European Union sugar production quotas will be abolished on 30 September 2017, signaling the European Union’s move toward self-sufficiency in sugar, and the end of preferential access of the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) sugar to the European Union markets. ACP countries export about 1.7 million tonnes of sugar per year to the European Union and in many of these ACP countries sugar revenues represent significant shares of both national income and agricultural income, providing for noteworthy direct and indirect employment. The precise magnitude of the impact that the loss of these export markets will have on both the overall economy and welfare of small sugar farmers and workers, especially in ACP countries, remains unknown.
The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of the elimination of the European Union sugar production quotas on ACP sugar production and trade, as well as, on welfare (including farmers’ welfare) and to examine the feasible options that the ACP sugar subsectors are considering to mitigate the brunt of this policy change, particularly as it will affect sugar farmers and workers. The approach taken in this study involves three distinct steps. First, the study examines the macroeconomic and trade impact on ACP countries of the European Union sugar production policy shift. To gain a better understanding of the welfare impacts of the sugar policy changes on a heterogeneous group such as the ACP, we have divided the ACP countries into two broad income categories, the higher income group (average GNI per capita USD 8 500 per year) and the lower income ACP. The second step is a re-examination of these macroeconomic and trade impacts at the country level, with the focus on three ACP countries, namely Fiji, Guyana, and Madagascar. Using the field surveys conducted between November 2014 and February 2015, the effects of the European Union quota elimination are re-examined in depth, specifically to determine just how the elimination of European Union quotas and the reciprocal preferences will affect the income and welfare of sugar farmers and workers. The final step focuses on the feasible policy alternatives in these three countries, all of which will need to find a way to allow their sugar industries to adjust to the post-2017 era when reciprocity of preferential access is installed and when the European Union production quota is finally abolished. These alternative policies will allow us to draw broader policy implications for the impacts of the sugar policy changes on the ACP countries as a group.
The base case scenario indicates that the elimination of European Union production quotas could lead to a 10 percent increase in European Union output and a 25 percent decline in ACP sugar exports to the European Union. This will cost the ACP sugar industry an annual loss of about USD 255 to 298 million, the bulk of which will be borne by the lower-income ACP countries. Moreover, total welfare in the ACP countries will decline by USD 74 million per year. A welfare loss of this entity, stemming from the fall in exports to the European Union, will cut domestic production (both price and input uses) and lead both to a loss of employment and to capital flight out of the sugar industry. Consumer welfare will increase slightly in ACP countries, due to a 1.0 to 2.0 percent decline in sugar prices, but sugar intra-trade among ACP countries will decline significantly, while intra-trade of sugar in the European Union is expected to increase. European Union welfare, on the other hand, declines by more than USD 400 million, primarily because of the negative allocative efficiency effects of the changes. But its total exports (including those to the ACP countries) will increase by 45 to 53 percent.
Additional shocks to the base scenario were introduced in the analysis to examine other policy effects. For instance, taking into account unemployment in the European Union, the simulation shows European Union welfare increases by USD 5.6 billion because of allocative efficiency and endowment effects, whereas ACP welfare declines by USD 52 million. Allowing for European Union unemployment in the model yields no major deviations from the results on sugar trade flows under a regime of full employment. A further addition to the base scenario is the elimination of bilateral tariffs on sugar between European Union and ACP countries and the rest of the world’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in order to mimic reciprocal preferential access.
The results show that although both trading blocs benefit from this kind of free trade scenario, the European Union by far is the biggest winner. Because of allocative efficiency (using input resources where they are most productive) and endowment effects (increased hiring of labour and capital) despite a USD 450 million loss in the terms of trade, the European Union’s welfare gain would be about USD 19.6 billion. The ACP countries’ welfare gain instead would be about USD 1.53 billion (99% of which accrue to the low-income ACP group) due to improvement in both the terms of trade and in endowment effects. But their sugar trade surplus with the European Union would decline steeply as the European Union increases production and exports of their own, as well as intra ACP trade would decline significantly by about 15 to 19 percent as some of the incremental exports from the European Union end up in net sugar importing ACP countries through the reciprocity agreement between the two trading blocs. Sensitivity analyses based on varying the extent of the elimination of European Union production quotas from 2.0 to 10 percent show consistent results in that the elimination of the European Union production quota is always shown to damage ACP welfare and its sugar sub-sector. In many ACP countries, small-scale farmers contribute significantly to sugar production. Surveys carried out by FAO in 2014 and 2015 in selected ACP countries, namely Fiji, Guyana and Madagascar, show that the decline in export demand from the European Union resulting from the elimination of import quotas will significantly affect incomes of small farmers (smallholders) and sugar factory workers. Smallholders in Fiji and Madagascar, are price-takers with limited land for expansion. Estimates based on survey data indicate that a 25 percent decline in export demand at country level will reduce income of smallholders by 11 and 19 percent, respectively, in Madagascar and Fiji, reflecting the dominance of sugar in the respective farming systems. Thus, an average small farmer earning a total crop revenue of USD 7 597 per year in Fiji and of USD 7 026 in Madagascar would lose about USD 1 444 and USD 773 per year respectively. We also found that the higher the sugarcane yields the higher the vulnerability of farms to supply shocks, implying that productivity gains remain fragile. The farm survey data point to the lack of competitiveness of sugar production at farm level.
The study concludes with the analysis of the policies and mechanisms that the ACP sugar industries are considering or are already implementing to cope with the expected fall in export demand, especially with regards to the European Union. Survey results indicate that diversification and a focus on domestic and regional markets have been among the solutions that the sugar sub-sector and local governments have started to implement. Some key coping strategies based on increasing production and competitiveness at farm and industry level are discussed in this study.