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Theories of false memory in children and adults
Abstract
Much attention has recently been paid to false-memory effects in children and adults. Attention initially focused on the effects themselves. Most observers now agree that false-memory effects are robust and replicable, although they are subject to constraints (e.g., Lindsay 1990; Reyna & Titcomb 1997; Zaragoza & Lane 1994; Zaragoza, Lane, Ackil & Chambers 1997). Using noncoercive procedures, it is possible to induce people to falsely remember witnessing events that they never experienced (e.g., that they saw a yield sign, rather than a stop sign; Loftus 1979; Loftus, Miller & Burns 1978). Currently, researchers are beginning to examine the origins of such effects: How are false memories created, and what can be done to minimize them? It has become apparent that the key questions of prediction and prevention must be addressed through theory development, i.e., by deepening our understanding of false-memory phenomena. In this article, we explore contemporary explanations for false-memory effects in children and adults, including constructivism, source monitoring, and fuzzy-trace theory. Our discussion is divided into four sections. In the first section, we briefly review the assumptions underlying different theoretical approaches. In the second section, various false-memory effects are described, and their interactions with age, delay, and type of questioning. Laboratory demonstrations of false memories are supplemented by real-life examples from clinical medicine. Then, we examine how each of these effects is explained from different theoretical perspectives. Finally, we take stock of the available evidence favoring different explanations for false-memory effects, and discuss the implications of that evidence for subsequent theorizing and for improving memory performance.
... The gist of an episode can be defined as "the central features of a particular episode (story line)" (Robin & Moscovitch, 2017). Noncentral details of an episode are much more likely to be forgotten (Sekeres et al., 2016) or influenced by misinformation, specifically if such misinformation is in line with the gist of the episode (Reyna, Corbin, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2016;Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). Furthermore, gist information is highly relevant for guiding judgment and decision-making (Corbin, Reyna, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2015). ...
... Therefore, we reasoned that memory accuracy for originally encoded episodes, as assessed by false alarm and hit rates and, more generally, the area under the curve (AUC; Brady, Robinson, Williams, & Wixted, 2022), might be generally lower for surface than for gist-modified episodes. In addition, prediction violation through surface and gist modifications might influence subsequent memory differently, in line with previous reports that surface-level detail is more likely to be influenced by misinformation (Reyna et al., 2016;Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). ...
... Therefore, it was more difficult for participants to correctly differentiate modified from original versions when the modification was not gist relevant. This observation is in agreement with reports that noncentral details are less likely to be remembered (Sekeres et al., 2016) and can be easily confused by misinformation (Reyna et al., 2016;Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). ...
Episodic memories can be modified, a process that is potentially driven by mnemonic prediction errors. In the present study, we used modified cues to induce prediction errors of different episodic relevance. Participants encoded episodes in the form of short toy stories and then returned for an fMRI session on the subsequent day. Here, participants were presented either original episodes or slightly modified versions thereof. Modifications consisted of replacing a single object within the episode and either challenged the gist of an episode (gist modifications) or left it intact (surface modifications). On the next day, participants completed a post-fMRI memory test that probed memories for originally encoded episodes. Both types of modifications triggered brain activation in regions we previously found to be involved in the processing of content-based mnemonic prediction errors (i.e., the exchange of an object). Specifically, these were ventrolateral pFC, intraparietal cortex, and lateral occipitotemporal cortex. In addition, gist modifications triggered pronounced brain responses, whereas those for surface modification were only significant in the right inferior frontal sulcus. Processing of gist modifications also involved the posterior temporal cortex and the precuneus. Interestingly, our findings confirmed the posterior hippocampal role of detail processing in episodic memory, as evidenced by increased posterior hippocampal activity for surface modifications compared with gist modifications. In the post-fMRI memory test, previous experience with surface modified, but not gist-modified episodes, increased erroneous acceptance of the same modified versions as originally encoded. Whereas surface-level prediction errors might increase uncertainty and facilitate confusion of alternative episode representations, gist-level prediction errors seem to trigger the clear distinction of independent episodes.
... Finally, the theory predicts that instructing individuals to explicitly make judgments about the source of memories (i.e. cuing the systematic process) should reduce the incidence of false recognition and recall (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). This prediction was borne out in a study (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989) in which participants were presented with a picture of an office scene, followed by either a misleading text that described items that were actually in the scene with other items that fit the theme of the scene but were not actually present, or a control text that only described items that were actually in the scene. ...
... Regarding these explicit prompts about source judgments, it should be noted that false recognition tends not to disappear completely when individuals are presented with such prompts, though reductions do occur (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). One key factor in the magnitude of the effect has been demonstrated to be the instruction to visualize distractor cues, which SMF argues increases false memory through source misattribution, since the traces of misleading cues contain greater detail upon deliberate visualization. ...
... Although SMF predicts that memory for source will increase with age, and thus, false memory based on source-misattribution will decrease with age, it is important to mention that the studies described here noting the accuracies of predictions of the source-monitoring paradigm tend to be either source confusions between external sources (e.g. between heard and seen sources), or contain a deliberate suggestion phase in which the participants are instructed to imagine objects or events. Few studies are performed in the paradigm in which false memories occur without external source confusion or an imaginative prime, and thus, source-monitoring the ory would have difficulty explaining effects that are commonly observed in spontaneous false memory, such as increases in incidence of false recognition and recall with age (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). ...
... Critical lures are accepted during memory test because they share their meaning with the stored gist traces. The memory traces may disintegrate over time, and fragments of traces may become associated with the wrong context (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). ...
... In a way, the participants mentally reinstated the study context when they expected that all the words associated with the particular gist were presented in the same colour. However, the prerequisite of false colour attribution to non-presented but gist-related lures is disintegration of traces whose fragments may become associated with the wrong context (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). ...
We examined the role of context memory for false recognition of critical lures and for illusory recollection of context in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm. In order to manipulate context (colour) memory, we asked the participants to read vs. generate items during the study and we presented items from one list using blocked-or mixed-colour formats. Both manipulations confirmed its influence on colour identification. Using signal detection analyses, we estimated memory sensitivity and response bias parameters, assuming that the former reflects encoding-mechanism influences, whereas the latter reflects retrieval-based mechanism effects. Our results showed no evidence for diagnostic monitoring, that is, the participants did not use failure of colour recollection as a retrieval strategy for lures rejection. However, we also showed that in the blocked-colour condition, the better memory for targets colours was related to a better gist memory and a stronger proneness to attribute the list-colour to corresponding critical lures. We interpret these results as indicating that participants "misbind" contextual details to activated critical lures at encoding and/or "borrow" these details at retrieval to corroborate the strong familiarity of critical lures.
... In line with research in the decision-making field Mather et al., 2003), however, our operational definition is narrower than Schacter's, specifically referring to the attribution of a correctly recalled feature to the wrong option. Indeed, misattribution presupposes correct encoding and recall of the actual information -only its source is confused -while false memory represents a separate category in our taxonomy, since it is a qualitatively different type of error (remembering information never presented), which may even be related to different underlying processes (e.g., Reyna and Lloyd, 1997), an issue that will be discussed later in the paper. ...
... They represent a more dramatic and radical departure from reality than simple fact distortions, in that an entire new piece of non-existing evidence is remembered. Moreover, this type of error is not attributable to a properly encoded but later confused feature, thus it is conceptually distinct from misattributing a correctly recalled feature to one of the presented options (for a classification of memory errors and false memory phenomena see also Reyna and Lloyd, 1997). ...
Although the literature on the influence of memory on decisions is well developed, research on the effects of decision making on memory is rather sparse and scattered. Choice-supportive misremembering (i.e., misremembering choice-related information that boosts the chosen option and/or demotes the foregone options) has been observed in several studies and has the potential to affect future choices. Nonetheless, no attempt has been made to review the relevant literature, categorize the different types of choice-supportive misremembering observed, and critically appraise the existing evidence and proposed explanations. Thus, starting from a new theoretically motivated and empirically grounded taxonomy, we review the current research. Our taxonomy classifies choice-supportive misremembering into four conceptually distinct types: misattribution is when information is attributed to the wrong source, fact distortion when the facts are remembered in a distorted manner, false memory when items that were not part of the original decision scenarios are remembered as presented and, finally, selective forgetting is when information is selectively forgotten. After assessing the impact of various potentially moderating factors, we evaluate the evidence for each type of misremembering and conclude that the support for the phenomenon is solid in relation to misattribution when recognition memory is assessed, but significantly weaker for the other three types, and when other memory tests are used to assess memory. Finally, we review the cognitive and emotional explanations proposed for choice-supportive misremembering in the light of the available evidence and identify the main gaps in the current knowledge and the more promising avenues for future research.
... Although few studies of the truth effect have used a gist paradigm (Arkes et al., 1991), the verbatim-gist distinction has been examined in other contexts. The most influential of these comes from fuzzytrace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005;Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). According to this theory, when encountering information, separate representations of this information's surface form (verbatim trace), and of its semantic properties (gist trace) are stored in memory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998). ...
Research has shown that repeating a claim increases belief in it and makes it more difficult to correct. This is referred to as the illusory truth effect. Previous studies have mostly examined the illusory truth effect in a verbatim paradigm, that is, when information is repeated word-for-word. In the present study, we looked at the difference between repeating a claim word-for-word and repeating only its gist, and how both these contexts can mitigate belief in false information that is refuted or not. Results show that gist and verbatim repetitions both lead to high, and relatively equal, levels of belief when they are not disconfirmed, and that a subsequent correction is more effective in lowering belief levels after verbatim than after gist repetition. This provides evidence that the way in which information is repeated has a differential impact on our ability to debias it.
... Additionally, suggestive psychotherapy techniques can lead to memory distortion or false memory production (Lilienfeld, 2007;Lindsay & Read, 1995;Loftus & Davis, 2006). As time passes and memory traces weaken, source monitoring errors can occur in which the post-event misinformation becomes confused with the original event at retrieval (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). ...
Delayed allegations of sexual misconduct have garnered much media attention, especially when allegations involve public figures such as politicians. In the current chapter, we discuss two main tenets related to the politics of sexual misconduct allegations. First, we argue that although individuals may wait years or decades before reporting valid experiences of sexual misconduct, delayed reporting is not without mnemonic consequences. Memory undergoes deterioration and distortion over time, so even in valid cases, the fading and reconstruction of event details are highly likely to take place. Further, as time passes, one’s susceptibility to misinformation and false memory production increase alongside natural processes of memory deterioration. We offer a framework to evaluate delayed allegations of sexual misconduct where we outline several event characteristics (e.g., repetition, exposure to post-event information) that contribute to memory reliability. We use two high-profile allegations of sexual misconduct involving US Supreme Court nominees to illustrate these processes. In the second half of the paper, we discuss the influence of various sociopolitical factors (e.g., political orientation, social media, social movements) on adults’ perceptions of sexual misconduct allegations. We conclude by highlighting the need to balance media exposure and scientific scrutiny to ensure that investigations of sexual misconduct in political domains are fair and just.
... In the DRM paradigm, participants study lists composed of the 15 strongest associates (e.g., "climber, peak, ski, valley, etc.") to a given theme word (e.g., "mountain") that is not itself presented, and are then given a recall or a recognition test that may occur minutes or days later. This paradigm typically produces high levels of false recall or recognition of the critical theme word in young adults, often rivaling the acceptance rate for presented words (e.g., Reyna & Lloyd, 1997;Roediger & McDermott, 1995). According to the Fuzzy-Trace theory (FTT, Brainerd & Reyna, 2002a;Brainerd et al., 2008;Chang & Brainerd, 2021), subjects store two types of episodic representations as they encode the items in DRM lists: verbatim traces of item presentations and gist traces of item meanings, especially semantic relations that connect the different items of a given list. ...
False memories are well established episodic memory phenomena. Recent research in young adults has shown that semantically related associates can be falsely remembered as studied items in working memory (WM) tasks for lists of only a few items when a short 4-second interval was given between study and test. The present study reported two experiments yielding similar effects in 4- (n = 32 and 33, 18 and 14 females, respectively) and 8-year-old children (n = 33 and 34, respectively, 19 females in both). Short lists of semantically related items specifically tailored for young children were retained over a brief interval. Whether or not the interval was filled with a concurrent task that impeded or not WM maintenance, younger children were as prone to falsely recognize related distractors as their older counterparts in an immediate recognition test, and also in a delayed test. In addition, using the conjoint recognition model of the fuzzy-trace theory, we demonstrated that the retrieval of gist traces of the list themes was responsible for the occurrence of short-term false memories in 4- and 8-year-old children. Gist memory also underpinned the occurrence of false recognition in the delayed test. These findings suggest that young children are as likely to make gist-based false memories as older children in working memory tasks. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
... Such monitoring failures might have occurred for a subset of participants (25%) who created a false alibi and reported their fabrications in their truthful accounts at Sessions 2 and/or 3. In general, it is possible that the creation of a false alibi served as a distractor or disruptor of establishing clear source cues of true and fabricated events (Johnson et al., 1993;Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). So, creating a false alibi might have decreased the source monitoring abilities leading to more intrusion errors as compared with truth tellers (i.e., commission errors unrelated to the false alibi). ...
A suspect of a crime can avoid legal repercussions by creating a false alibi. We examined whether creating such a false alibi can have adverse effects on memory. To do so, participants watched a mock crime video and were either instructed to create a false alibi or to provide an honest account for what they actually saw in the video. After a two-day and one-month delay, all participants were instructed to come forward with the truth using a free recall task. Participants who initially created a false alibi had more commission errors after a two-day and one-month delay (vs. truth telling participants). Moreover, participants who created a false alibi reported fewer correct details after a two-day and one-month delay (vs. truth telling participants). Our study suggests that like other types of deception, creating a false alibi can elicit memory undermining effects in the form of commission and omission errors.
... To this end, we manipulated the preactivation of the stimuli boosting their encoding (e.g., Stuart and Hulme 2000). The preactivation monitoring framework (e.g., Reyna and Lloyd 1997;Roediger et al. 2001) posits that the human lexicon organizes words based on their semantic properties, which implies that words with similar meanings are more strongly linked to each other compared to words with different meanings. The processing of one word can thus activate semantically related words via spread of activation. ...
Semantic relationship modulates working memory (WM) processes by promoting recall but impairing recognition. Updating is a core mechanism of WM responsible for its stability and flexibility; it allows maintenance of relevant information while removing no-longer relevant one. To our knowledge, no studies specifically investigated how WM updating may benefit from the processing of semantically related material. In the current study, two experiments were run with this aim. In Experiment 1, we found an advantage for semantically related words (vs. unrelated) regardless of their association type (i.e., taxonomic or thematic). A second experiment was run boosting semantic association through preactivation. Findings replicated those of Experiment 1 suggesting that preactivation was effective and improved semantic superiority. In sum, we demonstrated that long-term semantic associations benefitted the updating process, or more generally, overall WM function. In addition, pre-activating semantic nodes of a given word appears likely a process supporting WM and updating; thus, this may be the mechanism favoring word process and memorization in a semantically related text.
... Additionally, suggestive psychotherapy techniques can lead to memory distortion or false memory production (Lilienfeld, 2007;Lindsay & Read, 1995;Loftus & Davis, 2006). As time passes and memory traces weaken, source monitoring errors can occur in which the post-event misinformation becomes confused with the original event at retrieval (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). ...
Delayed allegations of sexual misconduct have garnered much media attention, especially when allegations involve public figures such as politicians. In the current chapter, we discuss two main tenets related to the politics of sexual misconduct allegations. First, we argue that, although individuals may wait years or decades before reporting valid experiences of sexual misconduct, delayed reporting is not without mnemonic consequences. Memory undergoes deterioration and distortion over time, so even in valid cases, the fading and reconstruction of event details are highly likely to take place. Further, as time passes, one’s susceptibility to misinformation and false memory production increase alongside natural processes of memory deterioration. We offer a framework to evaluate delayed allegations of sexual misconduct where we outline several event characteristics (e.g., repetition, exposure to post-event information) that contribute to memory reliability. We use two high-profile allegations of sexual misconduct involving United States Supreme Court nominees to illustrate these processes. In the second half of the paper, we discuss the influence of various socio-political factors (e.g., political orientation, social media, social movements) on adults’ perceptions of sexual misconduct allegations. We conclude by highlighting the need to balance media exposure and scientific scrutiny to ensure that investigations of sexual misconduct in political domains are fair and just.
Keywords: memory; sexual misconduct; politics; misinformation
... False memory has been studied not only in an adult population, but also over the course of life and, in particular, during childhood (e.g., Reyna & Lloyd, 1997;Bjorklund, 2000;Brainerd, Reyna & Forrest, 2002;Metzger, Warren, Shelton, Price, Reed & Williams, 2008;Otgaar & Smeets, 2010;Otgaar, Howe, Muris & Merckelbach, 2019). The analysis of this phenomenon, in a developmental phase, made it possible to clarify its onset and its relationship with the performance in other aspects of a cognitive system that is still in formation (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna & Holliday, 2018). ...
When participants process a list of semantically strongly related words, the ones that were not presented may later be said, falsely, to have been on the list. This ‘false memory effect’ has been investigated by means of the DRM paradigm. We applied an emotional version of it to assess the false memory effect for emotional words in bilingual children with a minority language as L1 (their mother tongue) and a monolingual control group. We found that the higher emotionality of the words enhances memory distortion for both the bilingual and the monolingual children, in spite of the disadvantage related to vocabulary skills and of the socioeconomic status that acts on semantic processing independently from the condition of bilingualism. We conclude that bilingual children develop their semantic knowledge separately from their vocabulary skills and parallel to their monolingual peers, with a comparable role played by Arousal and Valence.
... Another explanation was based on the retrieval-based explanation of forgetting and stated that original information and the misinformation coexist in memory, the latter making the former more difficult to retrieve (Bekerian and Bowers, 1983;Bowers and Bekerian, 1984). Yet another explanation was based on the fuzzy-trace theory and posited that false memories occur primarily because gist memories are falsely ascribed to experience (Reyna and Lloyd, 1997). ...
The misinformation effect occurs when an eyewitness includes information in his or her account that is incongruent with the event he or she witnessed, and stems from being exposed to incorrect external sources. This is a serious threat to the quality of witness testimony and to the correctness of decisions reached by courts. However, few methods have been developed to reduce the vulnerability of witnesses to misinformation. This article presents such a method, namely, reinforced self-affirmation (RSA), which, by increasing memory confidence of witnesses, makes them less inclined to rely on external sources of information and more on their own memory. The effectiveness of this method was confirmed in three experiments. It was also found that memory confidence, but not general self-confidence, is a mediator of the impact of RSA on misinformation effect (ME), and that contingent self-esteem and feedback acceptance, but not sense of self-efficacy or general self-esteem, are moderators of this impact. It is concluded that RSA may be a promising basis for constructing methods, which can be used by forensic psychologists in real forensic settings.
... Lindsay et al. (2004) note that the emergence of false memories of an unlikely event can be explained by naturally occurring distortions that may stem from interference from exposure to similar events, leading to psuedomemories. This idea is consistent with the fuzzy trace theory, which asserts that memory consists of dual independent systems (verbatim and gist representations), and these two systems are encoded in parallel but are stored separately (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002;Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). Within this framework, false memories are believed to emerge due to the incorrect use of gist representations to recall verbatim details of an event. ...
Researchers have used the term false memory to describe various memory errors, including the incorporation of erroneous information into a memory, misremembering a word presented as a picture, and the construction of a detailed memory of an event that did not occur. Whether such diverse manifestations of false memory are assessing the same construct has not been evaluated. The purpose of this study is to examine the relations among a set of variables that have been used in the literature to measure false memory. The sample consisted of 112 college students who completed four false memory measures, including the commonly used Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) and the misinformation tasks. Zero-order correlations indicated that there are little to no associations between false memories in the DRM and the misinformation tasks, as well as the other false memory tasks. A confirmatory factor analysis of the DRM and misinformation variables further suggested that the false memory variables share little variance in common and may not be represented by a unitary factor. Thus, the results of the current study suggest that tasks intended to measure false memory may be measuring different types of memory errors
... A robust and reliable way to experimentally create false memories is by using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which lists of associatively related words are presented during encoding (e.g., bed, dream, wake, rest, tired) in which one highly related theme word (the "critical lure": sleep) is not presented (Deese 1959;Roediger and McDermott 1995). Research shows that critical lures are often incorrectly recalled or recognized as having been presented before, thereby forming false memories, and acceptance rates for critical lures are often as high as acceptance rates for presented items (Brainerd et al. 2008;Reyna and Lloyd 1997). ...
Rationale: Cannabis use is widespread and has previously been associated with memory impairments. However, the role of cannabis in relation to false memory production, i.e., memories of events that were not experienced, is less well-understood.
Objective: The aim of the current field study was to examine the impact of cannabis use on false memory production.
Methods: The Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm was used to induce false memories. In this paradigm, participants study word lists that are associatively related to a non-presented word, termed the critical lure. In a later memory test, true recognition rates and false alarm rates toward critical lures and unrelated items are assessed. Memory performance was compared between three groups: regular cannabis consumers who were acutely intoxicated (n = 53), regular cannabis consumers who were sober (n = 50), and cannabis-naïve controls (n = 53). The participants were approached in Dutch coffee shops (cannabis outlets) and cafes and asked to participate in our study. After collecting general information on their cannabis use, they were subjected to the DRM procedure.
Results: Although false memory rates for critical lures did not statistically differ between groups, both intoxicated and sober cannabis consumers falsely recognized more unrelated items than control participants. Also, individuals without a history of cannabis use demonstrated higher memory accuracy compared with the intoxicated group. Conclusion: It is concluded that cannabis intoxication and history of cannabis use induce a liberal response criterion for newly presented words for which the level of association with previously learned words is low and uncertainty is high.
... When using classified items, the category is the gist. Not only the items have a gist, but a single word also has a gist, which can equally lead to the occurrence of false memory (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). Although the children have the ability to retrieve the gist, yet their ability increases with age, especially the ability to retrieve items across lexical items (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). ...
... Therefore, the contribution of recollection rejection, the phenomenon responsible for false-memory reduction, decreases when retention intervals are longer (e.g. Brainerd et al., 1995;Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003;Reyna & Lloyd, 1997; for a more recent discussion see Reyna et al., 2016). ...
Past research has demonstrated that participants with a high working-memory capacity (WMC) are less susceptible to false memory than individuals with a low WMC, especially in conditions using forewarning instructions. This suggests that high WMC individuals can use strategic control to counteract false alarms in a memory test. In this study, we explored whether individual differences in inhibition, sustained attention, and WMC are related to false memory task performance. We defined the processes in such a task according to the fuzzy trace theory and used multinomial modelling methodology to measure the contribution of these latent processes. We found higher verbatim memory in participants with a high WMC, as measured by the Rotation Span task, and in individuals who committed more errors in the Sustained Attention Response Task (SART). Participants with a high WMC and low-error level in SART showed higher gist memory for targets, and individuals high in WMC also rejected orthographically related distractors more effectively due to the recollection of distractors’ corresponding targets. We also observed that participants with better inhibition control were more conservative in guessing that an item was old.
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... In fact, a child having such high knowledge of a particular context resembles a real-world scenario in which children are questioned about events that happened in their close environment. Under these circumstances, it has been shown that children are indeed highly prone to memory distortions, especially when accurate source memory is required (Johnson & Foley, 1984;Loftus & Davies, 1984;Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). ...
We tested 6- to 7-year-olds, 18- to 22-year-olds, and 67- to 74-year-olds on an associative memory task that consisted of knowledge-congruent and knowledge-incongruent object—scene pairs that were highly familiar to all age groups. We compared the 3 age groups on their memory congruency effect (i.e., better memory for knowledge-congruent associations) and on a schema bias score, which measures participants’ tendency to commit knowledge-congruent memory errors. We found that prior knowledge similarly benefited memory for items encoded in a congruent context in all age groups. However, for associative memory, older adults and, to a lesser extent, children overrelied on their prior knowledge, as indicated by an enhanced congruency effect and schema bias. Functional MRI (fMRI) performed during memory encoding revealed an age-independent Memory × Congruency interaction in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Furthermore, the magnitude of vmPFC recruitment correlated positively with the schema bias. These findings suggest that older adults are most prone to rely on their prior knowledge for episodic memory decisions, but that children can also rely heavily on prior knowledge that they are well acquainted with. Furthermore, the fMRI results suggest that the vmPFC plays a key role in the assimilation of new information into existing knowledge structures across the entire life span. vmPFC recruitment leads to better memory for knowledge-congruent information but also to a heightened susceptibility to commit knowledge-congruent memory errors, in particular in children and older adults.
... It has been shown that a wide variety of memories can be falsely created, either inside or outside of a therapist"s office, through the use of suggestion, guided imagery, and hypnosis. Though these techniques do not always result in false memories, experiments suggest that a significant proportion of people will believe in and actively defend the existence of fabricated events, even after they are told that the events were false and deliberately implanted ( Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). False memories involving childhood sexual abuse have gained significant attention because, even when it is clear the accused is innocent, the accuser can be irrationally convinced to the contrary ( Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). ...
... To avoid reliance on familiar but invalid information, strategic memory processes are required to act as a filter of automatically retrieved memory output. However, strategic memory processes take effort and often fail (e.g., Herron & Rugg, 2003), and thus people can rely upon invalid but automatically retrieved information in their judgments (Ecker et al., 2011;Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997;Reyna & Lloyd, 1997;Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). A post-correction misinformation effect is therefore likely to occur when misinformation has been automatically activated but strategic memory processes have failed (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010). ...
People frequently continue to use inaccurate information in their reasoning even after a credible retraction has been presented. This phenomenon is often referred to as the continued influence effect of misinformation. The repetition of the original misconception within a retraction could contribute to this phenomenon, as it could inadvertently make the “myth” more familiar—and familiar information is more likely to be accepted as true. From a dual-process perspective, familiarity-based acceptance of myths is most likely to occur in the absence of strategic memory processes. We thus examined factors known to affect whether strategic memory processes can be utilized; age, detail, and time. Participants rated their belief in various statements of unclear veracity, and facts were subsequently affirmed and myths were retracted. Participants then re-rated their belief either immediately or after a delay. We compared groups of young and older participants, and we manipulated the amount of detail presented in the affirmative/corrective explanations, as well as the retention interval between encoding and a retrieval attempt. We found that (1) older adults over the age of 65 were worse at sustaining their post-correction belief that myths were inaccurate, (2) a greater level of explanatory detail promoted more sustained belief change, and (3) fact affirmations promoted more sustained belief change in comparison to myth retractions over the course of one week (but not over three weeks). This supports the notion that familiarity is indeed a driver of continued influence effects.
The process-dissociation model has stimulated important advances in the study of dual-process conceptions of memory. The authors review some limiting properties of that model and consider the degree of support for its parent theory (the recollection–familiarity distinction). A 2nd-generation model (conjoint recognition) is proposed that addresses these limitations and supplies additional capabilities, such as goodness-of-fit tests, the ability to measure dual processes for false-memory responses, and statistical procedures for testing within- and between-conditions hypotheses about its parameters. The conjoint-recognition model also implements an alternative theoretical interpretation (the identity–similarity distinction of fuzzy-trace theory). Worked applications to data are provided.
This study compares semantic and phonological interference vulnerability across the full range of learning processes. Method: 43 controls aged 61-88 underwent a neuropsychological examination, French adaptation of the LASSI-L, and an experimental phonological test, the TIP-A. Paired sample t-tests, factorial ANOVA and hierarchical regressions were conducted, psychometric properties were calculated. Results: TIP-A efficiently generated phonological interference between concurrent word lists and was associated with short-term memory, unlike LASSI-L. On LASSI-L, proactive interference was higher than retroactive interference; the opposite pattern was found on TIP-A. Memory performance was better explained by age in the semantic than in the phonological task. Age was not associated with interference vulnerability. Intrusions and false recognition were associated with cognitive functioning regardless of age, particularly in the semantic context. Conclusion: To our knowledge, this is the first study to assess phonological and semantic interference using homologous concurrent word list tasks, and not a working memory build-up or DRM paradigm. The pattern obtained illustrates the weak initial memory trace in a phonological context and results are discussed according to depth-of-processing and dual-process theories. Similar paradigms could be studied among various pathologies for a better understanding of generalised interference vulnerability vs. specific semantic or phonological impairment.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
He who deliberates lengthily will not always choose the best.
– Goethe
Introspection is often considered a uniquely human capability. Other species possess sophisticated cognitive and communicative skills (e.g., Premack & Premack, 1983; Ristau & Robbins, 1982), but as far as we know, we are the only species that thinks about its thoughts and feelings. Given the possibly unique status of our ability to self-reflect, it is tempting to view self-reflection as a uniformly beneficial activity. This assumption has been made, at least implicitly, by theorists in several areas of psychology. Many forms of psychotherapy view introspection as an integral part of the healing process, and some decision theorists argue that reflection about a choice will lead to better decision making (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Raiffa, 1968). Similarly, Langer (1978, 1989) has argued that we would be better off in most contexts if we were more “mindful” and contemplative about our actions.
Introspection and self-reflection undoubtedly can be very useful, with the ability to superimpose reason and discretion on otherwise impulsive actions. There is no reason to assume that introspection is always beneficial, however, and in fact, there may be times when it is best to avoid too much of it. There is a growing literature documenting the drawbacks of self-reflection and rumination. Morrow and Nolan-Hoeksema (1990) found that people who ruminated about a negative mood were less successful in improving their moods than people who performed a distracting task.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
A large research literature shows how the ability to deceive improves from early childhood on. For instance, growth in Theory of Mind allows older children to infer accurately others’ mental states, enabling plausible lying. However, theoretical frameworks for integrating these findings are scarce. We expand a cognitive theory of adult high-stakes deception for this purpose: Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT). According to ADCAT, deception typically involves four components: activation of the truth, a decision to lie if sharing the truth is sufficiently negative and if conveying a deception is sufficiently positive, construction of a lie that achieves goals, and then acting the deception out. Each component is elaborated developmentally, predictions are generated, and possible tests are proposed. The core developmental principle is that with age deceivers will discover more effective ways to reduce the cognitive load of deception. Expanded ADCAT organizes and explains many research findings and suggests dimensions for understanding deception development throughout the lifespan.
The main goal of the present study was to determine whether the probability of correct and illusory recall of word lists varies with participants’ frequency of memorization and recitation practice. The ancillary goal was to determine whether the concurrent presentation of Arabic words and English translations would influence correct and illusory recall rates relative to monolingual presentation. The words in each list were selected to gravitate around a theme word, which was never presented. In this procedure, recall of the theme word was considered prima facie evidence of an illusory memory. Participants were Arabic–English bilingual speakers from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). No effects of bilingual presentation on correct and illusory recall were observed in Experiment 1, which relied on lists developed in the United States for monolingual English speakers, and in Experiment 3, which relied on culturally appropriate lists. However, bilingual presentation reduced generic semantic intrusions in Experiment 1. Participants’ illusory recall rates were lower than those of published norms gathered from English-speaking monolingual participants. In Experiment 1, generic semantic intrusions declined as the breadth of participants’ recitation practice increased. No other significant correlations were found between memory indices and performance or sentiment measures of rote rehearsal. The implications of the finding that a didactic and religious practice taught to KSA students from an early age has little impact on the retention of verbal information are discussed.
The aim of this study was to define the processes underlying false recognition memory for orthographically related words by using the simplified conjoint recognition paradigm (Stahl & Klauer, 2009), which is grounded in the fuzzy trace theory. We considered 2 accounts. The first assumes that false memory stems from the perceptual feature overlap between targets and distractors represented in the gist memory parameter. The second account assumes that false memory for orthographically related distractors results from the misattribution of verbatim information, which is reflected in the phantom recollection parameter. Data from two experiments were analyzed with multinomial processing tree modeling to estimate the contribution of latent processes to performance in recognition memory tests. These analyses supported the feature overlap account, suggesting that gist trace encodes both semantic and orthographic patterns.
We also showed that a boost in false memories due to the adding of semantic associates to a list
of orthographically related words stems from an increase in phantom recollection. We discussed
further directions in theoretical and empirical research on the gist and verbatim traces’ contribution
to false recognition of perceptually related stimuli.
Recollection without remembering is a counterintuitive phenomenon that violates a traditional assumption of source memory models—namely, that accurate item memory is a necessary precondition for remembering source details that accompanied an item’s presentation. The dual-recollection model explains recollection without remembering as a by-product of the contrasting effects of target and context recollection on item tests versus source tests. We pitted that explanation against 2 others that preserve the traditional assumption, one based on hypothesized testing artifacts and the other derived from multivariate signal detection theory. Our experiments focused on a manipulation that, according to dual-recollection theory, should drive source memory and item memory in opposite directions. In 2 experiments, studied items were tagged with 3 source details (voice gender, taxonomic category, and list), such that either (a) the 3 details were consistent with each other or (b) 1 detail was inconsistent with the other 2. As predicted, source memory was better but item memory was worse when source details were consistent with each other. The recollection without remembering effect was observed in both experiments, and as predicted by dual-recollection theory, it was more robust when item memory was worse than when it was better. A further instance of recollection without remembering was detected that involved distractors rather than presented items.
In this article we reviewed studies relating to emotional influence on memory function and specifically, in the occurrence of false memories. False memories are a kind of mnemonic distortion which consist of the recovery of events that never happened. Emotion is being described in terms of dimensions of valence and arousal. Numerous studies have suggested that valence and arousal are beneficial to memory through distinct cognitive processes and neural mechanisms. On the other hand the research about emotional impact on the occurrence of false memories is quite incipient and there is not much consensus with respect to their results. We focus mainly on the methodological discussion of research relating emotion to false recognition. Finally we present some suggestions for future studies, and the current state of research carried out in Brazil.
The present article reveals some aspects about the memory, mainly our capacity of remember what didn't happen. We explain, from bibliographical risings, the general sense of the memory, the first theories and the types of memory. Then we analyze the possibility of to modify a real event, in other words, of we create false recalls. The memory is initially established and registered, but it can be modified by the acquisition of new information, as well as for subsequent episodes of recapitulation and evocation. The corroboration of an event to a person can be a powerful technique to induce to a false memory; in fact, the affirmation that a person see an other person making something wandered is already enough to drive the person to a false conclusion. A false evidence can induce the person to accept the fault for something that he didn't commit and developing memories to support their fault feeling. © Ciências & Cognição 2006; Vol. 09: xxx-xxx.
In the present study, we used the Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT) perspective to investigate the role of context switching or reinstatement on correct and false recognition. In two experiments, participants studied words presented against unique picture backgrounds. At test, we manipulated pictorial context, presenting test items with reinstated context, switched context or with no pictorial context. As a measurement method we used the multinomial model developed by Stahl and Klauer (2008, 2009) for the simplified conjoint recognition paradigm. The results indicated that providing item-context associative information in the reinstated-context condition enhances verbatim trace retrieval of targets but does not influence their gist retrieval. In the case of false recognitions of related distracters, manipulations of retrieval context resulted in different effects across experiments, putatively because simple false memory for occurrence (FMO) task and Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm involve different latent-processes. The DRM experiment showed decreased phantom recollection and increased gist-based recognition of critical distracters in the switched-context condition in comparison with the remaining conditions. In contrast, the FMO experiment, showed a decrease in the gist memory for related distracters and increase in the response bias to recognize distracters as targets in the switched-context condition in comparison with the reinstated-context condition.
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A limited number of eprints available at:
https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/PG6DZE3RBZRBCDVT7UZ8/full?target=10.1080/20445911.2017.1317264
A salient trend in modern memory development research, as well as in mainstream adult research, has been the emergence of dual-process theories. This chapter first considers four core principles that fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) uses to explain certain phenomena of memory development and to predict new ones. The chapter then focuses on treatment of the most important of those principles when it comes to memory development: (a) verbatim and gist representations; (b) retrieval dissociation; (c) dissociated forgetting rates; and (d) developmental change in verbatim and gist memory. The chapter also reviews five counterintuitive developmental phenomena that FTT predicted and that have been topics of extensive investigation all of which are closely connected to what has been, for the past quarter-century, the major applied impetus for child memory research: the reliability of legal evidence.
Reports from individuals who have witnessed multiple, similar emotional events may differ from reports from witnesses of only a single event. To test this, we had participants (N = 65) view a video of a road traffic accident. Half of the participants saw two additional (similar) aversive films. Afterwards, participants filled out the Self-Administered Interview on the target film twice with an interval of 1 week. Participants who saw multiple similar films were less accurate in recalling details from the target film than participants in the control condition. On their second report, participants were less complete but more accurate compared with their first report. These results indicate that adults who have witnessed multiple repeated events may appear less reliable in their reports than adults who have witnessed a single event. These findings are relevant when evaluating eyewitness evidence and call for new approaches to questioning witnesses about repeated events.
In 5 experiments and a pilot study, a total of 1,232 undergraduates watched a series of slides depicting a single auto–pedestrian accident. The purpose of these experiments was to investigate how information supplied after an event influences a witness's memory for that event. Ss were exposed to either consistent, misleading, or irrelevant information after the accident event. Results show that misleading information produced less accurate responding on both a yes–no and a 2-alternative forced-choice recognition test. Further, misleading information had a larger impact if introduced just prior to a final test rather than immediately after the initial event. The effects of misleading information cannot be accounted for by a simple demand-characteristics explanation. Overall results suggest that information to which a witness is exposed after an event, whether that information is consistent or misleading, is integrated into the witness's memory of the event.
Two experiments (modeled after J. Deese's 1959 study) revealed remarkable levels of false recall and false recognition in a list learning paradigm. In Experiment 1, subjects studied lists of 12 words (e.g., bed, rest, awake ); each list was composed of associates of 1 nonpresented word (e.g., sleep). On immediate free recall tests, the nonpresented associates were recalled 40% of the time and were later recognized with high confidence. In Experiment 2, a false recall rate of 55% was obtained with an expanded set of lists, and on a later recognition test, subjects produced false alarms to these items at a rate comparable to the hit rate. The act of recall enhanced later remembering of both studied and nonstudied material. The results reveal a powerful illusion of memory: People remember events that never happened.
This study replicated and extended the results of some recent studies concerned with the effects of repeated testing in false-memory creation (e.g. Brainerd and Reyna, 1996), and with the persistence of false memories over time (Brainerd and Reyna, 1996; McDermott, 1996; Payne et al., 1996). One hundred and twenty children of ages 6, 9 and 12 listened to a series of sentences and took three recognition tests (Immediate, One-week, One-month). Participants made recognition decisions about four items: (1) targets, (2) distractors with the same meaning as targets but different words, (3) distractors with different meaning than targets, but the same words, and (4) distractors with different meaning than targets and different words. Analysis of variance of hits and false alarms showed effects of repeated testing on both. Stochastic dependency analyses showed greater long-term persistence for false alarms than for hits. The effects of testing repetition in creating false memories and the persistence of false memories increased with age. Results are discussed using Fuzzy-Trace Theory as a theoretical framework.
Proposes a prototypical schema theory of memory. Such a theory assumes the operation of 4 central encoding processes: selection (a process that chooses only some of all incoming stimuli for representation), abstraction (a process that stores the meaning of a message without reference to the original syntactic and lexical content), interpretation (a process by which relevant prior knowledge is generated to aid comprehension), and integration (a process by which a single, holistic memory representation is formed from the products of the previous 3 operations. The supportive and critical evidence for these processes is evaluated in light of the need for any theory of memory to account for 3 fundamental observations; accuracy, incompleteness, and distortion. The central retrieval process of schema theory, reconstruction, is also discussed in this context. Evidence indicates that the memory representation is far richer and more detailed than schema theory would suggest. (6 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).
The hypothesis that misleading suggestions can impair recollection was supported in a study inspired by L. L. Jacoby and C. M. Kelley's (unpublished manuscript) "logic of opposition" and D. S. Lindsay and M. K. Johnson's (see record
1989-38908-001) hypotheses about source memory. Tendency to report suggested details was set in opposition to ability to remember their source by telling Ss not to report anything from the narrative. Conditions were manipulated so that in the high- but not the low-discriminability condition it was easy to remember the suggestions and their source. At test, Ss were told (truthfully) that any information in the narrative relevant to the questions was wrong. Suggested details were more often reported on misled than control items in the low- but not the high-discriminability condition, yet suggestions impaired accurate recall of event details in both conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Psycholinguistic evidence has suggested that memory for verbal material is basically an interpretive processing of underlying linguistic structure. 10 male and 10 female 2nd and 5th graders were administered a verbal acquisition list of sentences, an interpolated block-sorting task, and a recognition test for those sentences to measure their ability to synthesize semantic information not contained within the structures of the individual sentences. Both groups actively constructed semantic description implied by input sentences and exhibited poor recognition for the syntactic form of the original sentences. There were no differences due to grade or sex. Results are discussed in relation to interpretive and constructive conceptualizations of memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The authors review and critically evaluate scientific evidence regarding recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse and discuss the implications of this evidence for professional psychology, public policy, and the law. The discussion focuses primarily on abuse memories recovered through "memory work" by people who previously believed that they were not sexually abused as children. The authors argue that memory work can yield both veridical memories and illusory memories or false beliefs, and they discuss factors that could be used to weigh the credibility of allegations based on recovered memories. The article offers tentative recommendations regarding public education, training and certification of psychotherapists, guidelines for trauma-oriented psychotherapy, research initiatives, legislative actions, and legal proceedings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Suggests that detecting memory impairment with the modified test relies on long retention intervals that provide the necessary forgetting of event information for impairing effects of postevent misinformation to occur. 288 Ss were tested in 4 experiments that presented event items centrally, introduced verbal postevent items to a misled condition, and used the modified test, but differed by using either short (15 min) or long (5–7 days) retention intervals. As evidenced by poorer misled than control test performances, memory impairment only occurred with long retention intervals. Retrieval- and storage-based versions of memory-impairment hypotheses are assessed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
It has been reported that initial recall tests inoculate true memories against forgetting without creating false memories. This is not true of recognition tests. In 2 experiments with 5- and 8-year-olds, initial recognition tests elevated children's false-memory responses (false alarms to unpresented distractors) on delayed tests. In Experiment 1, false-memory creation exceeded true-memory inoculation in 5-year-olds, producing net losses in accuracy over time. In Experiment 2, false-memory creation exceeded true-memory inoculation at both age levels. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Two experiments (modeled after J. Deese's 1959 study) revealed remarkable levels of false recall and false recognition in a list learning paradigm. In Exp 1, Ss studied lists of 12 words (e.g.,
bed,
rest,
awake); each list was composed of associates of 1 nonpresented word (e.g.,
sleep). On immediate free recall tests, the nonpresented associates were recalled 40% of the time and were later recognized with high confidence. In Exp 2, a false recall rate of 55% was obtained with an expanded set of lists, and on a later recognition test, Ss produced false alarms to these items at a rate comparable to the hit rate. The act of recall enhanced later remembering of both studied and nonstudied material. The results reveal a powerful illusion of memory: People remember events that never happened. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Current views of prose memory argue that memory inaccuracies in the retelling of a complex event occur in part as the result of a storage deficit induced by the abstractive and assimilative aspects of prose processing. This view appears to contradict a large portion of the memory literature that shows, over long intervals, remarkably accurate recall. A perspective, based on an elaboration of B. J. Underwood's attributes model of memory (see record
1970-01756-001), is advanced which proposes that for all types of information both detailed and thematic attributes are stored. Consequently, the type of recall one sees, whether reconstructive or reproductive in nature, depends in part upon events that occur at the time of the request for recall. Results of 2 experiments with 108 and 64 undergraduates, respectively, using prose passages as stimulus materials with retention tested by free recall support this perspective. Ss were treated identically until the test of recall, when 2 sets of procedures were introduced that led Ss to either reconstruct or reproduce the story. (44 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Examined the relation between Piagetian mental operations and constructive memory. Recognition for 4 types of sentences following story presentations was assessed in 40 conserving and nonconserving 1st graders. The recognition task consisted of true and false premise and inference sentences. As hypothesized, conservers performed slightly better than nonconservers on sentences other than true inference sentences. Although novel, a true inference sentence was consistent with the overall meaning of a story. The false recognition of this type of sentence is thought to indicate active construction of meaning by the child. The results indicate that concrete mental operations relate to the process of constructive memory. (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Why is memory for a target event impaired by learning related events? Do related events change the trace for the target or hinder retrieval? Target names (e.g., Robert Harris) were shown; experimental items were followed by related names (e.g., Robert Knight) but control items were not. The given names and surnames of the targets were then provided for matching. At short (5–25 min) retention intervals, the control items were matched more accurately than were the experimental items. This retroactive interference (RI) decreased over a 30-min retention interval (Exp 2), suggesting that the related names did not cause a permanent change in the target trace. More RI occurred at the 30-min retention interval when the related names appeared just before the test (Exp 3). It appears that the related names must be accessed to interfere with retrieving the target. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Fuzzy-trace theory is used to explore children's memory and comprehension of sentences describing spatial or linear relationships. Recognition tests were given immediately and after a 1 wk delay, and test sentence truth, wording (original and novel), and premise–inference status were varied. When children were instructed to recognize only verbatim sentences (Exp 1), premise recognition (memory) was independent of systematic misrecognition of true inferences (reasoning), and experimental manipulations (delay; spatial vs linear stimuli) drove memory and reasoning in opposite directions. Therefore, verbatim memories were not semantically integrated with gist, such as inferences. When children were specifically instructed to process gist (Exp 2), however, memory and reasoning were positively dependent. Results are discussed from the perspectives of constructivism, theories of suggestibility, and fuzzy-trace theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Loftus and her colleagues demonstrated distorted reports of memory for an event in the direction of postevent misleading information. McCloskey and Zaragoza argued that these results do not necessarily imply a weakening of the memory for the original event. They obtained evidence supporting their position by using a modified recognition test. In this experiment we introduced still another modification to the recognition test ("Yes"/"No" instead of forced choice) to answer McCloskey and Zaragoza's objections to Loftus and her colleagues' procedures. We obtained evidence for distorted reports of original information as a consequence of the misleading information. Memory and confidence data support an interference or inaccessibility interpretation of the memory errors but cannot rule out overwriting of the original information in some cases.
This article reviews empirical research on memories for negative personal experiences among adults. It examines basic concepts (including neural underpinnings), theoretical models of the affect-memory relationship, and data from three sources: victims or witnesses to crimes and atrocities, “flashbulb memories” for traumatic events, and laboratory simulations of shocking experiences. Evidence suggests that memories for traumatic experiences contain more central than peripheral detail, are reasonably accurate and well-retained for very long periods, but are not completely indelible. Assertions of eyewitness memory's vulnerability to change through suggestion have overstated the evidence. Forensic and clinical implications are discussed and a plea issued for more study of the memory phenomena that characterize posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and are the focus of trauma survivors’ treatment.
In this age of specialization, the relationship between memory and reasoning-based judgments is one of the few topics that spans sub-disciplines. In cognitive development, for example, much of the post-Piagetian revolution is predicated on explaining reasoning performance (i.e., the accuracy of judgments) in terms of memory constraints (e.g., Bjorklund, 1987, 1989; Brainerd, 1983a, 1983b; Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Case, 1985; Dempster, 1981, 1985; Trabasso, 1977). At some disciplinary remove from cognitive development, social psychologists have looked to memory-judgment relationships to explain variations in attitudes and attributions (e.g., Cacciopo & Petty, 1985; Hastie & Park, 1986; Higgins & Stangor, 1988; Pratkanis, Greenwald, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1988). Although there have been some notable exceptions in both fields (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Brainerd & Kingma, 1984, 1985), most theorists have assumed a hand-in-glove relationship between memory and reasoning (or reasoning’s product, judgment).
Because of the biasing nature of retrieval tests, evidence that the introduction of misleading postevent information will impair the memory for an original event has recently been in dispute. In two experiments, a retrieval test sensitive to both biasing effects of misinformation (misinformation acceptance) and influences of the misinformation on memory (misinformation interference) was used. Both experiments demonstrated misinformation acceptance, and one of the experiments suggested that misinformation interferes with the ability to remember the original event. Two misinformation interference hypotheses are evaluated; they suggest that the misinformation may have either impaired memory or led to confusion regarding what had occurred during the event.
Eyewitness’s ability to accurately perceive, remember, and report witnessed events has received a great deal of attention from experimental psychologists over the last decade (Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983; Christiaansen, Sweeney, & Ochalek, 1983; Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Loftus 1975, 1977, 1978, 1979a, 1979b; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Weinberg, Wadsworth, & Baron, 1983; Yarmey, 1979). While we have learned much about eyewitness testimony in adults as a consequence, there has been relatively little parallel work on the reliability of eyewitness testimony in children. Nevertheless there is a critical need for up-to-date research on the reliability of children’s testimony. Attempts to prosecute cases of physical or sexual abuse, in which the child involved may be the only witness, have brought to the fore issues pertaining to the accuracy and reliability of their testimony (Melton, 1981). Laws for dealing with child witnesses are currently in transition, and the courts are turning to social scientists for information and advice (see Goodman, 1984, for an extensive review of past and present laws concerning child witnesses).
Throughout the relatively brief period since the invention of the modern Romantic concept of childhood in the nineteenth century (Aries, 1962, cited in Kessen, 1979), and throughout the even briefer history of the science of psychology, the idea of young children serving as eyewitnesses in courts of law has run counter to our notions of children’s capabilities (Goodman, 1984). Now, in the mid-1980s, children’s competency as eyewitnesses has become an important issue, as children more and more frequently are the victims of reported crimes and as psychologists become increasingly concerned with conducting research and constructing theory within “ecologically valid” contexts and constraints (e.g., Bahrick & Karis, 1982; Bronfenbrenner, 1977; Neisser, 1976, 1982, 1985).
Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that children's false-memory responses will be well preserved over time, and that under specific conditions, they will be less likely to be forgotten than true-memory responses The reason is that initial true-memory responses are supported by unstable verbatim traces, whereas initial false-memory responses are supported by stable gist Data consistent with these predictions were obtained in three experiments with 5- and 8-year-olds
In this paper we review the factors alleged to be responsible for the creation of inaccurate reports among preschool-aged children, focusing on so-called "source misattribution errors." We present the first round of results from an ongoing program of research that suggests that source misattributions could be a powerful mechanism underlying children′s false beliefs about having experienced fictitious events. Preliminary findings from this program of research indicate that all children of all ages are equally susceptible to making source misattributions. Data from a follow-up wave of data indicate that very young children may be disproportionately vulnerable to these kinds of errors when the procedure is changed slightly to create mental images more easily. This vulnerability leads younger preschoolers, on occasion, to claim that they actually experienced events that they only thought about. These preliminary findings are discussed in the context of the ongoing debate over the veracity and durability of delayed reports of early memories, repressed memories, dissociative states, and the validity risks posed by therapeutic techniques that entail repeated visually guided imagery inductions.
The concepts of organization and distinctiveness are considered important to memory. Yet, examination of research related to these concepts reveals conceptual inconsistency and confusion. We suggest that the problem can be traced to the use of similarity and difference as explanations and further suggest that adoption of a theory of similarity judgment as the description of encoding ameliorates the problem. The approach is illustrated by showing that Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner′s (Psychological Review, in press) theory of similarity judgment allows simultaneous organizational and distinctive processing. Reinstatement of these processes at retrieval produces unique convergence on a particular item and completes the description of the simultaneous importance of relational and distinctive processing of a particular item. The idea is applied to research directly related to organization and distinctiveness, and to the less obviously related phenomena of hypermnesia, generation effectsm, proactive interference, prose recall, and self-referent encoding.
Roediger and McDermott (1995) recently re-introduced a paradigm to study the creation of false memories. Subjects hear short lists of related words (e.g., thread, pin, eye, sewing, etc.), all of which are associates of a critical nonpresented word (e.g., needle); on a free recall test given immediately after list presentation, subjects often erroneously recall the critical nonpresented word. The experiments reported here explore (a) the effect of test delay on false recall and (b) whether multiple study/test opportunities reduce the proportion of critical items erroneously recalled. In Experiment 1, introduction of a 2-day delay between study and test produced probabilities of false recall that exceeded those of veridical recall. In addition, prior testing of the list enhanced false recall, much like testing enhances later recall of studied items (the testing effect). In Experiment 2, an attempt was made to reduce or eliminate the false recall effect by using a multitrial study/test procedure. Although subjects were able to reduce the proportion of critical nonpresented words erroneously recalled, they were unable to eliminate the false recall effect, even after 5 study-test trials. An interaction occurred between accurate and false recall as a function of retention interval: after a one-day delay, false recall levels rose, whereas accurate recall decreased. Results of both experiments demonstrate the persistence of this memory illusion.
The phenomenon of “idea acquisition and retention” is demonstrated experimentally and contrasted with an “individual sentence memory” point of view. Results indicate that during an acquisition phase of the experiments, Ss spontaneously integrate the information expressed by a number of non-consecutively experienced (but semantically related) sentences into wholistic, semantic ideas, where these ideas encompass more information than any acquisition sentence contained. Ss' subsequent attempts to recognize those exact sentences heard during acquisition are shown to be a function of the complete ideas acquired. Thus, Ss' are most confident of “recognizing” sentences expressing all the semantic relations characteristic of a complete idea, in spite of the fact that such sentences expressed more information than was communicated by any single sentence on the acquisition list. Ss' become less confident of having heard particular sentences as a function of the degree to which a sentence fails to exhaust all the semantic relations characteristic of a complete idea.
Previous research has indicated that children abstract semantic information from related acquisition sentences, falsely recognizing sentences which have never actually been presented but which contain information that can be abstracted from the original sentences. In the present 2 experiments, constructive memory in sentence-recognition tasks was examined as a function of lexical factors, logical ability to make transitive inferences, memory load, and age (kindergarten, first-, and third-grade children). Results indicated that kindergarten and first-grade children's recognition responses were based primarily on the familiarity of lexical characteristics of the sentences, while third-grade children's responses were based on the accuracy of the semantic content of the sentences. Increasing the memory load did not increase the degree of constructive memory at any age. Notably, the degree of constructive memory was not related to children's performance on Piagetian transitivity tasks. Alternative reasons for age-related differences in memory are discussed.
Assumptions of constructivism, information-processing, and fuzzy-trace theory were tested in two experiments on memory and comprehension of metaphors with 6- and 9-year-old children. In the first experiment, verbatim memory for metaphors was compared with misrecognition of the gist of metaphorical meaning. In the second experiment, children judged metaphorical meaning, including alternative perceptual and psychological interpretations. We found that (a) children misrecognized the gist of metaphorical interpretations, especially after a delay, much like they do for literal gist (e.g., true inferences); (b) contrary to both constructivism and information-processing theory, misrecognizing metaphorical gist was independent of memory for the metaphor itself; (c) true psychological interpretations were misrecognized and judged acceptable more often than any other type at all ages; and (d) contrary to the idea that literal or perceptual interpretations are suppressed to achieve psychological interpretations, acc...
In two experiments subjects viewed slides depicting a crime and then received a narrative containing misleading information about some items in the slides. Recall instructions were manipulated on a first test to vary the probability that subjects would produce details from the narrative that conflicted with details from the slides. Two days later subjects returned and took a second cued recall test on which they were instructed to respond only if they were sure they had seen the item in the slide sequence. Our interest was in examining subjects’ production of the misleading postevent information on the second cued recall test (on which they were instructed to ignore the postevent information) as a function of instructions given before the first test. In both experiments, robust misinformation effects occurred, with misrecall being greatest under conditions in which subjects had produced the wrong detail from the narrative on the first test. In this condition subjects were more likely to recall the wrong detail on the second test and were also more likely to say that they remembered its occurrence, when instructed to use Tulving's (1985)remember/knowprocedure, than in comparison conditions. We conclude that a substantial misinformation effect occurs in recall and that repeated testing increases the effect. False memories may arise through repeated retrieval.
Cognitive theorists generally assume that reasoning depends on memory; accurate reasoning requires access to critical informational inputs. Although memory dependency seems self-evidently true, it has been disconfirmed in recent studies of children's logical, mathematical, and pragmatic inferences. These studies have led to a new account of cognitive development, fuzzy-trace theory, that stresses the unfolding of gist-driven intuitive reasoning processes, and that reformulates traditional conceptions of the relationship between verbatim and gist memories. Fuzzy-trace theory also identifies circumstances in which reasoning accuracy depends on memory accuracy.
The purpose of the present study was to extend research on repetition and illusory truth to the domain of eyewitness suggestibility Specifically, we assessed whether repeated exposure to suggestion, relative to a single exposure, facilitates the creation of false memory for suggested events After viewing a video of a burglary, subjects were asked questions containing misleading suggestions, some of which were repeated Their memory for the source of the suggestions was tested The results show that following repeated (relative to a single) exposure to suggestion, subjects were more likely to (a) claim with high confidence that they remembered the suggested events from the video (Experiment 1) and (b) claim that they consciously recollected witnessing the suggested events (Experiment 2) The effects of repeated exposure were highly reliable and were observed over retention intervals as long as 1 week
We investigated whether guided imagery instructions would increase the likelihood of false
memory creation and of remembering previously unremembered true events. In three interviews,
participants repeatedly were asked to remember several true events (based on parent reports)
and one false event (created by the experimenters). In a guided imagery condition, if participants
could not recall an event (either a true of a false event) they were asked to form a mental image
of the event and describe the image to the interviewer. In a control condition, if participants
could not recall an event they were asked to quietly think about the event for 1 min. Participants
in the imagery condition were more likely to create a false event and recover memories of
previously unavailable true events (although it was unclear whether the recovered memories
were truly recalled or created in response to the interview demands). We argue that the creation
of false childhood memories involves both memory reconstruction and errors in source monitoring.
Surveys theories of human learning and memory, covering both the classical approaches and the newer information-processing approaches. Methodological principles, techniques and empirical laws of the field, and the solution of theoretical problems are integrated and discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Examined false recall and recognition of nonstudied words that are preceded by a list of strong associates, using the J. Deese (1959) paradigm, in which people frequently claim that nonstudied words appeared on a presented list. Results show that 12 amnesic patients (aged 31–73 yrs) were less susceptible to false recognition than were 12 matched controls and showed different patterns of false recall. To account for the observed differences between amnesiacs and controls, the authors suggest that false recognition of nonstudied words preceded by numerous associates depends on the same kinds of semantic and associative information about study list words that also supports accurate recognition. Amnesic patients do not retain such information, resulting in poor recollection of study list words and decreased susceptibility to false recognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Understanding the source of an inference is critical for regulating inferences and understanding mental process. Four experiments determine if and why young children make source errors in attributing causal inferences to stories rather than to themselves. First, second, and fourth graders listened to short stories containing an inconsistent goal and outcome that invited a causal inference. An inference was probed after each story and then attributed by the subject to self or the story. In Experiments 1 and 2, clues about the inference and the inference probe at test were manipulated to test the representation hypothesis that source errors vary with the likelihood that a story representation in memory contains causal information that matches retrieval cue information. The results were consistent with the hypothesis for all grades. In Experiments 3 and 4, instructions and test delay were manipulated to show that differential access to verbatim information in a story representation contributes to developmental differences in source errors. The results have implications concerning children's inference monitoring and developing theory of mind and about the developmental relation between memory for verbatim information and inference.
We examine seven issues that are raised by the commentators: the relationship between memory and reasoning; constructivism; the nature of gist memories; rationality, consciousness, and transfer across tasks; basic and strategic processes in memory development; global versus local theories of development; and implications of fuzzy-trace theory for the study of individual differences.
Three experiments that document a powerful false memory effect in recall and recognition are reported. Subjects studied lists of items related to critical nonpresented themes (e.g., sleep, needle) and then completed recognition and/or recall tests, as well as various metamemory tasks (e.g., remember/know, source monitoring). Results showed that the critical nonpresented items were recalled and recognized nearly as often as studied items. False recognition of critical nonpresented items did not decrease over a 24-h retention interval, whereas the recognition rate for studied items did decrease significantly. The false memory effect also increased across successive recall tests. Subjects’ responses on the metamemory tasks indicated that they experienced the critical nonpresented items as being very similar to the presented items that were recalled and/or recognized. Subjects were even willing to indicate which of two persons speaking the study items had spoken the critical nonpresented items that were recalled. Results are discussed in terms of fuzzy trace theory and it is argued that these false memory effects represent memory illusions that may yield important insights into normal human memory processes.
We review recent applications of fuzzy-trace theory to memory development, organizing the presentation around two themes: the theory’s explanatory principles and experimental findings about memory development that follow as predictions from those principles. The featured explanatory principles are: parallel storage of verbatim and gist traces, dissociated retrieval of verbatim and gist traces, differential survival rates for verbatim and gist traces, retrieval phenomenology, and developmental trends in verbatim and gist memory. The experimental findings come from four different areas of research: the development of retrieval phenomenologies, “reversed” developmental trends in false memory, the development of mere testing effects, and the development of false persistence in memory.
We review the current status of fuzzy-trace theory. The presentation is organized around five topics. First, theoretical ideas that immediately preceded the development of fuzzy-trace theory are sketched. Second, experimental findings that challenged those ideas (e.g., memory-reasoning independence, the intuitive nature of mature reasoning) are summarized. Third, the core assumptions that comprised the initial version of fuzzy-trace theory are described. Fourth, some modifications to those assumptions are explored that were necessitated by subsequent experimental findings. Fifth, four areas of experimentation are considered in which research under the aegis of fuzzy-trace theory is in progress: (a) suggestibility and false memories; (b) judgment and decision making; (c) the development of forgetting; and (d) the development of retrieval.
We summarize the historical background of fuzzy-trace theory along with its major assumptions about cognitive development. The theory is a product of two forces: the current dissatisfaction with Piagetian and information processing metaphors for cognition and the basic processes movement in memory development research. Intuition is the theory's core metaphor for cognition. Its key explanatory constructs are (a) gist extraction, (b) fuzzy-to-verbatim continua of memory representations, (c) the fuzzy-processing preference, (d) hierarchies of gist, (e) simple readout versus reconstructive retrieval, (f) readout and reconstruction in both short- and long-term memory, (g) memory limitations as a function of the time courses of verbatim and gist representations, and (h) output interference. We define these constructs and discuss their implications for developmental and individual differences in cognition with special reference to mathematical and scientific reasoning.
On a recognition test, if presentation of a memory target (e.g., CAT) is used to prime-related distractors (e.g., ANIMAL, DOG), common sense and global memory theories expect that false-recognition rates will increase relative to unrelated distractors. However, counterintuitively, fuzzy-trace theory predicts that false-recognition rates will decrease and that, in some instances, related distractors will be easier to reject than unrelated distractors. In five experiments, this reversal of the usual false-recognition effect was observed for associates, category exemplars, category names, and rhymes. False-recognition reversals increased with age, with amount of target repetition, with degree of target priming, and decreased with length of retention interval.
This experiment tests the memory trace strength theory of suggestibility, that stronger memories are more resistant to suggestibility than weaker memories, with strength of memory manipulated by means of frequency of presentation of target items. Four- and 10-year-old children viewed a slide sequence in which four target slides were presented one or two times each. In a postevent narrative, participants were misled about two target items, and two target items served as controls. In a subsequent recognition memory test, the hypothesis was confirmed. The d′ difference between control and misled items was greater for frequency one than for frequency two; stronger memories (items viewed twice) were more resistant to suggestibility than weaker memories (items viewed once). This pattern was consistent for both 4- and 10-year-old children, indicating that similar cognitive processes underlie suggestibility at each age. These results suggest that if children′s memory is tested for an event that occurred to them frequently, they would be expected to have more accurate memory for this event and be less vulnerable to suggestive influences such as biased interviewing procedures than they would for an event that occurred only a single time.
Under certain conditions, subjects in a forced-choice recognition task can discriminate between targets and distractors more accurately when the targets and distractors are similar than when they are dissimilar. This reversal of the conventional result is demonstrated in two picture-recognition experiments. The results of the experiments suggest that two kinds of similarity relations—perceptual and ecphoric similarity—must be specified in descriptions of the phenomena of forced-choice recognition memory.
This chapter reviews research on misinformation effects. Misinformation effects in memory have been widely researched because of their theoretical and practical importance. This review is divided into three major sections. The first section summarizes empirical findings; the second section details the major information processing explanations for these findings; the last section discusses newer theoretical perspectives. Misinformation procedure parallels classical interference paradigms, and similar theoretical controversies have arisen in both domains. Specifically, theorists have disagreed about whether misinformation effects are chiefly due to storage failure, to retrieval failure, or, indeed, to memory at all. New distinctions have been introduced, including memory for the source of information, as opposed to its content, and memory for verbatim information, as opposed to gist. Misinformation research encompasses multiple memory phenomena.