How to Make Sense of Weak Signals

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How to Make Sense of
Weak Signals
SPRING 2009 VOL. 50 NO. 3
REPRINT NUMBER 50317
Paul J.H. Schoemaker and George S. Day
Please note that gray areas reflect artwork that has been
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ticle appears as originally published.

WWW.SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU SPRING 2009 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 81
There’s no sense in denying it: interpreting weak signals into use-
ful decision making takes time and focus. These three stages can
help you see the periphery — and act on it — much more clearly.
BY PAUL J.H. SCHOEMAKER AND GEORGE S. DAY
How to Make Sense
of Weak Signals
GATHERING INTELLIGENCE
THE LEADING
QUESTION
How can man-
agers develop
their peripheral
vision to see
what’s ahead
more sharply?
FINDINGS
Managers who can
identify and mini-
mize both their
personal and organi-
zational biases are
less likely to get
blindsided.
Catching and
capturing distant
threats and oppor-
tunities means
applying different
search methods —
and looking for
overlapping
results.
Teasing out the
implications of
any finding requires
fitting it into differ-
ent frameworks.
“When people stumble onto the truth they usually pick themselves up and hurry about
their business.” — attributed to Winston Churchill
IT’S THE QUESTION everyone wants answered: Why did so many smart people miss the signs of the
collapse of the subprime market? As early as 2001, there were many danger signals about the impending
housing bubble and the rampant use of derivatives. Yet these signals were largely ignored by such financial
players as Northern Rock, Countrywide, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch until they all
had to face the music harshly and abruptly. Some players were more prescient, however, and sensed as well
as acted on the early warning signals. In 2003, investment guru Warren Buffett foresaw that complex de-
rivatives would multiply and mutate until “some event makes their toxicity clear.” In 2002, he derided
derivatives as financial weapons of
mass destruction. Likewise, Edward
Gramlich, a governor of the Federal
Reserve, warned in 2001 about a
new breed of lenders luring buyers
with poor credit records into mort-
gages they could not afford.1
Some business leaders also no-
ticed. Hedge-fund honcho John
Paulson spotted “overvalued” credit
markets in 2006 and made $15 bil-
lion in 2007 by shorting subprime.
In July 2006, the chief U.S. econo-
mist at The Goldman Sachs Group
Inc. warned that “nominal U.S.
home prices may be headed for an
outright decline in 2007. It would be
the first decline in national home
prices ever recorded, at least in
nominal terms.” And in early 2007,
his colleague further warned that
“there are signals of a decrease in
mortgage lending criteria and initial

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GATHERING INTELLIGENCE
signals of financial troubles from subprime lenders.”2
Likewise, the board of the Dutch bank ABN AMRO
Holding N.V. recognized the looming problems fac-
ing the banking sector, and sold itself. Shareholders
did very well, collecting about $100 billion before it
all fell apart, with Fortis SA/NV and others in the syn-
dicate in ruin.3
So, what separates the prescient few from the
hapless horde? Did the siren call of outsize profits
and bonuses, coupled with the delusional promises
of manageable risk, dull the senses? Was the ability
to see sooner and more clearly compromised by in-
formation overload, organizational filters and
cognitive biases that afflict sense making in all orga-
nizations? Economist Robert Shiller of Yale
University, a leading housing expert, recently in-
voked “groupthink” to explain why the Federal
Reserve didn’t take the early warning signs of a
looming housing bubble more seriously.4
All managers are susceptible to the distortions
and biases we saw in the credit crunch of 2008. Or-
ganizations get blindsided not so much because
decision makers aren’t seeing signals, but because
they jump to the most convenient or plausible con-
clusion. Our own research suggest that fewer than
20% of global companies have sufficient capacity to
spot, interpret and act on the weak signals of forth-
coming threats and opportunities.
The purpose of this article is to provide leaders
and management teams with proven ways of reduc-
ing the chance that they will be ambushed from left
or right field by an upstart rival, say, or a destabiliz-
ing technology. Our approach addresses the cognitive
biases organizations may not be aware of, yet need
to overcome.
The Shocking Truth About
Surprise Attacks
There are various individual biases that may cause
managers to be taken unaware. In addition, there
are organizational biases — such as groupthink or
polarization — that may keep much of the periphery-
dwelling enemy in the shadows, even in
organizations with an active scanning process. The
decision-making literature identifies many of the
human weaknesses that impair our sense-making
skills.5 Even for scholars, however, it is difficult at
times to untangle the knot of factors that clogged a
decision-making process. For example, academics
have attributed NASA’s ill-fated decision to launch
the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 — despite mul-
tiple warnings from its own engineers about risky
O-ring seals — to multiple causes. Among them: in-
complete data analysis by key engineers (a cognitive
failure); stress-induced groupthink — a bias that
values consensus above independent thinking —
caused by deadlines and isolation (a group-dynamic
explanation); and organizational values that gradu-
ally normalized danger beyond the point of
prudence (a cultural or institutional explanation).6
Once managers lock in on a certain picture, they
will often reshape reality to fit into that familiar
frame.7 (See “Missed Signals in Pearl Harbor.”) Hu-
mans tend to judge too quickly when presented with
ambiguous data; we have to work extra hard to con-
sider less familiar scenarios.
Whenever multiple pieces of evidence point in
opposite directions, or when crucial information is
missing, our minds naturally shape the facts to fit
our preconceptions.
Personal Biases: An Objective View
Although complete objectivity is elusive, managers
need to be aware of well-established traps that un-
derlie human inference and judgment. The major
ones are described below in terms of how informa-
tion is filtered, interpreted and often bolstered by
seeking additional information aimed at confirm-
ing prior leanings.8 The net effect of these biases is
that we frame a complex or ambiguous issue in a
certain way — without fully appreciating other
possible perspectives — and then become overcon-
fident about that particular view.
Filtering. What we actually pay attention to is very
much determined by what we expect to see. Psy-
chologists call this selective perception. If something
doesn’t fit our mental model, we often distort real-
ity to make it fit rather than challenge our
fundamental assumptions. A related phenomenon
is suppression or the refusal to acknowledge an un-
pleasant reality because it is too discordant.
Distorted Inference. Whatever information
passes through our cognitive and emotional filters
may be subject to further distortion. One well-
MISSED SIGNALS
IN PEARL HARBOR
On the morning of Decem-
ber 7, 1941, the captain of
the destroyer USS Ward
heard muffled explosions
coming from Pearl Harbor on
the mainland. This captain
had dropped depth charges
on an enemy submarine
moving into the harbor and
had apparently sunk it. Yet
when the captain heard the
explosions while sailing back
to port, he turned to his lieu-
tenant commander and said,
“I guess they are blasting
the new road from Pearl
Harbor to Honolulu.” Despite
his unusual encounter with
a foreign submarine that
morning, he made sense of
the exploding sound using
his peacetime mind-set and
failed to notice the signs of
the first hostilities between
the United States and Japan.

SPRING 2009 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 83WWW.SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU
known bias is rationalization: interpreting evidence
in a way that sustains a desired belief. We fall victim
to this when trying to shift blame for a mistake we
made to someone else or to external circumstances.
Wishful thinking leads us to see the world only in a
pleasing way, denying subtle evidence that a child is
abusing drugs or a spouse is being unfaithful. An-
other common interpretation bias is egocentrism,
according to which we overemphasize our own role
in the events we seek to explain. This self-serving
tendency is related to the fundamental attribution
bias, which causes us to ascribe more importance to
our own actions than to those of others or the envi-
ronment. We often view our organization as a more
central actor than it really is.
Bolstering. Not only do we heavily filter the lim-
ited information that we pay attention to, but also
we may seek to bolster our case by searching for ad-
ditional evidence that confirms our view. We might
disproportionately talk to people who already agree
with us. Or we may actively look for new evidence
that confirms our perspective, rather than pursuing
a more balanced search strategy. Over time, our
opinions may become frozen and our attitudes
hardened as we immunize ourselves from contra-
dictory evidence. Indeed, we may even engage in
selective memory and forget those inconvenient
facts that don’t fit the overall picture. The hindsight
bias similarly distorts our memories such that our
original doubts are erased. A vicious circle is cre-
ated in which we exacerbate the earlier biases and
get trapped in a self-sealing echo chamber.
Organizational Bias:
Getting Along, Getting It Wrong
In addition to our personal biases, we function in
organizations as well and may end up suffering
from what social psychologist Irving Janis termed
groupthink.9 In principle, groups should be better
than individuals at detecting changes and respond-
ing to them. But often a group can fall victim to
narrow-minded analysis, tunnel vision, a false sense
of consensus and poor information gathering, re-
sulting in groupthink. The true relevance of various
snippets of information often can be fully appreci-
ated only when they are debated with others and
merged into a larger mosaic.
The organizational problems caused by dis-
persed memory and varying perceptions can only
be overcome when information flows freely across
departmental boundaries.10 During the five
months preceding the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, for example, the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration received a total of 105 intelligence
reports, in which Osama bin Laden or Al Qaeda
were mentioned 52 times.11 These reports, from
the CIA, FBI and U.S. State Department, were
streaming into various parts of the government
bureaucracy, which did not have the necessary
means to make sense of it all. Some signals were
dismissed at the local level and simply not trans-
mitted; some were shared as fragments that
remained unconnected to other pieces of the puz-
zle. The end result was that the full magnitude of
the terrorist threat facing the United States was not
seen in time, even when the signals were there.
Organizational sense making occurs in a com-
plex social environment in which people are not
just sensitive to what is being said, but also to who
is speaking. We judge both the signal and the
source when we assess the meaning of informa-
tion. Source credibility is influenced by many
factors, including status, past experience, politics
and the like. Since most managers receive infor-
mation from multiple sources, they need to be
aware of such biases. These social biases will be es-
pecially strong when the information is weak or
incomplete.
The individual and organizational biases dis-
cussed above underscore why it is important to
bring together different perspectives on the same
issue. But how these different perspectives are culti-
vated and connected will greatly affect the ability of
the organization to make sense of the weak infor-
mation it receives.12
Start Making Sense
Sense making or interpretation is usually the weak-
est link in the process of capturing weak signals and
eventually making a sound decision. How can man-
agement learn to overcome biases to improve their
sense making? There are nine proven approaches
that managers can use actively to reveal, amplify
and clarify potentially important weak signals. (See
“Finding a Purpose of Sense,” p. 84.)

84 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW SPRING 2009 WWW.SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU
Actively Reveal Weak Signals
1. Tap local intelligence. Insects use a compound
lens system, where most of what they see and notice
occurs in the eye itself as opposed to in the brain.
They rely on “localized intelligence” at the level of
each eyelet and respond accordingly. Likewise, orga-
nizations may wish to drive more of their sense
making to local levels. Terrorist networks have dem-
onstrated the deadly power and resiliency of such an
approach, using nearly autonomous cells that see and
think locally. Or, in a more positive vein, Linux and
the open-source movement have used local design to
build an ongoing global software project.13 From
fighter plane cockpits to nuclear power plant control
rooms, the key to safety and reliability is to spot prob-
lems early and share them among well-trained
personnel. This requires procedures for real-time
cognition and constrained improvisation to bring
about flexibility and promptness in highly complex,
volatile environments. Accessing distributed intelli-
gence takes a culture of alertness and information
sharing across multiple social networks.14
2. Leverage extended networks. A valuable but
frequently overlooked way actively to reveal weak
signals is for executives to query their extended
networks to partners, suppliers, customers and
others in the company’s ecosystem. The common
element of all these networks is that they extend
the eyes and ears of the company. Different net-
works tap different zones of the periphery in
diverse ways. For example, the research and devel-
opment departments of Royal Philips Electronics
N.V. and General Electric Co. were greatly helped
in their early days by being deeply embedded in ex-
ternal government, academia and customer
networks, as well as connected to other parts of the
organization internally.15 Similar results were
found in a historical study of Merck & Co. Inc.,
showing how its innovations in biological com-
pounds were related to a “series of complex,
evolving networks of scientific, governmental and
medical institutions.”16 One consequence of
greater organizational participation in extended
networks — where many nodes in the network are
connected to other networks — is a rapid increase
in the number of weak signals received. This prob-
lem is intensified within Internet-enabled
networks, which virtually eliminate signal trans-
mission time and cost. Thus, managers must be
selective about which signals to pay attention to
and stay within the boundaries of the company’s
absorption capacity.
3. Mobilize search parties. Senior leaders can
identify weak signal areas that merit separate task
forces to canvass further. For example, IBM Corp.
has an ongoing capability called “Crow’s Nest” to
scan specific zones of the periphery and share in-
sights with top management. The zones include
time compression, customer diversity, globaliza-
tion and networks. The responsibility of the
group is to rise above functional and product
blinders, like a “crow’s nest” on a ship, where
lookouts watch for new land, pirates and danger-
ous reefs ahead.
Scanning activities are most valuable when used
in combination. For example, the CIA has brought
together a crow’s nest-type group and a venture
fund to find and assess emerging technologies that
could be used to fight terrorism. The agency tasked
a sensing group with identifying and assessing these
technologies. The primary activity of the sensing
group is to be the link between the agency and In-
Q-Tel Inc., an internal but separate venture fund
that invests in startups with technologies that could
address an agency priority. Because In-Q-Tel has
access to the deal streams of tier 1 venture capital
companies, it allows the CIA to get involved early,
when the technology can be shaped to address an
agency problem.
FINDING A PURPOSE OF SENSE
There’s no sense in denying it: interpreting weak signals into useful decision-
making takes time and focus. These three stages can help you see what’s on
the periphery — and act with much more confidence.
Sense-making
Probe further
and clarify
• Confront reality
• Encourage
constructive conflict
• Trust seasoned
intuition
Scanning for
Weak Signals Probing and Acting
Actively surface
weak signals
• Tap local
intelligence
• Leverage extended
networks
• Mobilize search
parties
Amplify interesting
weak signals
• Test multiple
hypotheses
• Canvass the wisdom
of the crowd
• Develop diverse
scenarios
GATHERING INTELLIGENCE

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Amplifying Interesting Signals
4. Test multiple hypotheses. Organizational sense
making is usually driven toward a single interpreta-
tion, so new data are force-fit into the existing mental
model.17 Managers often have limited tolerance for
ambiguity and may be reluctant to devote additional
time to develop alternative hypotheses. However, or-
ganizations need competing hypotheses to escape
the trap of getting stuck on a simple, single view that
is wrong. The British Armed Forces and other orga-
nizations deploy so-called red teams to accomplish
this. The red team is a parallel task force, made up of
senior leaders and support staff, whose only mission
is to collect and synthesize information to prove that
the current plan is wrong and needs to be changed.18
This team plays the role of the loyal opposition, in
the spirit of Alexander the Great, who would peri-
odically ask himself how much evidence it would
take for him to abandon the current plan.
As was recognized so painfully after the initial,
short-lived U.S. military victory in Iraq, such con-
trarian information is usually dispersed, unreliable
and ambiguous at first. Unless a concerted effort is
made by credible and trusted parties to show that
the combined evidence from many sources calls for
a change of course, leaders may pursue a flawed
strategy for too long. The red team approach re-
quires a judicious balance between the doubt
necessary to challenge false assumptions and the
conviction or courage needed to pursue a bold
course of action in the face of challenge and oppo-
sition. This balance can occur only if the underlying
theme is that strategic surprise is inevitable and
midcourse corrections are often necessary when
facing the unknown. In the pithy phrase of Prus-
sian General Helmuth von Moltke, “No plan
survives contact with the enemy.”
5. Canvass the wisdom of the crowd. To handle
the dangers of groupthink or the problem of dis-
tributed intelligence (where key information is
dispersed around the organization), managers may
wish to pay more attention to the grapevine. James
Surowiecki, author of The Wisdom of Crowds, sum-
marizes research showing that groups or markets
often make far better judgments than individuals.
This is particularly true if companies can create
forecasting methods (such as Delphi polling) to
pool the collective wisdom of an organization
without fostering undue conformity. Information
flows quickly through the grapevine when Big
Brother is not watching. One way to avoid collec-
tive myopia is to create anonymous opinion
markets. For example, in the 1990s, Hewlett-
Packard Co. asked employees to participate in a
newly created opinion market to forecast its sales.
Employees would bet in this market at lunch or in
the evenings, revealing through their investments
where they thought the sales trend was headed.
This market’s forecast beat traditional company
forecasts 75% of the time. More recently, a division
of Eli Lilly and Co. asked employees to assess
whether drug candidates would be approved by
the FDA based on profiles and experimental data,
and the internal company market correctly identi-
fied the winners from a set of six candidates.19
6. Develop diverse scenarios. Unfortunately, no
method is perfect, and uncertainty can never be fully
tamed or conquered. The consensus can be badly
mistaken, as Charles Mackay vividly chronicled in his
classic 1841 book, Extraordinary Popular Delusions
and the Madness of Crowds. To challenge the domi-
nant view in your organization, it may be wise to
create multiple scenarios about the issues under de-
bate. For example, when a Houston credit union was
going gangbusters thanks to Enron Corp.’s meteoric
rise, one of our colleagues asked senior managers to
imagine a scenario where they could no longer rely
on Enron for growth and deposits. At first, there was
reluctance to develop such an unrealistic and nega-
tive view, especially because Enron was the company’s
single corporate sponsor. But then some interesting
scenarios emerged, ranging from an Enron takeover
to more dire scenarios involving trouble for either
Enron or the credit union. Later, when Enron sud-
denly collapsed, the credit union was saved — against
the odds, according to regulators — because manag-
ers had taken pragmatic actions to be less dependent
on Enron.20 They had launched their own e-mail sys-
tem to communicate with members rather than using
Enron’s system. And they had opened branches out-
side the Enron building and started to admit
non-Enron employees into the credit union.
By considering multiple scenarios at the same
time, the organization can keep from being locked

86 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW SPRING 2009 WWW.SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU
into one view of what future might emerge and yet
share a common set of frameworks for discussing
new signals.21 Royal Dutch Shell PLC, which pio-
neered scenario planning in the corporate sector,
viewed it as “the gentle art of re-perceiving.”22 The
aim of scenario planning at Shell was not so much to
plan as to challenge people’s mental models. Sce-
nario planning systematizes the hunt for weak signals
that may foreshadow fundamental shifts in the mar-
ketplace and society at large — scenarios seek to
magnify “postcards from the edge” so that they are
readable by more eyes.
Probing and Clarifying
7. Seek new information to “confront reality.”
As Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan emphasize in
their book Confronting Reality, the greatest business
failures are usually not due to poor management but
rather reflect failure to “confront reality.”23 Bossidy
and Charan write about how data-storage company
EMC Corp. missed key changes in its environment
that caused a rapid decline in sales in 2001. EMC’s
sales force, speaking mostly with CIOs, was confi-
dent that orders were only being delayed. They
interpreted the downturn as a temporary blip. But
when Joe Tucci was named CEO in early 2001, he
began speaking to CEOs and CFOs at customer
companies and found that they were not interested
in paying a premium for top performance. Also, they
wanted software that wasn’t proprietary, since IBM
and Hitachi Ltd. were selling machines comparable
to EMC’s at a lower price. As EMC’s market share
slipped, Tucci rapidly transformed EMC’s business
model to focus more on software and services than
on hardware, which was becoming commoditized.
Once Tucci recognized the new reality, he under-
stood how the company needed to transform.
8. Encourage constructive conflict. A statue in
Helsinki, honoring former Finland president J.K.
Paasikivi (1870-1956), is engraved with his motto
that “All wisdom starts by recognizing the facts.”
This is especially difficult when not all the facts are
known and subject to interpretation. Wisdom re-
quires constructive conflict to ascertain and
interpret the facts as they are. But the conflict must
be among ideas, not people, and remain within rea-
son. Several academic studies show that moderate
conflict, as opposed to little or extreme conflict,
leads to the best decisions.24 This results in better
intelligence gathering, a wider exploration of op-
tions and a deeper examination of the issues.
Unfortunately, the opposite often happens, as one
insider at Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. observed about
the leadership team under CEO Stanley O’Neal:
“There was no dissent. So, information never really
traveled.”25 Leaders can play a key role in managing
conflict well; they must allow peripheral observa-
tions by team members to enter the discussion.
9. Trust seasoned intuition. Experienced manag-
ers often possess far more knowledge than they
realize, especially when operating within their do-
mains of expertise. If so, they should learn when and
how to trust their hunches. Scientist Gary Klein has
studied the power of intuition in fast-moving envi-
ronments such as firefighting, medical emergencies
and military combat.26 In one study he found that ex-
perienced nurses picked up the onset of septic shock
in premature infants at least a day before the textbook
symptoms appeared and a blood test could confirm
the presence of the deadly bacterium. These nurses
had learned to be sensitive to weak signals even if the
cues varied and the symptoms were not strong. It
takes many years of experience, with good feedback,
to develop reliable intuition. But once it has been
honed, intuitive hunches should be viewed as valu-
able inputs, along with more analytical ones, for the
judgment process.
Broadening Your Perspective
Just as having two eyes allows humans to use trian-
gulation and parallax for depth perception,
organizations should use multiple perspectives to
provide greater peripheral vision. Unlike humans,
organizations can draw upon more than two eyes
to make sense of what they’re seeing. Each single
view may have its biases, but several views together
allow organizations to see what’s really going on
and identify new opportunities.
When General Motors Corp. developed OnStar,
it drew on expertise in both technology and market-
ing to identify an emerging market opportunity. The
carmaker launched the OnStar service in its 1997
Cadillac line, using “telematics,” the integration of
wireless communications, vehicle monitoring sys-
WHAT IS A
WEAK SIGNAL?
A seemingly random or
disconnected piece of
information that at first
appears to be background
noise but can be recognized
as part of a significant pat-
tern by viewing it through a
different frame or connect-
ing it with other pieces
of information.
GATHERING INTELLIGENCE

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tems and location devices. This new venture was far
out on the periphery of the automobile market. On-
Star had nothing to do with automobile design and
production. Telematics had little to do with price, re-
liability or comfort — the industry’s traditional
bases of competition. Finally, the market was minus-
cule. In the early days, OnStar set a goal of bringing
in 50 new customers a day in an organization that’s
used to counting its buyers by the millions.
How did General Motors manage to get this pe-
ripheral opportunity rolling? GM’s acquisition of
Hughes Electronics Corp. (and later EDS Corp.)
gave it an early window on telematics technology,
and the company had reason to believe that there
was a market for it. In 1995, GM had commissioned
a study to look at the key factors influencing con-
sumers’ decisions to purchase an automobile. The
study revealed 26 factors, which were ranked ac-
cording to their importance to customers’ current
satisfaction.27 GM found that while customers were
very satisfied with how its products met their need
for “mobility,” four factors revealed important
unmet consumer needs: (1) personal attention, (2)
limited time and energy, (3) privacy and (4) per-
sonal safety.28 With insights into the desire of
customers for personal attention and safety, as well
as an understanding of the emerging technology,
GM managers were able to spot an opportunity at
the intersection. By 2004, OnStar controlled 70% of
the market with 2.5 million subscribers, generating
an estimated $1 billion in revenue.
Seeing the Biggest Picture Possible
No single technique will suffice in revealing the
whole picture, since all methods are flawed or lim-
ited in some important respect. Managers seeking
to understand an emerging technology might use
analogies to markets for technologies with similar
characteristics. But these analogies distort, be-
cause the situations may not be comparable in
critical but unknown respects. A combination of
methods is ideal.
Deploy Multiple Lenses. One way to systematize
the triangulation process is to look at weak signals
through various scenario lenses. More than a decade
ago, we worked with a major U.S. newspaper com-
pany that used scenario planning to look at a single
technological innovation from different perspectives.
Xerox Corp. had just introduced a new service to de-
liver customized newspapers electronically to hotels
and other locations, allowing users to print out tailor-
made content. Travelers to foreign cities, for example,
could get their local news delivered or read the lead-
ing national newspaper in their native language.29
How important was this signal? Would it mean
that hotel guests would never again hear the familiar
thump of a newspaper outside their doors, or would
it be a nonstarter? It depends on the scenario. In a sce-
nario of “business as usual,” this new service would
represent a niche market (the traveler’s market) and a
welcome alternative channel of distribution besides
the physical delivery of newspapers. It might create
new opportunities for newspapers to move beyond
their natural geographic area as well as enhancing
customer loyalty. In another scenario, called “cyber-
media,” where electronic channels would be adopted
rapidly, this initial foray into customized printing in
hotels might lead to customized home printing of
newspapers. Such a development could render the
company’s physical assets (such as expensive printing
presses) obsolete.
By looking at this single weak signal through
multiple lenses, the managers were better able to
explore its potential implications. Considering the
high ambiguity surrounding the signal, the com-
pany decided to track the development of remote
electronic printing of newspapers. While such
scenario-based analysis doesn’t eliminate the un-
certainty about either the development of the
technology or consumer acceptance, it can help
managers make better sense when one small piece
of information is added to the puzzle (such as
Xerox’s minor announcement about remote print-
ing options).
Moderate confl ict, as opposed to little or extreme confl ict, leads to
the best decisions. But the confl ict must be among ideas, not people.

88 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW SPRING 2009 WWW.SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU
Talk to Customers and Competitors. Compa-
nies often suffer from focusing too narrowly on
either customers or competitors, rather than look-
ing at both. An exclusive focus on one or the other
creates dangerous blind spots.30
By looking closely at its customers and competi-
tors, a company that owned a major carpet
manufacturing business forced its management
team to face up to so many unpleasant realities that
it walked away from the business.
These are just a few examples of how multiple
perspectives and methods can aid in the interpreta-
tion of weak signals from the periphery. Overlaps
in scanning may seem inefficient, but they serve an
important purpose. They verify a weak signal’s stra-
tegic import, and help to compensate for known
deficiencies in our individual and collective vision.
Conclusions
There is a major difference between taking in sig-
nals and realizing what they mean. Managers as
well as organizations tend to see the world in a
certain way and confuse their mental maps with
the territory. Weak signals that don’t fit are often
ignored, distorted or dismissed, leaving the com-
pany exposed.
In any given week — especially lately — the
popular press is full of examples of managers miss-
ing weak signals. The major problem is that
managers are insufficiently aware of cognitive and
emotional biases that can cloud their judgment
when interpreting weak signals. When ambiguity is
high, we can easily torture the weak data until it
confesses to whatever we want to believe. Counter-
ing these insidious tendencies requires leadership
as well as the mastery of various tools to combat the
pernicious filters that obscure and distort impor-
tant weak signals. In a fast-moving marketplace,
none of us can afford to miss what we are seeing.
Paul J.H. Schoemaker is research director of the
Mack Center for Technological Innovation, an ad-
junct professor of marketing at the Wharton School
of the University of Pennsylvania and executive
chairman of Decision Strategies International Inc. of
West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania. George S. Day
is the Geoffrey T. Boisi Professor and professor of
marketing at Wharton, where he codirects the Mack
Center. Comment on this article or contact the au-
thors at smrfeedback@mit.edu.
REFERENCES
1. E.L. Andrews, “Fed Shrugged as Subprime Crisis
Spread,” New York Times, Dec. 18, 2007; P. Barrett,
“Wall Street Staggers,” Business Week, Sept. 29, 2008,
28-31; and N.D. Schwartz and V. Bajaj, “How Missed
Signs Contributed to a Mortgage Meltdown,” New York
Times, Aug. 19, 2007.
2. These and other warnings were sounded by Jan Hatz-
ius, chief U.S. economist at Goldman Sachs, July 30,
2006; Dan Sparks, mortgage department, Goldman
Sachs, The Times, Jan. 2007; and again by Jan Hatzius on
Feb. 12, 2007, at a Goldman Sachs housing conference.
3. Board member interview with authors; see also a de-
tailed account in Dutch by P. Battes and P. Elshout, “De val
van ABN AMRO” (Amsterdam: Business Contact, 2008).
4. R.J. Shiller, “Challenging the Crowd in Whispers, Not
Shouts,” New York Times, Nov. 2, 2008, p. 5.
5. For a managerial overview of the extensive field of
decision making, see J.E. Russo and P.J.H. Schoemaker,
“Winning Decisions” (New York: Doubleday Publishing
Co., 2001).
6. The space shuttle data oversights are discussed in S.R.
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An organizational and cultural account is offered in an ex-
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7. R. Wohlstetter, “Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decisions”
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962);
and G. Prange, “At Dawn We Slept” (New York: Penguin
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8. The biases mentioned here reflect multiple research
streams that are too broad to cite fully. We suffice by list-
ing some of the classic references, such as L. Festinger,
“Conflict, Decision and Dissonance” (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1964); I. Janis, “Groupthink:
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos,”
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31 (1980): 457-501.
9. The original and classic reference on groupthink is I.
Janis, “Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Deci-
sions and Fiascos,” 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1982). For a critical review of groupthink as a psychologi-
cal model, see W.W. Park, “A Review of Research on
Groupthink,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 3
(1990): 229-245.
GATHERING INTELLIGENCE

WWW.SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU SPRING 2009 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 89
10. The special challenges of organizational coordination
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and T. Klausen, “Distributed Cognition in an Airline Cock-
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“Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating
on Flight Decks,” Administrative Science Quarterly 38
(1993): 357-381.
11. “A Vital Job Goes Begging,” New York Times, Feb.
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Princeton University Press, 1999); and M. Douglas, “How
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Chicago Press, 2001).
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ness As a Contributor to High Reliability Performance in
Railroad Operations,” Organization Studies 27, no. 7
(2006): 967-987; see also K.H. Roberts, “Some Character-
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G.A. Bigley and K.H. Roberts, “The Incident Command Sys-
tem: High-Reliability Organizing for Complex and Volatile
Task Environments,” Academy of Management Journal 44,
no. 6 (2001): 1281-1299; E. Hutchins and T. Klausen, “Dis-
tributed Cognition in an Airline Cockpit,” in “Cognition and
Communication at Work,” eds. D. Middleton and Y. Eng-
strom (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
1996); and K.E. Weick and K.H. Roberts, “Collective Mind in
Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks,” Ad-
ministrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 357-381.
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Philips in the 1930s,” Business Histor y Review 78, no. 2
(2004): 255-72; F.K. Boersma, “Structural Ways to Embed
a Research Laboratory Into the Company: A Comparison
Between Philips and General Electric 1900–1940,” His-
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16. M.W. Dupree, book review of L. Galambos and J.E.
Sewell, “Networks of Innovation: Vaccine Development
at Merck, Sharp & Dohme, and Mulford, 1895-1995,”
Business History, Oct. 1, 1997.
17. A classic philosophical treatment of different ap-
proaches to gathering and interpreting information is C.W.
Churchman’s book “The Design of Inquiring Systems”
(New York: Basic Books, 1971).
18. Sir Kevin Tebbit, interview with authors; also, see P.
Bose, “Alexander the Great’s Art of Strategy” (New York:
Gotham Books, Penguin Group [USA] Inc., 2003).
19. From a brief discussion of the book in Wired, www.
wired.com/wired/archive/12.06/view_pr.html.
20. For more detail on the case, see P.J.H. Schoemaker,
“Profiting from Uncertainty” (New York: Free Press, 2002).
21. Royal Dutch Shell used scenario planning as a learning
process to help reveal the implicit mental models in its or-
ganization. This form of institutional learning can be seen
as a way for management teams to “change their shared
models of their company, their markets and their competi-
tors.” A.P. de Geus, “Planning as Learning,” Harvard
Business Review 66 (March-April 1988): 70-74.
22. This was the original title of an internal Shell paper by
Pierre Wack, the main founder of Shell’s approach to sce-
nario planning. The paper was later revised and published
as two articles: P. Wack, “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters
Ahead,” Harvard Business Review 63, no. 5 (September-
October 1985): 73-89; and P. Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting
the Rapids,” Harvard Business Review 63, no. 6 (Novem-
ber-December 1985): 139-150.
23. L. Bossidy and R. Charan, “Confronting Reality,”
Fortune, Oct.18, 2004, 225-229, excerpted from
“Confronting Reality: Doing What Matters to Get
Things Right” (New York: Crown Business, 2004).
24. K.A. Jehn, “A Multimethod Examination of the Bene-
fits and Detriments of Intragroup Conflict,” Administrative
Science Quarterly 40, no. 2 (June 1995): 256-282. For an
excellent discussion of management conflict and perfor-
mance, see K.M. Eisenhardt, J.L. Kahwajy and L.J.
Bourgeois III, “Conflict and Strategic Choice: How Top
Management Teams Disagree,” California Management
Review 39, no. 2 (winter 1997): 42-62.
25. G. Morgenson, “How the Thundering Herd Faltered
and Fell,” New York Times, Sunday, Nov. 9, 2008.
26. G. Klein, “Sources of Power” (Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: MIT Press, 1998); also see R.M. Hogarth,
“Educating Intuition” (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2001).
27. V. Barabba, “Surviving Transformation: Lessons from
GM’s Surprising Turnaround” (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2004).
28. These unmet needs were identified in a study by
Wirthlin Worldwide Inc. through two measures — the im-
portance consumers placed on key factors that influenced
their buying decisions and their current level of satisfac-
tion with these factors.
29. This example is more fully discussed in P.J.H. Schoe-
maker and M.V. Mavaddat, “Scenario Planning for
Disruptive Technologies,” chap. 10 in eds. G. Day and
P.J.H. Schoemaker, “Wharton on Managing Emerging
Technologies” (New York: Wiley, 2000).
30. See M. Neugarten, “Seeing and Noticing: An Optical
Perspective on Competitive Intelligence,” Journal of
Competitive Intelligence and Management 1, no. 1
(spring 2003): 93-104.
Reprint 50317.
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