Summary Sen's capability approach considers development as the expansion of the individual freedoms that people have reason to choose and value. In that sense, the capability approach does not intend to be a full theory of justice but only specifies a space in which development processes are to be assessed. Nussbaum's capability approach, in contrast, brings the capability approach to a fuller theory of justice, by first specifying the individual freedoms that development processes ought to bring about, and by linking these freedoms to an implementation instrument, namely individual rights. However, if as a theory of justice, the capability approach aims at becoming a social theory that liberates the lives of the poor from the unfreedoms that oppress them, we argue that it need not remain only a liberal project focused on individual freedom, but could perhaps take into account in a more decisive way the socio-political processes that are part of a collective history and whose historical dimension is constitutive of human freedom. On the basis of the philosophy of history developed by the Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri, and on the basis of its application to the reality of development by the liberation theologian and philosopher, Ignacio Ellacuría, we suggest that the capability approach will be a greater liberating theory for the poor if it articulates its main concerns about individual freedom and agency with concerns about historical "possibilities". To our opinion, this historical dimension introduces a larger realism in promoting individual capabilities through the exercise of individual freedom. The central thesis of Zubiri and Ellacuría's philosophy of history is that human freedom always situates itself within a collective history, which is seen as a process of collective appropriation of possibilities. Through this process, new forms of both freedoms and unfreedoms are being created. As the capability approach has not yet paid enough attention to this dark side of human agency, we argue that the liberation from unfreedoms has hence to be thought within the possibilities of options and choices that a particular collective history has left over as legacy, for the best or for the worse. Two case studies, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, will illustrate to what extent individual freedom is always made possible, or "possibilitated", differently according to a society's past decisions or non-decisions, and to what extent, the capability approach, as a liberating theory, cannot remain an idealistic freedom-oriented liberal project but a project immersed in the historical, collective and conflictual human reality. I. The capability approach as liberal political project Sen's capability approach Any development theorist, development economist, social philosopher and hopefully any economist is now familiar with Sen's pioneer notion of capability. Sen's works in social choice theory have constructively and successfully offered an alternative space, the capability space, to the long dominating utility space for assessing the successes and failures of institutional arrangements in promoting human well-being. In his well-known definition, a capability is "a person's ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being, (it) represents the alternative combinations of things a person is able to do or be."3 In the capability perspective, development is seen "in terms of the expansion of the real freedoms that the citizens enjoy to pursue the objectives they have reason to value, and in this sense the expansion of human capability can be, broadly, seen as the central feature of the process of