No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Simulation and knowledge of action
... PFC is large and many functions have been proposed for all or part of it: working memory Smith & Jonides 1999), context and cognitive control (Braver & Cohen 2000;, the cross-temporal organization of behavior (Fuster 1997), the voluntary control of behavior (Passingham 1993), and aspects of personal and social decision making Tucker, Luu, & Pribram 1995). As shown by neuroimaging studies in humans (see Braver et al. 1997;D'Esposito et al. 1998;Smith & Jonides 1999), critical areas for WM include dorsal PFC (Brodmann's Areas [BA] 46,9) and ventral PFC (BA 44,45,47). ...
... 6,245,250,252 Turner,B.H. 41 Tversky,A. 86,166,168,198,199 U Umiker-Sebeok, J. 158, 177 Ungerleider, L.G. 303 emotion 43-46, 150, 151 emotional memory formation 4, 9, 13-14, 15, 20-23, 27-30, 35 emotional response 44, 150 emotional/social judgment 23, 43, 44 emotionally-significant events 44, 45; see also reinforcers evaluation 67 evaluative mapping 105-106 expression 14 facial expression, recognition 43 fear conditioning 3, 13, 27, 59,106 learning 14, 57 liking/wanting 53, 54, 60, 67 long-term emotional declarative memory 4, 9, 13-14, 15, 21 memory consolidation 18, 21, 23, 24, 28 memory encoding 21, 23, 28 memory reconsolidation 28 memory retrieval 21,23,28 Pavlovian conditioning 44,45,46,47 physiological perception 30 reinforcement 44,45,46,47,48,49,57,58 anger 138 free-floating 173 and goal blockage 171, 179 and joint errors 174 animal research studies 13, 14, 21, 23, 24, 28-30, 44, 45; 9,11,12,13 accuracy of 10, 11 adaptive function of 9, 27 beta-adrenergic activity 24 consolidation 18, 21, 23, 24, 28 encoding 21, 23, 28 formation 4, 9, 13-14, 15, 20-23, 27-30 lesion studies 14-19 neurobiology of 9, 13-14 neuroimaging studies 20-23 pharmacology studies 24-25, 26 recall 9, 10 reconsolidation 28 retrieval 21, 23, 28 role of amygdala 4, 9, 13-14, 15, 20-23, 27-30, 35 / , 173-175, 176, 180 judged expectations 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192 14-19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 43, 44, 45, 46 basolateral amygdala damage 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 38-40, 48, 49, 51, 54, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67 liking/wanting 53, 54, 60, 67 models 60-67 Pavlovian conditioning 36, 37-38, 44, 45, 48, 51, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67 preparatory properties 37, 53, 56 protopathic properties 37, 53, 55 reward discrimination 49-53, 52, 54, 56, 57, 58 role of amygdala 44,45,46,47,48,49,57, 58 second order conditioning 57, 58, 62, 89 S-R interpretation 51, 52, 54,58, 59, 60, 61 S-S interpretation 58 Reisberg task 11,12,16 Remote Associates Test 6,246,248,251,252,260,[262][263][264]263,264,266,267,268,274,275 repetition,stimulus 113,114 representations,mental 186, 190, 191-193 maximizing 192, 193 predicting choices from 191-192 study 187-190 In the series ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH (AiCR) the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication: ...
... 6,245,250,252 Turner,B.H. 41 Tversky,A. 86,166,168,198,199 U Umiker-Sebeok, J. 158, 177 Ungerleider, L.G. 303 emotion 43-46, 150, 151 emotional memory formation 4, 9, 13-14, 15, 20-23, 27-30, 35 emotional response 44, 150 emotional/social judgment 23, 43, 44 emotionally-significant events 44, 45; see also reinforcers evaluation 67 evaluative mapping 105-106 expression 14 facial expression, recognition 43 fear conditioning 3, 13, 27, 59,106 learning 14, 57 liking/wanting 53, 54, 60, 67 long-term emotional declarative memory 4, 9, 13-14, 15, 21 memory consolidation 18, 21, 23, 24, 28 memory encoding 21, 23, 28 memory reconsolidation 28 memory retrieval 21,23,28 Pavlovian conditioning 44,45,46,47 physiological perception 30 reinforcement 44,45,46,47,48,49,57,58 anger 138 free-floating 173 and goal blockage 171, 179 and joint errors 174 animal research studies 13, 14, 21, 23, 24, 28-30, 44, 45; 9,11,12,13 accuracy of 10, 11 adaptive function of 9, 27 beta-adrenergic activity 24 consolidation 18, 21, 23, 24, 28 encoding 21, 23, 28 formation 4, 9, 13-14, 15, 20-23, 27-30 lesion studies 14-19 neurobiology of 9, 13-14 neuroimaging studies 20-23 pharmacology studies 24-25, 26 recall 9, 10 reconsolidation 28 retrieval 21, 23, 28 role of amygdala 4, 9, 13-14, 15, 20-23, 27-30, 35 / , 173-175, 176, 180 judged expectations 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192 14-19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 43, 44, 45, 46 basolateral amygdala damage 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 38-40, 48, 49, 51, 54, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67 liking/wanting 53, 54, 60, 67 models 60-67 Pavlovian conditioning 36, 37-38, 44, 45, 48, 51, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67 preparatory properties 37, 53, 56 protopathic properties 37, 53, 55 reward discrimination 49-53, 52, 54, 56, 57, 58 role of amygdala 44,45,46,47,48,49,57, 58 second order conditioning 57, 58, 62, 89 S-R interpretation 51, 52, 54,58, 59, 60, 61 S-S interpretation 58 Reisberg task 11,12,16 Remote Associates Test 6,246,248,251,252,260,[262][263][264]263,264,266,267,268,274,275 repetition,stimulus 113,114 representations,mental 186, 190, 191-193 maximizing 192, 193 predicting choices from 191-192 study 187-190 In the series ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH (AiCR) the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication: ...
Emotional Cognition gives the reader an up to date overview of the current state of emotion and cognition research that is striving for computationally explicit accounts of the relationship between these two domains. Many different areas are covered by some of the leading theorists and researchers in this area and the book crosses a range of domains, from the neurosciences through cognition and formal models to philosophy. Specific chapters consider, amongst other things, the role of emotion in decision-making, the representation and evaluation of emotive events, the relationship of affect on working memory and goal regulation. The emergence of such an integrative, computational, approach in emotion and cognition research is a unique and exciting development, one that will be of interest to established scholars as much as graduate students feeling their way in this area, and applicable to research in applied as well as purely theoretical domains.
... Some variation of this argument from analogy motivates much of the ongoing discussion falling under the "Theory of Mind" framework (see, e.g., Premack and Woodruff 1978) in current social cognition research. According to this framework, social cognition is fundamentally a kind of "mind reading" facilitated by one of two mediating mechanisms: the predictive theories of Theory Theory (TT) (e.g., Premack and Woodruff 1978, BaronCohen and Frith 1985, Carruthers 1996 or the simulative models of Simulation Theory (ST) (e.g., Heal 1986, Gordon 1996, Dokic and Proust 2002, Goldman 2006. Though they differ in their details, 12 both TT and ST rest on the "Myth of the Hidden" (Torrance 2009). ...
... ST, on the other hand, urges that this sort of inferential theorymaking is unnecessary by virtue of the immediate access we have to our own cognitive and emotional resources. According to ST, we exploit the rich inner re sources of our own mental life to imaginatively model the mental states of others as if we were in their situation, yielding a practical understanding of another's motives and intentions (Heal 1986, Gordon 1996, Dokic and Proust 2002, Goldman 2006). The debate is certainly more complex than this. ...
This essay situates Tetsuro Watsuji within contemporary approaches to social cognition. It argues for Watsuji's current relevance, suggesting that his analysis of embodiment and social space puts him in step with some of the concerns driving ongoing treatments of social cognition in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It is further shown how Watsuji offers a fruitful contribution to this discussion by lending a phenomenologically informed critical perspective. First, some interpretative work is done to explore Watsuji's conception of embodied intersubjectivity. The focus in particular is on Watsuji's conception of what is termed here the "hybrid" body as well as his distinctive treatment of interpersonal space—what Watsuji terms "betweenness" (aidagara). Next, these notions are connected to current treatments of social cognition within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Made explicit are several of the ways that Watsuji challenges the core cognitivist and internalist presuppositions behind the Theory of Mind paradigm, and experimental work is drawn from, among other sources, developmental psychology and gesture studies to support Watsuji's alternative characterization of embodied social interaction.
... Several theoretical frameworks have postulated that such contributions exist, e.g., GibsonÕs (1979) ecological theory of perception, and the motor theory of speech perception (Liberman & Whalen, 2000). In the following, we will concentrate on the common coding approach to perception and action (Hommel, M€ u usseler, Prinz, 1997) and on action simulation approaches (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Dokic & Proust, 2002; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Jeannerod, 2001; Knoblich, Seigerschmidt, Flach, & Prinz, 2002). The common coding theory applies JamesÕ ideomotor principle (James, 1890) to the domain of event perception, action perception, and imitation (Greenwald, 1970; Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997 Prinz, , 2002). ...
... Thus, one could identify the consequences of oneÕs own past actions based on the differential activation of these codes. Like the common coding theory, recent action simulation theories assume that the motor system contributes to action perception (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Dokic & Proust, 2002; Jeannerod, 2001). These theories claim that when one observes the actions of others, one concurrently simulates carrying out the same action. ...
Prior research suggests that the action system is responsible for creating an immediate sense of self by determining whether certain sensations and perceptions are the result of one's own actions. In addition, it is assumed that declarative, episodic, or autobiographical memories create a temporally extended sense of self or some form of identity. In the present article, we review recent evidence suggesting that action (procedural) knowledge also forms part of a person's identity, an action identity, so to speak. Experiments that addressed self-recognition of past actions, prediction, and coordination provide ample evidence for this assumption. The phenomena observed in these experiments can be explained by the assumption that observing an action results in the activation of action representations, the more so, when the action observed corresponds to the way in which the observer would produce it.
... In fact, mental simulation is a form of information representation that is highly structurally similar to real or imagined situations (Taylor & Schneider, 1989). A person who uses mental simulation retrieves their past experience stored in their memory to obtain the enjoyable, motivational, or informational characteristics they need (Dokic & Proust, 2002). ...
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of teaching mental simulation strategies on academic performance and creativity of architecture students of Mohaghegh Ardabili University of Ardabil in the design of health clinics lesson. The research method was quasi-experimental with pre-test and post-test design with both trial and control groups. The statistical population was composed of all seven semester students who were studying architecture in Mohaghegh Ardabili University in the first semester of the academic year 1396-1397 that they were divided into two groups (each group was 15) that were randomly selected as the trial group and the control group. Tools used in this research were a questionnaire of academic performance, which was adapted from the Performance Measurement Questionnaire (EPT) Pham and Taylor, and Creativity Questionnaire, adapted from the Schaeffer Questionnaire for creativity assessment. Mental simulation trainings were presented for 5 sessions of 3 hours for the trial group. The control group did not receive any training. To analyze data we used ANCOVA covariance from inferential statistics to test the research hypotheses. Findings indicated that training mental simulation strategies improved the academic performance of students under the motivating factor (p <0.05), and on students' creativity have a significant effect under the factor of feeling of fantasy, so simulation strategies can be used to improve architecture students' academic performance and promote their creativity.
... During simulation processes, individuals may re-activate their own past experiences in order to gain access to pleasurable, motivational, or strictly informational properties [20]. Simulation of a situation seems to be realized by mirror neurons that increase their discharge frequency both during action production and during observation of the same action performed by another person [27,63]. ...
Postural control is a motor skill that allows individuals to interact with their environment. Indeed, in all species, development of postural control is a prerequisite for acquiring further motor abilities. In humans, the maintenance of a bipedal posture plays an important role in interaction with the environment, as it provides a stable postural basis allowing upper limbs and hands to be used to manipulate objects. On the other hand, this bipedal posture induces a constraint in terms of balance, as individuals have to deal with a relatively small base of support enclosed by the surface of the two feet. Biomechanical principles underlying postural control have been studied in great depth, but the effect of emotion on postural control seems to be an emergent topic. Over the last two decades, an exponential number of studies have been published at the interface of affective and social neurosciences. Moreover, the interactions between motor and affective processes are increasingly documented in the scientific literature. In this article, we try to synthetize main recent empirical results that have allowed exploration of the link between body posture and emotional processing.
... This system may be what allows both joint action (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005), and also the perception of gestures (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). An action-simulation is the anticipation of action and its effects, via imagination, which occurs automatically, via mirror neurons, when seeing an action (Dokic & Proust, 2002). One prediction of this hypothesis is that the system can better perceive its own actions than the actions of another person (Knoblich & Flach, 2001). ...
Performers’ ancillary body movements, which are generally thought to support sound-production, appear to be related to musical structure and musical expression. Uncovering systematic relationships has, however, been difficult. Researchers have used the framework of embodied gestures, adapted from language research, to categorize and analyze performer’s movements. I have taken a different approach, conceptualizing ancillary movements as continuous actions in space-time within a dynamical systems framework. The framework predicts that the movements of the performer will be complexly, but systematically, related to the musical movement and that listeners will be able to hear both the metaphorical motion implied by the musical structure and the real movements of the performer. In three experiments, I adapted a set of statistical, time-series, and dynamical systems tools to music performance research to examine these predictions. In Experiment 1, I used force plate measurements to examine the postural sway of two trombonists playing two solo pieces with different musical structures in different expressive styles (normal, expressive, non-expressive). In Experiment 2, I recorded the postural sway of listeners as they listened to the performances recorded in Experiment 1 while “conducting” them. In Experiment 3, I asked the same two performers to mirror the expression of their own and the other musician’s performances while their postural sway was recorded. Experiment 1 showed that performers changed their patterns of movement to reflect musical boundaries (places of change in musical structure), but did so differently depending the larger musical context, showing a complex, but systematic relationship between the musical structure, expression, and movement. Further, Experiment 1 showed that ancillary movements are not ancillary, but an intimate part of the creative process which produces musical performance. Experiment 2 and 3 showed that listeners and performers, when asked to mirror the expression of the recorded performance, mirrored both the real movements of performers as well as the metaphorical motion implied by the musical structure. This dissertation provides a new framework for the study of musical performance that treats the body as an important factor in the both the creation and experience of listening to music.
... Na taj način strukture simboličkih sklopova predstavljaju opojmljivanja sadržaja svjesnosti. Značenje koje nastaje spajanjem izraza i pojma u suštini je složena mentalna simulacija, odnosno vrsta zamišljanja ili prisjećanja koja pretpostavlja otjelovljeni doživljaj kakvoće učinaka intencionalnosti (Dokic, Proust, 2002;Markman, Klein, Suhr, 2008). Primjerice, doživljaj radnje hvatanja stola uključen je u sklapanju značenja izričaja »uhvatiti stol«, pri čemu se aktivira sustav zrcalnih neurona, odnosno brojni neuronski krugovi, kao i tijekom stvarne radnje (Arbib, 2006;Rizzolatti, Arbib, 1998;Rizzolatti, Sinigaglia, 2008;Iacoboni, 2009;Pineda i sur., 2009). ...
The article presents a multidisciplinary perspective on the problem of diminishing physical activity and its impact on the health in the overall population. We discuss possible reasons for apparent marginalization of the physical education and practice in the educational system and popular culture rituals, and present an emergent holistic approach as a way how to deal with this problem. This approach is not reduced to a mere prescription for greater inclusion of physical exercise in the educational programs or an apologetic stance for proper functioning of the bodily systems for optimal health, but argues for a reconceptualization and evaluation of the role of embodied cognition in the context of various psychological, emotional, cognitive and sociological components of human being. We argue that the model of emergent holism presents a well-defined scientific frame for the conceptualization of these issues.
... Na taj način strukture simboličkih sklopova predstavljaju opojmljivanja sadržaja svjesnosti. Značenje koje nastaje spajanjem izraza i pojma u suštini je složena mentalna simulacija, odnosno vrsta zamišljanja ili prisjećanja koja pretpostavlja otjelovljeni doživljaj kakvoće učinaka intencionalnosti (Dokic, Proust, 2002;Markman, Klein, Suhr, 2008). Primjerice, doživljaj radnje hvatanja stola uključen je u sklapanju značenja izričaja »uhvatiti stol«, pri čemu se aktivira sustav zrcalnih neurona, odnosno brojni neuronski krugovi, kao i tijekom stvarne radnje (Arbib, 2006;Rizzolatti, Arbib, 1998;Rizzolatti, Sinigaglia, 2008;Iacoboni, 2009;Pineda i sur., 2009). ...
Sažetak Rad predstavlja multidisciplinarno razmatranje problema smanjenog tjelesnog kretanja i njegovih posljedica za zdravlje stanovništva. Raspravlja se o uzrocima koji dovode do marginaliziranja tjelesnog vježbanja u cilju postizanja optimalnog zdravstvenog statusa, kako u sustavu školstva i akademskog obrazovanja, tako i u provođenju slobodnog vreme na. Ovaj pristup nije iscrpljen samo u preskripciji uključivanja tjelovježbe u edukacijskim programima ili apologetskog stajališta o nužnosti skladnog funkcioniranja tjelesnih sustava za optimalno zdravlje, nego je svrha rada naglasiti potrebu za promišljanjem i vrednova njem uloge utjelovljene spoznaje u kontekstu različitih fizioloških, emotivnih, kognitivnih i društvenih sastavnica ljudskog bića. U radu se predstavlja model emergentnog holizma koji predstavlja plodan znanstveni okvir za promišljanje o navedenim pitanjima. Ključne riječi tijelo, tjelesno vježbanje, zdravlje, obrazovanje, multidisciplinarnost, emergentni holizam Uvod Suvremene znanstvene spoznaje ukazuju na neraskidivu povezanost kogni-tivnih i tjelesnih aspekata (Diamond, 2000), odnosno međusobni utjecaj tje-lesnog, intelektualnog i emocionalnog razvoja (Baltes, 1987; Whitbourne, Whitbourne, 2010). Svjedoci smo, ipak, da u našoj kulturi mehanicistička pretpostavka o »dualizmu tijela i uma« nije prevladana. To je osobito zamjet-ljivo u području odgoja, obrazovanja i znanosti gdje se spoznajne aktivnosti koje se pripisuju mišljenju, logici i analitičnosti uzdižu kao vrednije u odnosu na tjelesne aktivnosti koje se povezuju s pukom motoričkom izvedbom. U ovom ćemo radu predstaviti probleme koji proizlaze iz takvog pristupa te ponuditi emergentni model koji proizlazi iz različitih znanstvenih istraživanja i promišljanja holističkog razrješenja odnosa tijela i uma. Paradoksi marginalizacije tjelovježbe i sportskih spektakla Čovjek suvremenog doba iznimno je vezan uz sedentarni način življenja što uzrokuje mnoge bolesti. Iako je taj podatak općepoznat i premda mnogi pate od zdravstvenih tegoba i neravnoteža (potkožno masno tkivo) te smanjenja funkcionalnih sposobnosti (otežano disanje kod manjih napora itd.), u praksi je otklanjanje takvih problema putem tjelovježbe zanemarivo. Primjerice, u Hrvatskoj su kardiovaskularne bolesti na vrhu ljestvice smrtnosti, a od njih je 2011. godine umrlo 24 841 osoba, odnosno 48,7 % ukupne smrtnosti (HZJZ/
... Action-perception mechanisms of recognition are grounded in the establishment of the appropriate links between the actions and their perceptual consequences, as emphasized by the ecological theory of perception (Gibson, 1979). Recent approaches such as the common coding theory (Prinz, 2002), action simulation theories (Jeannerod, 2001;Dokic and Proust, 2002), and the "simulation" theory of cognitive function (Hesslow, 2002), put forward the argument that the observer's action system is most strongly activated during the perception of self-produced actions. In other words, a closer match between anticipated actions and perceived effect leads to this selfrecognition capacity. ...
The generation of musical material in a given style has been the subject of many studies with the increased sophistication of artificial intelligence models of musical style. In this paper we address a question of primary importance for artificial intelligence and music psychology: can such systems generate music that users indeed consider as corresponding to their own style? We address this question through an experiment involving both performance and recognition tasks with musically naïve school-age children. We asked 56 children to perform a free-form improvisation from which two kinds of music excerpt were created. One was a mere recording of original performances. The other was created by a software program designed to simulate the participants' style, based on their original performances. Two hours after the performance task, the children completed the recognition task in two conditions, one with the original excerpts and one with machine-generated music. Results indicate that the success rate is practically equivalent in two conditions: children tended to make correct attribution of the excerpts to themselves or to others, whether the music was human-produced or machine-generated (mean accuracy = 0.75 and = 0.71, respectively). We discuss this equivalence in accuracy for machine-generated and human produced music in the light of the literature on memory effects and action identity which addresses the recognition of one's own production.
... . Je considère donc que la théorie de la simulation ne peut pas être « radicale » au sens deGordon (1995Gordon ( , 1996. Pour une évaluation de ce débat, cf.Dokic et Proust (2002), en particulier les contributions de Joëlle Proust et de Pierre Jacob sur les limites de la simulation.28.Gordon, 1995, 60. ...
Selon une théorie cognitiviste de l’auto-attribution, je peux parvenir à la connaissance directe, non-inférentielle de mes propres croyances. Cette théorie a été traditionnellement associée à la notion d’introspection conçue comme source de connaissance interne. On sait (au moins depuis Wittgenstein) que le recours à cette notion compromet l’application à soi-même d’un concept unifié de croyance, valable également pour autrui. Dans cet essai, j’explore une autre méthode d’auto-attribution, également envisagée par Wittgenstein (et plus tard par Gareth Evans), que j’appelle « méthode de déploiement ». Selon cette méthode, je parviens à la connaissance de mes croyances en portant mon attention, non pas à l’intérieur de moi-même, mais directement sur le monde extérieur tel que je l’ai trouvé. Certains arguments wittgensteiniens suggèrent que la méthode de déploiement conduit inexorablement au solipsisme. Je m’oppose à ces arguments, en m’inspirant de travaux récents sur la théorie de la simulation mentale. Je parviens à deux conclusions générales. Premièrement, la méthode de déploiement n’est pas réservée à l’auto-attribution ; elle fonde également l’attribution de croyances à autrui. En second lieu, on peut faire ressortir la spécificité de l’attribution égologique par le « matériau ontologique » auquel cette méthode s’applique. Par exemple, je suis fondé à croire que je crois qu’il pleut parce que c’est le fait qu’il pleut, et non une simple possibilité, qui se présente à moi lorsque je me tourne vers le monde. La méthode de déploiement peut échapper au solipsisme si on l’associe à une distinction ontologique naïve entre des faits et de simples possibilités.
... Simulation of one's own behavior is based on the ability of an individual to simulate actions, to simulate perception and to anticipate ( Hesslow, 2002Hesslow, , 2012). During simulation processes, the subject may replay her own past experience in order to extract from it pleasurable, motivational, or strictly informational properties ( Dokic and Proust, 2002). According to the embodiment theories, experiencing emotional states affects motor systems ( Giummarra et al., 2008;Michalak et al., 2009;Kiefer and Pulvermuller, 2012). ...
... This familiar context is important for the purpose of this paper in one particular respect, namely as regards the principal visibility of other minds. The enactive theory opposes the Theory Theory (Premack and Woodruff, 1978;Baron-Cohen et al., 1986;Antonietti et al., 2006) and the Simulation Theory (Gordon, 1996;Dokic and Proust, 2002;Goldman, 2006) that share the common presupposition of "homuncularity, the absence of body" (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, 485), in other words the idea that "[human beings] are hidden from each other in principle" (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009, 467). Enactivism explains this presupposition of the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory by the fact that they both stem from Cartesian dualism. ...
The question of visibility and invisibility in social understanding is examined here. First, the phenomenological account of expressive phenomena and key ideas of the participatory sense-making theory are presented with regard to the issue of visibility. These accounts plead for the principal visibility of agents in interaction. Although participatory sense-making does not completely rule out the existence of opacity and invisible aspects of agents in interaction, it assumes the capacity of agents to integrate disruptions, opacity and misunderstandings in mutual modulation. Invisibility is classified as the dialectical counterpart of visibility, i.e., as a lack of sense whereby the dynamics of perpetual asking, of coping with each other and of improvements in interpretation are brought into play. By means of empirical exemplification this article aims at demonstrating aspects of invisibility in social interaction which complement the enactive interpretation. Without falling back into Cartesianism, it shows through dramaturgical analysis of a practice called “(Inter)acting with the inner partner” that social interaction includes elements of opacity and invisibility whose role is performative. This means that opacity is neither an obstacle to be overcome with more precise understanding nor a lack of meaning, but rather an excess of sense, a “hiddenness” of something real that has an “active power” (Merleau-Ponty). In this way it contributes to on-going social understanding as a hidden potentiality that naturally enriches, amplifies and in part constitutes human participation in social interactions. It is also shown here that this invisible excess of sense already functions on the level of self-relationship due to the essential self-opacity and self-alterity of each agent of social interaction. The analysis consequently raises two issues: the question of the enactive ethical stance toward the alterity of the other and the question of the autonomy of the self-opaque agent.
... It has been proposed that common codes for perception and action can be used to simulate observed actions (Blakemore & Decety, 2001;Grush, 2004;Jeannerod, 2001;Wilson & Knoblich, 2005;Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003). Th is form of simulation is diff erent from the type of simulation implicated in the debate about theory of mind (e.g., Dokic & Proust, 2002;Goldman, 2006;Harris, 1995), which concerns the simulation of mental states to understand the behaviors of other individuals (putting yourself in another person's shoes, as it were). Th e basic idea in action simulation is that predictive or internal models guiding performance of one's own actions can be applied to simulate others' actions. ...
This chapter provides an overview of the evidence suggesting that action perception depends upon the interplay of perceptual and motor processes and discusses the implications of such perception-action coupling. The existence of the mirror neuron system, the impact of motor expertise on action perception, and the influence of motor constraints on action perception are discussed as support for the common coding hypothesis. The coupling of the perception and action systems also allows observers to accurately predict the actions of others and to differentiate self-generated from othergenerated actions.
... Much research has argued that the perceiver of an action mentally simulates executing that action herself (Decety, 2002). This simulation theory has counterparts in simulation theories of mind that propose that understanding another person involves simulating their mental activity (e.g., Gallese and Goldman, 1998). ...
Language is an inherently social behavior. In this paper, we bring together two research areas that typically occupy distinct sections of the literature: perspective taking in spatial language (whether people represent a scene from their own or a different spatial perspective), and perspective taking in action language (the extent to which they simulate an action as though they were performing that action). First, we note that vocabulary is used inconsistently across the spatial and action domains, and propose a more transparent vocabulary that will allow researchers to integrate action- and spatial-perspective taking. Second, we note that embodied theories of language comprehension often make the narrow assumption that understanding action descriptions involves adopting the perspective of an agent carrying out that action. We argue that comprehenders can adopt embodied action-perspectives other than that of the agent, including those of the patient or an observer. Third, we review evidence showing that perspective taking in spatial language is a flexible process. We argue that the flexibility of spatial-perspective taking provides a means for conversation partners engaged in dialogue to maximize similarity between their situation models. These situation models can then be used as the basis for action language simulations, in which language users adopt a particular action-perspective.
... Identification of emotional facial expressions is an ability of high surviving value that can be accomplished through activation of two main mechanisms, i.e., simulation and mentalizing (Goldman and Sripada, 2005; Decety and Grezès, 2006; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007; Apperly, 2008; Bastiaansen et al., 2009). On one hand, an attributor can understand the mental state of an agent by covertly mimicking or reenacting the same activity of the agent without producing an overt behaviour (Goldman, 2002). An observer can attribute a mental state to a target by replicating the target's state in her/his own mind and assigning the output of this process to the target; the observer could also test a hypothesized state by mentally simulating it and verifying whether its outcome matches that of the target (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). ...
Can reading others' emotional states be shaped by expertise? We assessed processing of emotional facial expressions in professional actors trained either to voluntary activate mimicry to reproduce character's emotions (as foreseen by the "Mimic Method"), or to infer others' inner states from reading the emotional context (as foreseen by "Stanislavski Method"). In explicit recognition of facial expressions (Experiment 1), the two experimental groups differed from each other and from a control group with no acting experience: the Mimic group was more accurate, whereas the Stanislavski group was slower. Neither acting experience, instead, influenced implicit processing of emotional faces (Experiment 2). We argue that expertise can selectively influence explicit recognition of others' facial expressions, depending on the kind of "emotional expertise".
... Simulation of one's own behavior is based on the ability of an individual to simulate actions, to simulate perception and to anticipate (Hesslow, 2002(Hesslow, , 2012. During simulation processes, the subject may replay her own past experience in order to extract from it pleasurable, motivational, or strictly informational properties (Dokic and Proust, 2002). According to the embodiment theories, experiencing emotional states affects motor systems (Giummarra et al., 2008;Michalak et al., 2009;Kiefer and Pulvermuller, 2012). ...
Background: Emotional context may play a crucial role in movement production. According to simulation theories, emotional states affect motor systems. The aim of this study was to compare postural responses assessed by posturography and electromyography when subjects were instructed to imagine themselves in a painful or a non-painful situation.
Methods: Twenty-nine subjects (22.3 ± 3.7 years) participated in this study. While standing quietly on a posturographic platform, they were instructed to imagine themselves in a painful or non-painful situation. Displacement of the center of pressure (COP), leg muscle electromyographic activity, heart rate, and electrodermal activity were assessed in response to painful and non-painful situations.
Results: The anteroposterior path was shorter (p < 0.05) when subjects imagined themselves in a painful situation (M = 148.0 ± 33.4 mm) compared to a non-painful situation (158.2 ± 38.7 mm). Higher tibialis anterior (TA) activity (RMS-TA = 3.38 ± 1.95% vs. 3.24 ± 1.85%; p < 0.001) and higher variability of soleus (SO) activity (variation coefficient of RMS-SO = 13.5 ± 16.2% vs. M = 9.0 ± 7.2%; p < 0.05) were also observed in painful compared to non-painful situations. No significant changes were observed for other physiological data.
Conclusion: This study demonstrates that simulation of painful situations induces changes in postural control and leg muscle activation compared to non-painful situations, as increased stiffness was demonstrated in response to aversive pictures in accordance with previous results.
... 7) identify one alternative to a representational conception of belief, namely the view that beliefs are "dispositions to act and to experience in various ways" (Gallagher, 2005, p. 214). Both Gallagher and Ratcliffe suggest that possessing a belief does not involve possessing a discrete state, but rather that our belief attributions can be indeterminate and "ambiguous even from the perspective of the believer" (Gallagher, 2005, p. 215 Dokic (2002) makes this point in developing a picture of immature belief-understanding that I think is attractive as an explanation of the online false-belief understanding displayed in these experiments. Dokic describes a "non-conceptual view of belief-ascription, according to which the capacity to ascribe beliefs does not require the antecedent possession of the concept of belief as a mental state" (p. ...
The dominant account of human social understanding is that we possess a "folk psychology": that we can understand and interact with other people because we have a commonsense understanding of their mental states. However, recently a group of philosophers from the phenomenological tradition have called into question the folk psychological account of human social understanding. I will first explicate the "phenomenological critics'" account of social understanding, making use of Michael Wheeler's distinction between online and offline intelligence. I will then discuss recent studies of early false belief understanding, and identify ways it supports and ways it challenges the critics' account.
... Simulation theory (ST), on the other hand, claims that we have no need for a theory like this because we have an inner model that we can use for simulating another person's mental states, and this model is our own mind. Thus, we model the beliefs and intentions of others whom we deal with as if we were in their situation, or as if we were them (Dokic and Proust 2002; Gordon 1996; Goldman 2006). Different as these two concepts are, there are several critical points that may be raised against both of them: ...
Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated
and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their
mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive
observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain.
In this paper, we present a concept of social understanding as an ongoing, dynamical process of participatory sense-making
and mutual incorporation. This process may be described (1) from a dynamical agentive systems point of view as an interaction and coordination of two embodied agents; (2) from a phenomenological approach as a mutual incorporation, i.e. a process in which the lived bodies of both participants extend and form a common intercorporality. Intersubjectivity,
it is argued, is not a solitary task of deciphering or simulating the movements of others but means entering a process of
embodied interaction and generating common meaning through it. This approach will be further illustrated by an analysis of
primary dyadic interaction in early childhood.
... Within this literature, social cognition is generally framed as a kind of " mindreading " or basic ability to detect and respond to another's unobservable mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, etc.). For several decades, this mindreading ability was said to depend upon extra-perceptual cognitive mechanisms: the early development of a quasi-scientific theory of mind (Baron-Cohen 1995; Gopnik and Wellman 1992) or, alternatively, the use of our own mental states to imaginatively simulate what another person is likely thinking and feeling (Dokic and Proust 2002; Goldman 2006; Gordon 1996). These two approaches, " Theory Theory " and " Simulation Theory, " were generally taken to be the two most viable solutions to the empirical problem of other minds. ...
Much recent work on social cognition and empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption
that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners.
I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental
states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its
initial implausibility, this view receives robust support from several strands of empirical research.
KeywordsPhenomenology–Philosophy of mind–Social cognition–Empathy–Distributed cognition–Extended mind
... This separation of gesture and musical sound prepares the ground for talking about mental simulation as the substance of musical imagery, meaning that musical imagery is not a kind of abstract representational or propositional system, but is a matter of reenacting from a first-person, egocentric perspective what we have perceived in the world. This simulation view of cognition [16, 25] seems fortunately now to be gaining plausibility, and means that whatever kind of music we imagine, and regardless our level of expertise and/or the complexity of the music, there is always the possibility of mentally mimicking gestures we think belong to the music (although perhaps only in a low-acuity, sketchy manner). Accepting that gestural images are integral to musical imagery, it could be useful to have a brief look at some principles of motor cognition [26]. ...
There seem to be strong links between gestural imagery and musical imagery, and it is suggested that gestural imagery can
be instrumental in triggering and sustaining mental images of musical sound. Gestural images are seen as integral to most
experiences of music, and several practical and theoretical musical disciplines could profit from focusing on these gestural
images. Research in support of this is reviewed, and some topics for future research are presented.
... ST, on the other hand, urges that this sort of inferential theory-making is unnecessary in virtue of the immediate access we have to our own cognitive and emotional resources. We instead exploit the rich inner resources of our own mental life to imaginatively model the mental states of others as if we were in their situation, yielding a practical understanding of another's intentions (Dokic & Proust, 2002;Goldman, 2006;Goldman & Sripada, 2005;Gordon, 1996;Heal, 1986). The particulars of the ToM debate are more intricate than this caricature suggests. ...
The extended mind thesis (EM) asserts that some cognitive processes are (partially) composed of actions consisting of the manipulation and exploitation of environmental structures. Might some processes at the root of social cognition have a similarly extended structure? In this paper, I argue that social cognition is fundamentally an interactive form of space management--the negotiation and management of "we-space"--and that some of the expressive actions involved in the negotiation and management of we-space (gesture, touch, facial and whole-body expressions) drive basic processes of interpersonal understanding and thus do genuine social-cognitive work. Social interaction is a kind of extended social cognition, driven and at least partially constituted by environmental (non-neural) scaffolding. Challenging the Theory of Mind paradigm, I draw upon research from gesture studies, developmental psychology, and work on Moebius Syndrome to support this thesis.
... Cette controverse a opposé les avocats de la « théorie de la théorie » à ceux de la « théorie de la simulation ». (Cf. Davies et Stone 1995a Carruthers et Smith 1996, Heal 1994, Dokic et Proust 2002). Selon la théorie dite de la simulation « off-line » (Gordon 1995aGordon , 1995bGordon , 1996 Goldman 1992) nous attribuons à autrui des états mentaux en utilisant notre propre esprit comme un modèle de son esprit, en re-créant, répliquant ou imitant dans notre esprit les états mentaux –croyances, désirs, intentions, perceptions…-d'autrui. ...
De même que nous mettons du sens dans le comportement des autres grâce à la simulation mentale, cet article fait l'hypothèse que la simulation –sous ses diverses formes – est à la base d'au moins une partie du sens que nous trouvons dans les fictions et les œuvres d'art.
... The ability to recognize one's own earlier actions requires a close link between perception and action. Although such a link was postulated by earlier authors (e.g., Gibson, 1979; Liberman & Mattingly, 1985), it has attracted much attention in recent years as a result of developments such as the common-coding theory of perception and action (Hommel, Mü sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1997) and the closely related concept of action simulation in neuroscience (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Dokic & Proust, 2002; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Jeannerod, 2001). The common-coding theory assumes that actions are coded in terms of the resulting perceptual events (Prinz, 1997; see also Greenwald, 1970). ...
Can skilled performers, such as artists or athletes, recognize the products of their own actions? We recorded 12 pianists playing 12 mostly unfamiliar musical excerpts, half of them on a silent keyboard. Several months later, we played these performances back and asked the pianists to use a 5-point scale to rate whether they thought they were the person playing each excerpt (1 = no, 5 = yes). They gave their own performances significantly higher ratings than any other pianist's performances. In two later follow-up tests, we presented edited performances from which differences in tempo, overall dynamic (i.e., intensity) level, and dynamic nuances had been removed. The pianists' ratings did not change significantly, which suggests that the remaining information (expressive timing and articulation) was sufficient for self-recognition. Absence of sound during recording had no significant effect. These results are best explained by the hypothesis that an observer's action system is most strongly activated during perception of self-produced actions.
... Generally speaking, the simulation process can be conceived as a conscious reactivation of previously executed actions stored in memory (Decety and Ingvar, 1990). An individual who is engaging in simulation may replay her own past experience in order to extract from it pleasurable, motivational or strictly informational properties (Dokic and Proust, 2002). Such a view was clearly described by the Swedish physiologist Hesslow (2002). ...
A large number of cognitive neuroscience studies point to the similarities in the neural circuits activated during the generation, imagination, as well as observation of one's own and other's behavior. Such findings support the shared representations account of social cognition, which is suggested to provide the basic mechanism for social interaction. Mental simulation may also be a representational tool to understand the self and others. However, successfully navigating these shared representations--both within oneself and between individuals--constitutes an essential functional property of any autonomous agent. It will be argued that self-awareness and agency, mediated by the temporoparietal (TPJ) area and the prefrontal cortex, are critical aspects of the social mind. Thus, differences as well as similarities between self and other representations at the neural level may be related to the degrees of self-awareness and agency. Overall, these data support the view that social cognition draws on both domain-general mechanisms and domain-specific embodied representations.
... We hypothesize that to recognize an earlier action as self-generated, or to predict action-related effects accurately, individuals access their action knowledge by internally simulating the action. This process of simulation involves imagining-in anticipation-the movements and effects that characterize the event, and it is triggered automatically when an action is observed (Dokic & Proust, 2002;Jeannerod, 2003;. Thus, the notion of action simulation presupposes close links between perception and action. ...
Ensemble musicians play in synchrony despite expressively motivated irregularities in timing. We hypothesized that synchrony is achieved by each performer internally simulating the concurrent actions of other ensemble members, relying initially on how they would perform in their stead. Hence, musicians should be better at synchronizing with recordings of their own earlier performances than with others' recordings. We required pianists to record one part from each of several piano duets, and later to play the complementary part in synchrony with their own or others' recordings. The pianists were also asked to identify their own recordings. The pianists were better at synchronizing with their own than with others' performances, and they were able to recognize their own recordings. Furthermore, synchronization accuracy and recognition were correlated: Pianists who were relatively accurate at synchronizing with their own performances were also good at recognizing them. Thus, action simulation may underlie both synchronization and self-recognition.
... In short, a so-called Theory of Mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) is required for AoR. There is still a lot of controversy about the best functional description of ToM: There are mainly three basic theories, namely the so-called theory-theories (Carruthers & Smith, 1996), the simulation theories (Davies & Stone, 1995; Dokic & Proust, 2002), and interaction theory (Gallagher, 2005). Whatever theory is on the right track, it is clear that a ToM involves the capacity to detect specific intentions (through the actions of others). ...
The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually evolving, onto- and phylogenetically plausible framework which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively. In particular, three fundamental levels of agency and ownership processing have to be distinguished: The level of feeling, thinking and social interaction. This naturalistic account will not only allow to "ground the self in action", but also provide an empirically testable taxonomy for cognitive neuroscience and a new tool for disentangling agency and ownership disturbances in psychopathology (e.g. alien hand, anarchic hand, anosognosia for one's own hemiparesis).
Previous
studies have reported (i) freezing-like posturographic correlates in response to painful as compared to non-painful scenes vision (Lelard et al., Front Hum Neurosci 7:4, 2013) and (ii) an increase of this response during the mental simulation as compared to the passive viewing of the painful scenes (Lelard et al., Front Psychol 8:2012, 2017). The main objective of the present study was to explore the modulation of posturographic correlates of painful scenes vision by the level of depicted pain and the influence of mental simulation on this modulation. Thirty-six participants (36.3 ± 11.4 years old) were included in this study. During the experiment, participants had to stand on a posturographic platform. Three types of static visual stimuli were randomly depicting different pain-level situations: no-pain, low-pain, high-pain. In a first run, participants watched these stimuli passively (passive condition); in a second run, they were asked to “imagine that they were personally experiencing the situations they were about to see” (mental simulation condition). For each picture, subjective ratings were recorded for displeasure and desire to avoid at the end of the posturographic session. Results support an approach-type behavior in response to high-pain stimuli in the passive condition which becomes a withdrawal-type behavior in the mental simulation condition. Moreover, this withdrawal-type behavior is modulated by the level of depicted pain and this modulation does not appear for the subjective data. As a conclusion, these results are in accordance with those of previous studies showing the modulation of posturographic correlates of pain perception by mental simulation and report, for the first time, modulation of this effect by the level of depicted pain. The dichotomy of this modulatory effect between subjective and objective data is discussed as well as the finding of an approach-type behavior towards painful stimuli when passively viewing them becoming a withdrawal-type behavior when mental simulation is applied to the same stimuli.
In this chapter, we consider epistemically robust accounts of self-knowledge. We start with recent inner sense theories (§1), devoting special attention to Armstrong's. He holds that self-knowledge is the product of a reliable cognitive mechanism that tracks first-order propositional attitudes and produces the corresponding second-order beliefs. The model is found wanting because it severs the connection between self-knowledge and rationality and concepts’ possession. We then move on to Gopnik's theory-theory (§2). According to her, subjects know their minds the same way the know others'--that is by inference to the best explanation involving a real theory they develop around age four. We criticise the model because it either collapses into bahviorism or else offers a circular account of self-knowledge. Finally, we examine simulation theories (§3) and pay special attention to Robert Gordon's. We cast doubts on its soundness as a theory of first-personal self-knowledge, although we find it more promising as a possible account of some instances of third-personal self-knowledge.
Simulation theory has been put forward as an account of our folk understanding of the mind. In this chapter, I examine a neglected argument to the effect that there is an essential limitation of simulation itself, which cannot explain a crucial ingredient of our ordinary, folk-psychological conception of beliefs. Even if it is conceded that simulation gives the subject some sense of what happens in the world when someone believes something, the understanding of facts of believing that can be extracted from simulation is incomplete; simulation must be augmented with a theory of beliefs as genuine constituents of such facts. Folk psychology reifies beliefs in order to deal with an essential requirement for mastery of the folk-psychological concept of belief. Hopefully, a reflection on the limits of simulation will lead to a better understanding of the role of theory in ordinary belief-ascriptions.
I review the shifting definitions of simulation as found in recent versions of the simulation theory (ST) of social cognition. I focus on two concepts that have become central to recent ST in the work of a number of simulation theorists: the notion of reuse and the notion of B-formatted representations. I point out specific limitations or problems involved in these concepts. Although the reuse hypothesis provides an interesting evolutionary account of how neural mechanisms may adapt to new tasks, it doesn’t offer an explanation of how these mechanisms work. In contrast to the genuinely embodied account that simulation theorists seek, an explanation of social cognition in terms of B-formatted representations not only remains disembodied, but also ignores social interaction and remains solipsistic. I conclude by briefly outlining a non-simulationist enactivist account that can incorporate the reuse hypothesis.
In a series of experiments, Bott and Noveck (2004) found that the computation of scalar inferences, a variety of conversational implicature, caused a delay in response times. In order to determine what aspect of the inferential process that underlies scalar inferences caused this delay we extended their paradigm to three other kinds of inferences: free choice inferences, conditional perfection, and exhaustivity in 'it'-clefts. In contrast to scalar inferences, the computation of these three kinds of inferences facilitated response times. Following a suggestion made by Chemla and Bott (2014) we propose that the time it takes to compute a conversational implicature depends on the structural characteristics of the required alternatives.
U tekstu se kultura sagledava u okviru složenog sustava kojeg tvore fizičke, biološke i kulturne pojavnosti te se za njezino razumijevanje predlaže pristup s teorijskom podlogom koja potiče međuprožimanje tradicionalno razdvojenih društveno-humanističkih i prirodoslovnih disciplina. Ontološko monistička teorija emergentnih sustava i otjelovljene spoznaje omogućuje razmatranje dvosmjernih odnosa među sastavnicama stvarnosti čime implicitno podrazumijeva da kulturne pojavnosti, bez obzira na njihovu simboličku apstrakciju ili subjektivnu kakvoću, pripadaju istoj stvarnosti kao i objekti istraživanja prirodoslovnih znanosti. Uzimajući u obzir holistički pristup stvarnosti kao složenog sustava, teorija emergencije pokušava se odhrvati dualitističkoj ontologiiji zasebnih domena koristeći kao središnji pojam utjelovljenje: otjelovljeno iskustvo življenog uključuje percepciju fizičkog prostora, simboličku misao i intervenciju kulture sa svojom iluzornom neposrednošću preko simbolizama i različitih kulturnih modela. Ovakvo iskustvo nije svedivo na sastavničke elemente, već je objašnjivo tek u složenosti veza među sastavnicama na različitim razinama, ili kako se u tekstu pojašnjava, na razinama emergencije stvarnosti (razina emergencije jednostavnih strultura ; razina emergencije složenih struktura ; razina emergencije povratne sprege i intencionalnosti ; razina emergencije kakvoće i pohrane informacija ; i emergencija simboličke razine i komunikacije). U odnosu na strukturiranje znanstvenih disciplina prema objektima proučavanja emergentnih razina stvarnosti, pojavnosti koje proučava kemija proizlaze iz pojavnosti fizike, pojavnosti molekularne biologije iz kemijskih pojavnosti, pojavnosti stanične biologije iz molekularne biologije. Kulturne pojavnosti proizlaze iz bioloških i psiholoških pojavnosti koje uvjetuju nastanak svjesnosti kod pojedinca, ali i iz ekološko-društvenih pojavnosti interakcije. Svaka disciplina usredotočuje se na proučavanje određene strukture stvarnosti razvijajući vlastiti opis pojavnosti te razine, ali i uspostavlja određene odnose s drugim razinama. Teorija emergencije, pak, omogućuje suvremenim disciplinama opise pojavnosti na različitim razinama stvarnosti, ali i objašnjenje njihovih kauzalnih veza. Ona tako doprinosi objašnjenju interakcija spoznaje i kulture te kauzalnih učinaka kulture kao emergentne pojave. Načelo neredukcije dodjeljuje, ipak, društvenim i humanističkim znanostima zasebnu razinu istraživanja jer struktura, informacijska umreženost i funkcionalnost proizlaznih svojstava i entiteta koji su njihov predmet nisu svedivi na biološke ili fizičke sastavnice, premda kauzalno ovise o interakciji emergentnih razina pojavnosti.
Simuler et faire simuler
How does simulation contribute to knowledge ? We shall distinguish between simulating, as a subjective game of make-believe, and simulating by using an objective device as a controllable simulator of natural process or of human behaviours. We suggest that the comprehensive simulation of others is objective : we make our mind a controllable simulator of other people minds.
The philosophical literature on simulations has increased dramatically during the past 40 years. Many of its main topics are epistemological. For example, philosophers consider how the results of simulations help explain natural phenomena. This essay’s review treats mainly simulations in the social sciences. It considers the nature of simulations, the varieties of simulation, and uses of simulations for representation, prediction, explanation, and policy decisions. Being oriented toward philosophy of science, it compares simulations to models and experiments and considers whether simulations raise new methodological issues.The essay concludes that several features of simulations set them apart from models and experiments and make them novel scientific tools, whose powers and limits are not yet well understood.
Dans son compte-rendu de mon livre, Les Animaux Pensent-ils?, Machery objecte que l'évolution n'étant ni hiérarchique ni linéaire, il n'et pas justifié de proposer une analyse hiérarchique des représentations. Je réponds à cette objection, en montrant qu'on peut en effet distinguer des types de représentation par leurs propriétés sémantiques et computationnelles. On peut reconnaître le caractère anagénétique du développement de la cognition sans pour autant légitimer une conception hiérarchique et continuiste de l'évolution des espèces.
This article reviews the claim that mirror neurons are simulating neurons and the basis of an implicit simulation theory in
regard to how we understand other persons. I claim that the equation of mirror system activation with an implicit simulation
is unjustified, and I offer an alternative interpretation of the scientific data. The alternative considers mirror system
activation as underlying part of an enactive perception in the social context.
KeywordsSimulation–Mirror Neurons–Social Cognition–Embodiment–Enactive Perception
Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulation theorists do their best to avoid the theoretical stance by using their own experience as the measure of everyone else's. When it comes to explaining how we understand other people some of the very best contemporary philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists are simulationists. For example, Vittorio Gallese, Alvin Goldman, Robert Gordon, Jane Heal, Susan Hurley, and Marc Jeannerod. This short list of simulationists, however, already involves some problems. Not everyone on this list understands simulation in the same way. In effect, there are different simulation theories, and although it is important to distinguish them, and I will do so before I go much further, I will in the end argue against all of them. For several reasons, I don't think that the concept of simulation explains our primary and pervasive way of understanding others, any more than theory theory (TT) does.
I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by simulation theory, because it fails to explain how neuronal processes meet constraints that involve instrumentality and pretense. Implicit simulation theory also fails to explain how I can attribute a mental or emotion state that is different from my own to another person. I also provide a brief indication of an alternative interpretation of neural resonance systems.
Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one's own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct.
Accumulative empirical evidence has been reviewed in support of the notion that the production and perception of action as well as the interpretation of others' actions are functionally connected, and indeed, rely on common distributed neural systems in the premotor and parietal cortices. We suggest that these neural systems sustain shared representations between self and other that are crucial in social interactions. The inferior parietal cortex plays a special role in the sense of agency, which is a fundamental aspect to navigate within this neural network. The role of other brain areas that implement and regulate these shared representations remains to be specified.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.