No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Machiavellian Intelligence: social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys
... This observation has led to an active debate about the factors that selected for the evolution of large brains in primates (e.g. Barrickman et al., 2008;Barton, 1996;Byrne & Whiten, 1989;Harvey, Clutton-Brock, & Mace, 1980;Dunbar, 1992Dunbar, , 1998Evans et al., 2005;Finlay, Darlington, & Nicastro, 2001;Gibson, 1986;Harvey et al., 1980;Hofman, 1983;MacLean et al., 2014;Miller, 1999;Moll & Tomasello, 2007;Reader & Laland, 2002;Van Schaik, Isler, & Burkart, 2012). The comparative method has been used as a powerful tool that has enabled scientists to increase our understanding of how the pressures of the socio-ecological environment have influenced variation in brain size across primate species. ...
... Another proposal that has received considerable research attention is the social intelligence hypothesis. This hypothesis also regarded behavioural flexibility as a key factor driving the evolution of large brains in primates (Byrne & Whiten, 1989;Whiten & Byrne, 1997;Reader & Laland, 2002). Arguing that primate social environments are inherently competitive, the nature of the social environment would lead to a selection pressure for the evolution of 'Machiavellian' strategies. ...
... These neural structures underlying manual gestures in the great apes are homologous with the communication areas in the human brain, suggesting an important link between human communication and primate manual gestures, but not primate calls or other primate bodily movements (Corballis, 2003). Additionally, while many primate species commonly communicate with calls, facial expressions or bodily movements, manual gestures are typically widely used only in humans and other great apes (Pollick & de Waal, 2007;Byrne et al., 2017). This lack of homology between Hominoidea and all other primate species regarding manual gestures indicates a shift towards a more flexible and intentional production of manual gestures in our pre-hominid ancestors (Corballis, 2003), demonstrating the importance of manual gestures in facilitating complex sociality (Roberts et al., 2014a(Roberts et al., , 2014b. ...
Mammals living in more complex social groups typically have large brains for their body size and many researchers have proposed that the primary driver of the increase in brain size through primate and hominin evolution was the selection pressures associated with sociality. Many mammals, and especially primates, use flexible signals that show a high degree of voluntary control and these signals may play an important role in forming and maintaining social relationships between group members. However, the specific role that cognitive skills play in this complex communication, and how in turn this relates to sociality, is still unclear. The hypothesis for the communicative roots of complex sociality and cognition posits that cognitive demands behind the communication needed to form and maintain bonded social relationships in complex social settings drives the link between brain size and sociality. We review the evidence in support of this hypothesis and why key features of cognitively complex communication such as intentionality and referentiality should be more effective in forming and maintaining bonded relationships as compared with less cognitively complex communication. Exploring the link between cognition, communication and sociality provides insights into how increasing flexibility in communication can facilitate the emergence of social systems characterised by bonded social relationships, such as those found in non‐human primates and humans. To move the field forward and carry out both within‐ and among‐species comparisons, we advocate the use of social network analysis, which provides a novel way to describe and compare social structure. Using this approach can lead to a new, systematic way of examining social and communicative complexity across species, something that is lacking in current comparative studies of social structure.
... Classically, intelligence has often been considered mostly-or sometimes solely-for its value in manipulating and understanding the physical world (Humphrey, 1976), the environment for an organism being a series of cognitive puzzles which intelligence assists them in completing. More recent developments have expanded on this classical understanding through acknowledging that the complexities of an organism's social life may place just as high of a demand on an organism's intelligence as the complexities of its physical life (if not more; Byrne, 1996;Byrne & Whiten, 1990;Whiten, 2018). Far removed from the relatively sterile cognitive puzzles with which we now test and study intelligence, there is reason to believe that the origin of intelligence is best understood for its social uses (Gavrilets & Vose, 2006;Geher & Miller, 2007;McNally, Brown, & Jackson, 2012). ...
... The first is the need to accurately signal intelligence in order to demonstrate genetic quality and fitness to potential mates (McKeown, 2013;Miller, 2000;Miller & Todd, 1998). The second, a pressure to manipulate, deceive, or influence others through the application of such social intelligence (Byrne, 1996;Byrne & Whiten, 1990;Handel, 1982;Sharma et al., 2013;Whiten, 2018). Third, the pressure to accurately maintain and manipulate mental models of complex social networks and interactions, as well as being able to simulate the mental states of others (Bjorklund & Kipp, 2002;Roth & Dicke, 2005;Stone, 2006). ...
Navigating social systems efficiently is critical to our species. Humans appear endowed with a cognitive system that has formed to meet the unique challenges that emerge for highly social species. Bullshitting, communication characterised by an intent to be convincing or impressive without concern for truth, is ubiquitous within human societies. Across two studies ( N = 1,017), we assess participants’ ability to produce satisfying and seemingly accurate bullshit as an honest signal of their intelligence. We find that bullshit ability is associated with an individual’s intelligence and individuals capable of producing more satisfying bullshit are judged by second-hand observers to be more intelligent. We interpret these results as adding evidence for intelligence being geared towards the navigation of social systems. The ability to produce satisfying bullshit may serve to assist individuals in negotiating their social world, both as an energetically efficient strategy for impressing others and as an honest signal of intelligence.
... These results are in line with previous studies suggesting that several primate species can use complex behavioural strategies 36,37 and even take into account conspecifics' visual perspective when retrieving food in a competitive context 9,10,14,18 . However, our results importantly add to previous research by showing how inter-specific differences in dominance style reliably predict the probability that these tactics are used. ...
... Similarly, this study cannot disentangle whether individuals take into account what other group members see or what they are attentive to. However, reliance on these strategies implies at least efficient learning abilities, sensitivity to a wide range of subtle social cues and high flexibility in using them 14,36,39 . ...
In several species, rank predicts access to food, and subordinates may need specific behavioural strategies to get a share of resources. This may be especially important in despotic species, where resources are strongly biased in favour of dominants and subordinates may more strongly rely on specific tactics to maximize food intake. Here, we compared three macaque species with an experimental setup reproducing feeding competition contest. Following our predictions, more tolerant species mostly retrieved food in the presence of others and were less dependent on specific tactics. Contrarily, subordinates in more despotic species more likely collected food (1) when dominants could not see food or (2) were attacking others, (3) while "dissimulating", or (4) "storing food". Our study reveals that dominance styles reliably predict the probability of using specific food retrieval tactics and provides important insights on the social conditions that might have led to the emergence of tactical deception.
... Aun así, se discute todavía si la cognición social es el último logro en nuestra evolución cognitiva. Se especula con la posibilidad de que la cognición social (o más bien, la consecución absoluta de la teoría de la mente) apareciera al final del pleistoceno (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). Esta hipótesis se basa en el hecho de que en ese periodo ya había una sociedad relativamente compleja con separación de funciones, organizada en clanes, y que las demandas impuestas por este entorno dieron lugar a la aparición de las funciones relativas a la cognición social. ...
... El hecho de poder predecir y adaptarse a las conductas de los otros grupos puede ser una gran ventaja evolutiva (obtener más comida y evitar conflictos directos). Esta ventaja permitiría "adelantarse" a los competidores y se basaría en capacidades tales como saber lo que otros ven, saben y pretenden (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). Por otro lado, la teoría de la mente podría suponer la base para la generación de alianzas y estrategias cooperativas, reduciendo así igualmente la probabilidad de conflictos directos y aportando más recursos. ...
Introduction
Social cognition enables the processing of social information and is needed to adapt one's behaviour to the perceived social scene. Its assessment is a very controversial issue, tests currently available often use unhelpful stimuli from the ecological point of view.
Aims
To develop a test based on genuine social stimuli–not on their representations–and to do so, a controlled social situation is created in which participants can be evaluated on their abilities to perceive and process such information.
Method
A script was prepared, consisting of several interactions which are staged before the participants by two members of the research team. The sample comprises 50 subjects, being on average 22 years old (56% women), who took this test, the MSCEIT and the MASC.
Results
The application showed no incidence, no one detected that it was a previously prepared situation and they were not upset when this fact was revealed. A final selection of 18 items obtained a reliability of 0.701. Multidimensional scaling, partly showed the subdomains taken into account. The correlation matrix confirms the validity of the instrument. (r = 0,465 alpha < 0,001 with MASC. r = 0,106 alpha > 0,05 with MSCEIT).
Conclusions
The instrument is applicable and tolerated by participants being evaluated with it. It is feasible to use it as a test to assess social cognition It is mid-high reliability allows its use for research purposes. The correlation matrix confirmed validity, showing a significant and moderate connection with MASC and no association with any of the scales of MSCEIT.
... One of the theoretical foundations for such inter-specific studies lies in the field of socio-cognitive research. This area of science has its roots in the 'social brain hypothesis' [20,21] and examines systems where complex cognitive and social mechanisms are reciprocally connected. The study of pet-human communication is a particularly dynamic example of such research. ...
All social animals influence each other's behaviour. One area of particular interest is the social interaction that occurs between pets and their owners. Within pet–owner dyads, food and feeding are always part of the dyadic ritual. In this review, we hypothesize that feeding can be considered to be a push–pull relationship where pets are, at least in part, able to 'negotiate' with their owner to influence 'when', 'what' and 'how much' they are fed. We examine the evidence that supports this hypothesis by appraising similar studies of other animals and the pre-verbal human infant. First, we review the differences in approaches and methodologies that exist between disciplines within the behavioural sciences. Second, the feeding behaviour of neonatal wild animals and pre-verbal infants is examined in terms of its causation, ontogeny, phylogeny and adaptation. Finally, the resulting knowledge concerning begging as honest signals of need, scramble competition, re-conciliation and consolation is applied to domestic pets with the objective of understanding of how owners are influenced by the feeding behaviour of their pets. Review Methodology: We searched the following sources: Scopus, Google Scholar, Google Books (keyword search terms used: pet, begging, bird and altruism). In addition we used the references from the articles obtained by this method to check for additional relevant material.
... An unsuccessful association by a dyad triggered a period of feeder inactivity (1), during which neither type of reward was accessible (red circle). At the end of this 'lockout' period, the task returned to its default state (2). A successful dyadic interaction that occurred during a period when a lockout was not in effect resulted in access to both the high-and low-quality rewards (3). ...
Influential theories of the evolution of cognition and cooperation posit that tracking information about others allows individuals to adjust their social associations strategically, re-shaping social networks to favour connections between compatible partners. Crucially, to our knowledge, this has yet to be tested experimentally in natural populations, where the need to maintain long-term, fitness-enhancing relationships may limit social plasticity. Using a social-network-manipulation experiment, we show that wild jackdaws (Corvus monedula) learned to favour social associations with compatible group members (individuals that provided greater returns from social foraging interactions), but resultant change in network structure was constrained by the preservation of valuable pre-existing relationships. Our findings provide insights into the cognitive basis of social plasticity and the interplay between individual decision-making and social-network structure.
... Interestingly, neocortex size was shown to be differently correlated with group size in males and females (239). Because the neocortex's size is related to the degree of social complexity (241) to enable the higher cognitive demands in larger groups and more complex social exchanges, it is justified to investigate how sex and sex-specific roles determine the relationship between neocortex size and sociality. Also, if relative neocortex size is positively correlated with group size in females and negatively correlated in males, then sex-specific responses to sociotoxicity in social relationships (e.g., rejection or loneliness) can be better understood by different neurocognitive changes induced by the quantitative and qualitative aspects of social interactions in both sexes. ...
Evolutionary analyses suggest that the human social brain and sociality appeared together. The two fundamental tools that accelerated the concurrent emergence of the social brain and sociality include learning and plasticity. The prevailing core idea is that the primate brain and the cortex in particular became reorganised over the course of evolution to facilitate dynamic adaptation to ongoing changes in physical and social environments. Encouraged by computational or survival demands or even by instinctual drives for living in social groups, the brain eventually learned how to learn from social experience via its massive plastic capacity. A fundamental framework for modeling these orchestrated dynamic responses is that social plasticity relies upon neuroplasticity. In the present article, we first provide a glimpse into the concepts of plasticity, experience, with emphasis on social experience. We then acknowledge and integrate the current theoretical concepts to highlight five key intertwined assumptions within social neuroscience that underlie empirical approaches for explaining the brain-social dynamics. We suggest that this epistemological view provides key insights into the ontology of current conceptual frameworks driving future research to successfully deal with new challenges and possible caveats in favour of the formulation of novel assumptions. In the light of contemporary societal challenges, such as global pandemics, natural disasters, violent conflict, and other human tragedies, discovering the mechanisms of social brain plasticity will provide new approaches to support adaptive brain plasticity and social resilience.
... Used as a social tool, mutual grooming can reinforce bonds between individuals, reduce social tension and create alliances between non-related individuals. Finally, chimpanzees have a highly developed social system and structure which is strongly reminiscent of that observed in humans and reflects their remarkable ability for social intelligence (Byrne and Whiten 1988). ...
... concealing pleasure). Chimpanzees and bonobos, however, do possess a rudimentary ability to deceive (Byrne and Whiten 1988), also exhibited by the orangutan Chantek. But in the area of deceptive behavior, humans are the undisputed masters. ...
... Current debate regarding the drivers of brain expansion and cognition in animals have primarily focused on the relative roles of social and ecological factors (Navarrete et al. 2016;Street et al. 2017). According to the "Social intelligence hypothesis", social challenges posed by group-livings, like the need to understand and anticipate the behavior of conspecifics, are the key drivers of enhanced cognition and enlarged brains (Byrne and Whiten 1988;Dunbar 1998). By contrast, the "Ecological intelligence hypothesis" states that ecological challenges like the need to exploit a wide variety of food or to access food that is difficult to obtain are the most important selective factors shaping cognitive skills and larger brains (Miltion 1988). ...
Despite important recent advances in cognitive ecology, our current understanding of avian cognition still largely rests on research conducted on a few model taxa. Vultures are an ecologically distinctive group of species by being the only obligate carrion consumers across terrestrial vertebrates. Their unique scavenging lifestyle suggests they have been subject to particular selective pressures to locate scarce, unpredictable, ephemeral, and nutritionally challenging food. However, substantial variation exists among species in diet, foraging techniques and social structure of populations. Here, we provide an overview of the current knowledge on vulture cognition through a comprehensive literature review and a compilation of our own observations. We find evidence for a variety of innovative foraging behaviors, scrounging tactics, collective problem-solving abilities and tool-use, skills that are considered indicative of enhanced cognition and that bear clear connections with the eco-social lifestyles of species. However, we also find that the cognitive basis of these skills remain insufficiently studied, and identify new research areas that require further attention in the future. Despite these knowledge gaps and the challenges of working with such large animals, we conclude that vultures may provide fresh insight into our knowledge of the ecology and evolution of cognition.
... Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important activities" (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 20). Such criteria can be applied to nonhuman primates (NHPs) with adaptation because a high degree of characteristics, related to social, behavioral, developmental, emotional, and complex cognitive abilities, (Byrne and Whiten, 1990;van Schaik, 2002, 2006;Preston and De Waal, 2002;Parr et al., 2005;Maestripieri and Roney, 2006;Matsuzawa, 2009;Dunbar, 2010;Kummer, 2017;Kret et al., 2018) is shared between human and NHPs. Moreover, the structures and processes that command consciousness, cognition, emotions, sense of self, and other faculties are shared between humans and NHPs, as are the brain structures affected by trauma (Capaldo and Bradshaw, 2011). ...
The diagnosis of psychopathologies in nonhuman primates has received increasing interest in the last decade. However, only a limited number of categories of pathology have been diagnosed in some
chimpanzees exclusively by using adapted versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). With this in mind, we have created a questionnaire for the assessment of psychopa-
thologies in 23 rescued ex-performer and ex-pet chimpanzees, based on an inclusion-exclusion adaptation of the fifth edition of the DSM. A total of 70 items were retained for the Chimpanzee Psychopathology Questionnaire in accordance with 3 main criteria: deleting those that could not be applied to the subjects, retaining those that could be applied, and adapted when needed. Principal component analysis and regularized exploratory factor analysis revealed 9 statistically significant factors with acceptable standards of interrater reliability and validity, accounting for 70.78 % of the variance. The factors obtained were clear and similar to some of the main categories of diagnosis for humans. Nevertheless, the limitation of the sample, the subjectivity in the creation of the questionnaire, as well as the theoretical and methodological challenges of the adaptation of the DSM to chimpanzees, led to the fact that this research should be considered as a first contact study on the identification of disorder
categories in a group of chimpanzees. The main purpose of this study is to start a debate to promote research on psychopathology in chimpanzees and other animals. Likewise, it is important to emphasize that the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders in chimpanzees could be translated to important pragmatic aspects for the species related to awareness, legal implications, welfare, and comparative
psychopathology.
... Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important activities" (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 20). Such criteria can be applied to nonhuman primates (NHPs) with adaptation because a high degree of characteristics, related to social, behavioral, developmental, emotional, and complex cognitive abilities, (Byrne and Whiten, 1990;van Schaik, 2002, 2006;Preston and De Waal, 2002;Parr et al., 2005;Maestripieri and Roney, 2006;Matsuzawa, 2009;Dunbar, 2010;Kummer, 2017;Kret et al., 2018) is shared between human and NHPs. Moreover, the structures and processes that command consciousness, cognition, emotions, sense of self, and other faculties are shared between humans and NHPs, as are the brain structures affected by trauma (Capaldo and Bradshaw, 2011). ...
The diagnosis of psychopathologies in nonhuman primates has received increasing interest in the last decade. However, only a limited number of categories of pathology have been diagnosed in some chimpanzees exclusively by using adapted versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). With this in mind, we have created a questionnaire for the assessment of psychopa-thologies in 23 rescued ex-performer and ex-pet chimpanzees, based on an inclusion-exclusion adaptation of the fifth edition of the DSM. A total of 70 items were retained for the Chimpanzee Psychopathology Questionnaire in accordance with 3 main criteria: deleting those that could not be applied to the subjects, retaining those that could be applied, and adapted when needed. Principal component analysis and regularized exploratory factor analysis revealed 9 statistically significant factors with acceptable standards of interrater reliability and validity, accounting for 70.78 % of the variance. The factors obtained were clear and similar to some of the main categories of diagnosis for humans. Nevertheless, the limitation of the sample, the subjectivity in the creation of the questionnaire, as well as the theoretical and methodological challenges of the adaptation of the DSM to chimpanzees, led to the fact that this research should be considered as a first contact study on the identification of disorder categories in a group of chimpanzees. The main purpose of this study is to start a debate to promote research on psychopathology in chimpanzees and other animals. Likewise, it is important to emphasize that the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders in chimpanzees could be translated to important pragmatic aspects for the species related to awareness, legal implications, welfare, and comparative psychopathology.
... These include new kinds of physical tool use and physical cognition, particularly causal cognition (e.g. [10][11][12]), sophisticated capacities for 'theory of mind' and social interaction and cooperation [13][14][15] and impressive capacities for cultural learning and transmission [16,17]. ...
I argue that the evolution of our life history, with its distinctively long, protected human childhood, allows an early period of broad hypothesis search and exploration, before the demands of goal-directed exploitation set in. This cognitive profile is also found in other animals and is associated with early behaviours such as neophilia and play. I relate this developmental pattern to computational ideas about explore–exploit trade-offs, search and sampling, and to neuroscience findings. I also present several lines of empirical evidence suggesting that young human learners are highly exploratory, both in terms of their search for external information and their search through hypothesis spaces. In fact, they are sometimes more exploratory than older learners and adults.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals’.
... (Austin, 1962)]. (6) Primate evolution is driven mainly by social-sometimes described as Machiavellian (Byrne and Whiten, 1988)intelligence, which is expressed in political behavior that aims at superior reproductive success for the competitor (de Waal, 1982). All these claims are not necessary for the argument presented in this paper but are only mentioned to provide further support. ...
This paper proposes a social account for the origin of the truth value and the emergence of the first declarative sentence. Such a proposal is based on two assumptions. The first is known as the social intelligence hypothesis: that the cognitive evolution of humans is first and foremost an adaptation to social demands. The second is the function-first approach to explaining the evolution of traits: before a prototype of a new trait develops and the adaptation process begins, something already existing is used for a new purpose. Applied to the emergence of declarative sentences, this suggests something already existing—natural signs (which have a logical or causal relation to what they denote)—were used for the declarative function and thereby integrated (in the form of indexical objects implying a past action) into communication. I show that the display of an indexical object (such as the display of hunting trophies) can imply a conceptual structure similar to that informing the syntax of sentences. The view developed in this paper is broadly consistent with the argumentative theory of Mercier and Sperber, which suggests that reasoning is less adapted to decision making than to social purposes such as winning disputes or justifying one’s actions. In this paper I extend this view to the origin of the concept of truth. According to my proposal, the first declarative sentence (articulated in a simple sign language) emerged as a negation of a negation of an implicit statement expressed by the display of an indexical object referring to a past action. Thereby, I suggest that the binary structure of the truth value underlying any declarative sentence is founded on disagreements based on conflicts of interest. Thus, I deny that the concept of truth could have evolved for instrumental reasons such as solving problems, or through self-questioning about what one ought to believe.
... Groups of wild rats are socially complex as they live in long-term groups of multiple generations, which allows for repeated interactions with differently familiar and related individuals (see Scheiber et al., 2017 for the characteristics of social complexity). Their complex social system implies that rats need certain cognitive adaptations to deal with challenges like mate or food competition that can be overcome, for instance, by cooperation or social learning (Byrne and Whiten, 1988). Yet, the social system of rats does not allow general conclusions about the underlying cognitive mechanisms of their behaviours. ...
The Norway rat has important impacts on our life. They are amongst the most used research subjects, resulting in groundbreaking advances. At the same time, wild rats live in close association with us, leading to various adverse interactions. In face of this relevance, it is surprising how little is known about their natural behaviour. While recent laboratory studies revealed their complex social skills, little is known about their social behaviour in the wild. An integration of these different scientific approaches is crucial to understand their social life, which will enable us to design more valid research paradigms, develop more effective management strategies, and to provide better welfare standards. Hence, I first summarise the literature on their natural social behaviour. Second, I provide an overview of recent developments concerning their social cognition. Third, I illustrate why an integration of these areas would be beneficial to optimise our interactions with them.
... The broad issue is not new, individuals have always sought to manipulate others to their own ends. The Machiavellian Intelligence hypothesis postulates mechanisms for the evolution of the ability, albeit mentalistic ability, to influence others (Humphrey 1976;Byrne and Whiten, 1988;Whiten and Byrne 1997). But the advent of a sophisticated science of human behaviour bypasses mentalism and bypasses individual agency and "free will", and so opens the way to quasi deterministic manipulation. ...
... In einem solchen sozialen Kontext, so die "Social Intellect"-Hypothese, haben jene Individuen Vorteile, die über besonders gute sozialkognitive Fähigkeiten verfügen, da sie das Verhalten anderer besser voraussehen können und ihr soziales Netzwerk effektiv pflegen können (z. B. Byrne/Whiten, 1988;Dunbar, 2003). Diese Forschungen verdeutlichen, dass nicht allgemein von "genetisch verfassten Sozietäten der Tiere" (173) geredet werden kann, sondern etwa Lernen, Taktieren und Täuschen in den Gruppenverbänden mancher Tiere eine wichtige Rolle spielen. ...
... Numerous ethology studies have attempted to explain animals' dominance and rank phenomena, and they have found that animal societies could have politics [23,24], that animals could exploit and manipulate each other [23,25,26], and that animals have ranks and hierarchical structures [27,28]. According to Darwin's theory of evolution [29], this kind of collective behavior with roles is a result of Natural Selection, and the competition for food and ability to breed. ...
In this study, I am going to develop a new theory of leadership phenomenon by observing similar natural mechanism with existing in the animal world. Animals’ social systems have similar structure, dominance, influence, manipulations (Machiavellism), and on the other hand have no stereotypes and not complex as human society. By observing animal social systems and extrapolating on human society I developed role-based theory of leadership. This theory gives a new look at the problem of leadership. That, in turn, can serve as a good idea for subsequent studies in real organizations and testing such conclusions as an advantage of natural competitive selection of leaders over an artificial breeding. The Role-based leadership theory proposes to change the focus of attention of researchers from trying to understand who became a leader and why, to understanding leadership as a continued rival.
... Indeed, its central claim is that human intelligence is essentially social. The roots of this hypothesis go back to a well- established trend in the cognitive sciences (Humphrey, 1976) and primatology ( de Waal, 1982;Byrne and Whiten, 1988) arguing that human intelligence emerged from the need of solving 'social problems.' However, over the years it abandoned its early focus on deception and manipulation, which characterized it when it was named "Machiavellian Intelligence." ...
Social robotics entertains a particular relationship with anthropomorphism, which it neither sees as a cognitive error, nor as a sign of immaturity. Rather it considers that this common human tendency, which is hypothesized to have evolved because it favored cooperation among early humans, can be used today to facilitate social interactions between humans and a new type of cooperative and interactive agents – social robots. This approach leads social robotics to focus research on the engineering of robots that activate anthropomorphic projections in users. The objective is to give robots “social presence” and “social behaviors” that are sufficiently credible for human users to engage in comfortable and potentially long-lasting relations with these machines. This choice of ‘applied anthropomorphism’ as a research methodology exposes the artifacts produced by social robotics to ethical condemnation: social robots are judged to be a “cheating” technology, as they generate in users the illusion of reciprocal social and affective relations. This article takes position in this debate, not only developing a series of arguments relevant to philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences, and robotic AI, but also asking what social robotics can teach us about anthropomorphism. On this basis, we propose a theoretical perspective that characterizes anthropomorphism as a basic mechanism of interaction, and rebuts the ethical reflections that a priori condemns “anthropomorphism-based” social robots. To address the relevant ethical issues, we promote a critical experimentally based ethical approach to social robotics, “synthetic ethics,” which aims at allowing humans to use social robots for two main goals: self-knowledge and moral growth.
... In many settings, such as interviewing for a job or attending a family reunion, appropriate social interactions and emotional behavior depend upon an assessment of the hierarchical ranks of both oneself and the other people present. The hierarchical ranks of individuals and the accurate evaluation of the hierarchical ranks of others affect the ability to thrive-for example, by influencing fluid and food access, mating priority and defensive behavior [2][3][4][5] . ...
The social brain hypothesis posits that dedicated neural systems process social information. In support of this, neurophysiological data have shown that some brain regions are specialized for representing faces. It remains unknown, however, whether distinct anatomical substrates also represent more complex social variables, such as the hierarchical rank of individuals within a social group. Here we show that the primate amygdala encodes the hierarchical rank of individuals in the same neuronal ensembles that encode the rewards associated with nonsocial stimuli. By contrast, orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices lack strong representations of hierarchical rank while still representing reward values. These results challenge the conventional view that dedicated neural systems process social information. Instead, information about hierarchical rank-which contributes to the assessment of the social value of individuals within a group-is linked in the amygdala to representations of rewards associated with nonsocial stimuli.
... Primates have evolved to adapt to complexities of social living and their higherorder intellect is primarily suited to social problem-solving [1]. To deal with such social problems, the utilization of adaptive cognitive abilities including mind reading, tactical deception and coalition-formation are required [2,3]. According to the 'social brain hypothesis,' living in a large social group imposes computationally demanding information, so primates evolutionarily developed a bigger neocortex volume to adapt to such a load [4]. ...
The social brain hypothesis proposes that large neocortex size evolved to support cognitively demanding social interactions. Accordingly, previous studies have observed that larger orbitofrontal and amygdala structures predict the size of an individual's social network. However, it remains uncertain how an individual's social connectedness reported by other people is associated with the social brain volume. In this study, we found that a greater in-degree network size, a measure of social ties identified by a subject's social connections rather than by the subject, significantly correlated with a larger regional volume of the orbitofrontal cortex, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and lingual gyrus. By contrast, out-degree size, which is based on an individual's self-perceived connectedness, showed no associations. Meta-analytic reverse inference further revealed that regional volume pattern of in-degree size was specifically involved in social inference ability. These findings were possible because our dataset contained the social networks of an entire village, i.e. a global network. The results suggest that the in-degree aspect of social network size not only confirms the previously reported brain correlates of the social network but also shows an association in brain regions involved in the ability to infer other people's minds. This study provides insight into understanding how the social brain is uniquely associated with sociocentric measures derived from a global network.
... The basis for the latter is known as third-party relationship knowledge, and has been demonstrated in a variety of species [28][29][30][31][32]. If it could be shown that individuals in stable groups integrate all the aforementioned information in response to an audience in a self-serving way [7,33] such results would provide important support for the strategic aspects of the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis [34,35]. This hypothesis builds on previous suggestions that cognitive processes mainly evolved to allow individuals to cope with the challenges of the rather unpredictable social environment [1,36]. ...
Group living promotes opportunities for both cooperation and competition. Selection on the ability to cope with such opposing social opportunities has been proposed as a driving force in the evolution of large brains in primates and other social species. However,we still knowlittle about the degree of complexity involved in such social strategies. Here, we report advanced social strategies in wild vervet monkeys. Building on recent experimental evidence that subordinate females trade grooming for tolerance from higher-ranking individuals during foraging activities,we showthat the audience composition strongly affects this trade. First, tolerance was lower if the audience contained individuals that outranked the subordinate partner, independently of audience size and kinship relationships. Second, we found a significant interaction between previous grooming and relative rank of bystanders: dominant subjects valued recent grooming by subordinates while intermediate ranked subjects valued the option to aggress subordinate partners in the presence of a dominant audience. Aggressors were also more likely to emit coalition recruitment calls if the audience contained individuals that outranked the subordinate partner. In conclusion, vervet monkeys include both recent grooming and knowledge about third-party relationships to make complex decisions when trading grooming for tolerance, leading to a finely balanced trade-off between reciprocation and opportunities to reinforce rank relationships. © 2017 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
... If among primates the individual's social status were determined exclusively by corporeal mass, as it is for example among elephant seals were the largest individuals invariably occupy the highest places in the hierarchy (Le Boeuf, 1974), then there would have been no need to develop a capacity for deontic reasoning, and pure physical force would have been enough. But since among primates the rank of an individual is determined to a great degree by his ability to form alliances (de Waal, 1982;Harcourt, 1988;Harcourt & de Waal, 1992), deontic reasoning has been selected, because it permits control over how the contracted obligations of the members of the coalition are respected. ...
Modern Darwinist perspective enables to deal with the study of several human phenomena, one of which is deception, that we define as a behaviour unfolded with the deliberate intention of producing or sustaining a state of ignorance or false belief in another person. Evolutionary Psychology, an emerging area inside Cognitive Science, represents a promising conceptual approach to the study of deception. According to it, knowledge on human mind can be improved by understanding the processes which, during evolution, shaped its architecture. This work traces back to the Evolutionary Psychology arguments (for a review see Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Buss, 1995; 1999) and develops the hypothesis that deception is a behaviour underpinned by two psychological mechanisms that evolved in response to problems posed by group living: the theory of mind and deontic reasoning.
... The motivation to display one's mind-reading abilities stems from the evolutionary advantages that are gained through rising up through the ranks of a social hierarchy [10]. The Analogical Peacock Hypothesis combines two evolutionary schools of thought, the social brain hypothesis [11], [12], [13], [14], and the use of mental fitness indicators [15], [16], to explain this connection between social status and mind-reading display. As our social groups became larger and more sophisticated, those who were better at climbing their social hierarchy would have access to better resources and mating possibilities due to their elevated status; amongst the most important skills required for climbing social hierarchies are the socio-political skills of perspective-taking, mind-reading and theory of mind. ...
Understanding humor in human social interaction is a prerequisite to the creation of engaging interactions between humans and digital assistants, embodied conversational agents and social robots. As these HCI methods become more prevalent and pervasive, more advanced conversational discourse abilities will be required. However, many models of dialogue and human communication used in computer science remain based upon out-dated understanding of the manner in which humans communicate with one another. This paper addresses these issues introducing a view of communication based on Relevance theory and the Analogical Peacock Hypothesis in which humor and humorous interactions are viewed as ostensive challenges inviting the receiver of a communication to engage in greater levels of cognitive processing and effort to resolve the challenge set by a humorous display. The increased effort is rewarded with positive socio-cognitive effects—a humorous payoff and knowledge of the mind-reading abilities of the humor producer.
... There are two broad explanations for the evolution of primate cognition. The social intelligence hypothesis argues that aspects of social lifesuch as living in large groups, the need for political or 'Machiavellian' maneuvering, cooperative breeding, or social learninghave been the primary force shaping intelligent behavior [1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. By contrast, the ecological intelligence hypothesis focuses on features of the diet, including the complex spatiotemporal distribution of foods, use of extractive foraging techniques, or responses to a fluctuating environment [8][9][10][11][12][13]. ...
What are the origins of intelligent behavior? The demands associated with living in complex social groups have been the favored explanation for the evolution of primate cognition in general and human cognition in particular. However, recent comparative research indicates that ecological variation can also shape cognitive abilities. I synthesize the emerging evidence that ‘foraging cognition’ – skills used to exploit food resources, including spatial memory, decision-making, and inhibitory control – varies adaptively across primates. These findings provide a new framework for the evolution of human cognition, given our species’ dependence on costly, high-value food resources. Understanding the origins of the human mind will require an integrative theory accounting for how humans are unique in both our sociality and our ecology.
... & Yanjie Su yjsu@pku.edu.cn 1 with important functions (Emery 2000;Rosati and Hare 2009); For example, gaze-following might aid animals in gathering information about their physical and social world, which is necessary for appropriate reactions. The social intelligence hypothesis posits that sociality is a major driver of cognitive evolution (Byrne and Whiten 1989;Dunbar 2003;Emery 2000;Herrmann et al. 2007;Whiten and van Schaik 2007). Cognitive abilities are predicted to evolve in response to challenges from social life, as opposed to those from the physical environment. ...
Gaze-following is a basic cognitive ability found in numerous primate and nonprimate species. However, little is known about this ability and its variation in colobine monkeys. We compared gaze-following of two Asian colobines-François' langurs (Trachypithecus francoisi) and golden snub-nosed monkeys (Rhinopithecus roxellana). Although both species live in small polygynous family units, units of the latter form multilevel societies with up to hundreds of individuals. François' langurs (N = 15) were less sensitive to the gaze of a human experimenter than were golden snub-nosed monkeys (N = 12). We then tested the two species using two classic inhibitory control tasks-the cylinder test and the A-not-B test. We found no difference between species in inhibitory control, which called into question the nonsocial explanation for François' langur's weaker sensitivity to human gaze. These findings are consistent with the social intelligence hypothesis, which predicted that golden snub-nosed monkeys would outperform François' langurs in gaze-following because of the greater size and complexity of their social groups. Furthermore, our results underscore the need for more comparative studies of cognition in colobines, which should provide valuable opportunities to test hypotheses of cognitive evolution.
Sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus) are highly social mammals that communicate using sequences of clicks called codas. While a subset of codas have been shown to encode information about caller identity, almost everything else about the sperm whale communication system, including its structure and information-carrying capacity, remains unknown. We show that codas exhibit contextual and combinatorial structure. First, we report previously undescribed features of codas that are sensitive to the conversational context in which they occur, and systematically controlled and imitated across whales. We call these rubato and ornamentation. Second, we show that codas form a combinatorial coding system in which rubato and ornamentation combine with two context-independent features we call rhythm and tempo to produce a large inventory of distinguishable codas. Sperm whale vocalisations are more expressive and structured than previously believed, and built from a repertoire comprising nearly an order of magnitude more distinguishable codas. These results show context-sensitive and combinatorial vocalisation can appear in organisms with divergent evolutionary lineage and vocal apparatus.
The standard cognitive explanation for the emergence of human communication is that it rests largely on the expression and attribution of communicative intentions which are, in turn, enabled by complex metarepresentations of mental states. This complexity is at odds with the limited metapsychological abilities of infants. But mentalistic metarepresentations are neither necessary nor sufficient in explaining communication. Coded ostensive signals (e.g., eye contact) and established channels (e.g., speech) allow that communicative episodes be identified through decoding rather than metarepresentational inferences. Thus, some metarepresentations may be unnecessary. However, metapsychology is also insufficient for explaining communication: the logic of instrumental actions permits interpreting their effect as following from intentions, yet the effect of communicative actions is often unavailable for inferring meaning. Moreover, current evidence for the developmental trajectory of communication and mental state attribution does not support the emergence of the former from the latter. My proposal is that our primitive concept of communication targets, instead, representational action. When we communicate, we typically convey a propositional content that is detached from our acts—a property absent in ordinary goal-directed actions. This view additionally raises the possibility that metarepresentational capacities evolved for representing external, communicative representations and were only later exapted for other purposes.
The article is devoted to the problem of studying the manipulative sphere in students with different levels of manipulative behaviour. Identifying certain differences in students with different levels of manipulative sphere may indicate different attitude of women and men to certain situations and life events. Students who have some sensuality and sentimentality are more prone to the manipulative behaviour of the manipulator. A real magnet for different toxic personalities can be responsive, conscientious and emotionally responsive people, as manipulators tend to exploit them and there is some interest in them. Manipulators can succeed quite easily by convincing people who are very responsive and conscientious, embodying that they are paranoia or "react acutely" at a time when they begin to manipulate. It is these sensetive people who are often targeted and can be forced to doubt themselves. Manipulative behaviour, it can be passive or active. The article reveals and substsntiates the differencies in the manipulative sphere in students between groups with high manipulative sphere and low manipulative sphere. Some characteristic differences that are inherent in men and women with high levels of manipulative behaviour have been identified: expression, validation, value, consensus, guilt or stretch, macivalism.
Evolutionary psychiatry attempts to explain and examine the development and prevalence of psychiatric disorders through the lens of evolutionary and adaptationist theories. In this edited volume, leading international evolutionary scholars present a variety of Darwinian perspectives that will encourage readers to consider 'why' as well as 'how' mental disorders arise. Using insights from comparative animal evolution, ethology, anthropology, culture, philosophy and other humanities, evolutionary thinking helps us to re-evaluate psychiatric epidemiology, genetics, biochemistry and psychology. It seeks explanations for persistent heritable traits shaped by selection and other evolutionary processes, and reviews traits and disorders using phylogenetic history and insights from the neurosciences as well as the effects of the modern environment. By bridging the gap between social and biological approaches to psychiatry, and encouraging bringing the evolutionary perspective into mainstream psychiatry, this book will help to inspire new avenues of research into the causation and treatment of mental disorders.
Background
Brain size is expected to evolve by a balance between cognitive benefits and energetic costs. Several influential hypotheses have suggested that large brains may be especially beneficial in social contexts. Group living and competition may pose unique cognitive challenges to individuals and favor the evolution of increased cognitive ability. Evidence comes from comparative studies on the link between social complexity and brain morphology, but the strength of empirical support has recently been challenged. In addition, the behavioral mechanisms that would link cognitive ability to sociality are rarely studied. Here we take an alternative approach and investigate experimentally how brain size can relate to the social competence of individuals within species, a problem that so far has remained unresolved. We use the unique guppy brain size selection line model system to evaluate whether large brains are advantageous by allowing individuals to better assess their performance in a social contest situation. Based on theoretical literature, we predict that contest duration should depend on the brain size of the loser, as it is the capitulation of the losing individual that ends the fight.
Results
First, we show that studying the movement of competitors during contests allows for precise estimation of the dominance timeline in guppies, even when overt aggression is typically one-sided and delayed. Second, we staged contests between pairs of male that had been artificially selected for large and small relative brain size, with demonstrated differences in cognitive ability. We show that dominance was established much earlier in contests with large-brained losers, whereas the brain size of the winner had no effect. Following our prediction, large-brained individuals gave up more quickly when they were going to lose.
Conclusions
These results suggest that large-brained individuals assess their performance in contests better and that social competence indeed can depend on brain size. Conflict resolution may therefore be an important behavioral mechanism behind macro-evolutionary patterns between sociality and brain size. Since conflict is ubiquitous among group-living animals, the possible effects of the social environment on the evolution of cognition may be more broadly applicable than previously thought.
Socially maintained behavioural traditions in non-human species hold great interest for biologists, anthropologists and psychologists. This book treats traditions in non-human species as biological phenomena that are amenable to the comparative methods of inquiry used in contemporary biology. Chapters in the first section define behavioural traditions, and indicate how they can arise in non-human species, how widespread they may be, how they may be recognized and how we can study them. The second part summarizes cutting-edge research programmes seeking to identify traditions in diverse taxa in contributions from leading researchers in this area. The book ends with a comparison and evaluation of the alternative theoretical formulations and their applications presented in the book, and lays out recommendations for future research building on the most promising evidence and lines of thinking. The Biology of Traditions will be essential reading for students and researchers in the fields of anthropology, biology and psychology.
Research on cognitive disorders is challenging due to the complexity of functions and numerous variables involved. The main purpose of this book is to effectively address the methodological issues and controversies in cognitive disorders research. First, it reviews the concept of human cognition as a complex activity involving interconnected mental and cerebral processes (its systemic structure), which represent the natural and social-cultural world by means of signs (its mediated, semiotic nature) and result from the internalization (or appropriation by the individual) of external actions and relations with things and persons (its cultural-historical origin).
Subsequently, methodological issues are examined, including the use of the systemic and network approach in neuropsychological research, the concepts of single and double dissociation, single-case versus group studies, problems of brain-behavioral correlations using the lesion method and functional neuroimaging, the influence of task-relevant variables (confounders) related to the patient (e.g., age, education), to the lesion (size, etiology), and to the tests and testing conditions (ecological validity, examiner´s experience). Finally, readers are given the fundamentals of statistics applied to biomedical and psychological research, with illustrative examples of how to calculate Z score, effect size, χ2 test, t test, Pearson´s correlation coefficient, and simple linear regression. Methodological problems in current cognitive research on early multiple sclerosis, medial temporal lobe epilepsy, mild cognitive impairment and dementia are examined in detail.
Socially maintained behavioural traditions in non-human species hold great interest for biologists, anthropologists and psychologists. This book treats traditions in non-human species as biological phenomena that are amenable to the comparative methods of inquiry used in contemporary biology. Chapters in the first section define behavioural traditions, and indicate how they can arise in non-human species, how widespread they may be, how they may be recognized and how we can study them. The second part summarizes cutting-edge research programmes seeking to identify traditions in diverse taxa in contributions from leading researchers in this area. The book ends with a comparison and evaluation of the alternative theoretical formulations and their applications presented in the book, and lays out recommendations for future research building on the most promising evidence and lines of thinking. The Biology of Traditions will be essential reading for students and researchers in the fields of anthropology, biology and psychology.
Anecdotal reports of horses opening fastened doors and gates are an intriguing way of exploring the possible scope of horses' problem-solving capacities. The species' natural environment has no analogues of the mechanisms involved. Scientific studies on the topic are missing, because the rate of occurrence is too low for exploration under controlled conditions. Therefore, we compiled from lay persons case reports of horses opening closed doors and gates. Additionally, we collected video documentations at the internet platform YouTube, taking care to select raw data footage of unedited, clearly described and clearly visible cases of animals with no distinct signs of training or reduced welfare. The data included individuals opening 513 doors or gates on hinges, 49 sliding doors, and 33 barred doors and gateways; mechanisms included 260 cases of horizontal and 155 vertical bars, 43 twist locks, 42 door handles, 34 electric fence handles, 40 carabiners, and 2 locks with keys. Opening was usually for escape, but also for access to food or stable-mates, or out of curiosity or playfulness. While 56 percent of the horses opened a single mechanism at one location, 44 percent opened several types of mechanism (median = 2, min. = 1, max. = 5) at different locations (median = 2, min. = 1, max. = 4). The more complex the mechanism was, the more movements were applied, varying from median 2 for door handles to 10 for carabiners. Mechanisms requiring head- or lip-twisting needed more movements, with significant variation between individuals. 74 horses reported in the questionnaire had options for observing the behaviour in stable mates, 183 did not, which indicates that the latter learned to open doors and gates either individually or from observing humans. Experience favours opening efficiency; subjects which opened several door types applied fewer movements per lock than horses which opened only one door type. We failed to identify a level of complexity of door-fastening mechanism that was beyond the learning capacity of the horse to open. Thus, all devices in frequent use, even carabiners and electric fence handles, are potentially vulnerable to opening by horses, something which needs to be considered in relation to keeping horses safely.
Objectives:
Unidirectional dominance-related signals can be used to communicate submission (an immediate behavioral response) or subordination (the status of an established relationship). Subordination signals are defined as emitted during peaceful interactions and are hypothesized to be critical for the evolution of social complexity and robust power structures because they reduce uncertainty in social relationships. The chatter vocalization in Verreaux's sifaka (Propithecus verreauxi) is a unidirectional submissive signal. I tested the hypothesis that chatter vocalizations can signal subordination and thereby reduce agonism in a dyad.
Materials and methods:
I examined 780 chatters from 18 dyads collected over 881 observation hours on four groups of sifaka in Kirindy Forest, Madagascar.
Results:
Sifaka emitted 63% of chatters in the peaceful context. Peaceful chatters significantly predicted grooming rate, fighting rate, reconciliation, and proportion of wins in a dyad but did not predict time in proximity. Dyad-type significantly predicted the frequency of peaceful chatters, with intrasexual dyads exhibiting chatters in peaceful contexts more often than intersexual dyads.
Discussion:
Sifaka communicate both submission and subordination with chatter vocalizations. Subordination signaling increased tolerance and affiliation. It reduced conflicts and the probability dominant individuals usurped resources. Moreover, intrasexual power may be more institutionalized than intersexual power in sifaka. The finding of complex and cognitively demanding social communication in a lemur with low levels of cooperation (1) challenges previous assumptions that the evolution of social complexity is dependent on frequent triadic interactions and high levels of cooperation, and (2) highlights the need for taxonomic diversity in studies of social complexity.
Primates, like all animals live in an environment that includes others. They can be detected by others and can influence the likelihood (and consequences) of this detection by sending signals. Signals are bodily features or behaviors of the signaler that trigger specific behaviors in the receiver. The receiver, signaler, signal and medium are the four basic building blocks of any communication cycle. Each component can be considered separately, but in the service of communication they are interdependent and defined only in relation to one other. Cycles of reciprocal signal exchange mediate social interactions, but even “asocial” species coordinate reproduction, manage conflict over territory, and may anticipate and influence potential predators and prey. Communication arose long before the evolution of primates, animals and even neurons, yet is a crucial aspect of primate behavior and of their nervous system evolution. In this review, we examine how exchanges take place among primates and how neural systems act to mediate them.
Humans are considered superior to other species in their tool using skills. However, most of our knowledge about animals comes from observations in artificial conditions with individuals removed from their natural environment. We present a first comparison of humans and chimpanzees spontaneously acquiring the same technique as they forage in their natural environment. We compared the acquisition of the Panda nut-cracking technique between Mbendjele foragers from the Republic of Congo and the Taï chimpanzees from Côte d’Ivoire. Both species initially acquire the technique slowly with similar kinds of mistakes, with years of practice required for the apprentice to become expert. Chimpanzees more rapidly acquired the technique when an apprentice, and reached adult efficiency earlier than humans. Adult efficiencies in both species did not differ significantly. Expert-apprentice interactions showed many similar instances of teaching in both species, with more variability in humans due, in part to their more complex technique. While in humans, teaching occurred both vertically and obliquely, only the former existed in chimpanzees. This comparison of the acquisition of a natural technique clarifies how the two species differed in their technical intelligence. Furthermore, our observations support the idea of teaching in both species being more frequent for difficult skills.
Consideration of social cognition—how an individual’s decision-making is influenced by her/his social environment—is key to understanding the behaviour of socially living nonhuman primates. In this chapter we discuss primate social cognition by focusing on primates’ behavioural responses to the presence and actions of others, how they adjust their behaviour to maximize their own gains, and possibly also the rewards received by a partner. Individuals can observe and replicate the actions of others, or the outcomes of their actions, to accelerate behavioural acquisition of techniques to obtain rewards (social learning). Beyond passively observing others, primates can also work with group mates to obtain rewards more easily or to get rewards that would otherwise be unattainable by a single individual (collaboration). Although not universally seen among primates, one individual may also help another to acquire resources (prosocial behaviour). Prosocial and collaborative interactions may result in an imbalance of benefits received, and certain primate species respond negatively when receiving less than a social partner (inequity aversion), a response which may protect individuals against cheating. Such behaviours demonstrate how the interplay between an individual’s desires and those of others can modify behavioural outcomes and the importance of considering cognition from a social perspective in order to understand the decision-making of individuals. However, there is variation both within and between species in their sensitivity to the actions of others and their responses to them. Thus, a comparative framework is needed when studying what is meant by ‘primate social cognition’.
When exploiting the environment, animals have to discriminate, track, and integrate salient spatial cues to navigate and identify goal sites. Actually, they have to know what can be found (e.g. what fruit), where (e.g. on which tree) and when (in what season or moment of the year). This is very relevant for primate species as they often live in seasonal and relatively unpredictable environments such as tropical forests. Here, we review and compare different approaches used to investigate primate spatial foraging strategies: from direct observations of wild primates to predictions from statistical simulations, including experimental approaches on both captive and wild primates, and experiments in captivity using virtual reality technology. Within this framework, most of these studies converge to show that many primate species can (i) remember the location of most of food resources well, and (ii) often seem to have a goal‐oriented path towards spatially permanent resources. Overall, primates likely use mental maps to plan different foraging strategies to enhance their fitness. The majority of studies suggest that they may organise spatial information on food resources into topological maps: they use landmarks to navigate and encode local spatial information with regard to direction and distance. Even though these studies were able to show that primates can remember food quality (what) and its location (where), still very little is known on how they incorporate the temporal knowledge of available food (when). Future studies should attempt to increase our understanding of the potential of primates to learn temporal patterns and how both socio‐ecological differences among species and their cognitive abilities influence such behavioural strategies.
Studies of eusocial invertebrates regard complex societies as those where there is a clear division of labour and extensive cooperation between breeders and helpers. In contrast, studies of social mammals identify complex societies as those where differentiated social relationships influence access to resources and reproductive opportunities. We show here that, while traits associated with social complexity of the first kind occur in social mammals that live in groups composed of close relatives, traits associated with the complexity of social relationships occur where average kinship between female group members is low. These differences in the form of social complexity appear to be associated with variation in brain size and probably reflect contrasts in the extent of conflicts of interest between group members. Our results emphasise the limitations of any unitary concept of social complexity and show that variation in average kinship between group members has far‐reaching consequences for animal societies.
Detection of deception is of fundamental importance for everyday social life and might require “mindreading” (the ability to represent others’ mental states). People with diminished mindreading, such as those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), might be at risk of manipulation because of lie detection difficulties. In Experiment 1, performance among 216 neurotypical adults on a realistic lie detection paradigm was significantly negatively associated with number of ASD traits, but not with mindreading ability. Bayesian analyses complemented null hypothesis significance testing and suggested the data supported the alternative hypothesis in this key respect. Cross validation of results was achieved by randomly splitting the full sample into two subsamples of 108 and rerunning analyses. The association between lie detection and ASD traits held in both subsamples, showing the reliability of findings. In Experiment 2, lie detection was significantly impaired in 27 adults with a diagnosis of ASD relative to 27 matched comparison participants. Results suggest that people with ASD (or ASD traits) may be particularly vulnerable to manipulation and may benefit from lie detection training. Autism Res 2018. © 2018 The Authors Autism Research published by International Society for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Lay Summary
Detection of deception is of fundamental importance for everyday social life. People with diminished understanding of other minds, such as those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), might be at risk of manipulation because of lie detection difficulties. We found that lie detection ability was related to how many ASD traits neurotypical people manifested and also was significantly diminished among adults with a full diagnosis of ASD.
The question of whether AI systems such as robots can or should be afforded moral agency or patiency is not one amenable either to discovery or simple reasoning, because we as societies constantly reconstruct our artefacts, including our ethical systems. Consequently, the place of AI systems in society is a matter of normative, not descriptive ethics. Here I start from a functionalist assumption, that ethics is the set of behaviour that maintains a society. This assumption allows me to exploit the theoretical biology of sociality and autonomy to explain our moral intuitions. From this grounding I extend to consider possible ethics for maintaining either human- or of artefact-centred societies. I conclude that while constructing AI systems as either moral agents or patients is possible, neither is desirable. In particular, I argue that we are unlikely to construct a coherent ethics in which it it is ethical to afford AI moral subjectivity. We are therefore obliged not to build AI we are obliged to.
The objective of this research is: To find out how the generic structure is written in the narrative texts, to find out the problems faced by the students of SMA Yasiha Gubug the academic 2011/2012 is written in the narrative texts, and to find out the solution of the problems. The writer uses descriptive quantitative. It is class XI IPA I that consists of 39 students. The instrument used to collect data was the writing test and observation sheet.The results of the research shows the mastery on writing based generic structure of narrative text class XI Senior High School Yasiha Gubug academic year 2012 is categorized into good score with the average 75 and the mean score belongs to the interval 66-79 and the result of observation sheet shows that there were 27 students in level of excellent, 10 students in good and 3 students in level fair. The problems that faced by the students in arranging the generic structure of written narrative text are they did not listen the material attentively given the teacher, the students only got the information from what they read at glance and based on their experiences before. The solution of the problem in arranging the generic structure of written narrative text is the students have to listen their teacher when she explains the material narratives. For example reading a legend and some books include narrative. Based on the result above, the writer suggests that the teacher should apply all of the things in the syllabi of genre in organizing the teaching learning process and the teacher has to give explain the generic structure of narrative text more clearly and give more exercises and more attention to the result of the assignment which are given to the students so that the teacher knows how far the achievement of the students in mastering material.
Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e. the ability to understand others' mental states, endows humans with highly adaptive social skills such as teaching or deceiving. Candidate evolutionary explanations have been proposed for the unique sophistication of human ToM among primates. For example, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis states that the increasing complexity of social networks may have induced a demand for sophisticated ToM. This type of scenario ignores neurocognitive constraints that may eventually be crucial limiting factors for ToM evolution. In contradistinction, the cognitive scaffolding hypothesis asserts that a species' opportunity to develop sophisticated ToM is mostly determined by its general cognitive capacity (on which ToM is scaffolded). However, the actual relationships between ToM sophistication and either brain volume (a proxy for general cognitive capacity) or social group size (a proxy for social network complexity) are unclear. Here, we let 39 individuals sampled from seven non-human primate species (lemurs, macaques, mangabeys, orangutans, gorillas and chimpanzees) engage in simple dyadic games against artificial ToM players (via a familiar human caregiver). Using computational analyses of primates' choice sequences, we found that the probability of exhibiting a ToM-compatible learning style is mainly driven by species' brain volume (rather than by social group size). Moreover, primates' social cognitive sophistication culminates in a precursor form of ToM, which still falls short of human fully-developed ToM abilities.
Aside from those who have been inspired by Griffin’s writings on cognitive ethology (Griffin, 1984, 1992), most students of bird behavior are unaware that a major revolution has overtaken scientific thinking about the behavior of primates and other mammals. The cognitive revolution took psychology by storm some years ago and, for many primatologists and psychologists, supplemented, and even superseded, more traditional approaches to the study of behavior, especially behavior of a social nature. This revolution led students of primate social behavior to focus on new kinds of questions that rarely arise in more traditionally oriented studies of the social behavior of birds. Although research on avian cognition figured prominently in the activities of early ethologists (e.g. Koehler, 1943, 1956a, 1956b; Thorpe, 1963), it fell from fashion. Instead, in the hands of behavioral ecologists and students of social evolution, economically inspired cost–benefit studies and kin selection theorizing became the driving forces behind most investigations of the behavior of birds, both in the field and in the laboratory.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.