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Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in the Climate Change Regime
Abstract
The international relations literature often assumes that negotiators in global regimes are actively seeking a collective agreement to the problem on the table. There are cases, however, where a delegation may instead be "striving for no," that is, participating with the aim of obstructing a deal. This article explores the challenges surrounding such cases of "obstructionism," using the example of Saudi Arabia in the climate change regime. It examines the evidence for diagnosing Saudi Arabia as an obstructionist in that regime, the delegation's negotiating tactics, strategies for addressing obstructionism, and finally the repercussions for both the climate change regime, and Saudi Arabia itself. In conclusion, the article considers whether Saudi Arabia may be moving beyond obstruction. (c) 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
... This is consistent with the results of the macroeconomic scenario presented in section 4. In these scenarios the total of negative emissions generated by DAC and CCS could reach 23 Gt/y of CO 2 in 2080. However, as for today, only small DAC pilot projects are underway 16 . The cost of capturing and storing a ton of CO 2 was over $800 per ton in 2019. ...
... As a result, GCC countries are in a difficult balancing act between reducing oil rents and investing in clean energy and carbon-free economic activities. 16 Climeworks https://climeworks.com/roadmap/orca For GCC countries, the consequences vary depending on the conditions that frame the trajectory towards the ZNE regime, such as natural gas endowment, the maturity of the oil sector, the cleanliness of the exploration and production processes (methane leaks and flaring); and the level of industrial activities associated with the transformation of oil and gas into steel, other energy intensive goods and petrochemical products. ...
... Interestingly, J. Krane observes that KSA, the largest economy among the GCC states has adopted a mixed strategy, which includes components of the three types above. In the past KSA was a climate obstructionist, which joined UN-led climate treaty negotiations to thwart, delay or weaken a possible agreement (see J. Depledge [16]). Since the 2015 Paris agreement, KSA has shifted its stance to one of support for climate action. ...
Using a multi-level perspective approach combined with top-down macroeconomic models, we analyse the situation of the GCC countries in the perspective of a global transition to zero-net emissions before the end of the century. Based on these analyses we propose strategic and political options for these oil and gas exporting countries. We show that it would be unwise for GCC member states to adopt an obstruc-tionist strategy in international climate negotiations. On the contrary, these countries could be proactive in developing international emissions trading market and exploiting negative emissions obtained from CO 2 direct reduction technologies, in particular Direct Air Capture with CO 2 sequestration, and thus contribute to a global net-zero-emissions regime in which clean fossil fuels are still used.
... Nigeria, Venezuela and a number of Gulf states) requested early on in the negotiations compensation for foregone oil revenues due to response measures (i.e. climate policies in OECD) (Armstrong 2020, Depledge 2008 but this has so far not gained any traction in the negotiations. ...
... The position of Saudi Arabia towards UNFCCC and climate change in general has historically been very negative (Depledge 2008) but this attitude has markedly shifted the last years (Krane 2021). Saudi Arabia changed their position within the UNFCCC negotiations from "blocker" (Depledge 2008) to "opportunistically constructive" (Krane 2019b). ...
... The position of Saudi Arabia towards UNFCCC and climate change in general has historically been very negative (Depledge 2008) but this attitude has markedly shifted the last years (Krane 2021). Saudi Arabia changed their position within the UNFCCC negotiations from "blocker" (Depledge 2008) to "opportunistically constructive" (Krane 2019b). This change of mind comes from internal problems within the Kingdom with deteriorating oil revenues, high domestic emissions and excessive energy use. ...
Petrostates face an unprecedented crisis as oil and gas revenues, on which their economies and states are built upon, are set to diminish rapidly the coming 20 years. The decline in revenues is an effect of the adopted climate policies in the major oil consuming countries that, together with a strong development of renewable energy, reduces the future demand for oil and gas. The challenges that this change create are not only the financial losses but equally important are political and institutional challenges. The dependence on oil and gas have formed both the goverance and the economic structures and thus neglected alternative developments that could have fostered a diverse and competitvie economy.
Petrostates need quickly to adopt green industrial polices to diversify their economies. A few petrostates have started to prepare for a future beyond oil and gas. These diversification strategies can be grouped into either diversification of existing industrial structures, or a developmental strategy to diversify the whole economy to become more robust and innovative. The effectiveness of these diversification ambitions is still unclear. The political changes needed are first to reduce the abundant consumption subsides to fossil energy. This is not easy as this is part of the social contract of a petrostate. In the longer-term, an institutional upgrading is needed to create the right domestic incentives for developing a diverse and competitive economy.
Several areas needs more and deeper understanding in order to formulate effective responses. More in-depth knowledge of the main petrostates, and how the political economy and state model is evolving, is needed. The geopolitical dimension of this transition cannot be understated and requires further efforts.
... Secondly, international pressure on and expectations of GCC countries to engage with sustainability have increased in recent decades since these countries are often criticized for exhibiting large per capita consumption footprints and blocking some parts of the international climate agenda (Depledge, 2008;Krane, 2018). Thirdly and finally, the technological and economic feasibility of many environmental technologies has provided "win-win" opportunities for GCC countries to satisfy environmental requirements and save costs or attract investments. ...
... However, climate change has not featured highly in national policymaking in the GCC, despite GCC states suffering significantly from extremes such as heatwaves, with multiple important impacts, particularly on marine ecosystems Hereher, 2020). GCC states have historically been skeptical to climate change action (Depledge, 2008), rather treating climate action more practically, in terms of expanding renewable energies and modernizing the built infrastructure (Al-Saidi and Elagib, 2018). These modernization efforts include building certifications, investments in public transport, and the expansion of the use of electric vehicles (particularly in the UAE). ...
The agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is a key international outcome for guiding development efforts of nation states. However, SDG targets cover vast areas of action, and they are difficult to break down and monitor for countries with different developmental situations and needs. Often, global rankings of countries’ compliance with the SDG agenda are plagued with false signals and methodological limitations. This paper presents a much-needed prioritization of the SDG targets for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. It maps SDG targets and outlines priorities and key areas for environmental action. Sustainability in resource use, consumption and production constitutes a primary area for investments. Education and awareness represent cross-cutting priorities and low-hanging fruit for action. Tackling climate change and emerging supply risks and the management of ecosystems represent an action area in which GCC governments can intensify their interventions. As a supporting policy, regional environmental cooperation is important for enhanced commitments and tackling transboundary aspects of the SDG agenda. The analysis of the SDG agenda in the GCC regions reiterates the importance of countries engaging with global sustainability framings in order work out their own interpretations in congruence with national development realities. Such an SDG regional mapping exercise also assists national-level planners or regional bodies working on development issues in shaping the Gulf region’s engagement with the global sustainability agenda and tracking progress on key SDG priorities.
... Source: Authors CCUS in international fora (Depledge 2008). In 2020, suggesting that the world's reliance on fossil fuels 'will not change for many decades to come', Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud explained that 'CCUS plays a central role' in the CCE (OPEC, 2020b). ...
... It has been described as a likely 'last man standing' in future global oil markets (Krane, 2019). Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has traditionally approached global climate change mitigation defensively, emphasising the threat that it poses to oil demand and the high reliance of its domestic economy on revenues from oil exports (Depledge, 2008;Khondaker, et al., 2014;Luomi, 2020;Russell, 2016). At the same time, the Kingdom has long recognised the need to diversify its economy away from oil (Luciani, 2012). ...
During its Presidency of the Group of Twenty (G20) in 2020, Saudi Arabia launched the concept of the circular carbon economy (CCE) as a framework for reducing emissions to a level consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement. The concept, which was endorsed by both G20 leaders and energy ministers, comes at a time when Saudi Arabia appears to have stabilised its domestic emissions after decades of rapid growth. This article describes the CCE concept and positions it alongside other related sustainability concepts, and assesses how it may be meaningfully applied. To that end, the article provides an analysis of key greenhouse gas (GHG) and carbon dioxide (CO2) trends in Saudi Arabia and existing climate change-related policies and measures using the CCE as a framing tool. Prominent data sources indicate that Saudi Arabia’s total CO2 emissions experienced their first-ever significant decline in 2018, of 3.93%. The analysis suggests that policy-induced variables, namely energy price reform and more robust energy efficiency measures, played a significant role in this. The article also explores the potential of key mitigation options if limiting global warming below 2°C is to be achieved. Finally, the article discusses the international significance of the CCE concept and its potential to foster stronger engagement on net-zero pathways, particularly from fossil-fuel rich countries and hard-to-abate sectors.
Key policy insights
• The CCE approach aspires to promote holistic assessments of how various carbon management options fit together to achieve a carbon balance, or net-zero emissions.
• Saudi Arabia's adoption of the concept signals a stronger level of engagement on climate policy. CCE’s game-changing potential derives from how it allows aligning fossil fuel producers’ interests with net-zero emissions trajectories.
• A meaningful operationalisation of the CCE in Saudi Arabia will still require a stronger CO2 accounting framework, aligned with international measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) standards.
• Achieving an emissions pathway consistent with a 2°C global warming target in Saudi Arabia would require significantly more policy support for carbon capture and storage (CCS) and hydrogen in particular, along with a continued emphasis on renewable energy and energy efficiency.
• The CCE should also be seen as a tool to build bridges between fossil fuel importers and exporters for holistic discussions around energy transition..
... Foreign trading only ended up being 5% of the total market shares. climate change is that they fear the potential negative impacts of mitigation policies on their economy being that they are highly dependent on the oil sector (Depledge, 2008). ...
... Saudi Arabian delegation is highly skilled, often being able to push the countries' agenda items forward and strengthen their position. It is consistent and has undoubtedly strengthened their position on climate change (Depledge, 2008). ...
This paper explores the awareness and concern for environmental protection among consumers in India. Data was
collected from 374 respondents using questionnaire survey covering issues on product usage and disposal. It is evident
from this study that Indians are aware and concerned about the environmental conditions but the commitment level to
take proactive individual actions is moderate.
... Foreign trading only ended up being 5% of the total market shares. climate change is that they fear the potential negative impacts of mitigation policies on their economy being that they are highly dependent on the oil sector (Depledge, 2008). ...
... Saudi Arabian delegation is highly skilled, often being able to push the countries' agenda items forward and strengthen their position. It is consistent and has undoubtedly strengthened their position on climate change (Depledge, 2008). ...
This research explores employee response toward change initiatives in order to create a working model to identify factors
which influence employee response toward changes in the organization such as re-structuring; merger and acquisition;
transfers, lateral moves and hiring; etc. This study identifies a workable model to allow management within
organizations undergoing change and transformation to predict the response of its employees with respect to the
identified factors. The resulting instrument is proven to be highly reliable and will assist organizations managing
change initiatives.
... Finally, a few studies also mention climate change skepticism among Muslim communities (Khan, 2014;O'Reilly, 2018;Yildirim, 2016) and governments of Muslim-majority countries (i.e., Saudi Arabia, see Depledge, 2008). For example, Khan reports that Muslim farmers in the Jamuna River region (Bangladesh), where the soil is eroding and shifting, perceive the concept of climate change as "poisonous knowledge from the West" (Khan, 2014). ...
... In response to these challenges, governments of Muslim-majority countries have signed international agreements, and some have started to implement green economy strategies (Vaghefi et al., 2015). For instance, after a long history of climate change skepticism and obstructionism at the United Nations climate negotiations (Depledge, 2008), Saudi Arabia has begun to diversify its oil-dependent economy and has sought to promote low-carbon transportation technologies. The United Arab Emirates is implementing, in Masdar City in Abu Dhabi, a pioneering urban development project, striving to develop a carbon-neutral city (Ali, 2016;Kaminski, 2019). ...
A growing body of research stresses the importance of religion in understanding and addressing climate change. However, so far, little is known about the relationship between Muslim communities and climate change. Globally, Muslims constitute the second largest faith group, and there is a strong concentration of Muslims in regions that are particularly affected by global warming. This review synthesizes existing research about climate change and Muslim communities. It addresses (a) Islamic environmentalism, (b) Muslim perceptions of climate change, and (c) mitigation strategies of Muslim communities. The analysis shows that there is no uniform interpretation of climate change among Muslims. Based on their interpretations of Islam, Muslims have generated different approaches to climate change. A small section of Muslim environmentalists engages in public campaigning to raise greater concern about climate change, seeks to reduce carbon emissions through sociotechnological transition efforts, and disseminates proenvironmental interpretations of Islam. However, it remains unclear to what extent these activities generate broader changes in the daily activities of Muslim communities and organizations. Contributions to this research field are often theoretical and stress theological and normative aspects of Islam. Empirical studies have particularly addressed Indonesia and the United Kingdom, whereas knowledge about Muslim climate activism in other world regions is fragmented. Against this backdrop, there is a need for comparative studies that consider regional and religious differences among Muslims and address the role of Muslim environmentalism in climate change mitigation and adaptation at the international, national, and local scales.
This article is categorized under:
• Social Status of Climate Change Knowledge > Sociology/Anthropology of Climate Knowledge
Abstract
Muslim pilgrims surrounding the sacred site Kaaba in the Great Mosque of Mecca
... These illustrations highlight how weak states' diplomatic efforts on some issues may shift international negotiation outcomes. But while these examples have captured researchers' attention in the form of case studies (see, e.g., Depledge, 2008 there is still no overarching evidence for how and why these countries are able to obtain international concessions and settle specific agreements. Overall, little systematic work has been attempted to cross-nationally articulate and validate the power sources of conventionally weak states at global climate negotiations. ...
... Similarly, Jakobsen (2009) suggests that attempting to be an honest "broker" generated success among small Nordic countries in past EU security negotiations. The importance of strategic positions may be relevant to the climate negotiations too, as some scholars have pointed out (Depledge, 2008). However, weak states at the UNFCCC do not need to rely on institutional formalities as much as in other institutions, given that nation-states are de facto the only actors engaged in the climate negotiations and no other forms of governance have decision-making power on the climate. ...
This Element provides an explanation for the power of weak states in international politics, focusing on the case of international climate negotiations at the United Nations. The author points to the pitfalls of assuming that weak countries elicit power from their coordinated salience for climate issues. Contrastingly, it is argued that weak states' influence at global climate negotiations depends on the moral authority provided by strong states. The author maintains that weak states' authority is contingent on international vulnerability, which intersects broader domestic discussions of global justice, and pushes the leaders of strong countries to concede power to weak countries. New empirical evidence is shown in support of the theory.
... Beyond carbon accounting, there are signs that oil supermajors have missed opportunities to demonstrate their commitment to climate action. Governments and executives linked to large utilities and energy firms have spent the past few decades voicing or funding opposition to climate action, while continuing to invest in the exploration and production of O&G (Depledge 2008;Bohr 2016;Culhane, Hall, and Roberts 2021). Few producers have diversified their capital investments into renewables, clean hydrogen, or even carbon capture and storage, given the reduced (or negative) rates of return for these fossil fuel options. ...
... The CCE, which was introduced by His Royal Highness (HRH) King Salman at the end of Saudi Arabia's 2020 G20 presidency, extends the idea of a circular economy but its primary focus is on energy and carbon flows (Figure 1.6). The approach has, however, raised questions given Saudi Arabia's past positions on global climate change (Depledge 2008). An early critical voice described the CCE as 'a renewed push' for CCUS technologies. ...
... Likewise, in the group of Arab petrostates, Saudi Arabia blocks negotiation progress and collaborates with other key "laggards" (Castro et al., 2014), notably the Brazil, South Africa, India, and China group and the Umbrella Group, to hinder decisions that would cut fossil fuel production. Saudi Arabia's position in climate negotiations is deeply shaped by the fear of the potential negative impacts of mitigation policies on its oil production and revenues, and therefore, Saudi negotiators have long played the role of an "obstructionist" in the United Nations climate change regime (Depledge, 2008). In the Umbrella Group, Russia holds an unpredictable position in negotiations due to its primary focus on accelerating unrestrained economic growth (Andonova & Alexieva, 2012). ...
The United Nations climate summits—Conferences of the Parties, or COPs—have emerged as important sites to confront fossil fuel incumbents. While new research indicates that least developed countries (LDCs) are challenging incumbents at COPs by calling upon them to phase out fossil fuel, there is limited research on how the coalition of LDCs is strategizing to confront incumbents and their capacity to do so. I address this gap by drawing on 24 interviews with LDCs’ negotiators and observers. Informed by the strategic power perspective and the neo-Gramscian account of power, it identifies three central dynamics in how LDCs contest fossil fuel incumbents. First, negotiators undertake “soft” strategies at negotiations to call upon incumbents to reduce fossil fuel consumption, while observers pursue “hard” tactics at side events to press incumbents to phase out production. Second, the coalition is divided between those countries focused on reducing fossil fuel consumption versus those emphasizing the need for a production phase-out. This split creates disagreement, contestation, and division in the coalition. Finally, the coalition’s capacity to confront incumbents is restrained by three obstacles: fragile strategies, varied interests and fragmentation in the coalition and the G77+ China, and interstate relations between LDCs and incumbents shaped by political economic factors and colonial legacy. The LDCs’ coalition is central to advancing supply-side climate policy in international climate negotiations. Overcoming these divisions and barriers would enhance the coalition's capacity to exert pressure on incumbents, particularly major fossil fuel-producing states.
... Chasek & Wagner, 2012;Spyros & Bourantonis, 2011, p. 4f). Just as some larger countries (Depledge, 2008;Dessai, 2004), some islands make a special effort to send their most senior and most able negotiators, and to send the same people over time (Carter, 2018;Kjellén, 2013). For CARICOM, Brandouille (2023) even writes that 'placing CARICOM representatives in leadership and senior posts in international organizations has been a long-standing feature of CARICOM foreign policy'. ...
... Accountability denotes the condition of holding an actor responsible for their behaviour, with the expectation that they will be answerable for their ( Anthropogenic climate change exposes the heightened challenges for global environmental governance in realising the accountability of state (and non-state) actors for climate-related harms (Widerberg & Pattberg, 2016). Under public international law, the regulation of transboundary and global environmental damage is centred on those legal norms of responsibility obliging states to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to other states or to areas beyond state jurisdiction (Mason, 2008;Verheyen, 2005 (Article 3.14), articles requiring consideration of the needs and concerns of countries whose economies are highly dependent on production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels (Barnett & Dessai, 2002;Depledge, 2008). This position, supported by the other Gulf petrostates, has justified calls for recognition that lost oil revenues be considered a legitimate source of compensation. ...
For states with political economies largely dependent on oil and natural gas rents, there seems to be little scope for accountability practices that answer for, and curb, fossil fuel production contributing to anthropogenic climate change. Critically engaging with rentier state theory, I examine the climate change accountability of Persian Gulf petrostates according to state responsibility norms under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). For both domestic and international actions undertaken by these countries, there is no meaningful climate answerability for responsible actions—that they recognise and/or commit to the phasing down of their oil and natural gas production. There are differences in their emission reduction goals, under the Paris Agreement, that map onto variations in the stability and structure of their political economies, notably between the ‘super‐rentier’ states (UAE, Kuwait and Qatar) and their rentier neighbours (Saudi Arabia and Oman). However, all make ritualistic, long‐term commitments to ‘clean‐carbon’ (net zero‐emission) futures with no plans to reduce hydrocarbon exports. I argue that international climate change obligations should include a responsibility on states to reduce GHG emissions (at source) arising from their domestic‐ and foreign ownership of operational oil and gas fields. State energy companies in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere are key actors in fossil fuel extraction, yet remain insulated, through their corporate identities, from state responsibility norms. Treating state ownership of fossil fuels as a legitimate target of international climate regulation would broaden state accountability for climate change harm.
... However, due to massive oil-consuming and oil-exporting flows, this economy ignored the issue of climate change. This tendency contributes to shifting to cleaner production processes challenging vis-a-vis carbon-based industries (Depledge, 2008). In the meantime, Saudi Arabia has adopted significant policy measures to promote renewable energy sources and attempted to recede the economy's reliance on conventional energy sources under the 2016-devised National Vision 2030 (Alomari & Heffron, 2021). ...
... Interestingly, J. Krane observes that KSA, the largest economy among the GCC states has adopted a mixed strategy, which includes components of the three types above. In the past KSA was a climate obstructionist, which joined UNled climate treaty negotiations to thwart, delay or weaken a possible agreement (see J. Depledge [69]). Since the 2015 Paris agreement, KSA has shifted its stance to one of support for climate action. ...
Using a multi-level perspective approach combined with top-down macroeconomic models, we analyze the situation of the GCC countries in the perspective of a global transition to zero-net emissions before the end of the century. Based on these analyses, we propose strategic and political options for these oil and gas exporting countries. We show that it would be unwise for GCC member states to adopt an obstructionist strategy in international climate negotiations. On the contrary, these countries could be proactive in developing international emissions trading market and exploiting negative emissions obtained from CO2 direct reduction technologies, in particular direct air capture with CO2 sequestration, and thus contribute to a global net-zero-emissions regime in which clean fossil fuels are still used.
... This is the reason Saudi Arabia has adopted an adversarial position in the global efforts to tackle climate change. The UNFCCC, according to Saudi Arabia, is not an energy treaty [2], and the country bases its climate change policy more on economic than environmental reasons. Apart from economic factors, Saudi Arabia contends that climate change such as extreme weather events, safeguarding biodiversity, and ensuring cultural survival is a secondary concern that should not receive any national policy attention. ...
The air temperature has gradually grown since the globe entered the industrial period, leading to several issues, including global warming. The worldwide community has been debating the climate change extensively for more than ten years. The international community has also taken numerous actions on this problem, including the adoption of the "Paris Agreement," the "Kyoto Protocol," and the "United Nations Framework on Climate Change." This paper investigates how the environment and jobs are affected by global climate change under the context of just transition. According to the study, climate change has prompted the creation of new energy sources. Amidst the backdrop of climate change, variables like international standing and GDP will have an impact on the economic standing of many nations. Climate change affects not only the economy but a variety of other fields as well. It has made some areas of the world hostile, and also led to the vanishing of certain cultures. Moreover, it has an impact on employment. Global climate change initiatives have not generated a lot of jobs, and they have both positive and negative impacts on employment.
... Set against these developments, however, are several powerful states and industry actors vigorously opposed to any suggestion that production should be limited by international law or through a club arrangement. The power of these incumbents and their ability to stall more ambitious climate action should not be underestimated (Depledge 2008;Newell and Paterson 1998). Incumbents may, for example, invoke international investment agreements to challenge or prevent fossil fuel phaseout policies or the participation of states in any international agreement (Tienhaara et al. 2022). ...
To achieve the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal, fossil fuel production needs to undergo a managed decline. While some frontrunner countries have already begun to adopt policies and measures restricting fossil fuel supply, an outstanding question is how international cooperation in support of a managed decline of fossil fuel production could take shape. This article explores two possible pathways—one following a club model and the other more akin to a multilateral environmental agreement. Specifically, the article discusses the participants in an international agreement; the forum through which cooperation will take place; the modalities, principles, and procedures underpinning the agreement; and the incentives to induce cooperation. The article concludes that the most likely scenario at this juncture is the emergence of club arrangements covering particular fossil fuel sources and groups of actors that, over time, give rise to growing calls for a more coordinated and multilateral response.
... 111 billion cubic meters per year in 2017) in the region of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) [1]. For decades, Saudi Arabia has been known for obstructing climate change agreements, and for dominating the positions of the oil-exporting countries which feared the negative spillovers of the energy transition on their carbon industries [2]. As the case of other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), there is lately an increased attention to renewable energies, energy subsidy reforms and the issue of sustainable development in general [3]. ...
Since 2016 and guided by the National Vision 2030, the energy transition in Saudi Arabia has gained significant momentum. There have been important energy subsidy reforms and dynamic developments in the renewable energy sector. This paper provides a systematic view of the Saudi energy transition by highlighting drivers, sectors, targets and processes. It analyzes the progress with regard to lowering carbon emissions and consumption, as well as introducing ambitious new targets and solar energy projects. The energy subsidy reforms have delivered the needed funds for the energy transition and allowed for more participation in the energy markets. Other aspects of the energy transition included low-carbon urban developments and energy efficiency measures in the building sectors. Besides, key energy-intensive industries such as petrochemicals and desalination are incorporating renewables and facilitating the use of clean energy. Overall, the Saudi energy transition is underway, and it holds significant and necessary adjustments to the most important economy in the Middle East region. It needs to be complemented by environmental awareness and sustainable lifestyles. Reforming the large carbon economy of Saudi Arabia towards more sustainability and environmental responsibility can have positive spillovers and powerful messages about the future of carbon-fuel exporting states.
... Country interests are too different for that -just take AOSIS and Saudi Arabia as examples (Kemp, 2015). In fact, Saudi Arabia has been a constant block in multiple sessions throughout the COPs, keeping an adamant position against any action against climate change (Depledge, 2008). It is a Catch-22: in order to get rid of consensus decision-making, you have to have a consensus! ...
Climate change is perhaps the biggest challenge of our times. In order to cope with it, we have to organise action collectively. The most important way to cooperate globally is through United Nations negotiations, known as ‘conferences of the parties’. However, progress has been very slow, and disillusionment with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process has set in. From a scientific point of view, several obstacles surfacing in these negotiations have been well researched. Institutional analysis may provide suggestions or even solutions to some of these problems. Hence, we think that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations could profit from scientific support. We provide scientific background for three prominent problems: how to reconcile different interests in a global public goods situation; how to ameliorate the consensus decision-making process; and how to design institutions to implement resolutions. Enhancing communication, trust and fairness, and enforcing sanctions, are suggested as key elements for that. Finally, we point to similar processes that have been brought to a successful end.
... Instead, the country has received more criticism over its disastrous environmental policy from the nongovernmental international community. Saudi Arabia does not only continually score very poorly in environmental indices and rankings but is also a regular recipient of the 'fossil of the day' prize, which is awarded by an environmentalist NGO (Depledge 2008;Aarts and Janssen 2003). Yet, it is highly doubtful that this criticism has triggered the Saudi government to act more environmental-friendly. ...
Within a few years, hydrocarbon-wealthy Arab Gulf states have managed to build up a green reputation despite their high ecological footprints and environmentally unsustainable development models. Particularly, the launch and promotion of grandiose clean projects such as the creation of the first zero-carbon city (‘Masdar’) in Abu Dhabi, Qatar’s promise to carry out a carbon-neutral Soccer World Cup in 2022 and, more recently, Saudi Arabia’s announcement of its futuristic megacity NEOM as the world’s largest city to be entirely powered by renewable energy gained great attention worldwide and illustrate an ‘ecological catch-up process’. Going beyond ‘post-oil’ discussion, this qualitative study looks at the recent sustainable transformation and analyse its broader implications on regime legitimacy. It argues that sustainable policy making constitutes a suitable vehicle to garner legitimacy at home and abroad. The Gulf monarchies, often perceived as old-fashioned and less adaptive to change, have realized this and have adjusted their policy making accordingly. Inspired by different avenues of political sciences such as policy analysis, political ecology, comparative autocracy research, as well as Gulf area studies, the study seeks to uncover their policy behaviour and observe how the implementation of a ‘new’ policy field affects a regime’s legitimation base. Thus, the study focusses on the process of environmental policy making and on the regime as an object of legitimacy. A holistic conceptual framework, called eco regime resilience, is established to explain how leaderships exhibit legitimacy from environmental policy making. The empirical part of the study follows a comparative analysis, which discusses the motivation and the policy processes in three similar cases, namely Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The study finds that all cases share similar political motives in terms of advocating environmental policy making with little attention to environmental consciousness and governance. Concretely, leaderships in the Gulf make use of environmental sustainability by increasing the regime’s popularity inside and outside as well as binding strategic elites closer to the regime. However, they all differ considerably in the implementation and the process of policy making. Broadly speaking, Kuwait focuses on accountability (input), Saudi Arabia relies on public service management (throughput), and Qatar on sustainable performance delivery (output). Additionally, the contextual factors (i.e. ‘trigger’) that evoked a stronger focus on environmental sustainability varied between the cases. In core, Qatar’s sustainable transformation was mainly triggered by external pressure, Saudi Arabia’s green turn came from within (though it needed external assistance), whereas regional developments had the greatest impact on a policy reconfiguration in Kuwait. The key findings of the study are threefold: First, by relying on the approach of political ecology, it provides the first comprehensive empirical study and novel approach to explain the green transformation in the Gulf states. Second, the study delivers a holistic conceptual model on policy making and its legitimation effects. Third, it reveals the interdependency of legitimacy and environmental sustainability showing that the advocation of environmental policy making has also clear and strategic political motives and incentives.
... Meetings of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Talberg et al., 2018), and of the London Convention had previously discussed particular aspects and forms of geoengineering, and rehearsed some arguments about possible forms of governance (Ginzky and Frost, 2014). Moreover, although a unique event, the Nairobi summit forms part of the ongoing history of international climate politics in which states with large fossil reserves and interests, including Russia, China, Saudi Arabia and the US have had a record of opposing an effective global carbon regime (Ciplet et al., 2015;Depledge, 2008). Notably, the US, already famous for its exceptionalist foreign policy tradition (Hughes, 2014;Ruggie, 2009)exempting itself from the CBD, for example, has in recent years both adopted a more antagonistic stance to global climate policy, and become the world's leading fossil energy exporter (Guliyev, 2020). ...
Climate engineering (geoengineering) is rising up the global policy agenda, partly because international divisions pose deep challenges to collective climate mitigation. However, geoengineering is similarly subject to clashing interests, knowledge‐traditions and geopolitics. Modelling and technical assessments of geoengineering are facilitated by assumptions of a single global planner (or some as yet unspecified rational governance), but the practicality of international governance remains mostly speculative. Using evidence gathered from state delegates, climate activists and modellers, we reveal three underlying and clashing ‘geofutures’: an idealised understanding of governable geoengineering that abstracts from technical and political realities; a situated understanding of geoengineering emphasising power hierarchies in world order; and a pragmatist precautionary understanding emerging in spaces of negotiation such as UN Environment Assembly (UNEA). Set in the wider historical context of climate politics, the failure to agree even to a study of geoengineering at UNEA indicates underlying obstacles to global rules and institutions for geoengineering posed by divergent interests and underlying epistemic and political differences. Technology assessments should recognise that geoengineering will not be exempt from international fractures; that deployment of geoengineering through imposition is a serious risk; and that contestations over geofutures pertain, not only to climate policy, but also the future of planetary order.
... Various opportunities exist to integrate supply-side elements into the Paris Agreement's architecture, including through the Agreement's transparency framework, commitment setting, financial support and capacity building, the global stocktake, and sharing of experiences and lessons learned . Many of these approaches could initially be pursued by one country or a small group of countries, thus side-stepping the need for buy-in from all major fossil-fuel-producing and exporting nations, many of whom have traditionally been reluctant to embrace ambitious climate action (Depledge, 2008). ...
... 14 US allies on issues related to climate change have varied over time, depending on the issue and on how it aligns with other negotiating parties' agendas. Their most frequent allies have been oil-producing states in both the Global North and the Global South (Depledge, 2008). 15 Pre-empting being held financially liable for its share of historical emissions, US interpretations of CBDR insist that this principle does not allocate responsibility for past GHG emissions (McGee and Steffek, 2016). ...
... Other GCC states have smaller populations (between 10 million inhabitants (the UAE) and 1.5 million (Bahrain)) and most of them have good relations with Iran (e.g., Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Dubai in the UAE). Moreover, Saudi Arabia has shaped the environmental diplomacy of GCC countries on the global stage and has thus greatly contributed to the historically skeptical attitude of the oiland gas-exporting countries in the region concerning global actions on ecological challenges such as alternative energies and combatting climate change [1,2]. Saudi Arabia is also the politically dominant actor due to its size, as evidenced by its effectuating the blockade on Qatar in 2017 or influencing the attitudes of other GCC countries towards regional issues, such as the rivalry with Iran and the concern over its nuclear programs. ...
Nuclear energy programs are currently under formalization in countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with the first power plants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) due to be operational in 2020, and Saudi Arabia's program under development. A political-economic narrative stresses potential benefits such as the diversification of energy sources, the centralization/maintenance of power in the energy supply sector, and the preservation of carbon fuel reserves for export purposes. However, a narrow justification renders the analysis of the nuclear push incomplete, as it is not specific to the nuclear option: i.e., the benefits mentioned apply to other types of alternative energies such as the (relatively) clean options of solar and wind. Economic or domestic considerations might actually be less dominant than geopolitical ones in GCC countries. By analyzing nuclear legacies in the region, this paper highlights the geopolitical considerations behind the nuclear programs of GCC countries, in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The rise of the nuclear energy option in the GCC region coincides with the resurrection of the nuclear program in Iran in the early 2000s. It is linked, in terms of evolution and discourse, to geopolitical rivalry and posturing as well as to the rising tensions in the region, at least in the case of the nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia. Despite the political and environmental vulnerabilities of the region, as well as the region-specific risks associated with nuclear power production, nuclear energy seems to be a stable choice in the energy mix policies of these countries.
... In contrast, Saudi Arabia has long had a rather negative and obstructionist approach to climate change negotiations (Depledge 2008), and at COP24 in Poland in December 2018, in alliance with Kuwait, Russia and the US, refused officially to "welcome" the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's report on limiting warming to below 1.5°C . Saudi Arabia's position has been that it should be compensated for losses arising from restrictions on fossil fuels (TheNational.ae ...
The world is currently undergoing an historic energy transition, driven by increasingly stringent decarbonisation policies and rapid advances in low-carbon technologies. The large-scale shift to low-carbon energy is disrupting the global energy system, impacting whole economies, and changing the political dynamics within and between countries.
This open access book, written by leading energy scholars, examines the economic and geopolitical implications of the global energy transition, from both regional and thematic perspectives. The first part of the book addresses the geopolitical implications in the world’s main energy-producing and energy-consuming regions, while the second presents in-depth case studies on selected issues, ranging from the geopolitics of renewable energy, to the mineral foundations of the global energy transformation, to governance issues in connection with the changing global energy order. Given its scope, the book will appeal to researchers in energy, climate change and international relations, as well as to professionals working in the energy industry.
... In contrast, Saudi Arabia has long had a rather negative and obstructionist approach to climate change negotiations (Depledge 2008), and at COP24 in Poland in December 2018, in alliance with Kuwait, Russia and the US, refused officially to "welcome" the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's report on limiting warming to below 1.5°C . Saudi Arabia's position has been that it should be compensated for losses arising from restrictions on fossil fuels (TheNational.ae ...
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is a critical one in the global energy transition, because of its core role in producing, using and exporting oil and natural gas. As international policies on climate change become more stringent, and new energy systems gain in competitiveness, its economic and political systems face the twin challenge of falling resource rents, and the global geopolitical and geoeconomic shift towards Asia. Regional countries are to different degrees implementing policies to retool their domestic hydrocarbon industries, introduce renewables and other new energy technologies, realign towards new markets and diversify their economies. Regional unrest and conflict, climate change, and geopolitical competition between the US, Russia, China and other local and international powers complicate the diplomacy and energy security challenges of the MENA energy transition.
... The top-right quadrant includes major OPEC members such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Notwithstanding those states' obstructionism in climate negotiations (Depledge, 2008), the transition will profoundly affect their people. Clearly, given their wealth, such countries cannot claim financial support from other countries, but given the severe challenges in shifting their economies away from oil dominance, nor can they reasonably be asked to transform their economies as rapidly as countries that are much less dependent on extraction (such as those in the upper left). ...
Equity issues have long been debated within international climate politics, focused on fairly distributing reductions in territorial emissions and fossil fuel consumption. There is a growing recognition among scholars and policymakers that curbing fossil fuel supply (as well as demand) can be a valuable part of the climate policy toolbox; this raises the question of where and how the tool should be applied. This paper explores how to equitably manage the social dimensions of a rapid transition away from fossil fuel extraction. Fossil fuel extraction leads to benefits for some people (such as extraction workers) and harms for others (such as pollution-affected communities). A transition must respect and uphold the rights of both groups, while also staying within climate limits, as climate impacts will fall most heavily on the world’s poor. This paper begins by reviewing how extraction affects economies and communities and the different transitional challenges they face. Based on that review, it then examines three common equity approaches – economic efficiency, meeting development needs, and effort-sharing. Drawing lessons from the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, the paper proposes five principles as a basis for equitably curbing fossil fuel extraction within climate limits:
(1) Phase out global extraction at pace consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C;
(2) Enable a just transition for workers and communities;
(3) Curb extraction consistent with environmental justice;
(4) Reduce extraction fastest where doing so will have the least social costs;
(5) Share transition costs fairly, according to ability to bear those costs.
• Key policy insights:
• Fossil fuel extraction is unlikely to be a viable path to development because the Paris Agreement goals require most fossil fuel use to be ended within a generation;
• Extraction should be phased out fastest in diversified, wealthier economies that can better absorb the transitional impacts;
• Governments of extracting countries should enact ambitious industrial policy to diversify their economies, alongside economic and employment policies to enable a just transition;
• The costs of a just transition should be borne by those most able to bear it: poorer countries can reasonably demand financial support.
... These fragmentations owe nothing to chance but are rather the product of structural 'selectivities' that are rooted in the global order and protected by powerful interests (Brunnengräber 2013). Saudi Arabia and other fossil fuel interests, for instance, actively worked to prevent any discussion on energy questions within the Climate Convention, so as to thwart any international regulation in that domain (Aykut and Castro 2017;Depledge 2008). The same applies to trade, whose absence from the climate negotiations is due to the active efforts of a coalition of industrialised and emerging economies (Luterbacher and Norrlöf 2001). ...
The 2015 Paris agreement represents a deep-rooted change in global climate governance. While existing scholarly assessments highlight central institutional features of the Paris shift, they tend to overlook its symbolic and discursive dimensions. Our analysis shows that the Paris architecture combines two core elements: an iterative pledge and review process to stimulate global climate action, and a ‘performative’ narrative aimed at aligning actors’ expectations on the prospect of a low-carbon future. We therefore suggest calling it an incantatory system of governance. We then examine the origins of the new approach and find that the rise of ‘soft law’ approaches and communicative techniques in global climate governance are both indicative of a broader process: the entry of management culture in international organisations. Against this backdrop, we examine the prospects, limitations and caveats of the new approach and discuss its wider implications for global politics.
... Oil and gas extraction rents provide regime stability, but they can mask deep social ruptures and a strong latent demand for democracy [118]. A global transition towards net zero emissions, which directly threatens the production of these rents [119], could result in severe political upheaval and is likely to be strenuously opposed [120]. ...
In the wake of the Paris Agreement, countries have yet to embark on deep decarbonisation pathways. This article explores the reasons for this limited response, taking a comparative political economy lens to identify national constraints that actively hinder climate policy progress. We discuss different metrics of climate policy progress, including emissions trends, climate legislation adoption, policy adoption, policy stringency, and policy outcomes. We then review literatures that explain varying national outcomes along these dimensions. Identified constraints include (but are not limited to) exposure to fossil fuel extraction activities, supply-side coal dependency , a lack of democratic norms, exposure to corruption, a lack of public climate awareness, and low levels of social trust. Correlation and principal component analysis of these variables demonstrates strong code -pendencies, including a North-South divide in institutional quality, trust and climate awareness that limits full participation in climate legislation and the removal of fossil subsidies. Recent trends indicate stability in corruption across the whole sample, and the continued durability of autocratic and extractivist states. We identify common constraints for five distinct country groups using cluster analysis: 'oil & gas states', 'fragile states', 'coal-dependent development', 'fractured democracies' and 'wealthy OECD'. We highlight the need to scrutinise ar-chitectures of constraint-combinations of political economic factors that are mutually reinforcing and highly resistant to intervention.
... Special extraction rights, cash payments, or debt forgiveness have not been foremost among the demands of these countries. For the most part, their request has been for assistance in diversifying their economiesthat is, in opening up a viable economic path capable of securing citizens' wellbeing in a post-carbon future (Barnett and Desai 2002:237; see also Depledge 2008). ...
If dangerous climate change is to be avoided, the majority of the world’s fossil fuel supplies cannot be burned. Fossil fuel exporting countries will therefore lose out on a significant source of revenue – among them some of the world’s poorest countries. Might they have a claim to assistance from the international community if these losses come to pass? If so, on what basis? I examine two distinct arguments for assistance. The first is based on the claim that when our expectations are thwarted by public policy, compensation for those affected may be morally required. The second is premised upon the right to development – a right which is jeopardised when some fossil fuel assets must go unexploited. I argue that the second argument enjoys better prospects. I also discuss several mechanisms which would allow the international community to assist countries incurring losses arising from the need to stabilise our global climate.
... The idea of a niche is sometimes invoked in studies of diplomacy to describe how nondominant actors, such as middle powers or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), carve out a role for themselves (Princen 1994;Betsill and Corell 2001). At a micro-level, the niche idea could help to explain the spatial configuration of negotiating sites-as different actors compete for space to deliberate or promote themselves-or the strategies used by marginal or obstructive parties to colonize agenda items that give them a foothold for advancing their objectives (as Saudi Arabia has done in using the UNFCCC's "response measures" item to obstruct collective progress on climate change mitigation; Depledge 2008). ...
Theories of complex systems can yield valuable insights for understanding the increasingly intricate networks of actors, institutions, and discourses involved in international environmental negotiations. While analysis of regimes and regime complexes has shed light on macro-level structures and relationships in global environmental politics, systemic analysis has gained less traction in making sense of micro-level interactions—such as communicative exchanges among participants—that occur within the sites of negotiation and how those interactions shape (and are shaped by) the broader dynamics of governance systems. This article shows how the conceptual lens of “deliberative ecologies” can bridge these levels of analysis by integrating theories of deliberative systems with ideas from complexity theory and social–ecological systems analysis. Drawing on evidence from United Nations climate change and biodiversity conferences between 2009 and 2018, I show how methods such as discourse analysis and process tracing can help to apply a deliberative ecologies perspective and thereby advance understanding of how discourses and deliberative practices diffuse through negotiating sites and how deliberation interacts with the social–ecological dynamics of those sites.
Achieving the Paris Agreement’s global temperature goal of keeping warming well below 2 °C and ideally 1.5 °C requires limiting fossil fuel production. In the United Nations climate change negotiations, this need is only beginning to be acknowledged. Nevertheless, as some countries have already adopted supply-side climate policies, initial cooperative activities have started, and calls grow for a fossil fuel treaty, questions arise about the prospects and possible effects of international cooperation on limiting fossil fuel supply. Combining qualitative insights on possible participants in a supply-side coalition with a quantitative analysis based on integrated assessment general equilibrium modelling, this article addresses these questions. Through k-means clustering based on fossil reserves per capita, fossil fuel rents and existing supply-side policies, we first identify which (groups of) countries are most likely to lead the formation of an international supply-side coalition, and which (groups of) countries are likely to follow. Drawing on these insights, we develop several scenarios for the evolution of international supply-side coalitions and compare these to a business-as-usual scenario. By doing so, we demonstrate the global and regional environmental, trade and macroeconomic effects of international cooperation on limiting fossil fuel supply and combining fossil supply restrictions with carbon pricing to meet the Paris goals. Our findings underscore the importance of pursuing supply-side and ambitious demand-side climate policies in parallel, and identify the scope and coverage, size of the coalition, and incentives for participation as key design elements for an international supply-side coalition.
In 1991, in meetings constructing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the small island state of Vanuatu introduced a proposal requiring wealthy countries to pay for damages related to sea level rise. More than thirty years later, countries finally agreed to establish a financing mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change. Scholars have observed the slow progress on loss and damage finance, but what tactics did countries use to obstruct negotiations? We answer this question using data from primary and secondary sources, observations at negotiations, and key informant interviews. Our analysis details four periods of obstruction and outlines a typology of fourteen tactics countries have used to delay progress. These tactics limited the issue’s scope, reduced transparency, manipulated language, and advanced nontransformative solutions. These findings contribute to the study of obstructionism in climate governance and can help loss and damage advocates better anticipate and respond to obstruction.
Far less is known about if and how CCCM opposition manifested in the Global South. This chapter synthesizes evidence from my own archival research and draws on scholarly literature, non-governmental organizations, and investigative journalists’ work to begin understanding this history. First, it explores the arguably better well-documented knowledge of coordinating a series of think tanks that expanded and diffused countermovement opposition across different countries. Following, the chapter describes some of the actions taken by countermovement organizations in response to international treaties from the late 2000s, mainly drawing attention to transformations in global governance whereby countries in the non-Annex category under the UNFCCC responded to the challenges presented by development dependent on fossil fuels or heavily polluting industries, in the face of growing climate risk.
Climate policies are tightening in an effort to curb carbon dioxide emissions. As a result, global oil demand may peak and gradually decline, causing oil prices to fall. A structural fall in oil prices may have serious implications for Middle Eastern oil exporters. Many studies attempt to estimate
the economic implications of climate change response measures for oil exporting countries. However, they have not reached a consensus regarding the magnitude of these implications. This study reviews energy-economy models that estimate the economic implications of climate policies for oil exporting countries. It also assesses the strategies that oil exporting countries may adopt to mitigate the potential economic losses associated with declining oil revenues. Most of the models reviewed support the hypothesis that advanced global climate change mitigation measures will likely create economic losses for oil exporting Middle Eastern countries. Importantly, some estimates suggest that Middle Eastern countries will bear higher costs than other oil exporting countries. Economic diversification is viewed as the best option for developing long-term economic resilience in the Middle East and enabling long-term economic growth.
Notwithstanding the clear contribution of fossil fuel production and consumption to global greenhouse gas emissions, fossil fuels have remained largely outside the focus of the international regime established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The 2021 Glasgow Climate Change Conference (COP26) marked an important change, however, with fossil fuels featuring prominently in the intergovernmental negotiations as well as on the side‐lines of the conference. Here we discuss these developments as a site for contestations around “anti‐fossil fuel norms.” We argue that anti‐fossil fuel norms are increasingly being adopted and institutionalized. However, ongoing contestation among proponents and opponents of measures to tackle fossil fuels raises important questions over the specific content of emerging norms, the role of the fossil fuel industry in climate governance, the extent to which these norms “fit” with their broader normative context, and the conditions of North–South cooperation in which such norms are to be implemented.
This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > International Policy Framework
Policy and Governance > Private Governance of Climate Change
This chapter unveils the various strategies of environmental sustainability at the regional and international levels. It first looks at the regional geopolitical setting, in which the exploitation of a strategic niche such as environmental sustainability is gradually becoming a key part of competition and the pursuit of hegemony. This often hampers much needed collective approaches to minimizing the looming climate crisis. At the international level, sustainability politics can be best explored through specific concepts such as environmental diplomacy, green branding or hedging. Here, policymakers tend to be more active within global climate regime and international sustainability governance for the sake of strengthening their leverage and linkages. The chapter highlights that a green agenda is often strategically instrumentalized and sometimes even politicized for serving specific state interests and foreign policy goals of the respective leaderships. It also shows the close interdependence of internal and external trajectories.
In the last decades, international expertise has been essential to put global environmental problems on the international agenda. These assessments are often contested, especially on issues where facts and values are profoundly entangled. This thesis investigates the case of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), one of the most authoritative, albeit contested expert organisation. It is more generally interested in how these organisations construct and maintain their authority, drawing on insights from Science and Technology Studies and sociological approaches to international organisations. A central argument is that, partly as a result of the controversial universe in which it has evolved, the IPCC has grown into an international bureaucracy. The thesis identifies four institutional arrangements on which the organisation has relied to maintain its authority. First, it has strived for a balanced representation of all nations, and in particular between developed and developing countries. Second, it has put in place governing mechanisms that allow governments to play a central role in the assessment process, encouraging the ‘ownership’ of its conclusions. Third, it has increasingly proceduralised the assessment, to formalise the role of its different parts and protect the organisation against criticism. Four, it has been more attentive to the management of the information displayed about its work. These arrangements are regularly renegotiated in the context of new challenges and controversies. Beyond the IPCC, they provide relevant lenses to observe the intertwining of political and epistemic authority at the international level.
The Near East and North Africa (NENA) region, including the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is one of the driest regions in the world and has insufficient renewable freshwater supplies for its current population, estimated at 400 million people. With the population growing by 2 percent each year, by 2050 the region is expected to host around 650million people – a difficult challenge for the governments of the 20 countries and territories that make up the NENA region. Steering equitable economic and social development with a natural resource base that, at best, will remain much the same, is a challenge. However, according to accepted scientific analysis conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other institutions, the region’s natural resource base, especially freshwater supplies, will be affected by the negative impact of climate change. Whatever the changes, it is certain that per capita access to resources will decline. Therefore, saving fresh water resources by reducing consumption is a must. In this context, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in partnership with the International Center for Agriculture Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA) and the International Center for Biosaline Agriculture (ICBA) has pooled the organizations’ knowledge, experience and resources to prepare a technical paper that will serve as a reference for targeted interventions implemented by the public and private sectors. The document is intended to serve as a blueprint for the region and to raise awareness and disseminate knowledge regarding new protected agriculture technologies and practices that aim to reduce water consumption in crop production. The document takes stock of current knowledge and paves the way towards more specialized studies of agricultural water-saving technologies, including high-tech closed greenhouses that minimize water loss from evapotranspiration.This technical document was prepared as part of the Regional Water Scarcity Initiative in the Near East and North Africa (WSI), an initiative that seeks to facilitate the endeavours of governments, international organizations, civil society and the private sector to develop participatory and innovative policies for sustainable water resource governance and management, which is vital for food security in the Near East, the GCC and North Africa. Based on an accurate assessment of the available water resources, strategic decisions must be made on how to use these resources sustainably, avoiding all possible losses and reaching the best possible level of food self-reliance. The GCC countries are looking to adopt various ways to enhance local agriculture. Switching, to some extent, from open-field production to protected agriculture is expected to save a significant amount of water, which can then be used for other purposes. This approach will offset considerably the region’s constraints of limited farmland and water scarcity.
Despite three decades of political efforts and a wealth of research on the causes and catastrophic impacts of climate change, global carbon dioxide emissions have continued to rise and are 60% higher today than they were in 1990. Exploring this rise through nine thematic lenses—covering issues of climate governance, the fossil fuel industry, geopolitics, economics, mitigation modeling, energy systems, inequity, lifestyles, and social imaginaries—draws out multifaceted reasons for our collective failure to bend the global emissions curve. However, a common thread that emerges across the reviewed literature is the central role of power, manifest in many forms, from a dogmatic political-economic hegemony and influential vested interests to narrow techno-economic mindsets and ideologies of control. Synthesizing the various impediments to mitigation reveals how delivering on the commitments enshrined in the Paris Agreement now requires an urgent and unprecedented transformation away from today's carbon- and energy-intensive development paradigm.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Volume 46 is October 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
Coalitions play a central role in the international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. By getting together, countries join resources in defending their interests and positions. But building coalitions may come at a cost. Coalition positions are a result of compromise between their members, and thus the increase in bargaining power may come at a price if the preferences of their members are heterogeneous. Relying on automatic text analysis of written position papers submitted to the negotiations, I analyze the extent to which coalitions represent the preferences of their members and discuss whether this contributes to disproportionate policy responses at the international level. I focus on a recently formed coalition: the Like-Minded Developing Countries, a large and heterogeneous group that brings together emerging, oil-dependent and poor developing countries.
Oil export-dependent states have adopted three near-term strategies to protect their continued receipt of lucrative oil rents from the threat of climate action. The first consists of a defensive “dig in” strategy aiming to insulate domestic oil industries from climate risk, whether by competing with rival producers or by undermining the aspirations of global climate accords, like the 2015 Paris Agreement. The second is the “join in” strategy, whereby producer governments pursue economically rational domestic energy policies that provide secondary benefits in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The third technique is described as the “throw in” strategy, by which producer states seek to convince consumers that GHG mitigation efforts should be avoided as more costly than the damage caused by fossil fuel emissions. This chapter examines Saudi Arabia’s response to global climate action and categorizes its initiatives according to the three strategy types provided.
The Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) faces a perfect storm. It is squeezed between the revolution in unconventionals, which has increased the global supply of hydrocarbons and lowered their price, and the prospect of a global peak in oil demand, stemming from climate policies and the falling costs of alternative energy technologies. In the face of these challenges, media commentators have declared the death of OPEC as a cartel. This perspective argues that the claims about OPEC’s demise are misguided for four reasons: (1) OPEC never acted as a cartel, let alone a powerful one; (2) thanks to its cheap production costs, OPEC’s oil will remain competitive in a low-cost environment; (3) the group has always proved to be flexible; and (4) OPEC is still attractive to its member states, most notably as a source of prestige, as is illustrated by the recent re-entries of Indonesia and Gabon. That said, over the longer term OPEC will inevitably need to adapt to a changing external environment. A likely possibility would be for the club to gradually morph from an output-setting cartel into a forum for deliberation and information sharing.
By contrast to the common objective of decarbonization of electricity production, the main driver of Russia's renewable energy policy is to achieve the economic benefits related to the manufacturing of green equipment. The focus on industrial development rather than the decarbonization of the power sector clearly appears from the decision of the Russian government to tie renewable energy subsidies to stringent local content requirements. In particular, solar energy benefits from a subsidy regime that is favourable to local manufacturers. Based on a detailed analysis of Russian renewable energy regulation, this paper studies the benefits for solar generation and explains this favourable treatment based on the vested interests of influential industrial groups in the solar PV manufacturing sector. These vested interests helped to overcome the resistance to renewable energy in an economy heavily dependent on oil and gas. More fundamentally, the influence of the local solar energy industry enabled the development of a support scheme that eventually stimulated the deployment of renewable energy technologies in general.
This book presents a comprehensive, authoritative and independent account of the rules, institutions and procedures governing the international climate change regime. Its detailed yet user-friendly description and analysis covers the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and all decisions taken by the Conference of the Parties up to 2003, including the landmark Marrakesh Accords. Mitigation commitments, adaptation, the flexibility mechanisms, reporting and review, compliance, education and public awareness, technology transfer, financial assistance and climate research are just some of the areas that are reviewed. The book also explains how the regime works, including a discussion of its political coalitions, institutional structure, negotiation process, administrative base, and linkages with other international regimes. In short, this book is the only current work that covers all areas of the climate change regime in such depth, yet in such a uniquely accessible and objective way.
Global negotiations on environmental problems raise complex challenges for diplomacy, such as dealing with complexity, uncertainty and equity dilemmas. Such challenges are particularly acute in the case of climate change. This thesis examines negotiations under the climate change regime, which overcame such challenges to reach agreement on the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. Using the analogy of negotiation as 'theatrical performance', the thesis analyses the organization of the Kyoto Protocol negotiation process and its effectiveness. This is an under-researched topic, despite its importance. Organizational elements are often open to policy manipulation, and can therefore be 'stage-managed' to maximize the chances of a successful negotiation. The thesis examines six organizational elements: the negotiation organizers, namely, the presiding officers, bureau and secretariat; rules for the conduct of business and decision-making; negotiating arenas; participation rules for parties and non-state organizations; arrangements for the input of scientific information; and the use of texts and time as negotiating tools. Little research has yet been conducted on what constitutes an effectively organized negotiation. To advance work in this regard, the thesis presents six effectiveness criteria that could be used to assess the organizational effectiveness of multilateral negotiations. These criteria - efficiency; procedural equity; transparency; information accessibility; promotion of a cooperative approach; and provision of leadership and skill and energy - are applied in the thesis to the case- study of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. The thesis begins by locating its subject matter within the negotiation and regime literatures, and by exploring the concept of the organization of the negotiation process and its effectiveness. After explaining the background to the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and their main political dynamics, the thesis uses the six effectiveness criteria to consider each of the organizational elements of the Protocol negotiations and their effectiveness. It then assesses how effectively the negotiations were organized as a whole, identifying lessons to be learnt.
Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Article 3.14 of its Kyoto Protocol require parties to take measures to minimise the adverse effects of climate change on developing and least developed countries (LDCs). The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) argue that this should mean assistance for capacity building to help them adapt to a changing climate. Articles 4.8 and 3.14 also require parties to take measures to minimise the impacts of emission reduction measures on energy exporting countries. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries argue that this should mean assistance to compensate for lost oil revenues. This paper explores the dimensions of the adverse effects/impacts issue. It explains how, in arguing that progress on Articles 4.8, 4.9 and 3.14 be equal to progress on the issue of assistance to compensate for lost oil revenues, OPEC countries obstruct progress on assistance to developing and LDCs for adaptation to climate change. This suggests that tacit G77/China support for OPEC’s position may ultimately not be in their best interests. The paper discusses the outlook for the adverse effects/impacts of response measures issue.
There are many roads to NO. Some are routed there intentionally. Parties sometimes engage in negotiations even though they are determined to avoid agreement, or at least consider any agreement as incidental to their reason for negotiating. The author identifies two varieties of avoidance negotiation. Opportunistic avoidance subsumes a variety of circumstances and motivations. By contrast, demand avoidance can be comprehended in a more unitary fashion as a response to audience expectations by a reluctant negotiator. The analysis is anchored in cases drawn from a range of settings and in the negotiation literature. It includes a discussion of diagnosis, response, and implications for theory and research as well as for negotiation and mediation practice.
The Special Climate Change (SCC) fund was established by the Marrakesh Accords under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This fund will finance climate change activities in the areas of: adaptation, technology transfer, certain specific sectors, and activities to assist oil-exporting countries diversify their economies. These activities are to be complementary to those funded by the Global Environment Facility and by bilateral and multilateral funding. This paper describes the origins of the SCC fund and proposes a framework for the prioritisation of its activities. The fund has a complicated history that is intrinsically linked to numerous Convention issues, which explains the range of activities included in it. The framework proposed is based on certain principles: sound scientific knowledge, the ultimate objective of the Convention, “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” and the status of the climate negotiations. This appraisal suggests that the fund should prioritise adaptation, followed by mitigation and finally economic diversification.
Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Article 3.14 of its Kyoto Protocol require parties to take measures to minimise the adverse effects of climate change on developing and least developed countries (LDCs). The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) argue that this should mean assistance for capacity building to help them adapt to a changing climate. Articles 4.8 and 3.14 also require parties to take measures to minimise the impacts of emission reduction measures on energy exporting countries. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries argue that this should mean assistance to compensate for lost oil revenues. This paper explores the dimensions of the adverse effects/impacts issue. It explains how, in arguing that progress on Articles 4.8, 4.9 and 3.14 be equal to progress on the issue of assistance to compensate for lost oil revenues, OPEC countries obstruct progress on assistance to developing and LDCs for adaptation to climate change. This suggests that tacit G77/China support for OPEC's position may ultimately not be in their best interests. The paper discusses the outlook for the adverse effects/impacts of response measures issue.
A range of energy-economy models forecast losses to members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) should the Kyoto Protocol come into force. These forecasts are a powerful influence in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations. They are used by OPEC to advance the agenda on the impacts of response measures, covertly arguing for compensation for lost oil revenues arising from implementation of the Protocol. This paper discusses this issue, and explores the key assumptions of these models and their uncertainties. Assumptions about carbon leakage, future availability of oil reserves, substitution, innovation, and capital turnover are considered. The paper suggests that losses will not affect OPEC countries equally, and that these losses are not likely to be as substantial as the models forecast. A range of policy measures are proposed to lessen any impact the Protocol may have on OPEC.
Sumario: Introduction -- The historical development of climate on the international agenda -- Before and after Rio: interstate negotiations -- The politics behind the negotiations -- Anarchy, the state and power -- Cooperation and institutions -- Science, politics and global warming -- A political economy of global warming -- Conclusions Bibliografía: P. 204-223
Climate for Change: Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse provides a challenging explanation of the forces that have shaped the international global warming debate. Unlike other books on the politics of climate change, this book concentrates on how non-state actors, such as scientific, environmental and industry groups, as opposed to governmental organisations, affect political outcomes in global fora on climate change. It also provides insights into the role of the media in influencing the agenda. The book draws on a range of analytical approaches to assess and explain the influence of these non-governmental organisations on the course of global climate politics. The book will be of interest to all researchers and policy-makers associated with climate change, and will be used on university courses in international relations, politics and environmental studies.
The Special Climate Change Fund: Origins and Prioritisation As-sessment An Analysis of the Role of OPEC As A G-77 Member at the UNFCCC
- Dessai
- Suraje
Dessai, Suraje. 2003. The Special Climate Change Fund: Origins and Prioritisation As-sessment. Climate Policy 3 (3): 295–302. ———. 2004. An Analysis of the Role of OPEC As A G-77 Member at the UNFCCC. Report for WWF, available at www.wwf.org
Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention Framing Future Commitments: A Pilot Study on the Evolution of the UNFCCC Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Regime
- Irving M Mintzer
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