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Adaptation to Climate Change as Ecological Modernisation: Australian Experience
Leigh Glover, GAMUT, University of Melbourne, Australia
Mikael Granberg, CUReS, Örebro University, Sweden
2011 European Conference Political Research Conference,
Reykjavik, Iceland, 25—27 August.
Section (ID 92): Green Politics:
Panel: Adaptation to Climate Change on National, Regional and Local Levels
Abstract
National policy approaches to adaptation to climate change in Australia are used to
address a research inquiry into the political values of adaptation policies. This study
examines whether this public policy response constitutes ecological modernisation
and considers the implications. Ecological modernisation’s associations with neo-
liberalism are reviewed and an account of key public policies is given. Particular
attention is paid to maladaptation risks and the question of the possible influence of
ecological modernisation in contributing to these risks. Key findings include that the
Australian adaptation policy approach features ecological modernisation, that
comprehensive-rational planning is used, and that ecological justice values are at
risk.
1. Introduction
Australian public policy experience is used as a case to investigate the politics of
climate change adaptation policy. While Australian efforts at national adaptation
policy cover both social systems and the management of natural systems, the latter
of which has arguably received the greatest effort to date, although more recently
there has been an increased attention given to social systems. It is this latter theme
that is of interest in this paper and to which three research questions are posed:
Firstly, what are the associations between policy approaches to adaptation and
ecological modernisation? Secondly, what is the effect of the comprehensive-rational
approaches on adaptation policy? Thirdly, is there evidence of ecological justice
being considered in adaptation policy?
Climate change has been a major national political topic in recent Australian
political history, notably as an issue in the 2007 federal election (where some
commentators consider that it was influential in bringing the Rudd Labor
Government to power), and in the subsequent efforts of the Rudd and Gillard Labor
governments to introduce carbon taxation and carbon emissions trading (Rootes,
2011; Tranter, 2011). Further, climate change has been a major factor in the
leadership of the two major political parties in Australia during this period and the
prominence of the issue has coincided with increased electoral success by the Greens
Party—which has campaigned on its credentials as being progressive on climate
change policy (Rootes, 2011; Tranter, 2011).
This year saw the Gillard government announcing the introduction of a national
carbon tax as a presage to a full emissions trading scheme, with the result that the
minority Labor government has been engaged in one of the most intense political
debates with the Coalition Opposition of the contemporary era. Australia’s next
federal election will not be until between August and November 2013, but a number
of commentators are of the view that the carbon tax will be a major issue, with the
Opposition on record as promising to repeal the tax if they are electorally successful.
A number of opinion polls have been conducted throughout this period and the
findings suggest that either the polling is not be regarded as reflective of public
opinion, or that the Australian public has waxed and waned over its regard of the
need to take action on climate change. One obvious complication here is the
possibility of the emergence of US-style ‘push polling’ that attempts to influence or
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alter opinion, and the partisan use of poll results by both major parties and their
supporters. Considerable caution in any interpretation of the polls of contemporary
public opinion would seem prudent.
Determining national public opinion on climate change may be equivocal, but
national behaviour in the production of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is
incontrovertible and unequivocal; Australia’s GHG emissions are high and continue to
increase. According to the most recent National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (for
2009), GHG emissions from all sectors (excluding land use, land use change, and
forestry) were 545.8 MtCO2-e (DCCEE, 2011a). Land use, land use change, and
forestry emissions were another 54 MtCO2-e (DCCEE, 2011a). Adding bunker fuels
that can be attributed to Australians’ international travel and export of commodities
and products, increases the GHG total another 12 MtCO2-e (DCCEE, 2011a). These
emissions have grown considerably, being some 30% above the Kyoto Protocol
baseline year of 1990 (DCCEE, 2011a). A forecast of future emissions by the federal
government—in Australia’s Emission Projections 2010—has emissions increasing 24%
above the year 2000 levels by 2020 in the absence of further policy action (DCCEE,
2010a). Per capita emissions are also high, being around 25 tMCO2-e.
Against this backdrop of intense party political controversy over national public
policy on GHG emissions mitigation, previous national climate change strategies have
been without controversy. Indeed, it would appear that it is only the carbon tax and
related initiatives from the 2011 national climate change strategy that has drawn
attention (see, Australia, 2011); the remainder of the document has been largely
ignored in the public debate. Each state and territory in Australia has its own
climate change strategy, but again, these have attracted little attention in political
debate and have received considerably less scholarly inquiry than the national
policies. Australia has in excess of 700 local governments, who comprise the third
sphere of Australia’s system of government, and many of these have climate change
policies. No national review has been carried out, nor is here a national inventory of
these local government policies; however, most are very modest in scale, resourcing,
and delivery.
Australia’s natural and social systems are vulnerable to climate change impacts and
a number of factors contribute to instances of high potential vulnerability.
Ecosystems, water security, and coastal communities in Australia were identified by
the IPCC as being exposed to higher risks of climate change and associated sea level
rise (IPCC, 2007). It is the government’s view that (DCCEE, 2010b: 5): “The impacts
of climate change will affect every facet of Australia’s economy, society and
environment.” A national adaptation response has been prepared, most recently in
2010, as described below (DCCEE, 2010b), yet the political aspects and implications
of adaptation policy have been subject to very little scholarly attention.
1. Ecological Modernisation
Ecological modernisation captures aspects of both the successful normative
responses of modern states to environmental problems, but also the positive and
aspiring aspects of the ways in which industrial states can shape and direct economic
markets to respond to problems such as climate change; i.e., it is a practice and an
ideology. As political theorist Albert Weale (1992: 75) states, there is “no one
canonical statement of the ideology of ecological modernisation”, but rather it
represents a transformation of the problem of environmental pollution and the roles
and activities of the state and corporations. In effect, the forces of modernisation
are harnessed to ensure its rescue, for as Spaargaren and Mol (1992) state, ecological
modernisation is way of addressing the environmental crisis without abandoning
modernisation. Weale (1992) identified failings of the older paradigm of industrial
states in responding to pollution, namely: that pollution could be handled by a
specialist branch of government, that environmental problems were well understood
and could be handled discretely, end-of-pipe solutions were deemed as typically
being adequate, and that environmental standards involved balancing the conflicting
goals of environmental protection and economic growth. These assumptions of the
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character of environmental problems are rejected under ecological modernisation.
Contrary to these assumptions, ecological modernisation holds that simple causative
factors are often absent in environmental problems, as there are often long and
indirect chains between cause and effect and these can operate over long time
frames. Further, it considers that end-of-pipe fixes are prone to failure in these
circumstances and the problem of displacement can occur, whereby pollution is
simply transferred from one location to another or into a different medium. Unless
pollution is addressed at its source, according to ecological modernisation, a
satisfactory resolution is unlikely. Ecological modernisation finds that narrow state
agencies and institutions have insufficient span and reach to deal with environmental
problems that require broad and coordinated institutional responses. As practice,
ecological modernisation is the institutional response to this revised perception of
pollution, which was informed by ecological and environmental research.
Underlying this re-conceptualisation of environmental problems are three
rationalisations (Weale, 1992). Firstly, by avoiding the costs of pollution there are
savings to current and for future generations and the avoidance of accumulated costs
means that these savings are greater. A part of this involves making the costs of
pollution visible and changed from being externalities to internalised costs borne by
corporations. Secondly, environmental protection is a source of future growth and
promotes innovation. Thirdly, under globalised markets, product acceptability will
be determined by the nation with the most stringent pollution standards, so that
future economies will need to be able to produce “high value, high quality products
with stringent environmental standards enforced”. Globalisation, in this view, is a
process that promotes increased control standards around the world. Reconciliation
is believed essential between economic growth and environmental protection; rather
than being opposed, ecological modernisation harnesses both to a common cause and
is bound together by these rationalisations. Strategically, ecological modernisation
engages in changes to production techniques to reduce pollution and resource use,
designing government institutions and markets according to ecological goals, and
creating environmental awareness amongst all major stakeholders. As a result,
ecological modernisation has given rise to environmental management systems,
awareness-raising about the environmental consequences of goods and services
(embracing their production, consumption, and disposal), market-based solutions,
voluntary measures by corporations, and guidelines and codes of practice.
Industrial states deployed their institutional apparatus to form new relationships
with the corporate sector to devise responses to pollution in line with the ecological
perception of pollution (and associated) problems. Government’s role is transformed
from the more regulatory and centralised ‘command and control’ approach to that
that ‘steers’ corporations and markets towards ecological goals, is flexible and
decentralised, and provides the institutional support for new markets and product
development. Cooperation and partnership characterise the new relationships
between governments and firms. Ideologically, the ideal is to harness state authority
and corporate capital and innovation in ways to redress pollution and foster
economic growth, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of both state and corporation as
agents in environmental protection. Central to the success of ecological
modernisation are the factors that drive modernisation, notably those associated
with technology and innovation and their rational application to industrial
production of goods and services, ultimately destined for mass consumption. Part of
the appeal to corporations is the prospect of efficiency gains through the reduction
of waste, the creation of new products and services demanded by a greener
economy, favourable public relations from endorsing a progressive cause, and the
possibly avoidance of unwanted government regulation. Flowing from these greener
technologies, goods, and services, is greater economic growth that benefits the
wider economy and, at the other end of the process, the associated benefits to
consumers.
Hajer (1995) declared ecological modernisation to be the dominant discourse for
dealing with environmental problems; i.e., environmental governance. Although
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ecological modernisation is term with greater use in Europe, much of the
contemporary rhetoric and practice of free-market environmentalism of the English-
speaking developed nations seemingly shares some common ground with ecological
modernisation, as Dryzek (1997) observes. Certainly they share a promotion of the
role of corporations in investing in pollution reduction, especially by applying
technological innovations. A point of difference may be that ecological
modernisation has a stronger role for the expression of state power and readily
endorses the role of regulation, while free-market environmentalism has a more
restricted role for the state in creating and managing markets for environmental
goods and acting to give recognition to values typically external to the conventional
economy.
Some scholars recognise a continuum of ecological modernisation (as practice and as
ideology), ranging from that which offers a mild corrective to activities that threaten
ecological values, whereby it exhibits the features of sustainable development, to it
being a radical movement that re-casts the role of the state in transforming
capitalist economies towards the goal of ecological sustainability (Christoff, 1996).
Modern states did undergo reforms that constituted a modernisation in which the key
stakeholders were able to continue to hold their place in the political and economic
order in the face of the ecological crisis.
Ecological modernisation has succeeded in many ways in reducing pollution, reducing
wasteful resource use, and addressing other environmental problems across the
developed world, as Hajer (1995), Weale (1992), and others have described. Despite
these positive outcomes, there are limits to its successes. Such limits are reached in
dealing with issues and problems for which it may not well be suited and
jurisdictions and states unable or unwilling to undertake such actions, including
those that have used less cooperative and more authoritarian approaches to
environmental protection. Unsuitable issues for ecological modernization closely
reflect those for which economic growth doesn’t result in greater environmental
protection. Economic growth can be amenable to improved environmental protection
when the environmental problems and their solutions concerned are (Glover, 2002:
252): “… relatively inexpensive, amenable to regulatory control, of small scale and
short-term, usually urban and linked to issues of human health and industrial
production.” Problems without inexpensive technological fixes, that involve diffuse
and distributed sources, and that require social change are as problematic for
solutions under ecological modernisation as for any other approaches.
As Dryzek (1997) suggests, those seeking more radical change reject the reformist
approach of ecological modernisation. Critics believing capitalism to be
environmentally destructive reject ecological modernisation as internally
contradictory. Others question the efficacy of technology-based solutions; including
doubting the applicability of narrow solutions to wider problems and a range of
locations, and noting the gap between the availability of a cleaner technology and
the extent to which it is taken up by corporations (York and Rosa, 2003). A number
of critics are concerned that local successes can be achieved by transferring the
problem to another location (e.g., Christoff, 1996). York and Rosa (2003) also
identify a problem that ecological modernisation makes energy and resource
consumption more attractive, so that rather than leading to an ultimate goal of
energy and resource conservation, the opposite occurs. Ecological modernisation can
result in local successes, but the widespread and continual degradation of the
environment can continue regardless. Low and Gleeson (1998), amongst others,
identify the risks of ecological modernisation that seeks to promote reduced
environmental costs without regard to social equity, so it can reinforce or worsen
social injustice in the name of environmental protection.
3. National Approaches to Adaptation Policy
Australian climate change strategies have generally followed a tripartite division of:
measures for GHG emissions abatement, assessment of potential climate change
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impacts, and indentifying or contributing to responses to adapt to climate change,
an approach that is fairly standard around the world. Up until quite recently each of
these elements were perceived independently, but there is growing recognition in
the scholarly literature of the complementarity between mitigation and adaptation
policies and the potential to adapt to climate change in ways that also reduce GHG
emissions. Examples include use of renewable energy, greater energy efficiency, and
livestock management. Policies in Australia have yet to recognise this development
to any great extent. Across the trajectory of national policy development,
adaptation has undergone a considerable increase in profile, and has now become
the subject of separate national strategies and research programs, in contrast to its
earlier treatment where it was accorded a low priority. Party platforms, political
expedience, and changing circumstances have resulted in differences in national
climate change policy that reflect the government holding office (Bulkeley, 2000;
Christoff, 2005, 2008, Hamilton, 2001; Rootes, 2011; and Tranter, 2011). Key policy
documents embody these political shifts: the first national strategy in 1992 was
produced under the Labor Party’s Hawke (1983—91) and Keating (1991—96)
Governments; the 1998 and 2007 strategies and first adaptation strategy were
products of the Liberal/Coalition (1996—2007) Howard Governments, with the most
recent climate change and adaptation policies under the Labor Party’s Rudd (2007—
10) Gillard (2010—) Governments. It appears that adaptation policy has been largely
immune from the frontline political debate over climate change.
Beginning with Australia’s first National Greenhouse Response Strategy (Australia,
1992), the treatment of adaptation strategies and responses is scant, general, and
tentative. Under ‘strategies’ is listed (Australia, 1992):
• Conduct research, focusing on the “natural, human, and built” environments
most at risk and developing techniques for vulnerability assessment
• Assess the vulnerability of natural, human, and built environments to climate
change impacts
• Incorporate knowledge of impacts into conservation and planning strategies
and into disaster planning, and
• Ensure that natural regime management takes climate change into account.
Despite the breadth of these strategies, only two response actions are described: 1)
To take climate change impacts into account in developing conservation reserves and
to incorporate corridors between protected areas; and 2) To request government
agencies use climate change scenarios in sensitivity analysis when planning to enable
climate change impacts to be taken into account. Treatment of the issue in the
‘process response’ section is slightly more detailed, calling for information sharing
within the government, for governments to cooperate in conservation research, for
environmental impact assessments to incorporate climate change impacts, to work
with local governments to include risk assessments in vulnerability assessments, and
for governments to agree that to conducting vulnerability assessments of the “human
environment” include baseline data, risk assessment, and hazard control studies.
Measures for adaptation in 1998’s The National Greenhouse Strategy (Australia,
1998) are more sophisticated and focused than in 1992, but remain fairly general. A
national framework for adaptation is to be developed which would prepare
integrated assessments for economic sectors and regions. Additionally, the
framework will consider mechanisms for implementation, including the barriers
faced and risks involved. It also describes work underway in key sectors in general
terms; coasts and marine, agriculture, biodiversity, forests, and human health.
Following an appropriation in the national budget of 2004, the National Climate
Change Adaptation Programme (AGO, 2005a) made available AUD$14 million over
four years. This program was linked to the National Climate Change Risk and
Vulnerability: Promoting an Efficient Adaptation Response in Australia (Australia,
2005b), which sought to comparatively assess the climate change impacts risks to
assist in setting adaptation priorities. Indicative of the politics of the time, rather
than use the government’s own research capabilities, the conservative Howard
Government had the task of authoring the National Climate Change Risk and
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Vulnerability report undertaken by consultants, the Allen Consulting Group.
Priorities are viewed as (Australia, 2005b: ix): “Prioritising adaptation action
requires the identification of vulnerable systems – human and natural – the costs if
these fail, the scope to reduce this risk, and the ability to capture any potential
benefits.” An ambitious set of terms of reference was set for this study and the
findings are reasonably broad. It identified priority vulnerable ecosystems and
regions (such as alpine areas, reefs, and tropical forests); vulnerable agri-business
units, water supply, settlements and emergency services, energy (covering
influences on demand and risks to infrastructure), and vulnerable regions. These
findings were based on existing published research on climate change impacts. This
report focused a great deal on impacts rather than on adaptation, per se. In 2006,
the federal government published Climate Change Impacts and Risk Management: A
Guide for Business and Government (AGO, 2006). Primarily this guide provides
instructions on how to conduct a risk management assessment process and how
workshops can be designed for this purpose. While it states as its purpose to help
enumerate these risks, set priorities for responses, and establishing a process for risk
management, it also states that it not intended to address (AGO, 2006: 9) “measures
and actions aimed at mitigating climate change itself”.
Despite the role that research on climate change impacts played in the compilation
of the aforementioned 2005 National Climate Change Risk and Vulnerability report,
there was very little research available on adaptation. Through this period, the role
of science under federal climate change programs did not include adaptation, but
was directed to assist in developing an understanding of actual and potential
impacts. For example, in the review, Australian Climate Change Science Program
2004—2008 (AGO, 2005c), adaptation didn’t rate a mention, nor did it appear in
Australian Climate Change Science Programme: Major Achievements: 1989-2004
(AGO, 2005d).
Climate change was a controversial issue under the Howard government and shortly
before the 2007 election it released a new national climate change policy,
presumably in an attempt to raise its credibility by promising a new platform of
policies. This Climate Change Policy described the government’s AUD$44 million
commitment in the 2007—08 Budget to a new National Climate Adaptation Flagship
(Australia, 2007a). Not all the components directly concerned adaptation, for
example, the funding included support for impacts research and the development of
the Australia Community Climate and Earth System Simulator. Dealing more directly
with adaptation, the policy also stated that the National Adaptation Framework
would guide work over the forthcoming five to seven years. It also stated that the
government would provide AUD$126 million for an Australian Centre for Climate
Change Adaptation. Also released in 2007, the National Climate Change Adaptation
Framework (Australia, 2007b) provides strategic directions and identifies eight
sectors/regions (comprising: water resources, coastal regions, biodiversity,
agriculture/fisheries/forestry, tourism, settlements, and natural disaster
management). One of these items was to support local government by producing a
toolkit, which was originally published in 2007 as Climate Change Adaptation Actions
for Local Government, and subsequently re-printed (DCCEE, 2010b). Included in the
guide were general climate change scenarios, information on the regulatory
framework for adaptation, adaptation options for a wide range of local government
responsibilities, and examples of local government initiatives. Despite this policy
activity, actual output of adaptation research, studies, and other materials
supported by federal government climate change programs was relatively meager in
the years 2006—09, perhaps around a dozen publications.
Under the AUD$126 million Climate Change Adaptation Program, the AUD$20 million
National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF) was established at
Griffith University. NCCARF’s AUD$2.6 million research program has prepared a set
of research plans for the following themes: Terrestrial Biodiversity; Human Health;
Marine Biodiversity and Resources; Freshwater Biodiversity; Settlements and
Infrastructure; Social, Economic and Institutional Dimensions; Primary Industries;
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and Indigenous Communities. Adaptation research has been transformed by this
initiative, as it marked both a serious effort to address adaptation at the national
level and also to fix adaptation research in the constellation of climate change
research for the first time. Some 55 research-projects have been funded to date. It
is noteworthy that adaptation research projects under this program are forbidden
from examining any GHG mitigation issues.
Also under this program are some small grant programs for local government: an
adaptation pathways programs (LAPP) (AUD$2 million), a skill-building program
(about AUD$2 million), and an integrated assessment of settlements that provided
funding for five projects to identify issues and develop responses. Some 32 local
governments were funded around AUD$50,000 each to undertake risk assessments
and action plans in round one in 2008 and a further seven groups of councils won
grants valued between AUD$86,000—140,000 in round two of the LAPP.
Under the national adaptation research plan, a research strategy for settlements and
infrastructure has been published (Thom, et al, 2010). Setting out research priorities
for the next five to seven years, the strategy identified critical research gaps and
posed research questions for the themes of urban and regional management, built
environment, vulnerable coastal communities, and infrastructure. Essential
questions deal with the potential severity of impacts or scale of benefits, the
immediacy of action needed, and the need to alter existing interventions and the
practicality of alternatives. So-called desirable questions address the potential for
co-benefits, cross-sectoral relevance, and equity considerations.
There have also been five major national vulnerability assessments, of which, the
National Coast Risk Assessment, includes consideration of settlements. A major
report (DCC, 2009)—Climate Change Risks to Australia’s Coast: A First Pass National
Assessment—identifies key issues and the locations of highest risk on a state-by-state
basis. Additionally, the report concludes with a set of issues for further attention
(DCC, 2009: 150—151): 1) National standards and benchmarks for coastal
development; 2) Regional risk assessments; 3) Demonstration strategies for areas
exposed to high or extreme risk; 4) Review and update Building Codes; 5) National
audit of critical infrastructure in the coastal zone; 6) Provision of information and
tools essential for decision-making; 7) Research to reduce uncertainty about the
magnitude of coastal risk from climate change; 8) Risk allocation and insurance; 9)
Ecosystems review; 10) Community engagement; 11) Build capability of local
government; and 12) Inter-jurisdictional cooperation.
In June 2011, the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency released a
follow-up report specifically dealing with settlements—Climate Change Risks to
Coastal Buildings and Infrastructure: A Supplement to the First Pass National
Assessment (DCCEE, 2011b). It lists as a key finding that (DCCEE, 2011b: 3):
Greater than $226 billion in commercial, industrial, road and rail, and
residential assets are potentially exposed to inundation and erosion
hazards at a sea level rise of 1.1 metres (high end scenario for 2100)
A new national adaptation strategy was published in 2010 (DCC, 2010): Adapting to
Climate Change in Australia: An Australian Government Position Paper. Again there
was another listing of national adaptation priorities, which this time were: coastal
management; water; infrastructure; natural systems of national significance;
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery with regard to natural disasters;
and agriculture. An innovation in this policy was the commissioning of a Climate
Futures report every five years to evaluate the status of adaptation activity and
evaluate the effectiveness of adaptation policy; the first will be produced in 2010
(although this was not available at the time of writing). In terms of major research
outputs to date, national vulnerability assessments have been produced for coasts,
biodiversity, world heritage sites, the national reserve system, and fire regimes.
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4. Ecological Modernisation and Australian Climate Change Policy
Many aspects of Australia’s public policy response to climate change constitute
ecological modernisation. Curran’s review of national climate change policy
perceived this development with some enthusiasm (2009: 201):
While Australia does not officially adopt the term, its climate policy
debate increasingly takes place within the discourse parameters of EM
[ecological modernisation]. In an age of accelerating climate change
risk, the logic and promises of EM have never been so compelling.
Although Australia’s climate change response has been characterised as expressing
ecological modernisation, these have concentrated on the issues of GHG emissions
abatement (Hamilton, 2001, 2007; Christoff, 2005; Curran, 2009; Australia 2011).
National adaptation policy has not been subject to much study or review at this
time. Adaptation policy has not been a part of the major political studies into
national climate change policies (e.g., Bulkeley, 2000; Christoff, 2005; Curran, 2009;
Hamilton, 2001, 2007; Rootes, 2011; Tranter, 2011). As the preceding overview of
the development of these policies suggests, there has not been much substantial
activity until recent years so there has not been a great deal to analyse. Guidelines
and advice from the federal government to other stakeholders made clear the
federal government’s view of its role in this regard and that did not involve federal
investment in adaptation measures outside the federal realm of legislative
responsibilities.
Several key features of the adaptation policy and approach are consistent with
ecological modernisation. As stated in the national adaptation policies, the
government anticipates that most adaptation activity will be conducted by the
stakeholders. Government’s role is given as awareness raising, providing support for
research into impacts at the broad scale, creating decision-support tools and
information (such as impact assessment methodologies), identifying priority areas/
themes for action, support of pilot programs and studies, and conducting
assessments and developing responses for national assets and property which it is
obligated to protect (AGO, 2006; DCC, 2010; DCCEE, 2010b).
Returning to the original 1992 national climate strategy, the government clearly
envisioned its role in adaptation minimally. At that time, there was little
institutional policy capacity in the government dedicated to climate change, being a
relatively small branch in the federal environment department. Furthermore, the
critical policy decisions were dictated by the central agencies of the Prime Ministers
department and the Treasury (Hamilton, 2001). Today, climate change is now part of
a federal agency dedicated to the topic—the Department of Climate Change and
Energy Efficiency—and the vision and capacities of government have expanded
accordingly. Adaptation has similarly grown from a short entry in the first National
Greenhouse Response Strategy to be the subject of its own strategies in 2005 (AGO,
2005a), again in 2007 (Australia, 2007) and most recently a national position paper in
2010 (DCC, 2010).
Comparing the government’s views on adaptation across 18 years is instructive. A
considerable portion of the 2010 position paper deals with the case for adaptation
and establishing the rationale for the paper. Given that federal politics under the
Howard government had involved senior members of that government being sceptical
of climate change science, the 2010 position paper might be seen as providing
another platform to confirm the bone fides of climate change science by the Rudd
government. On a more positive side, these descriptions outline the fruits of
considerable national investment in climate change research over this period. Three
reasons are advanced in the 2010 position paper outlining the government’s role in
capacity building and reform (DCC, 2010: 8): 1) Providing information for business
and communities to adapt; 2) Setting the right conditions for business and
communities to adapt; and 3) Government programs and assets. These rationales
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overlap with the paper’s statements describing the government’s role (DCC, 2010):
1) Maintaining a strong and flexible economy and a social safety net; 2) Leading
national reform; and 3) Managing Commonwealth assets and programs; and 4)
National science and information.
Many of the commentaries on Australian climate change politics have stressed the
differences between the recent governments, particularly the Howard government’s
well-known antipathy towards the issue. Emphasising these differences may have led
to oversight of the consistencies in national policy since its inception. A case can be
made that the basic ethos and rationale of the scant 1992 federal view on adaptation
is remarkably consistent with the more elaborate and scientifically-support position
paper of 2010. Furthermore, by examining the work done to date on coasts, arguably
the only area where the federal government has made any substantial efforts in
developing its adaptation response outside its legislative responsibilities, it is clear
that this general approach is being applied here as well (DCC, 2009; DCCEE, 2011;
Thom, et al). That consistent theme would appear to be the course of ecological
modernisation.
5. Ecological Modernisation in Adaptation Policy and the Risks of Maladaptation
In this section, we bring the two aspects of the paper together and consider whether
an adaptation approach based on ecological modernisation is conducive to conditions
causing maladaptation. Adger et al summarise adaptation in this way (2009: 337):
In essence, adaptation describes adjustments made to changed
environmental circumstances that take place naturally within biological
systems and with some deliberation or intent in social systems …
Although adaptation in social systems seeks to prevent or minimise the harms of
climate change impacts, adaptation to climate change can produce perverse
consequences, giving rise to maladaptation (Barnett and O’Neil, 2010; IPCC, 2001;
Scheraga and Grambsch, 1998). Maladaptation has been interpreted varyingly, with
narrower interpretations concentrating on adaptations that increase the risk to the
system or phenomenon were adaptation is being applied, and wider interpretations
considering the consequences beyond where the adaptation occurs. Barnett and
O’Neil (2010) provide a broader interpretation of ways that maladaptation might
happen and describe several ways in which it can occur: Increasing GHG emissions;
Disproportionately burdening the most vulnerable in society; Having high opportunity
costs; Reducing the incentive to adapt, and Reinforcing path dependency.
A key feature of the federal approach to adaptation is the central role given to
scientific assessment and, in turn, to rational planning approaches based on science.
In effect, the federal adaptation program has now become essentially one of
research. Under ecological modernisation, it is the private sector that is meant to be
the source of technological innovation to reduce environmental costs. Although the
federal government has been the source of most of the adaptation research (albeit,
that it’s a somewhat insubstantial body of work on the social systems to date), the
federal documents make it clear that the community (implying civil society) and
corporations will have to undertake most future adaptation. Critics of ecological
modernisation have raised the limitations of technological fixes and questioned the
reliance on technological innovation to reduce environmental costs. As Adger et al
(2009) and others have noted, the issue of scale is a particular problem for
adaptation. There are several dimensions to this issue. Firstly, the adoption of a
comprehensive-rational approach has provided an ambitious cast to the dealing with
adaptation, but one that appears to be at odds with the scale of the problem. It is a
model that provides some introductory science on impacts, but concedes that local
impacts will require science at the local scale and this will have to be supported by
local stakeholders. Secondly, there is a question as to how effective these rational
approaches have proven to be in addressing adaptation, as the basic model is
reductionist, namely dividing problems into smaller units for analysis. There would
10
appear to be a tension between the NCCARF research program that supports
individual projects under a suite of themes, and its regional work, such as that on
coasts, which would appear to require integrative studies. Thirdly, merely by making
certain adaptation information and tools available, such as developing vulnerability
assessment methodologies or suggestions for land planning policies for local
governments, falls a long way short of ensuring that adaptation occurs or that the
technologies and concepts are applied correctly and effectively.
Part of this critique is built on the way in which ecological modernisation
conceptualises environmental problems and how this conditions the resulting
response (and range of solutions offered). A number of assumptions about climate
change impacts under the existing approaches suggest certain weaknesses of
ecological modernisation. Climate change will not be presented as linear
phenomena, but rather a change marked by discontinuities, threshold effects, and
surprises (IPCC, 2007). Much of ecological modernisation is marked by its capacity to
address existing problems through technological solutions and planning instruments.
Many of these solutions are predicated on the forecasts of impacts with assumptions
of the predictability of the parameters of change and of the resulting impacts. Given
the unpredictability of some climate change impacts, there is a question as to how
effective these responses will be for rare, outlier events and conditions that have
not been considered.
An area where concentrating on narrow technical solutions can be limited, as usually
occur under ecological modernisation, is where there are complex and dynamic
systems. Seeking adaptation responses for single sectors or phenomena will be of
limited effectiveness in such systems. Adaptation responses need to consider not the
protection of parts of such systems against future impacts, but identify ways to
boosting the resilience of social systems (and managed natural systems) (IPCC,
2007). Effective resilience of a system involves adopting an integrated approach to
adaptation. This concept has appeared in some of the Australian adaptation
documents, but there seems to have been limited consideration into how such
concepts might be applied in practice for social systems. There would seem to be a
question of primacy here, as there is a choice between detailed studies of particular
phenomena or locations and of integrated studies of phenomena, and having adopted
one approach the opportunity for the other approach is diminished. Building on the
preceding points, there is the broader question for adaptation, namely whether the
adaptation policies are capable of responding to changing circumstances and
whether these follow an adaptive management approach.
For some critics of ecological modernisation, its gains in reducing environmental
damage and resource use are illusionary, as problems are displaced rather than
resolved. Applied to adaptation policies, such a displacement of the costs of climate
change impacts from one location to another is eminently possible. This is linked to
the issue of whether local improvements establish the conditions for broad scale
degradation of environmental and social values. Ecological modernisation involves an
accommodation of industrial activities with environmental protection, thereby
ensuring the continuation of that activity, albeit in a less environmentally damaging
way. Given that central tenet of the conserver societies is the reduction of net
resource use and waste production, environmental discourses that fail to curb
growth are inimical to this conservation goal. Accordingly, while on a project-level
scale ecological modernisation might reduce resource use and pollution, its net
effect is to provide the rationalisation and conditions for continued growth, with net
increasing resource use and pollution. Adaptation performs an ecological
modernisation function by seeking to reconcile social phenomena with climate
change impacts so as ensure their continuation. Barnett and O’Neil’s (2010) concern
that adaptation could increase national GHG emissions is pertinent. In the
approaches taken to date, there are no mechanisms in place to prevent adaptation
causing increased GHG emissions. Neglect of this issue may reinforce the industrial
order and technology choices giving rise to high GHG emissions. By assisting large
corporations to undertake adaptation responses to prevent losses to assets this is
11
likely to assist corporations with high GHG emissions, thereby facilitating path
dependency further locking in high emissions activities. Investments by the
government in adaptation lowers the costs of climate change to corporations with
high GHG emissions, thereby subsidising this activity and shielding these corporations
from the costs of GHG emissions.
A common theme in many critiques of ecological modernisation is its treatment of
the social implications of environmental policy, namely that modernisation is
achieved in the face of increased social costs, such as producing socially iniquitous
outcomes. In their consideration of the possible social limits to adaptation, Adger et
al concluded (2009: 350):
Based on our review, we suggest that an adaptable society is
characterized by awareness of diverse values, appreciation and
understanding of specific and variable vulnerabilities to impacts, and
acceptance of some loss through change. The ability to adapt is
determined in part by the availability of technology and the capacity
for learning but fundamentally by the ethics of the treatment of
vulnerable people and places within societal decision-making
structures.
In its most recent outputs concerning coastal adaptation, the issue of social equity is
recognised by the federal government. Recognition of an issue is not the same as
action, however, and throughout the history of public policy on adaptation there has
been little action to consider the equity dimensions of climate change impacts and
of the proposed adaptations to avoid or minimise these impacts. However,
governments’ provision of basic tools to assist in adaptation responses will be of
greater assistance to those with the resources to invest in developing adaptation
responses. Those with the least capacity to respond will be least able to develop
these responses. By not taking social and economic differences in society into
account, the government’s adaptation response favours wealthy corporations over
other stakeholders.
6. Conclusions
Three research questions were posed for this paper. Firstly, what are the
associations between policy approaches to adaptation and ecological modernisation?
Secondly, what is the effect of the comprehensive-rational approaches on adaptation
policy? Thirdly, is there evidence of ecological justice being considered in adaptation
policy? Our findings are as follows, together with a brief section on whether
alternative approaches might be possible and some closing remarks.
a) Associations between policy approaches to adaptation and ecological
modernisation
We find that those basic and defining features of ecological modernisation can be
identified in the policy response to climate change generally and specifically in the
case of adaptation policy. Overarching aspects of ecological modernisation in the
adaptation response include the key rationalisations that actions will reduce the
costs of climate change impacts for current and future generations and that
adaptation will protect, secure, and promote future economic growth. Although a
less prominent theme, it also appears that adaptation actions will serve as a source
of innovation. Key policy documents make it clear that economic growth and suitable
climate change adaptation are compatible goals can be pursued simultaneosly. More
specifically, the Australian government has interpreted its role as that of ’steering
and assisting’ the market towards adaptive responses and has eschewed ’command
and control’ approaches.
Given the limitations of eclogical modernisation, there are grounds for concern that
the an adaptation response guided by these principles will necessarily suffer from
these limitations. Accordingly, adaptation appears more likely to be effective when
12
it responds positively to economic growth, such as when the required adaptation
options are of relatively low cost, are ammenable to known technological solutions,
and can be narrowly defined. Adaptation problems requiring social change, that are
expensive to resolve and require more than technological fixes, and are of a diffused
character, are unlikely to respond to approaches based in ecological modernisation.
Under the model of ecological modernisation for adaptation it is difficult to see how
much of the wider community will be able to undertake the scientifically-based
approach to adaptation being promoted by the federal government, given the array
of barriers to such activity, including low level of resources, access to specialist
knowledge, the limits of actions taken in isolation for collective problems, and so on.
b) Effects of comprehensive-rational approaches to adaptation policy
From the initial period when national adaptation policy was a minor theme in the
first two national climate change strategies, to the contemporary period when
adaptation has achieved the status of a competitive research grant program and
focused research program, there has been a consistent commitment to adopting a
view that adaptation needed to be addressed comprehensively. Although there were
a number of efforts to define priorities, these were such that no major economic
sector was excluded, and affirmed the perceived need for a comprehensive outlook
on the potential for climate change impacts. All of the policy documents produced
by the federal government on adaptation have promoted a rational approach to
formulating adaptation responses, albeit these appear to be drawn from a range of
disciplines. Essentially, all feature a version of using science is needed to identify,
estimate, and quantify potential impacts, a range of solutions is put forward and
evaluated according to criteria, and according to the results, the optimal solution is
selected.
Not all public policy problems, however, are suited to comprehensive and rational
approaches and an argument can be made that the climate change adaptation is one
such issue. This approach assumes a unitary identity to public interest, being
unresponsive to social differences by seeking the optimum adaptive response
according to its generalised approach.
Australia’s ecological modernisation approach has cast the problem of adaptation as
one requiring particular kinds of scientific information and advice, and that once
established, this knowledge can be employed by those with an interest in adaptation
to undertake their own adaptive measures. It transpires that the risks of
maladaptation do not only arise from the consequences of applying this particular
approach, but that this process itself is a maladaptation. Far greater attention needs
to be given to the institutional side of adaptation, to the frameworks and processes
that can respond to changing circumstances. Our science-driven approach to
adaptation is generating narrow and static answers to wide and dynamic questions.
On the other side of ecological modernisation, these current approaches to
adaptation invest heavily in the existing institutions that have not always
demonstrated great performance under the current planning challenges, let alone
the increased uncertainties posed by climate change.
c) Treatment of ecological justice in adaptation policy
Ecological justice (and, more narrowly, social justice) is a neglected theme in the
policy responses to adaptation. Presumably, the approaches to adaptation policy
assume that existing state institutions for environmental protection will apply to
adaptation projects and that no special effort is required under adaptation policy.
We find a weakness in this assumption arising from the risks of maladaptation. A
particular weakness in the current approach is insufficient consideration of
institutional capacity available for ensuring that adaptation measures do not
contribute to increased GHG emissions. Additionally, one of the criticisms of
ecological modernisation is that risks can be transferred or relocated rather than
resolved; in the case of maladaptation this could mean that the risks of climate
change impacts in one location are shifted to another. Again, there does not seem to
be any institutional capacity to address this particular risk that has a number of
13
implications that threaten ecological justice. Priority-setting for adaptation
responses on the basis of the economic value of assets at risk accords with market
rationality, but if this preference produces iniquitous outcomes—which would seem
highly likely—then ecological justice goals will not be met.
We also draw attention to an issue that has largely passed without comment is that
which suggests that the corruption within the wider climate change policy processes
by corporate interests as being the dark side of ecological modernisation. In essence,
supporters of ecological modernisation only recognise the benefits of state—
corporate cooperation; that this relationship can and has taken forms inimical to the
public and environmental interests appears to be of no interest. These unwelcome
corporate activities can be dismissed as illegitimate and left to the recourse of the
law. In the case of Australia, there has been no use of the law to investigate or
prosecute such corporate malfeasance in climate change politics—in essence this
activity has been relegated to the realm of conventional politics, albeit of an
unattractive appearance. Civil society’s capacity to protect environmental interests
are weak when confronting an alliance of the state and major corporations.
Are there alternative approaches to ecological modernisation?
Our findings in this paper, described in these conclusions, suggest at least three
major areas where alternative approaches could be considered. Recognition of the
limits to ecological modernisation is required and alternative approaches considered
by public authorities. Reliance on the comprehensive-rational rationale approach to
understanding the issues of impacts and adaptation could be replaced by approaches
that consider the issue of resilience as an objective and build holistic and integrative
research and policy agendas around this objective. Maladaptation risks need to be
brought to the forefront in the design and implementation of adaptation policy
rather than being ignored; complementary GHG mitigation and adaptation policies
should be a high priority given its centrality to the policy response to climate
change. There needs to be far greater attention given to the recognising the needs
of ecological justice in adaptation policy formulation processes and delivery. This
requires creating new institutions with this capacity or building this capacity into
existing institutions. These suggestions are unlikely to entirely remove adaptation
policy from the sphere of ecological modernisation, but would go some way to
reducing its influence.
Closing Comments
A feature of public policy responses, and their enabling institutions, that involve
technological/ scientific tools and epistemic communities in a central role is a wider
inclination on the part of state authorities to consider such processes and outcomes
as being the objective expressions of wider community values and goals. In the case
of climate change adaptation, such assumptions are largely untested, both by
governments and by scholarly inquiry. Although the politics of the adaptation
responses to climate change in public policy have not been subject to much political
study, there are goods reasons for undertaking such work. This study is an initial
inquiry into some of the political dimensions of the adaptation response and
demonstrates the influence and exercise of political values in the form of ecological
modernisation. Climate change adaptation is a realm of public policy that will be
subject to increasing scope and scale, with greater research, investment, and policy
formulation and implementation in the future. Given the weaknesses of ecological
modernisation, attention needs to given to the question of designing and
empowering suitable institutions to formulate and implement adaptation public
policy that avoids the problems and limitations of ecological modernisation outlined
in this paper. Political inquiry into these efforts should be undertaken with the goal
of understanding the political dimensions of this activity and providing an
opportunity to contribute to future discourses on this issue.
14
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Acknowledgements
We had an opportunity to discuss ideas for this paper with Dr. Peter Christoff,
University of Melbourne and we thank him for this input; full responsibility for the
paper rests with the authors.
