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Journal
of
Educational
Psychology
1981,
Vol.
73, No. 4,
451-461
Copyright
1981
by the
American
Psychological
Association,
Inc.
0022-0f)63/81/7304-0461$00.75
Relationship Between What
Is
Remembered
and
Creative
Problem-Solving
Performance
in
Science Learning
Bruce
K.
Bromage
and
Richard
E.
Mayer
University
of
California,
Santa
Barbara
In
two
experiments,
subjects
read
a
scientific
passage
explaining
how to use a
35mm
camera
and
then
took
a
series
of
recall
and
problem
solving
tests.
In
Experiment
1,
subjects
who
performed
well
on
creative
use of the
presented
information
tended
to
recall
only
one
type
of
information
better than
poor
problem
solvers—explanations
of the
mechanisms
underlying
camera
use.
In
Experiment
2,
half
of the
subjects read
a
text
that
emphasized
and was
orga-
nized
around
explanation
of
mechanisms,
whereas
the
other
half
of the
subjects
received
the
same
basic
descriptions
and
facts
organized
in the
tradi-
tional
way.
The
groups
performed
similarly
on
recall
of
basic
information
and
straightforward
application
of the
information,
but the
explanation-of-mecha-
nisms
group
excelled
on a
test
of
creative
problem
solving.
Results
suggest
that
it is
possible
to
isolate structural characteristics
of
science text
that
are
related
to
creative
use of the
presented
information.
Some people
can
read
a
scientific pas-
sage
and
then
use the
information creatively
to
solve problems, whereas
other
people
can
read
the
same
text
and
retain much
of the
information
but
cannot solve problems.
This
article addresses
two
issues concerning
the
relation between learning
and
creative
problem solving
in
science.
First,
the
question
of
what good problem solvers pick
up
from
text
that
poor problem solvers seem
to
miss
is
addressed.
Then,
an
experiment
is
described
that
explicitly
attempted
to
emphasize
the
type
of
information
that
good
problem solvers acquired
to see if
this
in-
structional intervention could enhance
problem-solving
performance.
Description
and
Explanation
Historians
of
science (Bronowski, 1978;
Cohen, 1960; Kearney, 1971; Westfall, 1977)
have suggested
a
distinction between
two
stages
in the
historical development
of
sci-
entific
knowledge:
(a)
description
of
rela-
tionships
among observable variables
that
This research
was
supported
by
Grant
SED-80-14950
from
the
National Science Foundation Program
in
Research
in
Science Education.
Bruce
K.
Bromage
is now at
Bell
Laboratories,
6
Corporate
Place, Piscataway,
New
Jersey 08854.
Requests
for
reprints should
be
sent
to
Richard
E.
Mayer,
Department
of
Psychology,
University
of
Cali-
fornia,
Santa Barbara,
California
93106.
may
be
stated
as
rules
or
quantitative
laws,
and (b)
explanation
of
mechanisms under-
lying
the
rules
that
serve
to tie
many
of the
individual laws
together.1
For
example,
in
physics, Copernicus
and
others
established
many useful descriptions
of the
motion
of
objects
in the
universe,
but
Newton
is
cred-
ited
with developing
a
conception
of the
underlying mechanisms
that
tie all the de-
scriptive rules
together.
Thus,
the
power
of
explanations
in
science
is
that
they allow
one
to go
beyond
the
established facts
and to
make
new
predictions
in new
domains.
In
short,
they
allow
for
creative problem
solving.
What
is
true
for the
historical
growth
of
scientific
knowledge
may
also
be
true
in
1
For
example,
Westfall
(1977)
distinguishes between
the
"Pythagorean tradition"
and
"mechanical philos-
ophy."
The
former
is
based
on the
idea
that
"the cos-
mos was
constructed according
to the
principles
of
mathematical
order"
and the
goal
of
science
is "an
exact
mathematical
description"
(p. 1) of the
universe.
The
latter
is
concerned
with
"causation
of
individual phe-
nomena"
and is
based
on the
idea
that
"natural phe-
nomena
are
caused
by
invisible
mechanisms entirely
similar
to the
mechanisms
in
everyday
life."
(p. 1)
Kearney
(1971)
refers
to
these viewpoints
as the
"mysterious"
and the
"machine" approaches, respec-
tively. Bronowski (1978)
distinguishes
between
the
"idea
of
order"
and the
"idea
of
causes." Cohen (1960)
argues
that
the
move
from
"old"
to
"new" physics
in-
volves
the
addition
of new
mechanisms such
as
inertia,
mutual
attraction,
and
others.
451