Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains Nonviolent

Abstract

Hizb ut-Tahrir is a transnational movement that currently finds support among young Muslims in Central Asia and Western Europe. It presents a complex challenge to both Western and Muslim governments because it calls for the unification of all Muslim countries into a single Caliphate but has consistently rejected violence as a tool of political change. In this paper we focus on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan, a country that is a key U.S. ally in the war on terrorism. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Central Asia, we find that social movement theories (resource mobilization theory, political opportunities theory, framing theory) cannot explain why Hizb ut-Tahrir has remained opposed to violence under the same circumstances in which the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the other important radical Islamic group in the region, has embraced violence. We suggest that ideology is crucial for understanding why Hizb ut-Tahrir remains peaceful, and consider several scenarios in which the group might reconsider its ideology and turn to terrorism.

Full text

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the
Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That
Remains Nonviolent
EMMANUEL KARAGIANNIS AND
CLARK MCCAULEY
Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a transnational movement that currently finds support among
young Muslims in Central Asia and Western Europe. It presents a complex chal-
lenge to both Western and Muslim governments because it calls for the unification
of all Muslim countries into a single Caliphate but has consistently rejected violence
as a tool of political change. In this paper we focus on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan,
a country that is a key U.S. ally in the war on terrorism. Drawing on extensive field-
work in Central Asia, we find that social movement theories (resource mobilization
theory, political opportunities theory, framing theory) cannot explain why Hizb
ut-Tahrir has remained opposed to violence under the same circumstances in which
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the other important radical Islamic group in
the region, has embraced violence. We suggest that ideology is crucial for under-
standing why Hizb ut-Tahrir remains peaceful, and consider several scenarios in
which the group might reconsider its ideology and turn to terrorism.
Keywords Hizb ut-Tahrir, IMU, terrorism, Islam, Uzbekistan, social movement
theory
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
initiated a debate about radical Islamic groups in Central Asia. Although the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) initially received much greater scrutiny
because of its military activities, think tanks and Central Asian analysts have recently
expanded their attention to include nonviolent radical groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir
al-Islami (The Party of Islamic Liberation).
1
However, the available studies of Hizb
ut-Tahrir in Central Asia tend to offer more description than theoretical analysis
and do not attempt to evaluate systematically the group’s potential for turning to
violence.
Emmanuel Karagiannis received the Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of
Hull; he prepared this paper while holding an Asch Center Postdoctoral Fellowship supported
by the National Consortium for Study of Violence and Responses to Violence (NC-START).
Clark McCauley is Professor of Psychology at Bryn Mawr College, a director of the Asch
Center, and co-director of NC-START.
Address correspondence to Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, Solomon Asch
Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict, University of Pennsylvania, St. Leonard’s Court,
Suite 305, 3819-33 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. E-mail: mkaragiannis@yahoo.
com, cmccaule@psych.upenn.edu
Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:315–334, 2006
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0954-6553 print=1556-1836 online
DOI: 10.1080/09546550600570168
315

Hizb ut-Tahrir views itself not as a religious organization, but rather as a polit-
ical party whose ideology is based on Islam. Hizb ut-Tahrir is an international Isla-
mic movement, which calls for the unification of all Muslim countries into a single
state, the Caliphate. It has sought to advance its cause by widespread dissemination
of published materials including books and pamphlets. Although Hizb ut-Tahrir
advocates a strict interpretation of Islam, it does not oppose modern technology
and makes extensive use of the Internet to spread its message.
The group probably became active in Central Asia in the early to mid-1990s.
Regional governments have responded with repressive measures against its members.
Yet, the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek authorities have been unable to neutra-
lize Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities in their respective countries. In fact, the impression is
that punitive measures are having completely the opposite effect: the group is grow-
ing in popularity. Since the group operates clandestinely, its membership in Central
Asia is unknown. Rough estimates of its strength range from 20,000 to 100,000.
2
Based on extensive fieldwork in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajiki-
stan from September 2003 until February 2005, the first author estimates that there
are around 30,000 members and many more sympathizers.
Although the group has so far eschewed violent methods to achieve its aims,
such a development cannot be excluded. Indeed, there is an urgent need to under-
stand how Hizb ut-Tahrir perceives political violence. This article focuses mainly
on Uzbekistan for two reasons. Firstly, Uzbekistan is the hub of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s
activities in Central Asia; Islam has deeper roots in Uzbekistan than, for example,
in neighboring Kazakhstan.
3
Secondly, the Uzbek authorities have taken a parti-
cularly harsh stance against Hizb ut-Tahrir, accusing the group of organizing
terrorist attacks. In mid-May 2005, President Karimov claimed that the group orche-
strated the riots in Andizhan, a city in Ferghana valley, which led the country to a
new phase of instability. Thus the experience of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan can tell
us something about the group’s potential for violence where both its resources and
its challenges are greatest.
We begin with a description of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s origin, structure, and political
strategy of nonviolence, as well as a brief history of IMU and its career of political
violence. Then, we examine three social movement theories in an attempt to under-
stand why Hizb ut-Tahrir has not turned to violence in Uzbekistan. Comparison
between IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir will indicate that the existing theories of collective
violence do not fully explain why two groups with similar goals have followed differ-
ent paths. We will argue that ideas count: that ideology is crucial in understanding
why Hizb ut-Tahrir remains peaceful. Finally, we will consider the conditions under
which Hizb ut-Tahrir might turn to violence.
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Radical Islam Without Violence
Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953 by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, a famous Islamic
scholar and judge in the shariah (Islamic law) appeal court in East Jerusalem. Its
original members were mainly Palestinians from Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria,
although the group quickly found supporters in most Arab countries. Taqiuddin
an-Nabhani died in 1977 and Abdul Qadeem Zaloom, a founding member of
Palestinian origin, replaced him. When the latter died in April 2003, another
Palestinian, Ata Abu-l-Rushta, former party spokesman in Jordan, succeeded
316 E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley

him.
4
The fact that most founding members were Palestinians may explain why they
have dominated the Hizb ut-Tahrir’s leadership.
The doctrine of Hizb ut-Tahrir has not changed in the last fifty years, although
its leadership has occasionally attempted to provide an alternative Islamic view on
contemporary issues such as space exploration.
5
In fact, an-Nabhani’s writings
constitute the basis for Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideological platform and any major changes
would undermine the essence of the party.
Hizb ut-Tahrir operates through a network of underground cells resembling
those that the Bolshevik revolutionaries employed as the groundwork for their seiz-
ure of power in Russia in October 1917. At the lowest level, members and new
recruits are organized in study-circles (halqa) of five people. The head of each
study-circle (mushrif) supervises its members who study the group’s ideology. At
the district level, there is a local committee, whose leader is termed Naqib, which
is responsible for the administration of group affairs in the relevant urban center
and its surrounding villages. Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects the concept of the modern
nation-state and has divided the world into provinces (Wilayah); a province can
coincide with a nation-state or a particular region within a state. At the provincial
level, there is a committee headed by a provincial representative (Mu’tamad) who
oversees group activities. The Mu’tamad is appointed by the central committee
(lajnat al-qiyada) of the international party, headed by the supreme leader (Amir)
of the Hizb ut-Tahrir.
6
Internal discipline and obedience to the central leadership
are necessary for such a pyramid-like group to avoid infiltration by security agents
and maintain ideological coherence. There is a range of disciplinary measures for
members who break the rules, with expulsion being the most severe penalty.
The Bolshevik leadership believed that only a centralized and disciplined polit-
ical party with a theoretical overview of the state and the society could mount a suc-
cessful revolution against the ruling class. Similarly, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s intellectuals
have argued that their party ‘‘must be acquainted with the details of the economic,
social and educational systems and policies that Islam has laid down for without
them it would be incapable of resuming the Caliphate. It would also have to be uni-
fied in understanding as a structure, otherwise it would never be able to work collec-
tively as a party.’’
7
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s political doctrine is founded on two principles. The first is the
need for Islamic law, the shariah that justly regulates all aspects of human life—
politics, economics, sciences, and ethics. The second is the need for an authentic
Islamic state, because a just society can be achieved only within such a political
entity. Fundamentalist Islam involves a unique conjoining of religion and politics;
there is no separation between deen (the faith) and dawla (the state). The party rejects
contemporary efforts to establish Islamic states, claiming that Sudan, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia do not meet the necessary criteria.
Instead, Hizb ut-Tahrir wants to reestablish the Islamic state that existed in the
seventh century under the Prophet Muhammad and his first four successors. This
state would be led by a Caliph, a supreme leader who would combine religious
and political power, elected by an assembly (Majlis al-Ummah), which would in turn
be elected by the people. The Caliph would appoint an Amir, or military leader, who
would declare jihad (holy war) against non-Muslim countries.
Although its origins and most of its membership are from Sunni Muslims, Hizb
ut-Tahrir does not officially discriminate against Shi’a Muslims.
8
This stance is
consistent with their goal of re-establishing the kind of unified caliphate that existed
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Evaluating the Threat 317

prior to the division between Sunni and Shi’a in 661 A.D., and consistent also with their
goal of offering an Islamic political party rather than an Islamic sect. In practical terms,
acceptance of Shi’a is an adaptation to mixed Shi’a and Sunni populations in countries
where Hizb ut-Tahrir organizes, including Lebanon and Pakistan.
Hizb ut-Tahrir has been vigorously against the political path of Tadarruj
(Gradualism). Like the Bolshevik party who dismissed participation in electoral
processes, the group has criticized attempts by other Islamic groups to utilize the
democratic structures by holding ministerial posts in the existing governments, or
participating in the electoral and legislative processes, in order to achieve some influ-
ence in political decision-making.
9
Instead, Hizb ut-Tahrir has favored a radical
political change through the demolition of the existing state apparatus and the
construction of a new Islamic state.
Modeled after the three stages that the Prophet Muhammad experienced en
route to the establishment of the first Islamic state, Hizb ut-Tahrir has envisaged
a three-stage program of action:
10
.First Stage: ‘‘Finding and cultivating individuals who are convinced by the
thought and method of the party. This is necessary in order to formulate and
establish a group capable of carrying the party’s ideas.’’
.Second Stage: ‘‘Interacting with the ummah (community of believers) in order to
encourage the ummah to embrace Islam, so that it works to establish Islam in life,
state and society.’’
.Third Stage: ‘‘Establishing an Islamic state, implementing Islam generally and
comprehensively, and carrying its message to the world.’’
In brief, the three steps are recruitment of elite party members, Islamization of
society, and takeover of the state and jihad to spread Islam. While Hizb ut-Tahrir
does not explicitly mention anything about the current stage of its struggle in Central
Asia, a careful reading of its leaflets indicates that the group sees itself in recent years
in the second stage, that of building Islam within the ummah.
Although Hizb ut-Tahrir is politically radical, strategically it is rather conserva-
tive in its approach to restoring the Caliphate. Strategic innovation would mean
shifts that change the fundamental pattern of the group’s challenge to state autho-
rities. Remarkably, the group has maintained the same strategy for over fifty years.
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s consistency is associated with a dogmatic and consistent implemen-
tation of its ideology, which envisions a peaceful overthrow of the existing regimes in
Muslim countries. Yet, the organization has demonstrated a capacity to innovate
tactical changes within its existing strategy, such as its use of the Internet since the
mid-1990s to convey Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology to young, educated Muslims.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Radical Islam With Violence
The rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan, coincided in
recent years with the fall of IMU, the other important radical Islamic group in
Uzbekistan. The founders of IMU are Juma Namangani, the group’s military leader
and a former Afghan veteran, and Tahir Yuldashev, its political leader. Both men
were members of the Uzbekistan branch of the all-USSR Islamic Renaissance Party,
which was established in 1990. In 1991, however, they set up their own splinter
movement, Adolat (Justice), that called for the establishment of an Islamic state in
318 E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley

Uzbekistan. The group, consisting mainly of young men, attempted to enforce
shariah in parts of the Ferghana valley.
11
Its squads patrolled the streets of
Namangan and Kokand and detained people suspected of engaging in un-Islamic
behavior (e.g., gambling, trade in alcoholic drinks, prostitution).
12
When the Uzbek government banned Adolat in March 1992, the group’s leader-
ship fled to Tajikistan and joined the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a coalition of
political parties dominated by Tajik Islamists. Namangani fought in the Tajik civil
war between the neo-communist government and UTO until the war ended in a
compromise in 1997, while Yuldeshev focused on fundraising and organizational
matters. In 1998, following the ceasefire in Tajikistan, members of Adolat and other
Islamic groups that had been operating in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan united in
Afghanistan to form the IMU.
From the beginning, IMU’s focus in Central Asia was on the armed struggle
against the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan. Since the group paid scant attention
to education and propaganda, it is difficult to assess its ideological views. However,
it seems that IMU espoused militant Salafism, calling modern Muslims to revert to
the authentic Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, the salaf or
‘‘ancient ones.’’
13
During the summers of 1999 and 2000, the IMU conducted small-scale incur-
sions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. As a result, the IMU was listed by the U.S.
Department of State as a terrorist organization in 2000. Estimates of the number
of IMU guerillas have ranged from several hundreds to several thousands.
14
The
IMU allegedly changed its name to the Islamic Party of Turkestan in June 2001,
in order to signal an expansion of its goals.
15
Rather than its original goal of
establishing an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, the group now seeks the creation of an
Islamic state in all of Central Asia, which would include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China’s Xinxiang province. The new goal
is thus a somewhat more modest version of the worldwide Caliphate sought by
Hizb ut-Tahrir.
The IMU was physically and organizationally devastated by the 2001 U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan. It is very likely that Namangani was killed during an air
strike in Afghanistan in November 2001. The remaining members of the group are
currently believed to be taking refuge in the tribal areas along the Afghani border
with Pakistan.
Social Movement Theories: Why is Hizb ut-Tahrir Peaceful and
IMU Violent?
In this section we turn to social movement theories in an effort to understand why
Hizb ut-Tahrir has not joined the IMU in using political violence in Uzbekistan.
We will follow Quintan Wiktorowitz and Mohammed Hafez in drawing on resource
mobilization theory, political opportunities theory, and framing theory to assist
understanding of the circumstances under which an Islamic protest group is likely
to turn to violence.
16
Resource Mobilization Theory
In this theory, political violence is produced when a group mobilizes to attack its
opponent’s resources (e.g., space, privilege) or when a group, which had lost its
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Evaluating the Threat 319

resources, attempts to reclaim them.
17
According to Charles Tilly, mobilization is the
process by which a group assembles resources and places them under collective con-
trol for the explicit purpose of pursuing the group’s interests through collective
action. In his words, without mobilization ‘‘a group may prosper, but it cannot
contend for power [since] contending for power means employing mobilized
resources to influence other groups.’’
18
The ability of a group to challenge the authorities eventually would be determ-
ined by the extent to which it is in control of normative resources (commitment of
members to the group, legitimacy, and identity resources); coercive resources (means
of imposing its will on opponents, material, and organizational resources); and insti-
tutional resources (access to state agencies and elites, mass media resources).
19
Hizb ut-Tahrir has normative resources since it is an exclusive organization that
has established strict criteria for membership.
20
Only individuals who accept fully
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s beliefs, aims, and strategies are recruited by the organization.
New members must study Hizb ut-Tahrir’s program, strategy, and literature, as well
as geography, politics, religion, and history. The group perceives itself as a selected
and elite group, in effect an ummah within the ummah.
21
To be able to wage an armed struggle, Hizb ut-Tahrir must also have coercive
resources. Firstly, sources of funding are essential for the support of full-time acti-
vists, purchases of weapons and explosives, logistics (e.g., safe houses) and transpor-
tation. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s sources of income are subject to speculation, but it is
obvious that they are solid. Arrests of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s members in Uzbekistan have
revealed computer disks, videos, CDs, printing and photocopying machines, and
extensive use of e-mails—all of which are rare in a country where people have little
access to technology.
22
According to a senior member of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, the
group is funded by membership fees, donations, and public campaigns.
23
The Uzbek
government has claimed that Hizb ut-Tahrir is involved in drug trafficking, but it is
unlikely that a conservative religious group (which strongly believes that Islam pro-
vides a moral basis upon which to create a new social order) is engaged in such
activities.
24
Secondly, Hizb ut-Tahrir would have no difficulty purchasing arms. Following
the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Central Asia is awash with
arms. The retreat of the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989 through Uzbekistan
and the armimg of different factions in the Tajik civil war from 1992 to 1997 mean
that rifles and pistols are easily obtainable on the black market.
25
Indeed, the pro-
liferation of small arms and light weapons in Uzbekistan may become a decisive fac-
tor in transforming political disagreements into full-scale armed confrontations.
26
Thirdly, Hizb ut-Tahrir has been organized in such a way that that the leader-
ship can rapidly adopt violent methods, by making use of existing networks among
group members. The cell structure of Hizb ut-Tahrir is ideal for guerilla warfare
because the cell’s leader is the only person who has access to the next cell in the
group’s structure. The cell structure could allow the group to survive repression since
the capture, interrogation, and torture of members will not expose its entire structure
of command.
Fourthly, the demographic situation in Uzbekistan makes it easy for Hizb
ut-Tahrir to recruit new members. With an estimated 25.8 million inhabitants in
2004, Uzbekistan has the largest population of the former Soviet republics in Central
Asia.
27
The country has a birth rate of 20.4 per thousand and more than fifty-six
percent of the population is under twenty-five years of age.
28
320 E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley

Finally, Hizb ut-Tahrir may have had limited access to state resources or other
institutional resources. The group initially welcomed the rise of the Taliban and as a
result there were contacts between the two sides. Hizb ut-Tahrir may have expected
that the Taliban would attack neighboring Central Asian states in order to restore
the Caliphate.
29
In a visit to southern Kyrgyzstan in May 2004, the first author
discussed Hizb ut-Tahrir and related issues with a senior Kyrgyz military officer.
He claimed that Hizb ut-Tahrir had received financial support from the Taliban
regime in the late 1990s.
30
Although the pre-conditions in terms of resource mobilization exist for Hizb
ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan to transform into a violent group, it has abstained from
any involvement in terrorist attacks against the Karimov regime. In contrast,
IMU utilized all its normative resources (jihadist ideology), coercive resources
(weapons, ex-Soviet veterans of the Afghan war) and institutional resources (organi-
zational support, training and financing from the Taliban regime) to launch terrorist
attacks throughout Central Asia.
31
Therefore, resource mobilization theory cannot
provide a full explanation why an Islamic radical group has not so far decided to
utilize violence to achieve political aims, given its ability to mobilize the necessary
resources.
Political Opportunities Theory
This theory focuses on the environment outside social movements in order to explain
political violence. It argues that the behavior of a social movement is influenced by
the broader political context that can facilitate or hinder political violence. Donatella
Della Porta conducted an insightful comparative analysis of social movements and
political violence in both Germany and Italy, and her analysis suggests when and
how non-violent radical groups make the transformation to violence.
32
She argued
that political violence can develop directly from interactions between social move-
ments and the police. It seems that repressive techniques of policing may succeed
in suppressing most social movements, but those that manage to survive are likely
to respond to violence with violence. Police repression can create martyrs and
eventually delegitimize the state by associating the state with intolerable injustice.
The U.S. Department of State puts the total of Uzbekistan’s political prisoners
in September 2004 at 5,000–5,500, of which as many as 4,500 were members of Hizb
ut-Tahrir.
33
Those arrested are charged with anti-constitutional activities, inciting
religious hatred, and attempted overthrow of the state. International and local
NGOs have often claimed that arrested members of Hizb ut-Tahrir have been tor-
tured by the police and the death of some convicts under suspicious circumstances
has been celebrated by the group as martyrdom. Convicted Hizb ut-Tahrir members
usually receive sentences of about twenty years in prison. But the group has
remained peaceful despite police brutality.
Moreover, Mohammed Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowitz argue that repression is
most likely to encourage a social movement to adopt violent methods where the
movement is excluded from institutional politics and suffers indiscriminate and
reactive state repression.
34
The logic of this argument is straightforward. The polit-
ical exclusion of a movement limits drastically its available options and could
encourage radical members to resort to violence. State repression is selective when
it only targets the leaders and the core members of a social movement, or indis-
criminate when it aims even at sympathizers and families of suspected members.
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Evaluating the Threat 321

Indiscriminate violence creates martyrs and mobilizes movement sympathizers to
violent action. Repression is preemptive when it is applied before a group is able
to mobilize resources and reactive when it is applied after individuals have had the
opportunity to organize themselves. Reactive repression encourages violent response
to the extent that the movement has resources to protect, especially resources that
can support violence.
In Uzbekistan there are few checks and balances restraining the political elite.
There is no independence of the judiciary from the executive. There is no robust polit-
ical party system, no serious opposition, and no independent media. These conditions
all reflect and reinforce the fact of political repression in the country. It is clear that
opposition groups do not have the option to participate in open and fair elections.
The Uzbek regime first began targeting Hizb ut-Tahrir in 1998, although the
group had emerged in the early to mid-1990s. Hizb ut-Tahrir was initially a little-
known organization compared with the militant groups that were operating at the
time in the Ferghana valley. Hizb ut-Tahrir had the opportunity to organize and
mobilize structures before facing state repression, which means that Tashkent’s
response to the rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir was reactive, rather that preemptive. After
the assassination attempt on President Karimov in February 1999, which the autho-
rities blamed on ‘‘Islamic terrorists,’’ arrests of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s members escalated
dramatically. The authorities have launched a security crackdown not only against
group’s members, but also their families, relatives, and friends. As repression against
Hizb ut-Tahrir has been indiscriminate and reactive, one might expect that the group
would likely turn to violence.
On the other hand, the outbreak of the IMU insurgency coincided with the polit-
ical deliberalization of the Uzbek state in the late 1990s. The IMU has capitalized on
the regime’s repressive policies to mobilize support among Uzbekistan’s Muslim
population. In August 1999, for example, the IMU announced that its struggle
against the Karimov regime aims at ‘‘[defending] the scholars and Muslim youth
who are being assassinated, imprisoned and tortured in extreme manners—with
no rights given them at all [and] to secure the release of the weak and oppressed
who number some 5,000 in prison, held by the transgressors.’’
35
Islamic groups have seized political opportunities to challenge the social and
political order in Uzbekistan. Yet, the political opportunity structure theory cannot
explain why IMU turned to terrorism while Hizb ut-Tahrir consistently promotes
political struggle.
Framing Theory
Framing theory derives from ‘‘new social movement theory’’ which emphasized cul-
ture as a key issue in understanding social movements.
36
A frame is an interpretive
schema through which information is encountered and processed.
37
Frames identify
targets of blame, offer visions of a desirable world, and provide a rationale to mot-
ivate collective action.
38
In order to make frames resonate, social movements must
find consistency with deeply held cultural values. For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s pro-
posal to re-establish the Caliphate can be accepted only by Muslim Uzbeks, not their
Christian compatriots.
Frames offer new meaning and connect people’s lived experience to larger
ideologies. Frames and ideologies are related concepts but they are not the same.
Framing theory emphasizes the intentional ways in which group leadership seek to
322 E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley

communicate a message so as to mobilize supporters, whereas the concept of ideol-
ogy focuses on the content of a system of beliefs, their origin, and the ways they are
related to one another. Therefore, all ideologies can become frames if they have a
political agenda, but not all frames are ideologies. It is not unusual to see the same
frame being used by groups with diametrically opposite ideologies; for instance both
Hizb ut-Tahrir and Russian neo-communists have adopted anti-American frames.
Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan has framed President Karimov as a Western pup-
pet and an evil personality. According to one leaflet: ‘‘Only one thing can explain
Karimov’s shamelessness and hypocrisy, and that is not only that he is a Jew but that
he is an insolent and evil Jew, who hates you and your Deen (i.e., religion).’’
39
The
group claims that it found some sort of Jewish roots on Karimov’s maternal side.
40
In addition, Hizb ut-Tahrir has used anti-American frames to mobilize support,
accusing the United States of cultural imperialism in Central Asia since ‘‘millions
of dollars have been invested to build, not tens, but hundreds of colleges and public
lecture halls, and to publish hundreds and thousands of books in order to spread the
Western lifestyle and mentality.’’
41
The IMU has also promoted anti-U.S. and anti-Jewish frames. In April 1999,
for example, Iran’s state radio station broadcast a statement on behalf of the
IMU that described Karimov and his government as acting ‘‘in the forefront of
U.S. and Israeli attempts to enslave the peoples of Central Asia, to plunder their
wealth [and] to build military bases.’’ The statement repeatedly framed Karimov
as ‘‘Jewish’’ and an ‘‘unbeliever’’ seeking to ‘‘secure privileges for Judaism and
Christianity in Uzbekistan, to the detriment of Islam.’’
42
The ultimate aim of both Hizb ut-Tahrir and IMU is apparently the same,
namely the establishment of an all-Islamic state. Both groups have framed the future
Islamic state as an idealized religion-based community in which problems such as
unemployment, corruption, prostitution, alcoholism, and poverty would be banished
by the application of shariah.
Moreover, Hizb ut-Tahrir and IMU have tried to induce participation by fram-
ing membership as a sacred duty of Muslims. In particular, Hizb ut-Tahrir has
framed itself as the only real Islamic group, citing a hadith (saying of Prophet
Muhammad) that when ‘‘the world ends there will be seventy-seven Islamic move-
ments and only one of them (i.e., Hizb ut-Tahrir) will be right.’’
43
Consequently,
people may join the group because they expect a spiritual or heavenly reward. The
IMU has also utilized the canons of Islamic theology to create frames on the need
to join the struggle against the Karimov regime.
Both Hizb ut-Tahrir and IMU have had considerable success in promoting anti-
government frames portraying Uzbekistan’s political system as illegitimate and cor-
rupted.
44
Since there is no possibility of reform, the only option is to fight against the
regime. Mohammed Hafez argues that when a group promotes anti-system frames to
motivate collective action, the likelihood of conflict increases.
45
For Hizb ut-Tahrir,
‘‘Muslims should join and fight against [Karimov] by the laws of their sacred religi-
on. Islam calls Muslims not to keep silent before the crimes and violence of people
like Karimov and struggle against them, and Islam considers this struggle as the best
of jihad.’’
46
Likewise the IMU has denounced the Uzbek leadership for continuing
the policies of its ‘‘Bolshevik teachers’’ by repressing Islam, persecuting believers,
closing mosques, and generally promoting secularism, this time at the behest of
the United States and Israel. According to the IMU, such policies ‘‘give [the Uzbek]
people the right to replace this evil by force.’’
47
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Evaluating the Threat 323

Successful frames resonate with a ‘‘master frame.’’ A master frame is a set of
meanings that enjoys even broader popular resonance. It seems that Hizb ut-Tahrir
and IMU have adopted the master frame of the ‘‘Clash of Civilizations.’’ Hizb
ut-Tahrir claims that ‘‘this is a struggle and a clash that involves you [i.e., the
Muslims] automatically, even if you choose not to take part in this struggle [in
Uzbekistan] ...for it is apparent, more than ever, that there is a war against Islam
and there are now two camps: America and the Western nations stand on one and
the entire Muslim ummah on the other.’’
48
IMU has also framed its struggle in Uzbekistan as part of a wider conflict
between Islam and other civilizations in order to mobilize devout Muslims. Thus,
it has made frequent reference to conflicts in Chechnya and Palestine portraying
Muslims as the victims of infidel aggression. This master frame resonates with
Muslim recollections of medieval crusades against Islam.
The frames, particularly the anti-system frames, adopted by Hizb ut-Tahrir and
IMU can provide a justification for violence against the Uzbek regime. Yet, only the
IMU has utilized these frames to launch terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan and
elsewhere. Indeed there is an inconsistency between the militant frames that Hizb
ut-Tahrir has adopted and its non-violent strategy. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s frames are
aimed not to encourage terrorist acts, but rather to mobilize those marginalized
Muslim communities that are especially vulnerable to persuasive Islamic messages.
In addition, this strategy attracts the attention of Western media and its coverage,
although usually negative, allows the group to present itself as a defender of the
Uzbekistan’s ‘‘oppressed Muslims.’’ IMU’s use of anti-Western and anti-Jewish
frames are also aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the Karimov regime, which
supposedly receives support from United States and Israel, but IMU’s sympathizers
are encouraged to join in revolt against Tashkent.
Thus Hizb ut-Tahrir and IMU deploy very similar framings of the problems
in Uzbekistan, and call for a multi-national Caliphate as the solution of these
problems. The congruence of their frames does not help understanding why Hizb
ut-Tahrir has refrained from violence as IMU has embraced it.
Theorizing Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Commitment to Nonviolence: The Importance
of Ideology
To summarize, the theoretical perspectives reviewed do not provide a sufficient
explanation as to why Hizb ut-Tahrir has refrained from violence in Uzbekistan.
Resource mobilization theory claims that a group could utilize violent methods when
it mobilizes the necessary resources, and Hizb ut-Tahrir has strong normative,
human, and organizational resources in Uzbekistan. Political opportunity theory
argues that a group could become violent if it faces an environment which offers
political opportunities, and Hizb ut-Tahrir faces a repressive state in which the
options have been reduced to suffering or fighting. Finally, framing theory suggests
that the outbreak of violence is likely to occur when a group promotes militant and
anti-system frames, and Hizb ut-Tahrir promotes such frames. Separately and
together, then, these perspectives suggest that Hizb ut-Tahrir should have turned
to violence, as the IMU turned to violence. We suspect that these theories, derived
largely from examples of groups that turned to violence, may tend generally to
over-predict violence, as they do in this case.
324 E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley

In an effort to understand Hizb ut-Tahrir’s commitment to nonviolence, we turn
now to a perspective that privileges religious ideas and interpretations. All the
theories reviewed share a secular perspective that tends to run against the joining
of religion and politics in Muslim societies. We believe that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s
response to resources, political opportunities, and framing processes in Uzbekistan
has been circumscribed by its ideological view of political violence.
The group officially rejects violence as a method of political change. From its
point of view, ‘‘military struggle is not the method of reestablishing the Caliphate.’’
49
Following the February 1999 bomb explosions in Tashkent, Hizb ut-Tahrir denied
responsibility explaining that ‘‘it does not use violence, not because it is afraid of
the rulers and their tyranny, but rather because the method of the Messenger of
Allah in carrying the da’wah (invitation) to establish the Islamic state does not
include the use of violence.’’
50
Hizb ut-Tahrir does not use violence because it sees
itself as in the second phase of its imitation of the progress of Prophet Muhammad.
From Hizb ut-Tahrir’s point of view, the justification of non-violence lies in the
sacred example of Prophet Muhammad, who did not initially use physical force to
establish the first Islamic state, but rather criticized the pagan leaders of Mecca
and gathered followers around him.
Moreover, Hizb ut-Tahrir has distanced itself from terrorist attacks against civi-
lians and it even condemned the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington
D.C. According to Jalaluddin Patel, leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Great Britain, ‘‘such
attacks are not condoned by the shariah ...this is not proper or even effective
method of fighting Western imperialism.’’
51
Hizb ut-Tahrir teaches that only the Caliph can declare jihad and as a result the
current group leadership cannot decide to adopt violent methods as a tool for polit-
ical struggle. For Hizb ut-Tahrir to adopt violent methods would mean that the
group must abandon or reinterpret its ideology. Although such a development can-
not be excluded, Hizb ut-Tahrir is unlikely to risk its ideological credibility for the
sake of uncertain political gains. It is important to note, however, that the group
recognizes that ‘‘Islam permits Muslims to resist the occupation of their land,’’ a ref-
erence to the resistance movements in Afghanistan and Iraq.
52
In other words, Hizb
ut-Tahrir differentiates between jihad sanctioned by the Caliph and resistance
against foreign invaders.
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s unique understanding of political violence is clearer when we
compare the group with IMU. The tactics of Hizb ut-Tahrir and IMU are
fundamentally different. On the one hand, IMU has launched terrorist attacks
against targets in Central Asia aiming at physical destruction. On the other hand,
Hizb ut-Tahrir is fighting—and possibly winning at least in parts of Uzbekistan—
a war of hearts and minds. Indeed, IMU documents discovered after the overthrow
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan revealed that the IMU’s leadership criticized
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s peaceful tactics.
53
In particular, IMU disapproved of Hizb ut-Tah-
rir’s claim that jihad is an activity that can only be legitimately promulgated by a
Caliph and hence cannot be supported until such time as Caliphate is re-established.
Conversely, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s leadership criticized the Taliban—and implicitly the
IMU—for their conceptualization of what an Islamic state is; Hizb ut-Tahrir implied
that the two groups had not conducted adequate research and study on the issue.
54
Nevertheless, Hizb ut-Tahrir is clear in its call for existing regimes in the Muslim
world to be overthrown and replaced by the Caliphate. How then does it expects to
come to power and establish an Islamic state if it refuses to use violence? The group
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Evaluating the Threat 325

expects to have achieved a mass following for its ideas before assuming power, that
is, it expects success in Stage Two: Islamization. Hizb ut-Tahrir does not favor the
idea of seizing the state and then forcing society to accept Islam; rather it prefers
to persuade society to accept its ideas, which would lead inevitably to a change in
regime. But even in these circumstances, there is likely to be a need to use some kind
of pressure or force to remove recalcitrant regimes.
The media representative of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, Imran Waheed, in an
article published by the Khilafah Magazine about the prosecution of the group’s
members in Uzbekistan, wrote:
A day will come when the Muslims will take revenge against all those
who participated in their oppression [i.e., the Karimov regime] Hizb
ut-Tahrir does not use weapons or resort to violence, nor uses any physi-
cal means in its call ...However, do not expect, that these rulers and their
regimes will collapse all by themselves. On the contrary, patient believers
are required to shake these regimes and uproot them.
55
The ambiguity of his language about political change implies that the Uzbek regime
could be overthrown by acts of civil disobedience such as demonstrations and
strikes.
Hizb ut-Tahrir has also developed the concept of seeking outside support
(nusrah), by studying the assistance Prophet Muhammad received from Arab tribes
in his conquest of Medina.
56
It should be noted that the Prophet approached only
those ‘‘people of support’’ (ahl un-Nusrah) who were physically powerful enough
not only to establish the Islamic State in their land, but also to defend it against
foreign enemies. Furthermore, Hizb ut-Tahrir has interpreted the conquest of Med-
ina as a coup d’e
´tat orchestrated by the Prophet Muhammad that took local oppo-
nents by surprise.
In addition to the political and ideological struggle, therefore, the group is seek-
ing the ‘‘support from those capable (i.e., militarily capable) of removing the present
authorities and establishing, securing and maintaining the Islamic ruling.’’
57
Accord-
ing to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the preferred method of political change is a coup d’e
´tat orga-
nized by the military that would have first embraced Islam as its ideology. It should be
noted that Hizb ut-Tahrir encouraged elements within the Jordanian armed forces to
overthrow the government in 1968 and 1969; there are also indications that some
members of the group were linked to a failed coup attempt in Egypt in 1974.
58
As
an organization, however, Hizb ut-Tahrir never developed a paramilitary wing and
its members did not provide any military support for the coup attempts in Jordan
and Egypt despite the fact that these coups were aimed at establishing an Islamic
state.
In Uzbekistan, the group has concentrated its propaganda against President
Karimov, while avoiding an extensive criticism against the armed forces. According
to Hizb ut-Tahrir, ‘‘Uzbekistan’s criminal clique consists firstly of Karimov at the
head, then his ministers, governors, mayors, parliamentarians and other government
officials.’’
59
By avoiding the inclusion of the armed forces in the ‘‘Uzbekistan crimi-
nal clique,’’ a window of opportunity stays open for the group to approach members
of the armed forces at a later stage. Uzbekistan has one of the largest militaries in
the region, with 50,000–55,000 regular troops and 17,000–19,000 Internal Security
troops.
60
Although the military is not an important actor in Uzbek politics, there
326 E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley

are indications that the Karimov regime has taken precautions to prevent an army
revolt. In 1999, for example, when IMU guerillas invaded the Ferghana valley,
the Uzbek government did not rely on local units to crush the invasion; instead, it
sent troops from Tashkent, the capital city, which presumably were more loyal to
President Karimov.
61
In reference to judges, prosecutors, and police officers, Hizb ut-Tahrir has
argued that ‘‘regrettably the majority of them are Muslim sons, yet they perform
all of these things [i.e., torture against Hizb ut-Tahrir’s members] in trying to please
Karimov.’’
62
Again, it appears that the group intentionally does not characterize
police officers and state officials as ‘‘unbelievers’’; instead Hizb ut-Tahrir focuses
its criticism on President Karimov.
The objectives of seeking nusrah for the re-establishment of the Caliphate are
twofold: first to enable Hizb ut-Tahrir to continue its political struggle without risk-
ing a military confrontation with authorities; secondly, to propagate its ideology to
the security forces so that they overthrow the existing regimes and establish an
Islamic state. In any case, there is no evidence that Hizb ut-Tahrir has managed
to penetrate the armed forces and recruit officers in Uzbekistan who will support
the group at some moment of crisis to come.
Yet, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s attitude to political violence is more complicated than it
seems. From the Islamic point of view, the world is divided into two parts: the
domain of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the domain of war (dar al-harb). The former is
the land in which the authority is in the hands of the Muslims and shariah is applied
comprehensively, whereas the latter includes the territory that has not yet embraced
Islam. The founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, wrote a draft consti-
tution for the proposed Islamic state that reflects the Manichean division of the
world into two camps: Muslims and non-Muslims. According to an-Nabhani, the
Islamic state is forbidden to join any international (e.g., United Nations) or regional
organization (e.g., Arab League) which is not based on Islam, or which applies non-
Islamic rules (Article 186).
Furthermore, he had a vision for a New World Order—a Pax Islamica. For
instance, an-Nabhani stated in Article 183 that ‘‘conveying the Islamic da’wah [to
the world] is the axis around which the foreign policy revolves, and the basis upon
which the relation between the [Islamic] state and other states is built.’’
63
Moreover,
‘‘this policy is implemented by a defined method that never changes, which is jihad,
regardless of who is in authority. Jihad is the call to Islam which involves fighting or
the contribution of money, opinions, or literature towards the fighting.’’
64
Thus con-
frontation and jihad would remain the key features of the Islamic foreign policy until
eventually the whole dar al-harb was absorbed into dar al-Islam.
65
The group has even made reference to the conventional capabilities of the pro-
posed unified Islamic state, which would possess at least 5.5 million operational
troops, as well as 5,000 fighter aircraft and some 27,000 tanks.
66
According to Hizb
ut-Tahrir, ‘‘war is an inevitability in life. The Western nations are very experienced in
using force in order to achieve their goals, the crusade in Iraq being a clear example
of this. So it is hypocritical of the Western governments to force Muslims to say
Islam does not use force.’’
67
Thus the group is not against political violence per
se; in fact it endorses jihad as long as it is declared by the Caliph who is the legitimate
authority in the Islamic state.
It is worth noting that Hizb ut-Tahrir has nothing to say about the non-conven-
tional capabilities that a unified Islamic state might have. It is likely that the group’s
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Evaluating the Threat 327

leadership has realized that an open discussion about potential WMD capabilities
may jeopardize its legal status in Western countries, which are very sensitive to issues
of WMD proliferation.
In an effort to attain some overview of the ideological complexities, one might
suggest that there are two ways of summarizing Hizb ut-Tahrir’s understanding of
violence. The first is to say that they have been committed to non-violence for fifty
years. The second is to say that they have been waiting for fifty years for the right
moment to begin violent struggle. Our perspective is that these are not so different
as they seem. History records few groups with an unconditional commitment to
nonviolence; most groups will justify violence under some circumstances. Hizb
ut-Tahrir is not exceptional but typical in this regard. Its commitment to nonviolent
struggle is conditional and the condition sought is declaration of jihad by legitimate
authority. Its understanding of political violence is state-centered in a way that West-
ern observers can appreciate: political violence perpetrated without state authority
(except in case of foreign invasion) is terrorism, but the same violence with state
authority is legitimate.
When Might Hizb ut-Tahrir Turn to Violence?
Hizb ut-Tahrir is illegal in several Muslim and a few Western countries. On January
12, 2003, the German government outlawed Hizb ut-Tahrir, accusing the group of
promoting extremism and anti-Semitism at universities and calling for the destruc-
tion of Israel. In February 2003, the Russian Supreme Court banned Hizb ut-Tahrir
as a terrorist organization. In early August 2005, following the terrorist attacks in
London, British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced his intention to proscribe
Hizb ut-Tahrir, provoking a storm of criticism from the Muslim community.
68
The Uzbek authorities have often accused Hizb ut-Tahrir of organizing terrorist
attacks. Following blasts at the Israeli and U.S. embassies and the general
prosecutor’s office that killed at least three members of the Uzbek security forces
in Tashkent in July 2004, President Karimov argued that Hizb ut-Tahrir must bear
primary responsibility for the attacks. ‘‘[The terrorists] base their ideas on Hizb
ut-Tahrir’s teaching ...Hizb ut-Tahrir made the biggest contribution to that terror,’’
Karimov told public television.
69
However, the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir
issued almost immediately a statement denying any involvement in the events in
Uzbekistan.
70
It appears that there is no evidence connecting the group with terrorist
attacks in Central Asia and this is why it was not placed by the U.S. government on
the list of terrorist organizations in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
Nevertheless, the Karimov regime has skillfully portrayed itself as a pro-Western
bastion of secularism and democracy that is fighting its own ‘‘war on terrorism’’
against Islamic militants. With this framing, Tashkent has lobbied unsuccessfully
for years to persuade Western governments to declare Hizb ut-Tahrir a terrorist
organization. Most recently, Karimov’s claims about Hizb ut-Tahrir’s involvement
in the May 2005 violence in Andizhan have provided new momentum for hard-line
calls to outlaw the group in the West.
71
Indeed, there have been a number of
published suggestions that Hizb ut-Tahrir is linked to international terrorism.
72
Could Hizb ut-Tahrir turn to violence to achieve its aims? It is difficult to predict
the transformation of Hizb ut-Tahrir into a terrorist organization and in any case the
precise timing of such transformation cannot be forecasted with engineering
328 E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley

exactitude. Nevertheless, it is possible to examine the conditions under which Hizb
ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan might adopt violent methods.
There is no doubt that, judged by Western political standards, Hizb ut-Tahrir
has radical views and deliberately uses extremist language to propagate its message
to Muslim communities. Hizb ut-Tahrir presents a particularly difficult challenge to
Western and Muslim governments, since it aims at a radical Islamic goal—the resto-
ration of the Caliphate—but openly rejects violence as a tool of political change.
The theories of collective violence reviewed here can comprehend the outbreak
of terrorist violence as practiced by IMU, but do not account for the persistence of
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s nonviolent strategy. Fifty years of opposing violence deserves to be
taken seriously in evaluating the group’s potential for violence. The content of Hizb
ut-Tahrir’s ideology, which is based on a selective interpretation of Islamic theology
and history, serves as a barrier to the adoption of violence as a method for the estab-
lishment of an Islamic state.
There are two parts to this barrier. The first is that Prophet Muhammad’s path
to power—the three steps of recruitment, Islamization, and jihad—should be the
model for re-establishing the Caliphate and a renaissance of Islamic political power.
The second is the assessment that Hizb ut-Tahrir is currently working on the second
step, with the Caliphate that could legitimately declare jihad yet to come in step
three. One or both or these barriers would need to be dismantled for Hizb ut-Tahrir
to undertake violence.
Observers of Hizb ut-Tahrir interested in predicting a move to violence
might attend to its publications for signs of such change. Indeed, if Hizb ut-Tahrir
begins publishing suggestions that it is time to re-evaluate the relevance of Prophet
Muhammad’s example for the current situation, then the likelihood of violence will
increase dramatically. Similarly, if they begin to suggest that the third stage of the
struggle is at hand, then violence is more likely. So far as we know, there has been
only one instance of suggesting that the Caliphate was or was about to be declared;
this was in an editorial in Khilafah Magazine in April 2003.
73
Of course it is possible to attain the third state quickly if Hizb ut-Tahrir can deter-
mine that a Muslim with state power is the long-awaited Caliph. In fact, there is some
evidence that Hizb ut-Tahrir offered to declare Ayatollah Khomeini as their Caliph,
but on the condition that he accept the constitution drawn up by an-Nabhani. How-
ever, Khomeini rejected the Hizb ut-Tahrir’s offer.
74
It does not seem likely that this
deal would appeal to any Muslim leader who had already attained power.
Despite its record of fifty years committed to nonviolence, Hizb ut-Tahrir may
seem to have capabilities that demand action against it. That is, some Western gov-
ernments may be tempted to classify Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization in
order to preempt a terrorist threat. Yet, if there is a lesson to be learned from the
way the West responded to Al Qaeda’s campaign of terror, it is that the elimination
of central leadership can lead to the creation of local ‘‘franchise groups’’ around the
world. Such groups may share the ideological views of the ‘‘mother organization,’’
but they have their own leadership, resources, and tactics that are difficult for the
intelligence community to monitor and forecast.
The banning of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Europe and North America could have unde-
sired consequences if the central leadership loses its ability to control regional
branches. Isolation may encourage unrealistic expectations among members in
Central Asia, who could become impatient for action and establish violent splinter
groups. In Uzbekistan, if the leadership of splinter groups manage to avoid arrest
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Evaluating the Threat 329

and connect with other anti-Karimov groups at the local, regional, and national
level, then the probability of a protracted conflict rises substantially.
Indeed, the group has already experienced two splits in Uzbekistan. In 1994, a
group called Akramiya and headed by Yuldash Akramov, a former member of Hizb
ut-Tahrir in Ferghana valley, broke away from Hizb ut-Tahrir. Although initially
Akramiya retained the commitment to political but not military struggle, it is likely
that group members participated in the May 2005 uprising in Andizhan and fought
against the Uzbek security forces. In 1999, another group labeled Hizb an-Nusra
(Party of Victory) seceded from Hizb ut-Tahrir in the Tashkent area.
75
It appears
that the new group challenged Hizb ut-Tahrir’s commitment to nonviolent methods
as insufficient to bring about the collapse of the Uzbek regime and favored an armed
struggle. Apparently, the group did not survive state repression. Nevertheless, it
seems that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s members from the Ferghana valley and their colleagues
from the rest of the country are sometimes at odds over political strategy.
76
If inter-
nal differences over strategy and tactics emerge, Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan could
split along regional and sub-ethnic lines.
77
Another scenario by which Hizb ut-Tahrir might move to violence would be to
seek nusrah by forming a coalition with the Uzbek military or officials in the country’s
Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to challenge the regime. Although the security
apparatus is under the firm control of President Karimov, there may be groups within
the police and military which, while secular themselves, believe that there is a common
cause with Hizb ut-Tahrir that outweighs their ideological differences.
Most generally, Hizb ut-Tahrir is an example of the dilemma associated with
threat analysis that emphasizes capabilities over intentions. In the realist school of
international relations, states exist in a competitive and anarchic environment in
which survival depends on military power to resist the power of competitors.
78
Assessing the intentions of other states is difficult and fallible, whereas assessing
the power of other states is relatively objective and reliable. Thus threat assessments
tend to be power assessments, and the growing power of another state is most safely
interpreted as a growing threat. This focus on capabilities can lead to an undesirable
result, a ‘‘security dilemma’’ in which a state believes it must increase its power in
order to counter the power of another state, with the result that the other state per-
ceives that it must increase its own power, and so on into escalations that can easily
move into violence and war.
The realist perspective has been applied not only to states but to ethnic groups.
In an influential example of such application, Barry Posen argued that ethnic
groups in the context of state failure are in a situation of anarchy with security
dilemmas formally analogous to the dilemmas of interstate relations.
79
Here we
suggest that a related dilemma can arise in assessing the threat posed by radical
Islamic groups.
In particular, application of a realist security analysis to Hizb ut-Tahrir leads to
an appreciation of the considerable capacity for terrorist violence that this group
enjoys. As noted earlier, Hizb ut-Tahrir has strong organizational resources includ-
ing international reach, solid finances, and a cellular structure that makes it
relatively opaque to security services. It has political opportunities in Uzbekistan,
which is a state suffering from economic decline, authoritarian politics, and
repression of political opposition.
In response to the undoubted capacity for terrorist violence that Hizb ut-Tahrir
enjoys, some Western security analysts have been led to suggest that the group should
330 E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley

be targeted as part of the war on terrorism. This tendency is strengthened by noting
that Hizb ut-Tahrir aims for the same political goals as jihadist terrorists—a new
Caliphate that would join the currently separated lands inhabited by Muslims. Unfor-
tunately, this kind of targeting—banning Hizb ut-Tahrir in Western states where it is
currently legal, for instance—is likely to be the first step toward moving the group—or
its splintered remains—toward violence. For fifty years Hizb ut-Tahrir has argued that
the Islamic requirements for jihad have not been met. Western policy makers might
aim to avoid undermining this argument.
Notes
1. See for example, International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Respond-
ing to Hizb ut-Tahrir (Osh, Kyrgyzstan: ICG Asia, 2003); Zeyno Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir:
Islam’s Political Insurgency (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 2004); Alisher Khamidov,
Countering the Call:The U.S.,Hizb ut-Tahrir,and Religious Extremism in Central Asia
(Washington, D.C.: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution,
2003).
2. International Crisis Group (see note 1 above), 17.
3. Abdullah Robin, Personal communication from Abdullah Robin, senior member of
Hizb ut-Tahrir, London, Great Britain, July 2004.
4. Mahan Abedin, ‘‘Inside Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Interview with Jalaluddin Patel, Leader
of the Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK,’’ Jamestown Foundation’s Spotlight on Terror 2, no. 8 (August
11, 2004).
5. See for example, Qaiser Malik, ‘‘Quest for Life on Mars—A Campaign to Avoid the
Truth,’’ Khalifah Magazine (Oct. 2003).
6. Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Search for the
Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996) 116.
7. Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, The Method to Re-establish the Khilafah and
Resume the Islamic Way of Life (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2000), 81.
8. Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, The Islamic State (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1998),
136–137.
9. Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain (see note 7 above), 67.
10. Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change (London: Al-Khilafah
Publications, 1999), 32.
11. The Ferghana valley is located in the southeastern corner of Uzbekistan; it is 300
kilometers long and 170 kilometers wide. With a population of about eight million, the valley
is the most densely settled area in Central Asia.
12. Bakhtiyar Babadzhanov, ‘‘Religious-opposition Groups in Uzbekistan,’’ Proceedings
of the Conference on Combating Religious Extremism in Central Asia: Problems and Perspec-
tives, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, April 25, 2002, 43.
13. Vitaly Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (Berkeley, CA: Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies, 2003),
48–49.
14. Richard Weitz, ‘‘Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan?,’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 6 (Nov.=Dec. 2004): 506.
15. See Ibragim Alibekov, ‘‘IMU Reportedly Expands, Prepares to Strike Western
Targets,’’ Eurasia Insight, 29 October 2002.
16. See Quintan Wiktorowitz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004) and Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims
Rebel (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
17. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978),
172–188.
18. Ibid., 78.
19. Hafez (see note 16 above), 19.
20. On exclusive organization see Mayer Zald and Roberta Ash Garner, ‘‘Social Move-
ment Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change,’’ in Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, eds.,
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Evaluating the Threat 331

Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays (New Brunswick, NJ: Trans-
action Books, 1987), 125–126.
21. Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain (see note 7 above), 79.
22. Ibid., 121.
23. Robin (see note 3 above).
24. Uzbek security official (2004), Personal communication from Uzbek security official,
name withheld at his request, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, July 2004.
25. Neil MacFarlane and Stina Torjesen, Kyrgyzstan: A Small Arms Anomaly in Central
Asia? (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2004), 11.
26. Bodi Pirseyedi, The Small Arms Problem in Central Asia: Features and Implications
(Geneva: UNIDIR, 2002), 85–86.
27. Press Service of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘‘Uzbek Population
Comprises 25.8 m as of 1 January 2004,’’ March 5, 2004.
28. United Nations, Uzbekistan: Common Country Assessment (Tashkent: United
Nations Office in Uzbekistan, 2003), 9.
29. Mikhail Ardzinov (2004), Personal communication from Mikhail Ardzinov, Chair-
man of Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, July
2004.
30. Officer of the Kyrgyz armed forces (2004), Personal communication from an officer
of the Kyrgyz armed forces, name withheld at his request, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, May 2004.
31. Richard Clarke, Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action (New York: The Cen-
tury Foundation, 2004), 54–56.
32. Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Com-
parative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
33. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Uzbekistan—International
Religious Freedom Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2004).
34. Mohammed Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowitz, ‘‘Violence a Contention in the Egyp-
tian Islamic Movement’’ in Quintan Wiktorowitz (see note 16 above) 61–88.
35. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (London: Penguin,
2002), 248.
36. Enrique Larana, Hank Johnson, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds., New Social Move-
ments: From Ideology to Identity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 37.
37. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974).
38. David Snow and Robert Benford, ‘‘Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant
Mobilization’’ in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, eds., From Struc-
ture to Action: Comparing Movement Participation across Cultures, International Social Move-
ment Research (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1988), 197–218.
39. Hizb ut-Tahrir Uzbekistan, ‘‘Shto poistenne kroestya za attakoi Karimovim na
torgovchev?’’ [What is the Real Meaning of Karimov’s Attack on Traders?], July 22, 2002,
in Russian.
40. Igor Rotar, ‘‘An Interview with Sadykzhan Kamuluddin,’’ The Jamestown Founda-
tion’s Terrorism Monitor: In-Depth Analysis of the War on Terror, vol. 2, no. 5 (March 11,
2004).
41. Hizb ut-Tahrir Uzbekistan, ‘‘Zhestkoe otnoshenie presidenta Uzbekistana k
politicheskoi i intellektualnoi deyatelnosti organizaciyi Hizb ut-Tahrir’’ [The President of
Uzbekistan Counters the Intellectual and Political Work of Hizb ut-Tahrir with Violence],
December 24, 2000, in Russian.
42. ‘‘Iranian Propaganda Targets Uzbekistan,’’ The Jamestown Foundation’s Monitor,
vol. 5, issue 74 (April 16, 1999).
43. Ahmed Rashid (see note 35 above), 123.
44. The notion of anti-system frame comes from Mario Diani, ‘‘Linking Mobilization
Frames and Political Opportunities in Italy,’’ American Sociological Review 61, no. 6
(December 1996): 1056–1057.
45. Mohammed Hafez (see note 16 above), 22.
46. Hizb ut-Tahrir Uzbekistan, ‘‘Karimov qarorlari Uzbekistondagi musulmon halqni
yanchib tashlash uchun chiqarilgan qurollar jumlasidandir’’ [Karimov’s Decrees are the Deci-
sions Which Oppress the Muslim People of Uzbekistan], October 4, 2002, in Uzbek.
332 E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley

47. ‘‘Militant Islamic Group Serves Ultimatum on Uzbekistan from Iran,’’ Jamestown
Foundation’s Monitor, vol. 5, no. 60 (March 26, 1999).
48. Cited from a CD entitled ‘‘A Cry of Imam from Uzbekistan,’’ produced by Hizb
ut-Tahrir Britain. (without a date, but probably 2002 or 2003).
49. Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain (see note 7 above), 68–69.
50. Hizb ut-Tahrir Uzbekistan, ‘‘Praktika pravitelei Uzbekistana’’ [The Practices of the
Rulers in Uzbekistan], April 20, 1999, in Russian.
51. Abedin (see note 4 above).
52. Ibid.
53. International Crisis Group (see note 1 above), 31.
54. Abedin (see note 4 above).
55. Imrad Waheed, ‘‘Who killed Farhad Usmanov?,’’ Khilafah Magazine (July 2002).
56. Hizb ut-Tahrir (see note 10 above), 22.
57. Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain (see note 7 above), 105.
58. Suha Taji-Farouki (see note 6 above), 27 and 168.
59. Hizb ut-Tahrir Uzbekistan (see note 50 above).
60. International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002–2003 Military Balance (London:
IISS, 2003), 144.
61. Vitaly Ponomaryov, Personal communication from Vitaly Ponomaryov, Director of
Central Asian Program, Moscow’s Memorial Human Right Center, New York, March 2005.
62. Hizb ut-Tahrir Uzbekistan, ‘‘Despotichniy i kriminalniy klan vlasti Uzbekistana’’
[The Ruling Clan in Uzbekistan is a Tyrant and Criminal Clan!], March 24, 2000, in Russian.
63. Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, (see note 8 above), 275.
64. Ibid., 143–144.
65. David George, ‘‘Pax Islamica: An Alternative New World Order?’’ in Abdel Salam
Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1996), 78.
66. Salam Zahid-Ivan, Jihad and the Foreign Policy of the Khilafah State (London:
Khilafah Publications, 2001), 38.
67. Sidik Aucbur, ‘‘The True Meaning of Jihad,’’ Khilafah Magazine (May 2003).
68. See Jonathan Petre, ‘‘Muslims Attack Ban on Islamist Party,’’ The Daily Telegraph,
6 August 2005.
69. Agence France-Presse, ‘‘Uzbek President Blames Islamist Group for Deadly Suicide
Blasts,’’ 31 July 2004.
70. Imran Waheed, ‘‘Hizb ut-Tahrir Denies Involvement in Tashkent Blasts,’’ Press
Statement, August 1, 2004.
71. Gulnoza Saidazimova, ‘‘Uzbek President Blames Islamist Group for Unrest,’’
Eurasia Insight, 14 May 2005.
72. According to Zeyno Baran, Director of International Security and Energy Programs at
the Washington D.C.-based Nixon Center, ‘‘Hizb ut-Tahrir is part of an elegant division of
labor. The group itself is active in the ideological preparation of the Muslims, while other orga-
nizations handle the planning and execution of terrorist attacks ...Hizb ut-Tahrir today serves
as a de facto conveyor belt for terrorists.’’ See Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir (see note 1 above), 11. In
the words of Ariel Cohen, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C.,
‘‘Hizb ut-Tahrir may launch terrorist attacks against U.S. targets and allies, operating either
alone or in cooperation with other global terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. A Hizb ut-Tahrir
takeover of any Central Asian state could provide the global radical Islamist movement with a
geographic base and access to the expertise and technology to manufacture weapons of mass
destruction.’’ See Ariel Cohen, Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central
Asia (Washington, D.C.; Heritage Foundation Backgrounder), May 30, 2003.
73. Jalaluddin Patel, ‘‘The Khilafah has been Established (It now needs to be
announced),’’ Khilafah Magazine (April 2003).
74. Robin (see note 3 above).
75. Alisher Khamidov, ‘‘Hizb ut-Tahrir Faces Internal Split in Central Asia,’’ Eurasia
Insight, 21 October, 2003.
76. First author’s field notes in Tashkent, Bukhara, Kokand, and Namangan, July 2004.
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Evaluating the Threat 333

77. On Hizb ut-Tahrir’s view of ethnicity see Emmanuel Karagiannis, ‘‘Political Islam
and Social Movement Theory: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan,’’ Religion, State
and Society 33, no. 2 (June 2005): 145.
78. See for example, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA:
Addison Wesley, 1979); Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1966).
79. Barry R. Posen, ‘‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’’ in Michael E. Brown,
ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1993), 103–124.
334 E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley