No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Taiwan and Africa: Taipei's Continuing Search for International Recognition
Abstract
The United Nation's acceptance of the People's Republic of China's "One China Policy" forced Taiwan to pursue a more vigorous policy of legitimation through unofficial and non-political relations. The basis for this policy is historically tied to the post-World War II struggle for power and the outcome of the Chinese Civil War. Since these events, both Beijing and Taipei have actively courted African political movements and the states that grew out of these movements' struggles. The current issue of African recognition plays not only to conceptualizations of African states and the roles which they play in the international arena, but also to a re-conceptualization of Taiwan and the legitimacy of its interests on a world stage and Africa's part in that definition.
... In addition, the 3 factors influencing Taiwan's diplomatic recognition remain underdeveloped, with a literature dominated by individual case studies and regional analyses (e.g. Alexander, 2011;Atkinson, 2010;Harwit, 2000;Larus, 2008;Payne & Veney, 2001). Despite the insights gained through in-depth qualitative analyses, the literature fails to adequately address the economic factors that may influence recognition. ...
What explains why some countries recognise Taiwan despite attempts by the People’s Republic of China to pressure some to switch recognition? We argue for moving beyond ‘dollar diplomacy’ claims to unpack additional economic influences that might help explain why some states favour Taiwan. Using cross-national evidence from all countries (1950–2016), we find multiple economic factors influencing recognition and conclude that Taiwan’s comparative success in certain regions cannot be explained by broad structural factors.
... There is no consensus on the terminology concerning such entities and we can identify numerous definitions for entities lacking international recognition. Authors label these entities as de facto states, 17 self-proclaimed states, unrecognized states, 18 pseudo-states, 19 outcast countries, pariah-states, 20 insurgent states, 21 de facto regimes, 22 para-states, almost-states, 23 proto-states, nascent-states, 24 separatist states, self-proclaimed states, 25 de facto quasi-states, 26 or quasi-states, 27 unrecognized quasi-states, 28 contested states, 29 and post-secessionist unrecognized states. 30 While King's definition closely follows a definition by S. Pegg -the term unrecognized state includes Eurasian entities aiming at international recognition and sovereign statehood -he adds other character- ...
While the bipolar Cold War system in Europe was characterized by a stability of borders, the end of the Cold War brought into the former Soviet bloc a wave of more or less successful attempts of secession. In our article we point out that unrecognized entities in the proximity of Russia are not genuine attempts to establish full-fledged members of the international community but rather a deliberate reaction to a changing geopolitical situation in Europe. We argue that Russia's approach towards Eurasian unrecognized entities is not based on the denial of sovereignty first approach, but rather on utilitarian and selective application of normative theories of secession. The Kosovo precedence based on the application of priority of self-determination over the territorial integrity is a welcome pretext for justifying Russian geopolitical strategy vis-a-vis Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. The paper deals with the presented justifications of the secession (both primary rights and derivative rights theories) of the post-Soviet unrecognized entities as well as their effectiveness and dependence on Russian support. We conclude that none of the analyzed unrecognized entities fits into a new set of normative criteria applied in the case of Kosovo and that they are only geopolitical outposts of the Russian foreign strategy of maintaining controlled instability.
... There is no consensus on terminology concerning these entities. Authors label these entities as de facto state (Pegg, 1998), self-proclaimed state, unrecognized state (King, 2001;Chirikba, 2004), pseudo-state (Kolosov and O'Loughlin, 1998), outcast countries, pariah-state (Payne and Veney, 2001), insurgent state (Muir, 1997), de facto regime (Scheu, 2008), para-state, almost-state (Stanislawski, 2008;Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Strachota and Falkowski, 2008), proto-state, nascent-state (Vaďura and Šmíd, 2009), separatist state, self-proclaimed states (Chirikba, 2004), de facto quasi-states (Rywkin, 2006), or quasi-state (Baev, 1998;Chirikba, 2004;Rywkin, 2006;Kolstø, 2006;Stanislawski, 2008;Riegl, 2010). Particular terms describe subjects which are virtually independent on the central government of the parent state, but differ in internal characteristics. ...
Post-1945 period witnessed presence of dozens of unrecognized entities scattered
across the world. Some unrecognized entities existed for more than two decades, however,
only a few proved themselves as being able to meet the criteria of effective statehood. Even
less unrecognized states reached their ultimate goal – internationally recognized independent
statehood. Despite of outward and common features, the outcome of secession varies significantly.
The article is a comparative analysis of decisive internal as well as external factors
which determined different outcomes of secession of South Sudan and Somaliland. It is argued
that despite meeting the criteria for independence in both cases, only South Sudan was
given independence due to unwillingness of the central government in Mogadishu to grant
Somaliland its statehood. Furthermore, authors conclude that case of Somaliland is closer to
the probable future model of effective unrecognised statehood than South Sudan due to systemic
changes in international politics.
... It is not a member of major international organizations such as the United Nations, World Health Organization, or the World Bank, and most importantly, it does not maintain diplomatic relations with most countries. Given china's unflagging denial of Taiwan's existence as an independent state, Taipei must fight to strengthen its standing in the world with a powerful weapon—money (Payne and Veney 2001; Ying 2003). Taiwan has used its financial clout to win support from various small developing countries, who extend their official recognition to Taiwan in exchange for millions of dollars in aid, investments, or loans. ...
This case study analyzes the Lafayette scandal, which alleges that up to US$760 million in bribes and kickbacks was split among French, Chinese, and Taiwanese officials for the 1992 sale of French frigates to Taiwan. The case was unique in its complexity, intrigue, and repercussions. This analysis focuses on the structural and institutional deficiencies in Taiwan and France that intersected to create opportunities for massive corruption. It also traces how Taiwan and France implemented profound preventive reforms in the aftermath of the scandal. This landmark scandal highlights the need for further global efforts to establish legal frameworks and judicial protocols to tackle corrupt practices that transcend national borders.
This paper broadly examines the continued nuancing of the practice of democracy in Africa with a focus on how Africa's democratic governance is increasingly getting influenced by new actors in the international system, who are driving the formation of a new world order that challenges the current unipolar liberal global order. The paper traces the origins and rationale of the democratization project in Africa and uses this as a basis to delve into some issues around which many African countries have increasingly been engaging with new actors. These broad aspects include: Africa's international relations, peace and security; civil liberties as well as investments and trade. This paper contends that some states in Africa are charting middle grounds that increasingly, specifically align with their national/ elite interests, and broadly, is in tune with the consolidating discourse on Africa Rising.
What explains public support for Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition efforts? A sizable literature addresses the role of China and ‘dollar diplomacy’ in influencing countries to recognise Taiwan, yet little research addresses how these factors potentially influence Taiwanese public perceptions of efforts to maintain formal diplomatic recognition. Through four waves of an experimental survey design, we find that Taiwanese are more supportive of efforts when framed in terms of responding to China but support decreases when efforts are framed as potentially leading to increased demands for international aid from diplomatic partners.
Taiwan and Post-Communist Europe examines Taiwan's economic diplomacy towards post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. The media, and occasionally academia, have often suggested that Taipei resorts to costly aid, trade and investment diplomacy to facilitate its foreign relations, whilst China engages in equally costly counter-economic diplomacy to keep Taiwan isolated. Czeslaw Tubilewicz argues conversely that Beijing's diplomacy in post-communist Europe has demonstrated China's reluctance to employ economic instruments against states violating the 'one-China' principle when cheaper (diplomatic) alternatives are available. Taipei, for its part, has demonstrated that promises of economic assistance are sufficient to induce target states' short term compliance, whilst in the medium to long term Taiwanese economic assistance, conditional upon meeting political criteria, has proved inconsequential due to Taipei's refusal to follow up aid commitments. This book examines the efficacy and limitations of Taipei's frugal economic diplomacy in furthering its broader diplomatic objectives, looking at both Taipei's failure to establish a lasting diplomatic presence in post-communist Europe, but also its success in securing 'substantive' relations with a number of major post-communist states, and thus opening transition economies for its exports and investments. The first in-depth study into Taiwan's economic diplomacy toward post-communist Europe, this book will appeal to readers interested in Taiwan and China studies, diplomacy, Asian studies and international relations.
Despite the post-World War II emergence of many small states and growing economic interdependence, small state foreign policy still gets short shrift in international studies. This article seeks to enhance our understanding of the subject by examining the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. At the time of writing, 23 countries in the world have picked Taiwan over China. This is puzzling at first sight, since China is much more powerful than Taiwan, and a vast majority of countries pick China over Taiwan. This article shows that a full understanding must simultaneously take into account the systemic, domestic and individual levels of analysis. This research lends itself to structural realism, which stresses the role of structural factors in foreign policies, especially among small states. On the domestic level of analysis, this study identifies three important factors: ideology, economy and geography. For structural and cultural reasons, major leaders of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies are found to have loomed large in the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.
In the wake of China's Year of Africa in 2006, China-Africa relations are currently the subject of unprecedented attention. However, although those relations are widely covered they are also under-researched. This article offers an introduction to China-Africa relations, covering background to the history and politics of Chinese involvement in the continent and identifying areas of further research. It concludes by calling for the study of China-Africa relations to develop a culture of serious research beyond current ‘dragon in the bush’ preoccupations and so engage a complex subject that is about to become a mainstream issue in African politics.
In a comparatively short time and under constant th reat from the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan transformed into a genuine functional de- mocracy. Underpinning this rapid and relatively pea ceful transformation to a multiparty de- mocracy were deliberate actions taken during Taiwan's latter authoritarian days to fundamen- tally alter the shape democracy would take on the i sland. This shift has allowed for greater connections within Taiwanese society not only for t he then-ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, but for the opposition while encouraging both sides to moderate their stances regarding Tai- wan's ideal relationship vis-à-vis China. The resul t has been a consolidated democracy mir- roring Western counterparts while providing an example of a successful transition under less than ideal conditions. While the speed of consolidation may be encouraging and certainly suggests greater in- ternal stability, democratization has also created the potential for greater conflict with China. In an effort to curry electoral support, Taiwanese politicians often are motivated to take stances that deviate from the vague "One China" pol icy once respected by both sides of the strait. The lack of a unified voice on Taiwan's rel ations with China along with an increasing number of domestically popular but controversial re forms creates fertile ground for a misun- derstanding that could lead to military conflict. S imilarly, Taiwan's previous successes may lead politicians to underestimate the risk in futur e reforms. More generally, Taiwan's democ- ratization has stretched the boundaries of US secur ity commitments while potentially increas- ing the potential flashpoints for cross-strait conf lict. This paper will first analyze the process of Taiwan 's democratization in regards to ma- nipulation of the political space by Taiwan's polit ical elite. From there an analysis of issue saliency and party stability suggests a level of in stitutionalization rare in young democracies. From there, I shift to the negative ramifications that are perhap s unique to Taiwan's path to democracy, suggesting areas of conflict which remai n poorly analyzed. Through this, I hope to highlight not only the path of Taiwan's democrat ization, but its broader impact on cross- strait relations.
As China's economy continues to grow, it wants to expand its markets and secure reliable supplies of resources in support of its economic development. Resource diplomacy therefore becomes a prominent feature of its modernisation diplomacy. In turn, many African governments perceive political and economic ties with China to be an important asset, which strengthens their international bargaining power, especially vis-à-vis Western governments. African countries are also depicted as China's reliable political and economic partners, though one can hardly afford to be optimistic regarding Africa's peace and development in the future. Many small African governments have been switching diplomatic recognition between Taipei and Beijing for economic assistance too. Chinese leaders have no intention of engaging in diplomatic and strategic competition with the USA and the European Union in Africa, but they certainly will not co-operate with Western governments in helping Africa because they want to push for multipolarity.
Diplomatic recognition is generally seen as fundamental to the modern state system. The traditional views of recognition however focus almost exclusively on political or ideological rationales, ignoring other foundations on which other countries base establishing diplomatic recog-nition. Focusing on the Republic of China (Taiwan) suggests a more com-plicated view where economic self-interest on one side and national pride on the other may undermine traditional conceptions of recognition. Using the ROC-PRC diplomatic battle as a case study, this paper hopes to shed light on two questions: why, despite the PRC's rise as a global power, a country would continue to formally recognize the ROC and secondly what does the ROC receive in exchange for such high-cost en-deavors to maintain recognition. In this case mutual ideological rationales have greatly diminished while I contend that economic factors have pre-dominantly maintained this diplomatic battle. In addition, previous re-search often focuses on major world powers granting or withholding for-mal recognition to smaller states. In this situation, poor countries with typically little political influence are the major players, suggesting dif-ferent rationales behind recognition. Methodologically, this paper blends qualitative and quantitative analysis to uncover factors affecting recogni-TIMOTHY S. RICH is a doctoral student in political science at the Indiana University. His pre-vious research analyzed Taiwan's democratization and cross-Strait relations. His disserta-tion analyzes electoral reform in East Asia. In 2009, Timothy received a National Science Foundation grant to conduct research in Taiwan regarding recent electoral reforms. The author can be reached at <tsrich@indiana.edu>.
The development of Taiwan's agricultural sector contributed significantly to the country's transformation from virtual poverty after World War II to a modern industrial nation. Success resulted from the use of appropriate technologies, developed through an exceptionally close working relationship between government, research and development institutions, extension services and farmers in Taiwan. As part of their overseas development aid programme, the Republic of China on Taiwan has established Technical Missions in those developing countries where it receives political recognition. Among these is The Gambia, West Africa, where one focus of Taiwan's current Technical Mission is the development of women's market gardens. Although the gardens have proved successful, there is doubt as to whether their achievements will be sustained once Taiwan's Technical Mission in The Gambia has ended. Field research in Taiwan and in The Gambia, based largely on participatory techniques, has revealed that the low-tech methods introduced from Taiwan are appropriate for the Gambian environment. However, much depends on whether women participating in the schemes can commit sufficient time and energy to the gardens, as at present this is a limiting factor. The potential of the gardens may also be constrained by a lack of appropriate institutional infrastructure, particularly the scope for profitable disposal of garden produce. A major conclusion of the article is that successful transfer of appropriate technology to The Gambia is likely to be impeded by poorly developed coordination between groups that proved to be key ‘players’ in the development of agriculture in Taiwan: government, research and development institutions, extension services and producers.
The PRC and Taiwan are competing to gain diplomatic recognition from Pacific Islands states, a number of which recognise Taiwan and serve as a barrier to its international isolation. Since much of Oceania is in Australia's sphere of influence, this struggle has often involved Canberra. This paper focuses on the intensifying conflict–with conclusions about the local political economic situations of the countries in Oceania that are most likely to switch recognition, the dilemmas that the issue poses for Australia and its alliance with the US, and the game theory of these auctions of diplomatic recognition. The rental of recognition is analysed as a “sovereignty business” in which some Pacific Islands states engage—similar to the offshore financial centres which are prevalent in the region. Yes Yes