on the importance of associations. We examined our hypotheses regarding the moderating role of conservative values and political positioning on the linkage between religiosity and TGNB knowledge, social tolerance, and attitudes toward interacting with TGNB individuals using PROCESS (Model 1). RESULTS: This study’s results show that the conservative cis-normative system (i.e., religiosity, conservative values, and right-wing political orientation) seems significantly linked to TGNB social intolerance. CONCLUSIONS: This study's findings suggest that a broader definition of conservatism encompassing conservative values and right-wing political orientation may be useful in predicting trans-negativity. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: The levels of social tolerance, acceptance across the gender spectrum, and attitudes toward interacting with TGNB individuals should be considered by those working to change the attitude toward TGNB people.
... According to Jost (2017), conservative values are crucial to people's motives for maintaining the status quo. Conservatism is a way of thinking (a belief system) that aims to keep things as they are in society, especially by upholding social norms, preserving order and stability in the community, opposing change, honoring authority, and punishing those who are acting outside of social norms (McClosky, 1958). ...
The current study examines how conservative social ideologies and religiosity interact to predict lower levels of knowledge, social intolerance, and negative attitudes toward interacting with transgender and gender nonbinary (TGNB) individuals. An online cross-sectional research was conducted between March 2 and June 2, 2021. Two hundred and sixty-six participants were recruited for this study. The mean age was 29.30 (_SD_ = 11.98, age range: 18-60 years). The study used a between-subject correlational design. A multiple regression model was used to predict participants’ TGNB Knowledge, Attitudes, and Beliefs from the other research variables based on the importance of associations. We examined our hypotheses regarding the moderating role of conservative values and political positioning on the linkage between religiosity and TGNB knowledge, social tolerance, and attitudes toward interacting with TGNB individuals using PROCESS (Model 1). This study’s results show that the conservative cis-normative system (i.e., religiosity, conservative values, and right-wing political orientation) seems significantly linked to TGNB social intolerance.
... Researchers used to assume that political parties and attitudes could be arrayed on a single left-right dimension (e.g., Lipset, 1960;McClosky, 1958). However, more recently it has been argued that the meaning of this dimension varies across nations and over time and is often insufficient to represent the relevant political dimensions in a society (Inglehart, 1990;Rokeach, 1973). ...
Recently, Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten and Hutsebaut (2003) have shown that the Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS; Duriez, Fontaine & Hutsebaut, 2000) captures the two orthogonal bipolar dimensions of Exclusion versus Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal versus Symbolic along which Wulff (1991, 1997) organized the various possible approaches to religion. This chapter outlines the original and valuable contribution of the PCBS to the field of the psychology of religion by showing how the PCBS sheds a new light on several hotly debated topics within he psychology of religion.
... Researchers have long been interested in the personality origins of political attitudes and behavior (Adorno et al., 1950;Eysenck, 1954;McClosky, 1958). Throughout this article, I define personality traits as "relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that distinguish individuals from one another" (Roberts & Mroczek, 2008, p. 31) and that are exogenous to their political socialization (McCourt et al., 1999). ...
Negative partisanship describes the intense disdain for a rival political party. A growing number of political scientists in the US and beyond examine the impact of negative partisanship on citizens’ political behavior, asserting the notion that negative partisanship exerts a strong influence, either on its own or in combination with positive partisanship. Yet we know little about the psychological origins of negative and positive partisanship: Which personality traits are associated with high levels of negative partisanship, and do they differ from the ones that have been linked to positive partisanship? In this article, I address these questions. Utilizing a sample of US adults and a sample of Swedish adults, I examine the influence of prominent personality traits—including Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, the Need for Closure, and the Big Five—on strong negative and positive partisanship. I demonstrate that the personality origins of positive and negative partisanship differ not just across the two samples but also across partisans on the left and on the right. I conclude the article with implications for research on polarization and a plea for more comparative work on (positive and negative) partisanship.
... The notion that there is a relation between rigidity and conservatism has been with us for many decades (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950;Freud, 1921;Katz, 1960;Kaufman, 1940;McClosky, 1958). During this time, social scientists have conducted hundreds of tests bearing on the RRH, describing left-right differences in domains such as complexity of policy statements made by U.S. Senators and members of the British House of Commons (e.g., Tetlock, 1983;Tetlock et al., 1984), abstract reasoning abilities (e.g., O'Connor, 1952), tolerance of ambiguity (e.g., Block & Block, 1951), general neurocognitive functioning (e.g., Amodio et al., 2007;Nam et al., 2021), and working memory processes (e.g., Buechner et al., 2021). ...
The rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis (RRH), which posits that cognitive, motivational, and ideological rigidity resonate with political conservatism, is an influential but controversial psychological account of political ideology. Here, we leverage several methodological and theoretical sources of this controversy to conduct an extensive quantitative review—with the dual aims of probing the RRH’s basic assumptions and parsing the RRH literature’s heterogeneity. Using multi-level meta-analyses of relations between varieties of rigidity and ideology measures alongside a bevy of potential moderators (s = 329, k = 708, N = 187,612), we find that associations between conservatism and rigidity are tremendously heterogeneous, suggesting a complex—yet conceptually fertile—network of relations between these constructs. Most notably, whereas social conservatism was robustly associated with rigidity, associations between economic conservatism and rigidity indicators were inconsistent, small, and not statistically significant outside of the United States. Moderator analyses revealed that non-representative sampling, criterion contamination, and disproportionate use of American samples have yielded over-estimates of associations between rigidity-related constructs and conservatism in past research. We resolve that drilling into this complexity, thereby moving beyond the question of if conservatives are essentially rigid to when and why they might or might not be, will help provide a more realistic account of the psychological underpinnings of political ideology.
... La primera indica que las actitudes políticas son un producto cultural, social y de fuerzas externas; a saber, son producto del contexto en el que se desenvuelve el individuo (Converse et al., 1960). Mientras que, la segunda supone que las actitudes políticas subyacen en disposiciones psicológicas personales; es decir, el individuo es quien construye sus actitudes políticas sin mayor influencia de su entorno (Adorno et al., 1950;McClosky, 1958). ...
Este artículo combina el estudio del populismo y la polarización política en Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú. Utilizando datos agregados de la región andina, se indica una relación significativa entre la presencia de líderes populistas y el incremento en la polarización política. Luego, empleando datos individuales provenientes de una encuesta en línea a ecuatorianos mayores de 16 años, aplicada en 2019, 2020 y 2021, se consideran las actitudes políticas para el estudio de la interacción entre el populismo y la polarización política. Intuitivamente, los resultados corroboran que las actitudes políticas del electorado contribuyen al éxito electoral de líderes populistas. A su vez, las actitudes políticas aumentan indirectamente las probabilidades de polarización política.
... La primera indica que las actitudes políticas son un producto cultural, social y de fuerzas externas; a saber, son producto del contexto en el que se desenvuelve el individuo (Converse et al., 1960). Mientras que, la segunda supone que las actitudes políticas subyacen en disposiciones psicológicas personales; es decir, el individuo es quien construye sus actitudes políticas sin mayor influencia de su entorno (Adorno et al., 1950;McClosky, 1958). ...
Dossier: polarización perniciosa, democracia y populismo Coeditores: claudio riveros y alejandro pelfini Volumen 5, número 2, segundo semestre del 2022
... Moreover, an experimental manipulation of personal morality reduced participants' conspiracy theory endorsement, but only indirectly through a reduction of their personal willingness to conspire. As a result, the authors concluded that this may be an example of projection (Ames, 2004;McClosky, 1958) -a process whereby individuals attribute their own thoughts, feelings and motivations onto others in order to make sense of their social environment. ...
Collective narcissism – a belief in in‐group greatness that is not appreciated by others – is associated with using one's group for personal benefits. Across one pilot and four studies, we demonstrated that collective narcissism predicts readiness to conspire against in‐group members (rmeta‐analysis = .24). In Study 1, conducted in Poland (N = 361), collective narcissism measured in the context of national identity predicted readiness to engage in secret surveillance against one's own country's citizens. In Study 2 (N = 174; pre‐registered), collective narcissism in UK workplace teams predicted intentions to engage in conspiracies against co‐workers. In Study 3 (N = 471; pre‐registered), US national narcissism predicted intentions to conspire against fellow citizens. Furthermore, conspiracy intentions accounted for the relationship between collective narcissism and beliefs in conspiracy theories about the in‐group. Finally, in Study 4 (N = 1064; pre‐registered), we corroborated the link between Polish national narcissism and conspiracy intentions against fellow citizens, further showing that these intentions were only directed towards group members that were perceived as moderately or strongly typical of the national in‐group (but not when perceived in‐group typicality was low). In‐group identification was either negatively related (Studies 1 and 2) or unrelated (Studies 3 and 4) to conspiracy intentions (rmeta‐analysis = .04). We discuss implications for research on conspiracy theories and populism.
... Most of the items were invented, but some were borrowed from earlier studies. The other 13 items in this part of the questionnaire included four borrowed from the se1f-esteem index of Rosenberg (1965) and 9 from the political conservatism scale of McClosky (1958). ...
... The notion that there is a relation between rigidity and conservatism has been with us for many decades (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950;Freud, 1921;Katz, 1960;Kaufman, 1940;McClosky, 1958). During this time, social scientists have conducted hundreds of tests of the RRH, documenting differences like conservative U.S. Senators make less complex policy statements than liberals (e.g., Tetlock, 1983;cf. ...
The rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis (RRH), which posits that cognitive, motivational, and ideological rigidity resonate with political conservatism, is an influential but controversial psychological account of political ideology. Here, we leverage several methodological and theoretical sources of this controversy to conduct an extensive quantitative review—with the dual aims of probing the RRH’s basic assumptions and parsing the RRH literature’s heterogeneity. Using multi-level meta-analyses of relations between varieties of rigidity and ideology measures alongside a bevy of potential moderators (s = 329, k = 708, N = 187,612), we find that associations between conservatism and rigidity are tremendously heterogeneous, suggesting a complex—yet conceptually fertile—network of relations between these constructs. Most notably, whereas social conservatism was robustly associated with rigidity, associations between economic conservatism and rigidity indicators were inconsistent, small, and not statistically significant outside of the United States. Moderator analyses revealed that non-representative sampling, criterion contamination, and disproportionate use of American samples have yielded over-estimates of associations between rigidity-related constructs and conservatism in past research. We resolve that drilling into this complexity, thereby moving beyond the question of if conservatives are essentially rigid to when and why they might or might not be, will help provide a more realistic account of the psychological underpinnings of political ideology.
... In the development of the MRI, we carefully distinguished between social and economic ideology, focusing exclusively on the former. We follow McClosky (1958) in viewing the religious ideological spectrum as crossculturally relatively stable, whereas we assume that economic ideology varies more widely between societies and eras. For instance, in post-Communist Eastern European nations social conservatism (a preference for retaining social and religious traditions) is often uncorrelated or even negatively correlated with "fiscally conservative" values (Thorisdottir et al., 2007;Kossowska, 2003). ...
The Multidimensional Religious Ideology (MRI) scale is a new 43-item measure that quantifies conservative versus liberal aspects of religious ideology. The MRI focuses on recurring features of ideology rooted in innate moral instincts while capturing salient differences in the ideological profiles of distinct groups and individuals. The MRI highlights how religious ideology differs from political ideology while maintaining a robust grounding in the social psychology of ideology generally. Featuring three major dimensions (religious beliefs, religious practices, and religious morality) and eight subdimensions, the MRI is sensitive enough to generate novel insights into religious ideology across demographic groups and individual differences. The MRI is also summative, yielding a single quantitative measurement of left–right religious ideology with good scale and test–retest reliability. Analysis of 839 respondents across two studies confirmed the widespread assumption that religious ideology is a parallel construct to political ideology, emerging from similar foundations but following a distinct set of rules. The MRI shows the importance of conceptualizing ideology in ways that access the full spectrum of real-world ideological convictions—an important reminder, given the salience of religious factors for influencing ideology generally.
... Stephan, Ybarra, and Morrison (2009) have suggested the need to consider social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) as antecedents to intergroup threat perceptions. RWA promotes belief systems and attitudes that demand absolute obedience or submission to authority (Fromm 1941;Maslow 1943;McClosky 1958;Siegel 1956). SDO emphasizes the role of individual preference for group-based hierarchy and in-group dominance or superiority (Pratto et al. 1994). ...
This study explored the independent and interaction effect of political identification and moral foundations on perceived threats from Latino immigrants. Two hundred and eight adult Americans were recruited from the Amazon Turk Platform, 187 of whom completed the survey questions. On average, conservative participants reported higher realistic perceived threats from Latino immigrants in comparison with liberals. Consistent with prior work, multivariate regression analyses indicate that liberals at the superficial level were less likely to perceive a threat from Latino immigrants compared with conservatives. However, when political orientation/identification interacted with moral foundation, a nuanced picture emerged that contradicts the claim that liberals are more likely to be tolerant of immigrants. Negative associations between perceived threats from Latino immigrants and moral values rooted in harm and justice were observed. Finally, interaction effects suggest that efforts that foster moral values rooted in harm and fairness may reduce the perception of threat, regardless of political orientation, from Latino immigrants in the US.
... Whether it was intended to or not, the article by Jost et al. (2003b) and the accompanying exchange between Greenberg and Jonas (2003) and Jost et al. (2003c) reignited once vigorous debates about authoritarianism, dogmatism, cognitive rigidity, and the covariation of psychological characteristics and ideological beliefs, opinions, and values (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950;Brown, 1965;Eysenck, 1999;McClosky, 1958;Rokeach, 1960;Sidanius, 1978). Tetlock (2007) summarized the dispute as follows: ...
... Differences between right and left orientations help guide people's interpretations and responses within their political environments (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2006;Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Examples of core values within the conservative-liberal dimension are to maintain the status quo vs. supporting societal change (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003;McClosky, 1958;Wilson & Patterson, 1968); tolerance of vs. opposition to inequality (Bobbio, 1996;Jost et al., 2003); and a great vs. small emphasis on military strength (Shapiro & Bloch-Elkon, 2007). Several cultural stances have also been placed at either end of the spectrum since the 1970's, such as stances on abortion and homosexuality (Adams, 1997;Baldassari & Gelman, 2008;Fiorina & Abrams, 2009). ...
Can we be good partisans without demonizing our political opponents? Using insights from political science and social psychology, this book argues for the distinction between positive and negative partisanship. As such, strong support for a political party does not have to be accompanied by the vilification of the opposing party and its members. Utilizing data from five different countries, Bankert demonstrates that positive and negative partisanship are independent concepts with distinct consequences for political behavior, including citizens' political participation and their commitment to democratic norms and values. The book concludes with the hopeful message that partisanship is an essential pillar of representative and liberal democracy.
This analysis examined whether commonly assumed associations between personal values and political attitudes within countries varied worldwide by the level of democratic governance. In less democratic countries, people may have less exposure to or engagement with value expression through political party affiliation and experience less motivation to express values through political attitudes. Therefore, in such countries, the commonly assumed association of personal values typically labeled “conservative” (e.g., tradition) or “liberal” (e.g., universalism) with right‐ or left‐wing political ideologies could be weaker. Furthermore, less democratic governments are more likely to be perceived as a deciding presence in economic outcomes than the people's or the market's will, which could alter the degree to which right‐wing economic attitudes toward free markets and private enterprise are associated with conservative values. Responses to the World Value Survey across 60 countries were largely consistent with these moderation effects when operationalizing democratic governance using both more objective, structural, and subjective, perceptual metrics. In less democratic countries, conservation‐oriented personal values were less positively associated with broad right‐wing political identification and self‐transcendence‐oriented values less positively associated with broad left‐wing political identification. In less democratic countries, conservation‐oriented values were more negatively associated with right‐wing economic attitudes.
Social scientists are increasingly interested in studying the psychological bases of political preferences. Research at the interface of neuroscience and political psychology is uniquely positioned to test theories that link political attitudes to cognitive, affective, perceptual, and motivational processes in the brain. In this article, we review existing theories and evaluate findings from the growing field of political neuroscience with an emphasis on four brain regions that have emerged as important neural substrates of political ideology: the amygdala, the insular cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the prefrontal cortex. We conclude by discussing current methodological and theoretical limitations before setting out an agenda for future research.
As the majority of the research has focused on the association between the Big Five and political orientations in terms of social attitudes, or a combination of social and economic attitudes, this chapter highlights the research that examines the association between personality and economic attitudes, as somewhat different findings are sometimes uncovered.KeywordsPersonalityTrait theoryBig FiveExtraversionAgreeablenessCompassionPolitenessNeuroticismPolitical orientationsLeft-wingRight-wing
The influence of basic human values on citizens’ ideo-political orientation has been extensively documented in the literature. An important component of political orientation, attitudes towards immigrants in host societies are no exception in their dependence on some of the personal value categories identified by Schwartz in his Theory of basic values (Schwartz 1992). The results of two studies that employ Schwartz’s value categories and aim to explore the relationship between Bulgarian citizens’ values and their attitudes towards immigrants in the country are presented. Study 1 is a nationally representative sociological survey, and Study 2 uses qualitative research methods to examine the link between Bulgarian party members’ values on one hand and their political orientation and attitudes towards immigrants on the other. While Study 1 provides evidence of the dependence of Bulgarians’ attitudes towards immigrants on Universalism, Security, Tradition and Self-direction value categories, Study 2 results show a strong dependence of party members’ attitudes towards immigrants on political affiliation, and an insignificant one on individual values. Both studies contribute to ideology and immigration research literature in Bulgaria by proposing and empirically testing a values-based model of ideological orientation that is relevant to the Bulgarian context. Given the prevalence of the “conservative ideological and values complex” (Konstantinov 2022), in Bulgarian society and in other Eastern European countries, the findings could have implications for the analyses of negative attitudes towards immigration not only in the Balkan country but in the wider post-Soviet space as well.
The influence of basic human values on citizens’ ideo-political orientation has been extensively documented in the literature. An important component of political orientation, attitudes towards immigrants in host societies are no exception in their dependence on some of the personal value categories identified by Schwartz in his Theory of basic values (Schwartz 1992). The results of two studies that employ Schwartz’s value categories and aim to explore the relationship between Bulgarian citizens’ values and their attitudes towards immigrants in the country are presented. Study 1 is a nationally representative sociological survey, and Study 2 uses qualitative research methods to examine the link between Bulgarian party members’ values on one hand and their political orientation and attitudes towards immigrants on the other. While Study 1 provides evidence of the dependence of Bulgarians’ attitudes towards immigrants on Universalism, Security, Tradition and Self-direction value categories, Study 2 results show a strong dependence of party members’ attitudes towards immigrants on political affiliation, and an insignificant one on individual values. Both studies contribute to ideology and immigration research literature in Bulgaria by proposing and empirically testing a values-based model of ideological orientation that is relevant to the Bulgarian context. Given the prevalence of the “conservative ideological and values complex” (Konstantinov 2022), in Bulgarian society and in other Eastern European countries, the findings could have implications for the analyses of negative attitudes towards immigration not only in the Balkan country but in the wider post-Soviet space as well.
Ideological scaling methods have shown that behavioral traces in social platforms can be used to mine opinions at a massive scale. Current methods exploit one-dimensional left–right opinion scales, best suited for two-party socio-political systems and binary social divides such as those observed in the US. In this article, we introduce a new method to overcome limitations of existing methods by producing multidimensional network embeddings and align them with referential attitudinal for a few nodes. This allows us to infer a larger set of opinion dimensions from social graphs, embedding users in spaces where dimensions stand for indicators of several social dimensions including (in addition to left–right cleavages) attitudes towards elites, or ecology among many other issues. Our method does not rely on text data and is thus language-independent. We illustrate this approach approach on a Twitter follower network. Finally, we show how our method allows us to analyze the opinions shared within various communities of social networks. Our analyses show that communities of users that have extreme political opinions are also more homogeneous ideologically.
The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology provides a comprehensive review of the psychology of political behaviour from an international perspective. Its coverage spans from foundational approaches to political psychology, including the evolutionary, personality and developmental roots of political attitudes, to contemporary challenges to governance, including populism, hate speech, conspiracy beliefs, inequality, climate change and cyberterrorism. Each chapter features cutting-edge research from internationally renowned scholars who offer their unique insights into how people think, feel and act in different political contexts. By taking a distinctively international approach, this handbook highlights the nuances of political behaviour across cultures and geographical regions, as well as the truisms of political psychology that transcend context. Academics, graduate students and practitioners alike, as well as those generally interested in politics and human behaviour, will benefit from this definitive overview of how people shape – and are shaped by – their political environment in a rapidly changing twenty-first century.
Ideology is a central concept in political psychology. Here, we synthesise the scholarly debate's major themes. We first examine the ways in which ideology has been operationalised and discuss its prevalence (or lack thereof) in the mass public. This is followed by a discussion of the top-down and bottom-up forces that shape citizens' ideology. Top-down processes include political elites and socialisation. Bottom-up processes range from political values, basic human values, and personality to biology and genetics. Finally, we outline steps that we would welcome in the next generation of research on political ideology. These include fundamental questions about the causal relationship between different bottom-up factors and a call for more attention to measurement of key constructs and of open science practices in the study of political ideology. We hope this chapter inspires others and sets the stage for the next generation of research on political ideology.
In this chapter, I review current research on the relationship between personality and political preferences, with an eye to its complexities and the ways in which it is conditioned on other variables – including the contextual factors mentioned at the outset. To provide context, I briefly review research on the structure of political preferences. Next, I summarise a now-substantial body of work suggesting a relationship between rigidity in personality and right-wing political preferences, and then describe moderators of and boundary conditions to this relationship. Finally, in an effort to reconcile increasingly varied findings on political differences in cognition and motivation, I offer an integrative perspective on when the relationship between rigidity and political differences will be ideologically asymmetric and when it will be symmetric.
The corporate culture within firms is a significant concern for regulators, shareholders and other stakeholders. Drawing on a large sample of US firms, we use the political preferences of the top management team (TMT) to proxy for a firm's culture and examine whether it influences the decision to implement an effective internal control system (ICS) and whether the ICS plays a mediating role between the culture created by the TMT and financial reporting quality. We find that a Republican‐leaning TMT with a more conservative ideology is associated with a more effective internal control system. In addition, the TMT's political preferences affect financial reporting quality, both directly and indirectly, via the internal control system. A range of robustness tests reinforces our main findings.
Cyberrumor in the digital society: Cyberrumors examples in preventing Cobid-19
Prof. Diab M. Albadayneh, Police College. Academic Affairs Deanship. MOI, Qatar
This paper seeks to study cyberrumor in the digital society through an analysis of
cyberrumor, its forms, threats and means of prevention using the ecological approach (EA)
in prevention. EA is based on primary, secondary and tertary prevention in the context
of virtual (digital) society. The cyberrumor in this paper is false information relevant
to the important issues to the target and it is ambiguous with a personal, collective or
political goal. Cyberrumor can be in the form of a word, text, video, comment, post or
message that uses the internet and social media as a sitting to spread cyberrumer to the
largest possible target audience. Moreover, it addresses example of EA related to the
Coronavirus (COVID-19). This paper also includes some of the implications and practical
recommendations in the social, educational and security field in dealing with cyberrumors
in the light of the emerging chananegs and threats such as (COVID-19), blocade imposed
on qatar, and World Cup 2022 such as roumer clinik for roumers and cyberumers.
Key words: Cyberrumor, digital society, virtual society, cybersecurity, Qatar digital
society, (COVID-19), Qatar.
A central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that parties seek desired outcomes via the strategic adoption of electoral rules. Such partisan self‐interest, however, is merely one explanation for reform: A second is that an actor may attempt to maximize her core values, which constitute her perception of the “common good.” Although the extant literature has demonstrated the motivational power of core values, their effect on electoral rule choice has not been tested. Using a factorial experimental design that manipulates the partisan‐ and values‐implications of a fictitious reform proposal, I find evidence in favor of core values: Not only do they have an effect net of partisan concerns, but they also attenuate the effect of partisan self‐interest when the two predispositions countervail. The results provide evidence that partisan self‐interest offers an incomplete picture: Actors hold—and pursue through electoral reform—objectives that are not immediately partisan in nature.
Support for Gay Conversion Therapy may be motivated by homophobic prejudice driven by conservative groups. We propose that Support for Gay Conversion Therapy (SGCT) is motivated by conservatism and that this relationship is mediated by prejudice against gay individuals. We tested these hypotheses in three studies. In Study 1 (N = 249), we found that conservative values predict SGCT, and that this effect is partly mediated by prejudice. In Study 2 (N = 247), we replicated this mediation and found that ethical-religious and psychological essentialist beliefs differently moderated it. Study 3 (N = 210) went further by experimentally showing the political consequences of SGCT. We showed that more conservative individuals tend to absolve psychologists who practice sexual conversion, and that both prejudice and conservative-motivated SGCT mediated this effect. We discussed these results by emphasizing the psychosocial process that motivates SGCT.
Despite the fact that the study of politics has become increasingly empirical, quantitative and “behavioral” in recent years, and despite the apparently increasing tendency to feel that whatever meaningful debate ever existed between the behavioralists and the anti-behavioralists has ended, should end, or at least has become irrelevant since a more sophisticated and empirically productive behavioralism now predominates in virtually all fields of the discipline, the methodological debate continues, diminished perhaps in quantity but not in intensity.
This essay is based on the assumption that the antagonists concerned with the methodological issues raised by the “new science of politics” have but rarely focused precisely on the arguments raised by their opponents. A second motivating assumption is that nothing constructive, conciliatory or conducive to the integration of the discipline can be done “until the issues have been squarely confronted on the basic and general plane of philosophy….” A thorough analysis of all of the meaningful issues involved can only be a task of long-range proportions. But in the hope of bringing about some degree of communication, if not reconciliation, it is my intention in this essay to bring one of these issues into sharper focus, to show that almost despite themselves, some of the critics and proponents of the “new science of politics” have addressed themselves to the problem of concept formation, and that despite their proclaimed differences are talking at cross-purposes about a similar problem. Indeed, it will be seen that the conflict between the “traditionalists” and the “behavioralists” is utterly dependent—in the area of concept formation—upon an outmoded positivistic interpretation of behavioral science and a misguided reaction on the part of some political theorists to that obsolete conception.
In 1953 "… one hundred men visited the Institute of Personality Assessment and Research… to participate in an intensive three-day assessment of those qualities related to superior functioning in their profession." Conformity is discussed with regard to individual differences, relations to personality variables, conformity behavior in different populations, psychological processes involved in expressions of conformity to group pressure, and the reinforcement of conformity behavior. The author suggests that "… we have what appears to be a powerful new research technique, enabling the study of conformity behavior within a setting which effectively stimulates genuine group interaction, yet preserves the essential requirements of objective measurement." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)