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The Case for Shared Sovereignty
Abstract
Both socio-economic and actor oriented approaches to the development of democracy imply that poorly governed polities are unlikely to make progress. Socio-economic conditions are deteriorating in many poorly governed states. Because borders are fixed, violent state death is rare, foreign assistance is available, and raw materials can be exported, political leaders in many poorly governed states do not have an incentive to craft self enforcing pareto improving agreements with their own populations. Shared sovereignty arrangements, institutions in which authority would be shared by external and internal actors, would offer the possibilities for pareto improving agreements that would not otherwise be available.
... This commitment was reiterated by member states in 2007 in the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/62/7. Empirical literature on postwar peacebuilding reflects on international cooperation towards building democratic institutions, establishing legal systems for justice, and protecting human rights (Leblang, 1996;Krasner, 2005). Linking relief and development, the world's development assistance programmes have become another key enforcement for both peacebuilding and democratic reforms. ...
This comprehensive research report is organized into nine chapters, examining the democracy-building experience in Sri Lanka under the National Unity Government (NUG) during the period 2015-2019. The research is conducted by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) and funded by the Rule of Law Collaborative, University of South Carolina, USA.
... This commitment was reiterated by member states in 2007 in the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/62/7. Empirical literature on postwar peacebuilding reflects on international cooperation towards building democratic institutions, establishing legal systems for justice, and protecting human rights (Leblang, 1996;Krasner, 2005). Linking relief and development, the world's development assistance programmes have become another key enforcement for both peacebuilding and democratic reforms. ...
This comprehensive research report is organized into nine chapters, examining the democracy-building experience in Sri Lanka under the National Unity Government (NUG) during the period 2009-2015.
The research is conducted by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) and funded by the Rule of Law Collaborative, University of South Carolina, USA.
... Statebuilding interventions follow this aspiration, but the spaces they create rather point to the internationalization of statehood. After all, international intervenors exert important functions in policymaking and the governing apparatus (Schlichte, 2017: 115;also Cox, 1981: 146f.), and invoke a 'higher moral authority' (Fassin and Pandolfi, 2010: 9) to take over or at least share sovereignty (Krasner, 2005). ...
This article uses the example of the Mogadishu International Airport zone and takes a spatio-temporal lens to explore how (sovereign) power unfolds in international interventions that aim at building a sovereign state. I show that the Mogadishu International Airport zone emerges as an elastic frontier zone that contradicts the sovereign imaginary intervenors aim to project and undermines many of the taken-for-granted boundaries that states tend to produce. The Mogadishu International Airport and similar zones emphasize the centrality of logistics and circulation in interventions, but also point towards their temporal and liminal character. Modularity became the material answer to the demand to secure circulation while adapting to the rapid rhythm and short timeframes of statebuilding. Modular designs enable the constant adaptation of the intervention terrain, allow intervenors to deny their power and imprint and facilitate the commercialization of supply chains and intervention materials. Sovereign power that operates through such zones becomes modular itself. It is exercised as an adaptable, in parts exchangeable, and highly mobile form of power that operates through crises and emergencies. The spaces and materials created by modular forms of sovereign power remain elusive, but nonetheless stratify experiences of power and security.
... Federacy is seen as a solution to agitations for selfgovernment, granting some autonomy to domestic units, while preserving the integrity of the state (Ghai, 2008). Here, we witness the tensions involved between selfrulewhere decision-making capacity is notionally held by one playerand shared rulewhere decision-making capacity is shared between at least two players, typically two tiers of government (Elazar, 1987;Krasner, 2005). ...
This 2017 Annual Report brings together the state of knowledge on island economic change and development. It includes a review of the contributions from the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Islands Economic Cooperation Forum in 2017, an update to the key statistical indicators of island states and subnational island jurisdictions, and thoughts on island economies by leading international experts. This publication will help us to better understand island economies, and the role that islanders play to make islands more sustainable and prosperous.
... 1114 For Krasner, external actors cannot finance these projects because "the party who is footing the bill is unlikely to accept the limits on its control that shared sovereignty demands." 1115 Gaining access to donor funds is, however, the only reason why the government in South Sudan would ever agree to this model. ...
Much of the literature on the history of liberal peace-and state-building in South Sudan focuses most directly on the actions of the international community as being responsible for the intractable conflict and issues of state fragility. Implicit in such arguments is the assumption that, if Western donors, states and organizations simply remained more committed to their liberal ideals or devised more effective strategies, the situation would be more stable and prosperous. The central argument here is that state formation is primarily an internal process that cannot be manufactured effectively by foreign actors. Civil war and the inability to implement the liberal model are primarily explained by structural factors, within South Sudan and the international states system, that are not amenable to external manipulation. These include: the incipient and informal nature of the state, the character of relevant rebel and militia groups, the presence of oil, the country's interactions within anarchic global systems and the arbitrary make-up of African states. These conditions also inhibit indigenous actors from achieving lasting peace and consolidating state power. While this analysis scrutinizes the liberal paradigm, the argument is not that the model of political and economic liberalization is mainly responsible for the persistence of conflict and state fragility. Instead, although efforts to implement the liberal model have arguably been counterproductive at times, they have in fact been largely inconsequential to the outcomes in South Sudan.
... Examining Ethiopian foreign policies since the regime of Mengistu Halie Mariam illustrates how IGAD as a regional organisation has become useful to Ethiopian rulers in legitimising their involvement in peacebuilding projects in Somalia and South Sudan. Reflecting on international relations and political science theories that suggest "shared sovereignty" (Krasner, 2004(Krasner, , 2005 is necessary for the reconstruction of post-conflict countries; it is not unusual that the relationship between Somalia and IGAD has recently transformed into a patronclient relationship. ...
... Os Estados que têm na democracia o seu regime de governo, costumam ser mais suscetíveis a este tipo de abalo, pois a participação pública é maior e mais ativa e é permitida a expressão de pontos de vista pelos cidadãos (KRASNER, 2005). Quando o Estado é visto como não mais uma estrutura mantenedora dos bens políticos, principalmente no regime democrático, "a ordem e o poder (mas não necessariamente [obrigatoriamente] a legitimidade) caem para grupos locais" (ZARTMAN, 1995, p.1). Depois disto, cabe entender quando a falta de legitimidade estatal abre um espaço para grupos de interesse e pressão, que adquirem legitimidade frente à população realizando ações e fornecendo bens que estariam na esfera de compromisso do Estado. ...
The main objective of this work is to understand the relationship between a secular fragile State in promoting public goods, and the rise of religious interest groups, that acquire a measure of protagonism in political processes. For that, the Nigerian case is taken and the State’s limitations in promoting public goods in the northern region and the growth of Islamic interest groups, that begins to dispute some relevant political positions is observed. It’s noted that there is an inverted relationship between the legitimacy that is conferred to the State and to the Islamic groups: the delegitimization of the secular institutions and the legitimization of the religious interest groups
... The outcome of ECB strong powers together with the prominence of single monetary policy in the Eurozone (Neumann, 2010;Reichlin and Pill, 2016) is a shift of a considerable parcel of actual national sovereignty towards the central bank. In this case, it makes sense to postulate "actual sovereignty" (Agnew 2005;Krasner, 2005) because it deals with powers exerted at the economic level with an impact on the general well-being. This aspect will be explored in detail when section 4 addresses the re-conceptualisation of sovereignty. ...
... Delegative development shares features of 'shared sovereignty' arrangements(Krasner 2005) associated with cases of post-conflict state-building, it differs from these cases because there is no vacuum of legitimate central government of the kind found in collapsed or 'failed state' contexts; the central state is not formally 'de-centred' of power to external parties. Internal and external actors in delegative developmental arrangements are politically chosen by the state, sometimes under situations of constrained choice, but with the state's own aim of enhancing its domestic sovereignty. ...
This thesis offers a detailed study of the disadvantages of post-Cold War late development at the confluence of shifting regimes of development finance. As Lao PDR emerged from relative isolation at the end of the Cold War, it was quickly integrated into a Bretton Woods-led regional and global development regime that was itself undergoing a shift from aid to private-sector led development. This thesis contends that liberalizing reforms initiated by the Asian Development Bank and driven further under the aegis of the World Bank in its bid to re-enter the global hydrolending landscape through its landmark NT2 project in Laos led to the introduction of tools of modern finance into contemporary Lao infrastructure building. Seemingly small and innocuous institutional innovations brought to Laos and installed by OECD-DAC agencies, some for the purposes of environmental conservation, led to perverse outcomes and momentously facilitated a watershed of financialized regional infrastructure investment by state-coordinated business groups from neighbouring Thailand, Malaysia and China in the aftermath of the Asian (1997) and Global (2008) financial crises. The installation of financial instruments and practices by Bretton Woods institutions intending to further the public-private-partnership (PPP) paradigm and business interests of corporations established in OECD states has instead paved the way for the expansion and deepening of financial markets in the name of development led by emerging Asian business actors eager to transition from ‘national champions’ to international powerhouses. This historical account demonstrates both continuity and change as the neomercantilist aspirations of East and Southeast Asia’s emerging economies beneficially utilize the liberalizing environment spearheaded by Bretton Woods institutions to further their own interests while creating parallel governance institutions and divergent lending and environmental practices to the Development Assistance Committee. Based on over fifteen months of in-country research and interviews, this thesis sheds light on the ways in which state elites internalize ideologies of development in pursuit of autonomous economic development while reinforcing conditions of dependency through external economic reliance. Building on insights gleaned from early dependency scholars, this thesis provides a critical contribution by adapting their observations concerning constraints to development for a post-Bretton Woods development landscape which has shifted from MNC-led industrial investment to finance-driven portfolio investment. In doing so, this thesis upends the traditional ‘centre-periphery’ framing of asymmetric exploitation by introducing the notion of ‘proximate dependency’ to capture the pernicious dynamics of exploitation between (post-WWII) late developers and their even later (post-Cold War) brethren, cutting against popular discourses of south-south development.
... Die Forschung im Bereich Staatsbildung, Staatszerfall und Staatlichkeit verteilt sich auf fol- Dorff (2005); Doornbos (2005); Dorronsoro (1999); Durrani (2004); Einsiedel (2005); Eizenstat (2005); Ellis (2005), (2003); Elsenhans (1998); Erdmann (2003); Eriksen (2005);Fatton (2006), Fox (2004), (2003); Fukuyama (2005), (2004a), (2004b), (2004c), (1995); Gabriel (1999); Gélin-Adams (2003); Helman (1993); Hentz (2004);Herbst (2004), (2000), (1997), (1990); Holsti (1996;Ignatieff (2005); Jackson (1990); Kaplan (1996); Kasfir (2004); Kassem (2004); Kaufman (1997); Krasner (2005a), (2005b), (2004), (1996); Lambach (2002); Langford (1999); Lemarchand (2003); Osterkamp (1998); Patrick (2006); Reno ((2006), (2005a), (2005b), (2003), (2000), (1998), (1997); Rotberg (2005), (2004), (2003a), (2003b), (2002); Schlichte (2005); Skocpol (1985); Smith (2001), (1999), (1988), (1986); Zartman (2005). 48 Berlin (1968); Bodin (1976); Hegel (1970), (1961); Hobbes (1994a), (1994b); Humboldt (1967); Hu- me (1987); Kant (2003), (1992a), (1992b), (1990); Locke (1974); Montesquieu (2004), (1979); Rousseau (2003); , (2003), (2002a), (2002b); Tocqueville (1985). ...
An analysis of current weak states, covering the field of international law, security policy, international relations, conflict and development studies, history and political theory and using qualitative and quantitative research methods. The analysis focuses on the process of State Failure, which begins with weak statehood and ends in the extreme cases with the Failed State where there is no effective form of govern- ment present on the territory claimed by the state. State Failure refers to the complete or par- tial failure of state power, the loss of empirical statehood, and the multi causal deinstitution- alisation of the state. It has been shown that the criminalisation of the use of force in interna- tional relations by the UN in 1945 has dramatically changed the rules of International Rela- tions. Unfortunately in the same process one has focused less on the principle of effective governance. A consequence thereof is a rupture between de-facto- and the de-jure-aspects of statehood. A solution to the problem of weak statehood and state failure will be to give the principle of effectiveness at the recognition of states more space within the consideration.
... We control for economic development (Lipset 1959) and natural resources (Krasner 2005;Robinson et al. 2006;Ross 2006;Tilly 1985) as these factors might affect state capacity, regime type, and human development. Economic development is proxied by the logarithmic form of GDP (fixed prices) per capita and by urbanization. ...
This paper investigates to what extent and under what conditions democracy and state capacity affect human development. We argue that democratic institutions provide leaders with incentives for improving human development, whereas capable state apparatuses enable them to do so. Accordingly, we argue that the two factors reinforce the effects of each other and that the highest levels of human development are achieved when high levels of both factors are present. Our argument contradicts earlier studies, which have claimed that the effects of the two factors crowd out one another. We investigate the proposition through time-series cross-sectional analyses, employing new and improved measures of both democracy and state capacity. These new measures not only give our analysis an advantage in terms of measurement validity; they also substantially increase its temporal scope compared to previous studies. Consequently, we analyze a global sample of countries spanning the period 1902–2008. The results provide strong support for our theoretical expectations, and they are robust to both alternative measures and different model specifications. Our results highlight the importance of building capable state structures and democracy in conjunction and have significant implications for scholars and practitioners of development policy.
... A list of countries liable to breaking up (something Pascual argued might be precipitated to allow market democracy to be introduced more effectively; cited inKLEIN, 2005) was drawn up. The new authorities in 'failed states', reconstructed along lines dictated by the US and IMF, would then be invited to sign contracts in which elements of their sovereignty would be alienated, 'shared'(KRASNER, 2005; KRAS- NER, PASCUAL, 2005). How, then, have these doctrines affected actual Western policy?Alternating Emphases in the Western Advance into the Post-Cold War World ...
In this piece I look at the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as rivals of the West, united more by circumstance than by intent. It emerged as a seemingly innocuous banker’s gimmick referring to the ‘emerging market’ potential of the countries thus thrown together, but due to the aggressive Western response to independent policies, the BRICS have slowly moved towards solidifying their cohesion. Comprising half the world’s population, the bloc on the eve of the financial crisis of 2008 was closing in on the West. In Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, China’s GDP was three-quarters the size of the US economy, and India no. 4 behind Japan, whilst Brazil and Russia were catching up with the main EU states (Armijo 2007: 12). The 2008 financial collapse in the West contracted China’s export markets and speculation that the BRICS were passé, was rife (Sharma, 2012: 6). However, China and India soon recovered, surpassing the US and Japan, respectively, whilst Russia and Brazil are trailing just behind Germany (World Bank 2016).
This (uneven) recovery of the BRICS bloc in turn has provoked an even less benevolent response, increasingly amounting to a straightforward confrontation policy. My argument is that once the crisis forcedChina, the bloc’s locomotive, to slow down and the global commodity boom ended, a Western strategy of isolating it from the other BRICS ensued. This is most obvious in the case of the NATO siege on Russia.
... A partir do fim da Guerra Fria, configura-se uma agenda humanitária internacional dominada pelos atores governamentais e privados dos poderes ocidentais, fundamentada em valores altruístas, de compaixão e/ ou intenções civilizatórias aplicadas a contextos de extrema vulnerabilidade no mundo em desenvolvimento. Neste mesmo quadro ganham lugar os conceitos de soberanias periférica e/ou compartilhada e o princípio da responsabilidade de proteger (R2P) (Krasner, 2005, Bâli e Rana, 2012. Este último nasce da consideração de que a soberania é uma responsabilidade e não um direito, sustentando-se que os Estados incapazes de se protegerem os seus cidadãos de ações de genocídio, limpeza étnica, guerras e crimes contra a humanidade, devem recorrer à comunidade internacional. ...
... Shared sovereignty implies the co-existence and interdependence of two entities for mutual benefit and larger shared interest with the hope of promoting conducive socio-political environment for peace and good governance. While taking into account the topical problems in contemporary times that include internal strife, poverty, misgovernance, humanitarian crises, human rights issues and terrorist threats, according to Krasner (2005), "shared-sovereignty entities are created by a voluntary agreement between recognised national political authorities and an external actor such as another state or a regional or international organisation" (p. 70). ...
... In the viewpoint of U.S. military strategists, the cycle of pacification producing immiseration triggering rebellious reconstruction triggering pacification triggering enhanced immiseration triggering enhanced rebellion triggering re-pacification would be broken in Afghanistan by COIN's chief innovation-a 'clear, hold, and build' philosophy. Since the renewed rebellion most often occurs once the military moves on to new battles, this algorithm requires a medium-term military presence in each local community (the 'hold' part of the strategy) leading later (as the 'build' part of the strategy takes hold) into the shared sovereignty proposed by Krasner, in which indigenous officials eventually shoulder responsibility for ongoing administration (Krasner 2005). While the 'clear' and 'hold' elements more-or-less-inevitably create new waves of immiseration and potential rebellion, the 'build' stage is designed to defuse the clear -and-hold-generated-bitterness by erecting a new infrastructure capable of supporting political, economic, and social renewal. ...
This article seeks to understand the dynamics of twenty-first century military intervention by the United States and its allies. Based on an analysis of Bush and Obama administration policy documents, we note that these wars are new departures from previous interventions, calling on the military to undertake post-conflict reconstruction in ways that was previously left to indigenous government or to the civilian aspects of the occupation. This military-primary reconstruction is harnessed to ambitious neoliberal economics aimed at transforming the host country's political economy. Utilizing the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions as case studies, the study analyzes the dynamics set in motion by this policy. The key processes are two concatenated cycles of military pacification and economic immiseration in discrete localities operating through varying paths of causation. Pacification by the military as well as subsequent military-primary introduction of neoliberal economic reform generates immiseration; locally based resistance. As well as ameliorating efforts aimed at reconstructing the old system subsequently generates repacification. Each iteration of the cycle deepens the humanitarian crisis, and assures new rounds of local and sometimes national resistance.
... We venture that the dominant image implied by phrases such as "state intervention", "market failures", "state failures", "deregulation", "liberalization", "privatization" and "flexibilization", which still contain traces of the academically discredited "communicating vessel"--perspective, is misleading and should be replaced by an image of state--market relationships which is much more interactionist, reciprocal, co-dependent and "infrastructural" in nature. Legally stipulated rights and responsibilities, duties and claims are the medium in which financial transactions are articulated, implying a constellation which we below will denote as "shared sovereignty", a concept we have loosely borrowed from Stephen Krasner (2005), which in our view is a key characteristic of the current phase of financialized "regulatory capitalism" (Levi--Faur 2005: 27). While this is obviously not new, for the establishment of supranational "conversion rules" that have facilitated "legal dialogue" across borders and has allowed the construction of arbitrage--driven "Global Production Networks" (Coe & Yeung 2015) has dramatically increased the importance of "legal infrastructures" for the day--to--day functioning of global capitalism (see Drahos & Braithwaite 2000). ...
... Com as transferências de poderes que favorecem o nível supranacional, e a atrás mencionada alteração de estatuto das autoridades nacionais (que deixam de ser protagonistas e passam a ser destinatárias do processo), deteta-se uma tendência de centralização na produção de legislação que pode ser entendida como uma limitação (ou mesmo uma perda) de soberania nacional (Roobol, 2005 (Neumann, 2010;Reichlin e Pill, 2016), verifica-se a deslocação de uma parte considerável da soberania efetiva dos Estados membros para o banco central. A soberania considera-se efetiva (Agnew 2005;Krasner, 2005), pois trata-se de um núcleo de poderes exercidos na esfera económica e que condicionam o bem-estar das populações, no que serve para iniciar a introdução à reconceptualização da soberania, tarefa que será resolvida pela secção 4, infra. (Ramos, 2013). ...
Resumo Está enraizada a perceção, até entre alguns peritos da integração europeia, que a participação de um país na União Europeia (UE) envolve uma perda, ou ao menos uma limitação, da soberania nacional. O argumento é mais popular entre sectores euro-pessimistas e adversários da integração europeia. Esta comunicação pretende, em primeiro lugar, indagar se a modernização da ciência política, de que a integração europeia é um ingrediente inelutável, não está na origem de uma desconstrução do conceito de soberania nacional. Nesta abordagem, desafia-se o monolitismo do conceito e desbravam-se novas avenidas que fornecem o substrato para a reconceptualização de soberania. Em segundo lugar, a comunicação embebe-se na grelha de análise dos sectores críticos e, usando essa grelha, desafia um entendimento alternativo quanto aos efeitos da integração europeia na soberania nacional, negando a verificação dos danos propostos pelas teses críticas. Introdução É frequente, entre o cidadão comum que dedica alguma atenção à UE, a perceção de que a participação de um país no processo de integração europeia implica danos para a respetiva soberania nacional (Eurobarometer, n.º 05/2005). Esta perceção tem acolhimento em alguma literatura, com mais visibilidade em literatura que não versa especificamente sobre assuntos europeus, mas que traz a UE à colação a propósito de
This chapter analyzes the impact of soft power on trade relationships using Africa–Europe as analytical context. It examines the prospects of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as the epitome of African soft power. Although it may not seem arbitrary to assume that two continents with different socio-cultural attributes, institutional rules, and asymmetrical structural configuration can engage in a mutually beneficial cooperation, it has been observed that the inability of African states to deploy soft power partially accounts for why they are perpetually subservient to Europe in trade relationships. While there is a wealth of scholarly work on AU–EU cooperation in general, there is a dearth of materials on the role of African soft power in intercontinental cooperation. Therefore, this chapter addresses two salient questions. First, can the AfCFTA wield the AU’s soft power? Second, can the deployment of Africa’s soft power change the dynamics of African–European trade relationship? The chapter concludes that the AfCFTA can wield the AU’s soft power, but the ability of Africa to effectively deploy such soft power depends largely on the full implementation of the AfCFTA agreements.
Este artículo sostiene que las Relaciones Internacionales como disciplina académica (RRII) han entrado a formar parte de una creciente preocupación con la “seguridad” tras el 11 de septiembre. Esto no siempre ha sido así, e incluso actualmente existen también teorías alternativas dentro de la corriente principal de la disciplina. Sin embargo, la perspectiva de la seguridad estuvo determinada por dos momentos concretos en los que el miedo a un ataque inminente sobre Estados Unidos y sus aliados se articuló de manera muy dramática. El primero tuvo lugar entre la constitución original de la disciplina durante los años de entreguerras y el asedio de posguerra hacia la URSS. Aquí el papel de las RRII fue definir como racional la asunción de un ataque nuclear sorpresa, equiparando a la URSS como estado “totalitario” similar a las potencias del Eje, una de las cuales atacó Pearl Harbour. El segundo puede situarse en la década de los setenta cuando la amenaza de la revuelta del Tercer Mundo bajo el estandarte de la liberación nacional fue rebautizada como “terrorismo internacional” promovido por la extrema derecha y los militaristas israelíes en Estados Unidos, creando de esta manera una continuidad entre la supuesta amenaza soviética y los casos pos-soviéticos de revuelta antioccidental. De todo ello el artículo concluye que las RRII han servido para colocar a políticos y líderes de opinión bajo una “disciplina de miedo” que es insuficientemente reconocida, y menos aún retada por parte de investigadores de RRII.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, dozens of alliances asserting shared sovereignty formed in the Holy Roman Empire and the Low Countries. Many accounts of state formation struggle to explain these leagues, since they characterize state formation as a process of internal bureaucratization within individual states. This comparative study of alliances in the Holy Roman Empire and the Low Countries focuses on a formative time in European history, from the late fifteenth century until the immediate aftermath of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, to demonstrate how the sharing of sovereignty through alliances influenced the evolution of the Empire, the Dutch Republic, and their various member states in fundamental ways. Alliances simultaneously supported and constrained central and territorial authorities, while their collaborative policy-making process empowered smaller states, helping to ensure their survival. By revealing how the interdependencies of alliance shaped states of all sizes in the Empire and the Low Countries, Christopher W. Close opens new perspectives on state formation with profound implications for understanding the development of states across Europe.
Sovereignty and the sovereign state are often seen as anachronisms; Globalization and Sovereignty challenges this view. Jean L. Cohen analyzes the new sovereignty regime emergent since the 1990s evidenced by the discourses and practice of human rights, humanitarian intervention, transformative occupation, and the UN targeted sanctions regime that blacklists alleged terrorists. Presenting a systematic theory of sovereignty and its transformation in international law and politics, Cohen argues for the continued importance of sovereign equality. She offers a theory of a dualistic world order comprised of an international society of states, and a global political community in which human rights and global governance institutions affect the law, policies, and political culture of sovereign states. She advocates the constitutionalization of these institutions, within the framework of constitutional pluralism. This book will appeal to students of international political theory and law, political scientists, sociologists, legal historians, and theorists of constitutionalism.
What did independence mean during the age of empires? How did independent governments balance different interests when they made policies about trade, money and access to foreign capital? Sovereignty without Power tells the story of Liberia, one of the few African countries to maintain independence through the colonial period. Established in 1822 as a colony for freed slaves from the United States, Liberia's history illustrates how the government's efforts to exercise its economic sovereignty and engage with the global economy shaped Liberia's economic and political development over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Drawing together a wide range of archival sources, Leigh A. Gardner presents the first quantitative estimates of Liberian's economic performance and uses these to compare it to its colonized neighbors and other independent countries. Liberia's history anticipated challenges still faced by developing countries today, and offers a new perspective on the role of power and power relationships in shaping Africa's economic history.
Without nation-states Covid-19, climate change, international cyberattacks, and other threats would go unchecked. In The World of States, John L. Campbell and John A. Hall challenge the view that nation-states have lost their relevance in the context of globalization and rising nationalism. The book traces how states evolved historically, how contemporary states differ from one another, and the interactions between them. States today confront a host of challenges, but two features make some states more effective than others: institutional arrangement and national identity. The second edition has been updated to discuss why the BRICS countries (with the exception of China) are no longer the rising powers they were once thought to be; the effects of Brexit on the European Union; the legacy of the Trump administration for US politics and hegemony; and how the coronavirus may upset the world of states going forward.
This paper is based on an analysis of the concept of sovereignty as promoted by contemporary sovereigntists. I argue that although the sovereigntists vary greatly from country to country, they are united around a specific interpretation of the concept of sovereignty. Based on an analysis of Trumpism and Putinism, the sovereigntist ideologies of the core old democracy and the new autocracy, I argue that the sovereigntists define sovereignty as the supremacy of the people, the imagined majority; deny the sovereignty of the human person; and promote distrust of international organizations and treaties that support cosmopolitan norms of justice. I propose further that Trumpism and Putinism represent two cases of the sovereigntist turn in different political contexts; however, Putinism is a more radical ideological position and has had a deeper impact on the political and constitutional systems of Russia than Trumpism has had on those systems in the United States.
This chapter reviews the International Relations literature on globalisation and sovereignty. Using a revised version of Held and McGrew’s framework for understanding the politics of globalisation, it identifies three approaches to understanding the ways in which globalisation has affected state sovereignty: (1) Hyperglobalists, who primarily regard globalisation as a distinct ‘new’ phenomenon, which is having considerable effect, particularly on state sovereignty, with a significantly increased role for international organisations and transnational actors in key policy arenas. (2) Sceptics, who regard globalisation as not ‘new’, arguing that the state and state sovereignty remain central despite globalising forces. (3) Transformationalists, who take a middle view arguing that there are varying effects of globalisation on states exercising policy sovereignty.
One of the key principles for effective aid programmes is that recipient agencies exert high degrees of ownership over the agendas, resources, systems and outcomes of aid activities. Sovereign recipient states should lead the process of development. Yet despite this well-recognised principle, the realities of aid delivery mean that ownership is often compromised in practice. Aid, Ownership and Development examines this ‘inverse sovereignty’ hypothesis with regard to the states and territories of the Pacific Island region. It provides an initial overview of different aid ‘regimes’ over time, maps aid flows in the region, and analyses the concept of sovereignty. Drawing on a rich range of primary research by the authors and contributors, it focuses on the agencies and individuals within the Pacific Islands who administer and apply aid projects and programmes. There is indeed evidence for the inverse sovereignty effect; particularly when island states and their small and stretched bureaucracies have to deal with complex and burdensome donor reporting requirements, management systems, consultative meetings and differing strategic priorities. This book outlines important ways in which Pacific agencies have proved adept not only at meeting these requirements, but also asserting their own priorities and ways of operating. It concludes that global agreements, such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and the recently launched Sustainable Development Goals, can be effective means for Pacific agencies to both hold donors to account and also to recognise and exercise their own sovereignty. © 2019 John Overton, Warwick E. Murray, Gerard Prinsen, Avataeao Junior Ulu and Nicola Wrighton.
Can we speak of a joined up European Union (EU) Grand Strategy in the world? Strategy-based policy-making in the EU is a shared enterprise between the EU and its member state governments. The EU and its member states focus in the EUGS (Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe: a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, 2016) on the EU homeland as a priority and not the Neighbourhood or the global level of diplomacy as was the case previously in the ESS (A secure Europe in a better world, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, 2003). This is partly as a result of changing EU foreign policy priorities and partly as a result of the reassertion of national interests into the EU’s transnational foreign policy. EU Grand Strategy has shifted focus from the global to the regional level reflecting the new pragmatic turn in EU foreign policy. The new strategy is more regional, more pragmatic, and less ambitious in furthering the EU as a global actor as a result.
Scholarship on conflict-generated diasporas has identified the need to consider diaspora mobilisations in multiple contexts and how they are affected by local and global processes. I argue that diasporas react with mobilisations to global events that take place not only in host-states and home-states but also in other locations to which diasporas are transnationally linked. I illustrate the theoretical concepts with empirical discussion about global diaspora activism for Kosovo and Palestinian statehood. Two categories of global events, critical junctures, and transformative events, can be distinguished, with effects on diaspora mobilisation depending on the sociospatial context in which diasporas are embedded. Critical junctures can transform international and state structures and institutions, and change the position of a strategic centre from ‘outside’ to ‘inside’ a homeland territory and vice versa. Transformative events are less powerful and can change diaspora mobilisation trajectories. In contexts where diasporas have relatively strong positionality vis-à-vis other actors in a transnational social field, diaspora mobilisation is more likely to be sustained in response to critical junctures and transformative events.
Post-Cold War interventions have gone through a series of distinct paradigms—each allowing for its own oppositional discourse. This possibility seems to be diminishing with the rise of resilience thinking. In the early 1990s, liberal internationalist framings drove intervention by prioritising individual human rights over state rights to non-interference. Here, it was possible to oppose intervention as illegal boundary violation and unaccountable foreign rule. Neo-liberal approaches circumvented the legal problematic by conflating sovereignty with the capacity for good governance. However, they depended on a strong sociocultural dichotomy, giving rise to accusations of neo-colonialism. In contrast, the resilience discourse emphasises the positive, transformative aspects of local agency, rather than seeing it as deficient and needing paternal guidance. This paper argues that by claiming to merely plus up already existing social practices, international policy engagement in the Global South becomes difficult to conceive as boundary transgression or hierarchical imposition. These insights are drawn out with reference to the Merida Initiative, a US-Mexican security agreement signed in 2007.
Many conflicts throughout the world can be characterized as sovereignty conflicts in which two states claim exclusive sovereign rights for different reasons over the same piece of land. It is increasingly clear that the available remedies have been less than successful in many of these cases, and that a peaceful and definitive solution is needed. This book proposes a fair and just way of dealing with certain sovereignty conflicts. Drawing on the work of John Rawls in A Theory of Justice, this book considers how distributive justice theories can be in tune with the concept of sovereignty and explores the possibility of a solution for sovereignty conflicts based on Rawlsian methodology. Jorge E. Núñ!ez explores a solution of egalitarian shared sovereignty, evaluating what sorts of institutions and arrangements could, and would, best realize shared sovereignty, and how it might be applied to territory, population, government, and law.
This article seeks to create a State failure indicator. The methodology combines descriptive and multivariate statistics to analyze the databases Quality of Government Institute and the Earth Policy Institute. The results suggest that: (1) the independence of the judiciary is the variable that contributes the least to the creation of a State failure indicator; (2) cluster analysis classified 17 countries as collapsed states, Somalia is the most extreme case; and (3) ethnic fragmentation and uneven economic development show statistically significant variation between clusters.
As highlighted in the introductory chapter, for many commentators, the lack of success of international peacebuilding efforts has been explained through the pragmatic discourse of ‘liberal peace’, where it is assumed that ‘liberal’ Western understandings and assumptions have influenced policymaking leading to counterproductive results. At the core of the critique is the assumption that the international peacebuilding approach sought to reproduce and impose liberal models: focused on the formal liberal institutional framework of state sovereignty, markets, human rights and democracy. This chapter challenges this view of Western policymaking and suggests that post-Cold War post-conflict intervention and peacebuilding can be better understood as reflecting disillusionment with classical liberal assumptions about the autonomous subject – framed in terms of sovereignty, law, democracy and the market. The loss of credibility of liberal modernist frameworks of understanding the world (dealt with further in the concluding chapter) enabled pragmatic critiques of liberal peacebuilding to rewrite post-Cold War intervention in ways that have exaggerated the ‘liberal’ nature of the policy frameworks and acted as apologia, excusing policy failure on the basis of the self-flattering view of Western policy elites: that non-Western subjects were not ready for ‘Western’ freedoms.
The destabilization of Eastern Europe and of the Southern Mediterranean has exposed the limits of the European peace project. Obviously, the European Neighbourhood Policy has not succeeded in boosting peace and prosperity. This article attributes this failure to a combination of functionalist hubris and political myopia that emanates from the European Union’s peculiar constitution as a regulatory power with weak political union. While the projection of the European Union’s single market acquis has set over-ambitious targets, the needs of the partner countries and the wider geopolitical implications of the Neighbourhood Policy have received little political attention. In sum, the experience at the fringes of the European peace project not only unveils the limits of the European Union as a foreign policy actor, but it also raises more theoretical questions on the notion of ‘liberal peace’.
Globalizing processes are gathering increased attention for complicating the nature of political boundaries, authority and sovereignty. Recent examples of global financial and political turmoil have also created a sense of unease about the durability of the modern international order and the ability of our existing theoretical frameworks to explain system dynamics. In light of the inadequacies of traditional international relation (IR) theories in explaining the contemporary global context, a growing range of scholars have been seeking to make sense of world politics through an analytical focus on hierarchies instead. Until now, the explanatory potential of such research agendas and their implications for the discipline went unrecognized, partly due to the fragmented nature of the IR field. To address this gap, this ground-breaking book brings leading IR scholars together in a conversation on hierarchy and thus moves the discipline in a direction better equipped to deal with the challenges of the twenty-first century.
What does a “responsible end” to war in Afghanistan mean? As a panacea for international disengagement, the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) was launched in 2010. After the 2001 intervention, the Bonn Agreement laid the foundations for a new Afghan state. Its exclusion of the Taliban signaled continuing conflict. The APRP is ostensibly designed to address this and other exclusions and foster an “inclusive peace.” This article probes the peace process at the macro-, meso-, and micro levels within the context of ongoing war. It examines the abandonment and marginalization experienced by women, segments of the insurgency, civil society and human rights groups as well as fragile communities undergoing reintegration. I argue that these exclusions are facilitated by a coalescence of interests that have reinforced the cycle of war and deepened exclusion. Consequently, the peace process has become incapable of offering real solutions, instead functioning as a pretext for excluding already marginalized groups.
At the beginning of the interwar period, almost all European countries had introduced democratic rights. But at the end, more than half were under outright autocratic rule. Using csQCA, this article tests five structural explanations of why democracies either survived or did not gain a foothold. The results show that early state-building was a necessary condition for democratic survival. In the case of the predominant path to democratic stability, this factor was combined with weak landlords and a subordination of religious interests to political authority. Furthermore, the findings indicate that strong landlords and the absence of a liberal hegemony were prerequisites for establishing or continuing autocratic rule. In conjunction with late state-building or a strong, independent religious leadership, these factors made up two paths that applied to all democratic reversals but one. As regards lessons from history, the study suggests that deficient state-building and ‘strongmen’, such as powerful agrarian and religious elites, impede the construction, stabilization and deepening of democracy in today's developing countries.
This book addresses gaps in thinking and practice on how the private sector can both help and hinder the process of building peace after armed conflict. It argues that weak governance in fragile and conflict-affected societies creates a need for international authorities to regulate the social impact of business activity in these places as a special interim duty. Policymaking should seek appropriate opportunities to engage with business while harnessing its positive contributions to sustainable peace. However, scholars have not offered frameworks for what is considered 'appropriate' engagement or properly theorised techniques for how best to influence responsible business conduct. United Nations peace operations are peak symbols of international regulatory responsibilities in conflict settings, and debate continues to grow around the private sector's role in development generally. This book is the first to study how peace operations have engaged with business to influence its peace-building impact.
The recent proliferation of referendums on sovereignty matters has fuelled growing scholarly interest. However, comparative research is hindered by the weaknesses of current compilations, which tend to suffer from conceptual vagueness, varied coding decisions, incomplete coverage and ad hoc categorizations. Based on an improved conceptualization and theory-driven typology, this article presents a new dataset of 602 sovereignty referendums from 1776–2012, more than double the number in existing lists. In an exploratory analysis, it uncovers eight distinctive clusters of sovereignty referendums and identifies patterns of activity over time and space as well as outcomes produced.
In their earlier work on juridical statehood and its impact on development, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg noted the expectation that international legal norms thatguarantee state sovereignty and the borders of states would contribute to the political development of statehood in Africa (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986, p. 14). The logic behind such assumptions was obvious and compelling: because states in Africa would be freed from having to defend themselves from external threats, they would be at greater liberty to devote scarce resources to their own development.
With the recent developments in Syria the United Nations is once again making headlines. The failure to reach an agreement on a Security Council resolution demonstrates the continued problems in forging a coherent international response to crisis situations. This lack of coherence continues despite recognition of the need for more cooperation to solve the growing list of global problems. With the relative success of global governance initiatives in relation to the environment, health issues, and economic problems, the focus has increasingly shifted to the problems of international security. This timely and important book represents a response to that shift and the implications this has for the wider international system. Using a number of relevant case studies (including the UN interventions in Bosnia, Somalia, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and East Timor) it examines the securitisation of global governance through the prism of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and demonstrates that the development of both global governance and global security governance have transformed the environment in which international organisations, such as the United Nations, are operating. Moreover this book brings together a number of the key academic debates surrounding both global security governance and peacekeeping. It combines an examination of the power relations of global security governance, with the changing nature of peacekeeping operations. By bringing the two areas together the book for the first time bridges existing literatures and debates, from theoretical discussions of global governance, to practical examinations of peacekeeping operations. UN-Tied Nations provides a concise and analytical introduction to the ongoing debates around the development of global governance, global security governance, and the continuous impact these are having on the ability of the United Nations to act as an international peacekeeper.
This book provides an introduction to democratic theory and empirical research on democracy and democratization. The book first examines conceptions of democracy from the origins in ancient Greece to the present day, then tracks when and where modern democracy has developed. On this basis, the book reviews the major debates and schools of thought dealing with domestic and international causes and consequences of democratization. Based on a systematic distinction between minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy, the book provides a comprehensive and critical assessment of existing theories. Furthermore, using a comparative, historical perspective, it not only sketches the development in the conceptions of democracy and the corresponding empirical reality but also discusses whether causal relationships differ across periods. Finally, the book documents the way in which all of this has been reflected by the development within the literature. In doing so, the book offers a coherent framework, which students and scholars can use to grasp the literature on democracy and democratization as a whole.
This paper develops a game-theoretic approach to the problem of political officials' respect for political and economic rights of citizens. It models the policing of rights as a coordination problem among citizens, but one with asymmetries difficult to resolve in a decentralized manner. The paper shows that democratic stability depends on a self-enforcing equilibrium: It must be in the interests of political officials to respect democracy's limits on their behavior. The concept of self-enforcing limits on the state illuminates a diverse set of problems and thus serves as a potential basis for integrating the literature. The framework is applied to a range of topics, such as democratic stability, plural societies, and elite pacts. The paper also applies its lessons to the case of the Glorious Revolution in seventeenth-century England.
Some scholars suggest that the Middle East's oil wealth helps explain its failure to democratize. This article examines three aspects of this “oil impedes democracy” claim. First, is it true? Does oil have a consistendy antidemocratic effect on states, once other factors are accounted for? Second, can this claim be generalized? Is it true only in the Middle East or elsewhere as well? Is it true for other types of mineral wealth and other types of commodity wealth or only for oil? Finally, if oil does have antidemocratic properties, what is the causal mechanism?
The author uses pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 to show that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; that this effect is not limited to the Middle East; and that other types of mineral exports have a similar antidemocratic effect, while other types of commodity exports do not.
The author also tests three explanations for this pattern: a “rentier effect,” which suggests that resource-rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to dampen democratic pressures; a “repression effect,” which holds that resource wealth enables governments to strengthen their internal security forces and hence repress popular movements; and a “modernization effect,” which implies that growth that is based on the export of oil and minerals will fail to bring about die social and cultural changes that tend to produce democratic government. He finds at least limited support for all three effects.
The transition from communism in Europe and the former Soviet Union has only sometimes produced a transition to democracy. Since the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, most of the twenty-eight new states have abandoned communism, but only nine of these have entered the ranks of liberal democracies. The remaining majority of new postcommunist states are various shades of dictatorships or unconsolidated "transitional regimes." This article seeks to explain why some states abandoned communism for democracy while others turned to authoritarian rule. In endorsing actorcentric approaches that have dominated analyses of the third wave of democratization, this argument nonetheless offers an alternative set of causal paths from ancien régime to new regime that can account for both democracy and dictatorship as outcomes. Situations of unequal distributions of power produced the quickest and most stable transitions from communist rule. In countries with asymmetrical balances of power, the regime to emerge depends almost entirely on the ideological orientation of the most powerful. In countries where democrats enjoyed a decisive power advantage, democracy emerged. Conversely, in countries in which dictators maintained a decisive power advantage, dictatorship emerged. In between these two extremes were countries in which the distribution of power between the old regime and its challengers was relatively equal. Rather than producing stalemate, compromise, and pacted transitions to democracy, however, such situations in the postcommunist world resulted in protracted confrontation between relatively balanced powers. The regimes that emerged from these modes of transitions are not the most successful democracies but rather are unconsolidated, unstable, partial democracies.
This paper integrates game-theoretical and sociological concepts to conduct a comparative historical analysis of the relations between culture and institutions. It indicates the importance of culture, and in particular cultural beliefs, in determining institutions, in institutional path dependence, and in forestalling intersociety successful adoption of institutions. Examination of institutional change in two premodern societies from the Muslim and the Latin worlds yields that their distinct institutional structures resemble those found by social psychologists to differentiate contemporary developing and developed economies. This suggests the historical importance of distinct cultures and the related societal organizations in economic development. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.
Despite their presumed liabilities, institutions associated with democracy serve as a source of power in prolonged international competition by increasing the financial resources that states can bring to bear. The theory of sovereign debt suggests that a state s ability to raise money through public borrowing is enhanced when debtholders have mechanisms for sanctioning state leaders in the event of default. Institutions associated with liberal government provide such mechanisms. All other things being equal, states that possess these institutions enjoy superior access to credit and lower interest rates than do states in which the sovereign has more discretion to default unilaterally. Liberal states can not only raise more money from a given economic base but can also pursue tax-smoothing policies that minimize economic distortions. The ability to finance competition in a manner that is consistent with long-term economic growth generates a significant advantage in prolonged rivalries. These claims are explored by analyzing the Anglo-French rivalry (1688 1815) and the Cold War.We gratefully acknowledge thoughtful comments from Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Conklin, Shinju Fujihira, Peter Gourevtich, David Lake, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Fran ois Velde, and the anonymous referees.
The transition from communism in Europe and the former Soviet Union has only sometimes led to democracy. Since the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, twenty-eight mostly new states have abandoned communism. But only eight - the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and just last year, Croatia - have entered the ranks of liberal democracies. The remaining majority of new postcommunist states are various shades of dictatorships or unconsolidated “transitional” regimes. Why? Why did some states abandon communism for democracy, while others for authoritarian rule? Why are some states stuck in between? The answers to these questions should be easy for political science. Simultaneous regime change in two dozen countries - all beginning from roughly similar places, but moving along very different trajectories over ten years - provides the perfect parameters to test extant theories and develop new hypotheses about regime change. Clear variation on the dependent variable with a finite set of independent variables offered up a unique laboratory to isolate causal patterns. A decade since the collapse of European communism, however, theory development regarding regime change has advanced only slightly. At the beginning of the decade, Adam Przeworski pointed to the inability to predict communism’s collapse as a “dismal failure of political science.” Yet, the paucity of plausible explanations for regime patterns in the postcommunist world ten years later stands as an even greater indictment.
International Security 29.2 (2004) 85-120
Conventional sovereignty assumes a world of autonomous, internationally recognized, and well- governed states. Although frequently violated in practice, the fundamental rules of conventional sovereignty—recognition of juridically independent territorial entities and nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states—have rarely been challenged in principle. But these rules no longer work, and their inadequacies have had deleterious consequences for the strong as well as the weak. The policy tools that powerful and well-governed states have available to "fix" badly governed or collapsed states—principally governance assistance and transitional administration (whether formally authorized by the United Nations or engaged in by a coalition of the willing led by the United States)— are inadequate. In the future, better domestic governance in badly governed, failed, and occupied polities will require the transcendence of accepted rules, including the creation of shared sovereignty in specific areas. In some cases, decent governance may require some new form of trusteeship, almost certainly de facto rather than de jure.
Many countries suffer under failed, weak, incompetent, or abusive national authority structures. The best that people living in such countries can hope for is marginal improvement in their material well-being; limited access to social services, including health care and education; and a moderate degree of individual physical security. At worst they will confront endemic violence, exploitative political leaders, falling life expectancy, declining per capita income, and even state-sponsored genocide. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), for example, civil wars that have persisted for more than two decades have resulted in millions of deaths. In Zimbabwe the policies of President Robert Mugabe, who was determined to stay in office regardless of the consequences for his country's citizens, led to an economic debacle that began in 2000 with falling per capita income, inflation above 500 percent, and the threat of mass starvation. In Colombia much of the territory is controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist rebel group thatderives most of its income from drug trafficking. In Rwanda more than 700,000 people were slaughtered in a matter of weeks in 1994 as a result of a government-organized genocide.
The consequences of failed and inadequate governance have not been limited to the societies directly affected. Poorly governed societies can generate conflicts that spill across international borders. Transnational criminal and terrorist networks can operate in territories not controlled by the internationally recognized government. Humanitarian disasters not only prick the conscience of political leaders in advanced democratic societies but also leave them with no policy options that are appealing to voters.
Challenges related to creating better governance also arise where national authority structures have collapsed because of external invasion and occupation rather than internal conflict. The availability of weapons of mass destruction and the presence of transnational terrorism have created a historically unprecedented situation in which polities with very limited material capability can threaten the security of much more powerful states. These polities can be conquered and occupied with relative ease, leaving the occupying power with the more challenging task of establishing an acceptable domestic governing structure. Contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq are the obvious cases in point.
Left to their own devices, collapsed and badly governed states will not fix themselves because they have limited administrative capacity, not least with regard to maintaining internal security. Occupying powers cannot escape choices about what new governance structures will be created and sustained. To reduce international threats and improve the prospects for individuals insuch polities, alternative institutional arrangements supported by external actors, such as de facto trusteeships and shared sovereignty, should be added to the list of policy options.
The current menu of policy instruments for dealing with collapsed and failing states is paltry, consisting primarily of transitional administration and foreign assistance to improve governance, both of which assume that in more or less short order, targeted states can function effectively on their own. Nation- building or state-building efforts are almost always described in terms of empowering local authorities to assume the responsibilities of conventional sovereignty. The role of external actors is understood to be limited...
International Security 28.4 (2004) 5-43
George W. Bush and his administration came into office with a self-consciously realist orientation in foreign policy. The president and his advisers derided the Clinton administration's multilateralism as mere form without national security substance. They viewed Russia and China as the main potential threats or sources of danger, and regarded Bill Clinton as a naïve idealist for neglecting these great powers in favor of "foreign policy as social work"—humanitarian ventures in areas peripheral to U.S. national security concerns. Consistent with a realist suspicion of multilateralism and confidence in self-help, the administration's principal foreign policy project in its first months was the unilateral pursuit of ballistic missile defense.
The Bush team was particularly critical of U.S. participation in quixotic efforts at nation building for failed states. As a candidate, Vice President Dick Cheney created a significant flap in August 2000 when he suggested that the Bush administration would end U.S. participation in NATO's Bosnia mission. Condoleezza Rice, who would become Bush's national security adviser, expressed dismayed amazement that U.S. troops were being used to take children to kindergarten in Bosnia. The message was clear: The Bush administration would not engage in state-building efforts.
Ironically, the Bush administration has since undertaken state-building projects that are vastly larger and more difficult than anything the Clinton administration ever attempted. The U.S. military is now building kindergartens in Afghanistan, in addition to paving roads and assisting with many other major infrastructure projects in both Afghanistan and Iraq. GIs report on instructing Iraqis in how to run a town meeting with an agenda and turn taking—"It's basic P.T.A. stuff," one commented. These are local-level complements to the complex, higher-level efforts to build workable national political structures in both countries. And all this is happening without any significant reduction in U.S. involvement in ongoing peacekeeping operations in Kosovo or Bosnia. Indeed, the Bush administration even took on new peacekeeping responsibilities in Liberia, albeit very small ones thus far.
It can be argued that despite the apparent about-face, the Bush administration has actually kept true to its realist principles. It is attempting to rebuild "rogue" states that the United States attacked and destroyed as perceived threats to national security, rather than states that failed largely on their own. Arguing that chaos in Liberia does not threaten U.S. security, Pentagon officials successfully resisted the strong "CNN effect," as well as international and possibly State Department pressure for a more active U.S. role. In broader terms, the administration claims that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the game, clarifying a new security threat.
We argue to the contrary that the Bush administration's brand of realism has collided with post-Cold War realities that shaped the Clinton administration's foreign policy as well. Even before September 11, the world was changing in such a way that the main security threats and problems now emerge not from great power security competition—Russia and China, for example—but from the consequences of political disorder, misrule, and humiliation in the third world. These threats and problems have the character of "public bads" for the major powers. That is, collapsed states and rogue regimes seeking nuclear weapons impose diffuse costs on the major powers and other states. The total costs are often large enough that it would pay to address them, but not so large that doing so is necessarily worthwhile for any one state. Given the nature of the problem, the incentives for burden sharing through multilateral arrangements are strong. Furthermore, whether the problem is a failed state or a rogue regime that has been attacked and destroyed, state-building efforts led by major power interveners and international organizations are practically inevitable (to the Bush administration's chagrin).
As a result, the United States is now drawn toward a form of international governance that may be described as neotrusteeship, or more provocatively, postmodern imperialism. The terms refer to the complicated mixes of international and domestic governance structures that are evolving in Bosnia...
Political theorists from Machiavelli to Huntington have denied the possibility of popular government arising out of the chaos of civil war, instead prescribing an intermediate stage of one-man rule by a Prince, Leviathan, or a military dictator. Based on recent empirical evidence of post-civil war democratization in El Salvador, Mozambique, and elsewhere, I show that democracy can arise directly from anarchy. Predatory warring factions choose the citizenry and democratic procedures over a Leviathan when (1) their economic interests depend on productive investment by the citizens, (2) citizens' political preferences ensure that power allocation will be less biased under democracy than under a Leviathan, and (3) there is an external agency (e.g., the United Nations) that mediates and supervises joint disarmament and state-building. Ultimately, I discuss the implications of this argument for the basic intuitions of classical political theory and contemporary social theory regarding democratization and authoritarianism.
International peacebuilding can improve the prospects that a civil war will be resolved. Although peacebuilding strategies must be designed to address particular conflicts, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. Strategies should address the local roots of hostility; the local capacities for change; and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist change. One can conceive of these as the three dimensions of a triangle, whose area is the "political space"—or effective capacity—for building peace. We test these propositions with an extensive data set of 124 post-World War Two civil wars and find that multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference. UN peacekeeping is positively correlated with democratization processes after civil war and multilateral enforcement operations are usually successful in ending the violence. Our study provides broad guidelines to design the appropriate peacebuilding strategy, given the mix of hostility, local capacities, and international capacities.
The authors analyze the nation-state as a worldwide institution constructed by worldwide cultural and associational processes, developing four main topics: (1) properties of nation-states that result from their exogenously driven construction, including isomorphism, decoupling, and expansive structuration; (2) processes by which rationalistic world culture affects national states; (3) characteristics of world society that enhance the impact of world culture on national states and societies, including conditions favoring the diffusion of world models, expansion of world-level associations, and rationalized scientific and professional authority; (4) dynamic features of world culture and society that generate expansion, conflict, and change, especially the statelessness of world society, legitimation of multiple levels of rationalized actors, and internal inconsistencies and contradictions.
Most explanations for the creation of new state institutions locate the cause of change in the conditions or characteristics of the states themselves. Some aspect of a state's economic, social, political, or military situation is said to create a functional need for the new bureaucracy which then is taken up by one or more domestic groups who succeed in changing the state apparatus. However, changes in state structure may be prompted not only by changing conditions of individual states but also by socialization and conformance with international norms. In the case of one organizational innovation recently adopted by states across the international system, namely, science policy bureaucracies, indicators of state conditions and functional need for these entities are not correlated with the pattern for their adoption. Instead, adoption was prompted by the activities of an international organization which states the value of science policy organizations and established the coordination of science as an appropriate, and even a necessary, role for states. This finding lends support to constructivist or reflective theories that treat states as social entities shaped by international social action, as opposed to more conventional treatments of states as autonomous international agents.
State Death in the International System Table 1 on p. 320. 11. On foreign assistance, see David H. Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime For data on assistance as a percentage of government expenditures, see World Development Indicators Online at http
- Tanisha M Fazal
Tanisha M. Fazal, "State Death in the International System," International
Organization 58 (April 2004): 311-44, esp. Table 1 on p. 320.
11. On foreign assistance, see David H. Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949-89 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993). For data on assistance as a percentage of government expenditures,
see World Development Indicators Online at http://devdata.worldbank.org/
dataonline.
- D David
- Laitin
David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship," International Security 28 (Spring 2004): 5-43;
Some Social Requisites of Democracy A decade later, Samuel P. Huntington offered a complementary view contending that political mobilization without adequate institutionalization could lead to political underdevelopment
- Lipset Seymour Martin
Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American
Political Science Review 53 (March 1959): 79-84. A decade later, Samuel P.
Huntington offered a complementary view contending that political mobilization
without adequate institutionalization could lead to political underdevelopment.
12, and 15, www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html. For other examples of the use of international judges, see William W. Burke-White, "A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Articles 2 to 4, 12, and 15,
www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html. For other examples of the use of
international judges, see William W. Burke-White, "A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement," Michigan Journal of
International Law 24 (Fall 2002): 1-102.
Revised NATO Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA] Supplementary Agreement, and 28. The full text of the agreement is available at www.osc.army.mil. For a general analysis of Germany's situation after World War II
- Blaisdell
Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the
Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman
Public Debt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), 90-107.
17. "Revised NATO Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA] Supplementary Agreement," 3 August 1959, articles 19, 22, and 28. The full text of the agreement is
available at www.osc.army.mil. For a general analysis of Germany's situation after
World War II, see Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The
Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative AnalysisEvaluating Issues in Peace Implementation Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements The arguments presented here are elaborated inSharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States
- W Michael
- Nicholas Doyle
- George Sambanis
- Stephen John Downs
- Stedman
Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science Review 94 (December
2000): 779-802; and George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluating
Issues in Peace Implementation," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and
Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace
Agreements (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 50-52. The arguments presented here are elaborated in Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New
Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," International Security 29 (Fall 2004):
85-120.
Avner Greif emphasizes the importance of historical context for understanding the possibilities for self-enforcing equilibria. See Avner GreifCultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies
Avner Greif emphasizes the importance of historical context for understanding the possibilities for self-enforcing equilibria. See Avner Greif, "Cultural Beliefs
and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-50;
and Avner Greif, Institutions: Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).