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Year I, no. 2,
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1, pp. 51-64
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HU ISSN 2062-8870, HU E-ISSN 2062-8889
Article no. 2011-12
CROSS BORDER INTERACTIONS ACROSS A FORMERLY HOSTILE
BORDER :
THE CASE OF EILAT, ISRAEL AND AQABA, JORDAN
Shaul KRAKOVER
Professor, Department of Geography and Environmental Development,
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, E-mail: shaul@bgu.ac.il
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the evolution of the relationships between Eilat, Israel and Aqaba,
Jordan since the signing of the peace treaty in 1994. On the basis of this examination,
combined with paradigms derived from previous research, the objective of this study is to
evaluate the path of future developments in this region. Since both cities are facing each other
from a short distance the bi-national city evolution literature is also consulted.
Trans-border interaction, in general, and prospects for the development of bi-national
cities in particular attracted attention of scholars and planner (Ehlers, 2001; Gradus, 2001;
Kliot, 1997). Several models of cross boundary evolutionary relationships have been proposed
(House, 1981; Lezzi, 1994; Martinez, 1994). Most models assume an initial stage of no
interaction and end up with a stage of open boundary situation and even merger of towns
located on both sides of an international border .
Several papers have analyzed practical developments across boundaries of bi-national
cities (Herzog, 1991; Yang, 2005). Papers analyzing the evolutionary relationships across
formerly hostile boundaries are rather rare. Gradus (2001) is an exception. His paper is an
attempt to look into the developments and portray the prospects for future trans-boundary
relationships between Eilat and Aqaba .
From certain aspects, this paper is a sequel of Gradus' study. However, this study
differs from its predecessor in three ways: 1. While Gradus' main theoretical background
relies on the concept of the bi-national city developed by Ehlers (2001) this study relies on
trans-border evolutionary theory and models, 2. While Gradus (2001) conducted his study
five years after the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan (Sattloff, 1995), this
paper benefits from evidence accumulated for a decade longer time span, and 3. This paper
does not repeat background information. Readers interested in learning details about the
physical and natural conditions, historic, economic, and political background should refer to
Gradus (2001).
This paper attempts to contribute further evidence and knowledge regarding the
processes of development across formerly hostile borders, evaluate their pace and hindering
factors, and look into the prospects of further developments in the future.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Is there a theory that provides guidelines to comprehending the dynamics of potential merger
or coalescence of two cities positioned on two sides of a formerly hostile border? The
literature survey led to two papers carrying in their title the word "theory", to several models,
Shaul Krakover
52
and to numerous case study presentations. These sources however, paid very little attention
to the impact of places defined as formerly hostile borders.
Attempt at theorizing trans-border evolutionary development was made in the last
decade by Newman (2003) and Brunet-Jailly (2005). The former provides wide-brush
theoretical guidelines with a call to foster dynamic views of borders as places of contact and
interaction. Such views, Newman asserts, "will take us well beyond the traditional description
of territorial boundary delimitation and demarcation" (p. 22).
Brunet-Jailly (2005) proposes theorizing borders through "four equally important
analytical lenses: (1) market forces and trade flows, (2) policy activities of multiple levels of
governments, (3) the particular political clout of borderlands communities, and (4) the
specific culture of borderland communities" (p. 633). Each one of these lenses provides a set
of variables by which progress towards fusion may be measured. The author concludes that
"if each analytical lens enhances or complements one another, what emerges is a borderland
region that is culturally emerging and is integrating" (p. 645). Although it may be argued that
Brunet-Jailly does not provide a full-fledged theory, he certainly lays down the building
blocks necessary for a cross border theory formation. Certain components of Brunet-Jailly's
theoretical building blocks will be examined in this study.
Dynamic cross border interaction models
Models and case studies dealing with trans-border integration vary in their conclusions from
optimism to pessimism vis-à-vis the evolutionary process of cross border interaction. While
case studies reviewed in the next sub-section portray a wide range of variation between
optimistic and pessimistic views, the four models reviewed here appear to assume a rather
optimistic vision. Three of them are stage models starting from a very low level of cross
border interaction, if any, a situation compatible with a hostile border environment, and end-
up in a stage of full integration. It should be noted that the models chosen for review are
those presenting a comprehensive conceptual overview rather than models concentrating on
specific economic activity (e.g. Andresen, 2010; Portes and Rey, 2005).
Often, House's (1981) model is referred to as an early model depicting the
development of interactions in borderland areas along lines moving from conflict to harmony
(Minghi, 1991). House's four stage model emphasizes the political role of central governments
located far away in the main urban centers alongside with the role of regional cities located
closer to the border area, and finally the role of borderlanders located next to the borderline.
In essence, this is a geo-political model. Once central governments issue signals of trans-
boundary cooperation, local residents of the border areas take advantage of the newly
available opportunities. The final stage is depicted as a situation of wholly open boundaries
for local and remote interactions.
Martinez (1994) proposes four paradigms of borderland interactions. These
paradigms, taken together, form a four stage cross boundary evolutionary model. The model
starts from a stage of alienation, moves to a stage of co-existence, further to a stage of
interdependency and, finally, conditions permit, end up in a stage of border integration. This
final stage is characterized as "Economics of both countries are functionally merged, and
there is unrestricted movement of people and goods across the boundary. Borderlanders
perceive themselves as members of one social system" (p. 3). Martinez' model stresses the
contribution of sociological mechanisms leading to cooperation and integration.
The third model to be presented here is Lezzi's (1994) three stage model. The first
stage perceives "border as barrier", at the second stage border is viewed as a filter, while at
the final stage border acts as a "contact zone" which may lead to fusion and merger or to a
structure of supranational integration. The leading forces behind Lezzi's model are associated
with the political-administrative arena.
Cross border interaction across formerly hostile border: ……..
53
The fourth model was suggested by Krakover (1997). Contrary to the previous ones
this is not a stage model but rather one that focuses on the factors affecting border
permeability. The model allows mapping the level of CBIs based on two main factors:
economic benefits accrued to open boundaries on the one hand, and offsetting national-
political considerations, on the other. Krakover suggests considering two additional
accompanying factors. These are the societal cohesiveness within each of the neighboring
countries, and the nature of the prevailing dispute. By focusing on the main variables and
suggesting the way they are interconnected this model has a close resemblance to Brunet-
Jailly's (2005) four lenses theory.
Despite the different terminology used by the model builders and the varying
disciplinary points of view, all models foresee a final stage of full or almost full integration of
the economies and societies across the former separating borderline. The model builders did
not indicate, however, the time span of the process; is it a matter of years, decades, or
perhaps centuries before full integration is achieved? Likewise, most model builders perceive
the progress towards integration as a linear process and do not incorporate in their models
hindering factors and situations of temporary or permanent reversal in the process. Such
factors and situations tend to afflict newly opened borders in formerly hostile areas.
Trans-boundary interaction case studies
The number of case studies researching trans-boundary interaction processes in specific
border zones is on the rise, with the Journal of Borderland Studies being a catalyst (e.g.,
Arieli, 2009; Taylor, 2001). A meta-analysis is required in order to fully review this
expanding field of study.
The review of case studies will be limited here to samples taken from three sorts of
papers. One of these relates to the concept of bi-national cities that appears to be the nearest
to the case study at hand. Another group of papers represents a sample of CBI studies, and
the third group deals with the specific area of the Red Sea.
The concept of bi-national cities and their potential integration was researched by
Ehlers (2001) and her peers in a special issue of GeoJournal wherein eight pairs of cross
border cities have been examined. In their introductory section Ehlers, Buursink, and
Boekema (2001) state that "… hardly any theory is developed on this topic" (p.4).
Furthermore, relying on most of their authors they summarize gloomily that "the overall
conclusion could be stated as: "the binational city does not exist" (p. 3). Even for the case of
the two cities of Kerkrade and Herzogenrath, known as Eurode on the German-Dutch border
- where socio-economic conditions and geo-political situation are ripe for the emergence of a
bi-national city - Ehlers (2001) concludes that it is questionable "whether the binational city
can ever be more than Utopia" (p. 21).
The disappointment and pessimism expressed in the aforementioned studies may
arise from the high standards set as the definition of a bi-national city. Ehlers, Buursink, and
Boekema (2001) included in their definition not only geographic and economic relationships
but also socio-psychological elements of people being "connected by feelings of closeness and
togetherness" (p. 2). Such pre-conditions are hard to find even within a bi-national city
located within a single country, let alone a cross border bi-national entity.
Numerous studies have adopted less demanding definitions for transboundary
integration and reached quite optimistic conclusions. For instance, Herzog (1991) concluded
that the emergence of "transfrontier metropolis" in the Mexico-US border is a feasible option.
Findings carrying the same optimistic mood were reported fourteen years later for the same
border area by Dear and Burridge (2005). More recently in a follow-up study Ehlers (2007)
found that the concept of Eurode as a binational city based on economic and environmental
planning cooperation is gaining greater public support. The same optimism was conveyed by
Shaul Krakover
54
Yang (2004) with respect to Hong Kong and Shenzhen developing in China under the 'Two
Systems' policy. Yang concludes "that the two border cities have integrated economically,
socially and physically over the past two decades. In consequence, a cross-boundary
metropolis is in the making" (p. 195). This optimism is reversed when rival identities are
examined across open EU boundaries, for example, by Kaplan (2000) in northern Italy and
by Palmeiro Pinheiro (2009) on the Portugal-Spanish border.
Getting back to the northern Red Sea area, it is not only Gradus (2001) who viewed
the option of the integration between Aqaba and Eilat as a remote possibility. Kliot (1997)
also expressed her pessimism with respect to the planned grandiose transborder projects in
the same geographic area. She concluded "that some of the plans…, pursue incompatible
goals, and that the plans are too grandiose in scale and investment and are not likely to be
implemented." (p. 581). Three other studies dealt with the southern part of the Israeli-
Jordanian border prior to the signature of the peace treaty in 1994 (Drysdale, 1991; Gradus,
1994; Minghi, 1991). Ironically, they were less pessimistic in their spirit concerning the
possibilities for co-existence than those published afterwards.
In summing up the literature review it can be concluded that some theoretical
constructs on cross-border integration processes are starting to appear alongside several
wide view models. Most models reviewed portray in their final stage an optimistic view of
wide ranging CBIs leading to integration. The case study approach papers however exhibit a
broad variation on the scale between optimism and pessimism. Although a meta-analysis is
in need, one may hypothesize that the concluding spirit of the studies reviewed depends on
the initial expectations. Researchers approaching a border region with low expectation may
be surprised by their findings and end up with an optimistic view, and vice-versa.
Examination of the evidence accumulated for this study proves that it is rather hard to escape
the optimism trap.
LOCAL EVIDENCE
Evidence on trans-border relationships in the Eilat-Aqaba area is provided in this section on
the basis of three categories: One represents the political formal sector, the second reflects on
voluntary decisions made by travelers and businessmen, and the third relates to the physical
planning arena. The first two categories conform to the first two theoretical lenses suggested
by Brunet-Jailly (2005).
The concentration on these three areas of activity does not rule out other interactions
made mainly by individuals and private entrepreneurs. Some of these are sporadic and some,
especially in the tour operators sector, are done on a more continuous basis. These are
certainly very important activities for the analysis of the development of transborder
relationships. However, the contribution of such activities must await the provision of funds
for a detailed field survey.
Political formal sector: operation of joint sub-committees
The formal arena refers to the areas of cooperation earmarked in the peace treaty and other
official mutual agreements reached at the political level of both countries involved. Eight
joint sub-committees have been established in the framework of the 1994 peace treaty. One
more sub-committee, international fund raising for joint projects, was agreed upon at a
meeting of the Aqaba-Eilat Coordination Committee (AECC) in 2006. Scheduling regular
meetings of the mayors of both cities is another formal activity.
The various sub-committees and their level of activities are presented in Table 1. This
information was provided by Mr. Samo Samorai, the Director of Regional Cooperation Office
Cross border interaction across formerly hostile border: ……..
55
in Eilat. This office is responsible for the coordination of the activities of all sub-committees
and it follows up any further cooperation resulting from their decisions.
Several observations come to the fore. First, all sub-committees are active. Second,
and unsurprising, the busiest sub-committees are those concerned with the most relevant
regional issues - environment and tourism. Environmental issues encompass quality of life
problems designed to protect residence and visitors of both cities against flies, mosquitoes,
bad odours, and flashfloods. It includes also the efforts made by both sides to preserve the
rich marine life diversity prevailing in the Gulf of Aqaba-Eilat (Al-Halasah and Ammary,
2007).
Table 1 Joint bi-national sub-committees and their level of activity since 2006.
COMMITTEE
Level of activity
COMMITTEE
Level of activity
Environment
High
Tourism
High
Water, Energy and
Roads
Medium
Civil Emergency
Response
Medium
Health
Medium
Mayors Meeting
Medium
Transportation
Low
Culture, Sports ans
Education
Low
Economic
Development
Low
International Fund
Raising
Low
High – More than 2 meetings per annum, Medium – Two meetings as determined in the
agreement, Low – One meeting per annum
Source: Mr. Samo Samorai, Director of Regional Cooperation office in Eilat (personal
communication)
Tourism is also a major concern for both sides. For Eilat this is the city's main
economic base. Aqaba has other economic activities mainly those related to the fact that this
is Jordan's only outlet to the sea. However, tourism and hospitality is a fast growing industry
and both sides have a great deal to gain from cooperation and coordination.
Other sub-committees have lower level of activities; four were classified as having
medium level and four as low. The latter are characterized either by being of a less emergent
nature or by a demand for wider public participation.
The rather small number of meetings by most sub-committees calls for explanation.
The obstacles for more extensive meeting and cooperation appear to be related mainly to
three hindering factors: a) issuance of visas, b) local government stability, and c) regional
geopolitics. Visa issuance between Jordan and Israel are not reciprocal. Although Israeli
citizens, like most other nationalities, may apply for visa to Jordan at the border crossing
point and this is arranged within 30 to 60 minutes, Jordanians and other Arab countries
citizens wishing to come to Israel must apply for visa beforehand in the closer Israeli
embassy. Due to the threat of terror, visa issuance requires security clearance and it may take
weeks and months. This procedure prohibits frequent visits of Jordanians including Aqaba
officials in Eilat. As a result most meetings of the joint sub-committees take place in Aqaba
rather than Eilat.
The second factor prohibiting more extensive official cooperation relates to the
frequency of reshuffling at the local government in Aqaba. While the municipality of Eilat
enjoys local stability with a mayor re-elected recently for a second four years term, the
officials at the local government in Aqaba have been replaced three times during the last four
years. Aqaba and its region have been designated as the Aqaba Special Economic Zone
Authority known as ASEZA. This authority constitutes Aqaba's local government with powers
reaching far beyond regular local governments' tasks and duties (ASEZA website; Kardoosh,
Shaul Krakover
56
2005). ASEZA commissioners and the high commissioner are appointed by the Hashemite
Jordanian Kingdom in Amman. As such they may be replaced in a short notice.
The frequent replacement of commissioners in the ASEZA administration has a
serious impact on the reduction in the number of the joint committees meetings. This is
because a) The new appointees have a normal learning curve to comprehend their new jobs;
the meetings of the joint committees do not constitute a task of high priority, and b) It takes
time until the new commissioners nominate their staff including the members of the different
sub-committees.
The third factor for the low level of operation of the joint sub-committees relates to
the geopolitical situation. Each and every political or military tension between Israel and one
of its neighbors – be it Lebanon or Gaza – generates an immediate halt on the contacts
among Eilat and Aqaba members of the sub-committees. In such situations - which may
occur as frequently as twice a year - Aqaba delegates are often quoted asking their Israeli
counterparts to postpone even e-mail contacts until the political tension is over. The recovery
of the regular contacts between sub-committee members may take a period of one to two
months following the end of the tension or the military skirmish. Despite these setbacks both
bureaucracies across the border value the sub-committees operation and make efforts to
meet at least once a year.
The paper turns now to examine the intensity of voluntary contacts across the
international boundary between Israel and Jordan in general and in the Rabin crossing point
between Eilat and Aqaba in particular.
Voluntary border crossing between Israel and Jordan
Although border crossing procedures are settled on the national level, the volumes of trade
and tourism flow are mainly determined at the individual level. This section presents
longitudinal statistics on the flow of visitors and trade, paying special attention to trends and
timing of fluctuations.
Figure 1 presents tourist arrivals from Jordan to Israel by land crossing starting in
1996, two years after signing of the peace treaty between those countries. Virtually, due to
geographical proximity, tourists entering by air transportation are close to nothing. Three
land border crossings facilitate tourists entrance: The northern one is the Jordan River
crossing, midway is the Allenby Bridge crossing (serving Palestinian Authority citizens and
international tourists but not Israelis), and the southern one connecting Eilat and Aqaba
named after the assassinated Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin (formerly known as Arava
crossing).
The total number of tourist arrivals has surpassed a quarter of one million in the year
2000, about 80,000 of them came through Rabin border crossing from Aqaba to Eilat.
October 2000 marked the outbreak of the second Intifada. This violent sequence of events is
marked by a sharp decline in the number of tourist crossing from Jordan to Israel as reflected
in the chart for the years 2001-2003. Tourist crossings have recovered and reached its apex
in 2008 but declined again in 2009 due to Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. It is interesting to
note that the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006 had only a minor effect on the flow
of tourists via Jordan. The downward turns of both 2006 and 2009 are not as sharp neither
as long in duration as in 2001. Statistics published for 2010 by the Israeli Central Bureau of
Statistics on quarterly basis suggest a return to 'business as usual'. Tourist coming through
Rabin border crossing constitute about third of all tourists coming to Israel via Jordan.
The number of Jordanian citizens among the tourists is rather small considering the
short distance and the low travel cost (Figure 2). Percentagewise, they constituted about 60
percent of all tourists arriving from Jordan in 2002. However, their number has declined and
in the years 2008 and 2009 they numbered in absolute terms about 15,000 and in
percentages of total tourists about 5 to 6 percent only.
Cross border interaction across formerly hostile border: ……..
57
Tourists Arrival from Jordan to Israel by Land
Crossings
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
1,000s
Rabin
Total
Figure 1 Tourists arrival from Jordan to Israel by land crossing, 1996-2009
Data source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Tourism in Israel, Annul series (various
years)
0
5
10
15
20
25
1,000s
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Arrival of Jordanian Tourist to Israel
Figure 2 Arrival of Jordanian tourists to Israel, 2002-2009
Data source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Tourism in Israel, Annul series (various
years)
In contrast to the small number of Jordanians coming to Israel - probably mainly due
to visa issuance difficulties - the number of Israelis visiting Jordan has risen from about
200,000 in 1996 to more than 300,000 in 2007 and 2008 (Figure 3). The fluctuations in the
departure of Israelis to Jordan seem to follow the same pattern as revealed in the case of the
international tourists though with a lesser intensity. The number of Israelis going for a visit to
Shaul Krakover
58
Jordan reached a peak of about 340,000 visitors in 2008 declining to about 280,000 in
2009. Most Israeli tourists used the northern Jordan River border crossing. Only about 17
percent ventured to the south to use the Rabin crossing point.
Departure of Israelis to Jordan by Land Crossings
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
1,000s
Rabin
Total
Figure 3 Departure of Israelis to Jordan by Land crossings, 1966-2009.
Data source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Tourism in Israel, Annul series (various
years)
More statistics and charts are available at the IAA (Israeli Aviation Authority) website.
This authority is in charge of air and land border crossings. Their data refer to total flow
without distinction of nationalities. Their data display an upward trend in most indicators
(passengers, cars, and trucks) from 2003 onward as well as a decline of all indicators from
2008 to 2009 (Table 2). This decline in 2009 is, however, much milder for all indicators and
all border crossings than the decline displayed in Figure 1 for 2001-2003. A minor effect of
the 2006 war in Lebanon is also visible in these charts.
Altogether, the IAA data show that passengers flow in all three land border crossings
reached in 2008 an all time record of almost 2.5 millions of individuals revealing their
motivation to cross the formerly sealed borders between Jordan and Israel. Car crossings and
trucks at the terminals (see definition as footnote to Table 2) reached in 2008 record
numbers of more than 46 and 47 thousands, respectively. These figures reflect growing
interests of travelers and businessmen to explore and utilize opportunities offered in the
neighboring country. The growth rates during the five years from 2003 to 2008 are
remarkable. Rabin border crossing between Eilat and Aqaba surpassed the general growth
rates by far in two indicators. Passengers' growth rates at the Rabin crossing have grown 5
fold and car crossings have multiplied 2.8 times.
Cross border interaction across formerly hostile border: ……..
59
Table 2 Cross-border passenger and traffic flow indicators, 2003, 2008, 2009
No. of passengers
No. of cars crossings
No. of trucks at terminal*
Year
Total
Rabin
Rabin
(%)
Total
Rabin
Rabin
(%)
Total
Rabin
Rabin
(%)
2003
952,840
87,833
9.22
33,674
2,467
7.33
30,338
2,335
7.70
2008
2,447,603
439,356
17.95
46,888
7,016
14.96
47,834
2,039
4.26
2009
2,270,877
361,883
15.94
40,392
5,162
12.78
35,424
1,458
4.12
Growth
Rates
2003-
2008
2.57
5.00
1.39
2.84
1.58
0.87
* Trucks are not necessarily crossing the border. In most cases, due of security reasons, truck
loads are moved at the border from Israeli to Jordanian trucks and vice versa.
Source: IAA statistics, http://www.iaa.gov.il/RASHAT/en-US/Rashot
The development of the volume of foreign trade between Israel and Jordan is another
indicator for the evolving cross boundary relationships (Figure 4). Israeli export to Jordan is
growing exponentially with slight setbacks in 2005 and 2009. In 2008 the value of the
exported goods and services has climbed to almost $300 million. The Jordanian export to
Israel is showing a trend of a lesser growth with significant disturbances in 2006 and 2009.
Nevertheless the value of goods and service imported by Israel from Jordan in 2008 reached
a record high of more than $100 million.
Israel-Jordan Foreign Trade Development
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
$ Millions
Import
Export
Figure 4 Israel-Jordan foreign trade development, 1995-2009
Data source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics website, Foreign Trade Account,
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_SHTML&ID=461
Generally speaking, the travelers and trade data demonstrate the development of
vibrant streams of flow between Israel and Jordan. The total number of passengers and
especially foreign and Israeli tourists are on the rise. The value of goods and services traded
Shaul Krakover
60
between both countries is also increasing. These streams are facilitated by the administration
of both countries however decisions to travel across the border or decisions to trade goods
and services are made rather on an individual basis.
More and more people on either side of the border are feeling safe both to visit and to
conduct business with partners on the other side. Outbreaks of regional geopolitical tensions
appear to hamper the continued trajectories of growth. However, these disturbances are not
acting to completely re-seal the borders. On the contrary, the volumes of trade and visits
retreat a little but the impact of the disturbances appear to have a short duration of about one
year only.
The volume of activity at the Rabin border crossing between Eilat and Aqaba is on the
rise in terms of the number of passengers, cars, and international and Israeli tourists. This
volume reached about 25 to 30 percent of foreign tourists and about 15-17 percent for total
passengers and cars. Due to the long distances to the populated centers of both countries
Rabin's crossing share in the number of trucks is much smaller.
Physical planning indicators
This sub-section examines a third factor usually ignored in cross-border studies although it
sheds light on the improving relationships between countries sharing formerly hostile
borders. This factor could be named 'Borderline Fear Removal'. As long as Jordan and Israel
were at a state of war, or armistice ceasefire, both countries refrained from placing cityscape
projects in the vicinity to the border. At this state the border represented a dangerous zone to
get close to not only because of the soldiers watching each movement but also due to
minefields spread along the border line.
This does not mean to say that prior to the 1994 peace treaty there was no activity
close to the border whatsoever. On the Israeli side there was agricultural activity. On the
Jordanian side it was the late King Hussein who built his palace on the sea front not far away
from the border (Figure 5). However, hardly any other permanent construction was located
near the border on both sides. On the contrary, a zone of about one kilometer wide on the
Jordanian side and a little less on the Israeli side was left undeveloped.
From a city developer's point of view these 'near the border' undeveloped zones are
prime lands for development. These tracts of lands on both sides of the border are located
relatively close to the respective city centers. No wonder, therefore, the fact that developers
on both sides of the border have started to explore ways of utilizing these sizeable vacant
tracts of land. Two examples of 'near the border' construction projects will be presented.
Figure 5 portrays two mega projects designed for development along the border. Both
projects are centered on leisure and tourism. On the Jordanian side it is the Ayla $10 billion
mega project which has been under construction since 2006 (Ayla website). On the Israeli
side there were developers who suggested building a $500 million project named Aquaria
stretching along the Israeli side of the border. So far the Israeli side project has not been
approved by the local planning and construction committees due to bureaucratic
complexities.
There is no doubt that such projects were unthinkable prior to the signature of the
peace treaty. It is the gradual removal of fear and suspicion through numerous personal
contacts that encourages entrepreneurs and city planners to envisage the utilization of the
vacant lands along the border. This kind of infrastructural works and construction draws
both cities closer to each other, even if each project is restricted to the territory of the relevant
country.
The second example relates to a more daring proposal for cooperation wherein one
country is getting services on the land of the other. This is connected to the proposal of
utilizing the Jordanian international airport with an additional terminal which will be built to
serve passengers flying to southern Israel. The Eilat airport is located at the town's center and
Cross border interaction across formerly hostile border: ……..
61
is considered a nuisance to city development. It is small and old relatively to the King
Hussein International Airport located 10 kilometers north of the city of Aqaba. Given this
realities, strategic planners suggested cooperation between Israel and Jordan in the use of the
Aqaba airport facilities for the benefit of both sides. Such cooperation may save the need of
building another new airport north of Eiat on the Israeli side, avoiding the duplication of
infrastructural facilities (Gradus, 1994).
Figure 5 Fear Removal Factor: Mega-projects constructed near the borderline
Source: Self compilation on a Google Earth base map
This proposal was recently rejected by the Israeli government. A decision was made to
invest in the construction of a brand new airport next to Timna about 15 kilometers north of
Eilat, almost parallel to the King Hussein International Airport to the east. Thus, while
adding new infrastructural projects at the vicinity of one's country border is acceptable
attesting of improved confidence, cooperating on the utilization of the same airport located
on the territory of the other country is rejected. The difference between the two cases is clear;
building next to the border is confined to ones territory but welcoming ones travelers in the
neighbor's territory might be risky mainly due to the oscillatory character of the cross-border
relationships as pointed out in the previous sections.
Shaul Krakover
62
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION
This study set out to examine the evolutionary path of CBIs in the Eilat-Aqaba region. The
examination is based on local evidence related to three criteria: interaction of formal bi-
national sub-committees, cross-border data on the movement of travelers, vehicles, and
goods, and on physical construction projects nearing the borderline. This local evidence is
judged against CBI theories, models and case studies. The reviewed theories supplied
guidelines and building blocks for evaluating the prospects of enhanced interactions; the
presented models lead to the conclusion that full integration and merger are feasible; the
review of the case studies provided perplexing results – the bi-national cities literature as
well as those dealing with cross border local identities (Kaplan, 2000; Palmeiro Pinheiro,
2009) were mostly pessimistic while those concentrating on economic relationships were
mostly optimistic (e.g., Herzog, 1991; Yang, 2004).
Evidence introduced in this study portrays a rather optimistic picture of rapidly
increasing movement of people and goods across the border, the removal of fear in locating
new mega-projects adjacent to the border, and continuance of the formal meetings of the
sub-committees in compliance with the peace treaty. Alongside with the positive indicators,
short-term fluctuations in the CBI process have been observed. The travel data analyzed in
this study showed clearly that ups and downs in the number of travelers occur fairly
frequently and these are related to broader regional geopolitical tension. Reference has been
also made to the observation that local political CBIs are halted for a while during such tense
periods. The questions are how prevalent are these fluctuations and whether or not they
should be incorporated within the theoretical models such as those of Brunet-Jailly (2005),
House (1981), Lezzi (1994), and Martinez (1994).
It seems reasonable to assert that the aforementioned models portray historical trends
related to the long-run; therefore, the case for incorporation of minor fluctuations can be
overlooked. Although this assertion is acceptable one may argue that since fluctuations in the
process of CBIs are so recurrent, especially in formerly hostile borders, they should be an
integral part of any model in order to bring the model closer to reality. The optimistic views
embedded in the aforementioned models rely on the assumption that downturns in the
process are usually remedied by the stronger forces of cooperation driven by economic and
social motivations. This is probably true as long as the central government does not interfere
in regulating the CBI process or even arrive at a major change in its policy. When such
change comes to effect the whole process may collapse and cross-border relationships may
come to a complete halt for decades or generations (e.g., US-Cuba, Israel-Iran, and more).
Although complete halt in the process is less expected than regular fluctuations it seems
reasonable to incorporate both options somewhere in the CBI evolutionary models. Another
shortcoming of the models is related to their inability to provide a time scale to assess how
many years it is going to take to move from one stage to the next on the path to the final stage
of cross-border integration.
An additional observation that should be discussed is the effect of the mood of the
researcher on the conclusions. The review of the case studies gave the impression that
researchers approaching a border region with low expectation for interactions may be
surprised by their findings and end up with optimistic conclusions, and vice versa. The
analysis of the evidence exhibited in this study sheds rather an optimistic light. Is this
impression a result of my initially low expectations or is it backed by hard evidence?
Out of the three criteria used in this study, two appear to provide hard evidence which
do not depend on subjective assessment. These are the physical construction projects built
adjacent to the borderlines and the rapid growth in the volume of trade, traffic, and travelers
crossing the Israeli-Jordanian border. True, the number of Jordanians crossing the border to
Cross border interaction across formerly hostile border: ……..
63
Israel is still restricted mainly due to security clearance requirements due to the fear of terror
against citizens. However, nowadays this is more of a worldwide problem. Once fear of terror
is removed the number of Jordanian visitors to Israel is expected to rise rapidly due to the
close proximity of the centers of population of both countries.
The other criterion - the formal meetings of the mutual sub-committees – provides a
measure which is subject to the researcher's interpretation. One researcher may argue that
the number of meetings per annum is rather minimal and negligible while another one may
conclude that as long as regular meetings are continued, even if just once a year, it is an
indication of business-as-usual. Thus, based on the hard evidence, it seems safe to conclude
that CBIs along the Jordanian border in general and in the Rabin crossing point in particular
has been enhanced and even accelerated in the last decade since Gradus (2001) concluded his
study.
Would this acceleration of movements, contacts, and new construction next to the
borders lead in the long-run to the coalescence of Aqaba and Eilat to generate a bi-national
city in a similar way reported by Yang (2004) for the case of Hong Kong and Shenzhen? The
reviewed models seem to provide a firm positive answer pointing towards a coalescence of
the cities and integration of economies and societies, although at an unspecified future time.
Evidence reported in this study, despite fluctuations, appears to support the line of evolution
suggested by the models. However, Brunet-Jailly's (2005) theoretical building blocks issue a
reminder that lenses (3) 'the particular political clout of borderlands communities', and (4)
'the specific culture of borderland communities' are far from being ripe to continue along the
road to integration.
Thus, it seems safe to conclude that in the last ten years progress has been made on
the road to integration in the Eilat-Aqaba region. This progress is subject to fluctuations
depending on political and military events taking place on the wider geopolitical scene.
Complete halt in the process is unexpected unless a major change occurs in the regimes of the
countries involved. The pace of the process is unknown. Furthermore, the road towards
further enhanced integration seems to be blocked in the foreseen future by the extremely
different national identities and cultural affiliation prevailing on both sides on the border.
Therefore, the merger of both towns to generate a bi-national city is a vision for the distant
future rather than an anticipated reality.
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