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Brothers, Lovers, and Revoluon: Negoang
Military Masculinity and Homosexual Identy in a
Revoluonary Movement iun the Philippines
Kaira Zoe K. Alburo1
University of the Philippines, Cebu
kzalburo@gmail.com
Asia-Pacic Social Science Review 11:2 (2011), pp. 27-42
Copyright © 2011 De La Salle University, Philippines
In an attempt to contribute to theorizing military masculinity and heteronormativity, I look at
a ‘queer’ event that made headlines in the Philippines in 2005: the rst ‘gay marriage’ in the
country ofciated by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New
People’s Army (NPA). As a Maoist inspired guerrilla movement, the NPA has waged war against
the Philippine government since 1969 under the leadership of the CPP. The paper examines how
the relations between masculinity, military and homosexual identities play out at different levels:
ideology, institutions, subjective identities, and symbols. These elements come together and embody
competing articulations about the masculine/sexual Filipino ‘revolutionary’, thus challenging
heteronormative imaginaries of Philippine society. The paper concludes by demonstrating how gay
cadres in the NPA negotiate their sexual identity in the context of military masculinity in the 21st
century revolutionary movement.
Keywords: homosexuality, military masculinity, heteronormativity, Communist Party of the
Philippines, New People’s Army, Philippines
INTRODUCTION
In February 2005, the front page of The
Philippine Daily Inquirer carried the article
entitled “Reds officiate first gay marriage in
NPA” (Pinsoy, 2005, pp. A1, A20). It featured
a photo of two men kissing with a sequined
ag of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) in the background. As a Maoist inspired
guerrilla movement, the NPA has waged war
against the Philippine government since 1969
under the leadership of the CPP. This piece has
immediately piqued my curiosity as it has not
only challenged the stereotype of being gay in
Philippine society, but more importantly, it has
opened a new dimension of examining how the
intersections of gender, sexuality, and militancy
are expressed through competing articulations
about the masculine/sexual Filipino revolutionary
in the heteronormative imaginaries of Philippine
society.
In recent years, there has been an increasing
interest in gender and violent conict in feminist
scholarship. However, most of the feminist
28 VOL. 11 NO. 2ASIA-PACIFIC SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
theorizing on gender and sexuality in situations
of war and “soldiering” focus on the problem of
“gender inequality”, in particular how to integrate
women into the army as an attempt to address
the issue of gender inequality in the military.
Sexuality is often subsumed under gender, with
emphasis on sexual exploitation of women within
the militaries, or sexual violence against them,
mostly focusing on war rape (Zarkov, 2006).
While undoubtedly important, these studies
have largely marginalized the study of men,
masculinities, and heteronormativity in feminist
scholarship.
The relationship between gender and sexuality
has been theoretically problematic for feminist
and queer studies. While such studies are
now clearly anything but monolithic, a lot of
research has come to point out the interface
between the two categories, particularly between
gender and institutionalised heterosexuality/
heteronormativity. Gender has been theorized in a
number of ways. One stream addresses gender as
a relational concept “built on the presumption of
relations between biological males and biological
females” (Ingraham, 2006, p. 310). Another
assumes the existence of only two sexes that are
“xed and stable categories”, and yet another
builds on the “oppositeness” of these categories
(Ingraham, 2006). In using the term here, I
adhere to Joan Scott’s (1986) formulation of
gender rejecting “xed and permanent quality of
binary opposition” veering away from essentialist
theses (p. 40). Not only is gender a product of
history which is socially constructed, it is also
an organizing principle in society that operates
at multiple levels, and a useful category of
analysis (Scott, 1986). This notion also applies
to the analysis of the production of masculinities
(Connell, 2005). Moving beyond previous
conceptions of masculinity in the singular form
which primarily deals with power relations of
men over women, current research on the eld
has shown the plurality of masculinities that
exist in certain patterns of gender relations in
a specic society (Connell, 2005; Connell &
Messerschmidt, 2005) as well as the role of
power in constructing ideal masculinities in
specic settings. R.W. Connell’s (2005) concept
of “hegemonic masculinity”, wherein one type
of masculinity becomes a referent against which
other forms are measured at a given time and place
has become signicant in organization studies,
especially in studies of military institutions.
Research employing the concept has contributed
largely in documenting the consequences and
costs of hegemony, uncovering its mechanisms
and showing multiplicity of masculinities; and
in replacing “categorical models of patriarchy”
(Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 834). While
showing how production of masculinities are
different cross-culturally, such studies have also
shown the ways in which actors “negotiate certain
roles and positions, the struggle to maintain
continuity or introduce change, the frailty of
established boundaries and differences” (Zarkov,
2007, p. 152). In other words, the hegemonic
position attained by a certain type of masculinity
is never xed and is always being contested,
negotiated, and recongured.
Mainstream research on the military shows
little interest in gender given that it is a highly
gendered institution—governed largely by men
who produce and recreate “norms and practices
associated with masculinity and heterosexuality”
(Kronsell, 2005, p. 281). According to Jeff Hearn
(2003), despite the common conception that
militarism is tightly linked to what is considered
“masculine”, there is not a wealth of literature
focusing on men, masculinities, and the military,
and I would add, even less, if at all, on existing
revolutionary armies (p. xiv). The notion of
“military masculinity” seems to bind men’s (as
well as women’s)2 bodies to one uniform type of
masculinity, and focuses more on “male-female
axis of opposition” (Kovitz, 2003, p. 10). There
is a weakness in such an approach as it might
not account for the fractures within ‘military
masculinity’ itself. These fractures are masked by
a variety of methods employed by the institution;
one of which is the ranking system wherein higher
ranking ofcers embody the more “superior” kind
of masculinity, thereby debunking the idea of
ALBURO, K. Z. 29BROTHERS, LOVERS, AND REVOLUTION
“masculine unity” within the military institution
(Kovitz, 2003, p. 9).
In the Philippines, while studies on
masculinities in relation to the Philippine
military in particular are scant, a number
of studies has examined the concept of
strength—signifying physical power and
military competence—as a core foundation of
(hegemonic) masculinity in the army. Hazing,
a harsh initiation ceremony that “welcomes”
newcomers through harassment, humiliation,
and physical abuse, is part of the rite of passage
of cadets’ transformation to becoming “real
men” and true brothers-in-arms (McCoy, 1999).
Such constructions of military masculinities
imply that the male soldier is a real man ‘inside
and out’, with heterosexuality as a mandatory
requirement. While the Philippines is generally
being perceived as “tolerant” of homosexuality
as cross-dressing gay men in beauty parlours
and in the entertainment industry abound, moral
stigma and discrimination remain to be a major
problem faced by homosexuals in the Philippines
(Garcia, 2004). Gay men, who are regarded
as feminine and therefore as not essentially
men, are in fact “discouraged” from entering
the Philippine Military as they might not ‘t
in’ with the norms of the military institution
(Evangelista, 2009). This understanding of the
masculine soldier emphasizes the exemplary
Filipino male who is strong, brave, alert, and
decisive—in binary opposition to the notion of
femininity in the Philippines, to which gayness
is closely associated, is characterized by
weakness, dependence, and the domination of
emotion over reason (Israel-Sobritchea, 1990).
This paper examines how male homosexuality3
has come to be negotiated in the context of
military masculinity in the New People’s Army.
I argue for a rethinking of essentialist views
of gender and sexuality which xates the two
in rigid, permanent, and ahistorical categories
(Ingraham, 2006). Heterosexuality has been a
taken-for-granted concept, normalized as an
infallible standard for sexual relations, with
gender embedded and embodied in xed social
roles—in this case, the “masculine heterosexual
soldier”. In an attempt to contribute to theorizing
the relationships between military masculinity
and heteronormativity,4 I explore the conditions
of how the CPP has come to acknowledge and
institutionalize same-sex relationships, how
this translates into practice within the NPA,
and how it affects the lives and affairs of its
members. I interrogate the assumptions of the
CPP on gender and sexual relations, especially
how these have changed in the light of the
recognition of same-sex relationships. To do
this, I conducted eld research from July-August
2008 involving interviews with 12 gay men5
who formerly served in the NPA as well as two
key informants who were part of formulating
Party policies on sexual relations, including
the founding chair of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, Jose Ma. Sison, who currently
resides in Utrecht. I also employed documentary
research specifically looking into the CPP
documents on establishing sexual relationships,
“On the Proletarian Relationship of the Sexes”
[OPRS]6 (Communist Party of the Philippines
[CPP], 1998a) with particular interest in
“Section E (better known as Amendment E)”.
An accompanying document to this policy
is “Some Explanations on the Guidelines for
Marriage inside the Party (Ilang Paliwanag
sa mga Tuntunin sa Pag-aasawa sa Loob ng
Partido)” (Communist Party of the Philippines
[CPP], 1998b), explaining the principles on
which the policy is based.
‘REVOLUTIONIZING’ GENDER
AND SEXUALITY
It is erroneous to conclude that the CPP’s
gender/sexuality ideology has remained the same
since its inception, since it is not separate from
the historical development of the organization.
During the 1940’s-1950’s, the People’s Army
Against Japan (HUKBALAHAP) under the
Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), the
precursor of the CPP, enlisted women to join the
30 VOL. 11 NO. 2ASIA-PACIFIC SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
armed struggle against the Japanese. The PKP
was among the rst “major political and military
organizations in their countries” that actively
recruited women ghters (Lanzona, 2008, p.3).
Among the problems at this time for the PKP was
how to address the “sex problem” of married men
who left their wives at home and took in “forest
wives”, usually “young single women in the
camps.” The PKP then came up with a document,
Revolutionary Solution of the Sex Problem, which
allowed these men to have extramarital relations
“[c]laiming biological necessity” (Lanzona, 2008,
p. 3-4) as a justication. While such policies
assigned both men and women “traditional gender
roles” (which later became a liability to the
HUKBALAHAP), it contributed to placing issues
of family, sex, and morality in the organization’s
agenda, and subjected these to administrative
control (Lanzona, 2008, p. 4).
When Jose Ma. Sison (JMS) established the
CPP in 1968, the leadership started to codify
regulations pertaining to courtship, establishment
of relationships, marriage, and divorce. JMS, who
had taken part in making the guidelines, said in an
interview with me that prior to the codication of
the policy in 1972-1974, there was already a harsh
“customary law” that regulated these relationships
(Jose Ma. Sison, personal communication, July
4, 2008). In contrast to the previous policy
in the HUKBALAHAP movement, infidelity
(pagkakaliwa) was “punished in the severest
way”, sometimes even by death. However, JMS
said that the Party eventually learned to deal with
such situations. Hence, when the rst draft of
“On the Relation of Sexes” [ORS] (Communist
Party of the Philippines [CPP], 1974) came out
in 1974 (in English), such acts of infidelity,
especially addressing male comrades, were no
longer subjected to severe forms of punishment.
According to the 1974 ORS draft7 “[t]he question
of the relation of sexes is fundamentally a class
question. It is a struggle between two world
outlooks—the bourgeois and the proletarian”
(CPP, 1974).
Using the ORS as a guiding principle, the CPP
succeeded in framing personal/sexual relationships
within the discourse of “class struggle”. Therefore,
proletarian love became defined as personal
relationships that always kept the interest of the
revolution a priority—articulated in their mantra
of class love (political) over sex love (personal).
As such, party members have appropriated the so-
called proletarian love to counter the bourgeois,
feudal and largely Catholic views on love and
marriage dominant in Philippine society. The
ORS set out the basis for creating a ‘proletarian
relationship’ and ultimately for marriage and
the creation of a revolutionary family. As a
result, all yunits (red collectives) were directed
to intervene in making sure that relationships—
from courtship to marriage to raising a family
and, in some instances, divorce8 —are governed
by Party rules and guidelines. A main reference
for discussing gender/sexual relations of the CPP
was the classic work of Frederick Engels, “The
Origin of the Family, Private Property and the
State” (1972). In looking at women and their
relationship with men, the Party adopted Engel’s
own explanation of the “civilized society founded
on private property” giving rise to a “patriarchal
class system” that perpetuates male domination
over women (Engels, 1972, p. 9). While the ORS
(CPP, 1974) gives primacy to women exploitation
in gender relations within the party, same-sex
relationships are not addressed in the guidelines
thereby erasing homosexual partnerships from
the Party discourses. Although there were Party
members and cadres who were openly gay,
according to JMS, they were only “tolerated,
respected and credited” for their contributions to
the movement as “cultural workers” of the Party
(Jose Ma. Sison, personal communication, July
4, 2008). However, this issue will later be taken
up in the Second Great Rectication Movement
which is discussed in the succeeding section.
QUEERING THE PARTY
In 1992, the CPP launched the Second Great
Rectication Movement which resulted in the
split of the Party into “reafrmists” (RA) and
ALBURO, K. Z. 31BROTHERS, LOVERS, AND REVOLUTION
“rejectionists” (RJ), reecting the ideological
schisms that had wracked the organization.9
Towards the end of the 1990s, the Party declared
victory in consolidating ideological, political, and
organizational matters, except for the question
on sexual/interpersonal relationships. This
was seen as directly affecting the “future of the
movement” in terms of the social, and literally
biological, reproduction of Party cadres. As one
key informant explains:
Before 1992, relationships were
handled in a distorted way. There was a
lot of liberalism10 among Party cadres,
separations, and other sexual indiscretions.
No time was invested in deriving lessons
from forming and sustaining relationships.
Many comrades were having sexual
relationships but the guidelines were no
longer enforced to help them develop
their relationship toward the creation of
a revolutionary family. The Party was
called upon to enforce such guidelines.
A strategic view in establishing sexual
relationships was that they should lead to
marriage and not be seen as a joke (personal
communication, July 24, 2008).
Therefore in 1997, in the initial context of
having more “gender sensitivity” in framing
sexual relations in the Party, the National Women’s
Bureau facilitated formal discussions surrounding
the issue, providing kits with researched data
and documents. They reviewed Engels’ (1972)
The Origin of the Family, Private Property and
the State to elevate the issue to a “conceptual
level” and to provide theoretical grounding to the
notion of a “revolutionary family”. Eventually,
the discussion led to the topic of homosexuals
in the movement. Questions on the scientic
basis for homosexuality were raised: Were gays
and lesbians even entitled to raise revolutionary
families when they literally could not reproduce?
Would not the proliferation of a “gay culture” lead
to decadence and moral degeneration among party
cadres? Apart from these questions, there was a
prevailing view that the proletarian was one who
had rm principles matched with physical strength.
Gays were seen to be weepy, emotional, weak, and
affectionate (malambing)—characteristics seen to
be as the complete opposite of a true revolutionary
cadre.11 However, this perception was eventually
countered with the argument that the Party aimed
to strengthen ideology and not the physical body.
The basis for being a proletarian is not invested
in physical strength but in “upholding Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism.”
Furthermore, the debate on the role of
homosexuals in the revolution occurred within
the context of the insurgence of gay rights
movement in the Philippines. It should be recalled
that homosexuals in the Philippines led the rst
Gay Pride March in Asia in 1994.12 Against this
backdrop, it was difcult for the Party to ignore
the question of homosexuality in the movement.
As a result, the Party’s leadership has put forth
a new set of guidelines for relationships and
officially recognized same-sex relations and
marriage, stating that the actual participation of
gay men and women in the revolution should
be considered as a basis for their recognition.
Despite resistance within the Party13 to same-sex
relations, a memorandum was eventually issued
by the leadership regarding the amendment to the
ORS, now popularly referred to in the movement
as Amendment E. The OPRS (CPP, 1998a)14
replaced the ORS and became the official
policy on sexual relations within the Party with
Amendment E as a lynchpin for the recognition
of same-sex relationships.
Consisting of ve sections on courtship,
marriage, divorce, disciplinary actions, and
recognition of homosexual relations, the OPRS
(CPP, 1998a) has the following major amendments
to the ORS:
a. Pre-marital sex should still be avoided
but is no longer subjected to disciplinary
action, and will be addressed with
criticism, reminders, and education.
b. In granting divorce, the trial period
was removed and replaced with careful
32 VOL. 11 NO. 2ASIA-PACIFIC SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
examination of the basis for divorce
presented by one or both parties.
c. There was devolution of power to approve
the establishment of relationships and give
a couple permission to wed. This is no
longer the sole responsibility of higher
organs of the Party, but a power granted
to the lower committee level, or seksyon.
d. Different types of disciplinary actions are
applicable to various transgressions of the
guidelines which were not made clear in
the previous document. Cases that can be
tried in the revolutionary courts are also
differentiated.
e. A separate section is added on the
recognition and respect for homosexual
relationships. (emphasis added)
The OPRS (CPP, 1998a) opens with a statement
that in marriage, the Party and the people’s
revolutionary cause supersedes all other interests.
The OPRS has retained much of the substance of
the ORS, including the adoption of the concept
of class love (political) over sex love (personal).
In Some Explanations on the Guidelines for
Marriage inside the Party [SEGMP] (CPP,
1998b), a supplementary document of the OPRS,
the CPP emphasizes the necessity for all Party
and candidate members to study the OPRS since
the guidelines will ensure that the interests of the
revolution are upheld; secondly, that the rights
of individual members are protected; and thirdly,
that a healthy proletarian relationship is nurtured
by the couple.
The yunit plays a very big part in Party life—
from the making of political and organizational
decisions to discussing matters such as family
problems and individual concerns. While members
are not discouraged to display independence and
initiative, they also go by the organizational
principle of democratic centralism. This principle
is based on the notion of the minority acceding
to the majority, the lower organs acceding to the
higher organs, accountability, and the right of
every member to be heard.15 Hence, in forming
relationships and all the issues that occur
before, during, and after these are established,
the collective is a visible presence. The OPRS
states that if a Party member intends to ‘court’ or
pursue someone, his/her respective yunit must be
informed rst:
Sec. A.2. In order to court someone, the
member or candidate member must have
the permission of the yunit responsible
for overseeing his/her work. If the person
courted is from another yunit of the Party,
the suitor’s yunit will inform the other
yunit of his/her intentions and will ask for
permission to initiate the courtship process
if the one courted agrees. (CPP, 1998a)
The collective is also responsible for
scrutinizing whether both class love and sex love
are presented as basis for such relationship before
permission is granted. The document also allows
for a Party member to court or accept courtship
from someone who is not a Party member who:
1) can be “processed” to become a candidate
member within six months; and 2) is not a traitor
or anti-revolutionist or someone who would hold
back the Party member from fullling one’s tasks.
The guidelines strongly forbid any Party
member to court or accept courtship from more
than one person at a time, and to court or accept
courtship from someone already in a relationship
or is married. Other provisions include the
restriction of New People’s Army members or
others serving the revolution “full time” from
entering a relationship within the rst year of
service. It also sets a minimum of one year as
an engagement period before a couple is allowed
to marry. An amended provision pertains to the
restrictions on pre-marital sex, aiming to “ensure
the protection of women from exploitation
and to give the couple time to prepare for the
responsibilities of forming a family while waging
a revolution” (CPP, 1998a, Sec. A. 10).
In the same vein, marriage goes through the
same collective intervention as “[it] is a serious
thing that should be carefully prepared for by the
couple and the responsible yunit/s of the Party”
ALBURO, K. Z. 33BROTHERS, LOVERS, AND REVOLUTION
(CPP, 1998a, Sec. B. 1.). Apart from the yunit,
sponsors and the chosen ofciating CPP cadre
have the responsibility to look after the marriage,
offering advice to the couple when necessary,
such as how to remain loyal to each other and to
the revolution, and advice on the “revolutionary
way” of bringing up their children (CPP, 1998a,
Sec. B. 7.). All these rights and responsibilities
are inscribed in the marriage contract found in
the document.
The last section, Amendment E (CPP, 1998a),
is a very short addendum to the ORS. I have
translated its two points below:
E. On Same-Sex Relations
1. The Party recognizes the right of
each individual member to choose
their sex (kasarian).
2. The basic principles and guidelines
for marriage inside the Party are
applicable to their case.
My analysis shows that the OPRS (CPP, 1998a)
very early on brings forward a binary form of
categorization, that of the Proletarian and the
Bourgeois. The proletarian viewpoint, which
the document claims to represent, portrays the
bourgeois mode of thinking about sexual relations,
as its categorical other. In SEGMP (CPP, 1998b),
proletarian love supposedly combines freedom
and discipline, rights and responsibilities—
constituted by emotions as well as principles.
This is opposed to “anarchy” in love present in
the bourgeois viewpoint, which is basically the
absolute freedom for the individual to do what
one wishes. This apparently leads to the violation
of others’ rights, irresponsibility in getting in and
out of relationships, and “loose morality” (CPP,
1998b).
The document categorizes individual Party
members, whether single, married or in a
relationship, subdivided as “men” and “women”,
and the yunit one might belong to, representing
Party authority. While forming relationships is a
personal process a Party member might undergo,
it is also a collective experience. Whereas these
are very explicitly stated in the guidelines, I
find another categorization not as candidly
expressed—heterosexuality vs. homosexuality.
This leads me to reect on assumptions of gender
and sexuality underpinning the OPRS. While the
document is framed within the Party’s conception
of proletarian love, it is situated in a larger frame of
waging a revolution that rejects bourgeois society,
including the culture that informs bourgeois love.
However, if we follow the document’s arguments
for proletarian love we will nd that underlying
it all is a heteronormative ideology despite the
inclusion of Section E.
In Section 3 of the SEGMP (CPP, 1998b), the
heteronormativity of the concept of relationships
becomes even more evident, particularly in the
following lines: “Love is a natural feeling that
grows between a particular man and woman when
they reach a certain age.” And in Section 8:
The essence of marriage is the agreement
between a man and a woman to become a
couple inside a monogamous relationship
and that this agreement is made formal and
recognized in society through the blessing
of the state… [In] the proletarian marriage,
a monogamous relationship is strictly
enforced for both man and woman…the
institution of marriage is for the protection
of women from the exploitation of men.
(Italics mine)
Furthermore, Sec. B.7.b. of the OPRS cites
advice on how to “raise and educate the couple’s
children in a revolutionary way” as among the
responsibilities of the sponsors and the collective.
The discourse on marriage-for-family and family-
within-marriage is repeatedly emphasized in the
document. I noted that within the whole document
of the SEGMP, this reference to a man-woman
relationship and the creation of a family, or
responsibility to children appears 10 times. Thus,
while the prospect of marriage and forming a
revolutionary family is opened to homosexuals,
how same-sex couples gure in this particular
construction is unclear.
34 VOL. 11 NO. 2ASIA-PACIFIC SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
This now brings me to the peculiar inclusion
of Amendment E in the guidelines. In the light
of such heteronormativity, the amendment does
seem “extremely awkward and out of place”
(Abinales, 2004, p. 101). If we review the text
of Amendment E, it briey contains only two
points: the right to choose one’s sex (kasarian),
and the right to marry applicable to their case
(homosexuals). The language of Amendment
E indicates a tendency to create an “other” in
the form of homosexual comrades. Section 13
of SEGMP, mentions “[t]here is no reason for
the Party to refuse membership to an individual
who fulls the requirements just because one has
another chosen sex/gender (naiibang piniling
kasarian).” Naiibang piniling kasarian exactly
refers to an ‘other’ kind of sexuality in relation
to something that is considered the ‘normal’ kind
of sexuality—as naiiba comes from the word iba
which literally translates to “other” or “different”.
Therefore, labelling homosexuals as those having
naiibang piniling kasarian, already stresses
that homosexuality is out of the framework
of what is considered a “normal” kasarian. In
this sense, the struggle against homophobia, or
heterosexism for that matter, is framed within a
totalizing discourse of “class struggle”. Thus,
addressing homosexuality as merely an issue of
class oppression obscures the specic experiences
of homosexuality in the Philippines.
With the inclusion of same-sex unions in the
OPRS, the NPA has become duty-bound by Party
directive to “accommodate” openly gay men
who joined the revolutionary army. Whereas
previously the concept of a red ghter used to be
viewed from a masculinist-militarist frame in the
NPA as expressed through a discourse of “strength
in body and ideology”, the formal recognition of
gay cadres as stipulated in the OPRS served to
undermine this representation. While apparently
still heteronormative, the new guidelines have
provided gays and lesbians the language and
mechanism to assert their right to form unions with
the same sex, thereby allowing them to experience
proletarian relationships under the supervision of
the Party. What does it mean to be a gay red ghter
in this context, when the recognition of gay men
in the army seemingly creates a refracted image of
the strong, principled, brave people’s soldier, who
now wears lotion to battle? In order to understand
the formation of subjectivities, it is necessary to
examine how gay identities are created, understood
and experienced, and how these are negotiated
within given institutions and ideologies through
which actors operate.
THE GAY RED FIGHTERS
In examining the social identities of gay
men, it is important to see how their gendered
identities are substantively constructed in relation
to “a range of activities, social organizations and
historically specific cultural representations”
(Scott, 1986, p. 1068). The presence of gay
men in the NPA, as in all military institutions,
signies a contradiction as gay-ness is perceived
to be the anti-thesis of the military image. In the
Philippine context, the concept of a “gay ghter”
seems to be an oxymoron as the term homosexual
almost automatically brings to mind the image of
a hip-swaying, cross-dressing effeminate male,
popularly known as a bakla16. But what is unique
in this case is that CPP/NPA has sanctioned same-
sex relations in the organization, which is hardly
found in military institutions, if at all. The gay men
I interviewed came from a varied range of socio-
economic backgrounds. Most had started out as
student activists in local universities and later on
got recruited to the underground movement and
eventually joined the NPA. A few are of peasant
and urban poor origins, while one is from an
indigenous group in Mindanao. The age of the key
informants I interviewed ranges from early 20’s to
mid-40’s. During recruitment to the NPA, many
were fresh out of college or engaged in activism
in their own communities with particular local
struggles such as militarization in the countryside
and demolition of houses in urban poor areas.
How NPA gay ghters negotiate their identity in
the context of the revolutionary armed struggle
shall be discussed in the subsequent sections.
ALBURO, K. Z. 35BROTHERS, LOVERS, AND REVOLUTION
COMING OUT IN THE NPA
The process of revealing one’s sexual identity
entails the ritual of confession by which an
individual discloses his/her actions and thoughts,
especially in circumstances where they are most
difcult to tell (Foucault, 1978). Confession is
however a double-edged sword. While on the
one hand it is deemed an exercise of freedom and
liberation from constraints that prevent one from
actualizing selfhood, it also subjects one to the
acceptance or rejection of a structure of authority
that requires such confession, on the other.
Seen against this backdrop, the “coming out”
process is a dening moment for the afrmation
of one’s (sexual) selfhood. It refers not only to
public disclosure of one’s sexuality but also to a
complex process of recognizing, accepting, and
adopting a sexual identity (Gagne, Tewksbury,
& McGaughey, 1997). In the Philippines, this
process is often referred to as paglaladlad ng
kapa, literally meaning, “unfurling the cape”.
Prior to the OPRS document, there seemed to
be an unwritten ban on homosexuals (especially
gay men) in the NPA. The process of coming out
became difcult as gay men were forced to adhere
to the traditional concept of military masculinity
of the organization. Given this context, confession
of one’s sexual identity has become a difcult and
risky act of gay cadres. One informant, Reyna,
who had joined the movement in 1985 until his
capture by the state army in the late 90’s, narrated
how he had been continuously interrogated about
his sexuality by comrades. He always denied that
he was gay because he feared being stigmatized,
and was told repeatedly “to stop being soft-spoken
as this would mean acting like a gay. They said
that the masses will not accept a gay ghter.” He
had always referred to his ordeal of concealing
his “true feelings” as a thorn that was constantly
embedded in his skin.
However, for those who have already come out
as gay prior to joining the army, they have been
subjected to constant surveillance of their body.
Mohan, who joined the NPA in 1992, expressed
his disappointment with comrades who told him
to look and act like a red ghter, “I was told by
some [male] comrades not to sway my hips or be
affectionate and that I should act ‘manly’ with a
military gure.” Two other informants, Danika
and Amihan, who were recruited to the NPA after
the policy on recognition of homosexuals had
already been implemented, shared that when they
were assigned to one NPA camp, some comrades
told them upfront “you are gay, you should not be
here,” or “if only you were not gay, you would be
a commander by now.” There was an assertion
among some of the NPA members that gay people
had no place in the armed struggle as they were
perceived to be “weaklings” and “cowards.”
In some cases, joining the NPA has provided
them an avenue to realize their “gay identity”.
Ariel, for example, who came from a farming
village, never admitted he was gay before he
enlisted in the NPA because he said his community
was “conservative.” It is not uncommon in rural
communities in the Philippines for gay men to be
discriminated. When Ariel rst joined the NPA,
he pretended that he was “straight”, “I used to
pretend that I liked girls, but I would cry silently
about it when I was alone. But I think they already
knew I was gay because of the way I talked and
the way I moved…I was already a girl.” With the
recognition of homosexuality within the Party, it
has opened a space for gay cadres to deal with
their “identity crisis”. As Ariel aptly puts it: “I
became condent enough to admit that I am gay.
I learned that my struggle as a gay was part of a
bigger struggle of the people”. While both coming
out and institutional sanction might have opened
an opportunity for gay men to assert their identity
in the NPA, they have also posed new arenas of
struggle.
While many of the informants highly
appreciated the CPP’s official acceptance of
homosexuals, life of gay men in the NPA was
a constant act of negotiation. For example,
some comrades would ridicule gay ghters by
mockingly imitating gay cadres “swaying their
hips while fighting.” Gay fighters’ physical
capabilities to carry out military work and combat
were always in doubt. In the case of Ariel, he was
36 VOL. 11 NO. 2ASIA-PACIFIC SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
always questioned whether he was capable of
ghting, to which he would retort, “I know how
to pull the trigger and use my gun. It is not as if
I will be dancing around while ghting is going
on!” And indeed, Ariel was able to show his
abilities in combat when their camp was raided
by the Philippine military. Impressed with Ariel’s
performance, his comrades told him “even if you
are gay, you really are still useful.” Moreover, the
ability of gay ghters to bargain for recognition
is inuenced by their respective backgrounds
such as education, profession, and skills that they
capitalize on in the camps (e.g. intelligence work,
writing, facilitating educational discussions).
Especially for gay cadres with college education,
there seems to be more acceptance of their
sexuality as they are considered to be assets of
the NPA in the larger context of the revolutionary
movement.
ENTERING SAME-SEX RELATIONS
While believing in the principle behind the
policy that allows same-sex relationships, gay
cadres have difficulty dealing with it in the
movement. They believe that many comrades
are still not ready to accept gay relationships.
“Real men” were deemed unprepared to enter
serious sexual relationships with gay men, and if
they did entertain courtships from gay men, they
usually subjected themselves to the process out
of “obligation”. Hence, only three of the 12 gay
men I interviewed experienced going through ‘the
process’ of courtship under the OPRS, but only
one was able to form an “ofcial” relationship.
Sekar, a university student who dropped out to
join the movement, attempted to court a comrade
but he backed out because he felt that the man
entertained his courtship simply because “it was a
policy.” He also felt offended when he was talking
with a high ranking comrade about the policy and
the latter commented that homosexuality stemmed
from bourgeois decadence, “What next? Would
we accept marriage to dogs?” Sekar pointedly
said:
I think that the process is good in a
sense that it opens up a space for same-
sex relationships. But I think there is an
ideological and political limitation because
homosexual experiences have not been
extensively documented and summed up,
no lessons are derived. It would be better
if there is a re-examination of Amendment
E as I believe that it does not provide full
protection for same-sex relationships.
Ameer, from the region that held the same-sex
marriage in 2005, tried to go through the process
with a male comrade whom he had been secretly
seeing in order to make their relationship ofcial,
but it did not work out:
When other comrades found out about
this, they started to ridicule the guy and
kept questioning his sexuality. He was not
gay. He was straight. And because of the
pressure he felt from other comrades and
the distance we had from each other due
to the nature of our work, he left the NPA
without seeing me again.17
This would happen again with another male
comrade a few months later. He was also ridiculed.
Ameer said that his yunit tried to settle the matter
but he felt that the relationship was not taken
seriously. He recounted hearing one of the yunit
members say, “Why bother? It’s not going to last
anyway.” On this point, he has this to say about
the OPRS:
I think that the policy is OK as it
addresses our human right to be happy in
a relationship. But I also think that there
is no special protection for homosexuals
like what happened to me with my failed
relationships. The policy should be
holistic. I feel that the treatment of same-
sex relationships in my experience is very
superficial. The policy that applies to
heterosexuals is assumed to apply to us,
and it should not be this way.
ALBURO, K. Z. 37BROTHERS, LOVERS, AND REVOLUTION
Similarly, a few of my informants have
shared being encouraged to marry the opposite
sex despite having openly admitted being gay.
“Some comrades viewed that gay relationships
are not worth any serious effort” and that “the
only productive relationship is a heterosexual
one”. On the other hand, other informants
expressed a more optimistic view of the policy.
They regarded it as something that nally afforded
them “equality” in terms of recognizing their right
to form same-sex relations—something that they
have been deprived of by the Catholic Church and
the State. The marriage that happened in 2005
generated a lot of excitement for most of them
because it seemed like a validation for their hopes
that indeed, “it can happen.”
THE TIMID GUERRILLA:
UNPACKING SUBJECTIVITIES
A dominant discourse in my interviews is the
reference to “the woman within”. Because their
“inside” (kalooban) is supposedly “female”, gay
men are branded as mahinhin, connoting physical
weakness and inability to ght18. Thus, many
would question why there were gays in the NPA.
This notion has brought with it some ambivalence
on how to situate gays in the army, when the inside
does not match with the “outside”.
At the core of the construction of the Filipino
gay man is of one having a male physique and a
female heart embodied by the bakla (Manalansan,
1995). This construction of the bakla “primarily
centers on two closely related images—the
cross- dressing queen and the pseudo-woman”
(Manalansan, 1995, p. 197). While not all those
called bakla are effeminate or “cross dressers”,
they are generally considered to have the feelings
of a woman. Moreover, the concept of kalooban
(core-ness or what one really is on the inside)
greatly informs the (gender) identity of the
bakla in the Philippines (Garcia, 2003)—as a
“screaming queen beneath the masculine façade”
(Manalansan, 1995, pp. 198-199).
Such notion of being a “woman at the core”
largely affects how other guerrilla ghters view
and interact with gays, and how many of the
gay men view themselves.19 Many times, my
informants referred to themselves as being “like
a girl in the way I moved and talked” (Ariel), with
the “feelings of a woman” (Reyna), and “thinking
like a woman” (Danika). In terms of work, most
of them are assigned to be medics, instructors,
nance ofcers, and performers (theatre, dance,
etc.)—tasks considered “lighter”, in the physical
sense, and thus, feminine.
This concept of “woman in a man’s body” also
brings to mind the construction of a gendered and
heterosexualized homosexuality. In the Western
sense, homosexuality is “simply a question
of sexual orientation regardless of the self-
understanding one has of one’s gender” (Garcia,
2003, p. 63). But the notion of a woman in a man’s
body is not simply a matter of orientation. In
this context, the desire for other men necessitates
the understanding of one having a feminine
core. At the same time, since gay men are still
physically male, they are thus not allowed to be
in close contacts with women as in the case of
sleeping and bathing. All this is underpinned
by a heterosexualized understanding of gender
relations.
Selfhood of gay men is partly constructed
by instilling these dominant notions of sexual
relations in the Party. As homosexuality intersects
with notions of gender, and with concepts of what
it means to be a soldier, the subjective identities of
gay red ghters emerge. And in some instances,
they are able to use the dominant conception about
“gayness” to achieve military gains (e.g. dressing
up like a woman to accomplish a mission) and
prove their capabilities to comrades in order to
gain respect and a sense of self-worth.
EMBODYING MILITARY MASCULINITY
The body, more than being a biological entity,
is an object and site of power (Foucault 1980).
Masculinity and the ‘male sex role’ are closely
38 VOL. 11 NO. 2ASIA-PACIFIC SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
linked to a context-specic image of the ‘ideal’
male body as a “muscular physique that may serve
as a symbolic embodiment” of competitiveness,
persistence, condence, and even superiority.
This embodiment of masculinity is closely linked
to heterosexuality (Mishkind, Rodin, Silberstein,
& Striegel-Moore, 2001, p. 108). In this section, I
look at how the body is subjected to discipline—
used, transformed, and improved (Foucault, 1977)
in accordance with “acceptable” forms of military
masculinity. Moreover, I explore the perceived
paradoxes inscribed on the (gay) soldier’s body
as a site for contesting discourses about imagined
gender ideals.
The paradox of having a “manly physique”
while being a “woman at the core” comes out as
a site of tension when gay men interact especially
with other men in the NPA. Some of my
respondents shared how difcult it was for some
comrades to reconcile the perceived incongruence
of the muscular male body of a ghter and their
“femininity”. For instance, Ariel shared that
mostly male comrades would wonder how he
could carry heavy containers of water from the
river to the camp, or the fact that he could carry
a heavy rie. They would ask him, “Why did
you become gay when you have a strong body?”
On other occasions, while it was easier for male
comrades to reconcile the image of a gay man in
the NPA if they actually dressed like a woman,
some gay men were told to be more “manly” in
their stance because they were soldiers. We see
here many inconsistencies concerning how gay
men are viewed in terms of their physique and
their gendered meanings. What I nd consistent
is the imagined paradox between being physically
male, and emotionally/mentally a female. I say
it is imagined because these tensions are not
inherent in the body of the gay man, but rather
shaped according to the meanings inscribed on
the body. In this imagined paradox, confusion
arises on whether one should not be gay if one has
a muscular body; or if one is gay, then he should
look feminine; or if one is in the army and is
gay, one should appear more manly and suppress
femininity. It points to the situation that despite
ofcial recognition at the institutional level of the
CPP-NPA, ambiguities rest at many levels, from
the level of formation of subjective identities in
the day-to-day negotiations of gay men in the
NPA, to the dominant constructs of hegemonic
military masculinity of the CPP and Philippine
society. These ambiguities and paradoxes also
extend to how the gay man’s body is imagined in
terms of “discipline” and sexual behaviour.
The NPA follows a strict military discipline
patterned on Mao Tse-tung’s (1969) The Three
Main Rules for Discipline and The Eight Points
for Attention that laid down the rules for combat,
treatment of women, barrio folk and their
properties, and conduct toward prisoners of war
as follows:
A. Three main rules for discipline
1. Obey orders in all your actions.
2. Don’t take a single needle or piece
of thread from the masses.
3. Turn in everything captured.
B Eight Points for Attention
1. Speak politely.
2. Pay fairly for what you buy.
3. Return everything you borrow.
4. Pay for anything you damage.
5. Don't hit or swear at people.
6. Don’t damage crops.
7. Don’t take liberties with women.
8. Don't ill-treat captives.
However, when talking about discipline, my
informants almost always refer to regulation of
sexual behaviour rather than the military code of
discipline. While in principle, sexual relations
are only one of the domains governed by Party
discipline, sexual discipline is most emphasized
among (male) homosexuals. Clearly, the concept
of discipline no longer refers to explicit codes
of conduct and coercion but on how the object
of discipline “makes itself more obedient and
more useful” (Foucault, 1977). In this case, sex
is a domain of a gay man’s life that is subject to
heightened scrutiny in the NPA, due to a prevailing
ALBURO, K. Z. 39BROTHERS, LOVERS, AND REVOLUTION
notion of supposed homosexual promiscuity
deemed detrimental to the revolutionary cause
and thus must be suppressed. This view is held
by some gay cadres themselves, who nd that
their desires for other men need to be disciplined
especially when they are in the army waging a
revolution. As Reyna points out, “I understand
that we really need to have discipline because it
is the nature of gays to have sex whenever and
wherever they nd the opportunity.”
Here, we nd a conation of army discipline
and the regulation of sexual behaviour, something
that may not entirely be specic to gay men alone,
but something that definitely becomes more
accentuated as a result of being gay. And because
of this ‘expected promiscuity’ some gay men also
nd themselves subjected to sexual violence and
aggression—from unwanted touching to demands
for sexual favours. In one particular case, Ameer
recalled how he was always called the “pretty
gay” because of her long hair and feminine
body. This attracted the attention of some male
comrades which resulted in sexual assaults on his
person. Sexual favours are considered normal
in this situation due to the perception that gay
men are by nature promiscuous resulting in such
violence. In these instances, many choose to
keep quiet about their experiences of violence,
while others invoke redress mechanisms through
the responsible yunits within the guerrilla fronts.
Despite disciplinary action meted out on some
erring (male) comrades, sexual violence remained
a reality that many of these gay men faced.
Furthermore, situated in the sexualized
concept of discipline is the issue of gay men
being “security risks” because of their supposed
weakness to temptations when presented with
handsome men. Danika shared that he would be
told tales of how gay men in the NPA would turn
traitor and reveal information to the government
forces because they gave in to “temptation”.
When asked if this was documented, he said he
never saw an actual report and that there was no
specic event that he knew of. This brings me to
reect on how the internalization of such discourse
affects the gay men themselves. Sekar presented
a very interesting effect this kind of thinking had
on him, “There were times when I was afraid I
might cause the capture of my comrades or that
if someone did get caught by the military, I might
get blamed for it because I am gay.” Even the
government military seemed to share this idea.
For instance, when Reyna was captured after an
unsuccessful mission, he was tortured for three
days. And during the time of his interrogation, the
military would send handsome men to talk to him
and to make sexual suggestions if he cooperated.
However, Reyna asserted that he never divulged
any of the NPA’s plans. Despite that, the idea of
homosexuals being security risks is still dominant
and thus implies monitoring and “disciplining”
gay men’s sexuality.
In sum, the idea of discipline and security risk
become highly sexualized because they rest on
the ideas of promiscuity, as “the nature of gays.”
The popular image of male homosexuals as cross-
dressers or pseudo-women has resulted in an
imagined paradox between having a man’s body
with a woman residing inside. Ambiguities thus
arise in dealing with gay men in the army despite
institutional sanction, when the understanding of
homosexuality is something left for individual
negotiations. One thing that these negotiations can
impart is that such ambiguities and contradictions
can open a venue for rethinking of constructs that
seem to x what is actually highly uid.
CONCLUSION
In negotiating for their place in the New
People’s Army, gay cadres have challenged
hegemonic military masculinity by using resources
available to them—various individual skills and
capacities, initiating discussions about gay men’s
place in the NPA, accessing grievance machineries
of the Party through their respective yunits, and
adopting nationalist discourses by situating their
struggle for recognition within the larger context
of the revolutionary movement. This research
shows that hegemonic military masculinity,
inextricably linked to heterosexuality, has been
40 VOL. 11 NO. 2ASIA-PACIFIC SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
constructed in a way that suppresses other existing
forms of masculinities in the socio-spatial context
of the army. The focus on a normative model of
military masculinity not only makes us blind to
other masculinities but institutionalizes further
a kind of masculinity based on a heterosexual
imaginary. The case of gay men in the New
People’s Army destabilizes a heterosexualized
military masculinity which brings forth the
heteronormative image of the soldier as a real
man patterned on being strong, aggressive, and
skilled in the art of war. The enlistment of male
homosexuals in the New People’s Army produces
not just a ‘new man’ but also, with the backdrop
of armed struggle, a “new man ready to die”—
and even kill—for the revolutionary cause. This
“new military man” has claimed a space in the
army without adhering to a heterosexual requisite,
creating space for alternative masculinities to be
explored. My discussion on masculinities in the
NPA is not exhaustive, but it provides room to
look at possibilities of other existing masculinities
along other lines of social relations apart from
sexuality. This study highlights the complexities
of negotiation: that it is not a linear process, and
is carried out on various surfaces of engagement.
As gender and sexuality are organizing principles
of society, these pervade as ideologies within
given gender regimes, permeate institutions and
facilitate social (hetero) norms, become lived
realities in actual subjective experiences, and
inscribe themselves symbolically on (gay men’s)
bodies. Thus, the space for alternative military
masculinities has to be struggled for, in many
different levels.
NOTES
1 This article is based on my Masters thesis submitted
to the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The
Hague, under the Women, Gender, Development program.
I would like to thank my former supervisor, Dubravka
Zarkov, and second reader, Nahda Shehada of the ISS as
well as Aloysius Mariae Canete of A2D Project for their
contributions to the writing of this article. I would also
like to thank anonymous referees of this journal for their
comments on an earlier draft.
2 Masculinity is not necessarily attributed only to men.
3 While there are both male and female homosexuals
in the NPA, I chose to limit the scope of my study to male
homosexuals, mainly because I had difficulty making
contact/nding female informants within the limited period
of my eld work.
4 Upon embarking on this research, I become aware of
my own limitations as a researcher, sometimes falling into
the trap of “thinking straight” or viewing the world through
a “heterosexual imaginary” (Ingraham, 2006). While I
have been educated in the methods of employing feminist
and gender-sensitive research, with my own practice in
development work mostly focusing on women’s organizing,
I realized that undertaking a “masculine-sensitive research”
(Curato, 2010) was like venturing into an alien territory
where my positionality as a woman became my main
obstacle. From this standpoint, I was not only to capture
the male experience but to map out “the dynamic process
of negotiating men’s multilayered identity” (Curato, 2010,
p. 247).
5 Real names have been concealed to ensure
condentiality and informants’ security.
6 Also known as Hinggil sa Pag-aasawa (On Marriage),
1998
7 A nal draft was released in 1977 in Tagalog version
8 The Philippines remains the only country without a
divorce law.
9 The RA’s constitute the present CPP.
10 Referring to a strong sense of individualism which no
longer adhered to Party discipline
11 Key informant interview on July 28, 2008, Quezon
City
12 http://members.tripod.com/progay_philippines/intro.
html accessed October 19, 2008.
13 From an interview with Reyna, one of my gay informants
14 The ORS was amended in March 1998 during the 10th
Plenum of the CPP Central Committee.
15 http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/
Democratic-centralism accessed October 24, 2008
16 Bayot, Agi and Bantut are comparable terms in other
Philippine regions.
17 On this note, an interesting point uncovered in my
eldwork is that homosexuality in the Philippines is not
necessarily dened by sexual acts themselves. Hence, a
bakla might have sex with a ‘straight’ man, but only the
bakla is considered homosexual (Garcia, 2004, p. 13). It is
not necessarily a matter of who is ‘active’ or ‘passive’, as
homosexuality has already been dened through gender (the
bakla being the feminine one). This caught my attention
when some of the gay men I interviewed kept referring to
one of the same-sex couple who got married as the ‘straight
husband’ and the other one as the ‘gay wife’. Most baklas
look for a ‘real man’ (i.e. ‘straight’), as many of them refer
to sexual relations with other baklas in ‘cannibalistic terms’,
e.g. eating’s one’s own esh (Manalansan, 1995, p. 200).
ALBURO, K. Z. 41BROTHERS, LOVERS, AND REVOLUTION
18 Mahuyang is the equivalent term in the Cebuano
language referring to gay men in the NPA, literally meaning
weak.
19 This also reects in how almost all of them have
chosen feminine code names for the interviews.
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