Concerns about the Global Ethic

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Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
Concerns about the Global Ethic: A Sympathetic
Critique and Suggestions for a New Direction
1
It is undoubtedly the case that the spirit of the Global Ethic (hereafter GE) is one
which many people will find a great deal of sympathy with, and there is much to
praise about it. Nevertheless, there are a number of concerns about the way the
project works in practice, and these raise fundamental questions concerning its
rationale. As such, I offer this critique in a friendly and sympathetic way towards
those who have pioneered work in this area, but believe that the questions raised here
need careful consideration if the project is to be further pursued, and also to consider
how it will be pursued.
I will begin by looking, briefly, at the thought that has led us to the current situation in
the GE project. In particular, I will consider the guiding principles behind it. Within
this, I will focus upon the ‘Declaration Towards a Global Ethic’ drafted by Hans
Küng, as it is probably the most widely known, though I will take account of other GE
proposals, most notably that by Leonard Swidler. Within this critique, as I do not
intend to conduct a detailed point-by-point analysis of the ethic, rather to look at some
general problems, I believe it is legitimate to focus upon Küng’s proposal, but draw
out the linkages and parallels with others, and thereby offer and look at critiques of all
attempts at a GE. Having provided some scene setting, the main work of this article
will begin by raising five areas of concern with the GE, before making some tentative
suggestions for developments in the area, in particular to recast the current
presentations of the project in the light of these concerns. It should be noted that I do
not wish to claim the GE an impossibility, for, as Twiss has noted, it has not been
definitively shown that the problems are irresolvable, nor that the attempt is
“illegitimate or unattainable” (Twiss 2000: 158; for some examples of the case for see
Widdows 2007: 310, Cahill 2002: 9; and, against see Porter 2001: 3 & 8; Widdows
2007: 307-308) – this is a question I leave largely unexplored – rather, I am raising
questions about the direction the project has, and is, taking.
Background to the GE
Drafting a GE
A foundational event for thinking on the GE is the 1948 UN Declaration on Human
Rights, which is seen, by proponents of the project, as representing a move towards a
worldwide consensus in this area. However, in terms of the GE project as it exists,
the most important single figure is undoubtedly Hans Küng, who was involved in the
1989 UNESCO colloquium ‘World Religions, Human Rights and World Peace’, in
Paris, and, in 1992, was commissioned to write a draft proposal for a GE for the
Second World Parliament of Religions. The Parliament ratified this as its
‘Declaration Toward a Global Ethic’ in 1993. This stands as the main attempt to set
up a GE within and between the religions of the world. We shall discuss the events
and ratification at the Parliament in due course, as it relates very much to the critique
1
My thanks go to Alan Race for his corrections and comments on an earlier draft of this work, which is
based upon part of a paper I gave at the 2
nd
International Faith, Spirituality and Social Change
Conference, at the University of Winchester, 2007, entitled ‘Interfaith Dialogue and the Global Ethic’.
Another paper based on the same paper has been submitted to the journal, Faith, Spirituality and Social
Change.

Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
to be offered here. Subsequently a group of Religious Studies scholars published a
‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions’ (Sharma 1998),
while Leonard Swidler has forwarded a vision for the GE, both in 1998. Interest in,
and attempts to extend the effectiveness of these proposals, continues to be strong,
pushed on both by the The Centre for Global Ethics founded by Swidler, in
Philadelphia, and the Global Ethic Foundation associated with Küng in Germany.
It is worth mentioning that the attempt to procure a GE is not a strange and
idiosyncratic fascination of religious leaders and scholars. Two organizations, or
foundations, pursuing similar aims are the World Order Models Project, active in this
field since 1967, and the Institute for Global Ethics, founded in 1990. Both remain
active. The UN Commission on Global Governance also works in this area, and in
1995 published, Our Global Neighbourhood. Various charters for the earth also
pursue the aim of a global ethical and environmental vision, including ones by the UN
as well as the Earth Charter Commission founded in 1997, with such notable
advocates as Maurice Strong and Mikhail Gorbachev, who almost saw their charter
ratified at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 2002 (‘The
Earth Charter’). There have also been a number of books and articles in this area
published by scholars of different hues (e.g., Attfield 2006; Singer 2002; Graham
1999; Grieder 1997). We can therefore see that there is strong interest in pursuing
some type of GE. However, a great range of options and controversies surrounds its
underlying criteria.
Guidelines for a Global Ethic
I will seek, here, to outline some of the general principles that guide the GE project,
particularly in the versions propounded by Küng and Swidler. In doing so, I will raise
some generic inherent problems and tensions within the project to which we will
return when raising our five concerns.
According to Küng, and others, a GE must be neither too vague nor too detailed
(Küng 2000: 426; Falk 1999: 77; Duran 1999: 124). If too vague, there will just be a
series of trite generalities and banal phrases, while if too detailed, it will exclude
people and traditions (see Porter 2001: 6). Race tries to bridge this with reference to
the notion of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ ethics, as advocated by Michael Walzer, which, while
useful, does not solve the problems raised here (Race 2001: 130-131). In particular,
while recognizing that general principles, which are ‘thin’ ethics, such as to avoid
killing are common, the application in a socio-cultural context, ‘thick’ ethics, can be
diverse. For instance, Jain advocates of ahimsa and Khalsa Sikhs may both be in
favour of avoiding killing, but understand the meaning of this in very different ways.
Related to this issue, Harbour has suggested that there are a central collection of core
values held in common, which then become differentiated as they are instantiated in,
what he terms, secondary and tertiary values (Harbour 1995: 156 & 162-3). Yet, as
we will see, the divergence may undermine the very notion of a set of common values.
Therefore, at the heart of the project, is a tension, for a very precise balance must be
struck. The manifestation of this in the wording of the GE is something we will
explore below.
Moreover, to be ‘global’, a GE cannot come from only one place, and commentators,
such as Hick, have suggested various contributions are needed to build towards a GE
(Hick 1999: 102). In a similar way, Küng speaks of the need for a consensus (Küng
1993b: 58; Küng 1999: 38; see also Swidler 1999b: 17). Where this may be found is,

Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
however, the crux of the matter. Both Küng and Swidler have invoked the so-called
Golden Rule, citing its widespread use across many traditions (Swidler 1999b: 19ff;
Küng 1993b: 71-72). Its importance for them lies in the fact that it is seen as a global/
universal ethical standard, found across all major religious traditions. However, it
does not avoid the issues of generalities and particularities raised above, and to which,
as noted, we shall return to in due course.
Whatever the case, the argument for the Golden Rule is based upon its widespread use
across many religious traditions, and both Küng and Swidler assert a GE must be
religious in nature (Küng 1991: 36 ff; Swidler 1999b: 1ff). For them, the great world
faiths underpin so many cultures and societies that, to attempt such an endeavour
without religion would be erroneous. On the other hand, equally respected thinkers,
particularly Warnock, have argued that we must leave religion out of such an
endeavour (Warnock 2006), arguing that as, historically, religion has been the cause
of much division and conflict it cannot contribute to this end. However, it seems
Warnock assumes religion is inherently biased, whereas humanism is neutral and
agenda-free, a standpoint which has been deeply undermined in our post-modern
context (Flood 1999: 219-220; Vattimo 1988: 31 ff). Moreover, on a global scale, to
leave out religion is simply naive, not recognizing the strength and depth of its
connection in many cultures (Little 1999: 158). Therefore, I would agree with Küng
and Swidler that a religious perspective must be included in any attempt to create a
GE. Yet, a proviso, noted by Fenn, should be born in mind, that while such an ethic
should be religious, a basis in, or out of, any one tradition, especially Christianity, is
highly problematic, as it will alienate those of other traditions (Fenn 1999: 47). Quite
simply, assuming that a single tradition can be the basis for universal norms raises
deeply political issues. This, once again, is a theme we shall revisit as we raise our
areas of concern.
Lastly, we will consider the theoretical basis for such an ethic. Attfield has argued
that deontology is unacceptable, as we cannot find a universal basis between faiths or
cultures for a GE. This seems reasonable, and, in many ways, is simply an extension
of the previous point, that to take any one basis will cause arguement and dissension.
Instead, he has argued for what he calls a “biocentric Total-View practice-
consequentialism” (Attfield 2006: 16). His arguments go beyond the scope of this
paper, but his contribution is noteworthy in highlighting the problematic basis for the
GE. Meanwhile, Swidler has argued that it must be an ethic not a system of ethics
(Swidler 1999b: 17), by which he means it must be a principle, rather than a set of
individual rules. Therefore, we have a contentious question as to whether a GE is
founded in principles or practices, theoria or praxis. We can locate here another
problem, in grounding a GE, however, it is an area we will not consider here, but is
important to note as a key area of concern.
Küng’s Global Ethic
In the most widely used version of the GE, the declaration set out in 1993 at the
Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago, four basic statements, or
commitments, were endorsed:
1. Non-violence and respect for life
2. Solidarity and a just economic order
3. Tolerance and a life of truthfulness
4. Equal rights and partnership between men and women (Küng 1993a: 24-34)

Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
While each of these was considerably expanded upon, it is probably fair to say that
this, at one level, represents a reasonably representative collection of attitudes that
could be found within all the world’s major religions, and are expressed by various
religious teachers and scriptures (Morgan & Braybrooke 1998: especially 34-123),
however, I am worried by just what is implied by saying that this represents a
common GE. I will therefore seek to move beyond this by highlighting five concerns.
Areas of Concern
a) Are we Including the Extremes?
Firstly, although endorsed by representatives at the World’s Parliament of Religions,
Küng’s draft for a GE is a statement coming from a fairly self-selecting minority
within the religious traditions. That is to say, the proponents of the GE are
themselves already pre-committed to tolerance and understanding. While some of the
supporters of the GE may be senior figures within their own traditions, they do not
represent their tradition as a whole. In particular, three caveats arise. The first of
these is that if violence between the religions exists, then those who endorse this GE
and seek peace don’t include the radical and violent extremes (or elements) that must
be reached. Indeed, the following points will further expand upon this, and why the
GE may be more problematic than helpful in this regard. The second caveat, is that if
it is seen as a statement of ‘liberal’ or conciliatory scholars or devotees (King 2000:
129), those least inclined to it will feel more disenfranchised from it. It may cause
them to think that a GE means diluting the radical requirements of their faith to some
lukewarm common standpoint. We do not have to go far to find ‘extremes’, Forward
quotes the words of the former Iranian President Ali Khamenei, “When we want to
find out what is right and wrong, we do not go to the United Nations; we go to the
Holy Koran.” Forward continues with he terms Khameni’s ‘more colourful’ language,
“For us the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is nothing but a collection of
mumbo-jumbo by disciplines of Satan” (Forward 2001: 60-61, quoting Mayer, A. E.,
Islam and Human Rights, London: Pinter, 1999, p. 34). The third caveat is that while
endorsed by 143 delegates at the World’s Parliament of Religions, 1993, this is, again,
a selected group. Around 600 delegates were present, of whom less than a quarter
signed. It met with calls of dissent about the Western and Biblical nature of the GE at
this event, which suggests that although generally seen as one of the great successes
of the parliament, this is not necessarily the case.
Related to this, while endorsed by many religious leaders, no institutional effect
comes from the statement. In as far as it is a statement of ethics, it exists in an
ecumenical no man’s land. Will the Jewish or Christian traditions replace the Ten
Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount with the GE? This, of course, greatly
impacts upon its practical efficacy. Even if a majority of the world’s religions, or
their representatives, sign up does it go beyond being mere words on paper if there is
nothing else to give practical shape to it? Certainly the ‘Call to Our Guiding
Institutions’ was meant to address this, but it is not clear that it has had any significant
institutional impact.
b) Are there common points to a GE?
Secondly, we must ask if there is a common understanding of the points. To take
examples from a couple of the statements, we may ask what is meant by “a just

Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
economic order?” No doubt few, if any, from a religious background would endorse
anything else. However, just what might this mean? The development of an
enlightened and benevolent form of capitalism seems to be what many assume.
However, Islam has its own social and economic system with Islamic banking
providing an increasing alternative to the traditional Western system. Again, for
many traditional Hindus, the question of dharma in relation to social position (varna)
and caste (jati) mean that a just social order may not mean freedom and equality in the
modern Western sense. Moreover, Sallie King has questioned whether Buddhism can
accept the very premises of ‘self’ and ‘ownership’ found in Swidler’s wording, which
I would suggest are also inherent in Küng’s (King 1995: 215-216). This raise
questions about the ontology in which the GE is based, following a tradition,
seemingly, of the autonomous ‘I’ associated with Enlightenment thinking.
This raises one of the generic problems with a GE, the tension between vagueness and
specificity. While some general statements may seem acceptable and tenable across
traditions, the question of interpretation problematizes this. What may be meant
within one religio-socio-politico-cultural matrix by a particular set of words is not
necessarily what will be meant within another such matrix. The idea of a GE based
upon certain shared statements therefore becomes somewhat unstable. The problem
of mediating between principles and specifics has been raised by Hick (Hick 2007:
10-14), and, as noted above, is a central concern about the very underlying principles
upon which we can rest a GE.
Another contentious statement was the fourth, the declaration of the equal rights and
partnership of men and women (Küng 1993b: 69-70; Kushel 1993: 96). This, of
course, is one that is not just problematic for non-Christian religions, but also for
various Christian groups, and not just simply in the area of women and leadership
roles, for Porter has asked whether the Vatican’s stance on contraception and abortion
is compatible (Porter 2001: 6). The question, again, of terminology arises. For
instance, in Islam, it is taken for granted that both men and women have a full
equality before God, nevertheless, certain religious duties proscribed for men, for
instance, attendance at the mosque for Friday prayers, have not traditionally been seen
as binding upon women. Also, within certain forms of Judaism, men and women are
seen as having certain clearly defined areas of activity, either in the private sphere of
the home for women, or the public sphere for men. Might such systems be seen as in
accord with the notion of “Equal rights and partnership”?
These examples merely scrape the surface. Bosnian Muslims, for instance, were
concerned that the right to self-defence was not stated clearly in the section dealing
with the first principle (Küng 1993b: 67-68), something which Sallie King has further
drawn out problems with relating to the Buddhist position (King 1995: 218). We have
already alluded to this problem previously, noting the extreme ‘pacifism’, or ahimsa
tradition, of Jainism, in contrast to the Khalsa Sikh’s belief that it is right to wage war
in defence of faith. There seems little middle ground, or common understanding,
between such divergent viewpoints. While the third principle on tolerance and truth is
also treading on contentious ground. As post-modern critics will readily tell us,
whose truth we consider depends upon where we stand. If you consider that Jesus is
“The Way, the Truth, and the Life” then you will have a very definite stance on this
article, which may, to some, suggest an aggressive missionary stance as an expression
of that ‘truth’, which others would feel violates the accompanying principle of
tolerance.

Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
c) A Western Liberal Agenda?
Thirdly, I wish to extend a critique, mentioned above, and raised at the World
Parliament of Religion, that it is based in a liberalized Western ethics. Even
advocates of the GE recognize this as, perhaps, its greatest weakness (Muck 1997:
217). While we may, as I have said, read some of the articles in varying ways, it can
be seen as coming from a perspective based around certain assumptions about religion
and ethics. Certainly, I recognize that Küng consulted widely with representatives of
many different traditions, but I believe this does not answer all the possible criticisms.
Commenting upon Swidler’s proposals, antecedent to Küng’s, John Hick gives a
Protestant response:
“The difficulty in offering a distinctively Christian comment… is that it is
already… a Christian document. For since the European “Enlightenment” of the
eighteenth century Western Christianity has been increasingly suffused with the
individualistic, democratic, liberal, historically-minded, science-oriented outlook
of the Enlightenment, an outlook that constitutes what can comprehensively be
called the ethos of “modernity.” Indeed Christianity… is identified in the minds of
many… with these liberal ideals of modernity…. For… secular modernity has
transformed the outlook of most of the Christian world….” (Hick 1999: 100-101)
It seems hard to disavow such claims, and, as such, to the rest of the world the attempt
to forge a GE may appear as part of the continuing Western colonialist and imperialist
agenda of domination. Indeed, in her discussion of Global Ethics, Baroness Warnock
suggests that we should “seek to apply moral standards acceptable in the West to the
solution of problems world-wide” (Warnock 2006). Certainly, she says we should not
foist these principles onto others, but the approach makes it hard to avoid the
appearance of this. While she is not a proponent of a religious GE, we see the same
danger in supposing that a list of Western liberal humanistic values represent the core
values the world should adopt – though she does say we should not expect the rest of
the world to adopt our values.
Hick addresses the type of problems addressed above by saying: “It cannot count as a
legitimate criticism that the search for a GE has originated in the West; for it had to
originate somewhere!” Indeed! However, what Hick overlooks is that to those
outside the West it may well seem like that. While I have no doubt at all of the
integrity of those like Küng, Hick and Swidler, there seems a certain naivety in
supposing that the long dominated and oppressed world beyond the white Western
shores will so readily take this on board. I will suggest a possible way around this
dilemma in due course.
Indeed, even the point that consultations have taken place in preparing Küng’s
declaration does not allay all the criticism. In relation to my first concern, most of
those involved are pre-committed to dialogue and represent the ‘liberal’ wings of their
traditions. And so, the Muslim respondent to Swidler’s proposal happily says, as a
Muslim, that he “fully supports” the proposals. This may be expected from a rather
liberal, Sufi influenced Muslim. As he no doubt rightly says, other Muslims would
see it as part of a Christian missionary conspiracy (Duran 1999: 126). Given recent
history, can we blame them?
Hick suggests one answer, proposing every culture should venture its own draft: so
that multiple drafts from the “cultures of China, Africa, Russia, India, the Islamic
world, the Buddhist world, [and] the ‘primal’ life-streams,” should outweigh the

Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
perception of this as “an act of Western cultural imperialism” (Hick 1999: 102).
Barring, of course, the reading of each of these as monolithic, I can see some credit in
Hick’s proposal. However, it raises at least four questions:
Question one: as Sallie King has asked, “why should others respond to a Christian
document pretending to be a global document?” (King 1995: 213). This, of course,
applies more to Swidler’s proposal than Küng’s, but even this, as we have suggested
is still, primarily, in wording and thought, a Western document.
Question two: even if other models come forward, Western influence may lead to a
distortion of some responses, as they respond to a ‘dominant’ Western model.
Certainly, it is not my place to suggest that other cultures cannot respond as they wish,
even adopting aspects of some Western models, but I fear it may weaken their
distinctiveness. The African response to Swidler, for instance, makes clear that it
“abolishes many African traditions… and brings… [it] into a genuine dialogue with…
the context of modern civilization” (Nkulu 1999: 82). While Nkulu’s paper offers an
exciting outline of how African thought can shape a human rights agenda, and offers a
number of important critiques of Swidler’s model, I fear the difference and some
aspects of its power to voice a radical critique has been lost because it wants to make
itself in step with what it terms “modern civilization.” If one dialogue partner is in a
dominant position it can make it very difficult for the others to find their authentic
voice. This has been stated by Knitter in terms of a linguistic prism: “our language
and our truth claims are not only culturally conditioned, but they are also
economically and culturally conditioned…. Our interpretations and our language…
can also oppress the ability of others to assert and live their own truths.” (Knitter
1995a: 222). This may lie behind the African response, which, while cogently
arguing for human rights from African traditions, feels the need to make its own
response fit the dominant discourse of “modern civilization;” indeed, it has been
argued that the African traditions in particular have been robbed of power by Western
discourses (O’Neil 2001: 2). Katongole expresses the same idea in saying that
African has been ‘placed’ by Western discourse, and its own questions and
perspectives sidelined (Cahill 2002: 4, citing Emmanuel Katongole, ‘The “Faces” of
African Philosophy: On Being “Placed” by Western Paradigms and/ or
Misrepresentations,’ St Augustine Papers 1/1, 2000, 5-13).
Question three: in the light of this, should we be envisaging, certainly at this stage,
even moving towards a GE? Should we not, rather, be expecting to look at a
multitude of regional or local ethics, with which we can work? As Zhao has
emphasized, we are, at present, simply ignorant of when we may be ready to
formulate a GE, while a continued process of dialogue before we even consider this
may result in something even more “meaningful and fruitful” (Zhao 1999: 153; see
also Hick 2007: 16). Certainly, I accept that Küng and Swidler see their proposals as
moving towards a GE too, and not as the end result, but the very titles they carry, of a
‘Global Ethic’ tends to blur this. Moreover, the documents themselves imply the GE
has been found. For instance, Küng’s ‘Declaration Toward a Global Ethic’ after its
initial preamble sets out ‘The Principles of a Global Ethic’, the ‘Toward’ is dropped
for what appears to be a declaration of what the GE is. Swidler’s proposal does the
same, its initial title, ‘Toward a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic’, becomes,
when he gets down to spelling out the details, ‘Universal Declaration of a Global
Ethic’ (Swidler 1999a).

Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
Question four: should we be seeking a GE at all? Hick has told us that the fact that
this vision arose in the West does not mean that it should be seen as a Western
imperialistic venture. Others, too, he says, should present their own GE. However,
Hick does not ask one question. Are we asking, or expecting, everyone to play a
Western game, we may allow regional rules, but is this itself an imposition? I will
leave this question unanswered, and perhaps, unanswerable, however, as others have
noted the quest could be seen as involved within the “human rights imperialism”
which others cultures accuse the West of (Zhao 1999: 152, quoting Samuel
Huntingdon, ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993: 40-41).
d) Are the Faiths Monolithic?
My fourth concern is based upon insights from the previous three, and has already
been touched upon. One danger of the GE is that it seeks to draw an essentialist
picture of the world’s religious traditions. It works from the basis that every tradition
has an inherent set of agreements on certain rights, thus ignoring or sidelining those
aspects which would run counter to this (for example, see Twiss 2000: 160-161).
Once we have an agreement, such as, that all religions promote human dignity, peace
and common core values, then those who may then wish to raise disagreements, or
who engage in acts of violence, may be written off as unrepresentative of their
tradition, being seen as not properly ‘Christian’, ‘Islamic’, ‘Buddhist’, etc. However,
we cannot envisage traditions in such monolithic terms, one of the most influential
figures in the Christian tradition, Augustine, for instance, while at first opposed to the
use of any coercion in matters of religion, came, for pragmatic reasons, to see the use
of imperial force against heretics, specifically the Donatists, as valid to protect the
Catholic tradition (Chadwick 1996: 75-82). We cannot easily say that he initially
represented the ‘pure’ Christian tradition, and later was not ‘properly’ Christian. Such
a reading, of ‘proper’ and ‘improper’traditions, simply serves to ‘other’ the Other. By
this, I intend to extend into this context a critique advanced by Russell McCutcheon
when discussing the way scholars of religion create normative modes of discourse
(McCutcheon 2006: 11ff). Here, McCutcheon refers to the “no cost Other,” whose
concerns we can easily take on board, and whose wants and needs are “of such
obviously universal significance that the inevitable distance between some posited
‘us’ and ‘them’ can be overlooked” (McCutcheon 2006: 11). But what, he asks, of
those Others who do not meet our requirements for “civility” and “decency,” and who
“despite holding the sort of ‘deep beliefs’ that we are so often told we ought to respect,
happen to hold the wrong set of deep beliefs” (McCutcheon 2006: 22).
McCutcehon’s answer is that “we withhold the classifications ‘religion,’ ‘faithful,’
and ‘spiritual,’” while “they can be understood as deviants… or portrayed… as
enemies” (ibid.). This raises questions about whether our starting assumptions of
universal norms are too narrow, and may actually exclude those who don’t fit
comfortably within our borders. None of our borders are solid enough to do this, even
Küng’s ‘Golden Rule’ suggests we should not do this: do not exclude the ‘Other’ for
holding opinions that are other to your own, unless you wish them to do the same.
That we cannot afford to do so has been brought home by the recent terrorist attacks
in the UK, seemingly perpetrated and planned by doctors and other healthcare
professionals (BBC 2007). That we could so radically ‘other’ members of such caring
professions, fellow professionals like ourselves, to commit acts of mass murder
2
2
I feel it quite legitimate to use this term, as although these people would no doubt believe themselves
to be involved in Jihad, the rules of engagement laid down by Islamic tradition against killing women,

Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
suggests our Western liberal humanist outreach is going wide of the mark. This in
many ways is fundamental: if we cannot have world peace without peace between the
religions, then we cannot have a GE that ‘others’ the Others who must be brought on
board.
e) Can we Hear the Voice of the Excluded?
My final concern extends the previous one in relation to questions two and three of
the third concern, to consider what has been called the “hermeneutical privilege of the
oppressed” (Knitter 1995a: 226; see also Knitter 1995b: 87-93). The question must
be asked as to whether this GE is being sought by the right people in the right places.
As O’Connor has strongly argued, the writings of white Western middle-class
theologians (of whom I must count myself a member) are in no position to speak for,
or represent, the needs of those whose voices we must hear: the poor, oppressed and
downtrodden of the two-thirds world (O’Connor 2000). Though, conversely, they
may need the white Western middle-class voices to speak up for them as they often
lack a sufficient voice of their own, but we cannot call this a GE, but only our voice
for them, or to them. Moreover, O’Connor has also convincingly argued that the
possibility of dialogue is decreased if the experience of one conversational partner
goes beyond that of the other party (O’Connor 2000: 203). There are many voices to
be heard before we consider contemplating a GE, and some of those we most need to
hear are amongst the hardest for us to hear.
In Conclusion
Assessing the Critiques
As has been seen, I have voiced each of my areas of concern as a question, because I
do not intend to mount a damning indictment on the whole project, merely to raise
questions about how we can proceed. As such, I would suggest that we need to
rethink the way the GE has been presented. Alan Race has suggested that the GE
project is not intended to get rid of local ethics, and to be a grand new master ethic
that takes their place (Race 2008). However, in as far as it is seen as coming from a
place and as part of a cultural context that can imply this it is in danger of not being
recognized as such. Ali Khamenei’s words cited above should remind us there is little
point in us going in and talking of common standards as a set of universals that can be
seen in local colours. Rather, we need to work from the bottom up. We should seek
the voices of those who may not want to be engaged in the project, or reject the
‘Western’ notion of human rights, and hope that through giving them voices we may
build up to find a consensus.
I would contend that, as currently set out these concerns raise some serious, if not
fatal, problems for the GE project. However, as stated at the outset my aim is not to
overturn the GE, but to offer a sympathetic critique. To this end, I would suggest that
a different way of presenting and proceeding with the project is needed. To this end, I
suggest that we need to seek a model that avoids these problems.
However, first, I would want to suggest why we should not give up or dismiss
everything associated with the project of a GE. In the present global climate, we must
work as a global community in seeking freedom from human rights abuses and
children, priests, etc. and destroying other’s means of livelihood were clearly being flouted by these
attacks.

Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
finding common elements for this – as highlighted by Fasching, after Auschwitz we
cannot give way to an ethical relativism (Fasching 2000: 292-293) – for some
semblance of common values must exist if we are to speak out against atrocities (Hick
2007: 14). The quest for a GE has been, within this, a vital part of the discussion, and
the work of Küng and Swidler has been of great use here, especially in bringing a
voice of religion and morality to the economic and political sphere (See Swidler 1998
& Casanova 1999: 38). As Race has expressed it, “The GE is advancing change in a
plural world and with a plural consciousness about the problems we face” (Race
2007).
Having considered these pressing reasons for continuing with thinking in the area of a
GE, I think we need to heed Hick’s words about the GE being a particular Western
Secularized Christian affair, rather than a blueprint for the definitive GE itself.
Accepting that Küng’s consultations led him to go beyond a ‘typical Western’
viewpoint to stress community as well as the individual, yet his basis is still a
predominantly Western narrative. I would therefore advocate that proponents of the
GE should seek to recast the models projected, and perhaps even the project as
currently envisaged. Certain factors arise in this: one, as just highlighted, is the
Western-centric model that currently exists for the GE; two, the problem of
generalities and particularities means that the wording cannot assume a common
understanding of such features as ‘equal rights’ or ‘non-violence’; three, the treating
of faiths as monolithic, because, for instance, reform/ liberal and orthodox wings of
Judaism would have very different notions of what the equal treatment of men and
women would mean, thus we cannot seek a Western, or Jewish, or Buddhist, or
Chinese, or African ethic, etc..
Suggestions for Future Developments of the GE
Space does not permit the working out of a new model of the GE within the limits of
this article, however, from what we have said above, we can at least suggest some
guidelines for future work in the area. Firstly, expressions of the GE need to step back
from the implication that what they are proposing is the GE. While both Küng and
Swidler fully acknowledge that there work is but moves towards a GE, the way it is
presented – as noted above its language speaks as if there was a finished article –
mitigates against their intentions in this regard. As such, we have suggested, it may do
more harm than good in its quest to include those suspicious of the aims and motives
of what is often seen as a corrupt and immoral Western Christian world. Baroness
Warnock’s comments are pertinent here, that we should not expect others to obey our
norms – the sins of the West weigh too heavily on the world for us to bring such
moral impetus to the discussion. Therefore, we should take a step back, and at the
most propose a set of ethics that we would wish to act upon ourselves, and looking
out to others for similar expressions of interest in having an ethic that they can use in
a global environment – thus, if the attempt to formulate a GE can become a basis for
us to act out to the world then this is a start, and perhaps a better way to move towards
a GE.
3
Secondly, and developing from this, we should be wary of suggesting that any
generalized formulation of words can be the basis of a GE. If there is to be a GE at all
we may need to envisage it in much broader terms, perhaps as a variety of local or
regional ethics, but all aimed at living in a global village, as Nkulu says, “it is not
3
I develop this idea, as well as some issues raised throughout this section, in another article, ‘Are
Interfaith Dialogue and a Global Ethic Compatible? A Call for an Ethic to the Globe’, due to appear in
The Journal of Faith, Spirituality and Social Change, June 2008.

Dr P Hedges
Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
enough to think in a ‘global way’ or to have a kind of ‘universal mind.’ What is
required is ‘to act in a global way and with a global perspective’” (Nkulu 1999: 72).
This I think is compatible with my suggestion, that rather than having a ‘universal
mind’, where we have a one size fits all GE, we will instead act in a way and with a
perspective that takes our position as but one society in a larger community of
societies (and in relation to the planet and its non-human inhabitants) into perspective.
Thirdly, and in relation to this last point, we should be aware that a globalized vision
entails taking on board the localized situation and perspective of ourselves and others.
Therefore, instead of looking to the larger picture and attempting to paint vast images
of what a GE, or even a Christian ethic is, we will see our world, and a GE, as much
more of a patchwork of many different pieces. These suggestions are offered to make
the project of a GE more viable, in the face of criticisms that have or may be raised
against it, and therefore to offers suggestions for its future progress.
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Sample publication: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18:1 (2008), pp. 1-16.
Director: Faith and Globalization
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