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Rail infrastructure charging and on-track competition in Germany
Abstract
Germany was one of the pioneers amongst the European railways in opening up the network for third party access and introducing track access charging schemes. Several rail companies run services on the tracks of the incumbent company DB. This paper analyses the rules for network access, the track access charging scheme and the problems of competition in the rail market. The focus is on regional rail passenger transport due to the fact that this is the most lucrative and promising market for new entrants. The main result is that in this segment in particular non-DB companies have increasingly used the chances which were opened by (paid) access to DB tracks and competitive tendering by regional authorities. However, although their market share has grown DB is still the major carrier. The failure to set an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework has proven to be the major obstacle to a more intensive competition in the rail market.
... There are many reviews on competition and/or efficiency in railway markets. In Germany, Link (2004) discussed the problems facing on-track competition in the regional passenger market by analyzing the effects of access conditions and charges. In a similar Swedish study, Alexandersson and Rigas (2013) studied the European effects of the Swedish policy for opening access to the passenger market since 1988 until the complete deregulation in 2012. ...
... Main aspect(s) Market(s) Hansson and Nilsson (1991) Market organization SE Monami (2000) Market organization BE, FR, DE, GB, SE Gibson (2003) Capacity allocation, access charges UK Link (2004) Access charges, competition DE Crozet (2004) Access charges EU OECD (2005) Market organization OECD ECMT (2005) Access charges OECD Bouf, Crozet et al. (2005) Capacity allocation (conflicts) FR, GB Jensen and Stelling (2007) Performances SE UIC (2009) Access charges (noise) EU Friebel, Ivaldi et al. (2010) Performances EU Crozet, Nash et al. (2012) Competition (passenger) EU Van de Velde, Performances EU OECD (2013) Market organization, competition OECD Alexandersson and Rigas (2013) Market organization, capacity allocation EU Nash, Nilsson et al. (2013) Competition, performances SE, GB and DE Crozet, Haucap et al. (2014) Competition (freight) EU Tomeš, Kvizda et al. (2014) Competition (passenger) CZ Nash, Smith et al. (2014) Performances (costs) EU Laurino, Ramella et al. (2015) Market organization 20 countries (worldwide) Nash, Competition (passenger) SE, FR, GB, DE Tomeš, Kvizda et al. (2016) Competition (passenger) CZ Competition EU Abbott and Cohen (2017) Efficiency EU Nash, Crozet et al. (2018) Access charges SE, FR, GB, DE Smoliner, Walter et al. (2018) Competition, capacity allocation AT, CZ and NL This paper (2021) Market organization, competition, capacity allocation, access charges EU, CH, GB (US and JP are also mentioned) ...
... Both variants may lead to conflicts of interests when it comes to solving capacity conflicts, since the parent or holding company controlling the infrastructure manager may also have companies in the market. Link (2004) concludes that failing to find an appropriate organizational framework could be an obstacle for fostering competition and system efficiency. ...
Railway markets in Europe have been reorganized to allow competition between different operators. Thus, European railways have been vertically separated, separating infrastructure management from provisions of train services. This allows several train operators to compete for passengers and freight services. Different ways have emerged for vertical separation, capacity allocation and track access charges. This paper reviews, compares and discusses important deregulation aspects, using examples from a number of European countries to show different possible solutions. The study describes how competition has been introduced and regulated, with a particular focus on describing the different ways capacity is allocated and how conflicting requests by different train operators are resolved. It also reviews the related issue of how access charges are constructed and applied. Although guided by the same European legislation, we conclude that the studied railways have different deregulation outcomes, e.g., market organization, capacity allocation. Besides, few countries have so far managed to create efficient and transparent processes for allocating capacity between competing train operators. Although allowed by the legislation, market-based allocation is absent or never used. In order to foster more competition which can yield substantial social benefits, the survey indicates that most European railways still need to develop and experiment with more efficient and transparent capacity allocation procedures.
... Meanwhile, Mizutani and Shoji (2004) citing from previous cost studies stated that the full cost approach seemed to have a chance to recover all infrastructure services cost. Some cases showed that the implementation of full distribution cost with fairness principle often produced better results in term of a small number of complaint to be disadvantageous (Rothengatter, 2003;Link, 2004). ...
... The choice of each particular method for access pricing is to depend on particular objectives that the regulator must clearly balance and weight accordingly within the economic environment in which its action takes place. Link, 2004;Crozet, 2004;Terada, 2001). ...
In Presidential Decree Republic of Indonesia Numb. 53 in 2012, it is explained that every railway operator which use railwaysinfrastructure have to pay Track Access Charges (TAC) to Government. The rules of the calculation of TAC which have to be paidby PT.KAI is explained in Regulation of Transport Minister Numb. 62 in 2013. In this regulation, there is priority factor whichhas same value for every service type of the train (Fp=1). Actually, every service type of railway has different priority and givesdifferent damages for infrastructure based on the speed. This research intended for analyzing the influence of priority factor toTAC. Quantitative description method is used in this research. The objects of the research are Executive, Business, and Economicclass of passenger train in Java. It suggested with two alternatives calculation of TAC with variations in priority factor (Fp) whichoriented on train travel time. Then, the best Fp is chosen which represented the real condition where the train with higher priorityhas to pay higher TAC than that of others. The result of this research, with Fp=1, showed the value of TAC for Economic class isIDR 68.00/GT/km, for Executive class is IDR 30.00/GT/km, while for Business class is IDR 28.00/GT/km. A modified of Fp,with two alternatives calculation, considering travel time and stay time of each railway service type showed a better result. Thefirst alternative generates Fp= 1.39 for Executive class and gives IDR 42.00/GT/km for the average TAC, while Fp=1.21 forBusiness class and generates IDR 34.00/GT/km for average TAC. The second alternative generates Fp=3.00 for Executive classand it gives IDR 91.00/GT/km while for Business class generates Fp=2.00 and it gives IDR 56.00/GT/km. The calculation of TACwith second alternative is more represents the real condition, where Executive class has higher priority and speed than the otherclasses, so it also has to pay higher TAC.
... The idea of the "social value" of railway services is generally linked to its low profitability (with the partial exception of Germany (Link, 2004)). If a service is not profitable but it is provided to the public, it is implicitly assumed that it is socially desirable and must be subsidised in some way (direct subsidy or cross-subsidisation). Clearly, this criterion is weak, because unprofitability does not justify subsidization unless the society is willing to pay above the incremental cost of providing the service and those services are obtained in an efficient way. ...
... By contrast, the practice of tendering subsidies, especially for regional services, is almost unknown, though it is supposed to be compulsory. Germany is the only country where a high proportion of regional services is tendered (Link, 2004), while in Italy this happened only in a few and isolated cases. ...
The paper presents the results of a research on railway regulation and liberalisation in Italy, France, Germany and Spain. The analysed fields of regulation are the relationship between the State and the rail companies, network access conditions by operators, slot allocating and pricing schemes and how public service obligations are defined, paid and regulated. The aim of the paper is to give a comparative overview of the rail regulation from a critical point of view, rather than descriptive. The regulatory frameworks are outlined and then assessed according to their implications on the liberalisation level and on the effective market opening. The conclusions are that the actual level of liberalisation is still scarce and only in some cases the opening level is increasing. Market penetration of newcomers is significant only in niche markets. An issue emerging from the work is the opposing attitude of incumbent railways against liberalisation and the role of decision makers in backing this behaviour. The strategies followed to limit the outcomes of the liberalisation process are different across the country sample. However, all the incumbents argue with the self-referential declaration of efficiency, public service obligations and they claim to be under an excessive and unfair foreign competition. These arguments are yet embedded in legislative, organisational and economic settings supporting these positions like the common ownership of network and services, the permanence of dominant positions and favourable financial conditions.
... Wenn ein Schienenweg fertig geplant und vom EBA genehmigt wurde, wird das Projekt an den Vorhabenträger zur Umsetzung weitergegeben. Die Umsetzung der Schieneninfrastruktur liegt seit der Bahnreform 1994 in den Händen der formal privatrechtlichen Deutschen Bahn AG (DB), die sich jedoch vollständig im Besitz des Bundes befindet (Link, 2004;Nigrin, 2014) und durch das EBA als zuständige Aufsichts-und Genehmigungsbehörde verwaltet wird. Das EBA unterliegt wiederum den Weisungen des BMVI, wodurch sich der Kreis zwischen DB und Bundespolitik schließt (EBA, 2021). ...
Die bisher unzureichende Verlagerung von Personen- und Güterverkehr auf die Schiene in Deutschland führt zu zentralen Herausforderungen bei der Erreichung der Klimaziele und nachhaltiger Verkehrswege. Mit dem Deutschlandtakt hat die deutsche Verkehrspolitik ein langfristiges politisches Programm initiiert, um den Schienenverkehr angebotsorientiert zu gestalten und seine Attraktivität zu steigern. Dieses Programm wird von verschiedenen Akteuren aus Politik, Verwaltung, Wirtschaft und Verbänden getragen. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, was diese Akteure zusammenhält und wie sich ihr gemeinsames Eintreten für das Politikprogramm erklären lässt. Anhand des Programmatic Action Framework (PAF) werden in diesem Beitrag die biographischen Schnittstellen der Akteure und die Rolle der institutionalisierten Foren untersucht, die ihre Zusammenarbeit aus der Perspektive des PAF erklären. Der Beitrag zeigt außerdem, dass bereits bestehende gemeinsame soziale Identitäten ein Schlüsselfaktor für die Bildung einer programmatischen Identität sein können.
... Even though the observed period is long, we can conclude that the charge models have changed significantly, during this time, within the European railways. For example, Germany has changed the charge model five times [11,12] but only changed the type of charges in 2020, France changed its model twice, but the charge type has always been additive [13][14][15]. When it comes to small railways, Croatia changed its elements and ponders five times with [16] and Montenegro for four times [17], but the types of charges stayed the same in both countries. ...
It has been exactly 20 years since the common grounds for the design of track access charges (TAC) were laid for the European railways by the publication of Directive 2001/14/EC. However, these grounds were defined broadly, thus resulting in significant divergence both in the models applied by countries and during the model redesign within one country over the course of time. The participants in the process of charge system redesign includes all stakeholders from a country’s railway sector (infrastructure manager, train operating companies, the ministries responsible for transport, finance and economy, government, and regulatory bodies). Their opinions and requirements are often opposed, and they all need to be acknowledged simultaneously. This paper aims to solve the issue of ensuring continuity in the charge model redesign while achieving a balance between the requirements of all stakeholders. Moreover, it tackles the issue of producing a sustainable long-term TAC model by using survey methods and statistical analysis. The proposed approach was tested in practice during the access charge model redesign for the railways of Montenegro. The results show the importance of continual enhancement in TAC model development as one of the challenges and key precursors for the harmonization of all stakeholders’ requirements.
... In the more than ten years of separation of European railways, many scholars have studied the railway infrastructure charges of Germany [5], the United Kingdom [6], France [7], Netherlands [8], Sweden [9], Italy [4], Bulgaria [10] and other countries. The International Union of Railways [11] also presents an overview of the structure of the European toll system and explores differences among the countries. ...
With the rapid development of China's high-speed railway (HSR), there are also many problems. For example, in the classification and calculation of HSR transportation costs, there is a lack of reasonable cost statistical methods. There are many types of high-speed train currently running on HSR (mainly G and D trains). There are differences in the speed, load and energy consumption of different types of trains. The resulting infrastructure usage costs also vary. However, all train costs are classified and calculated uniformly in practice. This paper proposes the expenditure rate method of the transport process allocating the infrastructure use costs among types of trains. Based on data from the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway, the cost of infrastructure is calculated, and the calculation results can reasonably reflect the cost allocation among types of trains. It makes the cost calculation of high-speed railway more accurate and lays a foundation for environmental cost calculation.
... At the same time, they play an important role in determining the competitiveness of new railway lines (Sánchez-Borràs et al. 2010). 4 It is therefore not surprising that access charges in railway economics have drawn significant interest at the theoretical level (Dodgson 1994;Bassanini and Poulet 2000;Nash and Sansom 2001;Quinet 2003;Link 2004;Erhan and Robert 2005). ...
... To reduce the initial investment in locomotives, carriers prefer to exploit used locomotives. In [6], the analysis of the conditions for independent carriers' operation in Germany is presented, where the model of partial vertical division of the railway industry is implemented, when the infrastructure manager also has units that provide services for transportation of goods and passengers. It is noted that within the framework of regulatory norms in force in Germany, the infrastructure manager has the opportunity to create preferences for dependent on him carriers by varying the composition and quality of services access to the railway infrastructure. ...
Ukraine has undertaken the implementation of European Union Directives, which provide non-discriminatory admission to the railway infrastructure of independent carriers. A significant number of factors considerably affect working conditions of the carriers which are independent of Ukrzaliznytsia. One of the goals while performing transportation by independent carriers is the organization of private locomotives operation and their service by engine crews. The purpose of the article is to assess technical and economic indices of private locomotives use for goods transportation. The schemes of infrastructure objects arrangement for locomotives operation and engine crews work are presented. Performed calculations show the potential possibility of independent railway carriers to fulfil transportation to seaports with the use of its private locomotive infrastructure exclusively. The estimation of economically expedient volumes of cargo transportation by private locomotives in comparison with existing pricing of Ukrzaliznytsia is carried out. The nonlinear dependence of transportation volume depending on the distance is determined, at which the total cost of cargo transportation by Ukrzaliznytsia locomotives is equal to the cost of cargo transportation by private locomotives. The results of the study allow concerned companies to evaluate the investment efficiency into the development of locomotive fleet for rail transportation.
... The deep sea carrier is under the top ten of the world leading shipping companies in terms of market share (UNCTAD, 2015). The combined transport operator with the contracted combined transport agency is the largest provider in the combined transport service market in Germany and the rail transport company comprises the highest market share for the rail-bound maritime hinterland transport in Germany (Link, 2004). Altogether the actors in the case study have a considerable transaction volume with each other. ...
... Despite formal liberalization and free entry into the long-distance sector from 1996, the actual level of entry is very low and the impact on the total market almost negligible. Analysis of the reasons for this state of affairs can be found in Link (2004), Beckers, Von Hirschhausen, Haunerland, and Walter (2009), Séguret (2009), Link (2012. ...
Open access passenger rail services have been well established in Central Europe. They have been in operation in Austria on the Vienna–Salzburg line from 2011, in the Czech Republic on the Prague–Ostrava line from 2011, and in Slovakia on the Žilina–Košice line from 2014. These open access entries are all on principal domestic railway lines and have caused major increases in train frequencies. New entrants have introduced many service innovations and utilized aggressive price cuts. As a result, they have been able to win substantial market shares from incumbents. This article compares the impacts of open access entries on the development of railway markets in Central Europe. The comparison covers entry barriers, business models, market developments, and regulatory challenges. The main results are that open access competition has strongly stimulated ridership, but the impact on market revenues has been only moderate due to price reductions. The total costs on the market went up and both newcomers and incumbents are struggling with the profitability of their open access operations. We conclude that open access passenger rail services in Central Europe have led not only to significant benefits for customers but also cost increases and significant regulatory challenges.
... An open access scheme was introduced in Germany in 1994 in the freight and long-distance passenger transport. Access to the network is based on the free demand of the competitors of DeutscheBahn, without any particular regulation being provided for the pricing of access (see Link 2004). Between 2000 and 2010, there were 10 attempts to enter the long-distance market, all of them with a very limited volume (no more than two round trips per day). ...
This article analyses a case study of passenger rail transport in Slovakia when operation of a commuter line to the capital city was changed from a public operator to a private one. This change brought about significant changes in the organisation of services. The private operator RegioJet introduced new rolling stock, a regular and more frequent timetable, peak and off-peak pricing, and additional on-board services. The results were remarkable, with passenger ridership increasing by 156% in 3 years. The article aims to compare the performance of public and private operators on this line in order to identify the reasons for the increased ridership. A customer survey was conducted and passengers were asked questions about their former and present travel behaviour. Based on data from the survey, a logit model was estimated in order to identify the factors behind increased usage and satisfaction. The results indicate that all passengers most highly valued the speed and comfort of the rail services. The new passengers valued highly reliability and quality of the improved service. These factors appealed especially to women, students, and car owners who were newly attracted to rail commuting.
... The majority of new competitors who have tried to enter the market have not succeeded; there are several operators in niche markets (European Commission, 2013a). This may be due to high costs for entry into infrastructure (Link, 2004) or discrimination against new entrants by Deutsche Bahn DB (Nigrin, 2014). In Austria, a major route has been operated by a private company alongside the incumbent since 2011. ...
The objective of the European railway reforms which started in the 1990s was to enable the entry of competition to raise the efficiency of railway transport. This was undertaken because the level of services, particularly in former Eastern Bloc countries, was very low due to neglected investment, and so railway transport market share was in decline. The primary goal of this text is to determine based on available empirical studies whether the reforms affected the efficiency of the railway sector positively, and the secondary aim is to identify the factors which complicate evaluation of the reforms’ impact. According to empirical studies, the effect of competition on efficiency is unclear. The reforms have brought the most benefit to consumers, but their overall effect depends on many other factors. Competition for the market appeared to be a better way of implementing competition than competition in the market. In addition, comprehension of the problems complicating the analysis and their inclusion in the evaluation process constitutes an important point in evaluating the reforms’ effects and could be inspiring for countries that have not yet implemented all reforms.
... Compared to that, S2 is a network that connects S-Bahn Berlin and Hamburg [10]. For further calculation, the basic price will then multiply by product factor that considers whether the train categorized into passenger or freight train [11]. ...
The government of Indonesia currently focuses on improving the public railway services to be more effective and efficient by formulating suitable railways infrastructure charges. This paper examines a possibility to determine the track access charge (TAC) for Indonesia railways infrastructure based on a benchmark to other countries. Compared to existing charge that used basic price and product factor, the alternative proposed concept also considers multiplicative surcharge and load component. In-depth interviews will be conducted with related stakeholders from government bodies, operator, and academics to gain more insights and further to validate the research outcomes. The result shows that the suitable TAC value for the railway’s operator ranging from 56% to 66% from total proposed payable TAC, while government subsidy will cover the rest of 34% to 44% of determined track access charge to liberalize railways industry in Indonesia.
... As rail transportation provides a limited number of profitable operations concentrated in high speed, freight, and subsidized regional lines (Link, 2004), private participation remains limited throughout the world, and Turkey is no exception. Despite a few attempts, no rail project has yet been realized through a BOT scheme. ...
Over the last three decades. Turkish governments have intended to privatize major infrastructure sendees, mostly through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme to liberalize the economy and overcome budgetary constraints. After a fast and motivated start, the adverse effects of political instability, successive economic crises, and poor risk management slowed down the early Turkish BOT projects in the 1990s. The 2000s, on the other hand, backed by economic growth, political stability, and heavy use of demand and revenue guarantees, have experienced a boom in the infrastructure privatization and transport sector which has been getting the lion's share within the public investment budget for decades, is no exception to this trend. Because risk management is key for successful BOT project implementation, risk allocation practices play an important role in both the success and failure of the projects. In light of Turkish experience, this paper analyzes risk allocation practices in transport BOT projects, underlines both good and poor allocation of risks with respect to the specific characteristics of the transportation sector, and draws policy implications.
... Jedná se o Harz-Berlin-Express (HBX) a Hamburg-Köln-Express (HKX), přičemž druhý jmenovaný jezdí za nižší ceny než DB, frekvence jeho spojů je však nízká a současně není dominantnímu DB nasazujícímu nové moderní vlaky schopen konkurovat kvalitou [Jirásek, 2014]. Příčiny neúspěchu neregulované konkurence v Německu bývají spojovány s vysokými poplatky za vstup do infrastruktury [Link, 2004], skrytou integrací regionální a dálkové dopravy [Séguret, 2009] nebo s diskriminací nových dopravců ze strany DB [Nigrin, 2014]. Švédsko V současnosti existuje na celé železniční síti právo komerčního open accessu, ovšem z důvodu komerční neatraktivity většiny spojení není příliš využíváno. ...
Competition on the Czech railway passenger market has been developing recently. It is possible to distinguish two types of competition – unregulated competition (competition on the market) and regulated competition (competition for the market). Competition on the market is present on the Prague–Ostrava route and competition for the market has been applied in a few public tenders for subsidised services. However, the substantial part of the Czech railway passenger market has remained closed and there is a question how to proceed with the competition development – whether to promote competition on the market or competition for the market. Based on European and modelling experience, there is an argument for more competition for the market.
... From 1994 onwards, there were approximately ten entries of new operators against DB (Séguret, 2009); however, the majority failed, and only two operators are surviving in niche markets (European Commission, 2013). The reasons for unsuccessful entries of new private operators against Deutsche Bahn were suggested as high infrastructure charges (Link, 2004), hidden integration of long-distance and regional transport (Séguret, 2009) and discrimination against new operators by Deutsche Bahn (Nigrin, 2014). ...
This paper analyses open access passenger railway competition in the Czech Republic between 2011 and 2014. This competition emerged when the major railway connection between Prague and Ostrava, which was operated only by the incumbent, was entered by two private operators, RegioJet in September 2011 and LEO Express in January 2013. Theoretical studies and experience from other countries suggest that this competition should lead to a price war, intensive market dynamics and product differentiation. The findings from the market development on the Prague–Ostrava route are broadly consistent with these predictions. The open access competition has led to an intensive price war with 2nd class tariff declines reaching 46%. Innovative marketing and selling strategies have significantly increased the spread of prices, and price discrimination and yield management techniques are used extensively. All operators has been unprofitable on the line, leading to financial stress and accusations of predatory pricing on the part of the incumbent. The quality of service on the line has increased substantially with standardisation, new on-board services and higher frequency. The average number of seats per train has declined significantly, and new operators have been able to win 55% market share from the incumbent. Service frequency is higher but is strongly concentrated during rush hours.
... Non-DB companies not only need access to DB tracks and stations, but also must purchase services such as access to service facilities, workshops, information systems (announcement of trains operated by non-DB companies on timetables) and traction at DB. Several cases of disfavouring non-DB companies by DB Netz, DB Energie, and DB Station & Service are documented in the report of the BNA (see Bundesnetzagentur 2007, Mofair et al. 2009) and are criticised by Commission of Monopolies (2009). As mentioned above, access charges are not sufficiently regulated, enabling DB Netz to charge particularly high fees for RPSs (see Link 2004 for a detailed discussion on access charges). Until a decision of BNA from May 2010, DB Netz levied regional surcharges for RPSs, in particular for low-occupancy lines that are often operated by non-DB companies. ...
Since 1996 regional rail passenger services in Germany have been subject to franchising. The franchising framework is characterised by a strong decentralisation of responsibilities, a considerable degree of freedom for the responsible authorities regarding contract design, a sound financial basis for awarding contracts, and the free choice of authorities between tendering procedures and direct awarding of franchise contracts. This paper analyses the key outcomes of this franchising approach. We conclude that regionalisation of responsibilities and franchising positively impacts on service provision, patronage, customer satisfaction, service quality and costs, in particular through better targeting of services. However, these positive outcomes could have been even greater if the failures in the institutional set-up, foremost the vertical integration of the DB group and insufficient regulation, were resolved. Overall, competitive tendering appears to bear further potential for additional cost savings and quality improvements, although for already competitively awarded contracts the improvements will not be as great as those from the first round.
... A piacliberalizáció előnye elsősorban a verseny következtében a kínálati (szolgáltatói) oldalon olyan feltételekben jelentkezik, mint a magántőke befektetés, az innováció, illetve ezek hatására fokozódó technológiai, szervezeti modernizáció és hatékonyság, míg a keresleti (igénybe vevői) oldalon kiemelhető az operátorok, szolgáltatók közötti választási lehetőség, a várhatóan javuló szolgáltatásminőség, az ösztönző jellegű minőség-tarifa viszony. (Chang, Kao, 1992, Nash, Preston, 1993, Bokor, 1998, Tánczos, 2000, Link, 2004 Mindehhez elengedhetetlen a háttérfeltételek fejlesztése, az összetett közlekedési szolgáltatás-és kapcsolatrendszer összehangolása, a társágazatok együttműködése, ezen belül a szerepek elkülönítése, átláthatóvá tétele. ...
http://www.omikk.bme.hu/collections/phd/Gazdasag_es_Tarsadalomtudomanyi_Kar/2014/Kelemenne_Erdos_Aniko/ertekezes.pdf
... Lang and his co-authors [29] emphasize, while conducting a game-theoric model of a fully vertically separated, liberalized railway market, that more competitors reduce prices per kilometer, thus improving the performance in terms of train kilometers and social welfare. Mainly ticket revenues based on competitive tendering should be the method of entry, which should fall within regional authorities" cognizance, as suggested by Link [30], while focusing on the regional traffic of railway passenger transport. Alexandersson [1] agrees with competitive tendering, because it can create a competitive environment and develop the market, and thus improve the efficiency of the companies and in turn the services. ...
This paper analyses the liberalization procedure of the passenger and freight railway transport market in the Visegrád states. The paper applies macro and micro environment analysis to demonstrate the situation of these post-communist countries and introduces the regulatory impact on the railway market supply while concentrating on intra-modal competition. The aim of the paper is to highlight how railway liberalization has changed the shrinking railway market in order to define a strategic policy intervention, with the express purpose of increasing the competitiveness of railway transport and solving efficiency problems. The paper introduces the rate of railway market attractiveness (RAMATE rate) in order to compare the attractiveness of the different railway markets of the European Union for new entrants and the degree of deregulation.
... This indicates an application of fully distributed costs. It might be argued that DB Netz is responsible for a part of the underutilisation, because of neglected maintenance (Link, 2003). It is frequently argued, that the tariffs for the regional sections of the German network crosssubsidize the long-distance lines for passenger transport. ...
This paper analyses the requirements for rail infrastructure charging, laid down in directive 2001/14/EC. It calls for marginal cost pricing and allows for mark-ups. Four standard pricing principles are analyzed on their suitability for track charging. It is found that no charging system proves superior and that the EC legislation is not opposed to economic theory. Scrutinizing the tariff systems of the EU member states, it is found that not all accomplish this directive and information are gained for the development of tariff systems.
... The papers treating the AC applications and environment in which they were applied (Link, 2004;ECMT, 2005;Bugarinovic and Boskovic, 2008;Nikolova, 2008;Thompson, 2008;Santos et al., 2010;Calvo and Oña, 2012) have shown that AC still vary from country to country. They vary in terms of the applied AC principles and aims, as well as the level, structure, and value of AC. ...
The motive of this research is the fact that until now no universal model of access charges (AC) has been defined. In the process of modelling, AC principle is one of the key elements for defining the access charges. In this paper is proposed a model for AC principle selection based on the Analytic Network Process (ANP) approach. The developed model has allowed presenting the objectives of the identified stakeholders through the established criteria and from three different perspectives: the government influence, the railway market environment, and efficiency of network use. Based on the results of a research, network structure of the ANP method can successfully resolve the dependence and conflicts among evaluation criteria for AC principle selection. The proposed ANP based model can become a tool for evaluation and ranking of the AC principle as presented in the case study of Serbian Railways. The paper is based on real data.
... Nash, Nilsson and Link additive surcharges for higher weights, special trains and so on. Until a decision of BNA from May 2010, so-called regional surcharges were raised specifically for regional passenger trains (Link (2004) provides more details). Since 2005, TOCs can agree framework contracts for track access with DB Netz which cover up to five years. ...
This paper compares three European countries with long experience of competition in rail transport — Britain, Sweden, and Germany. Given the nature of the reforms undertaken, we would expect the British approach to be the most successful, with Sweden next and Germany least successful. But an examination of subsidy levels and trends in passenger and freight traffic finds that Germany has the slowest growth in public financial support for its railway, as well as the lowest increase in fares. While traffic growth is faster in the other countries, it is not clear that reforms there have provided better value for money.
... Pregled literature o implementaciji naknada za korišćenje infrastrukture (Loiyides and Tisionas, 2004; Link, 2004; Crozet, 2004b; Caliskan, 2006; Calvo et al., 2007; Bugarinović i Bošković, 2008; Nikolova, 2008; Thompson, 2008 Generalno, bez obzira na vrstu problema, u literaturi (Saaty, 2009; Vujošević, 2012) kriterijumi se mogu sistematizovati na: ekonomske, tehničke, tehnološke, socijalne i ekološke. Imajući u vidu karakteristike problema izbora modela naknada kriterijumi se mogu sistematizovati u sledeće grupe: tehnološki (T), ekonomski (E), tržišni (M) i institucionalni (I) 1 . ...
Is it possible to select the best access charges model regardless of the performances of the railway network, its historical development and current state, railway market structure or financial objectives and the pricing policy of railway sector in a country? Who makes the decision and that takes into account the interests of all stakeholders? The paper starts from the premise that it is necessary to define and systematize the criteria regardless of the previous questions, but the selection and evaluation of the same criteria and their variants different for specific railway network i.e. the state. In other words, "every time" has its own criteria and that the present moment Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State requires that the criteria reflect the goals of transport policy and the interests of all stakeholders if it wanted to have the best model that fits the reality and the strategic development of the railway sector. Based on the foregoing, the criteria are defined and made their grouping. It is also defined the stakeholders and discussed their position to make decisions and the interests and preferences of the individual criteria.
... These reflect prioritization in time tabling, several multiplicative or additive surcharges for higher weights, special trains etc. Until a decision of BNA from May 2010, socalled regional surcharges were raised specifically for regional passenger trains (Link, 2004, provides more details). Track access charges are usually part of the cost calculation in the bid and represent a transitory item for operators, i.e. they are financed within the franchise contracts and thus finally paid for by the PTAs. ...
This paper compares the experience of three European countries with long experience of competition in rail transport – Britain, Sweden and Germany. Britain is characterised by complete separation of infrastructure from operations, competition either for or in the market for the entire passenger network, open access for freight with two large operators and several smaller ones, strong regulation and careful attention to financial incentives. Sweden also has complete vertical separation, competitive tendering for all subsidised services, open access for freight and now also for commercial passenger services. Regulation, although now strengthened, is not as tight as in Britain. At the other extreme, Germany still has the dominant operator and the infrastructure company as subsidiaries to the same holding company, the regulator has had repeated disputes regarding their powers and – although there is some tendering of subsidised passenger services and open access for commercial passenger and freight – the incumbent still dominates the market. According to the general expectations of theoretical reasoning, we would expect the British approach to be the most successful in achieving an efficient, competitive rail system, with Sweden next and Germany least successful. But an examination of subsidy levels and trends in passenger and freight traffic finds that Germany has the slowest growth in public financial support for its railway as well as the lowest fares. Both Britain and Sweden have had faster growth in public financial support than Germany, although this has mainly been in infrastructure renewal and enhancement, and there has been debate as to the adequacy of current infrastructure spending in Germany. On most measures, Britain has lower absolute levels of financial support than Germany as well as faster traffic growth. Sweden clearly has much higher financial support, although this may be the result of low population density. Thus on balance it is not clear that the reform process has worked better in the other countries than in Germany, despite initial expectations. Further in depth research on the reasons for these changes in financial support and traffic levels would be needed to reach a more conclusive answer.
... Since European policy is presently demanding more competition in European railways, vertical relationships in railways are the subject of substantial controversy. Advocates of a vertical separation of infrastructure from transport operation argue that, even if vertically integrated firms are obliged to grant third-party access to railway infrastructure, potential for market foreclosure and discrimination will continue to exist and competition will remain restricted (Nash and Preston, 1994;European Commission, 1996;Link, 2003). Therefore, vertical separation is regarded as the only way to enhance competition within the railway industry. ...
We analyze the impact of different organizational structures on incentives to invest in railways: vertical integration, vertical separation, and a hybrid form. Economic theory predicts that vertical integration fosters socially optimal investment, whereas, due to potential hold-up problems, both vertical separation and hybrid forms cause severe underinvestment. We test these theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment and find evidence that, in a vertically integrated environment, the level of investment in rolling stock and in rail infrastructure is roughly socially optimal. The complete absence of a discrepancy in our experimental results between vertical separation and the hybrid organisational structure, contradicting the predictions of model-theory, is surprising and can be attributed to the relatively high investments in the separated model. This contradiction might also be explained by the existence of social preferences.
... When its rail network was opened up to competition in 1994, DB Netz had already applied various systems; a two-tier rate that is composed a fixed part and a variable part linked to the number of train-kilometres, elasticity-bound price-setting (Ramsey tarif 109 ) and a linear system. Discrimination against the private train operators takes various forms depending on the pricing system applied (Link, 2004). This varies from large reductions granted to DB enterprises because they are the biggest users of rail network to degressive effects associated with the two-part rate which has the same effect. ...
This study provides a detailed and easy-to read overview of the railway liberalisation in Belgium and the three neighbouring countries. The European Union's liberalisation Directives are often complex and are implemented in very specific ways in the different Member States. The analysis goes into some detail about the Commission's underlying motives and economic theories for letting network industries, which had previously been regarded as natural monopolies, convert into competitive enterprises with the separation of infrastructure from operations. The study takes a look at the impact of the European rail liberalisation Directives in Belgium and its neighbouring countries - France, Germany and the Netherlands. There are considerable variations in the way in which the Directives are applied. It is reflected in the way in which the separation of the infrastructure and the transport services within the railway companies was carried out, and in the degree of opening of the market in freight and passenger transport. The analysis shows that the dominance of the former monopolists in the different Member States means that private rail operators face major obstacles. The financial analysis of the railway companies reveals wide variations in economic performance. The combination of better balance sheet figures and a bigger domestic market means that some major players in Europe are financially better off, giving them superiority over the smaller railway companies. This raises the question whether these circumstances will ultimately lead to distortion of competition.
... Germany has always had a number of small private railways and these are increasingly operating over DBAG tracks, whilst there has been new entry in both freight and passenger services. Nevertheless there has been criticism that the level of competition remains limited, and that the organisational arrangements favour the incumbent, for instance in the tendering process (Link, 2003). Link advocates complete separation of infrastructure from operations and compulsory competitive tendering for all subsidised services. ...
European rail policy has concentrated on the introduction of competition into the rail transport market via separation of infrastructure from operations (at least in an accounting sense), by the progressive opening up of entry to the market for new operators and by rules regarding the allocation of slots and the pricing of infrastructure use, administered by an independent regulator. This is all in marked contrast to the US, where concentration has been on parallel competition between vertically integrated railroads. In the following section we explain the development of EU rail policy. We then consider alternative models of rail reform, both in principle and in practice, concentrating on developments in Europe. We present the results of studies examining the success of the European reforms, before concluding by outlining areas where more research is needed. 2. The development of EU Rail Policy For many decades, railways in most of Europe have been seen as a problem. They have steadily lost market share (figs 1 and 2), falling from 10% to 6% of passenger kilometres and 20% to 8% of freight tonne kilometres over 30 years. They also require high and increasing levels of subsidy; Table 1 shows that less than half of the total costs of rail transport in Europe are borne directly by passenger and freight customers. The initial response of the Commission to this situation was to encourage governments to reorganise railways as autonomous commercial bodies (in a number of countries the railways were still run directly by government departments), with separate and realistic accounts and with social obligations minimised but appropriate recompense paid where such obligations were maintained. Governments were not to interfere with market mechanisms by providing subsidies to railways except under specific conditions. Three regulations were critical in this process. These were:
In the last few decades, many railway markets (especially in Europe) have been restructured to allow competition between different operators. This survey studies how competition has been introduced and regulated in a number of different countries around the world. In particular, we focus on a central part of market regulation specific to railway markets, namely the capacity allocation process. Conflicting capacity requests from different train operators need to be regulated and resolved, and the efficiency and transparency of this process is crucial. Related to this issue is how access charges are constructed and applied. Several European countries have vertically separated their railway markets, separating infrastructure management from train services provisions, thus allowing several train operators to compete with different passengers and freight services. However, few countries have so far managed to create efficient and transparent processes for allocating capacity between competing train operators, and incumbent operators still have larger market-share in many markets. Abstract In the last few decades, many railway markets (especially in Europe) have been restructured to allow competition between different operators. This survey studies how competition has been introduced and regulated in a number of different countries around the world. In particular, we focus on a central part of market regulation specific to railway markets, namely the capacity allocation process. Conflicting capacity requests from different train operators need to be regulated and resolved, and the efficiency and transparency of this process is crucial. Related to this issue is how access charges are constructed and applied. Several European countries have vertically separated their railway markets, separating infrastructure management from train services provisions, thus allowing several train operators to compete with different passengers and freight services. However, few countries have so far managed to create efficient and transparent processes for allocating capacity between competing train operators, and incumbent operators still have larger market-share in many markets.
When connecting trains may be missed due to delays, and passengers are insufficiently flexible due to operator-tied ticketing, on-track competition may reduce effective frequency. We analyze passengers who share α−β−γ− preferences for being on time and a price-sensitive demand, but differ in the preferred arrival time. If the probability of missing a connection due to a delay is sufficiently high, both producer and consumer surplus in a duopoly with reduced effective frequency is smaller than in the monopoly case. Apart from reducing unpunctuality, ensuring the transferability of tickets, and switching to competition for the market, may constitute (regulatory) remedies.
This paper is aimed at evaluating the net gains and trade-offs at stake in implementing the competition of the rail mode in the long distance passenger market either by means of franchise or by an open access mechanism. We simulate the outcomes of competition in and for the market using a differentiated-products oligopoly model allowing for inter- and intra-modal competition in a long distance passenger market. Specifically we first calibrate the model using data describing high speed lines in France and show that the incumbent railway operator’s strategy does not simply boil down to a short-term profit maximization (e.g. because of existing regulation or limit-pricing strategy). This yields two important results when simulating competition. First, whether it is for or in the market, the opening to competition does not guarantee a decrease in prices in favor of passengers. Second, the effects of opening up to competition for the market are relatively predictable and potentially positive, while those of opening up to competition in the market remain very uncertain.
Over the last few years there has been considerable interest in research into open-access passenger rail competition in Europe. However, the competition that existed in long-distance services in Poland between 2009 and 2015 has yet to be analysed. Surprisingly, there was fierce market rivalry between two state-owned enterprises answering to different levels of government: PKP Intercity (the central-government-run incumbent) and Przewozy Regionalne (a challenger owned by regional authorities). In comparison with the experience of other countries, this challenge was exceptional in terms of territorial reach and acquired market share (33%). In the polycentric Polish network, the challenger's services (branded under the name of Interregio) not only served up to 62% of all possible direct connections between the largest Polish cities, but also reached into more peripheral regional centres. Interestingly, we found no evidence of responsive price cutting in regular fares. In order to counteract aggressive low-cost entry, the incumbent opted for a differentiation strategy combined with a strategic use of political action. We found that although the incumbent's strategic behaviour did indeed contribute to the challenger's withdrawal from the market in 2015, its failure was mainly the result of a departure from the principal source of competitive advantage.
Мета. У даний час магістральний залізничний транспорт України знаходиться повністю в державній власності. Україна взяла на себе зобов'язання щодо імплементації Директив Європейського Союзу, які передбачають недискримінаційний допуск до залізничної інфраструктури незалежних перевізників. Значна кількість факторів суттєво впливає на умови роботи незалежних від Укрзалізниці перевізників. Однією з задач, яка виникає при виконанні перевезень незалежними перевізниками, є організація роботи приватних локомотивів та їх обслуговування локомотивними бригадами. Метою статті є оцінка технічних можливостей використання приватних локомотивів для виконання перевезень вантажів у напрямку морських портів. Методика. Дослідження виконані на основі методів організації експлуатаційної роботи залізниць та методів тягових розрахунків. Результати. У роботі розглянута проблема організації перевезень вантажів у морські порти незалежними перевізниками. Визначені потреби в екіпірувальних матеріалах для тепловозів та електровозів у залежності від відстані перевезень. Також визначені допустимі відстані, які можуть обслуговувати локомотивні бригади при виконанні вимог щодо тривалості їх безперервної роботи. Розроблено схеми розташування інфраструктурних об’єктів для забезпечення роботи локомотивів та локомотивних бригад. Встановлено, що тепловози незалежних перевізників зможуть обслуговувати перевезення між станціями навантаження та вивантаження до 822 км, а електровози – до 1000 км із спорудженням основної частини локомотивної інфраструктури на припортовій станції. Виконані розрахунки показують потенційну можливість охоплення незалежними перевізниками залізничних перевезень у морські порти з використання виключно власної локомотивної інфраструктури. Для уточнення довжини пліч обслуговування локомотивами поїздів та локомотивів локомотивними бригадами необхідно виконати додаткові розрахунки на основі детальних профілів ділянок обслуговування. Наукова новизна. У дослідженні отримані схеми обігу локомотивів та локомотивних бригад незалежних перевізників при обслуговуванні ними морських портів. Практична значимість. Результати роботи дозволяють оцінити потреби в локомотивній інфраструктурі, які виникнуть при відкритті ринку залізничних перевезень для незалежних перевізників.
Indian Railways (IR) which is a vertically integrated organization under Ministry of Railways is in urgent need of reforms. It has been discussed since long that the current organizational structure of IR is a major deterrent for its commercial orientation, promoting competition and providing a level playing field to other players in the sector. As a result, private investments in the sector have been negligible in spite of several attempts made by the Ministry of Railways. Indian policy makers have been apprehensive about vertical unbundling citing negative experiences from British Railways. The authors believe that given the framework that vertical unbundling provides for leveraging private investments and operational efficiencies, it should be explored as an option for IR. This paper is an attempt in this direction wherein the unbundling of policy making, infrastructure and services is explored. Authors have studied the German Railway Reform in depth and explored the implications of similar unbundling for IR
The fundamental problem in the railway market is the tension between administrative burdens and the traditional tendency of courts to apply reasonableness tests in the common law process1. This tradition tends to direct courts towards an inquiry into the economic reasonableness2 of a defendant’s conduct. The rule of reason usually leads to the deregulation of the markets, but we will see that in its European application it leads to re-regulation in light of important new goals.
This casebook is an effort to explain infrastructure markets from a unique perspective: regulation. Regulation means the analysis of two main groups of laws, namely internal market and antitrust law. The aim is to find a uniform regulation applicable to infrastructures in the European common market through a direct reading and explanation of judicial opinions. The book is divided into five parts: two general chapters and three thematic chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the main European law principles applicable to infrastructure markets. The second chapter applies the Services of General Interest doctrine to infrastructure markets: The key issue is the separation of the public administrations and the private companies operating infrastructures. The thematic chapters focus on seaports, railways and airports, respectively. The core of the examination is a dual perspective dealing with both the internal market rules and ensuring fair competition. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013. All rights are reserved.
The European Transport White Paper 2011 sets high modal shift targets from road freight to rail 50% by 2050. The objective of this paper is to determine the rolling stock fleet size and type up to the year 2050 and associated challenges for stakeholders. Considering the White paper targets, three scenarios are considered; a) Business as usual or Reference Scenario - extrapolation of current trends without major policy change; b) White Paper 2011 Low Scenario (WPL) based on a partial implementation of the modal shift targets and c) White Paper 2011 High Scenario (WPH) based on the full implementation of modal shift targets. To determine the future fleet size, the current paper also conducts a sensitivity analysis assuming 60% productivity level as a base line. The study finds, among others, that significantly more rolling stock (in particular flat wagons, covered wagons and covered hopper wagons) as well as improved asset utilisation will be vital to facilitate the transport of increased freight volume. A unified rail freight system starting with nine Rail Freight Corridors and cooperation among the rail freight operators, wagons manufacturers and companies involved in leasing and hiring wagons will be very important to achieve the modal shift.
This article presents a systems approach to access charges in unbundling railways where an infrastructure manager charges services to operators on an open market. The motive for this research is the fact that until now no universal model of access charges has been defined. We define a universal access charges model for an essential service package for a mid- and small-size network based on a systems approach to recovering the costs that are incurred as a result of the operation of a train. System elements are a railway network, trains and costs. Having in mind the system complexity a combination of an analytical and engineering approach has been used for access charges modelling. The model has been developed for a Serbian mid-size railway network and tested on real data. The numerical results of model application indicate that with charges defined in this way it is possible to track cost and cost management by services.
This paper explores the access charge for the use of the Italian rail infrastructure. Access problems arise when the provision of a complete service to end users requires the combination of two or more inputs, one of which is non-competitive (OECD, 2004). It is a well-known fact that excessive access charges mean higher prices for rail passengers and rail freight companies when using the infrastructure. We conclude that the structure of the access charge has changed significantly with the recent introduction of the HS/HC (high-speed and high-capacity) network; specifically, the fixed component has lost importance, whilst the variable component reaches 94%.
This paper provides an analysis of the outcomes of the German model with a focus on unbundling, public infrastructure financing and access charge regulation. It reviews recent regulatory initiatives in Germany such as the regulator’s proposal to introduce a price-cap regulation and the draft of a new regulation law for the German rail sector. The analysis shows that the German Holding model appears to be successful in terms of transport performance and financial outcomes. However, it is characterised by regulatory deficits which have hampered a faster progress in introducing competition in the rail sector. The new regulation law contains a series of measures which will provide more transparency in access and access charges, strengthen the position of the regulator and move the current ex-post regulation towards an ex-ante regulation based on the efficient costs of service provision. However, exclusion of costs for replacements and new investments from access charge regulation leaves only the smaller part of costs for a consistent regulation and will weaken the impacts of regulation.
Resumo
Este artigo aborda o estado da arte da literatura sobre transporte e turismo para o transporte ferroviário de passageiros. Nele é analisado o conteúdo de 32 artigos em inglês publicados em revistas científicas. Tais artigos foram agrupados em seis grandes temas que evidenciam os enfoques mais relevantes considerados pelos seus autores. Além de agrupar e analisar este corpo bibliográfico, este artigo propõe um esquema geográfico que ilustra três desses temas considerados: as novas tecnologias ferroviárias; a competição e integração com o transporte aéreo; e a relação direta entre transporte e turismo.
Palavras-chave: transporte ferroviário; transporte de passageiros; transportes turísticos; estado da arte.
Abstract
This paper deals with the state of the art of the transport and tourism literature about rail passenger transport. It analyses the content of 32 journal articles published in English. These articles have been grouped in six broad themes that highlight the most relevant topics considered by their authors. Apart from gathering and analysing this body of literature, this article presents a geographical scheme that illustrates three of the above-mentioned themes: the new rail technology; the competition and integration with air transportation; and the direct relationship between transport and tourism.
Keywords: rail transportation; transport for passengers; tourist transport; state of the art.
Russian railway reform plan calls for partial vertical integration of infrastructure with the transpor-tation services. Alternatively to the complete separation this way of inducing competition proves to be regulatory intensive. The purpose of this paper is twofold. It assesses the current state of the on-track competition at the early stage of the reform and investigates the impact of newly intro-duced tariff structure on competition. Author argues that the lack of tariff flexibility forces the sys-tem towards complete vertical separation. In this case access to infrastructure is charged in accor-dance with the Ramsey formula and final services are unregulated.
This paper reviews the development of thought on the major issues in transit economics over the last 50 years, in developed and developing countries. Some issues – the analysis of cost and demand parameters – are perennial, with development mostly in the mathematical sophistication of analytical techniques employed, while others – such as issues of ownership and competitive form – reflect wider trends in economic thinking. Some issues – such as the relationship between transit and development – are universal, while others – such as the role of small vehicles and the informal sector – impact mostly on developing countries. One conclusion stands out. Transit is critical to the achievement of a wide range of social, economic and environmental objectives and, therefore, needs appropriate institutions to ensure its integration with the strategic management of the rest of urban development policy.
Germany is one of the most liberalised countries in Europe for rail freight. Since the market became deregulated in 1991, 299 companies have obtained licences to haul freight of these approximately 130 actively engage in providing traction, but 85% of the market is still dominated by Railion, the freight arm of DB. Many obstacles to market entry have been identified in the literature since liberalisation. The goal of this paper is to assess if these obstacles persist and what new challenges have arisen. The study, based on a survey of new rail traction providers, suggests that several of the challenges identified in the literature have been overcome, but major problems persist because of the dominance of DB through its control of infrastructure and its market power.
An outlay schedule gives the expenditures required of consumers for the purchase of different quantities of a good or service. For any uniform price unequal to marginal cost, there is a nonlinear outlay schedule that is preferred by each consumer and that yields greater vendor profit. In fact, Pareto efficiency requires an outlay schedule that offers the largest consumer a marginal price equal to marginal cost. A nonlinear outlay schedule can only be effective if the product cannot be readily traded among consumers and if the vendor can monitor individuals' total purchases. Many public utilities meet these criteria.
I. Introduction, 175. — II. The optimal price, 176. — III. The welfare loss due to incorrect pricing, 182. — IV. An example,
183. — V. Concluding remarks, 187.
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Ein wesentliches Problem: der “wesentliche Teil
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Vergabe von Aufträgen im SPNV
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Wann ist ein Teil wesentlich?
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- A Ricci
- R Enei
Berufungsurteil im Trassenpreisstreit––oder “Vom ewigen Unterliegen”
- Brauner
The German railway market in transition
- H Link
Bahn muss beim Wettbewerb noch Hausaufgaben machen. Financial Times Deutschland, Thursday
- Ftd
Vergabeverordnung rechtswidrig?
- Zeiss
Trassenpreissysteme der DB––zum rechtlichen Umgang mit der Vergangenheit
- Brauner
Trennung von Netz und Betrieb--Regionale Verantwortung für die Schieneninfrastruktur
- Probahn
Fernverkehr: Quo vadis. Background paper
- Vcd
Bahn legt Konzept für ihr Netz vor
- Welt