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The Nature of Belief Systems Among Mass Publics
... Die zweite, kausal-kategoriale Dimension betrifft Zweckorientierungen und technisch-rationale Begründungen, schließt aber häufig auch vortheoretische Elemente ein, wie sie etwa von Mary Douglas (1986) beschrieben wurden -Naturanalogien, Metaphern oder Archetypen (siehe auch sowie Lakoff und Johnson 1980) -was ihre teilweise nicht-rational anmutenden Erscheinungsformen erklärt. 38 In dieser Wissensdimension geht es um Wenn-Dann-Beziehungen, Handlungsoptionen und kategoriale Zuschreibungen, wobei man, wie Philip Converse (1964) und im Anschluss daran Paul Sabatier (1993), zwischen grundlegenden core beliefs und sekundären Inhalten unterscheiden kann. Die Basis kollektiver Begründungssysteme bildet eine Definition letzter Ursachen relevanter Probleme. ...
... Siehe Axelrod (1973),Conover und Feldman (1984), DiMaggio (1997,Rumelhart (1980),Schissler und Tuschoff (1988),Sewell (1992),Schön und Rein (1994),Tversky und Kahneman (1981) und Vowe (1994.25 SieheConverse (1964),), Hall (1993b,McNamara (1998),Sartori (1969),Sikkink (1991) und Steger (2008. ...
... Dies gilt, wieConverse (1964) feststellt, insbesondere für schwächer strukturierte Vorstellungswelten bzw. für diejenigen sozialen Gruppen mit schwach ausgebauten und integrierten belief systems. ...
... Die zweite, kausal-kategoriale Dimension betrifft Zweckorientierungen und technisch-rationale Begründungen, schließt aber häufig auch vortheoretische Elemente ein, wie sie etwa von Mary Douglas (1986) beschrieben wurden -Naturanalogien, Metaphern oder Archetypen (siehe auch sowie Lakoff und Johnson 1980) -was ihre teilweise nicht-rational anmutenden Erscheinungsformen erklärt. 38 In dieser Wissensdimension geht es um Wenn-Dann-Beziehungen, Handlungsoptionen und kategoriale Zuschreibungen, wobei man, wie Philip Converse (1964) und im Anschluss daran Paul Sabatier (1993), zwischen grundlegenden core beliefs und sekundären Inhalten unterscheiden kann. Die Basis kollektiver Begründungssysteme bildet eine Definition letzter Ursachen relevanter Probleme. ...
... Siehe Axelrod (1973),Conover und Feldman (1984), DiMaggio (1997,Rumelhart (1980),Schissler und Tuschoff (1988),Sewell (1992),Schön und Rein (1994),Tversky und Kahneman (1981) und Vowe (1994.25 SieheConverse (1964),), Hall (1993b,McNamara (1998),Sartori (1969),Sikkink (1991) und Steger (2008. ...
... Dies gilt, wieConverse (1964) feststellt, insbesondere für schwächer strukturierte Vorstellungswelten bzw. für diejenigen sozialen Gruppen mit schwach ausgebauten und integrierten belief systems. ...
... Die zweite, kausal-kategoriale Dimension betrifft Zweckorientierungen und technisch-rationale Begründungen, schließt aber häufig auch vortheoretische Elemente ein, wie sie etwa von Mary Douglas (1986) beschrieben wurden -Naturanalogien, Metaphern oder Archetypen (siehe auch sowie Lakoff und Johnson 1980) -was ihre teilweise nicht-rational anmutenden Erscheinungsformen erklärt. 38 In dieser Wissensdimension geht es um Wenn-Dann-Beziehungen, Handlungsoptionen und kategoriale Zuschreibungen, wobei man, wie Philip Converse (1964) und im Anschluss daran Paul Sabatier (1993), zwischen grundlegenden core beliefs und sekundären Inhalten unterscheiden kann. Die Basis kollektiver Begründungssysteme bildet eine Definition letzter Ursachen relevanter Probleme. ...
... Siehe Axelrod (1973),Conover und Feldman (1984), DiMaggio (1997,Rumelhart (1980),Schissler und Tuschoff (1988),Sewell (1992),Schön und Rein (1994),Tversky und Kahneman (1981) und Vowe (1994.25 SieheConverse (1964),), Hall (1993b,McNamara (1998),Sartori (1969),Sikkink (1991) und Steger (2008. ...
... Dies gilt, wieConverse (1964) feststellt, insbesondere für schwächer strukturierte Vorstellungswelten bzw. für diejenigen sozialen Gruppen mit schwach ausgebauten und integrierten belief systems. ...
... Importa, assim, referir que os significados atinentes a cada campo político têm sido alvo de diversas mutações e/ou adaptações à nova sociedade industrial avançada (Flanagan, 1987;Inglehart, 1971;Kitschelt & Hellemans, 1990), daí a postura ideológica dos partidos, quer de Esquerda quer de Direita, ter vindo a ser moldada. Contudo, são diversos os autores (por exemplo, Converse, 2006;Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990;Jacoby, 1991) que defendem a falta, por parte do eleitorado, não de conhecimento do espectro político Esquerda-Direita, mas, sobretudo, de compreensão dos diversos campos políticos que compõem esta dimensão. Ao passo que outros (por exemplo, Freire, 2006b;Knutsen, 1998), sem refutar essa ideia, acreditam também que o eleitorado se autocoloca na escala política Esquerda-Direita, sobretudo sobre a influência da sua identidade partidária. ...
... Ainda que alguns autores tivessem achado que a maioria dos cidadãos se autoposicionam ou se autoidentificam com esta dicotomia sem terem um conhecimento ideológico do que a separa e/ou identifica (Converse, 2006;Jacoby, 1991), limitando--a apenas às elites políticas, esta terminologia permite, atualmente, não apenas aos atores políticos, mas a todos os abrangidos pela dimensão política -os eleitores e a comunicação social -obterem um sentido de orientação, na posição que devem tomar, relativamente aos assuntos atinentes à esfera política, servindo como um "código comunicacional" no sentido interpretativo entre ambas as partes, reduzindo assim, em grande parte, a complexidade do sistema político (Bobbio, 1995;Dalton, 2010;Freire, 2005;Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990;Knutsen, 1995). O esquema politico horizontal Esquerda-Direita é reconhecido pela maioria dos cidadãos, os quais se posicionam com naturalidade num dos dois campos (Freire, 2006b;Heywood, 2003;Kroh, 2005;Lachat, 2015), o que justifica, de certo modo, a abundância de estudos, nos últimos anos, no campo da sociologia e da ciência política, sobre o comportamento eleitoral dos cidadãos, da evolução ideológica dos partidos e da competição partidária em torno desta dimensão política (por exemplo, Belchior, 2008;Freire, 2005;Guedes, 2012;Lisi, 2010;Weber, 2012). ...
... Deste modo, após a análise das respostas dos inquiridos a estas questões, contrariamente àquilo que a maioria pensa, a julgar pelas posições em se autocolocaram, verificamos que o eleitorado do concelho de Vila Real ocupa, ideologicamente, o campo atinente ao Centro-Direita, com 35,5% dos inquiridos posicionados na posição 6. Pela análise da Figura 3, denota-se que o eleitorado em análise pertence ideologicamente ao campo da Direita do espectro, não apenas pela elevada percentagem que a posição 6 representa, mas também pelo o eleitorado que se apresenta como pertencendo à posição 7. Jacoby (1991) e Converse (2006) acreditam que a maioria dos cidadãos não apresenta um conhecimento profundo da dicotomia política Esquerda-Direita, limitando esse conhecimento apenas às elites políticas. Já Fuchs e Klingemann (1990) acreditam que os termos Esquerda e Direita funcionam como mecanismos de orientação política para os eleitores, no entanto a compreensão desses rótulos ideológicos pode ser bastante reduzida. ...
Este artigo pretende averiguar de que forma a dicotomia Esquerda-Direita é um dos elementos tidos em conta no eleitorado, procurando verificar qual a sua compreensão e o seu conhecimento acerca desta díade política. Para isso, recorremos a um inquérito por questionário direcionado para avaliar os valores sociais, económicos e culturais dos cidadãos, de forma a perceber a ideologia política de cada inquirido. As conclusões demonstram que o eleitorado inquirido apresenta dificuldades em compreender, em se orientar e se autoposicionar na escala política Esquerda-Direita.
... Este último ejemplo se relaciona con el debate sobre las características de la IP. Así, algunos autores y autoras mencionan a la coherencia, el contraste y la estabilidad como los atributos centrales de la IP (Converse, 1964(Converse, , 2000. Al respecto, la IP se estructura como un conjunto coherente de ideas (esto supone que no habría contradicciones al interior del sistema de creencias ideológicas de las personas), que manifiesta un contraste con posiciones antagónicas (es decir, las ideas de izquierda se contraponen con las de derecha, por ejemplo). ...
... A su vez, esta perspectiva comprende que la IP se caracteriza por incluir una serie de creencias relativamente estables, con poco margen de modificación. De acuerdo con Converse (1964Converse ( , 2000, el común de la gente actúa ideológicamente sólo si sostiene actitudes estables, lógicas, coherentes y relativamente sofisticadas políticamente. En consecuencia, y dado que no logra corroborar que ello siempre acontezca, para el autor la mayoría de las personas manifiestan una escasa sofisticación ideológica. ...
... Finalmente, el modelo de Michigan destaca también los aspectos cognitivos al señalar la existencia de una baja conceptualización políticacantidad de elementos de información política disponible y a la posibilidad de conexión entre esos elementos-en la población. Como consecuencia, comprendían que el voto se asemejaba a un comportamiento habituado e instintivo que los ciudadanos y ciudadanas realizaban sin contar con información adecuada y recurriendo a atajos o heurísticos (por ejemplo, la identificación partidaria) que simplificaban el proceso de decisión (Converse, 1964). ...
"Políticamente. Contribuciones de la Psicología Política en Argentina” propone un recorrido temático por las principales contribuciones de la Psicología Política en América Latina en general, y Argentina en particular. Específicamente, se reportan discusiones en torno al desarrollo histórico de la disciplina y sus principales discusiones en términos de su institucionalización, aportes y desafíos para el estudio de las relaciones internacionales desde vertientes psico-políticas, y sobre estudios de socialización política. Se describen a su vez las principales conclusiones de investigaciones sobre participación política, comportamiento de voto, persuasión y consumo de información política, y acción colectiva y movimientos sociales desarrollados en la ciudad de Córdoba a lo largo de la última década. Para estos capítulos se destacan las contribuciones no sólo de dimensiones de tipo cognitivo, si no, además, de factores emocionales, ideológicos y de identidad grupal. A continuación se presentan abordajes y problematizaciones en torno a éstas y otras variables psico-políticas de comprensión del mundo político (ideología política y valores) y de relaciones intergrupales (prejuicios, autoritarismo y dominancia social), ilustradas por estudios desarrollados en la ciudad de Buenos Aires, Córdoba y Neuquén. Los capítulos articulan así las discusiones sobre el estado teórico de desarrollo de las problemáticas abordadas, con diversos resultados y conclusiones de investigaciones conducidas por el Equipo de Psicología Política. El texto busca promover, desde diversos puntos de vista, la relevancia de considerar los factores psico-sociales y psico-políticos para una mayor y mejor comprensión de los fenómenos políticos. Asimismo, constituye una síntesis pertinente para la introducción y el estudio de la Psicología Política en general, con un énfasis en las contribuciones locales a discusiones nacionales e internacionales, en particular.
... Research has found that there is more than one fundamental principle of redistributive justice prevalent in society (e.g., Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2013;Wegener & Liebig, 1995a). Moreover, each individual member of society may simultaneously endorse multiple principles, even though the endorsed principles may seem contradictory or incoherent (Converse, 2006). However, to date nothing is known about which particular combinations and patterns of thinking regarding principles of old-age provision actually exist, nor how such belief patterns are distributed across the population. ...
... It is quite possible for a single individual to defend more than one social justice principle at the same time, even when the principles appear contradictory (Converse, 2006). The widespread acceptance of the three pillars of the German pension system provides a good example of how such apparently contradictory social justice beliefs can coexist. ...
... Moreover, the introduction of the Riester pension in 2001 reflects elements of self-reliant principles. In light of evidence that people simultaneously endorse multiple, sometimes incoherent social justice beliefs (Converse, 2006), we investigated whether there were different patterns of social justice beliefs regarding old-age provisions in the German older population. H1 Individuals' social justice beliefs regarding old-age provisions can be described by a number of different "belief profiles," which vary in the extent to which a person simultaneously agrees or disagrees with the different distributive principles. ...
Examining personal beliefs about social justice in the way a society provides financial security in old age may reveal potential conflicts about the distribution of wealth. Individuals differ with regard to how they believe old-age provisions should be distributed (e.g., based on principles of merit or self-reliance), and individuals often endorse more than one belief at the same time. Using latent profile analysis and data from the 2014 German Ageing Survey we identify five separate profiles of social justice beliefs among older adults (40–85 years) in Germany. Belief profiles were based on the extent to which people simultaneously endorse and/or reject meritocratic, redistributive, self-reliant, and fatalistic ideas regarding old-age provisions. Almost 20% of the sample demonstrated a belief system in line with the German meritocratic system. Roughly three-fifth did not show strong preferences for a specific social justice principle. However, we identified two belief profiles representing 22.4% of the sample which may reflect dissent from the current system. Sociodemographic characteristics, political identification, and indicators of social disadvantage (e.g., lower income, fears of decline in social status, and feelings of social exclusion) were differentially associated with the five belief profiles. Overall, the results showed that in particular people of lower socioeconomic status were critical with respect to the principles of the German pension system raising questions regarding the demand of political interventions.
... And approximately the same proportion (14 percent) emphasize economic outcomes over procedures ("MacPhersonians"). But, to paraphrase Converse (1964), the majority of our respondents are "innocent" of any strong convictions about what democracy is or is not. 3 To anticipate a major line of multivariate analysis pursued later in this chapter, we calculate the average level of support for democracy among respondents in each cell of this cross-tabulation. ...
... how little solidity and substance there is in the political or social belief of nineteen persons out of every twenty" (1888, 174). The voting literature has emphasized individual-level differences produced by cognitive mobilization, distinguishing between sophisticated and unsophisticated voters, between a few highly ideological voters and a large ideologically innocent majority (Converse 1964). This split has an aggregate equivalent. ...
... Besides its emphasis on modernization effects, Chapter 2 also serves as a good example of an increasing academic interest in within-country contextual effects (Jennings 2007). Focus on context includes rules, of course, which are expected to infl uence vote choices (Dalton and Anderson 2011) and even patterns of party identifi cation (Converse 2007). But context is not limited to rules; it extends to the countries' social structures and the patterns of political intermediation. ...
"Voting in Old and New Democracies" examines voting behavior and its determinants based on 26 surveys from 18 countries on five continents between 1992 and 2008. It systematically analyzes the impact on voting choice of factors rooted in the currently dominant approaches to the study of electoral behavior, but adds to this analysis factors introduced or reintroduced into this field by the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP)—socio-political values, and political communication through media, personal discussion, and organizational intermediaries. It demonstrates empirically that these long-neglected factors have significant political impact in many countries that previous studies have overlooked, while "economic voting" is insignificant in most elections once long-term partisan attitudes are taken into consideration. Its examination of electoral turnout finds that the strongest predictor is participation by other family members, demonstrating the importance of intermediation. Another chapter surveys cross-national variations in patterns of intermediation, and examines the impact of general social processes (such as socioeconomic and technological modernization), country-specific factors, and individual-level attitudinal factors as determinants of those patterns. Complementing its cross-national comparative analysis is a detailed longitudinal case study of one country over 25 years. Finally, it examines the extent of support for democracy as well as significant cross-national differences in how democracy is understood by citizens. Written in a clear and accessible style, "Voting in Old and New Democracies" significantly advances our understanding of citizen attitudes and behavior in election settings.
... kohärente ›belief systems‹« verfügen (Jankowski et al. 2019: 143). Glaubenssysteme bilden Geschichten ab, die den Realitätssinn von Individuen definieren (Converse [1964(Converse [ ] 2006. Angenommen wird, dass die kohärenteren Glaubenssysteme es ermöglichen, vergleichbare Konzepte in den Einstellungen und im Verhalten messbar zu machen. ...
... kohärente ›belief systems‹« verfügen (Jankowski et al. 2019: 143). Glaubenssysteme bilden Geschichten ab, die den Realitätssinn von Individuen definieren (Converse [1964(Converse [ ] 2006. Angenommen wird, dass die kohärenteren Glaubenssysteme es ermöglichen, vergleichbare Konzepte in den Einstellungen und im Verhalten messbar zu machen. ...
Wie werden Erkenntnisse im von Norm- und Wertekonflikten dominierten Feld der Migrations- und Integrationsforschung generiert und reflektiert? Die Beitragenden des Bandes gehen dieser Frage nach und diskutieren die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen im Rahmen ihres Vorgehens. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Verbindung zwischen der inhaltlichen Auseinandersetzung und dem methodisch-analytischen Vorgehen, denn die Transparenz der im Forschungsprozess getroffenen Entscheidungen ist für eine anwendungsorientierte Wissenschaft unabdingbar.
... Si l'activité définitoire est généralement première dans un travail de recherche, le caractère polysémique des concepts constituant le coeur de ce travail (e.g., idéologie, néolibéralisme, liberté) nous oblige à un surcroît de rigueur dans cet exercice. D'autant plus que l'idéologie a été, pendant un temps, un objet de recherche controversé (e.g., Converse, 1964). Pour ces raisons, le début de ce chapitre sera dévolu à l'explicitation des termes qui seront employés tout au long de ce travail. ...
... La conception marxiste évoluera, notamment dans le Capital, vers une idéologie dépersonnifiée, davantage comprise comme un ensemble d'idées remplissant une fonction sociale (de reproduction) dans la structure économique (Macherey, 2014). Converse (1964) serait le premier, dans le champ de la psychologie, à reprendre le concept pour le concevoir comme un système de croyances stable (Jost, 2006). ...
L'idéologie néolibérale est fréquemment théorisée comme un facteur de dépolitisation des citoyens. Néanmoins, les travaux explorant empiriquement ses effets sur des attitudes et des comportements politiques sont rares. Cette thèse a donc pour objet l'étude des implications psychosociales de l'idéologie néolibérale, comprise comme un ensemble de valeurs (i.e., idéographie) conditionnant une conception particulière de la personne (i.e., conception néolibérale du sujet). Afin d'éclairer la manière dont cette idéologie peut influencer les attitudes des personnes (e.g., justification du système) et leurs comportements politiques, 9 études ont été menées. Les deux premières études ont mis en évidence l'association entre l'adhésion aux valeurs néolibérales, la justification du système et les comportements politiques (i.e., manifestation et vote). Consécutivement, 5 études expérimentales ont été réalisées afin de vérifier la nature causale de la relation entre l'idéologie néolibérale et la justification du système. Plus encore, ces études visaient à éclairer le rôle du contrôle personnel perçu comme mécanisme explicatif de cette relation. Les résultats ne permettent pas de conclure sur l'ensemble de la médiation mais étayent l'hypothèse selon laquelle le contrôle personnel perçu constitue un antécédent à la justification du système. Enfin, les deux dernières études expérimentales explorent les effets de l'idéologie néolibérale et de la justification du système sur les intentions comportementales des sujets face à des problématiques systémiques (i.e., inégalités de genre et crise climatique). Les résultats indiquent que l'idéologie néolibérale, en tant qu'idéologie justificatrice, favorise des réponses individuelles, normatives et non-disruptives. Dans son ensemble, cette thèse fait apparaitre que l'idéologie néolibérale favorise un « citoyen minimal », figure individualisée polarisée autour de la liberté individuelle, à l'opposé d'un « citoyen agent social » polarisé autour de la liberté politique.
... The sorting of opinions regarding diverse sets of political goals along ideological dimensions as recently identified in opinion data on American public opinion (Dimock et al., 2014) is of particular relevance in our context. In fact, an organization of the complex landscapes of political preferences along a few axes such as left versus right, liberal versus conservative or technocratic versus ecological (Leuthold et al., 2007) can only acquire meaning if political preferences regarding a multitude of political goals are correlated over a population and constraint in form of a belief system or ideology (Converse, 1964). The main aim of the paper is to show that ACTB is easily extended to account for this kind of opinion sorting or ideological alignment as well. ...
... Furthermore, the model entails the possibility to consider different sub-population or sub-cultures with differing cognitive maps and is therefore suited to explore the impact of cultural differences (operationalized in this way) on deliberative argument exchange process (a first attempt is made in Banisch et al., forthcoming). This also allows to link the model to recent empirical work on the identification of different belief systems within different social strata or sub-cultures (Baldassarri and Goldberg, 2014;Daenekindt et al., 2017, see also Converse (1964)) and the qualitative differences with respect to issue alignment in particular (cf. Goldberg, 2011, Figure 7). ...
A multi-level model of opinion formation is presented which takes into account that attitudes on different issues are usually not independent. In the model, agents exchange beliefs regarding a series of facts. A cognitive structure of evaluative associations links different (partially overlapping) sets of facts to different political issues and determines an agents' attitudinal positions in a way borrowed from expectancy value theory. If agents preferentially interact with other agents that hold similar attitudes on one or several issues, this leads to biased argument pools and polarization in the sense that groups of agents selectively belief in distinct subsets of facts. Besides the emergence of a bi-modal distribution of opinions on single issues that most previous opinion polarization models address, our model also accounts for the alignment of attitudes across several issues along ideological dimensions.
... Some studies have suggested that sexual orientation may not be an important factor in social attitudes because of the importance of childhood political socialization or because of other factors and identities superseding sexuality. Childhood socialization is important for party affiliation and attitude development, with strong links between parents' and children's partisanship and attitudes across the life course (Converse 1964;Glass, Bengtson, and Dunham 1986;Hyman 1959;Jennings and Niemi 1968;Miller and Glass 1989). Whereas race, ethnicity, or religion-based minority values can be transmitted from parents to children over generations, sexual minority values typically cannot be transmitted in this manner (Glass et al. 1986;Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009;Sapiro 2004;Sherrill 1996). ...
... For example, despite holding conservative attitudes on some key partisan issues, women and blacks are more likely to identify as liberal and as Democrats (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004;Kinder and Winter 2001;Manza and Brooks 1998). Various theories have been proposed for why group members hold this type of self-concern and why it can extend to general partisanship, including individualistic self-interest or socialization into a limited set of shared group interests (Converse 1964;Gilens 2012;Phelan et al. 1995;Stubager 2008). ...
Gender, race, and class strongly predict social attitudes and are at the core of social scientific theory and empirical analysis. Sexuality (i.e., sexual orientation), however, is not as central a factor by which we conceptualize and systematize society. This study examines the impact of sexual orientation, gender, race, and education across attitudinal topics covered by the General Social Survey. Sexual orientation is an important part of people’s lives that, as I demonstrate, is a strong and exceptionally consistent predictor of social attitudes across issues regardless of whether it is measured with partnering behavior or self-identification. When sexual behavior and identity differ, however, identity is more influential. This pattern lends support to a marginalized identity explanation for why sexual minorities are consistently liberal. I conclude that future work should pay more attention to sexuality as a core factor in social scientific theory and empirical analysis.
... In terms of cognitive psychology, cognitive ability refers to a person's capacity for logic, planning, problem-solving, abstract thought, and the interpretation of complicated data. A well-defined system of cognitive structures, or some kind of constraint or functional interconnectedness among concepts, awareness, and attitudes, is present in citizens with high cognitive abilities (Converse 1964). This restriction or interconnectedness shows that the many attitudes held by individuals in a certain cognitive area are organized and consistent (Freeze and Montgomery 2016). ...
Many studies have been conducted on the link between Confucianism and democratic values in East Asia, but they have failed to account for the complex character of Confucianism and the possible impact of political systems. This study re-measures Confucian values into four dimensions—authoritarianism, familialism, collectivism, and harmoniousness—based on data from the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer survey. It then uses a multi-layer linear regression model to examine the relationship between the Confucian cultural values and the democratic values held by people in six East Asian societies at both the macro and micro levels. The findings demonstrate an asymmetrical pattern in the relationship between the various dimensions of Confucian cultural values and the democratic values of East Asia, collectivist values do not affect democratic values, while familial and authoritarian values have a significant and negative correlation with democratic values. Harmonious values have a significant and positive correlation with democratic values. In addition, there is a significant positive correlation between democratic institutions and the democratic values, and the relationship between the values of harmoniousness and collectivism and democratic values varies across countries with different political systems. This offers insightful material for reflection as we reconsider the connection between Confucianism and democracy in East Asia.
... Demografen en economen vinden het doorgaans moellijk om veranderingen (Converse, 1964).De kritieken zijn derhalve divers en vergen nadere behandellng. De specificatie met strikte endogeniteit van waardenoriëntaties miskent belangrijke aspekten. ...
Het artikel illustreert dat de recette evolutie inzake gezinsvorming niet enkel in een belangrijke mate bepaald wordt door economische veranderingen (inzonderheid deze met betrekking tot de tewerkstellingsmogelijkheden) maar ook door waardenverschuiving. Economische factoren zouden vooral verantwoordelijk zijn voor periode-effecten die bovenop een lange-termijn trend zijn ge6nt. Deze laatste zou overeenkomen met cohorten-verschuivingen inzake waarden. Het Europees waarden-onderzoek verschaft het empirisch materiaal. Als afhankelijke veranderlijke komen vooral twee dimensies aan de orde: de tolerantiegraad ten aanzien van non-conformisme (tolerantie echtscheiding, abortus, één-ouder gezin, betekenis huwelijk) en de betekenis van ouderschap, Deze worden in verband gebracht met diverse waardenschalen (religiositeit en secularisme, Ingleharts "post-materialisme", nationalisme, linkse politieke voorkeur, afkeer politieke extremismen, tolerantie andersdenkenden en minoriteiten, sociaal engagement, etc.). Vorder worden banden gelegd en getoetst met de theorieën van respectievelijk Easterlin en Simons. De eerste verklaart de terugloop in de vruchtbaarheid door de verzwakking van de economische kansen van de jongere generaties in vergelijking met hun hoge materiële aspiraties. De tweede bindt vruchtbaarheid aan het concept van de "burgerlijke religie" en aan de mate van nationalisme.
... We cannot assume that respondents will have views that cohere into a consistent geopolitical worldview. Various dilemmas in the study of structures of belief in public opinion were outlined by Converse (1964) decades ago. Populations vary greatly by their capacity to conceptualize issues, to recognize and to consistently apply binary sorting abstractions. ...
Examining geopolitical orientations in a representative survey of Belarus in early 2020, we adopt a critical geopolitical perspective that highlights geopolitical cultures as fields of contestation and debate over a state’s identity, orientation, and enduring interests. We examine support among 1210 Belarusians to four foreign policy options for the country – neutrality as the best foreign policy, joining the European Union, staying in the Eurasian Economic Union, or developing close relations with both these organizations. We also analyze responses to where Belarus should be on an 11-point scale from aligned with the West to aligned with Russia. In early 2020, Belarusians indicated divided geopolitical preferences in the same way as other post-Soviet societies along demographic, ideological, and attitudinal cleavages. Lukashenka’s quarter-century dictatorship has left Belarus in a condition of nascent (geo)political polarization. The 2020 electoral crisis alone did not polarize Belarus; it was already a dividing polity.
... We cannot assume that respondents will have views that cohere into a consistent geopolitical worldview. Various dilemmas in the study of structures of belief in public opinion were outlined by Converse (1964) decades ago. Populations vary greatly by their capacity to conceptualize issues, to recognize and to consistently apply binary sorting abstractions. ...
This paper analyzes responses to geopolitical orientation questions in a survey of Belarus residents in early 2020, just months before the political crises that erupted later in the year. We adopt a critical geopolitical perspective that highlights geopolitical cultures as fields of contestation and debate over a state’s identity, orientation and enduring interests. In a representative national survey, we examine support among 1210 Belarusians to four foreign policy options for the country – neutrality as the best foreign policy, joining the European Union, staying in the Eurasian Economic Union, or developing close relations with both these organizations. We also examine the reasons behind responses to where Belarus should be on an 11-point scale from aligned with the West to aligned with Russia. In early 2020, Belarusians indicated divided geopolitical preferences in the same way as majorities in other post-Communist societies along demographic, ideological and attitudinal cleavages. Alexanders Lukashenka’s quarter-century dictatorship left Belarus in a condition of nascent (geo)political polarization. The 2020 electoral crisis alone did not make Belarus polarized in ways seen in other post-Soviet countries. It already was a divided polity
... Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that such relationship is more complex than expected. First, some scholars believe that public opinion cannot influence government and politicians, because public opinion is mutable and incoherent (Converse, 2006). Even in Western societies where universal suffrage exists, government officials sometimes implement policies in accordance with their own preferences (Aldrich, 1995). ...
Government response to public opinion is essential to democratic theory and practice. However, previous research on the relationship between public opinion and government attention predominantly focuses on western societies. Little is known about such relationship in nonwestern or nondemocratic societies. Drawing upon time-series data of public opinion polls and government press releases, this study examines the dynamic relationships between public opinion and government attention in posthandover Hong Kong. The findings reveal that the responsiveness of the Hong Kong government to public opinion varies across issue domains and is constrained by the political power from the central government in Beijing.
... Lastly, no MPT research to date has examined how top-down influences might moderate the impact of people's family models on their political stances. Political scientists have long argued that political elites-how they frame issues and the rhetoric they use-provides an important basis for how the general public understands hot-button issues, and in particular, which moral concerns get linked with a given issue (e.g., Converse, 2006;Federico & Malka, 2018). Research has found that political elites commonly use strict-father and nurturant-parent rhetoric (Cienki, 2005b;Deason & Gonzales, 2012). ...
Individuals' political stances tend to place them into the conservative "right," the liberal "left," or the moderate "middle." What might explain this pattern of division? Moral Politics Theory (Lakoff, 1996) holds that political attitudes arise from moral worldviews that are conceptually anchored in contrasting family models-the strict-father and nurturant-parent models-while the political middle is morally "biconceptual," endorsing both models simultaneously. The present research examined these postulations empirically. Studies 1 and 2 tested the conceptual and predictive validity of the theorized models by developing an instrument assessing strict and nurturant parenting beliefs (the Moral Politics Scale [MPT]), and examining its power to predict political stances on issues seemingly unrelated to parenting attitudes (e.g., abortion, taxes, and same-sex marriage). Studies 3a and 3b explored construct validity while testing whether the family models translate into more general moral worldviews, which then serve as a foundation of political attitudes. Studies 4a through 4c tested generalizability, examining the relationship between the family models and political stances across different countries, data-collection modalities, and a representative American sample. Finally, Studies 5-7 explored biconceptualism and the tendency for these individuals to shift political attitudes as a consequence of situational factors, particularly moral framing, such that strict-father frames lead to increased support for conservative stances while nurturant-parent frames lead to increased support for liberal stances. Overall, we found support for each of MPT's assertions, suggesting that an important aspect of the conceptual and experiential basis of people's political attitudes lies in the strict-father and nurturant-parent family models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
... As far back as Converse (1964), scholars have speculated that social mechanisms, like inter-personal discussions, help articulate belief systems that operate to increase the expediency of political information. Thus, political discussion plays an essential role in spurring democratic processes. ...
Since introduced by Professor McLeod and the Wisconsin School at the turn of the century, a large body of research has employed the communication mediation model. Yet, most of these studies rely on cross-sectional and individual-level survey data collected in the United States. This paper seeks to address these shortcomings by testing a specification of the model—the citizen communication mediation model—across cultures. Relying on panel survey data from 19 countries, this study advances a multilevel citizen communication mediation model. Our findings indicate that discussion remains a strong mediating predictor of political participation across countries and political contexts, though the relationship is moderated by macro-level repressive democratic expressive norms.
... In a classic work on popular attitudes, Converse (1964) argues that the mass public is not "constrained" by overarching belief systems. In other words, people do not hold consistent opinions, particularly surrounding specific issue positions. ...
Efforts by anti-abortion advocates to introduce “personhood” initiatives, which state that human life begins at fertilization, have prompted concern among infertility specialists that these initiatives would hinder access to in vitro fertilization (IVF). Yet, our understanding of public opinion about IVF is limited. It remains unclear whether attitudes about this technology are consistent with opinions about other issues related to human embryos, particularly abortion and embryonic stem cell (ESC) research. Using data from a nationally representative survey, I fill this gap by exploring the role that religion plays in shaping attitudes about a range of embryonic politics issues. I find that religiosity, income, and ideology strongly influence whether individuals view these issues in moral terms. Respondents who are most devout and Evangelical Protestants are most likely to consistently oppose all three embryonic politics issues. Yet, the relationship between religion and attitudes about the morality of each procedure is also influenced by the procedure's outcome, with religion most influential with respect to abortion attitudes and least influential in the case of IVF. Additionally, women are less likely than men to describe IVF as morally wrong, while, in comparison to non-Hispanic whites, Latino respondents are more likely to do so.
Replication Data . Replication data is publicly available on the website of the Pew Research Center Religion and Public Life Project.
... This analysis demonstrates the utility of the model in diagnosing public opinion and provides evidence of its ability to predict support or opposition across a wide range of mili-____________ 37 Zaller's (1992) three-stage Reception-Acceptance-Sampling (RAS) model provides a recent discussion of the process by which mass attitudes become diffused that seems likely to become the standard analysis. Downs (1957), Converse (1964), McCloskey (1964), Gamson and Modigliani (1966), Hastie (1986), Newman (1986), Ferejohn and Kuklinski (1990), and Popkin (1994) offer views that share much with Zaller's, while Downs and Popkin also offer credible discussions of the political reasoning processes used by members of the public. 38 Zaller (1992, pp. ...
... Theoretically, this is somewhat puzzling since it is reasonable to assume that a person's values and his or her ideology should have much in common-perhaps even capturing the same basic phenomenon (cf. [34,35]). If this possibility is not ruled out through empirical research, there is a risk that two parallel universes are established, the primary reason being a lack of theoretical and cross-disciplinary dialogue. ...
This article explores the relationship between two major explanations of the formation of positive attitudes towards environmental policy measures. Ideological orientation and personal values have, in theory, significant overlaps in the sense that they collect general and cross-situational sentiments used to understand and evaluate a wide range of political issues. However, in the empirical literature, although they independently have been shown to have rather significant effects on pro-environmental policy attitudes, they are rarely tested together in order to explore whether they capture the same basic mechanisms. In this article, two data sets from Sweden are used to demonstrate both that ideological orientation and personal values independently affect pro-environmental policy support, as well as that these effects differ across different policy types.
... Considering that individual members of society cannot live completely free from any form of social or group-based interaction, ranging from family to greater society, this study seeks to understand how the effect of cultural predisposition, especially egalitarianism, individualism, and hierarchism, on environmental concern is mediated by an individual's group affiliations, notably party and religious affiliation. Literature suggests that political parties, like religious institutions, send signals to members that can influence their overall policy attitudes and beliefs (e.g., Converse 1964;Jacoby 1988;Zaller 1992). Recent studies show that such group signals interact with an individual's fundamental core values and beliefs that may collectively influence issue attitudes (Jackson 2014). ...
Decades ago, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky suggested that public concern for the environment is shaped, in part, by intrinsic values and beliefs; however, very little research has explored how an individuals’ group affiliations condition the impact of their deep core cultural beliefs on environmental concern. Using original data from a four-year annual nationwide survey of more than 9,000 American adults conducted from 2008 to 2011, this study examines how the effect of cultural predisposition, especially egalitarianism, hierarchism, and individualism, on environmental concern is mediated by an individual’s political party and religious affiliations. This research has broad implications for understanding how cultural worldview, partisanship, and religion collectively contribute to the formation of environmentalism among the general public.
... To remedy the first deficiency, we draw on sociological discussions of the formal properties of belief systems (for a review, see Mohr 1998). Much of this work begins with the notion of " constraint " as formulated byConverse (1964). In this tradition, we begin by conceptualizing the structure of belief in the economics profession as a generic " idea space " with as many dimensions as there are measured items. ...
Scholars interested in the political influence of the economics profession debate whether the discipline is unified by policy consensus or divided among competing schools or factions. We address this question by reanalyzing a unique recent survey of elite economists. We present a theoretical framework based on a formal sociological approach to the structure of belief systems and propose alignment, rather than consensus or polarization, as a model for the structure of belief in the economics profession. Moreover, we argue that social clustering in a heterogeneous network topology is a better model for disciplinary social structure than discrete factionalization. Results show that there is a robust latent ideological dimension related to economists’ departmental affiliations and political partisanship. Furthermore, we show that economists closer to one another in informal social networks also share more similar ideologies.
... Another controversial aspect of ideology is whether or not people actually understand the meaning of ideology or hold ideological beliefs (Converse 1964). The responses to this skepticism have been many, ranging from measurement error models (Achen 1975, Ansolabehere et al. 2008, to considerations-based answer models (Zaller and Feldman 1992), to bottomup models of constraint rather than top-down ones (Schwartz 1992, Jost et al. 2003, Goren 2004, to the observation that ideology has been remarkably effective at explaining a vast array of political policy preferences, judgments and behaviors (Jacoby 1991, Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, Jost et al. 2009, Erikson and Tedin 2014. ...
Years of research show that left-leaning individuals are more supportive of environmental policies than right-leaning individuals. The explanation for the lower level of support among right-leaning individuals is their stronger preference for economic growth and lower acceptance of intervention in markets. However, recent cross-national studies have questioned whether the effect of ideology on environmental support is universal. A Swedish survey experiment shows that the effect of ideology varies greatly depending on how individuals think about the environment. Specifically, it demonstrates that if environmental support is contrasted with economic growth, then the effect of ideology is stronger as opposed to when environmental support is not juxtaposed with economic growth. Furthermore, among people who strongly perceive the environment as a left–right issue, there is a larger divide between left and right.
... 52 Luskin, Fishkin and Hahn (2007, p. 2). 53 Converse 1964. 54 Knight and Johnson 2011. ...
An experiment on the extension of the political rights of foreigners in the Swiss city of Geneva used three different procedural ways to structure deliberation: participants take positions at the outset, do not take positions, and reflect first. Most opinion change occurred when participants did not have to take a position at the outset. However, no learning effects were recorded, the deliberative quality was poor and group influence had the greatest impact. When participants had to take a position at the outset, opinion change and group influence were least, but there was significant learning, and the deliberative quality was better. These results indicate a potential trade-off between opinion change – which many scholars equate with deliberative success – and good procedural deliberative quality.
... The encapsulating global developments in the areas of trade and investments liberalization, information science and technology, and popular empowerment in the decision making processes, have, without argument, questioned the utility and continued application of cultural pluralism to the study and understanding of contemporary Nigerian political structure and processes. Beginning from the mid-1980s,especially following the introduction of structural adjustment by the Babangida administration which he implemented alongside a Transition to Civil Rule Programme, there emerged the sudden upsurge in the activities of groups and individuals, especially civil society groups and individuals concerned primarily with the entrenchment of fundamental core values of democracy without regard to the politics of fractionalization of Nigeria along the precolonial social formations that make it up [7][8][9][10][11]. Nigerians, as attested to by the annulled June 12, 1993 Presidential Election, and perhaps influenced by the global waves of democratization of the 1990s and the driven ethos of contemporary public administration and management such as transparency and accountability, have come to recognize the indivisibility of the country and the rejection of the bifurcation of the processes of allocation of values along primordial considerations and criteria [12]. ...
What are the peculiar features that tend to condition the way and manner in which Nigerian government and politics are being studied and analyzed? Is there any encompassing analytical framework through which these peculiar features can be adequately and comprehensively studied and analyzed in a manner that in turn provides informed view and opinion on Nigerian body politics? The article examines the form and character of politics in Nigeria using cultural pluralism as an analytical framework. It is set against the objective of providing detailed and exhaustive analysis of cultural pluralism as a theoretical framework of disquisition; and determining as well its appropriateness to the study and analysis of politics in Nigeria. The methodology is qualitative and hinged on descriptive examination of the concepts that are contained in cultural pluralism as a theoretical formulation and further analysis of the adequacy and suitability of the concepts in being able to properly enhance a holistic study and analysis of the peculiar features of politics in Nigeria. It concludes that in its present form, the framework is inadequate and archaic.
Cette recherche examine la situation actuelle des guides européens qualifiés. L’ambition de ce travail vise à explorer les différents regards posés sur l’activité du guide en Europe. Pour ce faire, nous avons d’abord centré notre regard sur les tentatives émises par les guides ou les institutions pour négocier la définition de l’activité qui varie en fonction de la perspective empruntée. La définition formelle issue du cadre stratégique européen précise sa dimension de service public, sa compétence technique et sa territorialité. Ensuite, nous avons interrogé l’environnement du guide au travail en Europe, et ses différents aspects stratégiques, juridiques et socio-économiques. Le champ d’action met en avant les effets de la corrélation entre les concepts du patrimoine, de la culture et de l’interaction démocratique. Enfin, la nature de l’activité saisie de l’intérieur, via la visite guidée et des études de cas en Europe et en France, souligne l’action culturelle et didactique. Pour pouvoir observer la situation du guide européen qualifié dans son ensemble, nous avons choisi de joindre un regard fonctionnaliste et un regard interactionniste dans une vision holistique afin de proposer une interprétation des représentations des acteurs impliqués. Pour ce faire six enquêtes qualitatives ont été menées auprès de guides experts. Elles ont ensuite été complétées par les témoignages des concepteurs, des exécutants et des visiteurs. Les résultats sont accompagnés d’un corpus théorique académique qui sert à expliquer les moments clés prélevés sur le terrain comme problématiques pour un développement professionnel harmonieux. Cette recherche confirme que le guidage est une activité à la fois physique et symbolique, institutionnelle et sociale, globale et locale. Elle montre que ce sont les établissements scolaires ou les associations professionnelles qui sont amenés à proposer un terrain d’entente entre les tensions d’intérêts opposés. Les résultats de notre recherche soulignent que face aux crises sanitaires, économiques et militaires qui frappent l’Europe en 2020, la forme « guide » est en train de muter en plusieurs formes du « guidage ». Dans un tel contexte la communication devient le centre des régulations qui tendent à se renforcer, il n’y a donc pas de raison que l’activité de représentation et d’accompagnement disparaisse. Mais il est fort possible qu’elle se développe d’une nouvelle manière automatisée, modifiant par-là les modes d’existence et les dénominations des guides européens.
This study explores the relationships among the variables: willingness to quarantine, perception of the epidemic, willingness to do outdoor activities, government credibility, and public morality. To understand these relationships, it integrates theories including epidemic prevention and control, government credibility, public morality, and social network systems. Structural equation modeling (SEM) with bootstrapping estimation was conducted using data calculated from 368 healthy citizens who are quarantining at home due to COVID‐19 in Chinese cities that have launched a first‐level primary public safety incident response. The results show that residents’ perception of the epidemic has a positive effect on their willingness to quarantine, and willingness to do outdoor activities has a negative effect. Moreover, government credibility and public morality have a mediating effect on the relationship between the perception of epidemic and willingness to quarantine. What is more, government credibility has a moderating effect on the relationship between willingness to do outdoor activities and willingness to quarantine. We discuss the implications of these results for beating future epidemics that may break out.
Though most observers agreed that pension was the biggest issue in the 2007 Japanese Upper House Election, how people viewed this issue has not been fully discussed in electoral studies. This research examines the structure of the election issues as well as the meaning of the pension issue for Japanese society using 3 types of text data: 1) diet member’s statements, 2) coverage of newspapers, and) people’s answers to open-ended questions about the election issues. Analysis of text data possesses the advantage of avoiding preconceived notions about the meaning of the issues, since it uses spontaneous remarks from people. The results show that though political elites mainly discuss the pension system and the media focuses on the opinion of parties about the pension issue, ordinary voters’ views did not depend on attitudes toward the pension system itself but on their evaluation of the policies and the performance of the government of that period.
This article examines whether a public opinion survey can improve the quality of political attitudes. More specifically, we argue that simply positioning a summary attitudinal question after a balanced series of relevant items can increase people's ability to answer in a way that better reflects their underlying interests, values, and predispositions. By manipulating the location of the vote preference question in two separate national election campaign surveys, we find that there are fewer undecided respondents when the question is asked at the end of the survey rather than early on, that some people are changing their mind during the questionnaire, that a larger set of determinants is structuring late-survey vote choice, and that voting preferences based on the later question are a better predictor of the actual vote. The findings carry important lessons for students of deliberation and of citizen decision making.
The existence of unidimensionality in congressional voting has been widely debated. Four characteristics, in particular, seem necessary for unidimensionality: constraint, stability, structure, and generality. Briefly, these characteristics mean that the voting history of a member of Congress should be interdependent across issues, consistent across time, consistent of topic, and broadly applicable. Unfortunately. congressional voting scholars disagree shout their presence.
To avoid such confusion, a longitudinal congressional voting model is developed in this study. Congressional voting is influenced at three levels. At the highest level, it is the consequence of critical realignments which produce permanent changes in the congressional policy agenda. At the second level, congressional voting history is the stable product of party, constituency, and ideology. However, short term forces including policy influence, presidential influence, personal change, and membership effects can alter this voting history. At the third level, congressional voting is the consequence of cue-taking, a search for vote cues from fellow legislators.
To test the unidimensionality of this model, interest group ratings from the period 1959 to 1978 are analyzed using multi¬dimensional unfolding: In general, the unidimensionality of congres¬sional voting is supported. A single dimension explains an average of 75 percent of the variance in the ratings (constraint). The lowest correlation between yearly voting locations is .81 (stability). Almost all years are dominated by government management and social welfare issues (structure). Finally, the dimension shows substantial influence across time on an average of 70 percent of the roll-calls with at least a 10 percent minority (generality).
Still, as the model predicts, external forces do precipitate change. The period from 1968 to 1972 seems especially deviant. Considerable regional shifting of position occurred. These changes appear to be the consequence of both seat change and personal change in voting history. The ultimate cause of the movement, though would appear to be issue evolution. From 1969 to 1972, foreign and defense policy and civil rights replaced government management and social welfare as dominant issues. The change was temporary, however. Eventually, the old realignments reasserted themselves.
European elections take place against the background of the political culture of European integration. “Political culture” in this context means the attitudes, preferences, perceptions, knowledge, and behavioral propensities of the mass of European citizens vis-à-vis the European institutions in particular and European integration in general. In order to investigate the culture of integration in which the European Parliament elections of 1999 took place, this chapter first provides an overview of the development of orientations toward European integration since the early 1970s, including some examination of the limited evidence that exists on the cognitive aspect of these orientations. The chapter then focuses on the situation just prior to the 1999 elections and summarizes the main features of attitudes toward Europe and its institutions as the citizens prepared (or, as we know, in many cases did not prepare) to go to the polls to elect the members of the first European Parliament for the new millennium. This section of the chapter also provides a more detailed examination of two indicators of attitudes to integration, analyzing variations across countries and across the different social and demographic sectors of European society. The third main section of the chapter compares the attitudes and perceptions of citizens as manifested in the 1994 and 1999 European elections.
This article draws on the writings of Slavoj Žižek to argue that legal architecture is a source of ideological beliefs. Žižek asserts that it is through the materialisation of ideology that people often first encounter ideological beliefs, and through exposure to these materialisations ideological beliefs are formed over time. Instead of our acts reflecting our beliefs it is our beliefs that are born out of our acts and belief is merely the formal act of recognising what we already believe. Due to its scale and silence legal architecture is a particularly prominent though largely unnoticed site for the materialisation of legal ideology. The article explores the ideological dimensions of two popular styles of legal architecture – neoclassicism and postmodernism. It argues that neoclassical legal architecture can materialise belief in the eternality, universality, and unchallengeable authority of historic and hierarchical legal relations and norms, and theorises that postmodernist legal architecture likely materialises an equally problematic cynical indifference towards social stratification while projecting an intimate relationship between multinational corporations and the practice of law.
The writings of Slavoj Žižek have greatly expanded our understanding of how social stratification is maintained through ideology. However, those writing on the ideological operation of law are yet to engage with Žižek’s work. This thesis draws on Žižek’s multifaceted definition of ideology to provide unique insights into the ways that law is implicated in the maintenance of systemic inequality in liberal democracies. Ideology is defined as incorporating four interdependent and interrelated axes. The first axis, discourses, explains how communicative networks often controlled by the powerful lead people to view contingent, cultured and historic concepts necessary for social hierarchy as universal, egalitarian or eternal. It is asserted that the dominant legal norms of individual freedom and formal equality act in this way by masking the systemic oppression prevalent in liberal democracies. These norms also permeate abstract individualism and colonise popular understandings of two potentially revolutionary concepts.
The second axis, spontaneous beliefs, analyses how people instinctively react to unfamiliar situations drawing on ideological discourses in ways that adapt, develop and individualise beliefs that are intimately entwined with social hierarchies. In daily experiences people draw on the dominant norms of abstraction and individualism permeated by law. In doing so these norms are amended to suit changing social conditions. The production of legal ideology is consequently not the exclusive terrain of professional ideologues like academics, politicians and judges but is assisted by people from all walks of life in seemingly mundane and ordinary circumstances.
The materiality of ideology is the third axis and explains how material forms such as rituals can serve as the basis for ideological beliefs. It is through the materialisation of ideology that people often first encounter ideological beliefs and this exposure forms ideological beliefs. Žižek argues that belief is merely the formal act of recognising what we already believe. A particularly prominent component of the materiality of legal ideology is architecture and it is contended that many courthouses and parliament buildings materialise idealist legal norms, proclaim the universality and eternality of contingent and historic legal relations, and are built in celestial designs to manifest a religious-like faith in law.
Fourth is the unconscious axis of ideology. This axis applies Žižek’s political engagement with Lacanian psychoanalysis to explore the ways that subjects of ideologies rely on fantasy and repression to maintain their beliefs in the face of constant experiences exposing the flaws, incompleteness and dogmatism inherent in legal ideology. I argue that the perceived universality and irreproachability of human rights stems in part from the fantasmatic elevation of rights to a sublime status assisted by the repression of the turbulent origins and power politics at play in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is ideological as rights are often seen as a silver bullet to complicated social problems without the need to consider the sources of social stratification. Moreover, the belief in the universality of human rights can blanket discussion as to what should constitute a human right, and how rights should be enforced, today and in the future. Through the employment of the four axes of ideology this thesis makes an original contribution to explaining how legal norms and practices assist in the sustainment of systemic inequality.
This dissertation explores why research finds that women know less about politics when compared to men (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1997). This gender gap puts women at a disadvantage in terms of their in political participation and representation. These dynamics are important in a democracy like Mexico where channels of representation for women are still evolving. By applying a gendered theoretical framework to the study of the acquisition of political information, this dissertation explores how three factors (incubator, structural, and agency mechanisms) transform our understanding of why people seek political knowledge and how their opportunities to access political information are enhanced or curtailed by a variety of factors. Through fieldwork (surveys of high school students in two Mexican states) and an analysis of more than twenty years of public opinion data, the results show that contrary to surveys of Mexican adults, which consistently find a gender gap in political knowledge, there is no such gap among adolescents. Therefore, the evidence supports an “incubator mechanism,” which exists when individuals are exposed to political information through similar means inside the boundaries of an institution. The existence of the gender gap in political knowledge among adults, but not among adolescents, suggests that when people leave the "incubator" the structural and agency mechanisms are the primary cause for the development of the gender gap in political knowledge. This occurs because gender differences in socialization and opportunities provide advantages for men to continue learning about politics after their formal education ends, while women's traditional roles in the home and family leave them at a disadvantage in this regard.
Parents are the linchpins in any school choice initiative—whether vouchers, intra- or interdistrict public school choice, voluntary desegregation plans, or the choice and supplemental services provisions of No Child Left Behind (NCLB). What parents know about and want for their child’s education critically defines the level of interest in school choice, and hence sets in motion (or not) all of the possibilities for competitive pressures and systemic change that reform-minded advocates espouse. If parents are basically satisfied with their child’s teacher and school, or if they have insufficient information about alternative schooling options, or if they express little desire to disrupt their child’s current education, then choice initiatives will not get off the ground.
Does Japanese public opinion influence political parties and ultimately shape foreign policy? It is common to dismiss the influence of public opinion in Japan. In contrast to American debates between elitists1 and pluralists,2 with respect to Japan the elitist view has dominated. Public opinion is often claimed to have had little influence on Japanese foreign policy, and public opinion is often seen as subject to elite molding.3
Since their creation, automobiles have become a central facet of the American culture and psyche. As status symbols and modes of transportation their importance cannot be overstated. Americans love their cars, and the average citizen believes that he or she has legitimate privacy interests in his or her vehicle. But is this the case? For decades, The Court has struggled to balance 4th Amendment privacy rights with effective police procedure, and has thus handed down dozens of rulings on the topic, many of which often seem disparate and contradictory. In the face of such confusion, the Court’s answer has almost always been to allow an increasing amount of discretion to police officers. This study seeks to find out how well college students on the University of Maine campus know both police powers of search and seizure as well as what their rights are in vehicular search and seizure situations. A questionnaire was distributed throughout Greek life on the University of Maine campus, the results of which were compiled and analyzed in an endeavor to gain insight into how well students understand their rights. Through this we can gain insight as to how much young people know about the rights and responsibilities that come with obtaining their license. This question is of more than passing importance in light of current Supreme Court rulings trending toward expansion of police power. Finally, I will assess the question of significance: How and to what extent should public education inform individuals of their rights?
This chapter deals with some aspects of two sources of systematic error in surveys: non-response and measurement error. The quality of the obtained response is discussed first with a focus on non-response bias estimation and non-response bias reduction. Measurement error is studied by evaluating the quality of registered responses through question wording, order, and response scale effects. The different approaches to measurement error are discussed. Practical examples of dealing with bias and measurement error are offered. These include the evaluation of non-(response) rates and response enhancement strategies, comparing cooperative and reluctant respondents on non-response issues based on the analysis of European Social Survey. Concerning measurement error, the split ballot approach and multitrait multimethod are extensively discussed including theoretical concepts and methods/models, and an example of acquiescence when a balanced set of items is available. The chapter also presents some debates concerning theoretical construct and model developments in the respective fields, and emphasizes that both errors are strongly related. This means response distributions, correlations, and regression parameters can be seriously affected.
In der Theorie politischer Steuerung hat sich in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren ein Paradigmawechsel ereignet (vgl. Mayntz 1996, 163). Dieses neue Paradigma geht von einer zunehmenden funktionalen Differenzierung der Gesellschaft als Folge ihres Modernisierungsprozesses aus. Mit diesem Gesellschaftsverständnis wird heute erklärt, warum Steuerung nach einem hie rarchisch-deterministischen Steuerungsverständnis zum Scheitern verurteilt war (vgl. Burth 1999, 80–88). Zum einen impliziert Modernisierung im Verständnis dieser Theorie „eine wachsende Bedeutung der horizontalen und einen Bedeutungsverlust der vertikalen Differenzierung [...]. In der funktional differenzierten Gesellschaft ist auch das politisch-administrative System nur noch ein Funktionssystem unter anderen; die Gesellschaft der Moderne hat kein Zentrum mehr [...] und zentrale Gesellschaftssteuerung [ist] eine Utopie“ (Mayntz 1996, 153). Dies bedeute, daß es zwar politische Steuerung in der Gesellschaft gebe, aber keine Steuerung der Gesellschaft. Zum anderen werden die diversen Untereinheiten der Gesellschaft in dem Sinne als selbstorganisierend und autonom aufgefaßt, daß sie je nach Grad ihrer Ausdifferenzierung ihre Eigendynamiken anhand je spezifischer Strukturen, Programmen oder Codes selbst regeln. Steuerungsimpulse seitens des politischen Systems werden nur insofern wirksam, als sie das jeweilige System anregen, mit einer bestimmten Wahrscheinlichkeit einen in seiner Struktur schon angelegten Entwicklungspfad einzuschlagen (vgl. Görlitz/Burth 1998, 251 f.).
Though there is widespread scholarly consensus that American political elites have become increasingly ideologically polarized, there remains debate about how the mass electorate has responded to the increase in polarization at the elite level. This article shows that as party elites have become more polarized, individuals have become better able to identify the party that best matches their own ideological positions, thereby contributing to polarization at the mass level. Using forty years of ANES and DW-NOMINATE data to test this argument, it was found that the relationship between a voter’s position in policy space and their political behavior is indeed conditional upon polarization at the elite level. This finding demonstrates how changes in elite polarization translate to behavioral changes on the mass level.
Dieser Aufsatz geht der Frage nach, wie sich Einstellungen deutscher Bürger zur gemeinsamen Währung erklären lassen. Anhand von 2011 erhobenen Online-Daten kann gezeigt werden, dass insbesondere ökonomische Erwägungen und Gruppenbindungen Einfluss auf Einstellungen zum Euro nehmen. Zusätzlich ziehen Bürger bei der Einstellungsbildung außenpolitische Grundorientierungen und Elitensignale heran. Trotz der hohen Salienz der deutschen Euromitgliedschaft in Folge der Staatsschuldenkrise greifen lediglich Bürger mit mittlerer politischer Involvierung auf Elitensignale zurück. Die Ergebnisse legen den Schluss nahe, dass die weitere Unterstützung des Euro zu einem großen Teil von der Entwicklung der wirtschaftlichen Lage und den entsprechenden Deutungen durch die politischen Eliten abhängig ist.
A key characteristic of democratic politics is competition between groups, first of all political parties. Yet, the unavoidably partisan nature of political conflict has had too little influence on scholarship on political psychology. Despite more than 50 years of research on political parties and citizens, we continue to lack a systematic understanding of when and how political parties influence public opinion. We suggest that alternative approaches to political parties and public opinion can be best reconciled and examined through a richer theoretical perspective grounded in motivated reasoning theory. Clearly, parties shape citizens' opinions by mobilizing, influencing, and structuring choices among political alternatives. But the answer to when and how parties influence citizens' reasoning and political opinions depends on an interaction between citizens' motivations, effort, and information generated from the political environment (particularly through competition between parties). The contribution of motivated reasoning, as we describe it, is to provide a coherent theoretical framework for understanding partisan influence on citizens' political opinions. We review recent empirical work consistent with this framework. We also point out puzzles ripe for future research and discuss how partisan‐motivated reasoning provides a useful point of departure for such work.
A partir de una muestra de residentes en la ciudad de Lima (N = 311), se analizan los aspectos psicopolíticos
por los cuales los ciudadanos respaldarían o no el proceso de revocatoria iniciado contra la alcaldesa de Lima, Susana Villarán. En conjunto, los resultados indican que el conservadurismo político (medido a través del RWA, SDO y la orientación política izquierda/derecha) se asocia a una posición desfavorable con respecto a la alcaldesa. En específico, la gestión de la alcaldesa es percibida por los sectores conservadores como ineficiente y responsable de los desmanes acontecidos en el intento de desalojo del mercado “La Parada”. Estos resultados respaldan la idea de que el continuo ideológico izquierda/derecha sigue vigente en la cultura política limeña y permite organizar y dar sentido a la información política y social.
Palabras clave: Ideología política; Proceso de Revocatoria; Conservadurismo político.
Prior research finds that liberals and conservatives process information differently. Predispositions toward intuitive versus reflective thinking may help explain this individual level variation. There have been few direct tests of this hypothesis and the results from the handful of studies that do exist are contradictory. Here we report the results of a series of studies using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to investigate inclinations to be reflective and political orientation. We find a relationship between thinking style and political orientation and that these effects are particularly concentrated on social attitudes. We also find it harder to manipulate intuitive and reflective thinking than a number of prominent studies suggest. Priming manipulations used to induce reflection and intuition in published articles repeatedly fail in our studies. We conclude that conservatives— more specifically, social conservatives—tend to be dispositionally less reflective, social liberals tend to be dispositionally more reflective, and that the relationship between reflection and intuition and political attitudes may be more resistant to easy manipulation than existing research would suggest.
This paper aims to investigate the role of the individual media agenda and issue public membership in the agenda-setting process in a theoretical model and test this model for five issues, based on media content analysis of 28 news outlets and a panel study in the context of a national election. The findings of the path models show, first, that the public agenda is quite stable. Second, the influence of the used media agenda on the public’s personal issue agenda is mediated through the involvement with a particular issue – i.e. issue public membership.
Although they share a similar 'social media' tag, blogs, micro-blog sites like Twitter, and social networking sites (SNS) like Facebook are distinctive in their relationships with political engagement. This paper examined the impact of the use of the three media on the gaps in political knowledge and participation between the more and less educated people. In the results, Facebook use interacted positively with education in predicting civic and issue knowledge. The gap of offline participation was larger among heavy Twitter users than among light users. Overall, findings imply that social media amplify or reinforce inequality of political engagement.
In this paper, we use follow-up probes administered to respondents who initially select the mid-point to determine whether they selected this alternative in order to indicate opinion neutrality, or to indicate that they do not have an opinion on the issue. We find the vast majority of responses turn out to be what we term 'face-saving don't knows' and that reallocating these responses from the mid-point to the don't know category significantly alters descriptive and multivariate inferences. Our findings have important implications for the design and analysis of bipolar ratings scales.
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