Why are religious people happy? The effect of the social norm of religiosity across countries

Abstract

Drawing on social norms theories, we suggest that religiosity substantially increases subjective well-being if it is considered normative in a certain national context. In Study 1, we test this hypothesis using an indicator of a country's social norm of religiosity that includes both the national level of religiosity and the social desirability of religion. The results of a multilevel regression analysis suggest that religious individuals are on average happier and more satisfied with life than non-religious individuals. This effect is stronger in religious countries with dominant negative attitudes towards non-believers. In Study 2, we further examine whether the differences in social recognition of religious and non-religious individuals in countries where religiosity is normative account for this finding. The results of a moderated mediation analysis indicate that in religious countries, religious people report being treated with more respect, which partially explains their higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction.

Full text

Why are religious people happy? The effect of the social norm
of religiosity across countries
Olga Stavrova
a,b,
⇑
, Detlef Fetchenhauer
a
, Thomas Schlösser
a
a
Department of Social and Economic Psychology, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany
b
GK SOCLIFE, University of Cologne, Richard-Strauss-Str. 2, 50931 Cologne, Germany
article info
Article history:
Received 5 October 2011
Revised 21 May 2012
Accepted 10 July 2012
Available online 25 July 2012
Keywords:
Religion
Subjective well-being
Social norms
Social recognition
Cross-national differences
abstract
Drawing on social norms theories, we suggest that religiosity substantially increases sub-
jective well-being if it is considered normative in a certain national context. In Study 1, we
test this hypothesis using an indicator of a country’s social norm of religiosity that includes
both the national level of religiosity and the social desirability of religion. The results of a
multilevel regression analysis suggest that religious individuals are on average happier and
more satisfied with life than non-religious individuals. This effect is stronger in religious
countries with dominant negative attitudes towards non-believers. In Study 2, we further
examine whether the differences in social recognition of religious and non-religious indi-
viduals in countries where religiosity is normative account for this finding. The results of a
moderated mediation analysis indicate that in religious countries, religious people report
being treated with more respect, which partially explains their higher levels of happiness
and life satisfaction.
Ó2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
‘‘And whoever trusts in the Lord, happy is he’’ Proverbs 16:2 (KJV)
The results of numerous psychological studies indicate that religious people benefit from greater physical and mental
health and report higher life satisfaction (e.g., see Idler, 2009; Koenig, 2001). In the United States—one of the most religious
countries among the Western democracies—this effect is especially strong and persistent (Snoep, 2008). Interestingly, the US
is not only a highly religious country, it is also a country where more than the half of the population has negative attitudes
toward atheists and will never vote for an atheist in presidential elections (Edgell et al., 2006; Joyner, 2007; Zuckerman,
2009). It seems that, at least in the US, following a religion remains a socially approved normative behavior. This observation
raises the question of whether the happiness effect of personal religiosity is a function of the degree to which religiosity rep-
resents a social norm in a given society.
Recent research in subjective well-being suggests that the same behavior can have a substantially different influence on
subjective well-being depending on the extent to which this behavior is regulated by social norms in a given society. For
example, unemployed people are more dissatisfied with their life in countries with a strong norm of working for a living than
in countries with more tolerant attitudes toward living off public funds (Stavrova et al., 2011a,b; Stutzer and Lalive, 2004).
Similarly, unmarried cohabitors are less happy than married individuals only in nations where cohabitation is not socially
0049-089X/$ - see front matter Ó2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.07.002
⇑
Corresponding author at: Department of Social and Economic Psychology, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany.
E-mail address: stavrova@wiso.uni-koeln.de (O. Stavrova).
Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105
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accepted (Soons and Kalmijn, 2009). Finally, cohabiting women are psychologically worse off than married women in
societies with a strong normative expectation for women to marry (Stavrova et al., 2011b).
Taking these findings into account, as well as the theoretical assumptions of social norms research (e.g., see Cialdini and
Goldstein, 2004; Horne, 2009), we suggest that the extent to which religiosity is normative within a society can enhance the
subjective well-being of religious individuals and decrease the subjective well-being of non-religious individuals. We further
hypothesize that this effect is explained by social sanctions and rewards that religious and non-religious individuals receive
in their respective societies.
2. Religion and subjective well-being
The connection between religiosity and subjective well-being has been established through numerous studies. Personal
aspects of religiosity, such as religious beliefs and intrinsic orientations, salience of religious identity, and subjective religi-
osity were linked to higher levels of subjective well-being and resilience (Green and Elliott, 2010; Greenfield and Marks,
2007; Koenig, 2001; Laurencelle et al., 2002; Pargament, 2002; Phillip, 2011; Regnerus and Elder, 2003). Similarly, religious
practices and frequent church attendance were shown to have positive outcomes for physical and mental health (Ellison
et al., 2009; Ellison, 1991; Smith et al., 2003; Strawbridge et al., 2001) as well as for happiness and life satisfaction (Ab-
del-Khalek, 2006; Diener and Suh, 1999; Mochon et al., 2008). In addition, a number of longitudinal studies suggest that cau-
sality is likely to run from religiosity to psychological well-being, but the reverse is not true (Childs, 2010; Headey et al.,
2010; Lim and Putnam, 2009).
Why are religious people happier than non-religious people? Thus far, the research has identified several mechanisms by
which religion affects psychological well-being (for a review, see George et al., 2002). These mechanisms include a healthy life-
style (Musick et al., 1998; Wallace and Forman, 1998), social support (Eliassen et al., 2005; Krause et al., 1999; Krause and
Wulff, 2005; Lim and Putnam, 2009), a specific emotional culture that prescribes happiness (Wilkins, 2008), and religious cop-
ing mechanisms (Pargament et al., 1990; Park, 2005). For example, religious practices such as prayer represent a widely used
coping method in situations of uncertainty, serious illnesses, the death of a relative, or even threats to one’s own life (Hogg
et al., 2010; Hood et al., 1996; Norenzayan et al., 2009; Pargament, 1997; Sharp, 2010). By promising life after death, religion
represents a powerful tool of mitigating death anxiety and thus serves a terror-management function as well (Vail et al., 2010).
In addition, God represents an attachment figure that supplements personal affiliations or attachments in real life or compen-
sates for the lack of them (Granqvist and Kirkpatrick, 2008; Granqvist et al., 2010; Kirkpatrick and Shaver, 1992).
Finally, the effect of religiosity on well-being was considered from the perspective of self-categorization, social identity,
and social attraction theories (Hayward and Elliott, 2009; Ysseldyk et al., 2010). For example, Ysseldyk and colleagues
(2010) regard religiosity not only as a belief system but also as a source of social identity that strengthens the religious per-
son’s subjective well-being. Drawing on social identity theory as well, Elliott and Hayward (2009) demonstrated that personal
religious identity represents an additional source of life satisfaction in countries where democratic liberties are curtailed. In
those countries, it remains one of the sources of self-expression when other sources are restricted. Another theory—self-cat-
egorization theory—suggests that the effect of group membership on the self depends on the salience of group identity. Indeed,
in a study by Greenfield and Marks (2007), people who identified themselves with a certain religious group drew greater emo-
tional benefits from their religious participation than people whose identification with their religious group was weaker.
3. Religiosity as a social norm
One aspect that, to our knowledge, has been consistently overlooked in previous research is that religious beliefs and
behavior often represent a desirable way of life or, in other words, a social norm.
The concept of social norms has a long tradition in sociological and psychological research (Cialdini et al., 1990; Deutsch
and Gerard, 1955; Parsons, 1937). The main theoretical contribution of studies of social norms consists in using others’
behaviors and attitudes to explain why people behave the way they do. For example, the concept of social norms turned
out to be very helpful in explaining why people are more likely to litter in littered environments than in clear ones (Cialdini
et al., 1990), adolescents are more likely to abuse alcohol when their peers do so (Rimal and Real, 2003), or hotel customers
are more likely to reuse their towels when they know that other customers do (Goldstein et al., 2008). Religious behavior and
beliefs can be influenced by social norms as well (White, 1968). For example, individuals whose friends regularly attend reli-
gious services are more likely to have heightened religious beliefs and attendance than individuals whose social networks
are concentrated outside of the congregational community (Cornwall, 1989; Stroope, 2011). Why are individuals so easily
affected by social norms?
Social norms are enforced by providing rewards for conforming behavior (social approval and acceptance) and applying
informal sanctions for counter-normative behavior (social disapproval and rejection) (Cialdini and Trost, 1998; Hechter and
Opp, 2001; Horne, 2009; Schachter, 1951). For example, it has been hypothesized that one’s friends within a congregational
community may apply informal sanctions to enhance one’s bonds with the religious community and prevent one from leav-
ing (Stroope, 2011; White, 1968).
We hypothesize that social rewards and sanctions may represent another source of the differences in happiness between
religious and non-religious individuals. Recently, several authors have noticed that the national level of religiosity can influ-
O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105 91

ence the happiness of religious and non-religious individuals differently. Lavric
ˇand Flere (2008) and Snoep (2008) found that
the positive correlations between religiosity and happiness were typically stronger in religious countries than in secular
ones. These results were further replicated in a multi-level study with 79 nations worldwide (Okulicz-Kozaryn, 2010) and
disputed in another study based on the data from 26 European countries (Clark and Lelkes, 2009). When the happiness effect
of religiosity is stronger in religious countries, can it be explained by the social norms effect? To answer to this question, we
must first clarify whether religiosity can be considered a social norm.
The classic sociological literature (Blake and Davis, 1964; LaPiere, 1954; Parsons, 1937) suggests that a certain behavior is
normative when it is common and socially requested or appropriate. Social psychological literature refines this definition by
indicating that social norms can incorporate sources of informational and normative social influence (Cialdini and Goldstein,
2004; Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). These influences are also referred to as descriptive and injunctive norms, respectively
(Cialdini et al., 1990). The former are inferred from other people’s typical behavior and reflect the motivation to make an
accurate judgment about reality. The latter are inferred from other people’s approval or disapproval of certain behaviors
and thus reflect the motivation to be accepted and recognized by others (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). In other words,
the information about the level of religiosity in a community would represent a descriptive norm, while the information
about the social desirability of religiosity represents an injunctive norm. Survey research suggests that the descriptive
and the injunctive aspects of behavior often overlap (Bicchieri, 2006; Cialdini, 2003; Thøgersen, 2006, 2008). In other words,
‘‘what most people approve of is also what most people do’’ (Thøgersen, 2008, p. 461).
These considerations suggest that religious beliefs and behaviors represent social norms if they are common and socially
desirable. Taking into account that the degree to which religiosity is widespread and socially approved varies across coun-
tries, we suggest that religiosity can be normative in some societies and less normative or neutral in others. If the majority of
people in a society define themselves as religious, follow religious practices, and consider religiosity as a socially desirable
personal characteristic, we consider this society to have a high level of the social norm of religiosity.
4. Informal social sanctions and rewards
How does a society reward those who conform to the norm and sanction those who do not? Society members commu-
nicate their disapproval to norm perpetrators through withdrawal of social support and respect, open criticism, contempt, or
disregard, i.e., social control mechanisms (Brauer and Chekroun, 2005; Gibbs, 1981a,b; Hechter and Opp, 2001; Horne, 2009).
Unfriendly glances or negative comments coming from other people typically do not leave one emotionally unaffected
(Eisenberg, 2000; Nugier et al., 2007). For example, in an experiment by Nugier and colleagues (2007), participants imagined
themselves performing uncivil acts (e.g., cutting in line in a post office) and then receiving informal social control (a negative
comment concerning these behaviors given by another person). Their results showed that informal social control increased
the levels of shame, embarrassment, anger, aggressiveness, and other negative emotions. Taking into account that emotions
are closely related to people’s subjective well-being (Diener et al., 1999), people who are confronted with informal social
control on a regular basis are likely to report lower levels of subjective well-being.
Social sanctions may take more severe forms, such as stigmatization and ostracism, leading to social exclusion. For exam-
ple, Kalmijn and Uunk (2007) showed that divorcees in regions with intolerant social attitudes toward divorce experience
greater declines in social contacts compared to divorcees in regions with more permissive attitudes. From the psychological
perspective, social exclusion is directly related to the unsatisfied need for interpersonal attachment and belongingness,
which results in lower psychological well-being (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Stillman et al., 2009).
On the other hand, social sanctions can be positive (called social rewards) if they are directed at those who conform to the
norms (Horne, 2001; Parsons, 1937). There is some evidence that conformity may support the attainment of a higher status
(Hollander, 1960; Wahrman and Pugh, 1974). High-status individuals are evaluated more positively for their performance,
and even objects in control of high-status actors are perceived as more valuable (Berger et al., 1977; Thye, 2000). Similarly,
according to the social attraction theory, those who reflect the collective group standard are considered to be particularly
attractive by other group members (Hogg and Hardie, 1991). Hence, society members who follow norms may benefit from
higher levels of social recognition (public acknowledgment of their status, merits, or personality) and respect, which in turn
can positively affect their subjective well-being.
In the following, we present two studies that support the proposed social norm explanation of cross-national differences
in the effect of religiosity on well-being. In Study 1, we analyze societies in which religiosity represents a social norm (i.e., is
common and socially desirable) and examine the possibility that those who are religious experience higher subjective well-
being than those who are not. For this, we use the data from the World and European Values Surveys. In Study 2, we put the
social norm hypothesis under a stricter test by examining whether non-religious individuals living in religious countries
actually experience social sanctions (in terms of loss of social respect and loss of recognition) while religious individuals
experience social rewards. We also test whether this accounts for their different levels of subjective well-being.
5. Study 1: Religiosity and subjective well-being in 64 countries
In Study 1, we use survey data from 64 countries to examine whether the gap in happiness and life satisfaction between
religious and non-religious individuals depends on countries’ social norm of religiosity. To operationalize the social norm of
92 O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105

religiosity, we constructed an indicator combining the national levels of religiosity and the degree to which religion is per-
ceived to be a necessary trait of a person of value.
5.1. Data and measurement
The data for the analysis come from the combined World (5th wave) and European (4th wave) Values Studies (EVS, 2010;
WVS, 2005). Both surveys are large-scale cross-national research programs on human values that have been conducted on a
regular basis since 1981. The data we use were collected between 2005 and 2009. The final working sample after eliminating
cases with missing data comprised 101,682 subjects from 64 countries. The participating countries and their characteristics
are presented in Table 1.
The dependent variables in our analysis are general happiness and overall life satisfaction, measured with the questions,
‘‘Taking all things together, would you say you are not at all happy, not very happy, quite happy, or very happy?’’ and
‘‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?’’ (participants answered on a 10-point
scale ranging from ‘‘completely dissatisfied’’ (1) to ‘‘completely satisfied’’ (10)). Despite their simplicity, these measurements
of happiness and life satisfaction were shown to have appropriate test–retest reliability and convergent validity (Diener,
1984; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006).
Personal religiosity. Taking into account that different measures of religiosity have a different degree of relevance across
religious traditions (Cohen et al., 2003) and following the recommendations of Fetzer (2003) and Koenig et al. (1997) we
adopted a multidimensional approach to measure religiosity. Religiosity aspects that were consistently measured in both
World and European Values Surveys were church attendance, subjective religiosity, importance of God, and importance of reli-
gion. Church attendance was measured with the question, ‘‘Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you at-
tend religious services these days?’’ with answer options ranging from ‘‘never’’ to ‘‘more than once a week.’’ Subjective
religiosity referred to the respondent’s self-identification as a religious person (1), a non-religious person (0), or an atheist
(0). The importance of God was measured with the question, ‘‘How important is God in your life?’’ on a 10-point scale rang-
ing from ‘‘very important’’ to ‘‘not at all important.’’ Finally, the question, ‘‘How important is religion in your life?’’ (dichot-
omy) was used to capture the degree to which religion represents a significant domain in one’s life. The values for each of
these four questions were standardized and combined into the religiosity scale (individual-level Cronbach’s
a
.84)
1
. Although
we use the composite measure of religiosity for the main analyses, we provide some descriptive statistics as well as the corre-
lations between these religiosity items and the dependent variables in Appendix A.
To operationalize the country’s social norm of religiosity, we constructed an indicator that reflects both descriptive and
injunctive aspects of the norm. The descriptive aspect (national level of religiosity) was measured with a country’s aver-
age values on the religiosity scale described above. The injunctive aspect of the norm (the degree to which religious be-
liefs are socially desirable and that those who do not share them are socially shunned) was captured by the following two
questions. First, the respondents were given a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home (hard
work, independence, obedience, etc.) and were asked to select those that they consider especially important (up to five).
One of these qualities was religious faith. We computed the percentage of respondents who mentioned religious faith in
each country as an indicator of social desirability of religiosity. The second question reflected the degree of intolerance of
non-religious behavior: ‘‘Politicians who don’t believe in God are unfit for public service’’ (5-point strongly agree–strongly
disagree scale). Each country’s average score on this question was used as the second indicator of the injunctive aspect of
the norm.
2
Finally, each country’s national level of religiosity, social desirability of religiosity, and intolerance of non-reli-
gious individuals were standardized and combined into an index of the country’s social norm of religiosity (country-level
Cronbach’s
a
.93). Higher values on this index indicate a higher average religiosity score in a country, a higher percentage
of the population that believes that children must learn religious faith, and a higher degree of intolerance of non-religious
people.
Individual-level control variables. We control for common socio-demographic variables, as they were shown to have an im-
pact on happiness (Diener and Suh, 1999): age, age squared (age has a curvilinear relationship with subjective well-being
(e.g., see Frey and Stutzer, 2002), gender, employment and marital status, educational level, income,
3
religious denomination,
and belonging to a minority vs. majority religious group.
Country-level control variables included Gross Domestic Product per capita at current prices in US dollars (UNO, 2011), the
country’s largest religious denomination (Finke and Grim, 2005), and an index of religious fractionalization (Alesina et al.,
2003). Religious fractionalization represents the degree of population heterogeneity in terms of religious denominations.
1
The wording of these questions was partly modified to suit the broad range of religious traditions in the sample. For example, in the Chinese version of the
questionnaire, the question about attending religious services referred to taking part in religious rituals, while the question about the importance of God
referred to ‘‘Buddha/God/Allah/deities’’. For further information, survey documentation provided by data producers can be accessed under http://
www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSDocumentation.jsp.
2
Countries whose citizens reported higher levels of intolerance for non-believing politicians also showed a higher proportion of citizens who believed that
religious faith should be encouraged in children (r(64) = .83, p< .001).
3
As in the World and European Values Study, respondents’ income was measured by different scales, we standardized the reported values of income so that
the respondents’ values are relative to country’s mean. Because the income question had many missing values (12.5% on average across countries), we coded
the missing values to the mean income in each country and added an indicator variable to for missing values to control for selectivity (Cohen and Cohen,1983;
Cohen et al., 2003).
O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105 93

Table 1
Country descriptive statistics (N= 64).
Country N Country’s norm of religiosity
a
GDP per capita Religious fractionalization
b
Dominant religion
c
Albania 1242 .20 4173.61 .47 Islamic
Andorra 979 1.36 31836.53 .23 Catholic
Armenia 1367 .24 3876.87 .46 Other Christian
Australia 1278 .81 36225.57 .82 Catholic
Austria 1396 .64 49596.39 .41 Catholic
Azerbaijan 1302 .40 5298.30 .49 Islamic
Belarus 1223 .66 6230.27 .61 Orthodox
Belgium 1488 1.29 47609.44 .21 Catholic
Bosnia Herzegovina 1331 .49 4873.65 .69 Islamic
Brazil 1436 .95 8311.12 .61 Catholic
Bulgaria 1964 .41 5344.71 .60 Orthodox
Burkina Faso 1276 1.32 458.96 .58 Islamic
Canada 2012 .23 39189.18 .70 Catholic
Chile 908 .07 7255.73 .38 Catholic
Cyprus 1980 .50 27714.37 .40 Orthodox
Czech Republic 1464 1.41 21036.00 .66 Other Christian
Denmark 1417 1.30 62519.94 .23 Protestant
Estonia 1363 1.15 17298.16 .50 Protestant
Ethiopia 1400 .97 244.13 .62 Islamic
Finland 1933 1.00 44327.64 .25 Protestant
France 2432 1.39 40255.73 .40 Catholic
Georgia 2823 1.38 2969.95 .65 Orthodox
Germany 3640 1.30 39854.56 .66 Catholic
Ghana 1474 1.63 662.68 .80 Other Christian
Greece 1373 .51 31954.09 .15 Orthodox
Guatemala 957 1.15 2140.97 .38 Catholic
Hungary 1460 .84 15447.98 .52 Catholic
India 1471 .55 719.36 .33 Hindu
Indonesia 1728 1.89 1642.68 .23 Islamic
Iran 2356 1.32 4003.79 .12 Islamic
Iraq 2007 1.54 715.01 .48 Islamic
Ireland 846 .004 61314.26 .16 Catholic
Italy 921 .14 30312.94 .30 Catholic
Japan 745 1.13 35717.82 .54 Shinto
Latvia 1323 .63 14955.95 .56 Protestant
Lithuania 1202 .33 14243.96 .41 Catholic
Luxembourg 1450 1.14 111742.69 .09 Catholic
Mali 1142 1.35 575.83 .18 Islamic
Malta 1470 .72 20254.34 .12 Catholic
Mexico 1505 .37 8014.25 .18 Catholic
Moldova 2413 .48 1291.62 .56 Orthodox
Netherlands 2274 1.12 52699.49 .72 Atheist
Norway 1007 1.54 94791.24 .20 Protestant
Peru 1397 .52 4471.15 .20 Catholic
Poland 2198 .37 10905.54 .17 Catholic
Portugal 1480 .24 22805.48 .14 Catholic
Romania 2963 1.11 7050.99 .24 Orthodox
Russia 2703 .50 11857.53 .44 Orthodox
Rwanda 1098 .94 360.84 .51 Catholic
Slovak Republic 1273 .07 17585.26 .57 Catholic
Slovenia 2069 .78 22412.15 .29 Catholic
South Africa 2818 .94 5770.33 .86 Other Christian
South Korea 1193 .67 17761.80 .66 Protestant
Spain 2490 .99 34351.43 .45 Catholic
Sweden 951 1.59 43142.29 .23 Protestant
Switzerland 2282 .85 65199.76 .61 Catholic
Thailand 1486 .43 3673.57 .10 Buddhism
Trinidad and Tobago 967 1.27 14619.84 .79 Catholic
Turkey 1299 .74 9003.34 .005 Islamic
Ukraine 2067 .001 3116.56 .62 Orthodox
Uruguay 437 .10 6012.01 .35 Catholic
USA 1175 .27 42906.91 .82 Other Christian
Vietnam 1381 1.06 715.78 .51 Buddhism
Zambia 1189 1.21 943.11 .74 Other Christian
a
z-Standardized values. Higher values indicate stronger norm of religiosity.
b
Higher values indicate stronger religious heterogeneity.
c
Modal value.
94 O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105

The higher a country scores on religious fractionalization, the higher is the diversity of religious traditions adopted by its
population.
5.2. Results and discussion
To answer the question of whether the social norm of religiosity accounts for cross-national variations in the religios-
ity effect, we conduct a series of multilevel regression analyses with a random intercept and a random slope of personal
religiosity. Multilevel modeling is the most appropriate method for our purposes, as it takes into account the nested
structure of our data (individuals are nested within countries) and allows the religiosity slope to vary across countries.
Thus, we can determine whether religiosity has a different effect on subjective well-being in countries with different
norms of religiosity.
Models 1 (Table 2. Panels A and B) indicate that religious people are happier (b= .10. p< .001) and more satisfied with
life (b= .28. p< .001) than non-religious people. However, the variance components (var = .005. SD = .073 for happiness
and var = .049. SD = .220 for life satisfaction) for the religiosity slope indicate significant country differences
(
v
2
(63) = 477.89. p< .001 for happiness and
v
2
(63) = 445.97. p< .001 for life satisfaction). Hence, in some countries, per-
sonal religiosity does make people happy and satisfied, whereas in others, it may have no significant influence. For exam-
ple, a simple OLS regression reveals that in Moldova, a unit increase in religiosity is associated with a .01 reduction in self-
reported happiness (b=.01. n.s.). However, a unit increase in religiosity is associated with a .23 unit increase in self-re-
ported happiness (b= .23. p< .001) in Iran. Are country differences in the social norm of religiosity the reason for these
variations?
Model 2 (Table 2, Panels A and B) provides an answer to this question. It shows that the happiness effect of religiosity is
significantly larger in countries where the social norm of religiosity is strong (b= .04. p< .01). A similar conclusion can be
drawn with regard to life satisfaction: the life satisfaction gap between religious and non-religious individuals is larger in
countries where religiosity is normative (b= .09. p< .05). In both cases, the effect is independent of GDP per capita, religious
fractionalization, and the country’s dominant religious denomination (Table 2, Model 3, Panels A and B). Finally, the Chi-
square test suggests that adding the cross-level interactions between personal religiosity and the country’s social norm of
religiosity (Models 2) significantly improves the model fit in comparison to the main-effect models (
v
2
(1) = 12.32. p< .01
for happiness;
v
2
(1) = 7.11. p< .01 for life satisfaction).
Fig. 1 shows the effect of religiosity on happiness and life satisfaction for two levels of countries’ social norms of religi-
osity (one standard deviation below and above the mean). The figure demonstrates that the effect of personal religiosity on
happiness and life satisfaction is stronger in countries where religiosity is socially welcome compared to countries where
religiosity is less normative.
It is also interesting to note that that even in the countries that score the lowest on the social norm of religiosity, the pre-
dicted effect of religiosity on happiness is positive, although very small (b= .05, SE = .02). However, in countries that score
the highest on the religiosity norm, the predicted effect of religiosity is almost four times as large as (b= .18, SE = .02). In
other words, the positive effect of religiosity on happiness and life satisfaction is stronger in countries where religiosity rep-
resents a social norm.
6. Study 2: Social recognition and subjective well-being of religious and non-religious individuals across countries
Although Study 1 provided some evidence for the operation of social norms, it did not test whether non-conformity is
followed by social sanctions and conformity by social rewards. In Study 2, we give a more thorough consideration to the
mechanisms through which conformity to religious norms affects subjective well-being.
The concept of social sanctions and rewards assumes that norm transgressors receive negative comments, are stigma-
tized, and are treated with disrespect, whereas norm conformers enjoy social approval and recognition. Thus, differences
in social recognition and respect that religious and non-religious individuals receive in religious and non-religious countries
may be responsible for differences in their levels of subjective well-being.
In Study 2, we test this possibility using a multilevel moderated mediation framework (Fig. 2). We explore whether the
effect of conformity to the norm of religiosity can be explained through differences in the degree of social recognition of
norm conformers and deviators.
We proceed using two steps. First, we test whether social recognition mediates the effect of personal religiosity on hap-
piness and life satisfaction. We use the data-restructuring procedure proposed by Bauer and colleagues (2006), which allows
us to estimate both the direct and indirect effect simultaneously (see Appendix B for the technical details).
4
Second, we test
whether the indirect effect is conditional upon the degree to which religiosity is normative in a respective country. As the Euro-
pean Social Survey does not include any questions that could be used as an indicator of the injunctive aspect of the norm of
religiosity, we use the national level of religiosity as a proxy for the social norm of religiosity. In sum, we estimate whether
the strength of the mediation depends on a country’s norm of religiosity.
4
As a check, we estimated the models using a traditional two-step approach to mediation (Kenny et al., 2003), which provided no different results.
O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105 95

Table 2
Random intercept and slope models for happiness and life satisfaction (Study 1).
Variable Panel A: Happiness Panel B: Life satisfaction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b(SE) b(SE) b(SE) b(SE) b(SE) b(SE)
Intercept 3.05
***
(.03) 3.04
***
(.03) 3.32
***
(.14) 6.93
***
(.09) 6.92
***
(.09) 7.62
***
(.49)
Age .01
***
(5e4) .01
***
(5e4) .01
***
(5e4) .01
***
(5e4) .01
***
(5e4) .01
***
(5e4)
Age squared 1e4
***
(1e5) 1e4
***
(1e5) 1e4
***
(1e5) 4e4
***
(1e5) 4e4
***
(1e5) 4e4
***
(1e5)
Male .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01
**
(1e3) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01)
Employed 3e4 (.009) 2e4 (.009) 2e4 (.009) .02 (.02) .02 (.03) .02 (.02)
Unemployed .12
***
(.02) .12
***
(.02) .12
***
(.02) .46
***
(.03) .46
***
(.03) .46
***
(.03)
Married .15
***
(.01) .15
***
(.01) .15
***
(.01) .25
***
(.02) .25
***
(.02) .25
***
(.02)
Divorced/widowed .10
***
(.01) .10
***
(.01) .10
***
(.01) .21
***
(.03) .21
***
(.03) .21
***
(.03)
Primary education .10
***
(.02) .10
***
(.02) .10
***
(.02) .30
***
(.02) .30
***
(.02) .30
***
(.02)
Secondary education .03
***
(.01) .03
***
(.01) .03
***
(.01) .10
***
(.02) .10
***
(.02) .10
***
(.02)
Income (missing value = 1) .04
***
(.01) .04
***
(.01) .04
***
(.01) .09
***
(.02) .09
***
(.02) .09
***
(.02)
Income (mean imputed) .10
***
(.01) .10
***
(.01) .10
***
(.01) .42
***
(.01) .42
***
(.01) .42
***
(.01)
Personal religiosity .10
***
(.01) .10
***
(.01) .10
***
(.01) .28
***
(.03) .29
***
(.03) .29
***
(.03)
Catholic .02 (.02) .02 (.02) .02 (.01) .05 (.05) .04 (.05) .05 (.03)
Protestant 9e4 (.02) 4e4 (.02) 6e4 (.01) .01 (.04) .01 (.04) .01 (.03)
Orthodox .08
***
(.02) .08
***
(.02) .07
***
(.01) .25
***
(.07) .25
**
(.07) .25
***
(.04)
Muslim .02 (.03) .01 (.03) .01 (.01) .13 (.08) .12 (.08) .12
**
(.04)
Buddhist .02 (.03) .03 (.03) .03 (.02) .01 (.09) .03 (.09) .03 (.08)
Jewish .02 (.06) .02 (.06) .02 (.05) .33
*
(.16) .33
*
(.16) .33
*
(.16)
Hindu 2e4 (.05) .001 (.05) .001 (.03) .08 (.19) .09 (.18) .08 (.09)
Evangelical .06 (.03) .06 (.03) .06
***
(.02) .08
*
(.03) .08
*
(.03) .08 (.05)
Other .03 (.03) .02 (.03) .02 (.01) .04 (.06) .04 (.06) .04 (.04)
Religious minority .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .02
**
(.01) .03 (.04) .03 (.05) .03 (.02)
Country’s social norm of religiosity .16
***
(.02) .12
***
(.03) .003 (.03) .61
***
(.07) .53
***
(.09) .15 (.11)
Personal religiosity country social norm of religiosity .04
**
(.01) .04
**
(.01) .09
*
(.04) .08
*
(.03)
GDP per capita 5e6
***
(1e6) 1e5
**
(4e6)
Religious fractionalization .03 (.09) .60 (.32)
Catholic culture .24 (.14) .46 (.50)
Protestant culture .29 (.15) .63 (.52)
Orthodox culture .38
*
(.15) .96 (.52)
Islamic culture .39
*
(.16) 1.22
*
(.55)
Eastern culture .15 (.16) .87 (.56)
Other Christian culture .23 (.15) .56 (.53)
Variance components
Var (intercept) .043 (.207) .041 (.205) .022 (.150) .463 (.681) .460 (.678) .282 (.531)
Var (religiosity) .005 (.073) .004 (.065) .004 (.065) .049 (.220) .041 (.203) .043 (.207)
Var (residual) .426 (.653) .426 (.653) .426 (.653) 4.206 (2.051) 4.206 (2.051) 4.206 (2.051)
Deviances 202,382.97 202,370.71 202,331.67 436,210.09 436,202.96 436,167.53
Parameters 28 29 37 28 29 37
Estimation method: Full maximum likelihood. All continuous variables are centered around the grand mean. The presented coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients. Reference categories: for
employment status –people who are not in the labor force (students, housewives, retired, etc.); for marital status—single, for education—tertiary, for religious denomination and country religious culture—‘‘no
denomination’’ and ‘‘atheism dominant,’’ respectively.
*
p< .05.
**
p< .01.
***
p< .001.
96 O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105

6.1. Data and measurement
The data we use in this study come from the third wave of the European Social Survey (2006–2007). The rationale for
using this dataset is that it contains several items that assessed each respondent’s perception of social recognition and re-
spect. Our sample included 35.107 individuals from 22 European countries.
Fig. 1. The effect of personal religiosity on happiness and life satisfaction at different levels of country’s social norm of religiosity (based on Models 3,
Table 2).
Fig. 2. Moderated mediation model of religiosity and social recognition on happiness and life satisfaction (individual- and country-level control variables
not shown).
O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105 97

As in Study 1, the dependent variables were general happiness and overall life satisfaction, measured with the questions,
‘‘Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?’’ (11-point scale) and ‘‘All things considered, how satisfied
are you with your life as a whole nowadays?’’ (11-point scale), respectively. Personal religiosity was measured with a scale
(Cronbach’s
a
.75) consisting of two items: ‘‘Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do
you attend religious services nowadays?’’ (7-point scale) and ‘‘Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how
religious would you say you are?’’ (11-point scale). To determine the extent of the social recognition that respondents enjoy,
we considered the three items asking participants to rate the extent to which they feel that other people treat them with
respect, that other people treat them unfairly (inversely coded), and that they receive appropriate recognition for what they
do (6-point agree-disagree scale). The items were rescaled so that higher scores indicate stronger feelings of social recogni-
tion and were then combined into a scale (Cronbach’s
a
.66).
The measure of country’s norm of religiosity was obtained by averaging individuals’ scores on the religiosity scale de-
scribed in this section.
Individual-level control variables included gender, age, age squared, marital and employment status, income,
5
years of edu-
cation, religious denomination, and membership in a religious minority group.
Country-level control variables were exactly the same as in Study 1 (s. Section 5.1).
6.2. Results and discussion
As in most previous studies (e.g., see Snoep, 2008), the correlation between religiosity and subjective well-being is posi-
tive but small. Our estimation reveals that religiosity correlates with happiness at r= .08, p< .001 and with life satisfaction at
r= .09, p< .001. Religiosity is also related to the mediator social recognition (r= .03, p< .001), and social recognition is pos-
itively correlated with happiness (r= .28, p< .001) and life satisfaction (r= .24, p< .001).
6
The true magnitude of the effect can
be judged on its merits only when taking into account cross-national differences in effect size. For instance, the correlation be-
tween religiosity and happiness reaches .18 (p< .001) in Ireland and only .06 (n.s.) in the former East Germany. Similarly, the
correlation between religiosity and social recognition is r= .21 (p< .001) in Ireland and r= .02 (n.s.) in the former East Germany.
Our mediation model presumes a direct path from religiosity to happiness/life satisfaction and an indirect path from reli-
giosity through social recognition to happiness/life satisfaction (Fig. 2). Models 1 (Table 3) show that the direct path without
the mediator variable (c) is estimated at b= .19 (p< .001) for happiness and at b= .21 (p< .001) for life satisfaction. When the
mediator variable is added (Model 2), the coefficient of the direct path (c
0
) drops to b= .15 (p< .001) in the case of happiness
and b= .18 (p< .001) in the case of life satisfaction. Following the recommendations by Kenny and colleagues (2003), we
computed an average indirect effect of .03 (p< .001. 95% CI [.02, .03]) and an average total effect of .18 (p< .001. 95% CI
[.14,.21]) for happiness. We found an average indirect effect of .03 (p< .001. 95% CI [.01, .04]) and an average total effect
of .21 (p< .001. 95% CI [.16,.25]) for life satisfaction. Hence, on average across countries, 17% of the total effect of religiosity
on happiness and 14% of the total effect of religiosity on life satisfaction is mediated by social recognition. The variance com-
ponents for the random slopes a, b, and c
0
indicate that the strength of the indirect and direct effects significantly varies
Table 3
Unstandardized path coefficients for the mediation and moderated mediation models (Study 2).
Path Dependent variable: happiness Dependent variable: life satisfaction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b(SE) b(SE) b(SE) b(SE) b(SE) b(SE)
a(Religiosity ?social recognition) .04
***
(.01) .05
***
(.01) .05
***
(.01) .05
***
(.01)
b(Social recognition ?happiness) .52
***
(.02) .52
***
(.02) .53
***
(.02) .53
***
(.02)
c(Religiosity ?happiness) .19
***
(.03) .21
***
(.02)
c
0
(Direct effect) .15
***
(.02) .15
***
(.02) .18
***
(.02) .18
***
(.02)
ab (Indirect effect) .03
***
(.0002) .03
***
(.006)
aNational religiosity .10
**
(.03) .10
**
(.02)
bNational religiosity .09 (.06) .08 (.06)
c
0
National religiosity .08 (.04) . .16
**
(.05)
Var (a) .002
***
(.039) .001
*
(.024) .002
***
(.039) .001
*
(.025)
Var (b) .008
***
(.092) .007
***
(.088) .008
***
(.092) .008
***
(.088)
Var (c) .006
***
(.078) .003
**
(.058)
Var (c
0
) .003
**
(.050) .002
**
(.043) .004
**
(.067) .002
*
(.045)
Models 1 and 2 include all predictors at the individual level. Model 3—at individual and country level.
*
p< .05.
**
p< .01.
***
p< .001.
5
The question asked whether the respondents lived comfortably on present income, were coping on present income, were finding it difficult on present
income, or were finding it very difficult on present income (continuous variable).
6
The partial correlations under control of individual- and country-level variables described in Section 5.1 (with the exception of the national levelof
religiosity) are reported here.
98 O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105

across countries (
v
2
(21) = 63.73, p< .001;
v
2
(21) = 123.57, p< .001;
v
2
(21) = 42.14, p< .001 for happiness;
v
2
(21) = 63.94,
p< .001;
v
2
(21) = 104.48, p< .001;
v
2
(21) = 49.77, p< .001 for life satisfaction). Hence, the mediation is stronger in some
countries than in others. Do country differences for the norm of religiosity account for these variations?
To answer to this question, we estimate the effect of the country’s norm of religiosity on each of the slopes a, b, and c
0
(Models 3, Table 3). The results suggest that the effect of religiosity on social recognition in the happiness model increases
with an increase in the country’s norm of religiosity (b= .10, p< .01). Similarly, the effect of religiosity on social recognition
in the life-satisfaction model is stronger in countries with a high norm of religiosity (b= .10. p< .01). Hence, in religious
countries, religious people enjoy greater social recognition. The direct effect of religiosity on happiness (c
0
) does not depend
on a country’s social norm of religiosity (b= .08. n.s.), whereas the direct effect of religiosity on life satisfaction (c
0
) is affected
by the country’s levels of religiosity (b= .16. p< .01): the higher a country’s average level of religiosity, the larger the direct
effect of personal religiosity on life satisfaction. Thus, in religious countries, religious people are psychologically better off,
partially because they enjoy greater social respect and recognition. Their non-religious counterparts are worse off, as they
report being treated with less respect. Conversely, in non-religious countries, religious people do not feel more highly re-
spected than their non-religious counterparts, which explains why there is little to no difference in the subjective well-being
between these two groups in non-religious countries.
The main results are depicted in Fig. 3, which presents the proportion of the indirect and direct effect of religiosity on
happiness for each country. The strength of the indirect effect of religiosity increases as the national level of religiosity in-
creases. For example, in former East Germany (the least religious country in our sample), the indirect effect is actually neg-
ative. That is, religious people in former East Germany feel that they are treated with less respect and recognition than non-
religious people (although not significantly). In contrast, in Poland (the most religious country in our sample), the perceived
social recognition of religious individuals is higher than that of non-religious individuals. These differences explain approx-
imately 17% of the total effect of religiosity on life satisfaction and approximately 27% of its effect on happiness in Poland.
Hence, whether or not one is religious in Poland (and other religious countries) is directly related to being treated with more
or less respect and consequently to higher or lower subjective well-being.
7. General discussion
In the present study, we examined the positive effect of religion on subjective well-being under the framework of theories
of social norms and conformity literature (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2001; Horne, 2001). We assumed that religiosity can be
conceptualized as a social norm at the country level: the higher the proportion of people in a country who are religious
and consider religion a socially desirable way of life, the stronger is the country’s social norm of religiosity. Consistent with
our theoretical considerations, the positive effect of religiosity on subjective well-being was stronger in countries where the
norm of religiosity was strongly enforced. This effect was independent of the person’s and the country’s dominant religious
denomination, the country’s religious homogeneity, and personal membership in minority or majority religious groups. The
Fig. 3. Decomposition of the total effect of religiosity on happiness and life satisfaction into a direct effect and an indirect effect through social recognition
for 22 countries.
O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105 99

validity of these findings is strengthened by the fact that they were consistent for two dependent variables representing dif-
ferent facets of subjective well-being: happiness and life satisfaction.
The social norm hypothesis provides a sound explanation for the previous findings indicating that religious individuals
are happier in religious countries (e.g., Snoep, 2008). Our data show that most religious countries are also countries in which
non-religious individuals are likely to be regarded quite negatively. Generally, the higher the level of religiosity in a country,
the higher is the percentage of people who see religious faith as a quality that children should be encouraged to learn and the
stronger is the social intolerance of a politician who does not believe in God
7
. For example, in America—one of the most reli-
gious among Western industrial countries—more than the half of the population has unfavorable attitudes towards atheists
(ARDA, 2002), would never vote for a non-religious presidential candidate (Joyner, 2007), and would even give atheists lower
priority on a waiting list to receive a kidney than Christian patients (Furnham et al., 1998).
These facts raise the question of whether non-religious people in strongly religious countries represent a stigmatized
group derogated by the rest of the population. Consequently, in Study 2, we asked whether the lack of social recognition
(public acknowledgment) may be the reason for lower subjective well-being among nonbelievers. Our results showed that
in secular countries, there are no differences in social recognition between religious and non-religious individuals. In con-
trast, religious individuals in religious countries seem to receive more approval and recognition from their social environ-
ments, whereas their non-religious counterparts are less likely to feel to be treated fairly and with respect. In some
countries, atheists can even be legally prosecuted: e.g., in Saudi Arabia, non-believers face severe legal sanctions, including
the death penalty (Campo, 2009). Discrimination against non-believers seems to exist even in Western democracies: e.g., in
Germany, one has to pay an administrative fee to leave the Church (Beucker, 2008), and 98% of government-funded schools
in Ireland are denominational (HAI, 2011).
In addition, non-religious individuals can become the subject of informal social-control behavior exercised by their rel-
atives, acquaintances, neighbors, or other people who are familiar (or accidentally become familiar) with their ‘‘unbelief.’’
John Stuart Mill in his essay ‘‘On Liberty’’ described these sanctions as ‘‘loss of consideration,’’ ‘‘distaste,’’ and ‘‘standing aloof
from a person ... that displeases us’’ (Mill, 1869). Discrimination against atheists in the US and particularly in Europe may
have weakened considerably since Mill’s times. However, informal sanctions such as comments about the inappropriateness
of one’s worldview or skipping religious services, disapproving glances and frowning, and other similar behaviors may still
take place. In addition, non-religious individuals living in religious countries may feel embarrassed to admit their unbelief or
simply feel uncomfortable when expected to behave in accordance with religious traditions. For example, they may feel
embarrassed when asked to pray before a dinner with relatives, a girlfriend or boyfriend’s parents, or even business partners.
Even though our findings provide direct support for the social-sanctions explanation, they also leave room for other
explanatory factors. For example, religious individuals living in countries in which their beliefs and behaviors are shared
with other people may benefit from the perceived fit with their environment. Thus, several studies (Fulmer et al., 2010; Sagiv
and Schwartz, 2000) showed that the positive effect of particular personality dimensions and values on subjective well-being
is amplified in cultural contexts where these personality dimensions or values are dominant.
At a more general level, our findings harken back to the Durkheimian approach to religiosity as a social process that moti-
vates an individual’s actions. In his ‘‘Elementary Forms of Religious Life,’’ Durkheim (1912/2001) suggested that community
involvement can sustain and increase one’s moral forces: ‘‘Because he is in moral harmony with his contemporaries, he has
more confidence, courage, and audacity—like the believer who thinks the eyes of his god turned benevolently toward him’’
(p. 159). Subsequently, other authors have shown how involvement in moral communities indeed strengthens belief and dis-
courages antisocial behavior such as criminal activities, gambling, drug use, or even suicide (Baier and Wright, 2001; Eitle,
2011; Lofland and Stark, 1965; Stack and Kposowa, 2011). Similarly, it has been suggested that the effect of religiosity on
happiness is social in nature: attendance of religious services and closeness to God affect religious peoples’ happiness even
more than belief does (Stark and Maier, 2008). Hence, our findings may be interpreted as a contribution to this body of lit-
erature: religiosity enhances one’s subjective well-being to the extent that it is supported by one’s community.
Finally, one might wonder why belonging to a religious minority group did not negatively affect subjective well-being (s.
Table 2). Religious minority groups do not conform to the majority’s behavior and thus break certain social norms and stan-
dards. According to a social norms explanation, such minorities should be sanctioned. However, religious minorities form a
cohesive group, which not only strengthens their beliefs but also provides all social supports (Ebaugh and Pipes, 2001; Wil-
kins, 2008). This cohesion compensates for the possible liabilities of their minority status. In contrast, atheists and unbeliev-
ers rarely create communities or support groups based on their common interest and hence cannot benefit from a
community’s social support.
This research utilizes the concepts of social norms and conformity to explain the effect of religiosity on subjective well-
being. The conceptualization of a country’s norm of religiosity, which includes a descriptive and an injunctive component,
provides initial direct evidence of the operation of social norms in the context of religiosity and well-being. Furthermore,
our moderated mediation analysis provides additional support. Still, our findings leave space for further investigations.
For example, future research might address the question of causality more directly by conducting mediation analyses using
panel data in several countries with different norms of religiosity to test alternative causal explanations.
7
The national level of religiosity and the percentage of people who see religious faith as a quality that children should be encouraged to pursue correlate at r
(64) = .85 (p< .001); the national level of religiosity and the social intolerance of a politician who does not believe in God correlate at r(64) = .79 (p< .001).
100 O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105

Table A1
Correlations between religiosity questions and dependent variables for each country.
Country With happiness With life satisfaction
Attendance Importance of God Personal religiosity Importance of religion Attendance Importance of God Personal religiosity Importance of religion
Albania .071
**
.053
*
.036 .103
**
.056
*
.121
**
.057
*
.176
**
Andorra .05 .017 .006 .008 .026 .030 .062 .032
Armenia .087
**
.053
*
.065
*
.053
*
.043 .014 .027 .042
Australia .108
**
.073
**
.069
**
.099
**
.126
**
.071
**
.060
*
.102
**
Austria .079
**
.094
**
.082
**
.098
**
.062
*
.146
**
.046 .062
*
Azerbaijan .02 .002 .020 .072
**
.019 .042 .012 .046
Belarus .03 .033 .031 .019 .022 .006 .027 .021
Belgium .076
**
.034 .068
**
.057
*
.085
**
.047 .088
**
.052
*
Bosnia Herzegovina .113
**
.096
**
.058
*
.104
**
.083
**
.159
**
.082
**
.047
Brazil .060
*
.074
**
.007 .089
**
.082
**
.097
**
.067
**
.034
Bulgaria .04 .002 .002 .029 .039 .024 .004 .016
Burkina Faso .098
**
.051 .072
**
.118
**
.047 .127
**
.013 .048
Canada .074
**
.050
*
.046
*
.073
**
.096
**
.074
**
.083
**
.085
**
Chile .075
*
.116
**
.079
*
.094
**
.032 .118
**
.032 .147
**
Cyprus .061
**
.064
**
.054
*
.000 .055
**
.038 .048
*
.031
Czech Republic .00 .055
*
.042 .034 .024 .055
*
.031 .030
Denmark .04 .009 .051 .007 .055
*
.023 .034 .030
Estonia .065
*
.053
*
.064
*
.025 .004 .064
*
.065
*
.019
Ethiopia .126
**
.098
**
.074
**
.015 .107
**
.026 .053
*
.040
Finland .085
**
.046
*
.047
*
.068
**
.090
**
.086
**
.076
**
.058
**
France .01 .019 .001 .002 .015 .003 .014 .024
Georgia .134
**
.021 .058
**
.112
**
.147
**
.006 .034 .040
*
Germany .117
**
.128
**
.138
**
.121
**
.178
**
.183
**
.186
**
.193
**
Ghana .083
**
.001 .053
*
.083
**
.074
**
.018 .022 .057
*
Greece .05 .013 .018 .034 .012 .037 .013 .081
**
Guatemala .104
**
.079
*
.057 .065
*
.074
*
.054 .029 .029
Hungary .02 .016 .001 .002 .041 .037 .016 .009
India .060
**
.131
**
.009 .139
**
.127
**
.135
**
.069
**
.131
**
Indonesia .120
**
.082
**
.095
**
.003 .128
**
.121
**
.132
**
.091
**
Iran .074
**
.081
**
.098
**
.182
**
.039
*
.054
**
.047
*
.101
**
Iraq .00 .104
**
.037 .015 .008 .076
**
.017 .013
Ireland .03 .053 .069
*
.090
**
.083
**
.068
*
.079
*
.069
*
Italy .122
**
.077
*
.031 .045 .127
**
.139
**
.078
*
.099
**
Japan .106
**
.095
**
.057 .109
**
.115
**
.108
**
.108
**
.120
**
Latvia .057
*
.084
**
.059
*
.005 .026 .027 .003 .023
Lithuania .03 .046 .036 .079
**
.015 .004 .026 .056
*
Luxembourg .02 .023 .028 .038 .008 .028 .019 .002
Mali .01 .006 .000 .070
**
.036 .021 .011 .070
**
Malta .076
**
.063
*
.131
**
.117
**
.022 .164
**
.040 .131
**
Mexico .04 .064
*
.039 .080
**
.057
*
.079
**
.052
*
.075
**
Moldova .02 .026 .018 .056
**
.020 .014 .032 .036
Netherlands .066
**
.036 .009 .068
**
.077
**
.051
**
.031 .073
**
Norway .073
*
.011 .050 .027 .033 .023 .053 .024
Peru .057
*
.033 .042 .097
**
.003 .095
**
.076
**
.051
*
Poland .061
**
.012 .022 .012 .049
*
.033 .014 .026
Portugal 0.02 .052
*
.043 .018 .021 .092
**
.026 .009
Romania .065
**
.039
*
.017 .032 .048
**
.007 .021 .010
(continued on next page)
O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105 101

Table A1 (continued)
Country With happiness With life satisfaction
Attendance Importance of God Personal religiosity Importance of religion Attendance Importance of God Personal religiosity Importance of religion
Russia .02 .019 .005 .012 .022 .062
**
.041
*
.012
Rwanda .129
**
.029 .088
**
.047 .049 .025 .026 .069
**
Slovak Republic .01 .084
**
.091
**
.098
**
.028 .099
**
.118
**
.115
**
Slovenia .01 .051
*
.042 .035 .006 .024 .032 .024
South Africa .135
**
.051
**
.058
**
.086
**
.149
**
.079
**
.071
**
.089
**
South Korea .135
**
.143
**
.165
**
.143
**
.128
**
.174
**
.148
**
.142
**
Spain .065
**
.062
**
.037 .061
**
.057
**
.037 .056
**
.075
**
Sweden .075
*
.015 .010 .038 .083
**
.006 .014 .093
**
Switzerland .03 .009 .030 .035 .024 .043
*
.013 .016
Thailand .05 .021 .102
**
.196
**
.021 .253
**
.060
*
.142
**
Trinidad and Tobago .159
**
.009 .017 .118
**
.096
**
.017 .009 .099
**
Turkey .082
**
.134
**
.137
**
.032 .137
**
.113
**
.080
**
.038
Ukraine .106
**
.050
*
.094
**
.044
*
.130
**
.067
**
.077
**
.047
*
Uruguay .04 .018 .009 .013 .055 .033 .004 .052
USA .177
**
.125
**
.122
**
.170
**
.174
**
.096
**
.112
**
.086
**
Vietnam .092
**
.034 .032 .054
*
.086
**
.028 .017 .003
Zambia .057
*
.054
*
.030 .068
*
.003 .027 .005 .020
*
p< .05.
**
p< .01.
102 O. Stavrova et al. / Social Science Research 42 (2013) 90–105

Finally, our results may be considered outside the study of religion. We show that the way personal religiosity—an ulti-
mately private matter—affects happiness and life satisfaction is shaped by social contexts. We believe that contextual effects
and the individual–environmental interaction merit further attention in subjective well-being research.
Appendix A
See Table A1 and A2.
Appendix B
Following the instructions provided by Bauer and colleagues (2006), we formulate the model with a single Level 1 equa-
tion by means of stacking the dependent variable (happiness/life satisfaction) and the mediator variable (social recognition)
into one new dependent variable (Z) and creating two selection variables (Sy and Sm). The selection variable Sy is equal to 1
when Zrefers to happiness/life satisfaction and 0 when Zrefers to social recognition. Similarly, the variable Sm equals 1
when Zstands for social recognition and 0 when Zrefers to happiness/life satisfaction. Thus, the mediation model is repre-
sented in the following equation:
Z
ij
¼S
mij
ðd
Mj
þa
j
REL
ij
ÞþS
yij
ðd
yi
þb
j
SOC
ij
þc
0
j
REL
ij
Þþe
zij
The selection variables Sm and Sy toggle from the Model where the dependent Zis happiness/life satisfaction to the Mod-
el where the dependent Zis social recognition. When Zis a value of social recognition, Sm = 1 and Sy = 0, then Z
ij
=S
mij
(d
Mj
+
a
j
REL
ij
)+e
zij
. Similarly, when Zis a value of happiness/life satisfaction, Sm = 0 and Sy = 1. then Z
ij
=S
yij
(d
yi
+b
j
SOC
ij
+
c
0
j
REL
ij
)+e
zij.
The final equation can be rearranged as follows:
Z
ij
¼d
Mj
S
Mij
þa
j
ðS
Mij
REL
ij
Þþd
Yj
S
Yij
þb
j
ðS
Yij
SOC
ij
Þþc
0
j
ðS
yij
REL
ij
Þ þ e
Zij
;
where a
j
represents the effect of religiosity on social recognition, b
j
is the effect of social recognition on happiness/life sat-
isfaction, and c
0
j
stands for the direct effect of religiosity on happiness/life satisfaction.
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