Content uploaded by Robert Keohane
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Robert Keohane on Nov 10, 2014
Content may be subject to copyright.
The Promise of Institutional Theory
Abstract
Robert O. Keohane is Stanfield Professor of International Peace, Harvard University, and author of After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984).
Lisa L. Martin is John L. Loeb Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University, and author of Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton University Press, 1992).
The authors thank Marc Busch, Chris Gelpi, Andrew Moravcsik, and Celeste Wallander for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this essay.
1. Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962). Mearsheimer relies heavily on Claude's critique in his own discussion of collective security.
2. See Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 225-286. Ashley included Robert O. Keohane as one of the "neorealists" whose "orrery of errors" he rejected. The fact that Mearsheimer criticized institutionalism and critical theory in the same article should not, therefore, lead readers to believe that there is an intellectual affinity between these two schools of thought. However, the work of "constructivist" theorists such as Alexander Wendt eloquently makes a number of arguments that many institutionalists would accept.
3. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 52.
4. John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), p. 199.
5. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 7. Subsequent references to this article are in parentheses in the text.
6. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 227.
7. See Celeste A. Wallander, "Balance and Institutions in German-Russian Security Relations after the Cold War," manuscript, Harvard University, 1994; Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Toward an Institutional Theory of Alliances," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 22-25, 1995.
8. See David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 323, especially chapters by Joseph Grieco, Duncan Snidal, Robert Powell, and Robert O. Keohane.
9. Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726.
10. For development of arguments about the relationship between international regimes and distributional problems, see James D. Morrow, "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 387-423; and James Fearon, "Cooperation and Bargaining Under Anarchy," manuscript, University of Chicago, 1993.
11. For example, Stephen Krasner has argued that coordination problems can be solved by the unilateral exercise of power by the strongest state. Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366.
12. Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 1-27.
13. Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), p. 10.
14. Since institutionalists do not claim that institutions always have a major impact on outcomes, finding weak institutions hardly constitutes a refutation of institutionalist theory. Hence the weakness of the International Energy Agency during the 1979 oil crisis, described by Keohane in After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), is hardly the damning evidence that Mearsheimer claims.
15. On such issues see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
16. Ronald B. Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1994). See also Ronald B. Mitchell, "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 425-458.
17. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of...
... By fulfilling these key responsibilities, UNMISS can be able to gather valuable information and intelligence thus facilitating trust and confidence building thus fostering cooperation. This will in turn bolster general security and peacebuilding efforts in the country (Keohane and Martin, 1995). The mission also does monitoring and evaluation to improve security in South Sudan. ...
... The mission has been able to utilize monitoring and evaluation strategies to hold key stakeholder partners and actors accountable for their actions. This further promotes transparency and serves as a deterrent to potential conflict triggers in the area ultimately ensuring comprehensive protection of civilians and facilitating peace-building activities in South Sudan (Keohane, 1995). ...
... The process of increased harmonious cohabitation between individuals, organizations, and institutions within a community is known as social cohesiveness. It is desired to foster trust, collaboration, and a feeling of common purpose amongst historically separated individuals and groups within society as well as between society and the state (Keohane and Martin, 1995). ...
This study delves into the nature of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and specifically explores UNMISS's key roles like violence reduction, political instability, the security situation, social cohesion, reduction of violence, protection of civilians and socio-economic development. The study was guided by two objectives; to assess the objectives and mandates of UNMISS, and to examine the effectiveness of the roles and mandates of UNMISS in addressing the underlying causes of conflict and fostering sustainable peace in South Sudan. The study was underpinned by two theories, conflict transformation and Liberalism institutionalism theory. The study adopted a mixed method design with a target of 3280 and a sample size of 354 which was determined by the Yamane (1967) formula. The study employed purposive, cluster, stratified, and systematic sampling. Primary data was collected through interview schedules and questionnaires which were supplemented by FGDs. While secondary data was collected through a review of various publications. Quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed using SSP version 28 and thematic excerpts respectively. The study concludes that UNMISS has been in the front run to de-escalate hostilities by putting in place several strategies to create a conducive environment that supports dialogue and negotiation. This includes concerted DDR efforts that aim to reduce armed conflicts and prioritize the protection of civilians by fostering trust within the warring communities. Equally, UNMISS has played critical roles in ensuring social cohesion and political stability that are conducive to reconciliation and dialogue at the grassroots level. Peace-building initiatives have been achieved through missions’ commitment to the protection of human rights, social-economic development and availability of resources. The study recommends a substantial increase of resources to UNMISS and strengthening the SSR and DDR programs.
... Additionally, international institutions often have rules and procedures that govern how decisions are made and how disputes are resolved. Authoritarian regimes can increase their predictability and reduce uncertainty in their interactions with other countries by adhering to these rules and procedures [27][28][29]. ...
... International institutions in other areas can be important channels for obtaining such information. Relative to nonparticipating countries, member states can reduce transaction costs and get reliable information about other countries' decision-making [28]. Further, under the same institutional constraints, participants are expected to have converging preferences compared to non-participating countries [41,44,59]. ...
Do Chinese-led international institutions influence human rights discourse in China? Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, China has spearheaded the establishment of various international institutions, attracting numerous member states. States that participate in Chinese-led international institutions tend to be swayed by China's influence and are more cautious when addressing sensitive issues concerning China. Additionally, they are more likely to adopt a favorable stance towards Chinese human rights issues compared to those that are not affiliated with these institutions. This paper examines how membership in international institutions led by China affects state responses to human rights issues in China. We leverage recommendations on Chinese human rights made in the United Nations Universal Periodic Review (UN UPR) between 2009 and 2018 in two steps. First, we utilize multinomial logistic regression models to determine which choices the reviewers prefer with respect to the UN UPR recommendations: not sending, sending praising, neutral, or shaming. Second, using ordinal logistic regression models, we investigate which types of recommendations reviewers are more likely to send to China if they decide to send them. Our findings show that reviewers with greater involvement in Chinese-led international institutions are more likely to send recommendations to China, which contradicts our first hypothesis. However, reviewers are more prone to make praising recommendations, aligning with our second hypothesis.
... The most influential liberal tradition in the ISS literature, neoliberal institutionalism, holds that the most effective security practice is multilateralism, which refers to 'the coordination of national policies in groups of three or more states through ad-hoc arrangements or by means of institutions' (Keohane 1990, 731). Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the effectiveness of multilateralism lies in its ability to reduce transaction costs, provide information, render commitments credible, establish focal points for coordination, facilitate reciprocity and enable complex interlinkages of issues (Keohane and Martin 1995). ...
Strategic partnerships (SPs) have grown exponentially over the last decade in the Asia-Pacific. However, little remains known in the international security studies (ISS) literature regarding why they have proliferated now and how to best understand what they mean for regional security. In this article, I argue that SPs are best understood as a new security practice in the Asia-Pacific that allows states and multilateral actors to flexibly manage threats, strategic challenges, and interests through cooperation and common norm building. To evidence this argument, I adopt a functional approach to SPs that draws upon the mainstream ISS theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism and synthesises them where possible to draw attention to a wide range of causal factors responsible for them. Analyses guided by eclecticism can provide an all-encompassing tool for explanatory and comparative studies on Asia-Pacific security to draw a broader range of conclusions than any one approach allows for.
... The rules-based international system as a concept rests, however, more on the theory of liberal institutionalism set forth in the 1980s by American political scientists, such as Robert Keohane, John Ruggie, Stephen Krasner, and Robert Axelrod (see for example Keohane & Martin, 1995). How is it, these researchers asked, that cooperation between states arises and then persists over time? ...
In the last chapter, the authors take stock of the challenges which are besetting the European Union’s (EU) internal and external borders from the perspective of contemporary events and crises, and evaluate them in the context of a changing international environment. They consider what can be learned from past experiences concerning the internal borders which in the last decades were lifted only to be reinstated again, and the hardening of the EU’s external borders in order to keep unwanted pressure from irregular immigration at bay while facing off hybrid security threats, terrorism and organized crime. The chapter analyzes the geopolitical shift from the perspective of the EU’s quest to protect internal policy progress, such as the greening of the economy, against political actors which challenge the principles of the rules-based international order. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of the war in Ukraine on the European security architecture, and the prospect of a future enlargement to Ukraine, Moldova, and the candidate countries on the Balkan Peninsula.
... liberal perspective on international institutions argues that international institutions play a significant role in enhancing cooperation among states. robert Keohane and lisa Martin, strong proponents of this school of thought, argue that in enhancing cooperation among states, international institutions "provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity" (Keohane & Martin, 1995). liberal institutionalism envisions cooperation between states on agreed institutional framework or set of agreed principles, which regulates the behavior of member states. ...
Did populist leadership in the US and Brazil hinder effective management of Covid-19 at the international level? The study carries out exploratory research to understand leadership styles of Donald Trump in US and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and their populist response to international cooperation and institutional coordination related to the global pandemic. Using a comparative approach, the study reviews how populist style of leadership in the two states has impacted on international cooperation and collaboration during Covid-19. The research employs a liberal institutional approach, referring to global institutions, international health protocols, and global cooperation as necessary avenues for dealing with the global health crisis. The article argues that US and Brazilian leadership response in handling the crisis demonstrated populist features, challenging international cooperation while discrediting international health institutions and protocols. In doing so, the two leaders undermined transnational and global institutional cooperation, while they blamed outsiders, associating them with the outbreak of the pandemic. In evading responsibility, the two states populist leaderships’ orientation undermined effective management internationally by blaming (and calling them ‘others’) foreigners, immigrants and ethnicities (mainly Chinese) for the spread of Covid-19.
Well-functioning states are often seen as great pacifiers in the sense that serious societal disputes within their respective territories are usually solved without violence. On the other hand, deep conflicts between states may more easily result in violent situations due to the partly anarchical character of the international system. One could therefore expect that studies of war and peace focused extensively on various ways of organizing interstate relations and the potential for replacing anarchy with political order. However, although several peace studies deal with the role of international organizations (IOs), this research is surprisingly absent in review literature. One reason for this absence may be that findings on the peacemaking role of IOs among member states seem to be ambiguous. The purpose of this review essay is to increase our understanding of under what conditions international institutions could matter in this respect. The fierce debate between realists and institutionalists only marginally touches upon the effect that the various ways of organizing IOs might have on interstate peace. Arguably, the only international organization so far that in its structure and work clearly transcends a basically intergovernmental arrangement is the European Union (EU). This could make the EU, and EU-like structures, more able to avoid polarization along the territorial dimension since its organization structure activates cross-cutting cleavages and a system-wide perspective among policymakers, arguably tying together rather than splitting the system. Interestingly, the peculiar organizational structure of the EU seems very much ignored in the IO literature in general, and in peace research on IOs in particular.
Regime analysis has focused on issues of market failure, the resolution of which depends upon knowledge and institution building. Global communications regimes, however, have been concerned either with issues of pure coordination or with coordination problems with distributional consequences. Outcomes have been decided by the underlying distribution of national power. In those areas where power was asymmetrically distributed and there was no agreement on basic principles and norms—radio broadcasting and remote sensing—no regime was formed. In those areas where distributional issues could not be unilaterally resolved—allocation of the radio spectrum and telecommunications—regimes were created, although both principles and rules changed with alterations in national power capabilities.
During the postwar era, much scholarship was concerned with understanding the causes of the Cold War and with identifying ways in which East—West tensions might be reduced. Since the 1980s, however, an increasing number of analysts have chosen to characterize the years following World War II as a ‘Long Peace’, during which, contrary to many fears and expectations, a major war never occurred. Rather than focusing on the sources of hostility between the leading powers of the period, these scholars have sought to explain how military conflict between them was avoided for an extended length of time.
With the end of the cold war, the military posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has entered a period of profound change. Prior to the recent dramatic political events in Europe, however, NATO conventional force levels in the Central Region had been remarkably stable for some three decades. This article seeks to explain this record of stability in terms of three widely used theories of international relations. It argues that balance-of-power theory and public goods theory cannot alone provide a satisfactory account. Rather, these traditional approaches for understanding alliance behavior must be supplemented by regime theory, which emphasizes the constraining effects of enduring institutional factors even in the face of structural change. Specifically, it shows how an international regime has influenced the provision of conventional forces in the Central Region by alliance members. More generally, this analysis seeks to contribute to the literature on international regimes in three ways. First, it demonstrates that regimes do matter by providing an example of their importance for explaining state behavior and international outcomes. Second, it extends regime theory to relations among military allies. Third, it elaborates a comprehensive model for understanding why states actually comply with regime injunctions. The model stresses both the ways in which regimes effectively modify the international environment within which states operate, altering the costs and benefits associated with different courses of action, and the ways in which participating states may internalize regime norms and rules, thereby making compliance increasingly automatic.
This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun
- Ibid
Ibid., p. 143. This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 14:40:16 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions