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End of the ‘Low, Dishonest Decade’: Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939

January 1993
Europe-Asia Studies 45(2):303-341

January 1993
45(2):303-341

DOI:10.1080/09668139308412091

Authors:

Michael Jabara Carley

Université de Montréal

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End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939

Author(s): Michael Jabara Carley

Source:

Europe-Asia Studies,

Vol. 45, No. 2 (1993), pp. 303-341

Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

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EUROPE-ASIA

STUDIES,

Vol. 45, No. 2, 1993, 303-341

End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade':

Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet

Alliance in 1939

MICHAEL JABARA CARLEY

In September 1939, as World War II began, W. H. Auden wrote a verse which

poignantly described the 1930s, so well in fact that the poem is sometimes remem-

bered in the context of the failure of appeasement:

I sit in one of the dives on Fifty-Second Street

Uncertain and afraid

As the clever hopes expire

Of a low dishonest decade:

Waves of anger and fear

Circulate

over the bright

And darkened

lands of the earth,

Obsessing our private lives;

The unmentionable

odour of death

Offends the September

night...

Auden's 'low, dishonest decade' began with the Great Depression and unfolded as

Nazism and Stalinism oppressed Europe and Soviet Asia. The Anglo-French policy

of appeasement led to the abandonment of Abyssinia, Austria and Spain and the

betrayal of Czechoslovakia. Yet in spite of all this, the decade was not without

moments of hope. The USSR, and especially its commissar for foreign affairs, Maxim

Maximovich Litvinov, offered 'collective security', or an anti-Nazi alliance, to France

and Great Britain. Paradoxically, Stalin's blood-drenched wickedness did not mean

that Soviet foreign policy was wicked also. But in France and Great Britain the

determination to resist fascism was sapped by hatred of bolshevism, fear of socialist

revolution, and sneaking admiration for Hitler's repression of the left. Inter-war

anti-bolshevism was in fact so like anti-communism after 1945 that it poses the

question of when the Cold War began and whether it was a cause or an effect of war

in 1939. Anti-bolshevism inspired illusions that Nazi Germany could be encouraged

to expand eastward-peaceably, economically, to be sure-to run up against the

USSR. The two scorpions' parlous embrace would leave France and Great Britain out

of harm's way.

Such illusions were dissipated after Nazi Germany destroyed the rump of

Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Romania and Poland seemed next on Germany's list.

Should these states fall, France and Great Britain would themselves be threatened.

MICHAEL

CARLEY

Perhaps an arrangement

with the USSR would be desirable after all. Opposition

elements and public opinion in Great Britain and France - both left and right -

insisted on it. In April the Soviet government proposed

a tripartite

alliance, which the

British and French rejected. The three governments bargained and bickered over

endless wordings of the terms of an agreement.

The negotiations which should have

been most secret were leaked to the press on all sides and unfolded in an almost circus

atmosphere,

belying their deadly importance.

In August the French

and British finally

sent missions to Moscow to conclude a military agreement against Nazi Germany.

But the talks quickly stalled over the passage of the Red Army across Poland and

Romania to meet the enemy. On 23 August the Soviet government signed instead a

non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. A week later the German army invaded

Poland.

Historians have written voluminously on why the negotiations failed.' Stalin was

perfidious

and had deceived the French and British

while secretly negotiating

with the

Germans. 'Glutinous knavery ... surrounded

the German-Soviet Non-Aggression

Pact'.2

On the other hand, Soviet historians

like V. Ya. Sipols have asserted that the

French and British did not intend to negotiate seriously and were just stringing along

the Soviet government.3

Watt

writes that such an interpretation

ignores the earnestness

of Anglo-French

policy makers; the USSR 'destroyed British hopes of an Eastern

Front' against Nazi Germany.4

The French especially, reasserting

their policy inde-

pendence after several years under the British thumb, sought a Soviet alliance and

pressed the British to do likewise.5 Roberts argues-and Watt concurs-that 'the

perception

that British and French

leaders were mainly motivated

by anti-bolshevism

was completely off-beam'. This is not a new idea: Feiling wrote after the war that

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain

had no ideological prejudice.6 The

ideologues, say Watt and Roberts,

were on the Soviet side.7 The contrary

view is not

new either: anti-appeasement

Conservatives accused Chamberlain and his circle of

confusing their class interests with those of their country.8

Duroselle speaks of the

'decadence' of French society.9 Girault has written of a divided France rent by

ideological divisions between right and left which paralysed

the French

government.'?

The maverick British historian A. J. P. Taylor in his much discussed-and much

dismissed-Origins of the Second World War aptly noted that Western reproaches

with regard

to the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression

pact 'came ill from the statesmen

who

went to Munich... The Russians, in fact, did only what the Western statesmen

had

hoped to do; and Western

bitterness was the bitterness

of disappointment,

mixed with

anger that professions of communism were no more sincere than their own profes-

sions of democracy'." Taylor, like Soviet historians Medvedev and Volkogonov,

concluded that the West left the Soviet government little choice but to conclude a

non-aggression

pact with Hitler.'2

However, 'few historians',

writes Gorodetsky,

'take

seriously the invariable

Soviet claim .. . that the Soviet Union signed the pact under

duress, regarding

it as the lesser of two evils'."3

The study of Soviet archives, which are beginning to open, may prove or disprove

this view, but for now Soviet deceitfulness-though Stalin was certainly proficient

it-appears no worse than that of France and Great Britain. The published Soviet

documents,

which have not been extensively used by historians,

show a commissariat

for foreign affairs (Narkomindel)

anxious for agreement

with the West and angered

304

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

by continued

Western rebuffs.

Narkomindel

officials appear

on the whole to have been

astute political observers and good at their

job. However, other evidence to confirm

Soviet earnestness

comes not from farsighted Soviet diplomats, as opposed to their

pudding-headed Anglo-French counterparts,

but from Anglo-French diplomats,

politi-

cians, or soldiers, ignored by those who held ultimate

power in London and Paris.

The

Western 'pragmatic' view-regarded as 'fatuous'

by Chamberlain

and his retinue-is

sometimes reported

and sometimes not in the historical literature. It may be found in

British and French archival sources and Soviet published documents available now

for some time. The papers

of Paul-Emile

Naggiar,

the French ambassador

in Moscow,

have not been hitherto cited in this context, but are useful because they represent

virtually complete set of the Paris-Moscow cable traffic

during

the crucial months of

1939-important in view of the destruction of French archives during the war-and

because Naggiar left many contemporary

and post facto marginal

comments critical

of the Anglo-French conduct of negotiations with the Soviet government. His

comments,

as well as those of other French and British

pragmatists

are here reported,

and corroborate the evidence of the Soviet published papers.14

One point is certain:

events in 1939 cannot be considered

outside the context of the

inter-war

years. Soviet relations with Great Britain and France were almost always

bad. In 1924 the 'Zinoviev letter' allowed the Tories to return to power after a short

Labour interlude on the wings of anti-communist

hysteria; in 1925 the French and

British

governments sought to organise

an oil embargo against

the USSR; in 1927 the

British government

broke off diplomatic relations with Moscow. In the same year

anti-communism and 'red-baiting'

electoral politics in France led to a fierce press

campaign against the Soviet ambassador

in Paris, driving him from his post. The

Soviet government's support

for revolution in China and the Third International or

Comintern's

revolutionary propaganda

aggravated

and imperilled relations with the

West. To little avail, Narkomindel

attempted during

the 1920s to distance itself from

the Comintern and to enhance Soviet security and economic growth.

In the 1930s relations

were scarcely better.

In 1930 the French

government,

goaded

on by the anti-communist

press, launched an abortive trade war with the USSR. In

1932 the British government

abrogated

the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement.

Only the

growing strength

of Nazism in Germany

gave the French

cause for reflection.

In 1932

a centre-left French government signed a non-aggression pact with the USSR; in

1934 a trade agreement

was signed; and in the following year a mutual assistance

pact. There was no corresponding improvement

of Anglo-Soviet relations,

and in fact

the British government

had qualms about the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet

mutual

assistance pact.15

By the time the pact was signed, in May 1935, so did the French.

Its animators,

the radical

Herriot and socialist Paul-Boncour,

were out of office or out

of the way; and the conservative Barthou was dead, murdered

by a Croatian fascist

in October 1934. Barthou was succeeded by Pierre Laval, who was partial to an

accommodation

with the fascist states. In 1934 Laval's views were no secret, and

Charles

Alphand,

French ambassador

in Moscow, warned

him bluntly that if France

attempted

to come to terms with Germany, 'the Soviets would not hesitate to try to

outbid us' in Berlin. Laval paid little attention,

and the 'wall of money', or Banque

de France, driven by anti-bolshevism, blocked the deepening of Franco-Soviet

economic relations.16

305

MICHAEL

CARLEY

Franco-Soviet staff talks, 1935-37

The Soviet government, which worried about French commitment to the mutual

assistance pact, sought to strengthen Franco-Soviet relations through the conduct

of military staff talks. Laval himself had raised the idea-in a moment of excess

enthusiasm

or double-talking

jabber-with Stalin in Moscow in May 1935.17 Soviet

representatives pressed the French relentlessly for talks. Laval had scarcely

returned from Moscow before the Soviet military

attache

broached the question with

a French deputy chief of staff.'8 But scarcely had Laval returned to Paris before

the French began to stall, a point the Soviet ambassador

in Paris, V. P. Potemkin,

was quick to report to Moscow. The general staff blamed the delay on Laval,

but the generals themselves were in no hurry to parley. France did not need a

military agreement

with the USSR which would only provide Nazi Germany

with a

pretext

to denounce

the 1925 Locarno Western

security agreements

and reoccupy the

demilitarised

Rhineland.

Poland, fearing the USSR more than Nazi Germany,

would

be pushed into the arms of Hitler while French relations with Great Britain would

also suffer.'9 In the latter half of 1935 Franco-Soviet relations

languished

and soured.

Laval was toppled by the Abyssinian crisis in January 1936, and a palpably

relieved Alphand cabled Paris that perhaps now the damage of recent months

could be undone.20

But Laval was not the only opposition to closer ties with

Moscow.

While Potemkin warned

that too much interest

in staff talks might be counterpro-

ductive, the Soviet government was impatient to see a ratification

of the mutual

assistance pact, delayed by Laval, and a start

to military talks.21

Soviet efforts could

not have come at a worse time. French national

elections took place in May 1936 in

an atmosphere

of deepening political acrimony between right and left. The Popular

Front of Communists, Socialists and Radicals won the elections and formed a

government under Leon Blum, but frightened the French right, which feared the

spread of communism. Such fears made a deepening of Franco-Soviet relations

impossible, although

the German

occupation

of the Rhineland in March 1936 led to

ratification of the mutual assistance

pact. The USSR was far away and had no borders

with Germany.

For the right, the Soviet Union was pushing Europe toward war and

preparing

the way for world revolution. Potemkin

judged that the French

government

had lost its nerve when the German

army

entered

the Rhineland and dared not alienate

Great Britain. The government's mood was exemplified by the 'dark and desperate

pessimism' of Alexis Leger, the influential

secretary-general

of the Quai d'Orsay, the

French foreign ministry.22

While the Soviet government

doubted

French

commitment

to the mutual

assistance

pact, it continued

to press for staff talks. At the end of June 1936 Litvinov raised the

issue with Yvon Delbos, the French foreign minister, as did E. V. Girshfeld, the

Soviet charge d'affaires

in Paris, with the deputy

chief of staff, General

Schweisguth.

Girshfeld conceded that the lack of a common Soviet-German border impeded

Franco-Soviet

military cooperation,

but unless the French and Soviet staffs met to

discuss common defence issues, there could be no serious cooperation

between them.

The French government

feared provoking Germany:

would staff talks have to wait

until Hitler was ready to attack?23

The unfortunate

answer to this question became

only too apparent

three years later.

306

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE

IN 1939

Schweisguth

went as an observer to Red Army manoeuvres in September

1936, at

which time the deputy commissar for war, Tukhachevsky, asked the unwelcome

question again.24

So did Litvinov with Blum the following month. With remarkable

candour,

Blum said that talks were being 'sabotaged' by the general staff and by the

war minister, Edouard Daladier. Soviet orders for war materiel were also being

blocked by the military bureaucracy.

Potemkin said that the Soviet government

was

beginning to doubt French sincerity in facilitating the build-up of Soviet arms.25

'Repeated' Soviet initiatives for staff talks put the French

government

ill at ease, but

Daladier was afraid 'to alarm certain friendly powers and to provide Germany

with

the easy pretext

of an attempt

at encirclement'. The French

war ministry

blocked the

sale of modem military, especially naval materiel, likewise because of anticipated

British objections. It did not mind, however, selling obsolete materiel

to the USSR.26

As the leader of an unstable left-centre coalition in a bitter political environment,

Blum faced formidable obstacles in deepening Franco-Soviet relations. Daladier's

opposition legitimised the general staff's objections and emboldened permanent

officials at the Quai d'Orsay, like Leger. But not all members of the Blum

government were hostile. Radical Socialist Pierre Cot, the air minister, shared the

views of Herriot and Paul-Boncour and was prepared to start staff talks on the

narrower basis of air force cooperation

without a cabinet decision. Daladier

resisted,

but Cot pressed on, quite prepared

to drag the government

along after him.27

On 6

November 1936 he seemed to win the point as the Cabinet

agreed to start staff talks

initially with the Soviet military attache. The breakthrough

was deceptive: Daladier

and the chief of staff, General Gamelin went along to take the initiative out of Cot's

hands and to reassert control. 'It would be difficult', noted Schweisguth, 'to delay any

longer without the risk that the air ministry

would take control of the movement. . .28

On 9 November

Blum advised Potemkin that Cot's initiative was to be broadened

and

that Gamelin

was coming round. 'In comparison

with the previous situation',

he said,

'it was a step forward', The Soviet government appeared

to take Blum at his word,

but feared the negative consequences if the talks failed.29

At the same time Robert Coulondre arrived in Moscow as the new French

ambassador.

In his first audience with Litvinov on 10 November,

he complained

about

communist

propaganda

in France.

The position of the Radicals was critical, and they

were running

scared of communism. Litvinov gave assurances and in fact did not care

a jot about French communists. He observed to Coulondre that France and the USSR

had a common interest

in safeguarding

the peace against

Nazi Germany.

Hitler sought

to disrupt

this unity of purpose by whipping up fears of communism.

Would France

play into Nazi hands?30

Coulondre

did not report

his reply, but Litvinov's plea would

have fallen on deaf ears in any case. Ideological fears were the mainstay

of opposition

to closer Franco-Soviet

military

ties. The growth of the French Communist

Party

and

the Spanish

civil war frightened

the grande bourgeoisie and the general staff. General

A. J. Georges, deputy chief of staff, thought the mutual assistance pact should be

abandoned altogether. He feared the progress of communism in France and the

possibility of a general strike. Georges' colleagues, Generals P.-H. Gerodias and

M.-E. Debeney, considered the Soviet pact a dupe's game for which the dead Barthou

was responsible.31

Delay and duplicity

became the main tactics to scuttle the staff talks. Gamelin

told

307

MICHAEL

CARLEY

Schweisguth, 'We need to drag

things out'. When a Soviet response

to French

queries

arrived, Schweisguth noted Gamelin's consigne: 'we should not hurry, but avoid

giving to the Russians the impression

that we were playing them along, which could

lead them into a political volte-face' [i.e. a rapprochement

with Germany].32

Gamelin

and Daladier headed the movement; L6ger took charge at the Quai d'Orsay.

Schweisguth met the new Soviet military attache several times, but it was all a

charade. 'The situation is still the same', noted Schweisguth, 'gain time, without

rebuffing

the Russians and without proceeding to staff talks. . .' Daladier calculated

that France

could do without Soviet support,

but not without the British. The British

government

had had trouble 'swallowing' the mutual assistance

pact; it would choke

on a military agreement.33 Leger assured Blum that the war and foreign ministry

bureaucracies would loyally respect the government's policy on staff talks, but this

was dust in the eyes; not even Daladier intended

to respect government

policy.34

For

Daladier and Gamelin, it was a case of taking one step forward

in order

to take two

steps back.

In February

1937 the Soviet military

attache,

A. S. Semenov, met Schweisguth

and

his superior,

General Colson. Semenov said that

if Poland and Romania would permit

passage across their territory,

the Red Ariny would assist France with all its forces in

the case of German attack. If not, Soviet assistance would necessarily be more

limited, but the Soviet government was prepared

to send troops to France and to

provide air support-no doubt a chilling prospect to the Red-obsessed general staff.

In return,

the Soviet government

wanted to know what assistance France could offer

in case of German

aggression against the USSR.35

Blum saw Potemkin

on 17 February

after Semenov had met Colson, thanking

him

for the 'direct and comprehensive' Soviet proposals. Blum wondered if Romania

might be persuaded

to accept Red Army passage on the assumption

that Poland would

remain neutral. Potemkin replied that he had 'before hand resigned himself to the

refusal of Poland to fulfil its obligations as an ally'.36

A few days later Blum met

Daladier, Leger and Gamelin. Daladier's marginal notes blame Schweisguth for

delays in the talks, but this is untrue;

Daladier and Gamelin were calling the shots,

Schweisguth was simply a faithful executor of their policy.37 According to

Schweisguth's notes, Stalin himself had written a 'very cordial' letter in favour of a

Franco-Soviet military alliance, which Potemkin had read to Blum, who was

impressed. But Daladier remained 'sceptical'.38

Schweisguth met Semenov on 19 March, asking more questions about Soviet

military capabilities. As for Franco-Soviet

cooperation

on the ground, Schweisguth

indicated

that it would be 'extremely difficult' and would be dependent

on 'political

factors' with respect to Poland, the Baltic and elsewhere.39 Delbos saw Potemkin

23 March as the latter was preparing

to return to Moscow to take up the post of

deputy commissar for foreign affairs, vacated by the doomed but brave N. N.

Krestinsky, soon to perish in Stalin's purges. Delbos appeared

to want to be more

encouraging

than Schweisguth had been with Semenov. He regretted

the absence of

contact between Blum and Daladier

in recent days because of police shootings on 16

March

during

a left-wing demonstration

at Clichy-a 'diplomatic

Waterloo'-imply-

ing that this had affected the French response to Semenov. Potemkin would not

speculate

on the Soviet general staff's reaction to Schweisguth's

remarks to Semenov,

308

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET

ALLIANCE IN 1939

but he had his doubts.40

On 27 March Blum also sought to reassure the charge

Girshfeld,

but he thought it 'expedient' to see Daladier before another

meeting with

Semenov.4'

The Soviet commissar for war, Voroshilov, reacting angrily to the additional

questions posed by Schweisguth,

refused further

discussions. The Soviet general staff

had indicated what it was prepared

to do in the event of German

aggression against

France and asked in return what the French would do in the case of a German

attack

on the USSR. Instead

of an answer, the French had put more questions. Negotiations

were deadlocked.42

Blum and Cot manoeuvred for continued

discussions,

but the British

Foreign Office

intervened

heavily in April and May 1937 to discourage the French. Ironically, the

future anti-appeasers,

Eden and the Permanent

Under Secretary,

Vansittart,

applied

the pressure.

But as late as the end of May Blum and Cot still sought to advance the

talks. 43

Aware of French

dissension, Potemkin

advised the new Soviet ambassador

Paris, Ya. Z. Surits,

not to press the issue. Open discussion in the French

government

could only make matters worse.44

The question

was soon moot in any case. At the end

of May Stalin authorised a devastating purge of the Soviet high command.

Tukhachevsky

and other senior commanders were executed after a drum-head trial in

early June. Daladier and Gamelin had a pretext to block staff talks, and the Blum

government

fell on 21 June.45

But Daladier

never had any intention of agreement

a Soviet military alliance.46

The failure of Franco-Soviet

staff talks in 1937 was a prelude

to the Anglo-Franco-

Soviet negotiations

in 1939. The same questions

were on the table:

passage of the Red

Army across Poland and Romania,

fear of provoking

Germany

or driving

Poland into

the arms of Hitler,

hostility from the Baltic states, among other factors. In September

1936 Jean

Payart,

French

charge

d'affaires

in Moscow, told Schweisguth

that

it would

not be the USSR which would oppose a Soviet-Polish rapprochement,

but Poland,

which feared 'bolshevik

contagion' and still dreamed of expansion

into the Ukraine-

after the failure of the Polish invasion in 1920.47

Doldrums of Franco-Soviet relations

The abortive talks in 1937 left a bad after-taste. For the French general staff the

Stalinist purge of old bolsheviks was hardly troubling,

but the 'decapitation'

of the

Soviet high command-either because the Soviet government was riddled with

traitors or with madmen, who had turned on their best generals-gave cause for

concern,

quite apart

from the splendid pretext

it offered to block staff conversations.48

The French general staff continued to fear communist infiltration

in the army, so

much so that the deputy chief of staff, Colson, recommended

against the attendance

of French

enlisted men at a concert of the Red Army choir. Such events 'always had

an obvious propagandistic

intent' and risked having a negative effect on ordinary

soldiers who lacked the 'critical

judgement' of their officers.49

On the Soviet side-or that part of it which survived Stalin's murderous

depreda-

tions-the duplicity of Daladier and Gamelin was scarcely interpreted

as a sign of

309

MICHAEL CARLEY

French

commitment

to mutual assistance. At the end of 1937, nine months before the

Munich agreement, the Soviet government doubted Anglo-French resolve to resist

Nazi Germany. The Soviet ambassador

in Paris, Surits, in a stunningly accurate

assessment of the French

political mood, saw little hope. French

resolve was sapped

by a fear of tomorrow and the perception

of enemies on all sides. Great Britain was

France's main ally, and the French government

would maintain

its ties with London

at any cost even though the British took little account of French views. Fear of the

'Red danger' and 'hatred of socialist revolution' dominated the French political

agenda to the point where France had lost sight of its vital national interests. The

French

government sought no deepening of the mutual assistance

pact, its only value

being a hindrance

to a Soviet-German

rapprochement.

Indeed, the right considered

undesirable the defeat of fascism at the expense of increased Soviet influence in

Europe.

Even the French

opposition, led by Herriot and Paul-Boncour

among others,

was listless and ineffective.50

In Moscow Potemkin attacked Coulondre as a collector

of anti-Soviet gossip-though undoubtedly

there was plenty going around-and a

'puny Philistine'.5'

Litvinov complained

to a French

journalist

in December 1937 that events in France

were unfolding as if there were no Franco-Soviet

pact. The USSR, he said, appeared

isolated, but not by its own choice. This situation could not continue,

even if it meant

an accord

with Germany-and 'why not?' Litvinov quipped. 'Was it possible?', asked

the incredulous journalist. 'Perfectly', replied Litvinov.52 The French and British

governments were not frightened by Litvinov's blunt warning; the Foreign Office

queried its European

ambassadors and concluded that a Soviet-German rapproche-

ment was unlikely.53

In early 1938 Chautemps, then premier, told Surits that Franco-Soviet ties

should be strengthened,

but the Soviet ambassador was sceptical. After Delbos

complained of French isolation, Surits commented to Moscow that the French

had only themselves to blame.54 And with reason: when the French military attache,

Colonel Palasse, reported

in April 1938 that the Soviet high command

was beginning

to recover from the Stalinist

purges and that

the Red Army had a formidable

potentiel

de guerre, he was rounded

on by his superiors

in Paris.55

Palasse stuck to his guns,

but the general staff did not want to hear. At the same time, however,

Daladier politely-or falsely-sang the praises to Surits of the 'might of the

Red Army'.56

The Soviet ambassador was not fooled; he wrote scathingly of French

policy in July 1938, anticipating the betrayal of Czechoslovakia two months

later. Daladier had the temerity to say Soviet support was so certain that

French diplomats need do nothing to retain it. Surits saw the British behind

French indifference to the Soviet pact, Daladier fearing to lose the British bird in

the hand for the sake of the Soviet in the bush. French cabinet members

Georges Mandel and Paul Reynaud,

who were advocates of a Franco-Soviet

alliance,

were incensed by such attitudes and advised Surits to insinuate to Daladier that

France risked losing the Soviet pact. Fear of all things Soviet contributed

to the French attitude. The situation was so bad, said Surits, that the Bibliotheque

Nationale had turned down an exhibition of Soviet books. The left in France had

weakened, much of the press was hostile, and the political pendulum

was swinging

to the right.57

310

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

Effects of the Munich crisis

As the Czech crisis intensified

in early September

1938, Litvinov hoped to obtain at

the League of Nations a condemnation of the Nazi threat to peace; he sought to put

political pressure on Bucharest to permit Red Army passage across Romania to

reinforce Czechoslovakia. The Soviet general staff 'advised the French that 30

combat-ready infantry divisions were deployed on its western frontier.58

As for

Poland, it appeared to have one foot in the German camp: in May the Polish

ambassador

in Paris

told Georges Bonnet, the French

foreign minister,

that the Polish

army 'would not budge' to support France should it go to the assistance of

Czechoslovakia

in the event of German

aggression. The Polish government regarded

the USSR as 'enemy No. 1', and would resist any Red Army attempt to cross its

territory

to aid Czechoslovakia. Colonel Beck, the Polish foreign minister,

considered

the Czech state 'unviable' and subverted by bolshevism. Polish officials held old

grudges against the Czechs, who had been too friendly with the USSR. If Germany

was to have the Sudetenland,

said Beck in September,

Poland would have the Czech

district of Teschen-by force if necessary.59

In early September

Litvinov suggested Franco-Soviet-Czech staff talks, seconded

by Coulondre,

who pressed the Quai d'Orsay

to agree. Bonnet brushed aside the idea.

The general staff, he said disingenuously, would keep in touch with the Soviet

military

attache

in Paris.60

In the meantime Bonnet pressed the Czech government

not

to resist the Poles any more than the Germans. Czech resistance over Teschen could

wreck the Munich settlement and lead to war. On 1 October Coulondre

telephoned

Potemkin for news. 'It's another surrender',

said Potemkin;

the Czechs had capitu-

lated and the Poles were already moving into the Teschen district. Potemkin

implied,

said Coulondre, that the Czech capitulation had eliminated any basis for Soviet

intervention.61

The Soviet Union reacted with anger and alarm to the Munich settlement. It is a

'most terrible

defeat', said Surits; without a shot being fired France had suffered 'a

second Sedan', losing its most faithful ally and an army of one-and-a-half million

men. France had been betrayed by the right, which feared the spread

of communism

in Europe through the victory of Soviet arms. The French government had lost

confidence in itself. There was no Clemenceau nor even a Poincare to rally the

country.62

Litvinov took in the full measure of defeat which was his as much as that of

France;

his policy of collective security was in ruins. Like Surits, Litvinov reckoned

that the French had only themselves to blame. They had systematically evaded

military staff talks even to support Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain had not dragged

Daladier, then premier, and Bonnet after him to Munich. Now, said Litvinov, the

British and French governments

would have to choose between Nazi domination of

Europe or resistance to further Nazi aggression. Litvinov was not hopeful. 'After

Munich, who will believe in the word of France', asked the Narkomindel

newspaper

in Moscow, 'who will remain its ally?'63

Soviet views, ventilated widely in the press, were reported

to Paris. The Soviet

government interpreted

Chamberlain's

communique

with Hitler on 30 September

a British offer of good offices to facilitate German eastward

expansion on condition

that Germany

leave the west in peace. Coulondre and Palasse both warned

of Soviet

311

MICHAEL CARLEY

isolation and the possibility of a Soviet-German rapprochement

at Polish expense.

Litvinov had not totally given up on collective security, but Coulondre reported-

prophetically as it turned out-that having learned from experience, the Soviet

government 'would undoubtedly demand precise guarantees of assistance' from

France and Great Britain

before making any further

security agreements.

The French

had no illusions about the gravity of their defeat: in May 1937 Delbos had said to

Eden that France could not abandon

Czechoslovakia 'without

disappearing

as a great

power from the map of Europe'. Another defeat like Munich, Coulondre warned,

would put France in mortal peril.64

The British government, especially Chamberlain,

was more optimistic. It was

normal that Germany

should dominate central

Europe,

otherwise there would be war

every 15 or 20 years, said Lord Halifax, then foreign secretary,

to Maisky, the Soviet

ambassador

in London.

Why should Great Britain

risk war to save the USSR?65

'Why

indeed?' asked foreign minister Bonnet. He hinted that France

would like to shed its

commitments,

such as they were, to Poland and the USSR. Rumours

circulated that

the Nazis were looking to the Ukraine to satisfy their growing territorial

appetite.

For

Bonnet this was both a relief and a concern, and all the more reason to unburden

France of dangerous

commitments. But in January

1939 other rumours circulated

only

a month after von Ribbentrop,

the Nazi foreign minister, came to Paris to sign an

understanding

with Bonnet to maintain 'peaceful and good neighbourly relations'.

Holland and western Europe were now the target of Nazi ambition. Suddenly, it

seemed less desirable to break commitments to Poland and to the USSR. Anglo-

French anti-appeasers,

silenced after Munich, began to find their voices.

Anglo-French policy reappraisal

In Great

Britain,

reappraisal

took place within the Foreign Office. Halifax was not as

sanguine as Chamberlain about the prospects of an accommodation with Nazi

Germany.

Neither was Vansittart,

now promoted

out of the way to chief diplomatic

advisor because of a difficult personality

and increasing opposition to the Conserva-

tive government's

foreign policy. In January

1939 a seemingly academic paper by a

Foreign Office clerk, Harold Caccia, reviewing Wheeler-Bennett's book on the

Soviet-German treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1918, touched off an important exchange

of views on Anglo-Soviet relations.

Caccia's memo suggested a re-examination of British policy toward the USSR in

the light of the perspective

offered by Wheeler-Bennett's book. Recalling that Lenin

had agreed

to accept 'the assistance of French

imperialism against German

brigands',

he asked why the British government

should not adopt the same policy, working on

the principle that "'Russian murderers"

might in certain eventualities be a lesser

danger

than "German

brigands"'?

Caccia suggested that the new British ambassador

in Moscow, Sir William Seeds, attempt to meet Stalin to 'clarify' Anglo-Soviet

relations, applying Lenin's first principle.

The memo soon had attached to it minutes from the lowest Foreign Office clerk to

Halifax himself, reflecting the gamut of opinion toward the USSR. A central

department official, D. W. Lascelles, asked '. . . what is there to clarify?'

312

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

Essentially, ... [Anglo-Soviet] relations are based on a mutual and inevitable antipathy

and

on the realisation

that the other party, in attempting

to cope with the German

menace, will

act empirically and solely with an eye to its own interests. The Russians know quite well

that if they are attacked

by Germany

we shall neither assist them nor join in the attack...

Lascelles conceded, however, that a little talk with the Soviet authorities might 'have

a certain prophylactic effect on the Germans, and it might also ... be of some use ...

against the English critics of His Majesty's Government'. Other mid-level Foreign

Office officials such as Laurence Collier, head of the Northern department, and

William Strang, head of the Central department, picked up this idea and pushed it

forward, though resisted by the anti-bolshevik Sir Lancelot Oliphant, deputy under-

secretary of state, and by Sir Alexander Cadogan, Chamberlain's 'sane, slow man' to

succeed Vansittart.66 Cadogan opposed an initiative in Moscow since the British

government had nothing to offer: 'we should very soon have to disclose the emptiness

of our cupboard'. Stalin could ask bothersome questions about what Great Britain

might do or not do in the event of a Soviet-German conflict. He might, for example,

'ask whether "no indirect assistance" [to Germany] means standing aside and giving

Germany a free hand. And that is not an easy question to answer-at best I do not

think we could give Stalin the answer he wants ...'

Cadogan's views would have confirmed Soviet suspicions about British intentions

in eastern Europe, but they did not fully satisfy Halifax, who invited Vansittart to

comment. 'Anglo-Soviet relations', Vansittart minuted,

are in a most unsatisfactory

state. It is not only regrettable

but dangerous

that they should

be in this state, and a continuance of it will become a great deal more dangerous very

shortly. They are in a bad state because the Russians feel, and I think it is an incontestable

fact (at any rate it is a very widely stated one), that we practically boycotted them during

1938. We never took them into our confidence or endeavoured to establish

close contact with

them, and this fact accounts for the gradual

drift towards isolation that is going on in Russia.

That fact and that tendency we ought to correct and correct soon.

Vansittart was not sure how to proceed. 'What the Russians need is a gesture'. He

suggested sending a cabinet minister-either Robert Hudson or Oliver Stanley-to

the USSR under the cover of ongoing trade negotiations. Halifax asked Vansittart to

see him about his idea.67 This marked a certain progress-if one favoured better

relations with the USSR-but it was far from a dramatic change in policy. Vansittart

had come a long way since 1935 when he thought Litvinov 'obsessed' with the

German danger.68 He shared the obsession now, but he was no longer permanent

under-secretary, and Cadogan and Chamberlain were against him.

The day Vansittart wrote his minute at the Foreign Office he went to see Maisky

to complain-neither discreetly nor for the first time-about Chamberlain's policy.

Vansittart was in 'great anxiety', noted Maisky, he was 'highly dissatisfied with the

state of affairs both in England and in France. . . In his view, 1939 will be the decisive

year'. Vansittart argued that British, French, and Soviet interests were identical, and

that if they were not careful Hitler would pick them off one after the other-'as an

artichoke is eaten leaf after leaf'. Having listened for a while, Maisky answered that

Vansittart was preaching to the converted, 'the USSR had all along been upholding

the principle of collective security, while London and Paris had been systematically

313

MICHAEL

CARLEY

undermining

it'. At the end of their conversation,

Vansittart

expressed 'hope that in

England the policy of "appeasement"

would soon come to a deservedly inglorious

end' .69

There were some modest signs that

this was happening.

In Moscow Seeds informed

Litvinov on 19 February

that the British government

would send Hudson, secretary

for the ministry of overseas trade, to Moscow. Hudson would discuss trade matters,

but Seeds hinted that London hoped for a general improvement

in relations. Litvinov

picked up the hint, but complained

of endless Anglo-French

capitulations:

assurances

to the contrary 'nowadays ... were freely given and as freely broken'. Under the

circumstances,

Litvinov said that the USSR would 'keep aloof'. Seeds insisted that

there was a change of mood in England.

All to the good, replied Litvinov, but what

is needed is a change in action.70 Maisky reported

that there were further

signs of a

change in policy, though Litvinov remained sceptical-these were mere 'gestures',

and they were not enough.71

Maisky kept probing. He met Hudson for lunch on 8 March. As Maisky was

leaving, he told Hudson 'that he was quite convinced that we, the British Empire,

were unable to stand up against German aggression, even with the assistance of

France, unless we had the collaboration and help of Russia'. Hudson replied that he

thought Great Britain and France were changing direction and that they would

eventually triumph

with or without the USSR. Hudson recorded this in a minute,

concluding

that Maisky, having gone 'out of his way to raise these questions ... may

indicate a certain nervousness in the minds of the Russian government'. Vansittart

was exasperated

when he saw the memorandum,

leaving a note for Halifax.

There

is unfortunately

a great

deal

of force in what M. Maisky

says:

for

example

the British

and

French

air

forces are

utterly

unequal

to standing

up to the whole

German air force.

is quite

essential

that a portion

should be immobilised on the German

Eastern Front.

I see

little

utility

in denying

these self-evident

facts,

or in not

trying

to bring

the Russians out

their

isolationist tendencies instead

of pushing

them back in that

direction...

Before

talking

like this it is well to remember

(1) that

we had both

Russia & Italy

with

us in the last

war,

& then

only

scrambled

through,

(2) that

France could

have

had

no chance

of survival

whatever

in 1914,

if there

had

not been an Eastern Front. She

only just

survived

as it was.

'Surely', Vansittart

concluded, 'when a foreign ambassador

talks like this there is a

very obvious, and infinitely preferable

gambit that sticks well out of the ground'.

Vansittart,

at least, did not need to be a general to sense which way the war winds

were beginning to blow. On 14 March

Halifax left a minute for Vansittart

indicating

that he had spoken to Hudson, warning him 'against taking a line that would

encourage Russian "withdrawal"'.72

Such steps were a little late; the German army

marched into Prague the following day, disrupting the pace of change in British

policy. Chamberlain,

who had not interfered in the 'gestures' being made to the

USSR, was now drawn more deeply into the foreign policy debate. He did not like

Vansittart's

advice and ignored it.

During the same period the French government

did even less than the British to

repair

the damage done to their relations

with the USSR. A new French ambassador,

P.-E. Naggiar, arrived

in Moscow in February

1939. He came from the embassy in

314

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET

ALLIANCE IN 1939

China, and made a good impression on his British counterpart.

He had several talks

with Litvinov and Potemkin who conveyed the same message as that given to Seeds.

Still, Litvinov said that the USSR would continue to support

the policy of collective

security

if the French

government

would support

it also, even though

the post-Munich

situation was less favourable. In fact, Litvinov made clear his preference for

Anglo-Franco-Soviet cooperation.

He had earlier

expressed

his repugnance

of Soviet-

German

economic relations; so many German

technicians, said Litvinov, meant so

many German spies.73

But the British and French governments could not go on

ducking out at critical moments. Naggiar, and Payart before him, warned Bonnet

categorically

that if they did, the USSR might come to terms with Germany-what-

ever Litvinov's preferences.74

Stalin too warned in an often-quoted speech on 10

March that the Soviet government

had no intention of 'pulling other

people's [that

to say, French and British] chestnuts out of the fire'.75

Of course, warnings

like this

were old hat, and Bonnet's cables to Moscow were routine until 23 March, a week

after the Nazi invasion of the rump of Czechoslovakia.

For Litvinov this was a difficult time. By early 1939 the Stalinist purges had

decimated

Narkomindel. 'How can I conduct foreign policy', he said to Naggiar in a

fit of ill humour,

'with the Lubyanka

across the way?'76

Litvinov feared

seeing his last

day there.

In March

Payart

found Litvinov very tense because of criticism

in Moscow

of his policies, but he carried

on.77

Common wisdom in the diplomatic community

was that Litvinov's days were numbered.

Voroshilov, for one, was said to favour a

Soviet-German rapprochement;

but Stalin opposed it.78 Among Litvinov's few

surviving colleagues were Potemkin, Surits and Maisky. Were they spared to keep

open the option of Soviet-Western

cooperation against Nazism? Or was it simply a

tyrant's whimsy?

The beginning of Anglo-Franco-Soviet discussions, March-May 1939

On 18 March Litvinov proposed the calling of a six-power conference in Bucharest

to discuss the 'possibilities of common action' against further Nazi aggression.

Halifax replied to Maisky that a conference would be premature,

but he had another

idea: a four power declaration

by the British,

French,

Soviet and Polish governments.

Would the Soviet government

agree to this proposal?

Litvinov replied favourably

22 March. British policy was scarcely a sea change; London was only inviting

consultation about what might be done later.79

But this was still too much for Beck,

who rejected the British proposal.

The Polish decision was no surprise

to the French government,

which trusted the

Poles no more than did the Soviet. The French

secretary-general,

Leger, thought

Beck

'entirely cynical and false' and just looking for an excuse 'to tuck in closer to

Germany'.80

Mistrust was exacerbated by Polish policy during the Munich crisis,

when the Polish army had seized Teschen. 'The Germans were not the only vultures

upon the carcass', wrote Churchill.81

Others drew analogies with jackals and hyenas.

Presumably,

the Poles found the distinction between taking and giving away another

state's territory

rather a fine one.

Leon Noel, the French ambassador

in Warsaw, noted in January

1939 that many

Poles feared the Nazis less than the Soviet Union; forced to a choice, they would

315

MICHAEL CARLEY

collaborate with Germany

rather

than accept aid from the USSR. Noel reported

the

comment of the Soviet military attache, who observed that the Poles would let

themselves be crushed rather

than accept Soviet aid. Counselling patience, Noel said

the Poles would have to be coaxed along.82

It was the old question of whether the Polish government

would permit the Red

Army to cross Poland to meet the Nazi enemy. French diplomats had reported

the

difficulty as early as 1934-35-the British also. Soviet troops, Payart

had noted, once

on Polish territory might not want to leave. The Polish government, having taken

Soviet territory

in 1919-20, understandably

feared that the Soviet Union might one

day want to take it back. In 1938 the issue came up repeatedly.

No wonder Kennard,

the British ambassador

in Warsaw, commented after Munich that collective security

had foundered on Polish opposition.83

The British were nevertheless more disposed than the French to follow Noel's

counsels of patience. Although the British government

had taken a dim view of the

Polish seizure of Teschen, its attitude to the Poles in March 1939 was to let bygones

be bygones. Leger was not so easy to convince, though one Foreign Office clerk

remarked

that the French were always a little hard on Beck.84

Leger advised the

British to use 'very clear and firm language' with the Poles, and so did the French

ambassador,

Corbin. 'He thought

the strongest

pressure

must be brought

to bear upon

Poland,

even to the extent of threats,

to secure her collaboration'.

Strong

language

had

not been characteristic

of the French in recent years-except against

French commu-

nists, or Italians-and it still was not. Leger complained of being 'surrounded

reticence'. Much of it, of course, was of his own making, but Leger was right in

telling the British

charge

in Paris

that

France and Great Britain should not subordinate

their attitude to those governments, those 'corollaries', with whom they were

consulting. 'That would be to put the cart before the horse. These governments

would

decide their attitude

in accordance with the intentions of France and Great Britain'.85

This was undoubtedly

true; Lloyd George, the former prime minister, said as much

in the House of Commons on 3 April.96

The Tory gadfly Churchill would also say it,

but he-like Lloyd George-was greatly disliked by Chamberlain. So the British

government

did not take this sound advice. Neither did Bonnet.

One wonders why. Halifax noted in March that France and Great Britain

could not

prevent

Poland from being overrun

by Germany.87

Both Lloyd George and Churchill

stated in Parliament that there could be no 'eastern front' without the USSR.88

Litvinov told Hudson, who finally made it to Moscow on 23 March,

that 'France

was

practically done for.. . full of German agents, disaffected and disunited. . .' He could

see the day not too distant when Europe would be fascist from the Bay of Biscay to

the Soviet frontier. It would be up to Great Britain and the USSR then, and Litvinov

'made it clear that he had in mind the possibility of resistance by force of arms'.89

Who can say that Litvinov was wrong?-but he was going too fast for Chamberlain

and other 'men of Munich' in London. Chamberlain did not trust 'the Soviet'-as it

was fashionable to say in those days-but one wonders why he trusted the Poles

more. Chamberlain did not believe that the Red Army could take the offensive against

Germany.

This from a British prime minister

who just then could put four divisions

into the field-'two and two more later'; 'the Soviet' could send 100, 250 after the

first

year.90

But Chamberlain

distrusted Soviet motives, they were communists and did

316

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

not share 'our ideas of liberty'. Did Beck? Definitely not, but he was not a

communist.

Beck was a 'slippery customer' even by British lights: when he came to London

in early April he was already facing heavy intimidation

from Ribbentrop-though he

denied it-over the German-populated

'free city' of Danzig, created under the treaty

of Versailles. Beck still hoped for a settlement with Germany, proposing a modest

compromise

on 25 March and continued commitment to an anti-Russian,

anti-commu-

nist policy.9' Leger was after all not so hard on Beck; the British were not hard

enough. 'The important

thing', said Bonnet, 'was not to give Poland (or, indeed,

Romania)

a pretext for running

out on account of Russia'.92 Chamberlain would then

be left without a second front or rather

with the unacceptable option of 'the Soviet'

as his main ally in the east. This had also been a danger

in 1938. Nazi intransigence

spared Chamberlain the contemplation

of such a scenario.

In the face of Polish opposition, the British government

abandoned its four-power

declaration and offered instead a unilateral

guarantee

of Poland which it persuaded

the

French government

to make also. Chamberlain

explained privately to Lloyd George

that Hitler would never risk war if he had to fight on two fronts. 'Where is the second

front to be?', asked Lloyd George. Poland, the prime minister responded. Lloyd

George 'burst

into laughter

and began to jibe Chamberlain,

noting that Poland had no

air force to speak of, an inadequately mechanised army, worse than mediocre

armaments,

and that Poland was weak internally, economically, and politically',93

Like Vansittart,

neither Lloyd George nor Churchill needed to be a general to tell

which way the war winds were blowing. In late March the British chiefs of staff also

began to sense the winds.94 Chamberlain had trouble because anti-bolshevism had

twisted round his own weather vane.

The Foreign Office was not unaware of the importance

of implicating

the USSR in

the defence of Poland, and so it invited the USSR on 14 April to join in making a

unilateral declaration.

The Soviet government had other ideas. On 6 April Maisky

raised the question of military staff talks, and he inquired 'with inquisitorial persis-

tence' about Chamberlain's

meaning of 'direct and indirect' aggression in a parlia-

mentary

statement that day on Poland. Chamberlain

appears

to have been the first to

raise the question

of 'indirect'

aggression, though Halifax preferred

not to explain the

prime minister's meaning. Halifax assured

Maisky of the British government's

desire

to create a broad coalition to protect the peace and that this coalition would not be

formed without

the USSR. But the Foreign Office flatly rejected

Maisky's suggestion

of a trip by Litvinov to London to facilitate negotiations. Sargent,

assistant under-sec-

retary

of state, and Cadogan thought

this a dreadful idea. It would 'arouse the deepest

suspicion in every country where the Soviet connection is feared.. . I hope we will

not allow Maisky's fictitious

grievances and Litvinov's assumed sulks to push us into

action against our better

judgement', Sargent suggested 'calling the Soviet bluff by

asking them point black to make us a definite and detailed scheme showing the extent

to which and the manner in which they are prepared to cooperate with other

governments...' Cadogan chimed in 'I agree'. 'Personally', Cadogan minuted, 'I

regard

association with the Soviet as more of a liability than an asset. But I should

rather

like to ask them what they propose, indicating

that we don't want a lesson in

"moral issues", but some practical indication of what they propose

317

MICHAEL

CARLEY

should be done'. Halifax concurred-with qualifications: '.. . of course we want if we

can-without making a disproportionate

amount of mischief ... -to keep them in

with us...'95

Litvinov-who had many talents-must have been able to read minds. He was

certainly well informed.96 On 17 April he called the British bluff and proposed-in

eight points-a tripartite political and military alliance against Nazi Germany.

The

Foreign Office was confounded; Cadogan thought the Soviet proposals 'extremely

inconvenient': they would 'give little additional security', and would alienate our

friends and provoke our enemies. 'In order to placate our left wing in England,

rather

than to obtain any solid military advantage',

noted Cadogan,

the British government

had asked for a Soviet unilateral declaration

of support.

'The assistance of the Soviet

government

would be available, if desired and would be afforded in such manner as

would be found most convenient'. Cadogan had to admit, however, that the Soviet

proposal put His Majesty's Government

in a bind.

.There is great difficulty

in refusing

the Soviet offer. We have taken the attitude that the

Soviet

preach

us sermons on 'collective

security'

but make

no practical proposals. They

have

now made

such,

and

they

will rail at us for

turning

them down. And the Left

in this

country

may

be counted

on to make

the most

of this... There

is further

the risk-though

I should

have

thought

it a very

remote

one-that, if we turn

down this proposal,

the Soviet

might

make

some 'non-intervention'

agreement

with the German

government.

Cadogan

recommended that Litvinov's proposal should be rejected,

and it was-with

'disdain', Corbin would say later.97

Cadogan's weather vane was twisted also; and

when Vansittart

pressed to have the USSR included in a collateral matter,

Cadogan

exploded in his diary that Vansittart was an 'ass'!98

Cadogan was irritated

by an

interfering

predecessor but, personal rivalries aside, the Foreign Office was more

divided than the country on the matter

of an alliance with the USSR.

The debate over Anglo-Soviet cooperation was heated and continued throughout

April. The problem of Romania and Poland-but especially Poland-came up

repeatedly. The British ambassador, Kennard, warned that pressure on Poland to

cooperate

would only make matters worse. Once the USSR became a full member

an anti-German

coalition, the Polish government

would fear relegation

to a secondary

role. Moreover,

the extraordinary

publicity in the press and on radio about a possible

agreement

with the USSR made Polish opinion anxious and played into the hands of

Nazi propagandists exploiting fears of bolshevism. 'Would it not be possible',

pleaded Kennard,

'even at this late hour for someone in authority

to insist that the

press and BBC control themselves?' Cadogan thought

that showing Kennard's letter

to Chamberlain

'might help'.99

Collier, head of the Northern

department, commenting

trenchantly

in another context, observed that if Hitler wanted to devour another

victim, he could 'always find a pretext without referring

to Russia!'100

Collier was a member

of Vansittart's small circle, and at times he boldly criticised

the government. In a shocking comment on the minutes of the Foreign Policy

Committee,

composed of senior cabinet ministers,

he noted that if one 'read between

the lines', especially of Chamberlain's

comments,

one could not 'help feeling that the

318

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET

ALLIANCE IN 1939

real motive for Cabinet's attitude is the desire to secure Russian

help and at the same

time to leave our hands free to enable Germany to expand eastward at Russian

expense'. Strang

disputed

this, but Cadogan,

consistent

with his earlier

views, did not

refer to it. Collier warned

that the 'Russians are not so naive as not to suspect this,

and I hope that we ourselves will not be so naive as to think that we can have things

both ways'. Soviet support was worth having, whatever its shortcomings,

and 'we

ought not to boggle at paying the obvious price-an assurance

to the Russians, in

return

for their promise of help, that we will not leave them alone to face German

expansion'. Anything less would not only be cynical but doomed to failure.'0' It was

not for lack of good advice that British policy went awry; it was for failure to heed

it. On 29 April Halifax disingenuously

told Maisky that the British government

had

been 'too busy' to deal with Litvinov's 'very logical and well constructed' pro-

posals.102

The French government, whose relations with the USSR had been in a state of

torpor since Munich, bestirred itself at the end of March. Funk was the principal

motivator, and rising public clamour for better Franco-Soviet relations. The

chameleon Bonnet tried to change his colours. In March he had the effrontery to

remark

to Halifax that the Soviet authorities

liked to talk, but not to act. They had to

be pinned down as to 'their

real intentions'. In several meetings with Surits in April

he pressed for greater

Franco-Soviet

cooperation.

Surits and Litvinov reacted cynic-

ally, but said that the Soviet government

would 'give sympathetic

consideration to

any concrete proposals'. In Moscow Litvinov quipped that perhaps an isolationist

policy would after all be best for the USSR. Payart, standing in for the absent

Naggiar, who was ill, noted that such remarks

were an effort to stimulate Anglo-

French interest. Payart warned, however, that Litvinov's cynical remarks 'almost

always indicated the alternative

policy directions of other Soviet leaders'. In any

event, Litvinov was sick and tired of the Anglo-French

cold-shoulder and 'fed up'

with Polish and Romanian

hostility. He did not intend

the USSR to be a lightning

rod

for Nazi aggression.103

The French sought to reassure

Moscow. Bonnet-'in a state of complete prostra-

tion'-told Surits that an Anglo-Franco-Soviet

accord

to support

Poland and Romania

was essential. Daladier

railed

against

the Poles who would lead their

country

'to ruin';

Gamelin

went to see Surits,

kepi in hand,

to say that

it was not too late to oppose Nazi

Germany.

But anti-bolshevism

still maintained its hold. The chief of the 2e Bureau

said that the USSR would not give help to the West, preferring to watch the

'democracies

and totalitarian

states ... cut one another's throats which would pave

the way for bolshevism in Europe.

. .' Nevertheless,

Surits

reported

that French

public

opinion had turned

around;

press attacks

against

the USSR had all but ceased. The old

French

arrogance

was gone, they were supplicants

now: 'people who need us, not ...

people whom we need'. France was neck deep in rising danger;

accommodation

with

the aggressors

was no longer possible and war was imminent.

In fact, France

and the

USSR needed each other. But Surits feared betrayal:

we should negotiate, but 'not

assume any obligations without reciprocal guarantees'.'04

On 14 April Bonnet pro-

posed an exchange of letters promising Soviet 'immediate

aid and assistance' in the

event of German

aggression. Surits tactfully suggested that Bonnet's proposal

would

have a better

chance of success if it possessed a measure of reciprocity.

The following

319

MICHAEL

CARLEY

day Bonnet produced 'a more complete text' where France would render 'immediate

aid and assistance' if the USSR in support

of Poland and Romania were attacked

Germany. Surits responded reservedly, but advised that his government would

perhaps

have counter-proposals

to make.105

The British government did not like the French idea any more than Litvinov's

proposals which soon followed. Nor did it care for the more positive French attitude

to the Soviet idea of a tripartite

alliance. Cadogan

explained the position to Corbin,

but the French

ambassador

warned that 'a flat rejection

would enable the Russians to

cause both governments

considerable

embarrassment,

and it would be better if some

practical counter-proposals

could be devised'. The USSR was entitled 'to ask for the

same kind of guarantee

from Great

Britain and France as Poland is receiving and she

could hardly

be expected to undertake

any obligations

without such a guarantee.

. .'06

'I don't like this much', minuted Halifax, and he was more receptive to Anglo-

Soviet cooperation

than

Chamberlain. Halifax need not have worried;

the French were

accommodating,

and put off Surits.107 On 29 April Bonnet told the British

ambassador

in Paris, Sir Eric Phipps, that the French government would go along with British

policy if the Foreign Office could persuade

the USSR to accept it, though he doubted

this would be possible.108

Foreign Office officials sometimes used the word 'sulk' to describe Soviet unhap-

piness with Anglo-French policy. They stopped using it after 3 May, after Soviet

'sulks' led to the sudden sacking of Litvinov. This was an important development.

Litvinov was the principal advocate of collective security against Nazi Germany.

Stalin, who outwardly

had little to do with foreign affairs, supported

Litvinov and

appears

to have left him to implement

policy. Although Litvinov was not a member

of the highest decision-making circles, he did not need to be-as long as Stalin

supported

him. How else could he have avoided the Lubyanka?

When Stalin evidently decided to widen his options after the long string

of failures

of collective security, he dismissed Litvinov, whose preference

for an alliance with

the West against Nazi Germany, apart

from other desiderata,

would have hampered

a reversal of Soviet policy. If Litvinov was not purged, it may have been blind

luck-for Litvinov-or it may have been a sign that Stalin had not altogether rejected

collective security.

But Stalin would have no preferences;

he would weigh his options.

Litvinov's successor was Molotov, Stalin's most important

lieutenant. Gone was

the urbane, blunt but tractable Litvinov, to be replaced by a traditional old bol-

shevik-one of the few in fact whom Stalin did not have shot-hard, mulish,

humourless. Litvinov's endless if angry patience with Anglo-French

filibustering

and

sometime duplicity was over.

The French and British

governments

were startled

by the dismissal. Payart

reported

that the Soviet government

was fed up with British stalling. Litvinov's disappearance

could signal a move toward

neutrality

or, worse, an agreement

with Germany,

but this

seemed unlikely

for the moment.

However, Stalin would be taking a closer hand in

Soviet foreign policy, and it would be subject to his amour-propre, and to his

impulses.'09

Molotov reassured the French and British that there would be no change

in Soviet policy-unless, he added cryptically to Seeds, 'other states changed

theirs'. 10

320

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

The main Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, May-August 1939

Pressure for a Soviet alliance was building up on all sides. Public opinion in Great

Britain was vociferous. 'Winston', long a thorn in the side of Tory cabinets,

challenged the government

in Parliament and in the press. What was going on, why

the delay in responding

to Soviet proposals, why no pressure

on Poland to cooperate?

The old hater of bolsheviks was for banding

together

to 'break Hitler's neck!'111 The

British chiefs of staff also started to press for agreement

with the USSR. They knew

in early May that the French intended to stand on the defensive on the fortified

Maginot line in the event of war between Germany and Poland. The Polish army

would quickly be defeated without Soviet support, and if the USSR sided with

Germany,

Great

Britain

would face the gravest

dangers.

Vansittart also returned to the

charge and seemed to influence the dawdling Halifax.12

The position of the chiefs of staff discomforted Chamberlain. But

'"Appeasement"',

as British

diplomat

Oliver Harvey

put it, was 'raising

its ugly head

again'. The Times ran a headline: 'Danzig is not worth a war'. Chamberlain's

entourage was intriguing; Halifax, a young anti-bolshevik 'die-hard' in the early

1920s, was said to regard

the USSR as 'the anti-Christ'.

Strang,

head of the Central

department,

thought that Chamberlain

opposed a Soviet alliance because it would

signal the end of appeasement;

he said 'all at No. 10 are anti-Soviet'. Halifax

explained to the French that 'half the British population' held the Soviet Union

responsible as much as the Nazis for 'all the troubles of the last 10 years'.13

Obviously, Halifax had not kept up with British public opinion which massively

favoured an Anglo-Soviet alliance, but neither had Chamberlain. He was relieved by

Litvinov's sacking and threatened to resign 'rather than sign [an] alliance with the

Soviet'. Even Corbin attributed

the British cabinet's 'reticence' to anti-communist

animosity. 14

Daladier,

who had tamed his communists,

was not now so frightened.

Neither was

Bonnet;

he was more worried

by the prospects

of failure to conclude. There was such

a strong movement of public opinion in France and Great Britain in favour of an

alliance with the USSR that if negotiations

failed, it was essential that the Soviet side

'and not us', take the blame."5 Implicitly, this seemed more important

for Bonnet

than the success of negotiations.

Maisky, assessing British opinion, correctly reported its anti-German mood to

Moscow, but he, like Harvey, also noted the resurgence

of appeasement.16

On 8 May

Molotov commented unfavourably

to Seeds on the British delay in responding to

Litvinov's proposals: the 'Soviet government had always replied ... within three

days, instead of three weeks'. Seeds answered drily, 'I [take] off my hat to

Soviet efficiency'. In mid-May Molotov laid out the Soviet minimum position: a

tripartite

mutual assistance pact, guarantee

of the central and east European states

including the Baltics, and a concrete military accord. When Molotov spoke of the

Baltic guarantee,

Seeds 'uttered

deprecatory

noises', tapping

his fingers on the paper

which explained the Soviet proposals.

But the 'slab-faced' Molotov would not be put

off. 17

Chamberlain

finally began to give in to pressure;

he swallowed hard and agreed to

new proposals-they were half-way measures by Soviet lights, by Churchill's

also-but they went too far for Chamberlain,

who was 'very disturbed' by the

321

MICHAEL CARLEY

prospect

of agreement.11

On 25 May the British

government,

with the French

in tow,

offered a limited mutual assistance pact. Its ignition clause was dependent on the

consent of threatened third

states, and the proposal

was couched in the context of the

discredited

League of Nations. A clever move, thought

Chamberlain,

and he privately

boasted of it. The League caveat would allow the British government

to narrow its

commitments or cut them short. The suspicious Molotov picked this up at once and

condemned it."9 But according

to Cadogan, Chamberlain was prepared

'to leave no

stone unturned'

to solve the looming crisis over Danzig. He might still save the

peace-his way-and he did not want to commit too far to 'the Soviet'. Maisky noted

this also and duly reported

it to Moscow.120

During May the French

government

pushed

the British to respond

quickly to Soviet

overtures. But they did not press too hard,

expressions of impatience

were accompa-

nied by the caveat that of course 'the French government

would be perfectly well

satisfied with the British formula [for agreement]

if the Soviet government

could be

persuaded

to accept it'. The French

government

was not after all so quick to resume

the diplomatic

initiative. Bonnet instructed

Payart 'to take a back seat and let Sir W.

Seeds make the running...

.121 Bonnet confided to the British

ambassador,

Phipps,

that

while an agreement

with the USSR was necessary, we must be careful not to allow

ourselves 'to be dragged into war' by the Soviet government. Anyway, the 'best

policy with the Soviet is to avoid giving them the impression

that we are running

after

them'. Bonnet sneered at cabinet ministers Reynaud and Mandel: 'the [French]

communists are unfortunately not the only people here who are under Soviet

influence'.122 The Quai d'Orsay reiterated to Naggiar, back in Moscow in early June,

that the French government

would remain in the background.

If the British failed to

obtain Soviet agreement, the French government could put forward its own com-

promise solutions. Naggiar, impatient

for a quick agreement,

did not like Bonnet's

policy.'23

No one did who wanted an agreement

with the USSR.

On 2 June Molotov countered

with proposals for ironclad, well defined commit-

ments and in effect returned

to Litvinov's initiative of 17 April guaranteeing

all the

states between the Baltic and Black Seas.124 The Soviet counter-offer

specified a list

of countries to be guaranteed, including the Baltics, and, unlike the previous

Anglo-French

proposal,

it did not condition assistance on the consent of affected third

states. Moreover,

Molotov's proposal, like Litvinov's, called for the conclusion of a

military agreement 'within the shortest possible time' specifying in detail the

commitments of the contracting parties.'25

On the latter point Molotov explained to

Seeds that the Soviet government

had learned from its experience with the French.

The Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact 'had turned out to be ... a paper delusion'.

Without a military convention the political accord would be worthless. Back in

London, Sargent

commented, 'the Russians have for years past been pressing

for staff

conversations to implement

its (sic) Franco-Soviet

pact, and the French

largely at our

instigation have always refused them'. Molotov had a point. Do not take us for

'simpletons and fools', he would say.126

Maisky characterised

British policy as 'bazaar

technique': 'But even in the bazaar,

when asked a shilling one did not begin by offering twopence'. Moscow had the

impression that the British government

was 'at bottom opposed to a pact and was

reluctantly

and gradually being pushed against its will into making one'.127 If this

322

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

meant Chamberlain and his entourage,

who can say Maisky was wrong?

Chamberlain

must have felt like Br'er Rabbit

struggling

with the tar

baby in the Uncle Remus tales:

the more he tried to get away, the more he got stuck in the tar. It was only 'Jedge'

Stalin who in August 'come long en loosed 'im'.

In June the Foreign Office sent Strang

to Moscow to assist in negotiations. Strang

told Naggiar that his instructions were not to move toward the Soviet position, but in

fact to try to take back concessions made in previous Anglo-French

proposals.128

wonder 'the Soviet' mistrusted Chamberlain and Bonnet; the British and French

anti-appeasement opposition did not trust them either. In June Churchill

questioned

the Chamberlain

government's good faith. In early July Mandel, the last of the

Clemencists,

told Surits that the Soviet government

'had

every right' to be mistrustful,

and he urged Surits to insist on a 'clear and explicit' agreement, so arch appeaser

Bonnet could not rat.129

In this atmosphere

is it any surprise that Stalin-suspicious, ruthless and com-

pletely unscrupulous-began to contemplate

the possibility of an agreement

with Nazi

Germany?

If the Anglo-French

could pursue

such a policy, so could he. In April 1939

the Soviet ambassador

in Berlin, A. F. Merekalov, went to the German foreign

ministry

to discuss the fulfilment

of Soviet contracts

in defunct Czechoslovakia.

The

meeting focused on economic relations but, as Litvinov had reminded Payart in

March, 'there was a close interdependence

between political and economic rela-

tions. . .,130

The German

government thought

there

might be a political opening in this

initiative.

Merekalov

disappeared

from the scene, eventually purged

but not shot; and

the Soviet charge d'affaires, G. A. Astakhov, took up the parley before he too

disappeared

in September.

Talks continued in May and June on economic matters.

Political questions remained at the level of generalities.

At the end of June Molotov

still appeared

more interested in the Anglo-French negotiations.131

The discussions with the French and British dragged

on in June and July, haggling

over endless wordings of a political agreement. In early July Sargent admitted to

Corbin that the British guarantees

to Poland and Romania had been a mistake. The

Soviet leaders, having thus obtained a measure of security, could hold out for their

own terms. And they did: Molotov stuck tenaciously to the basic Soviet position laid

out by Litvinov in April. The French and British had to negotiate or their guarantees

would be worthless. Sargent's admission is 'a little late', noted Naggiar; 'to correct

this error,

Russia's price has to be paid'.132

The key issues were over guarantees

of the Baltic states, a definition of 'indirect

aggression', and negotiations

for a military

convention

tied to the political agreement.

The British feared giving the Soviet government

licence to threaten Baltic indepen-

dence. The Soviet Union feared German

aggression

through

the Baltic with or without

consent. Meanwhile, the Baltic states looked on nervously. They preferred

a year of

Nazi occupation to a day of Soviet-which was what worried the Soviet govern-

ment.'33

The Baltic ambassadors made regular inquiries

at the Foreign Office; British

ambassadors

reported

Baltic anxiety and anti-Soviet hostility. In early June Estonia

and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts with Germany;

German officers supervised

the building of their fortifications.

The French government became more impatient and more willing to make

concessions to the Soviet point of view, especially on the Baltic issue. But no sooner

323

MICHAEL CARLEY

did Bonnet send a trumpeting

cable to London which insisted on the importance

an immediate agreement than he sent further word that he would defer to the

British.34 In Moscow Naggiar observed this and became increasingly angry and

alarmed.

He and Seeds complained repeatedly

about press leaks revealing important

details of the negotiations.

The Soviet authorities-or the Germans for that matter-

did not need agents in the Foreign Office; all they had to do was read the London or

Paris papers.'35 Naggiar reported

that the Soviet government

was complaining again

about delays and public statements

by Chamberlain and others on British willingness

to conciliate Germany. Increasingly impatient, Naggiar asked for what amounted

plenipotentiary powers to conclude an agreement;

if the cabinet did not like it, the

Quai d'Orsay could disavow him. Bonnet queried

the Foreign Office, but the British

were reticent and Bonnet did not insist.136

Naggiar worried

less about the Baltic states than about the question of Poland and

Romania.

He reminded

Paris repeatedly

in July that their cooperation

was vital to the

success of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet

alliance. Naggiar raised the issue of Red Army

passage across Poland, as did the French military attache Palasse. If the Polish

government

did not agree to it there could be no effective eastern front. Poland and

Romania could not hold out without Soviet support.

And if the eastern front were

broken, Germany

and Italy could turn all their force against the West. This was not

a question

of Polish or Romanian

security

but of French

security, quite apart

from that

of the USSR. The Soviet government

understood this point only too well and would

not compromise itself against Germany without 'precise and concrete military

guarantees',

as Coulondre had warned after Munich. New Anglo-French proposals

for

agreement

risked

provoking

new Soviet counter

proposals.

If we do not conclude, the

USSR could remain neutral or come to terms with Germany

based on a partition

Poland and the Baltic states. It is time, said Naggiar, to recognise that relations

between states are governed by equations of force. What is needed is a 'classical'

military alliance with concrete terms and conditions. No effort should be spared to

obtain Polish and Romanian cooperation;

no time should be lost in concluding an

agreement on Soviet terms in spite of our reservations. Unfortunately, Naggiar

minuted

later, 'we did nothing is this regard,

except at the last minute'.'37 It was thus

not for lack of good advice that French policy also went awry; it was for failure or

unwillingness to heed it.

Naggiar correctly identified the problem: neither the French nor British govern-

ments were prepared

to make the necessary commitments. Bonnet wanted a political,

not a military

agreement

which would require

Polish cooperation.

Poland

did not want

to give it, minuted

Naggiar, and we did not want to press for it. 'We want a gesture',

scribbled

Naggiar, 'the Russians want a concrete agreement

involving the assent of

Poland and Romania'.138 The Soviet leaders having been duped in the past, would

accept nothing

less than an ironclad

military

alliance. If the Anglo-French

did not like

Soviet proposals, said Molotov, he was prepared

to consider a straight

triple alliance

guaranteeing

the security of the contracting parties against direct aggression.139

Bonnet felt trapped.

A straight triple alliance would leave Poland and Romania

unprotected,

but Molotov's insistence on tying political and military agreements

together would enable the Soviet government to hold France and Great Britain to

ransom.

In August, when the danger

of war was greatest,

the Soviet side could tighten

324

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

the screw: either you agree to our terms or we break off talks and the political

agreement

falls to the ground. Any military agreement

would hinge on the assent of

the grudging

Poles and Romanians.'40

Naggiar's minutes

aptly described the situation:

the Quai d'Orsay calculated on the 'psychological' effect on Hitler of an Anglo-

Franco-Soviet

political agreement. 'The puerile idea is that we will force Hitler to

back down with words, without the only reality which will cause him to reflect: the

assent of Poland to a military

accord with Russia'.141 A few days later Naggiar wrote

again, 'London and Paris continue not to want to understand what is essential in these

negotiations:

a military agreement

which would permit Russia to make geographical

contact with Germany

to replicate the military conditions of 1914'.142

Not wanting to understand caused mounting frustration

in London. The British

cabinet,

which at first

thought

the Soviet government

was serious about

an agreement,

though intending to drive a hard bargain,

in late July began to wonder. On 19 July

Halifax and Chamberlain

expatiated in the Committee on Foreign Policy on how

'humiliating

for us' it would be to make further concessions to Molotov when he

would make none of his own.

[Halifax]

said that there should also be borne in mind the effect on Herr Hitler's mind of

our

going

down on our knees

to Soviet

Russia

to implore

her assistance. Herr Hitler has a

very

low opinion

of Russia and our action would

confirm him in the idea

that we were a

weak and feeble folk. Considerations of this kind should be taken

into account.

On the other

hand, domestic pressures

were building up, a campaign

to put Churchill

in the cabinet had been underway

for some time, and Chamberlain feared 'consider-

able trouble' in the House of Commons over delays in concluding an agreement.

The

prime minister was in no hurry

for military conversations,

but Halifax feared that it

might be 'somewhat difficult to persuade

the French to adopt our point of view'. In

any event, one cabinet member, sounding like Bonnet, thought that if talks were to

break down, it would be important

to have public opinion on 'our' side.143

Events began to move quickly, and made this cabinet debate somewhat academic.

Molotov indicated that he was more or less satisfied with the political agreement,

remaining

difficulties over the definition of 'indirect

aggression'

could be settled later.

He wanted

military

conversations

to start at once, and Naggiar

and Seeds both pressed

for acceptance of Molotov's proposal. The French and British governments agreed

quickly-for a change. The British, however, were not prepared

to let the issue of

'indirect

aggression' be set aside and they made agreement

on it a condition for the

conclusion of a military accord. As Halifax explained at a July meeting of the

Committee

on Foreign

Policy, 'by encouraging

Soviet Russia in the matter

of internal

interference we should be doing incalculable damage to our interests both at home

and throughout

the world'.144 The British government

did not wish to facilitate the

spread

of bolshevism. This could explain why earlier

in July when one British

officer,

General Ironside, opined that an agreement

with the USSR 'was the only thing we

could do', Chamberlain

shot back, 'the only thing we cannot do'. Ironside

concluded

that Chamberlain's

policy a month before the invasion of Poland was 'not hurrying

on getting in Russia'.145

On the other hand, the French

position was stiffening, or so Leger said to Phipps

in July. Daladier was very resolute and 'firmly

convinced of the necessity of showing

325

MICHAEL CARLEY

an irreducible refusal to treat with a rdgime in whose word no confidence could be

placed and with which any treaty must be valueless'. Indeed, 'so convinced was

Daladier of the wisdom of an attitude

of determined reserve that he had even given

orders against any manifestations of friendship towards Germany such as mutual

visits for athletic contests and such like: it was better for the time being to renounce

the natural instinct to act "en gentlemen". ..'146 Leger offered no comment-or Phipps

did not record it-on negotiations with the USSR.

In the meantime

Soviet officials continued

discussions with their German counter-

parts. In mid-July

the chief of the Soviet trade

mission in Berlin informed

Schnurre,

responsible for economic negotiations, that the Soviet government was prepared

once to sign a new trade

agreement.

Schnurre

countered

by proposing

a normalisation

of Soviet-German political as well as economic relations. The Soviet side replied

evasively, saying that normalisation would have to take place slowly and gradually.'47

Discussions with the French and British still appeared

to have priority, but if they

went wrong, the option was open for an accommodation

with Germany.

In anticipation

of staff talks in Moscow the French and British governments

made

their plans. Neither expected a quick conclusion as the Soviet would want a detailed

agreement. Negotiations would drag out and eventually some general undertaking

would be concluded.

This did not trouble

Halifax, since as long as military

conversa-

tions were taking

place, he mistakenly

reckoned that 'we should be preventing

Soviet

Russia from entering

the German

camp'. Chamberlain

went along because 'he did not

attach

any very great importance'

to the talks. He told Admiral

Drax, the head of the

British

mission to Moscow, 'that the House of Commons

had pushed

him further than

he had wished to go'.148

Making a military agreement conditional on Soviet acceptance of the British

definition of 'indirect

aggression' led to instructions for British representatives

'to go

very slowly' in the military negotiations. If there were no agreement,

at least time

would be gained until the autumn or winter, delaying the outbreak of war.149

Complacency

was reflected in different

ways. As is well known, the British govern-

ment opted to send its mission to the USSR by a slow merchant

ship, its modem

flying boats being tied up by routine

fleet manoeuvres.150

The talks seemed of so little

import

that Halifax had 'scarcely

perused' British

instructions.

Concerns

about Soviet

impatience if the British dragged out the talks were shrugged off. And the British

delegation was instructed to avoid discussion of Soviet aid to Poland and Romania;

the Soviet Union would have to negotiate directly with the Polish and Romanian

governments.

British complacency was not entirely shared

by the French. They were impatient

for the talks to begin and wanted to send their delegation more quickly to the USSR.

As was their habit, however, after complaining about British travel plans, they

finished by going along with them. Instructions

given to the head of the French

delegation, General

Doumenc, were brief and vague, 'almost useless', according

to a

British source, though the much longer British instructions were no better.152 Like the

British instructions,

they said little about Soviet aid to Poland and Romania, except

to note that Poland was unlikely to agree to Red Army passage across its territory.153

Doumenc complained

to Leger that he was going to Moscow 'empty-handed',

not a

good negotiating posture for supplicants. Leger agreed. Bonnet and Daladier, more

326

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

rousing, urged Doumenc to come back with an agreement. 'Make promises if you

have to', said Bonnet. What promises? asked Doumenc. 'Whatever you think

necessary', replied Bonnet; if the negotiations fail war is inevitable. 'Au revoir et

bonne chance!', bade Daladier.'54

With such fatuous, if not duplicitous instructions did Doumenc set off to

Moscow with his British counterpart,

Drax. The Anglo-French delegations arrived

on 11 August. Doumenc advised Naggiar that Daladier had given him instructions

not to agree to any military accord stipulating Red Army passage across Poland.

Doumenc should indicate to the Soviet authorities that they were being asked only

to provide military supplies to Poland and other such aid as the Polish government

might eventually request. 'If the Russians do not want to conclude on this basis',

added Daladier, 'I have another card to play, and I will play it if necessary'.

Doumenc did not say what it was or Daladier did not name his other card. In any

event, Doumenc told Naggiar that Drax's instructions were to delay an agreement.

Naggiar was appalled, telling Doumenc that their instructions would kill the

negotiations.'55

As the ambassador noted in retrospect,

'I recommended a well defined

military agreement and they send from Paris and London two missions instructed

to agree to nothing in this regard. As improbable

as this seems, it is nevertheless

true'.156

After repeatedly warning of the need to face the question of Red Army passage

across Poland,

Naggiar was at his wit's end. He immediately

cabled Paris that British

instructions were at variance

with what had been agreed by the three

governments

and

that they were exceedingly dangerous

unless the British government 'secretly hoped

for the failure of the talks'. The Soviet leaders were already highly suspicious of

Anglo-French

motives, they would now only become more so. Naggiar asked Bonnet

to intervene in London.'57

The Soviet government

was aware of what was going on. Mandel told Surits on 2

August that Doumenc was going to Moscow without detailed instructions. 'London

and Paris (owing to the pressure

of public opinion) want to avoid a breakdown of the

talks, but there is no sign of any desire to achieve a serious agreement

that should be

put into effect immediately'.158 Maisky sent similar information.

In Moscow Stalin

observed to Molotov that London and Paris were not serious, they 'still want to play

poker'. Molotov advised that they had to go ahead with the talks anyway. 'Let them

show their cards', he said. 'Agreed', replied Stalin, 'if we must'."59

Like Daladier, Stalin also had another card to play-in Berlin. In early August

German

diplomatic

initiatives toward the Soviet government

became more pressing as

German military preparations

for an invasion of Poland matured. 'There was no

problem

from the Baltic to the Black Sea', said Ribbentrop

to Astakhov, which could

not be resolved. Astakhov demurred,

and the Germans assumed that talks with the

British and French

remained the Soviet priority.

It was still a game of cat and mouse,

but not for long. The Soviet leaders not only distrusted the Anglo-French

but had to

worry

about

security

in the far east. The Red Army was just then fighting

off Japanese

raids on the Manchurian frontier. The Germans

might help in settling the conflict. On

12 August Astakhov indicated to Schnurre

that the Soviet government

was prepared

to undertake economic and political negotiations, the only qualification

being that

they should take place by stages. On 15 August the German ambassador

in Moscow,

327

MICHAEL CARLEY

Schulenburg,

proposed to Molotov a meeting with Ribbentrop

in Moscow to settle

outstanding differences. Would the German government be prepared to sign a

non-aggression

pact? asked Molotov. But Molotov stalled on a visit by Ribbentrop;

this would require 'adequate preparation'.60

Meanwhile in Paris the Quai d'Orsay, reacting to Naggiar's cable of 12 August,

asked the Foreign

Office 'to relax the instructions'

to Drax. Seeds also cabled London

with the same request. The 'French general has instructions to do his utmost to

conclude military agreement

at the earliest

possible date, and such instructions

clearly

do not tally with those given to Drax'. Seeds asked to know if the government

definitely wanted progress in the talks, 'beyond vague generalities'. If not, it would

be a pity 'as all indications so far go to show that Soviet military negotiators are

really out for business'.161 The deputy chiefs of staff agreed with Seeds, and the

Foreign Office advised that Drax's instructions could be loosened, though not

completely. But Halifax was puzzled by Seeds' comment on Doumenc's instructions

since the French mission had not shown any impatience

to conclude while in London.

'C'est tres juste', minuted Naggiar.'62

The talks began in Moscow on Saturday

12 August. As is well known, they ran into

early trouble when Voroshilov, the head of the Soviet delegation, put his written

powers on the table and asked for those of Doumenc and Drax. Doumenc provided

a vague letter of authority from Daladier. Drax, embarrassed,

said he had none.

Voroshilov scowled, but finally agreed to proceed while Drax hurriedly cabled

London asking for written instructions by return air mail! The Foreign Office

complied;

Drax would have power to discuss and to negotiate, but still not to sign.163

The French and British had planned to keep the negotiations to generalities. Not

Voroshilov; he wanted to discuss operational plans and he would not let his

interlocutors dodge the issues. On 13 August, after listening to an expose by

Doumenc, Voroshilov asked how they envisaged the role of the USSR in the event

of aggression against the prospective allied powers, and in particular

Poland and

Romania.164

The following day, 14 August, Voroshilov repeated

his question. Dou-

menc, respecting Daladier's instructions,

answered that each ally would defend its

own territory,

asking for help if necessary. What if they do not ask in good time?

asked Voroshilov. 'It will mean they have put up their hands, that they will have

surrendered'. Doumenc responded evasively; Drax said that Poland and Romania

would 'soon ['in two weeks', according to Doumenc's account] become German

provinces' if they did not accept Soviet military support.

The marshal allowed his

interlocuters to dance around the issue a little longer, then he cut them short,

I want a clear answer to my very clear question concerning the joint action of the Armed

Forces of Britain, France and the Soviet Union against the common enemy ... should he

attack.

That is all I want to know ... Do the French and British General Staffs think the

Soviet land forces will be admitted to Polish territory

in order to make direct contact with

the enemy in case Poland is attacked?

Doumenc and Drax, discountenanced, still tried to dodge, but Voroshilov would not

tolerate it. 'I want a straight answer. .. Your opinion is that Poland and Romania will

ask for help. I doubt if it would turn out like that. They might ask for aid ... or they

might not, or they might ask for it too late'. If so, 'their forces will be destroyed.

328

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

These troops should be used as an additional allied asset; it is in the interest neither

of England, nor of France, nor of the USSR that they should be destroyed'.165

Finally, after five years of Anglo-French evasion, Voroshilov backed his would-be

allies up against the wall. Drax was flummoxed. Naggiar was not ready to call it quits.

I told you so, he cabled Paris. But it was still not too late to extort an answer from

the Poles and Romanians. Seeds cabled London, supporting Naggiar. We are the

'petitioners in this matter', said Seeds, the onus is on London and Paris to obtain an

answer from Warsaw.166

In London the deputy chiefs of staff, whom Chamberlain had tried at times to

muzzle or ignore, would be muzzled or ignored no longer. We want 'to put on

record', they said pointedly, 'certain general observations on the broad question of the

use of Polish and Romanian territory by the Russian forces'. Voroshilov could have

written the report. It was no time for half-measures, said the deputy chiefs, the

'strongest pressure' should be brought to bear on Poland and Romania; 'the Russians

should be given every facility for rendering assistance and putting their maximum

weight into the scale on the side of the anti-aggression powers'. If this is not done,

the Poles would have no chance against a German attack.

The supply of arms and war material

is not enough. If the Russians are to collaborate

resisting German

aggression against Poland or Romania

they can only do so effectively on

Polish or Romanian

soil; and ... if permission for this were witheld till war breaks out, it

would then be too late. The most the Allies could then hope for would be to avenge Poland

and Romania and perhaps

restore their independence

as a result of the defeat of Germany

in a long war.

Without immediate and effective Russian assistance . . . the longer that war would be, and

the less chance there would be of either Poland or Romania emerging at the end of it as

independent

states in anything like their original form.

Who can say now that the deputy chiefs were wrong? The 'unpalatable truth', they

said, had to be presented 'with absolute frankness' in Warsaw and Bucharest. A treaty

with the USSR was 'the best way of preventing a war'; if it failed, Poland and

Romania could pay the price of a possible Soviet-German rapprochement.167

The war winds were blowing hot now, but apparently not hot enough as the Foreign

Office was still producing papers on 'indirect aggression', 'Comique si cela n'etait

pas tragique', scribbled Naggiar.168 In Paris Voroshilov's ultimatum and Naggiar's

cables prompted the Quai d'Orsay to press the Polish government to accept Red Army

passage across Polish territory. The Polish government refused to cooperate. Moscow

might think Poland afraid and put up the price of its help. 'Bargaining with the Soviet

government ... was like doing a deal in an oriental bazaar; the essential thing was

to show no interest in what you really wish to buy'.169

On 15 August Bonnet summoned the Polish ambassador in Paris, Lukasziewicz,

who said Beck would certainly reject out of hand a Soviet demand for passage.170

Bonnet sent instructions to Noel to see Beck, and the French military attache, General

Musse, was ordered back to Warsaw. In the midst of a full-blown crisis, commented

Naggiar, 'the military attache was on holiday in Biarritz'. It was worse than that;

neither Noel nor Musse was prepared to apply the full rigour of their instructions.

Noel feared to compromise his personal position in Warsaw. Musse was vulnerable

to Polish influence and questioned Soviet good faith as much as did the Poles.171

329

MICHAEL

CARLEY

Doumenc wanted to send a senior officer to Warsaw,

but Paris blocked it for fear of

undesirable

publicity. He sent instead a subaltern,

Captain Beaufre, who could not

hope to influence Noel or Musse. Typical of the negotiations, Beaufre missed his

plane back to Moscow, prompting Naggiar to more sarcastic marginalia.

With such

messengers there was no chance of success. The Soviet side would let us cut our

throats,

Drax reported,

over the question

of Red Army

passage across Poland.

Naggiar

signalled that if the Poles did not agree, the talks in Moscow would fail.'72

The Foreign Office sent instructions

to Kennard to support

the French, though he

had no greater success. 'We have done our best', Kennard said, but the Polish

government would not budge. Quite apart from centuries-old national animosities,

'strong internal

political reasons' dictated the Polish position.

It is unthinkable

that

the

present political

structure

of Eastern Galicia could

survive the

entry

of Russian

troops, especially

as communism makes a certain

appeal

to young

Ukrainians.

Vilna area

large

White Russian

population

is politically

immature and is easily

influenced

by Soviet propaganda.'73

The Foreign Office sent additional instructions, but Kennard replied that he had

already used his best arguments

and had decided 'to refrain

from further action'.74

The Quai d'Orsay

directed Noel to try again. On 21 August the French

government

authorised

Doumenc-though the British never sent similar instructions

to Drax-to

sign the best agreement he could get with the Soviet Union. 'Too late', minuted

Naggiar.175

On 17 August the Soviet government

suggested

to Berlin a non-aggression

pact with a protocol defining German and Soviet foreign policy interests. Stalin's

willingness to wait for acceptable Anglo-French

offers was nearly-but not quite-at

an end. When Ribbentrop pressed

for an immediate

meeting in Moscow, Molotov still

stalled, suggesting 26 or 27 August. Until the last moment, the Germans were not

certain that the Soviet Union would conclude. Hitler, impatient

for a showdown with

Poland, sent a cable to Stalin insisting on an earlier meeting. During the evening of

20/21 August Stalin, after some hesitation, agreed.176

On 21 August Tass announced

the signature

of a Soviet-German trade

agreement;

on 22 August that

Ribbentrop

was

expected in Moscow on the morrow to conclude a non-aggression

pact.

Doumenc saw Voroshilov on the evening of 22 August in a last-ditch attempt

save the situation. The French government,

he said, had authorised him to sign an

agreement consenting to Red Army passage across Poland. Does the British govern-

ment concur?

asked Voroshilov. Doumenc did not know. What about the Polish and

Romanian governments? asked Voroshilov. Doumenc could not say. 'I am per-

suaded', replied Voroshilov, 'that the Poles would want to participate directly in our

talks had they given their consent to the passage of Soviet troops. They would have

insisted...',77 The best the Poles would do was to agree on 23 August that in the

event of German aggression some form of Polish-Soviet cooperation would not

necessarily be excluded. This is not enough, noted Naggiar.178 Ribbentrop

arrived

Moscow the same day and signed a non-aggression

pact in the early hours of the

following morning.

The pill was bitter

to swallow. Seeds went to see Molotov later on the evening of

22 August after Doumenc had met Voroshilov. The meeting was stormy. Molotov

angrily rejected Seeds' accusation of bad faith. He would not allow the British 'to

330

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

stand in judgement of the Soviet government'.

You should have warned

us, accused

Seeds. The British government

does not advise us of changes in its policy, replied

Molotov. This is different, retorted Seeds.

The British government

was not serious, said Molotov, the 'height of insincerity

had been reached when military missions arrived in Moscow empty-handed' and

unwilling to deal with the question

of Red Army passage across Poland and Romania.

You were only 'playing with us', accused Molotov. Finally, the Soviet government

had decided-'either yesterday

or the day before' surmised

Seeds-to accept German

proposals.

Seeds denied that the British mission had arrived 'empty-handed'-though Dou-

menc had used the same expression when discussing his instructions with Leger in

Paris. Molotov waved off Seeds' explanation,

saying that the passage issue had been

raised 'on several occasions in the past' and that the French could never bring

themselves 'to give a clear answer'.79

Who can say that Molotov was wrong? Even

in 1935, minuted Naggiar, the USSR had proposed definite treaty obligations 'to

which we responded

with vague formulations'.180

Molotov could have added that Litvinov had warned countless times of the Soviet

option of a German

rapprochement.

So did Alphand,

Coulondre,

Naggiar and Payart.

French cabinet ministers Mandel and Reynaud

had even encouraged

Surits to threaten

this option in order to shake French complacency. How many times did I say it?

remarked

Alphand: 'Implement

the [mutual assistance] accord with the USSR, or the

Russians

will come to terms with the Germans'.l81 It had been no use, the French and

British governments

did not take such warnings seriously-or in any event, seriously

enough. The Soviet authorities

had been too eager to conclude with the West.

In Warsaw Beck was untroubled

by the sudden turn in events which simply

confirmed

his suspicions of the Soviet Union. 'Really not much had changed', Beck

told Noel. When Naggiar saw this report,

he minuted, 'One cannot imagine anything

more insane'. In Paris Daladier

thought the German

army would march into Poland

in a matter of days. He condemned the Poles' 'folly' as much as the Soviet

'duplicity',

though

in the latter case he had little room for criticism.182

Bonnet funked.

He cabled Naggiar to invoke the consultative clause of the 1935 mutual assistance

pact. 'A little late', thought

Naggiar.183

Beyond a Bonnet flirt with Rome, the French

ran out of ideas. In London the Chamberlain

government

sought a way out up to the

last minute, but to no avail.

The outbreak of war

In the early morning of 1 September 60 German divisions invaded Poland. On 2

September

Chamberlain

spoke in the House of Commons not of a declaration

of war

but of further

negotiations.

There was consternation

in the House which thought

that

Chamberlain was going to run for it. An Opposition leader rose to speak. One MP

shouted 'Speak for England'; the House rumbled its approval. Appeasement was

finally dead, or at least dying. It died harder in France.

It took the French

government

three days before it could muster up determination

enough to issue an ultimatum

Germany. And the French did so reluctantly, trailing the British. After years of

criticising

the Red Army, the French

high command launched the drole de guerre, not

331

MICHAEL

CARLEY

an offensive, and let Poland be crushed in a fortnight-about what Drax had predicted

to Voroshilov a few weeks before.

Is it any wonder that the Soviet leaders mistrusted the French and British

governments?

If the Anglo-French

were ready to let Poland be crushed, would they

have done more for the USSR? Volkogonov says that both sides lacked statesmen to

overcome mutual distrust and be patient enough to work out an agreement.184

This is

undoubtedly

so; perhaps in another week the Poles might have been compelled to

yield. But would it have made the French more willing to take the offensive?

Thinking

not, the Soviet government

saw a no-win situation:

fight now, or fight later.

Stalin preferred

to fight later. It was not a question of whether Stalin trusted Hitler

more than the Anglo-French;

Stalin trusted

no one. It was a question of buying time,

or of sauve qui peut. His decision was akin to that of the Anglo-French

in 1938 not

to go to war over Czechoslovakia. This was a tit-for-tat policy, encouraging the

'crocodile' to stalk other

prey. Stalin's policy was perhaps

understandable,

but it was

not that of Volkogonov's statesman.

In hindsight, Stalin gravely miscalculated;

should have been ready to fight at once because even a French

army standing

on the

defensive would have been a far greater

asset than no French

army

at all, as he would

discover in June 1941 when the well-blooded, far more powerful

Nazi armies invaded

the USSR. But hindsight is twenty-twenty; sometimes we forget, noted A. J. P.

Taylor, that 'events ... in the past were once in the future'. In 1942 Molotov saw

Strang again in London: 'We did our best in 1939, but we failed: we were both at

fault' .185

Mistrust motivated Anglo-French

policy, but anti-bolshevism was its most impor-

tant component. Watt discounts Western anti-bolshevism, and says Maisky and

Litvinov were purblind ideologues who could not see straight.'86

Taylor said that

Chamberlain

'seemed to be practising

ideological aloofness toward the Soviet Union',

but here Taylor understated

the case. Chamberlain was an anti-bolshevik

ideologue.

He mostly hid his ideology for fear of provoking opposition attacks. But he never

embraced the idea of an Anglo-Soviet alliance and resisted every move in that

direction.

Taylor added that an Anglo-Soviet alliance was the policy of the Opposi-

tion. Chamberlain was a 'good hater', and when he looked at the possibility of a

Soviet alliance 'he saw there faces which reminded him of the Opposition front

bench'-but especially of 'Winston who is the worst of the lot', whose entry into the

cabinet would signal the end of appeasement.'87

For Chamberlain a Soviet alliance

and appeasement

were at opposite poles.

The French too were motivated by anti-bolshevism,

especially when the French

Communist

Party and the left in general showed signs of strength,

as was the case in

the mid-1930s. France had too long 'bitten at the hook of Nazi anti-bolshevik

propaganda', the Red bogey had stopped the development of a Franco-Soviet

alliance.'88 But in France anti-bolshevism was diluted by uncertainty, sympathy for

fascism, and plain fear. By 1939 the Popular Front was dead, French communists

were marginalised,

and Daladier and Bonnet could contemplate

a closer relationship

with the USSR, but not too close. The idea that the French resumed the diplomatic

initiative

in 1939 and were determined to obtain

a Soviet alliance is exaggerated.

The

French objective, like that of the British, was to have the USSR as an obliging

auxiliary,

out of the German

camp, but not fully in the Anglo-French. 'The Soviet'

332

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

would be a supplier of 'guns and potatoes', to borrow a phrase, for Poland which

would constitute a potential second front against Germany.

Not a real second front,

but the reflection of one, just menacing enough to bluff Hitler. The French were as

fond as Stalin of the image of playing poker, and they played until the last minute.189

But Hitler did also, and he played va banque.

The French and British governments

did not doubt the Soviet desire for Franco-

Soviet staff talks or for an alliance against Nazi Germany. They feared it-because

of the anticipated growth of Soviet prestige and influence and the spread of

communism

in the event of a victorious war. They did not foresee that a successful

Allied coalition where Polish, French and Romanian armies remained

in being would

limit the expansion

of Soviet influence.

The idea was to finesse the Soviet leaders, to

benefit from their support

but not to pay a price for it. The Chamberlain-Daladier

policy was less a mistake than a calculated risk which went wrong. It was a policy

driven by anti-bolshevism.

About the only contemporary

success the French and British governments enjoyed

was to put the blame for the failure of negotiations on the Soviet side. At the time,

however, the Foreign Office was not so sure. Louis Fischer, a well-known American

journalist and historian

previously 'infected with bolshevik ideas', but then 'disillu-

sioned and disappointed',

like others on the left, by the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression

pact, asked for privileged information for a story condemning

Soviet policy. Halifax

refused, calculating that the 'left' could scarcely be more disillusioned, and that 'it

might not impossibly cause ourselves some embarrassment. ..' 90 Halifax need not

have worried;

most Western

historians still roundly

condemn

the Soviet leadership

for

the pact with the Nazis. Perhaps responsibilities should be more equitably appor-

tioned. Until August 1939 the Soviet Union held the high political ground

in the effort

to resist Nazism. It was high ground awash in blood spilled in the Stalinist purges,

but it was high ground

nevertheless.

The French

and British should have been alerted

by the sacking of Litvinov, but the 'men of Munich' were blinded

by ideological fears

and calculations.

Stalin, on the other

hand, was too unscrupulous,

too cynical to be an ideologue; he

was less of one, at any rate, than Chamberlain or Daladier. Litvinov was not one at

all; he had been too long in Narkomindel;

he was a skilled and courageous

diplomat

out to serve the national

interests of his country.

He did not care about the Comintern

or the French Communist

Party, or any foreign communist

party for that matter,

was interested in a Franco-Soviet

and then an Anglo-Franco-Soviet

alliance against

Nazism. Litvinov was the statesman whom Volkogonov says the Soviet Union

needed; he had the necessary patience, but not quite the staying power.

It was not for nothing that Auden called the 1930s the 'low, dishonest decade'; in

August 1939 Stalin gave up the Soviet's small patch of high ground,

which had to be

repurchased

at terrible cost by the Soviet peoples, though the price of appeasement

was high for all the nations which fought fascism. Paradoxically,

it was the Soviet

leaders who through

most of the inter-war

years were willing to treat with the West

on a more pragmatic

basis. Litvinov was the exemplar

of this approach.

Ideologically

driven Soviet foreign policies were the exception, not the rule.

In France and Great Britain the opposite seems true. Anti-communist hysteria

during

the inter-war

years was as strident

as it would be after 1945 when it was called

333

MICHAEL CARLEY

the Cold War. French historians have stressed the decadence and the ideological

divisions of French society in the 1930s. Dissident British Tories spoke of the

appeasers' 'fatal confusion' between class and national interests. The American

historian F. L. Schuman wrote that the Cold War started after the Bolshevik

revolution in 1917, though it was interrupted during the inter-war years by a period

of 'coexistence'.'19 These ideas may be carried a step further. The Cold War did

indeed begin in 1917, but there was no interregnum. The mutual mistrust engendered

by it did much to prevent Anglo-French pragmatists from banding together with the

USSR in 1939 to break Hitler's neck and thus contributed greatly to the origins of

World War II.

Social Science Federation of Canada, Canadian Federation for the Humanities

' I wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its

financial

support

and the Social Science Federation

of Canada and the Canadian Federation for the

Humanities

for leave of absence to do continuing

research. Thanks are also due to John

C. Cairns,

Richard K. Debo and Robert J. Young

for reading

and

commenting

on an earlier draft.

2 Earl of Birkenhead,

Halifax

(London,

1965), p. 440.

3 E.g. V. Ya. Sipols,

Diplomaticheskaya

bor'ba

nakanune vtoroi mirovoi

voiny

(Moscow, 1989),

pp.

262-267; or I. K. Koblyakov,

USSR;

For Peace

Against Aggression,

1933-1941 (Moscow,

1976),

pp. 144-156. See also 'Kruglyi

stol: vtoraya mirovaya

voina: istoki i prichimy',

Voprosy

istorii,

1989, pp. 3-32.

4 D. Cameron

Watt,

How War

Came

(London, 1990), pp. 338, 452.

5 E.g. Jean-Baptiste

Duroselle, La ddcadence,

1932-1939 (Paris, 1985), pp. 416-417, and

passim;

Robert

J. Young,

In Command

of France: French

Policy and

Military Planning,

1933-1940,

(Cambridge,

MA, 1978), pp. 236-237, 240-241; and Robert

J. Young, 'A. J. P. Taylor and the

Problem

with France' in G. Martel,

ed., The

Origins

of the

Second

World War

Reconsidered

(Boston,

MA, 1986), pp. 97-118.

6 K. Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain

(London, 1947), p. 403; and John Charmley,

Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (London, 1989), p. 181.

7 Geoffrey

Roberts,

The Unholy

Alliance:

Stalin's

Pact with

Hitler (Bloomington,

IN., 1989),

pp. 225-226; and Watt,

How War

Came,

p. 120.

8 On Tory anti-bolshevism

see Margaret

George, Warped

Vision: British Foreign Policy,

1933-1939, (Pittsburgh,

PA, 1965),

passim;

Neville Thompson,

The

Anti-Appeasers:

Conservative

Opposition

to Appeasement

in the 1930s (Oxford, 1971), pp. 38-40, and passim; and Maurice

Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940 (London, 1975),

passim.

On Chamberlain's

anti-bolshevism see Sidney

Aster,

1939: The

Making of the Second World

War

(London,

1973), pp. 184-185 and

passim.

9 Duroselle, Decadence,

pp. 12-27.

Ren6

Girault,

'Les d6cideurs

francais et la puissance

francaise

en 1938-1939', in R. Girault

& Robert

Frank,

eds, La puissance

en Europe,

1938-1940 (Paris,

1984), pp. 34-40.

" A. J. P. Taylor,

The Origins

of the Second

World

War

(Harmondsworth, 1964), p. 318.

12 Taylor, The Origins, p. 319; Dimitri Volkogonov, Staline (Paris, 1991), p. 268; Roy

Medvedev,

Let

History Judge:

The

Origins

and Consequences

of Stalinism

(New York,

1989),

p. 728.

G. Gorodetsky,

'The

Impact

of the Ribbentrop-Molotov

Pact on the Course

of Soviet

Foreign

Policy', Cahiers

du monde

russe et sovietique,

XXXI, 1, 1990, pp. 27-28. For the view that the

Soviet government

preferred

a Soviet-German

accord see among others Gerhard

Weinberg,

The

Foreign

Policy of Hitler's

Germany: Starting

World

War

II, 1937-1939 (Chicago,

IL, 1980),

passim,

or Adam

Ulam, Expansion

and Coexistence

(New York, 1968), pp. 257-279). T. J. Uldricks

notes

that

this view 'makes

98 per cent of all Soviet diplomatic

activity

a brittle

cover for the remaining

covert

2 per

cent'. T. J. Uldricks,

'A. J. P. Taylor

and the Russians',

in Martel,

The

Origins,

p. 178).

14 In some respects,

this article

is a reprise

and

an expansion-with published

and

unpublished

papers

to hand-of the views of L. B. Namier,

Diplomatic

Prelude,

1938-1939 (London,

1948),

pp.

143-210. See also F. L. Schuman,

Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad (New York,1948),

pp.

361-378.

15 G. Clerk, British

ambassador

in Paris,

n? 31 saving,

26 February

1935, and minute

by Orme

Garton

Sargent,

assistant

under-secretary

of state, C1558/55/18,

P[ublic] R[ecords] O[ffice,

London],

334

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

F[oreign] O[ffice] 371 18827; and Minute, n? N1313/53/38, 15 March 1935, comment by Sargent,

PRO FO 371 19456.

16 Alphand, n?s 505-11, 9 November 1934, M[inistere des] A[ffaires] 6[trangeres], B[ureau du]

C[hiffre], t6elgrammes a l'arriv6e de Moscou, 1934-5; and M. J. Carley, 'Five Kopecks for Five

Kopecks: Franco-Soviet Trade Negotiations, 1928-1939', Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique,

XXXIII, 1, 1992, pp. 23-57.

17 N. Lloyd Thomas, British charg6 d'affaires in Paris, to Anthony Eden, foreign secretary, n?

1310, 14 October 1936, C7262/92/62, PRO FO 271 19880.

18 Louis Maurin, minister of war, to Laval, n? 1365 2/EMA-SAE, 29 May 1935, S[ervice]

h[istorique de l']a[rmee de] t[erre, Vincennes] 7N 3186.

19 Potemkin to Litvinov, 26 June 1935, Kommissiya po izdaniyu diplomaticheskikh dokumen-

tov, D[okumenty] v[neshnei] p[olitiki SSSR], 21 vols (Moscow, 1958-77), XVIII, pp. 415-421; Note,

Directeur politique [Paul Bargeton], MAE, 24 June 1935, MAE ancienne s6rie Z-Europe, 1930-

1940, followed by the geographic subheading, volume, and folio number, thus Z-URSS/1004, pp.

172-174; and also 'Note sur les avantages et les inconv6nients de l'alliance russe', Etat-Major de

l'Arm6e [EMA], 2e Bureau, 24 April 1935, SHAT 7N 3143.

20 Alphand, n?s 36-40, 25 January 1936, MAE BC, telegrammes a l'arriv6e de Moscou, 1936.

21 Potemkin to Litvinov, 26 July 1935, DVP, XVIII, pp. 415-421; Litvinov to Potemkin, 13

January 1936, ibid., XIX pp. 26-27; and 'Record of a conversation of the plenipotentiary representa-

tive of the USSR in France with the president of the council of ministers of France [Albert] Sarraut',

signed Potemkin, 14 March 1936, ibid, pp. 145-147.

22 Potemkin to N. N. Krestinsky, deputy commissar of foreign affairs, 26 March 1936, ibid, pp.

189-195.

23 Schweisguth notes, 24 June 1936, A[rchives] n[ationales, Paris], Papiers Schweisguth 351AP/

3; and Compte rendu d'une conversation entre M. Hirschfeld, charg6 d'affaires de l'URSS, et le

general Schweisguth', nd (but 30 June 1936), AN Papiers Schweisguth, 351AP/5.

24 'URSS, Manoeuvres de Russie blanche de septembre 1936', by Schweisguth, 5 October 1936,

SHAT 7N 3184.

25 Litvinov (from Geneva) to the Soviet commissariat for foreign affairs (Narkomindel), 5

October 1936, DVP, XIX, pp. 461-462; Potemkin to Narkomindel, 17 September 1936, ibid., pp.

428-429; and Potemkin to Narkomindel, 19 September 1936, ibid., pp. 430-432.

26 Daladier to Delbos, n? 1411 2/EMA SAE, 13 October 1936, SHAT 7N 3143; and the dossier

entitled 'Cession de mat6riel a l'URSS (juillet-september 1936)', AN Papiers Daladier, 496AP/7.

27 Schweisguth notes, 25 June 1936, AN Papiers Schweisguth, 351AP/3; and Girshfeld to

Narkomindel, 8 October 1936, DVP, XIX, pp. 465-466.

28 Schweisguth notes, 27 & 31 October, 7 November, 22 December 1936 & 5 January 1937, AN

Papiers Schweisguth, 351AP/3; cf., Maurice Vaisse, 'Les militaires francais et l'alliance franco-sovi-

dtique au cours des anndes 1930', Forces armees et systemes d'alliances: Colloque international

d'histoire militaire et d'etudes de defense nationale (Montpellier, 1981), II, pp. 696-697; and Young,

In Command of France, pp. 147-149.

29 Potemkin to Narkomindel, 9 November 1936, DVP, XIX, p. 549; and Litvinov to Potemkin,

14 November 1936, ibid, p. 775.

30 Coulondre, n?s 507-20, 12 November 1936, MAE BC, telegrammes a l'arrivde de Moscou,

1936; Coulondre, n?355, 16 November 1936, MAE Z-URSS/1005, pp. 14-22; and R. Coulondre,

De Staline a Hitler, souvenirs de deux ambassades, 1936-1939 (Paris, 1950), pp. 31-32.

31 Schweisguth notes, 22 October & 4 December 1936 (comments by General Marie-Eugene

Debeney), AN Papiers Schweisguth 351AP/3; and comment by deputy chief of staff Paul-Henri

Gerodias on Jean Payart, n? 308, 27 September 1936, SHAT 7N 3124.

32 Schweisguth notes, 8 January & 8 February 1937, AN Papiers Schweisguth, 351AP/3.

33 Schweisguth notes, 8 February & 19 March 1937, ibid.

34 Schweisguth notes, 8 February 1937, ibid. Young and Vaisse report the lack of French interest

in staff talks, but only allude to French duplicity (Young, In Command of France. . ., pp. 148-149;

and Vaisse, 'Les militaires francais.. .', p. 696).

35 'Visite du general Semenoff...', TRES SECRET, 17 February 1937, SHAT 7N 3186.

36 Potemkin to Narkomindel, 17 February 1937, DVP, XX, pp. 88-89; and 'Entretien avec

M. Potemkine... le 17 Fdvrier 1937. . ., Notes prises par L6on Blum', AN Papiers Daladier,

496AP/7,

37 'Compte rendu au ministre', TRES SECRET, n[ot] s[igned], 23 February 1937, AN Papiers

Daladier, 496AP/7.

38 Schweisguth notes, 19 March 1937, AN Papiers Schweisguth, 351AP/3.

335

MICHAEL CARLEY

39 'Conversation du general Schueisguth avec le general Semenoff.. .', TRES SECRET, 19

March 1937, SHAT 7N 3186.

40 Potemkin to Narkomindel, 23 March 1937, DVP, XX, pp. 141-142.

41 Girshfeld to Narkomindel, 27 March 1937, ibid, pp. 152, 703-704; and Schweisguth notes,

8 & 9 April 1937, AN Papiers Schweisguth, 351AP/3.

42 Schweisguth notes, 8 & 23 April 1937, AN Papiers Schweisguth, 351AP/3.

43 Schweisguth notes, 25 April, 14, 26, & 27 May 1937, ibid; Note by R. G. Vansittart,

permanent under-secretary of state, 13 May 1937, C3620/532/62, PRO FO 371 20702; and 'Extract

from a record of conversation at a lunch given by the Secretary of State to MM. Delbos & Leger on

15 May 1937', C3685/532/62, ibid.

44 Potemkin to Surits, 4 May 1937, DVP, XX, pp. 227-228.

45 Cf. Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, 1936-1939

(London, 1977), pp. 49-50; and Joel Colton, Leon Blum: Humanist in Politics (New York, 1966), pp.

210-213.

46 So said Etienne de Croy, Leger's private secretary, to Fitzroy Maclean, en route for Moscow,

on 17 December 1937 (Untitled minute, 18 December 1937, C8880/532/62, PRO FO 371 20702).

47 'Conversation avec M. Payard (sic). . .', nd (September 1936), ns, AN Papiers Schweisguth,

351AP/5; and 'Repercussions possibles d'un contact militaire franco-sovietique sur l'alliance franco-

polonaise.. .', EMA, 2e Bureau SAE, nd (probably June 1937), SHAT 7N 3143.

48 Relating two conversations at the end of June 1937 with the French journalist Pertinax, Lord

Chilston, British ambassador in Moscow, to Laurence Collier, head of the Northern department

at the

Foreign Office, 27 July 1937, N3932/45/38, PRO FO 371 21095.

49 'Note pour le Cabinet du ministre', n? 1579 2/EMA-SAE, signed Colson, 7 September 1937,

SHAT 7N 3186.

50 Surits to Litvinov, 27 November 1937, DVP, XX, pp. 630-634.

51 Potemkin to Surits, 19 December 1937, ibid., pp. 671-673.

52 Colonel A.-A. Palasse, French military attachd in Moscow, n? 427/S, 28 December 1937,

SHAT 7N 3123; and Coulondre, n? 308, 28 December 1937, MAE Z-URSS/1005, pp. 37-42; cf.,

J. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-39 (New York,

1984), pp. 153-154.

53 See the exchange of correspondence and minutes in PRO FO 371 21094/21095.

54 Surits to Narkomindel, 15 February 1938, DVP, XXI, pp. 77-78; and Surits to Narkomindel,

22 February 1938, ibid, p. 84.

55 'Note pour le colonel Palasse...', n? 1356 2/EMA-SAE, signed General Henri-Fernard

Dentz, deputy chief of staff, 30 May 1938, SHAT 7N 3186.

56 Surits to Narkomindel, 5 May 1938, DVP, XXI, pp. 227-228

57 Surits to Litvinov, 27 July 1938, ibid., pp. 392-402.

58 Payart, n?s 663-5, 5 September 1938, MAE BC, telegrammes a l'arrivde de Moscou, 1938-9;

and Coulondre, n? 729, 28 September 1938, ibid. For a recent study of Soviet military preparations

during the Munich crisis, see G. Jukes, 'The Red Army and the Munich Crisis', Journal of

Contemporary History, 26, 1991, pp. 195-214.

59 Bonnet to Noel, n? 390, 23 May 1938, MAE Papiers 1940, Varsovie, telegrammes, d6part,

1938-1940; Noel, n?s 472-4, 10 May 1938, D[ocuments] d[iplomatiques]f[ran!cais], 2e sdrie (Paris,

1964-), IX, p. 673; 'Note d'audience du ministre [Bonnet]', 22 May 1938, ibid., pp. 846-847; Noel,

n? 556, 26 May 1938, ibid, p. 907; Noel, n? 293, 31 May 1939, ibid., pp. 973-979; Bonnet to

Coulondre, n?s 541-2, 24 September 1938 & n?s 536-7, 25 September 1938, MAE BC, telegrammes

au depart de Moscou, 1938-9; and Coulondre, n?s 724-7, 27 September 1938, MAE BC, tele-

grammes l'arrivee de Moscow, 1938-9.

60 Payart, n? 661, 4 September 1938, MAE BC, telegrammes a l'arrivee de Moscou, 1938-9;

Coulondre, n? 720, 24 September 1938, ibid.; Coulondre, n?s 724-7, 27 September 1938, ibid.; and

Bonnet to Coulondre, n? 555, 28 September 1938, ibid.

61 Coulondre, n? 742, 1 October 1938, MAE BC, telegrammes a l'arrivde de Moscou, 1938-9.

62 Georges Clemenceau, pere la victoire, premier, 1917-1920, and Raymond Poincare, president

of the Republic, 1913-1920, and premier, 1922-4, 1926-9 (Surits to Litvinov, 12 October 1938,

DVP, XXI pp. 575-581).

63 'Record of a conversation of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR and the

French ambassador in the USSR Coulondre', signed Litvinov, 16 October 1938, DVP, XXI,

pp. 589-590; Litvinov to Surits, 19 October 1938, ibid., p. 594; Coulondre, n? 283, 18 October 1938,

AN, Papiers Daladier, 496AP/11; Chilston, n? 442, 18 October 1938, N5164/97/38, PRO FO 371

22289; Coulondre, n?s 745-8, 5 October 1938, MAE BC, telegrammes a l'arrivee de Moscou,

1938-9.

336

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

64 Coulondre, n? 265, 4 October 1938, MAE Papiers 1940, Cabinet Bonnet/16, pp. 327-333;

Coulondre, n? 283, 18 October 1938, AN, Papiers Daladier, 496AP/11; Palasse, n? 507/S, 18 October

1938, SHAT 7N 3123; and 'Extract from a record of conversation.. .on 15 May 1937', C3685/532/

62, PRO FO 371 20702.

65 Charmley, Chamberlain, p. 144; and Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, p. 281.

66 Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, p. 169.

67 Memorandum by Harold Caccia, 3 January 1939, and attached minutes, N57/57/38, PRO FO

371 23677.

68 Charles Corbin, French ambassador in London, n? 110, 8 February 1935, Z-URSS/972, pp.

116-119.

69 Maisky to Narkomindel, 20 January 1939, V. M. Falin et al., eds, S[oviet] P[eace] E[fforts

on the Eve of World War II (September 1938-August 1939)] 2 vols (Moscow, 1973), I, pp. 178-180.

70 'Memorandum of a conversation. ..', by Litvinov, 19 February 1939, ibid., pp. 214-216; and

Seeds, n? 24, 19 February 1939, N902/57/38, PRO FO 371 23677.

71 Litvinov to Maisky, 4 March 1939, SPE, I, pp. 232-233. Watt says that Litvinov and Maisky,

ideologically blinkered, did not notice the gradual change in British policy, but clearly they did (How

War Came, p. 120).

72 'Secretary of State', by Hudson, 8 March 1939, N1389/57/38, PRO FO 371 23677; Watt

mistakenly says that the Hudson mission was only 'a narrow exercise in trade promotion' (How War

Came, p. 119). On this point see Maisky to Litvinov, 18 March 1939, A. P. Bondarenko et al., eds.,

God krizisa, [1938-1939, Dokumenty i materialy] 2 vols (Moscow, 1990), I, pp. 292-293. These

volumes add some interesting details to the story of Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, but many of

the documents have already been published.

73 Payart, n?s 53-8, 1 February 1989, MAE, BC, t6ele6grammes

a 1'arriv6e de Moscou, 1938-9.

74 Payart, n?s 50-2, 31 January 1939; n?s 72-8, 6 Feb. 1939, ibid.; and Naggiar, n? 134, 24

February 1939; n?s 82-8, 9 February 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10.

75 Payart, n?s 159-66, 11 March 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10.

76 Naggiar's minute on his dispatch n? 161, 19 July 1939, ibid./8.

77 Payart, n?s 171-5, 15 March 1939, ibid./10.

78 For an early report see Raymond Brugere, French minister in Belgrade, n? 97, 1 March 1938,

Z-URSS/988, p. 59; also Coulondre, French ambassador in Berlin, n? 1203, 4 May 1939, DDF, 2e

tome XVI, pp. 109-111.

79 Cadogan's minute on a note by Sargent, 20 March 1939, C3775/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23061.

80 Eric Phipps, British ambassador in Paris, n? 114, 18 March 1939, C3455/3356/18, PRO FO

371 23060.

8S Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, MA, 1948), p. 322.

82 Noel, n? 19, 4 January 1939; and n? 74, 12 January 1939, MAE Z-URSS/1019.

83 Payart, n? 313, 20 August 1934, MAE Z-URSS/981, pp. 6-10; Jules Laroche, French

ambassador in Warsaw, n?s 483-6, 5 June 1934, MAE Z-URSS/965, pp. 63-65bis; Chilston n? 110

confidential, 9 March 1935, N1313/53/38, PRO FO 371 19456; Kennard to Collier, 6 April 1937,

N1926/45/38, PRO FO 371 21095; and Kennard to Sargent, 30 November 1938, D[ocuments on]

B[ritish] F[oreign] P[olicy], 3rd series, 9 vols (London, 1949-57), III, pp. 373-375.

84 Phipps, n? 114, 18 March 1939, minute by J. D. Roberts, C3455/3356/18, PRO FO 371

23060.

85 R. I. Campbell, British charg6 d'affaires in Paris, n? 155 saving, 22 March 1939, C3784/3356/

18, PRO FO 371 23061; 'Record of conversation between M. Leger and Mr. Campbell on March

18th', C3962/3356/18, ibid; and 'Record of an Anglo-French Conversation.. .', 21 March 1939,

DBFP, 3rd, IV, pp. 422-427.

86 William Manchester, The Caged Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill 1932-1940 (London,

1989), p. 480.

87 Birkenhead, Halifax, p. 434; and Anita Prazmowska, Britain, Poland, and the Eastern Front,

1939 (London, 1987), p. 52.

88 Taylor, The Origins..., pp. 276-277.

89 Seeds, n? 43, 23 March 1939, C3880/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23061; 'Notes of a conversa-

tion. . . [between Litvinov and Hudson]', 25 March 1939, God krizisa, I, pp. 324-327; and 'Notes of

a conversation... [between Potemkin & Hudson]', 27 March 1939, ibid., pp. 335-337.

90 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 391; and Palasse to Dentz, n? 1955, 124 June 1938, SHAT

7N 3186.

91' W. Jedrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in Berlin, 1933-1939: Papers and Memoirs of Jozef Lipski

(New York, 1968), pp. 504-507; cf., Prazmowska, Britain, Poland, and the Eastern Front. .., pp.

48-49, 60; and Charmley, Chamberlain, pp. 182-183.

337

MICHAEL CARLEY

92 'Record of an Anglo-French Conversation. ..', 22 March 1939, DBFP, 3rd, IV, pp. 457-463;

and Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (London, 1980), p. 306.

93 Maisky to Narkomindel, 31 March 1939, SPE, I, p. 300.

94 Bond, British Military Policy..., pp. 307-308; and Prazmowska, Britain, Poland, and the

Eastern Front..., pp. 51-52.

95 Maisky to Narkomindel, 6 April 1939, God krizisa, I, pp. 361-363; Halifax to Seeds, n? 255,

6 April 1939, DBFP, 3rd, V, pp. 53-54; and minutes, C5430/3356/18, recording the views of Sargent,

Cadogan and Halifax between 6 and 8 April 1939, PRO FO 371 23063. God krizisa gives more

complete versions of at least a few documents previously published in SPE where ellipses were not

used to indicate deletions. In this case Maisky's report on 6 April of Halifax's assurances of good will

was previously omitted (cf., SPE, I, pp. 318-320).

96 E.g., Litvinov to Surits, 29 March 1939, God krizisa, I, pp. 342-343. A source of information

may have been a Soviet agent in the Foreign Office (Watt, How War Came, p. 116).

97 Note by Cadogan, 19 April 1939, C5460/15/18, PRO FO 371 22969; and Corbin, n? 409, 25

May 1939, DDF, 2e, XVI, pp. 562-566.

98 D. Dilks ed. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London, 1971), pp. 178-179.

99 Kennard to Cadogan, 18 April 1939, C5859/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23064; Kennard,

n? 38 (saving), 19 April 1939, C5676/3356/18, ibid.; and n? 116, 18 April 1939, C5682/3356/18,

ibid. 100 Minute, C5749/3356/18, 22 April 1939, ibid.

101 Minute, C6206/3356/18, 29 April 1939, ibid.

102 Maisky to Narkomindel, 29 April 1939, God krizisa, I, pp. 410-412.

103 'Record of an Anglo-French Conversation. . .', 21 March 1939, DBFP, 3rd, IV, pp. 422-427;

Seeds, n? 63, 14 April 1939, C5330/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23063; and Payart, n?s 235-9, 2 April

1939; n?s 265-9, 14 April 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10.

104 Phipps to Halifax, n? 373, 28 March 1939, DBFP, 3rd, IV, p. 535; Surits to Narkomindel, 7

April 1939; SPE, 1, pp. 320-321; 8 April 1939, ibid., pp. 321-322; 11 April 1939, ibid., pp. 328-329;

and Surits to Narkomindel, 10 April 1939, God krizisa, I, p. 367.

105 Surits to Narkomindel, 14 April 1939, SPE, I, ibid., p. 341; and Bonnet to Payart, n? 129-36,

15 April 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/9.

106 Ivone Kirkpatrick, FO, London, to Phipps, n? 981, 20 April 1939, C5692/3356/18, PRO FO

371 23064; and Minute, C5842/3356/18, 25 April 1939, ibid.

107 ibid.; and Surits to Litvinov, 26 April 1939, SPE, I, pp. 360-361.

108 Phipps, n? 192, 30 April 1939, C6213/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23064; and Bonnet to Corbin,

n?s 752-6, 15 April 1939, MAE Papiers 1940, Cabinet Georges Bonnet/16, p. 169.

'09 Payart, n?s 326-9, 4 May 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10; and Payart, n?s 351-6, 10 May

1939, DDF, 2e, XVI, pp. 265-266.

110 Payart, n?s 346-9, 9 May 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10; Seeds, n? 87, 8 May 1939,

C6804/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23065; 'Memorandum of a conversation... [between Molotov and

Seeds]', 8 May 1939, SPE, II, pp. 25-26; and 'Record of a conversation... [between Molotov and

Payart]', 11 May 1939, God krizisa, I, pp. 449-451.

Il Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 365.

112 Ian Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet (London, 1971), p. 225; meeting of the Foreign Policy

Committee, Tuesday, 16 May 1939, C7401/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23066; and Vansittart to Halifax,

17 May 1939, C7169/3356/18, ibid.

113 'Notes prises au cours de l'entretien franco-britannique du 20 mai 1939...', AN Papiers

Daladier, 496AP/13; John Harvey ed. The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1937-1940 (London,

1970), pp. 286, 290, 290, 292; and Cowling, The Impact of Hitler. . ., p. 272.

114 ibid. 302; Aster, 1939, pp. 184-185; Dilks, The Diaries [Cadogan], 182; and Corbin, n? 409,

25 May 1939, DDF, 2e, XVI, pp. 562-566.

115 'Visite de Monsieur Souritz du 26 mai 1939. . .', MAE Papiers 1940, Cabinet Bonnet/16, pp.

266-268. N. B., the same note in the AN Papiers Daladier, 496AP/13 has a different, less negative

conclusion.

116 Maisky to Narkomindel, 3 May 1939 [the same date as Harvey's diary entry], SPE, II, pp.

11-13; 9 May 1939, ibid., p. 28.

117 Seeds, n? 87, 8 May 1939, C6804/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23065; Seeds, n? 93, 15 May 1939,

C7065/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23066; and Seeds, n? 148, 16 May 1939, C7328/3356/18, ibid.

118 Cadogan to Halifax, 23 May 1939, C7469/3356/18, ibid.; and Manchester, The Caged

Lion..., p. 471.

119 Molotov to Surits, 26 May 1939, SPE, II, p. 60; and Payart, n?s 400-05, 27 May 1939, MAE

Papiers Naggiar/10. Watt, How War Came, p. 247.

338

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939

120 Cadogan to Halifax, 23 May 1939, C7469/3356/18, PRO FO 37123066; Maisky to Molotov,

10 May 1939, SPE, II, pp. 30-32; and Maisky to Narkomindel, 21 May 1939, ibid., pp. 52-53.

121 Memorandum, by Strang, 16 May 1939, C7206/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23066; and Phipps,

n? 307 saving, 18 May 1939, C7264/3356/18, ibid.

122 Phipps, n? 217, 1 June 1939, C7916/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23067; and Phipps, n? 344

saving, 7 June 1939, C8137/3356/18, ibid; and Phipps to Halifax, 22 June 1939, DBFP, 3rd, VI, pp.

150-151.

123 Bonnet to Naggiar, n?s 218-9, 14 June 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/9.

124 Comment from MAE internal note, Direction politique, 5 July 1939, MAE Papiers 1940,

Cabinet Bonnet/16, pp. 280-297.

125 'Draft agreement.. .', 2 June 1939, SPE, II, pp. 75-76.

126 Seeds, n? 161, 30 May 1939, C7937/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23067; and Seeds, n? 181, 20

June 1939, C8840/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23069.

127 'Mr. [W.N.] Ewer's [diplomatic correspondent, Daily Herald] account of his talk with

M. Maisky', nd (but 9 June 1939), C8701/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23068.

128 See Naggiar's handwritten notes on his n?s 481-3, 14 June 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10;

and Naggiar, n?s 502-6, 16 June 1939, ibid.

129 Manchester, The Caged Lion. .., 471; and Surits to Narkomindel, 7 July 1939, SPE, II,

p. 128.

130 Payart, n?s 185-90, 17 March 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10.

131 Roberts, The Unholy Alliance. . ., pp. 124-127, 145-149.

132 Naggiar's minute on Bonnet to Naggiar, n?s 333-8, 5 July 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/9; see

also Payart's earlier, n?s 383-8, 24 May 1939, ibid./10; Naggiar, n?s 442-5, 3 June 1939, DDF, 2e,

XVI, pp. 655-656; and Naggiar, n?s 543-9, 22 June 1939, ibid., pp. 951-952.

133 Naggiar, n?s 449-54, 6 June 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10; and Seeds, n? 139, 23 June

1939, C8928/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23069.

134 Bonnet to Corbin, n? 1517, 19 July 1939, AN Papiers Daladier, 496AP/13; and Note by

Kirkpatrick, 21 July 1939, C10292/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23071.

135 Naggiar, n?s 455-9, 6 June 1939; n?s 463-70, 11 June 1939; and n?s 601-03, 2 July 1939,

MAE Papiers Naggiar/10; and Seeds to Sargent, personal letter, 3 August 1939, C11927/3356/18,

PRO FO 371 23073.

136 E.g., Naggiar, n? 484, 15 June 1939; n?s 580-6, 29 June 1939; n? 589, 1 July 1939; n?s

642-4, 7 July 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10; and Bonnet to Naggiar, n?s 444-8, 15 July 1939,

ibid.19.

137 Naggiar, n?s 629-39, 5 July 1939; n?s 674-83, 11 July 1939; n?s 686-91, 13 July 1939; n?s

699-703, 15 July 1939; n? 707, 16 July 1939; n?s 723-37, 18 July 1939, ibid./10; and 'Note', by

Palasse, n? 599/S, 13 July 1939, SHAT 7N 3186. Watt mistakenly states that Paris was ill-served by

Naggiar who failed to appreciate the possibility of the Soviet Union opting for a German rapproche-

ment (How War Came, p. 611).

138 Naggiar's minutes on Bonnet's n?s 423-8, 430-6, 11 July 1939, ibid.19.

139

Naggiar, n?s 507-18, 17 June 1939, ibid./10; and Naggiar, n?s 534-7, 22 June 1939, DDF,

2e, XVI, pp. 938-939.

140 Naggiar, n?s 543-9, 22 June 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10; Bonnet to Naggiar, n?s 252-9,

24 June 1939, ibid.19; and Corbin to Sargent, 11 July 1939, C9972/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23070.

14' Naggiar's minute on Bonnet, n? 505-11, 25 July 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/9.

142 Naggiar's minute on Bonnet, n? 548, 30 July 1939, ibid.

143 Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Policy, 19 July 1939, C10267/3356/18, PRO FO 371

23071.

144 Committee on Foreign Policy, 10 July 1939, C9761/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23070.

145 Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet..., p. 229.

146 Phipps, n? 929, 21 July 1939, C10410/90/17, PRO FO 371 22912.

147 Roberts, The Unholy Alliance. . ., pp. 148-151.

148 Committee on Foreign Policy, 10 July 1939, C9761/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23070; and

Admiral Sir Reginald Drax, 'Mission to Moscow, August 1939', p. 7, Churchill Archives Centre,

Cambridge, Drax Papers, 6/5.

149 Cabinet conclusions, 26 July 1939, C10629/3356/18, PRO FO 371 20371; Drax, 'Mission to

Moscow, August 1939', p. 6, Churchill Archives, Drax Papers, 6/5; and 'Rapport de mission a

Moscou', Capt. de corvette Williaume, August 1939, SHAT 7N 3185.

150 Committee on Foreign Policy, 1 August 1939, C10826/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23072.

151 'Extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence. . .', 2 August

1939, C10952/3356/18, ibid.

339

MICHAEL CARLEY

152 'Cabinet extract... Major General H. L. Ismay's conversations in Paris on 29 July 1939',

C10811/3356/18, ibid.

153 Gamelin to Doumenc, n? 1522/DN. 3, 27 July 1939, SHAT 7N 3186.

154 Doumenc, 'Souvenirs de la mission en Russie, aoft 1939', pp. 11-12, SHAT 7N 3185. Watt

and Duroselle quote or refer to this exchange (from excerpts in DDF), but they do not mention

Doumenc's important comment that he was leaving for Moscow empty-handed-'les mains vides'

(Watt, How War Came, p. 452; and Duroselle, La Decadence ..., p. 428).

155 Naggiar's minute on his cable, n?s 860-3, 12 August 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10;

Doumenc, 'Souvenirs', 57, SHAT 7N 3185; and the little noted confirmation of Daladier's instruc-

tions in L. Noel, L'agression allemande contre la Pologne (Paris, 1946), p. 423. Naggiar's minute

sharply qualifies what is usually assumed to be French determination to conclude a Soviet alliance.

Daladier said in 1946 that Soviet insistence on Red Army passage came as an 'extraordinary'

surprise

to the French government, but the evidence demonstrates that it was not a surprise at all (Namier,

Diplomatic Prelude..., pp. 204-206; cf., Watt, How War Came, pp. 452-453).

156 Naggiar's retrospective minute on his cable n? 707, 16 July 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10.

157 Naggiar, n?s 860-3, 12 August 1939, ibid.

158 Surits to Narkomindel, 3 August 1939, SPE, II, pp. 168-170.

159 Volkogonov, Staline, pp. 260-261.

160 Roberts, The Unholy Alliance ..., pp. 151-154.

161 Seeds, n?196, 12 August 1939, C11275/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23072; and Strang's minute,

14 August, ibid.

162 Halifax to Seeds, n? 209, 15 August 1939; Chatfield to Drax, n? 1, 15 August 1939, ibid.;

and Bonnet to Naggiar, n? 585, 15 August 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/9.

163 Seeds, military mission n? 1, 12 August 1939, C11276/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23072; and

Instructions, 15 August 1939, ibid. For Soviet military expectations, see 'Considerations of the Soviet

side for negotiations with the military missions of Great Britain and France', B. M. Shaposhnikov,

Soviet chief of staff, 4 August 1939, God krizisa, II, pp. 168-174.

164 'Record of the evening meeting of the military missions of the USSR, Britain and France',

13 August 1939, SPE, II, pp. 196-202.

165 'Record of the meeting of military missions of the USSR, Britain, and France', 14 August

1939, ibid., pp. 202-210; and Andre Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France (London, 1967), pp. 109-13,

118. Beaufre's published account is taken word for word from Doumenc's 'Souvenirs', pp. 74-80,

90, and passim, SHAT 7N 3185.

166 Doumenc, 'Souvenirs', 76, SHAT 7N 3185; Naggiar, n?s 869-72, 14 August 1939, MAE

Papiers Naggiar/10; and Seeds, mission n? 3, 14 August 1939, C11323/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23072.

167 'Committee on Imperial Defence, Deputy chiefs of staff sub-committee', meeting of 16

August 1939, C11506/3356/18, ibid.

168

Naggiar's minute on Bonnet to Naggiar, n? 601, 18 August 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/9.

169 Quoting an un-named Polish foreign ministry official, C. J. Norton, British charge d'affaires

in Warsaw, n? 205, 21 July 1939, C10460/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23071.

170 'Conversation du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres avec M. Lukachievicz', Bonnet, 15 August

1939, AN Papiers Daladier, 496/AP/13.

171 Doumenc, 'Souvenirs', 96-7, SHAT 7N 3185.

172 Colson to Doumenc, n? 2388-EMA/2-SAE, 15 August 1939, SHAT 7N 3186; Naggiar, n?s

873-4, 15 August 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10; Noel to Naggiar, n?s 5-15, 18 August 1939,

ibid./9; and Charles-Jean Tripier, French minister in Riga, 20 August 1939, ibid; and Drax to Lord

Chatfield, minister for the coordination of defence, 16/17 August 1939, C12064/3356/18, PRO FO

371 23073.

173 Kennard, n? 279, 19 August 1939, C11585/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23073; and Roger

Cambon, French charge d'affaires in London, n? 2642, 21 August 1939, AN Papiers Daladier

496AP/13.

174 Kennard, n? 282, 21 August, 1939, C11701/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23073.

175 Bonnet to Naggiar, n? 615, 21 August 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/9; and Seeds,

mission n? 9, 22 August 1939, and Strang's minute of the same day, Cl

11729/3356/18, PRO FO 371

23073.

176 Roberts, The Unholy Alliance.. ., pp. 154-155; Volkogonov, Staline, pp. 262-267; V. Ya.

Sipols, 'A Few Months before August 23, 1939', International Affairs, May 1989, pp. 124-136; and

Note by Schnurre, 19 August 1939, Documents on German Foreign Policy, series D, 13 vols

(London, 1948ff.), VII, pp. 132-133.

177

'Memorandum of a conversation between the head of the Soviet military mission and the

head of the French military mission', 22 August 1939, SPE, II pp. 261-265.

340

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET ALLIANCE IN 1939 341

178 Naggiar's minute on Noel to Naggiar, n? 21, 23 August 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/9.

179 Seeds, n? 211, 22 August 1939, C11740/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23073.

180 Naggiar's minute on his telegram reporting Seeds' meeting with Molotov, n?s 941-3, 23

August 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10.

181 Hervd Alphand, L'etonnement d'etre (Paris 1977), p. 20.

182 Campbell (Paris), n? 543 saving, 23 August 1939, Cl1815/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23073.

183 Naggiar's minute on Bonnet to Naggiar, n?s 627-30, 23 August 1939, MAE Papiers

Naggiar/9.

184 Volkogonov, Staline, pp. 267-269; cf., Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, p. 204. See also M.I.

Semiryaga's comments in 'Kruglyi stol', Voprosy Istorii, pp. 20-24.

185

W. Strang, Home and Abroad (London, 1956), p. 159.

186 Watt, How War Came, pp. 120, 216-219; and Roberts, The Unholy Alliance..., pp.

224-226.

187 Taylor, The Origins..., p. 277; Manchester, The Caged Lion..., p. 411; cf., Uldricks,

'Taylor and the Russians. . .' pp. 170-174.

188 Alphand, L'etonnement..., p. 20.

189

Jean Chauvel, Commentaire, 3 vols. (Paris, 1971), I, p. 59.

'90 Untitled note by I. Kirkpatrick

and minutes, 27 September 1939, C16202/3356/18, PRO FO

371 23074.

191

F. L. Schuman, The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect (Baton Rouge, LA, 1967),

pp. 78, 82.

Novichok(s) & Russia et al - Multidisciplinary knowledge resources

Book

Jun 2022

Marcin Kloske

Build on early and initial stages of the book's development. Updated throughout on a weekly basis. In addition to cognitive purposes, the build provides a testing ground to evaluate the feasibility of combining a markup languages, and selected programming languages, including but not limited to: Python, Lua, Julia and Rust, in a single work. The book is an attempt to show how resource rarity affects the ability to execute tasks under wartime conditions. Great emphasis will be placed on showing the concept of modern defense against weapons of mass destruction, in the context of resource rarity of the Armed Forces - to put it simply, how not to waste resources on it. However, this is the song of the future...

Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Interpretations, Myths, Reality

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May 2020

Marek Kornat

Artykuł przynosi próbę reinterpretacji paktu Ribbentrop-Mołotow, komentując obfitą historiografię poświęconą temu przełomowemu wydarzeniu w stosunkach międzynarodowych XX w. Autor dyskutuje różne podejścia do wyjaśnienia jego genezy i znaczenia. Daje też własną interpretację tego taktycznego aliansu dwóch totalitarnych dyktatur.

De Petsamo à Narvik: Opérations périphériques dans le nord de l'Europe, décembre 1939 - Avril 1940

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Mar 2018

Louis Clerc

From Petsamo to Narvik: Péripheral Operations in Northern Europe, December 1939 - April 1940 Following the Soviet attack in November 1939 on neutral Finland, the French Government decided to intervene in Northern Europe. While this intervention was wrapped in the rhetoric of aid to Finland, more concrete factors were at stake, most notably the opening in Northern Sweden and Norway of a new front against Germany. Altogether, the decision was a sharp break in French policy since the 1920s toward Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea region. This article examines how this policy mixed long-term concerns into the context of the “Phoney War” in France and the role of the Scandinavians themselves. This decision would end up by involving France in Northern Europe, with consequences seen in the resignation of Daladier and the military operations in Norway in May-June 1940.

Capital, the State, and War: Class Conflict and Geopolitics in the Thirty Years' Crisis, 1914-1945

Book

Jan 2014

Alexander Anievas

The era of the two World Wars persists in informing the contemporary policymaking imagination, providing powerful tropes and guideposts for thought. In Europe and North America, the Second World War (WWII) is portrayed as the "good" war, fought to defend civilization from barbarism and catastrophe. Its events, symbols, and personalities are invoked repeatedly in public and governmental discourses. If the Thirty Years' Crisis of the two world wars is a defining experience in the evolution of 20th-century world politics, its influence in the social sciences is nowhere greater than on the field of international relations (IR). The study of IR originates within and was a response to an epoch of generalized crisis and global conflagration, representing the paradigmatic moment in the discipline's formation and subsequent trajectory (Halliday 1989; Long 1995; Brian C. Schmidt 1998).

Anna Maria Cienciała (1929–2014) jako historyk dyplomacji

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Dec 2016

Marek Kornat

To the Brink of War: The Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1938

Chapter

Jan 1995

Geoffrey Roberts

Russia’s involvement in the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938 stemmed from two sources. Firstly, the USSR’s commitment to collective resistance against Nazi aggression and expansionism — a policy which Litvinov had affirmed time and time again in public statements in 1936–7.l Secondly, there was the Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance treaty of 1935 under which the Soviet Union pledged military aid to Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack on that country by a third party. Soviet assistance was, however, conditional upon France, which also had a mutual assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia, simultaneously fulfilling its aid obligations — a clause inserted in the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of 1935 at the suggestion of Benes/ , the Czech President.2

Introduction: Conflicting Views on the USSR and the Origins of the Second World War

Chapter

Jan 1995

Geoffrey Roberts

For more than 30 years historical debate on the outbreak of the Second World War has centred on one book: A. J. P. Taylor’s The Origins of the Second World War.1 In the various controversies generated by the Originsattention has focused mainly on Taylor’s depiction of Hitler as a tactical improviser in foreign policy rather than a fanatical ideologist bent on war, and on his sympathetic treatment of British and French appeasement of Germany.2 Generally ignored in these debates is Taylor’s authorship of an equally controversial and contentious interpretation of the Soviet role in the origins of the Second World War.3

The balkans in world war two: Britain’s Balkan Dilemma

Book

Jan 2003

Christopher Catherwood

Between 1939 and 1941 Britain had a terrible dilemma. She was keen to see Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia join the Allies against Nazi Germany. But the 1939 Molotov Ribbentrop Pact had changed everything: the Balkan countries were far more afraid of Stalin than of Hitler. Britain and France were also concerned about the Soviets giving so much oil to Germany: in 1940 Britain almost went to war with the USSR in an attack on the Caucasus. This book looks at how Britain tried to solve these dilemmas and ultimately failed to do so.

An Elite within an Elite: Politburo/Presidium Membership under Stalin, 1927–1953

Chapter

Jan 2004

Evan Mawdsley

This chapter deals with the membership of the Politburo/Presidium and is based on earlier research on a larger elite, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.1 Great power was accorded the Central Committee in the various party Rules, and the operational role of the Central Committee’s administration (apparat) was great. Despite this, the Central Committee was arguably significant, not so much because it was an actual centre of policy making (as opposed to policy-approval), but because its members were a cross-section of the senior Soviet leadership, notably in the central and regional party administration, in the central people’s commissariats (after 1946, ministries), and in the army high command.

The Politburo and Foreign Policy in the 1930s

Chapter

Jan 2004

Derek Watson

After 1917, the traditional foundations of Russian foreign policy: the quest for security, great power ambitions and the everyday need to conduct relationships with other states, were joined by new ideological factors: the Bolshevik commitment to spread communism and implacable hostility to the capitalist world. These ideological factors were dominant in foreign policy during the early years of the Soviet regime, with unsuccessful attempts to spread world revolution in Germany, Hungary and Poland between 1917 and 1921. They were sponsored particularly by the activities of the Communist International (Comintern), founded in Moscow in March 1919 with the aim of promoting the development of foreign communist parties and supporting trade unions in capitalist countries.

France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939

Book

Aug 2021

Anthony Adamthwaite

In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933-1940

Book

Jan 2013

Robert J. Young

The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy 1933-1940

Book

Jul 1975

Maurice Cowling

In his book, Mr Cowling describes the relationship between British party politics and the conduct of British foreign policy between Hitler's arrival in office in 1933 and Chamberlain's resignation in May 1940. He sets British policy in the context of European, Imperial, League, national and isolational sentiments and takes account of the strategic and financial limitations within which decisions were made. He shows how far prime ministers, foreign secretaries and the cabinet responded to parliamentary criticism, and argues that, from mid–1936 onwards, foreign policy and the prospects of the party system were so intimately connected that neither can be understood in isolation from the other.

Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939

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Jul 1987

Anita J. Prazmowska

This book offers a revisionist interpretation of British foreign policy towards Poland and the role of the Anglo-Polish relationship during the period March-September 1939. It challenges and questions hitherto held views on the British determination to defend Poland and oppose German expansion eastwards. It includes a study of foreign policy, economic policy and military planning. This book is a major contribution to our knowledge of the outbreak of the war because it contains a unique and original study of the role of the Poles in British proposals for an eastern front and the Polish perception of their relationship with Germany. Finally the inconclusive nature of British approaches to the Soviet Union and the Rumanian government are put into the context of the abortive proposal for an eastern front against Germany.

The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39

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