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Neopatrimonialism in the Middle East and
North Africa: Overview, Critique
and Alternative Conceptualization
André Bank & Thomas Richter
Paper to be presented at the workshop
“Neopatrimonialism in Various World Regions”
23 August 2010, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies,
Hamburg
1
André Bank & Thomas Richter
GIGA Institute of Middle East Studies
bank@giga-hamburg.de
richter@giga-hamburg.de
Neopatrimonialism in the Middle East and North Africa:
Overview, Critique and Alternative Conceptualization
To be presented at the GIGA Workshop “Neopatrimonialism in Various World Regions”
Hamburg, August 23, 2010
1. “Traditional” Neopatrimonalism in the Middle East and North Africa
There is a widely shared consensus among political scientists working on the Arab states of
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that contemporary polities – with the possible
exception of Lebanon – are purely authoritarian. While this traditional understanding of
authoritarianism is still valid for a broad characterization of the political regimes in the
region, however, it underestimates the predominance of both personal and informal patterns
of political rule. These two aspects, personalism and informality, are more explicitly taken
into account by the concept of ‘neopatrimonialism’ (Eisenstadt 1973; for a systematic Middle
East application cf. Pawelka 1985 or Pawelka 2002).1
1 Please note: In addition to neopatrimonialism, the concept of wasta - literally meaning in Arabic the act and the
person who mediates or intercedes to steer conflicting parties toward a middle point or compromise – has also
gained some prominence among MENA scholarship as a description of informal practices by individuals in
seeking benefits from the government (Cunningham und Sarayrah 1993, 1). Even though we believe that
discussions about wasta overlap with but also complement discussions on neopatrimonialism in the MENA, we
do not elaborate on this concept any further.
2
In political science scholarship on the MENA starting in the 1970s, neopatrimonalism
was thus understood as a system of rule in which a top figure within the state hierarchy
governs mainly through a network of personal and informal relations. Therefore, the
analytical focus was usually on the key decision-maker or ruler who – idealtypically –
controls a network of multiple patron-client relations. These dyads function through the
exchange of loyalty to the patron and the granting of political and/or material influence to the
client. In this understanding, all members of the political elite are directly dependent on the
leader, and they are recruited to politically relevant circles primarily due to their loyalty to the
central figure and only secondarily on the basis of other criteria such as performance or
competence.2 To prevent potential alternative power bases from evolving, the neopatrimonial
ruler’s strategy consists of balancing different elite segments by specific mechanisms such as
divide-et-impera and elite rotation or circulation. The two bases of legitimation in
neopatrimonial regimes are traditional loyalty – aspects of family heritage and religion – and
material rewards – allocation of jobs, grants, licenses etc. (Pawelka 1985, 24). The latter
aspect connects studies of neopatrimonalism to political-economic rentier approaches (e.g.
Richter 2007; Peters und Moore 2009).
The Pawelka model (Pawelka 1985, 2002), originally developed during the 1980s using the
case of Egypt as prime example, illustrates a certain ‘traditional consensus’ among German
speaking scholars on what neopatrimonialism constitutes in the MENA region. Figure 1
illustrates the structure of a neopatrimonial regime having a single decision maker – in the
case of Egypt the president – at its center (P). Defined by the personal distance to the ruler,
societal elites are structured around this presidential core on a scale distinguishing between
different elite segments (e.g. top, core, middle and sub elite). In addition to that, there are at
least six different societal sectors ordered around the neopatrimonial orbit. These sectors are
incorporated – similar as elite groups – by its actors’ personal distance to the neopatrimonial
ruler. In the case of Egypt, these sectors are; the military, the palace, the economy, societal
organizations, the religious sector, and the bureaucracy.
2 On the politics of elite change cf. Perthes (2004).
3
Figure 1 – Neopatrimonialism in the Middle East and North Africa: The Case of Egypt (Pawelka model)
4
Furthermore, five structural principles describe key working mechanisms of this model of
neopatrimonial rule: personalism, emanation, elite pluralism, balance of power, and
intersection of institutional authority.
- Personalism (Personalismus) points to the fact that neopatrimonial rulers recruit members
of their political elite primarily on the criteria of personal (political) loyalty. A ruler
appoints elite members as personal advisor or to certain key positions within the
bureaucracy and the state economy. These (newly) appointed elite members then
themselves appoint their personal clients to major position within the political or
economic unites they have been entrusted with. The latter also try to bring into the system
as much as they can of their own personal clients.
- Emanation (Ausstrahlung) means that decisions by elite members appointed to major
positions gain its importance only because these personalities are appointed by the
neopatrimonial leader himself. Thus decisions’ acceptance by other elite members or the
public works only due to the personal weight of the neopatrimonial ruler behind
appointments of key decision makers. Elite members therefore basically fulfill its function
as an emanation of the ruler’s will. Without a personal support by the leader, even key
decision makers will become powerless.
- Elite pluralism or competition (Elitenkonkurrenz) means that all elite members, even
being on different levels of the model, compete among each other on the ruler’s personal
favor. However, this competition is not only about personal wealth or influence; it is
rather – from a ruler’s perspective – about picking the most appropriate (political) idea
among a pool of elite experts. In a way, this kind of elite pluralism is a major structural
characteristic of policy making within neopatrimonial regimes and allows for
comparatively complex and even innovative policy adaptations.
- As a result of this competitive principle there usually exists a certain degree of power
balance (Machtbalance) within neopatrimonial regimes. Additionally there are two major
principles which ensure the neopatrimonial leaders political autonomy: first, the
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systematic rotation (Rotation) of key elite figures and, second, the principle of
intersection of institutional authorities (Rollenüberschneidung). These two structural
principles constrain coalition building among key elite members and hinder the
concentration of power among single elite members beyond the influence of the
neopatrimonial core.
Overall, a permanent fluctuation among key positions within the elite, the rivalry between
elite members and the predominance of informal relations between the leader and top elite
members as well as among elite members themselves are major constraints for an expansion
of reliable political institutions within neopatrimonial regime (Pawelka 2002, 434).
2. Critique of the ‘Traditional’ Understanding of Neopatrimonialism in the MENA
While there are strong believes among MENA scholarship that neopatrimonialism should
(yet) play an important role in conceptualizing politics in the Middle East, there is a
remarkable lacuna regarding empirical research in this field. With a few exceptions on the
stability of neopatrimonial regimes in general (Brownlee 2002) and certain policy fields in the
case of Egypt (Richter und Steiner 2008), research on the changing characteristics of
neopatrimonialism within MENA scholarship does not exist. However, the realm of different
modes of authoritarian legitimation might be an emerging exception to this testimony.
To start with, the concept of neopatrimonialism emphasizes above all the stabilizing
aspects of political rule (Pawelka 1985, 28; Tripp 1995, 34) and is therefore particularly well
in explaining regime stability (Brownlee 2002). However, this perspective does tend to
neglect the various ‘continuities in the apparent changes’ as well as the ‘changes in the
continuity’ (Valbjørn und Bank 2010) of political rule in a specific context – in order words:
its focus is too narrowly on the non-occurrence of a change of regime at the expense of a
sensibility for the multiple, complex and party contradictory changes in regime. Secondly, the
‘traditional’ understanding of the 1970s and 1980s tends to reduce the ruler’s non-repressive
strategies of political domination to a narrow understanding of traditional loyalty and, more
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importantly, to a mere granting of material rewards. In doing so, it underestimates the
potential impact of, for instance, external influences or the role of identity, political discourse
and ideology on regime stability. Broadening the concept to include these aspects will allow
for a more comprehensive analysis of the wide array of patterns of political rule under
neopatrimonialism (Bank 2004, 157ff).
3. Alternative Conceptualization on Legitimation in Neopatrimonial Regimes3
Trying to grasp the broad spectrum of strategies of domination under neopatrimonialism, the
alternative conceptualization uses a legitimation-based perspective: Similar as the ‘traditional’
understanding of neopatrimonialism, it focuses attention on the figure at the top of the regime
hierarchy, be it a president, a king or an emir or shaykh. At the same time, it extends the
rather narrow, traditional understanding of the two legitimation strategies of tradition and
material rewards by incorporating two further dimensions that go beyond the almost exclusive
political economy perspective.
First of all, this ‘integrative’ approach of legitimation in neopatrimonial regimes
distinguishes three dimensions which cover the broad spectrum of potential legitimation
strategies that are at the ruler’s disposal. These three dimensions, (1) Rent-Seeking and
Allocation, (2) the Politics of Participation and (3) the Politics of Symbolism, do not
correspond with typical policy areas such as education or foreign policy. Rather, they
incorporate elements from different policy fields.
To begin with, Rent-Seeking and Allocation entails aspects from both economy and
foreign policy. In general, the distribution of rents and other material favors to politically
influential clients is at the heart of any strategy to legitimize systems of personal rule. The
allocation of public resources to larger parts of society – subsidies to consumer products,
large-scale public sector employment or free health care and education – are eminent tools in
achieving regime maintenance. Foreign policy belongs to this context insofar as one primary
3 This section draws on ideas first developed in Bank (2004, 159-161).
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goal of the neopatrimonial leader’s external relations – above all in states that do not possess
large sources of income themselves – is to attract foreign rents which in turn can be allocated
domestically as they best suit the patron’s political interests. After the oil price revolution of
the early 1970s, Rent-Seeking and Allocation was the most important dimension of non-
democratic regime stability in the Arab states, above all of the Middle East. But with the
harsh economic crises of the late 1980s, throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first
century as well as a region-wide decline in rent income, this dimension was decisively
weakened and other dimensions of legitimation strategies of neopatrimonial ruler’s gained in
relevance.
The second dimension is called Politics of Participation. This directs attention to the
ruler’s strategies regarding the inclusion or exclusion of other political actors into or from
political decision-making processes. In this context, it seems necessary that the ruler strikes a
balance between integrating into his system of rule a broad spectrum of politically influential
individuals or social groups while at the same time making sure that none of these actors
develops an alternative power base that might become autonomous from the top figure’s
immediate grip. This aspect is important for regime stability in particular with regard to the
upper echelons of the political hierarchy. The ruler tends to recruit personnel to the primary
decision-making circles not necessarily due to the criteria of performance or know-how in the
specific policy field but also out of loyalty, tradition etc. Since the early 1990s, larger parts of
society are also given a voice and are therefore incorporated into the systems of rule, for
example by their participation in municipal and parliamentary elections.4 Elections give a
somehow new note to the traditional working mechanisms of neopatrimonial regimes. They
fulfill, first, a legitimating function towards external actors balancing growing pressures to
further liberalize the rules of the neopatrimonial game. Secondly and maybe more
importantly, elections in neopatrimonial regimes have become in some cases (e.g. Egypt) a
mechanism of elite selection (Blaydes 2008).
4 It is thus fitting to understand elections in the Middle East as instances of ‘competitive clientelism’, cf. Lust
(2009).
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The Politics of Symbolism, the third dimension of the ruler’s strategies of legitimation,
looks at the immaterial aspects of culture, identity and discourse, in this way adding new
aspects to the classic ‘Weberian’ categories of charisma and tradition that were already – at
least partially – included in the earlier, traditional understanding of neopatrimonialism. A
central aspect herein are the ruler’s strategies to dominate the public sphere through media
and other means in order to announce, explain, justify and legitimize his policy priorities as
well as the decisions taken. Sometimes, a shift in the ruler’s narrative strategy can also be
interpreted as a preventive measure to stave off demands before they become prominent
issues on the political agenda.
In addition to these three dimensions of legitimation strategies under neopatrimonialism,
two arenas of ‘addressees’ are distinguished: (1) the ruler’s strategies regarding the political
elite and (2) the ruler’s strategies regarding larger parts of society. The reasoning behind this
classification is based on the assumption that, depending on the respective ‘addressee’ of the
ruler’s political initiatives, either the political elite or larger parts of society, different patterns
of legitimation will be discernible.
4. Final Remarks and Some Open Questions
While most MENA specialists would agree to the statement that neopatrimonialism is of
lasting importance within Arab regimes, contemporary MENA scholarship lacks systematic
research on this subject. It is neither sufficiently explored what empirical similarities and
differences of neopatrimonialism have emerged in a post-colonial period across Arab regimes,
nor does any systematic research exist which points to the changing nature of neopatrimonial
rule given the external shocks and internal challenges Arab regimes haven been undergoing
during the last two decades.
In this context, some of the most pertinent open questions relevant for a more general
discussion on the role of neopatrimonialism among comparative area specialists are: First,
what have been the most important drivers of change – if at all – of neopatrimonial rule?
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What was more important regarding the modification of neopatrimonial rule: the decrease of
external rents as experienced during the 1980s or the change of leadership at the top of
regimes as seen since the late 1990s (in Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria)? And second,
should we consider neopatrimonialism as a regime type sui generis, or does this concept refer
to just one but yet important dimension of for instance authoritarian regimes?
5. Literature
Bank, André. 2004. “Rents, Cooptation, and Economized Discourse: three Dimensions of
Political Rule in Jordan, Morocco and Syria.” Journal of Mediterranean Studies 14(1
& 2): 155-180.
Blaydes, Lisa. 2008. “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence
from Egypt.” Unpublished Manuscript, Stanford University.
Brownlee, Jason. 2002. “And Yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in
Neopatrimonial Regimes.” Studies in Comparative International Development 37(3):
35-63.
Cunningham, Robert, und Yasin K Sarayrah. 1993. Wasta: the hidden force in Middle
Eastern society. Westport, Conn: Praeger.
Eisenstadt, Shmuel. 1973. Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism.
Beverly Hills, London: Sage.
Lust, Ellen. 2009. “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East.” Journal of Democracy
20(3): 122-135.
Pawelka, Peter. 2002. “Der Staat im Vorderen Orient über die Demokratie-Resistenz in einer
globalisierten Welt.” Leviathan 30(4): 431- 454.
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Pawelka, Peter. 1985. Herrschaft und Entwicklung im Nahen Osten: Ägypten. Heidelberg:
C.F.Müller.
Perthes, Volker. 2004. Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change. Boulder & London:
Lynne Rienner.
Peters, Anne Mariel, und Pete W Moore. 2009. “Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents,
Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan.” Studies in Comparative International Development 44(3): 256-285.
Richter, Thomas. 2007. “The Political Economy of Regime Maintenance in Egypt: Linking
External Resources and Domestic Legitimation.” In Debating Arab Authoritarianism:
Dynamics and Durability in Non-Democratic Regimes, hrsg. Oliver Schlumberger.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 177-193.
Richter, Thomas, und Christian Steiner. 2008. “Politics, Economics and Tourism
Development in Egypt: Insights into the Sectoral Transformations of a Rentier-State.”
Third World Quarterly 29(5): 935-955.
Tripp, Charles. 1995. “Long-Term Political Trends in the Arab States of the Middle East.” In
Politics and International Relations in the Middle East, hrsg. Jane M Davis. Aldershot
and Brookfield: Edward Elgar, p. 17-36.
Valbjørn, Morten, und André Bank. 2010. “Examining the ‘Post’ in Post-Democratization.
The Future of Middle Eastern Political Rule through Lenses of the Past.” Middle East
Critique 19(3): forthcoming.
