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The cognitive neuroscience of action. Fundamentals of cognitive neuroscience.
Abstract
This book [reviews] cognitive neuroscience studies of the representation for actions. The fundamental question addressed concerns the nature and role of different representations in the planning and execution of movements. Adopting a cognitive neuroscience approach to this question generates a new perspective and some challenging hypotheses.
The book explores in detail the contribution of the brain structures, particularly the cerebral cortex, to the various aspects of movement preparation and execution. In so doing, the author discusses a wide range of evidence, including the study of anatomical connections between areas, the recording of single neuron activity in animals, and brain stimulation and imaging studies in human Ss. This neuroscience evidence is related to both behavioral experiments in normal Ss and clinical observations in brain-lesioned Ss, resulting in provocative hypotheses about the cognitive structure of central representations and processes which subserve actions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
... In a next step, the agent's own perception of the exterior world is included as another, bottom-up, regulating mechanism with the power to short-circuit the intention-building process to start intentions of its own. Closing the second part is the new suggestion that one can, in fact, distinguish between two cooperative externally-and internally-oriented types 52 These discussions formed an integral part of the neuro-ethical project of intention that result in motor or non-motor output-thereby expanding on the single-unit concept of motor representation (Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014;Jeannerod, 1997;Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2016). ...
... Importantly, an intention need not unify all functional roles, but rather bundles subsets of said roles that scale according to their top-down hierarchy ( Fig. 5.1). Three such subsets or "types" of intention are commonly identified: distal intentions (DI) represent a state of commitment to perform actions in the future (Bratman, 1987;Mele, 1992), proximal intentions (PI) take over to begin and sustain an action (Mele, 1992;Pacherie, 2006Pacherie, , 2008, whereas motor intentions (MI) directly interact with the motor system during the action's execution (Jeannerod, 1997(Jeannerod, , 2006Pacherie, 2006Pacherie, , 2008. ...
... The philosophy of mind and its action subfield are still in the process of integrating neuroscientific findings into their models (Jeannerod, 1997(Jeannerod, , 2006Pacherie, 2006Pacherie, , 2008. Interdisciplinary efforts to merge the fields of philosophy and neuroscience (in all their shapes and colors) face multiple teething problems, beginning with unfamiliar research practices 55 and reaching to an "explanatory gap" between philosophical descriptions of mental states and the neuronal processes of movement execution (Schönau, 2019). ...
The main goal of neuroscience is to bridge the gap from “membrane” to “mind” via empirical research that elucidates the functional processes from neuron to brain, or theoretical models that frame the cognitive flow from thought to action. Yet, in spite of great, technology-enabled advances in our knowledge of basic neural mechanisms, we still struggle to understand how abstract higher-order cognitive functions such as intention formation finally give rise to goal-directed behavior. Likewise, how external stimuli may precipitate subconscious, yet purposeful action remains unclear. The reasons for these difficulties are both methodological and conceptual in nature and might, in both cases, stem from neglect to account for the multiscale organizational elements in the human brain: for instance, connectivity analyses based on functional MRI (fMRI) routinely pre-process data with an arbitrarily selected single spatial filter, thereby obscuring cortical activity at other observation scales; similarly, signal sampling for BCI applications is usually limited to single lower-order processing areas, although neuronal correlates of intention are more likely to be distributed across higher-order association regions.
This doctoral thesis investigates the spatial multiscale dimension of neocortical network activity as observed via fMRI recordings and devises an integrative hierarchical model of intention formation informed by neuroscientific evidence and philosophical concepts established in the field of action theory.
Multiscale, surface-constrained pre-processing of movement-related data reveals spatiotemporal features of the hemodynamic response previously unknown in spite of the ubiquitous use of fMRI as an investigative tool: the biphasic response function underlying the majority of fMRI studies in the past 20 years is called into question, as the post-stimulus response undershoot is shown as a surround effect absent from higher-order processing areas; these multiscale data sets also lend themselves to the analysis of cortical networks and the scale-dependent variability of interregional network connections, indicating a possible relation to different levels of the processing hierarchy. Finally, the current neuroscientific and philosophical theories on intention formation are contrasted with each other, and suggested to reflect two opposed, yet complementing streams of top-down and bottom-up influences that scale across time and brain regions as they become integrated in a dynamic process before resulting in intentional, goal-directed action.
... In line with others Jeannerod, 1997;Prinz, 1997), ADORE assumes that actionoutcome representations are a natural consequence of repeatedly performing actions and experiencing their outcomes. These action-outcomes form the basis for goal-directed behavior. ...
... Important support for such a perspective comes from the empirical observation that humans represent their actions in terms of their observable e ects or outcomes and establish associations between the outcomes and the motor programs that produce the outcome (s-o; Hommel et al., 2001;Jeannerod, 1997;Prinz, 1997;Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). As a consequence, action can follow from an ideomotor principle (James, 1890): ...
The Oxford Handbook of Human Motivation, Second Edition, addresses key advances made in the field since the previous edition, offering the latest insights from the top theorists and researchers of human motivation. The volume includes chapters on social learning theory, control theory, self-determination theory, terror management theory, and regulatory focus theory and also presents articles from leading scholars on phenomena such as ego depletion, choice, curiosity, flow, implicit motives, and personal interests. A special section dedicated to goal research highlights achievement goals, goal attainment, goal pursuit and unconscious goals, and the goal orientation process across adulthood. The volume sheds new light on the biological underpinnings of motivation, including chapters on neuropsychology and cardiovascular dynamics. This resource is also packed with practical research and guidance, with sections on relationships and applications in areas such as psychotherapy, education, physical activity, sport, and work. By providing reviews of the most advanced work by the very best scholars in this field, this volume represents an invaluable resource for both researchers and practitioners, as well as any student of human nature.
... Mirror neurons were originally discovered in the macaque monkey [Di Pellegrino et al 1992] and later were identified in the human brain [Fatiga et al 1995]. In a nutshell, mirror neurons are neural systems which are located in the premotor cortex and parietal areas and are activated when subjects: 1) intentionally act in specific ways (classic examples are reaching and grasping), observe the same kind of action, imagine such action [Jeannerod 1997;Ruby, Decety 2001]; 2) experience certain emotions and observe others experiencing these emotions [Adolphs 2003] (for further details see [Gallagher 2012]). ...
... Going back to Ellis and Newton's action images it should be noted that they correspond to the sense of action image in Marc Jeannerod's usage: they are initiated in the cerebellum and the motor cortices and precede implementation of overt actions and they represent what it would feel like for the subject to perform an action [Jeannerod 1997]. So, put into the context of mirror neuron's discovery, action images contribute to the explanation of inter-subjectivity in that they ground it in the natural acquisition of the earliest concepts of other persons. ...
The paper addresses the problem created by the gap between Cognitive Linguistics usage-based theoretical commitment and the lack of empirical cognitive research on live communication. Its primary objective is to analyse advanced models of cognition in an attempt to outline basic methodological principles of cognitive analysis of verbal/co-verbal communication and, building on these principles, define the workable units and instruments of such analysis. I propose the key unit of cognitive analysis of verbal/co-verbal communication: an inter-subjective act, i.e. an inter-action including at least two verbal / co-verbal utterances (one initial and the other responsive) embedded in the complex dynamic psychic experiential context ‘shared’ by the communicants focusing attention on the same utterance as a perceptual stimulus. Such perceptual stimulus triggers parallel conscious / nonconscious inference processes involving cognition, volition, and affect to issue a command of a motivated, goal-oriented communicative and/or (immediate or postponed) social action. I also suggest analysing the process of the generation of meaning in communication in terms of inference. An inference is viewed as both a natural emergent product of conscious / nonconscious interplay of volition, cognition, and affect, triggering a communicative and/or social action, and also a tool of discovering this key structure of human psychic experience in cognitive linguistic analysis of communication.
... From this perspective, the comprehension of action results from a series of rapid cognitive processes that involve comparing past experiences with the current visual stimuli (e.g., Casile et al., 2011). In particular, the observer's motor system (MNs) plays a key role in understanding actions, resulting in a close relationship between action perception and production (e.g., Liberman & Mattingly, 1985;Jeannerod, 1997;Prinz, 1997;Rizzolatti et al., 2001). The motor system is involved in different ways, such as when a person perceives auditory cues associated with familiar actions (Kohler et al., 2002) or views acting on a screen in 2D dimension (Caggiano et al., 2016) and even actions that are partially occluded but can still be inferred from their initial motion path (Umiltà et al., 2001). ...
Background: Drivers consider external and hypothetical behaviours of other drivers, but internal factors also impact road safety. Objectives: This study aims to examine the connection between Cognitive and Affective Theory of Mind (ToM) and Driving Style in road safety. It hypothesizes that a higher level of ToM corresponds to a greater ability to avoid accidents and to assume virtuous driving behaviour. The study investigates how ToM impacts driving behaviour, directly correlating with assessing potential accidents' probability and severity. Method: 207 non-expert drivers, including 164 females, participated in assessing Cognitive and Affective ToM through two tasks. They also completed self-measured questionnaires to assess their driving style and behaviours. In addition, they evaluated 12 videos depicting cars, motorcycles, trucks, and pedestrians to determine the probability of a road accident and the level of danger in each scenario. Results: The results of the mediation models clearly indicate a relationship between ToM and the reduction of road accidents. Specifically, Cognitive ToM plays a crucial role in assessing the probability of risky and dangerous situations related to Risky and Angry Driving Styles. However, it was observed that Cognitive ToM does not significantly affect the prediction of actual driving behaviours. Conclusions: Findings are discussed within the theoretical framework of the Task-Capability Interface Model and the Embodied Simulation Model based on mirror neuron research. Our results suggest the importance of creating drive-assistance systems considering both the Cognitive ToM and Driving Style to reduce road accidents among non-expert drivers.
... It simply claims that it directly provides to the motor system the end to achieve. The specific means to achieve this end are computed by the motor system, which anchors the bodily command to the situation and which organizes the information into action schemas hierarchically organized (Jeannerod, 1997). 10 However, we cannot fully rule out that the imperative content could explain both effects. ...
There is a large amount of evidence of placebo and nocebo effects showing that one’s expectation of a forthcoming pain can influence the subsequent experience of pain. Here I shall not discuss the implications of these findings for the nature of pain, but focus instead on the nature of pain anticipation itself. This notion indeed remains poorly analysed and it is unclear what type of anticipatory state it involves. I shall argue that there is more to pain anticipation than a mere combination of anticipatory beliefs and fears. When the impending damage is imminent, pain anticipation involves a distinctive sui generis mental state, which I call nociceptive prediction. One then anticipates the forthcoming event under the pain mode. After analysing its points of similarities and differences with pain, I shall argue that nociceptive prediction is best understood in imperative defensive terms.
... The idea that we can sense our activity directly has been investigated in the study of muscle sense. This literature indicates that the sensation of action effort arises from a combination of inputs, including efference (signals from brain to muscles) and afference (signals from muscles, joints, vision, and other peripheral sites to the brain; cf.Jeannerod, 1997;Scheerer, 1987). However, because conscious will can be experienced for purely mental activities, such as thinking or concentrating, just as surely as it is for physical movement, any analysis of the sensations of muscle activity cannot be the full answer to the question of how we experience conscious will.July 1999 • American Psychologist ...
The experience of willing an act arises from interpreting one's thought as the cause of the act. Conscious will is thus experienced as a function of the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action. The thought must occur before the action, be consistent with the action, and not be accompanied by other causes. An experiment illustrating the role of priority found that people can arrive at the mistaken belief that they have intentionally caused an action that in fact they were forced to perform when they are simply led to think about the action just before its occurrence.
... (Klatzky, McClosky, Doherty, Pellegrino, 1987). Jeannerod (1994Jeannerod ( ,1997 ritiene che vi sia una rappresentazione pragmatica e una semantica dell'oggetto. Nel caso della rappresentazione pragmatica l'azione è strettamente legata alle caratteristiche dell'oggetto, nel caso di rappresentazione semantica vi è un'integrazione tra caratteristiche del soggetto, del suo significato per il soggetto, la ripresa delle azioni memorizzate con l'oggetto. ...
Great consideration is given by educators and parents to conditions/games that may improve cognitive abilities
of pupils but little attention is paid to the effects on physical behavior. The aim of the research is to determine the role of
environment on physical activity levels in 3 years old children performing unstructured games in a kindergarden.
Fiftythree 3 years old children of a kindergarden in Verona were divided in 4 groups and left without instruction
(unstructured game, free play) in a playroom where all furniture were removed. Circles of 50 cm diameter were spread on
the floor (condition A) or piled in one corner of the room (condition B). In different days, a pool with soft balls was placed in
the center of the room (condition C) or in one corner (condition D). Each group of children was left in the room for 30
minutes and video-recorded to measure time spent in the different forms of activities. Activity level was also measured by
mean of podometers. Groups were randomized for sequence of condition; interval between conditions was 2 weeks. Data
from the four conditions were compared by paired t-student test.
In condition A, children spent most of the time running on and around or jumping in the circles. In condition B, the same
children used circles for individual and/or symbolic games and the running/jumping behavior was limited and random. No
differences in physical activity levels were measured between condition C and D. Interestingly the collective behavior quickly
changed when one of the children modified the way of playing with the tool.
The data indicate 1- that the organization of space/environment has significant impact on physical behavior of children
involved in free games; 2- that spatial distribution of tools in the environment determines their unstructured use and the
levels of physical activity inducible in children; 3- observation of action by other children can prime similar responses during
unstructured games. We speculate that motor cognition during free games builts up on factors involving space organization
and social interaction.
... Experiments seem to show that in most (if not all) cases, unconscious processes are much more important when it comes to action control (e.g. Jeannerod 1997;Milner and Goodale 1995). Intentional actions may successfully unfold in the absence of conscious perception, consciously-made adaptions, and/or conscious intentions. ...
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the nature of conscious control. As a result, experiments suggesting that we lack conscious control over our actions cannot be properly evaluated. Joshua Shepherd (2015; 2021) aims to fill this gap. His proposal is grounded in the standard causalist account of action, according to which, simply put, bodily movements are controlled by the agent if and only if they are caused, in the right way, by the relevant psychological states. In this paper, I argue that the proposal does not succeed in distinguishing between mere causation and actual control; it does not solve the problem of deviant causation. On the basis of my criticism, Anscombean action theory promises to offer a valuable perspective. It suggests that an important function of consciousness is to integrate an action into a rational whole. If this is on the right track, it supports Shepherd’s overall claim that the importance of consciousness for action control is often underestimated, because this contribution of consciousness may often go unnoticed in experimental settings.
... 9 Cf. Jeannerod (1997Jeannerod ( , 2001Jeannerod ( , 2002. common neural basis not only for the execution and the preparation (or the imagining) of one's own actions, but also for the understanding of the actions of others. ...
... The fact that agency sensations were evoked is thus in line with the notion that motor imagery involves internal simulation of voluntary motor programs and the expected sensory consequences of the imagined movements. The former, in which kinesthetic motor imagery involves internal simulation of motor programs and central motor commands, is well established (Jeannerod 1997;Jeannerod and Decety 1995;Roland et al. 1980), but the latter is much less studied. Kilteni and Ehrsson (2018) used kinesthetic-motor imagery to show that imagined self-generated touch produces an attenuation of real tactile sensations, which suggests that that type of motor imagery involves predicting the sensory consequences of the imagined movement. ...
Recent evidence suggests that imagined auditory and visual sensory stimuli can be integrated with real sensory information from a different sensory modality to change the perception of external events via cross-modal multisensory integration mechanisms. Here, we explored whether imagined voluntary movements can integrate visual and proprioceptive cues to change how we perceive our own limbs in space. Participants viewed a robotic hand wearing a glove repetitively moving its right index finger up and down at a frequency of 1 Hz, while they imagined executing the corresponding movements synchronously or asynchronously (kinesthetic-motor imagery); electromyography (EMG) from the participants’ right index flexor muscle confirmed that the participants kept their hand relaxed while imagining the movements. The questionnaire results revealed that the synchronously imagined movements elicited illusory ownership and a sense of agency over the moving robotic hand—the moving rubber hand illusion—compared with asynchronously imagined movements; individuals who affirmed experiencing the illusion with real synchronous movement also did so with synchronous imagined movements. The results from a proprioceptive drift task further demonstrated a shift in the perceived location of the participants’ real hand toward the robotic hand in the synchronous versus the asynchronous motor imagery condition. These results suggest that kinesthetic motor imagery can be used to replace veridical congruent somatosensory feedback from a moving finger in the moving rubber hand illusion to trigger illusory body ownership and agency, but only if the temporal congruence rule of the illusion is obeyed. This observation extends previous studies on the integration of mental imagery and sensory perception to the case of multisensory bodily awareness, which has potentially important implications for research into embodiment of brain–computer interface controlled robotic prostheses and computer-generated limbs in virtual reality.
... This action-guiding role is so integral to how vision works that it has motivated replacing the idea of a monolithic visual system with the idea that the visual control of actions depends on mechanisms that are functionally and neurally separate from those subtending our perception of the world (e.g. Goodale and Milner 2005;Jacob and Jeannerod 2003;Jeannerod 1997;Milner and Goodale 1995;Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982). Vision-for-action and vision-for-perception, it is now agreed, are two separate visual subsystems. ...
What representational state mediates between perception and action? Bence Nanay says pragmatic representations, which are outputs of perceptual systems. This commits him to the view that optic ataxics face difficulty in performing visually guided arm movements because the relevant perceptual systems output their pragmatic representations incorrectly. Here, I argue that it is not enough to say that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly; we also need to know why they are output that way. Given recent evidence that optic ataxia impairs peripersonal space representation, I argue that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly because the organizing principle of the vision-for-action system is blocked by optic ataxia. I then show how this means that this principle, not pragmatic representations, is the representational state that mediates between perception and action, i.e. the principle, not pragmatic representations, is the immediate mental antecedent of action.
... (Klatzky, McClosky, Doherty, Pellegrino, 1987). Jeannerod ( ,1997 ritiene che vi sia una rappresentazione pragmatica e una semantica dell'oggetto. Nel caso della rappresentazione pragmatica l'azione è strettamente legata alle caratteristiche dell'oggetto, nel caso di rappresentazione semantica vi è un'integrazione tra caratteristiche del soggetto, del suo significato per il soggetto, la ripresa delle azioni memorizzate con l'oggetto. ...
Cooperation allows to reach goals that one single organism cannot achieve. In ethological studies the
mechanisms of cooperation have been widely investigated; new experimental paradigms are now introduced in controlled
environments to simplify the approach and to go deep inside the strategies of cooperation. One of these experimental
paradigms is the “loose string task”, for example used with chimpanzees and birds. Analyzing the strategies and the
mechanisms used by artificial organisms to perform a cooperation task, we observed that vision can help agents to solve the
problem better than communication.
... These alternative names may refer to the whole action representation or to just some of its components. Jeannerod's (1997) concept of action representation is similar to Arbib's (1981) motor schema concept. The latter was introduced as a concept to integrate information from perception, action and memory and described how knowledge from these domains was stored and applied. ...
Socially situated thought and behaviour are pervasive and vitally important in human society. The social brain has become a focus of study for researchers in the neurosciences, psychology, biology and other areas of behavioural science, and it is becoming increasingly clear that social behaviour is heavily dependent on shared representations. Any social activity, from a simple conversation to a well-drilled military exercise to an exquisitely perfected dance routine, involves information sharing between the brains of those involved. This volume comprises a collection of cutting-edge essays centred on the idea of shared representations, broadly defined. Featuring contributions from established world leaders in their fields and written in a simultaneously accessible and detailed style, this is an invaluable resource for established researchers and those who are new to the field.
... Neural circuits of attention, emotion, and memory are ubiquitous in decision-making [30]. Neural control of learning and motion is also produced when a behavior takes place [31,32], which constitutes the main neuropsychological unit of behavior analysis [33]. ...
In construction engineering, there are many interactive and decision-making behaviors which could affect the progress and final performance. Based on the people-oriented concept, managing construction engineering should not ignore the understanding of individual behavior, and neuropsychology provides a refined microscopic perspective. This paper employed a bibliometric analysis of 1254 studies from the Web of Science related to behavioral research in construction engineering management using VOSviewer and summarized the neuropsychological mechanisms and research methods of behavior by systematic review. This paper found that: (1) Neuropsycho-logical mechanisms of behavior include basic mechanisms about the brain and function and range from sensory to decision processes. Core factors are the functional ingredients. (2) Behavior research in construction engineering management is turning to neuropsychological experiments. Understanding the complex correlation mechanisms are the research trends in recent years. (3) Construction engineering management studies provide the means and methods to improve the validity and efficiency of management in the construction industry. The results confirm the impact of sensory perception on behavior and managerial performance. (4) The research trend in this field in the future is multidisciplinary. In total, this paper provides a potential effective reference for improving the performance of construction engineering management, developing sustainable construction production and consumption, and building a people-oriented livable city.
... Advancements in the studies of functional anatomy and the proposal of realistic theoretical models have led to a distinction between brain areas that represent the intention of performing an action and the areas that control the performance of the action (see Mazzoni et al., 1996;Colby et al., 1996;Snyder et al., 1997 andCisek et al., 1998). These findings corroborate observations made by Held, Hein, Ullman and others (see Jeannerod, 1997), bringing a new concept of the relation between perception and action, partially in accordance with Gibson (1979), who stressed the importance of action in perception -but without the representational step. ...
The projection of conscious content is a central feature of Max Velmans' Theory of Consciousness, implying that conscious experiences are built within a conversation of minds and worlds, in which they form a "reflexive" unity-as stated in his Reflexive Monism. What are the neurobiological structures and functions that make possible the experience of conscious contents being located in a spatiotemporal frame outside the nervous system that instantiates them? In this paper I make some informed speculation about these neurobiological structures, calling attention to the role of glial cells, on the basis of an analysis of the mechanisms behind acute leg pain symptoms in the human lived experience of the Creutzfeldt-Jakob syndrome.
... In fact, increasing the size of visual stimuli by a constant diameter (width) produces increasing changes of area, whereas increasing stimulus size by area would produce decreasing changes of diameter. For our experiments, we deliberately decided to increase the size of the stimuli by a constant diameter (width) because diameter, and not area, is a critical parameter for grasping objects (e.g.,Jeannerod, 1997;Jeannerod et al., 1995). ...
Recent studies have demonstrated a novel compatibility (or correspondence) effect between physical stimulus size and horizontally aligned responses: Left-hand responses are shorter and more accurate to a small stimulus, compared to a large stimulus, whereas the opposite is true for right-hand responses. The present study investigated whether relative or absolute size is responsible for the effect. If relative size was important, a particular stimulus would elicit faster left-hand responses if the other stimuli in the set were larger, but the same stimulus would elicit a faster right-hand response if the other stimuli in the set were smaller. In terms of two-visual-systems theory, our study explores whether “vision for perception” (i.e., the ventral system) or “vision for action” (i.e., the dorsal system) dominates the processing of stimulus size in our task. In two experiments, participants performed a discrimination task in which they responded to stimulus color (Experiment 1) or to stimulus shape (Experiment 2) with their left/right hand. Stimulus size varied as an irrelevant stimulus feature, thus leading to corresponding (small-left; large-right) and non-corresponding (small-right; large-left) conditions. Moreover, a set of smaller stimuli and a set of larger stimuli, with both sets sharing an intermediately sized stimulus, were used in different conditions. The consistently significant two-way interaction between stimulus size and response location demonstrated the presence of the correspondence effect. The three-way interaction between stimulus size, response location, and stimulus set, however, was never significant. The results suggest that participants are inadvertently classifying stimuli according to relative size in a context-specific manner.
... Decety [30] suggested that motor imagery 'corresponds to the so-called internal imagery (or first-person perspective) of sport psychologists. This idea was endorsed by Jeannerod [37] who distinguished between visual/third-person imagery, whereby people imagine seeing either themselves or someone else performing the action, and motor imagery proper, which is experienced from within, as the result of a 'first-person' process, where the self feels like an actor rather than a spectator. As clarified by Fourkas et al. [38] people can commonly form motor images using either a first-person or a third-person perspective. ...
The development of a language of action representation is a central issue for cognitive robotics, motor neuroscience, ergonomics, sport, and arts with a double goal: analysis and synthesis of action sequences that preserve the spatiotemporal invariants of biological motion, including the associated goals of learning and training. However, the notation systems proposed so far only achieved inconclusive results. By reviewing the underlying rationale of such systems, it is argued that the common flaw is the choice of the ‘primitives’ to be combined to produce complex gestures: basic movements with a different degree of “granularity”. The problem is that in motor cybernetics movements do not add: whatever the degree of granularity of the chosen primitives their simple summation is unable to produce the spatiotemporal invariants that characterize biological motion. The proposed alternative is based on the Equilibrium Point Hypothesis and, in particular, on a computational formulation named Passive Motion Paradigm, where whole-body gestures are produced by applying a small set of force fields to specific key points of the internal body schema: its animation by carefully selected force fields is analogous to the animation of a marionette using wires or strings. The crucial point is that force fields do add, thus suggesting to use force fields as a consistent set of primitives instead of basic movements. This is the starting point for suggesting a force field-based language of action representation, named Pinocchio in analogy with the famous marionette. The proposed language for action description and generation includes three main modules: 1) Primitive force field generators, 2) a Body-Model to be animated by the primitive generators, and 3) a graphical staff system for expressing any specific notated gesture. We suggest that such language is a crucial building block for the development of a cognitive architecture of cooperative robots.
... In addition to James and Norman and Shallice, various iterations of the supervisory inhibition model receive approval from other influential contributions to the literature. The idea of a supervisory system based in the frontal lobes with the function of monitoring motor schemata, for example, is adopted in Marc Jeannerod's treatment of the fine-grained neurophysiology of action ( [71]: Sect. 5.5). ...
This article makes the case that our digital devices create illusions of agency. There are times when users feel as if they are in control when in fact they are merely responding to stimuli on the screen in predictable ways. After the introduction, the second section of the article offers examples of illusions of agency that do not involve human–computer interaction in order to show that such illusions are possible and not terribly uncommon. The third and fourth sections of the article cover relevant work from empirical psychology, including the cues that are known to generate the sense of agency. The fifth section of the article shows that our devices are designed to deliver precisely those cues. In the sixth section, the argument is completed with evidence that users frequently use their smartphones without the sort of intentional supervision involved in genuine agency. This sixth section includes the introduction of Digital Environmental Dependency Syndrome (DEDS) as a possible way of characterizing extended use of the smartphone without genuine agency. In the final section of the article, there is a discussion of questions raised by the main claim, including suggestions for reducing occurrences of illusions of agency through software design.
... Nesse empreendimento, compreender a natureza e o papel de diferentes representações no planejamento e execução de movimentos tem sido um grande desafio. Em outras palavras, entender como as ações motoras são representadas no cérebro ou como os mecanismos básicos que controlam a contração muscular são selecionados e engrenados, além dos princípios que regem esses processos (Jeannerod, 1997). ...
... Following this idea, many studies now provide concrete descriptions of how objects afford different kinds of interactions with subjects depending on subjects' attitudes, such as when a cup will afford different types of grips depending on what the subject intends to do with the cup (Pacherie 2018, 381;cf. Gallagher 2001, 150-151;Ansuini et al. 2006Ansuini et al. , 2008Ebbesen and Olsen 2018;Jeannerod 1997;Sartori et al. 2011). ...
This study clarifies the need for a renewed account of the body in physiotherapy to fill sizable gaps between physiotherapeutical theory and practice. Physiotherapists are trained to approach bodily functioning from an objectivist perspective; however, their therapeutic interactions with patients are not limited to the provision of natural-scientific explanations. Physiotherapists’ practice corresponds well to theorisation of the body as the bearer of original bodily intentionality, as outlined by Merleau-Ponty and elaborated upon by enactivists. We clarify how physiotherapeutical practice corroborates Merleau-Ponty’s critical arguments against objectivist interpretations of the body; particularly, his analyses demonstrate that norms of optimal corporeal functioning are highly individual and variable in time and thus do not directly depend on generic physiological structures. In practice, objectively measurable physical deviations rarely correspond to specific subjective difficulties and, similarly, patients’ reflective insights into their own motor deficiencies do not necessarily produce meaningful motor improvements. Physiotherapeutical procedures can be understood neither as mechanical manipulations of patients’ machine-like bodies by experts nor as a process of such manipulation by way of instructing patients’ explicit conscious awareness. Rather, physiotherapeutical practice and theory can benefit from the philosophical interpretation of motor disorders as modifications of bodily intentionality. Consequently, motor performances addressed in physiotherapy are interpreted as relational features of a living organism coupled with its environment, and motor disorders are approached as failures to optimally manage the motor requirements of a given situation owing to a relative loss of the capacity to structure one’s relation with their environment through motor action. Building on this, we argue that the process of physiotherapy is most effective when understood as a bodily interaction to guide patients towards discovering better ways of grasping a situation as meaningful through bodily postures and movements.
... 21 Jeannerod has distinguished between an internal and an external MI perspective. 22 Further, a visual and a kinaesthetic MI mode have been described. 23 Persons imagine watching themselves moving with visual MI, with the kinaesthetic mode, they feel themselves moving. ...
Introduction:
Motor imagery (MI) refers to the mental rehearsal of a physical action without muscular activity. Our previous studies showed that MI combined with rhythmic-auditory cues improved walking, fatigue and quality of life (QoL) in people with multiple sclerosis (pwMS). Largest improvements were seen after music and verbally cued MI. It is unclear whether actual cued gait training achieves similar effects on walking as cued MI in pwMS. Furthermore, in pwMS it is unknown whether any of these interventions leads to changes in brain activation. The purpose of this study is therefore to compare the effects of imagined and actual cued gait training and a combination thereof on walking, brain activation patterns, fatigue, cognitive and emotional functioning in pwMS.
Methods and analysis:
A prospective double-blind randomised parallel multicentre trial will be conducted in 132 pwMS with mild to moderate disability. Randomised into three groups, participants will receive music, metronome and verbal cueing, plus MI of walking (1), MI combined with actual gait training (2) or actual gait training (3) for 30 min, 4× per week for 4 weeks. Supported by weekly phone calls, participants will practise at home, guided by recorded instructions. Primary endpoints will be walking speed (Timed 25-Foot Walk) and distance (2 min Walk Test). Secondary endpoints will be brain activation patterns, fatigue, QoL, MI ability, anxiety, depression, cognitive functioning, music-induced motivation-to-move, pleasure, arousal and self-efficacy. Data will be collected at baseline, postintervention and 3-month follow-up. MRI reference values will be generated using 15 matched healthy controls.
Ethics and dissemination:
This study follows the Standard Protocol Items: Recommendations for Interventional Trials-PRO Extension. Ethical approval was received from the Ethics Committees of the Medical Universities of Innsbruck (1347/2020) and Graz (33-056 ex 20/21), Austria. Results will be disseminated via national and international conferences and published in peer-reviewed journals.
Trial registration number:
DRKS00023978.
... Lobule pariétal inférieur et sillon intra-pariétal : L'idée que les régions pariétales inférieures et le sulcus intra-pariétal soient impliquées dans la localisation des buts d'action dans l'espace n'est pas nouvelle, notamment l'idée que ces régions coderaient les connaissances pragmatiques liées aux actions (voir par exemple, Goodale et Milner, 1992;Gallese et al., 1994;Sakata et al., 1995;Jeannerod, 1997). En accord avec ces études, Haaland, Harrington et Knight (2000) ont montré que les patients souffrant d'apraxie idéomotrice 54 auraient en effet souvent des lésions au niveau des régions entourant le sulcus intrapariétal (BA 7,39,40). ...
Speech is built on a set of correspondences between sensory and articulatory representations, especially during the acquisition of language in the early years of life. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, the primary goal of our work was to determine, in adults, a possible functional coupling of French vowel perception and production systems, as elementary speech units. In parallel, our work should help to clarify the brain structures related to the orofacial motor control of simple supralaryngeal movements and to determine a possible causal contribution of sensory and motor regions during speech perception. Our work highlights the involvement of sensory and motor areas when performing orofacial gestures and during vowel production and perception. Adaptive effects of these motor, auditory and somatosensory regions during repeated orofacial movements and in vowel perception and production suggest the existence of common adaptive mechanisms involved in the online control of perceived and produced speech gestures. Finally, we demonstrated a causal and functional role of the sensorimotor regions of the dorsal pathway in speech categorization. Taken together, our results emphasize the distributed sensorimotor nature of cerebral representations of speech units.
... Ambos se basan en la distinción entre sistemas reactivos y sistemas cognitivos; pese a la eficiencia de aquéllos, es preciso reconocer sus límites para funciones y tareas tales como pensar y planificar acciones. Importa estudiar aquí cómo se establecen los modelos internos acerca de la acción y cómo ciertos organismos inteligentes no sólo reaccionan a las perturbaciones del entorno sino que también inician o emprenden las acciones, se forman representaciones internas acerca de cómo es el mundo exterior, anticipan la representación de cómo quedaría modificado ese mundo a partir de una determinada acción sobre el mismo y actúan consecuentemente (Jeannerod, 1997)(36) Este proceso refleja de forma bastante aproximada cómo se produce la acción humana sobre el entorno (por ejemplo, en una acción de carácter pedagógico). Precisamente son los sistemas cognitivos aquéllos que son capaces de planificar de forma preventiva, y no simplemente reactiva, los que actúan a partir de representaciones y modelos internos acerca de las propiedades del mundo, representaciones «libres de contexto» que actúan de modo dinámico generando productos (conocimientos y nuevas representaciones) de carácter simbólico (37). ...
... When people grasp an object, the grip aperture "in flight" is typically scaled to the size of the object (Jeannerod, 1984(Jeannerod, , 1997. In experiment 1, we found that participants perceived target objects placed on top of toy rats (negative emotion) to be larger and closer than those on top of toy squirrels (positive emotion) and wooden blocks (neutral emotion). ...
Previous studies have shown that our perception of stimulus properties can be affected by the emotional nature of the stimulus. It is not clear, however, how emotions affect visually-guided actions toward objects. To address this question, we used toy rats, toy squirrels, and wooden blocks to induce negative, positive, and neutral emotions, respectively. Participants were asked to report the perceived distance and the perceived size of a target object resting on top of one of the three emotion-inducing objects; or to grasp the same target object either without visual feedback (open-loop) or with visual feedback (closed-loop) of both the target object and their grasping hand during the execution of grasping. We found that the target object was perceived closer and larger, but was grasped with a smaller grip aperture in the rat condition than in the squirrel and the wooden-block conditions when no visual feedback was available. With visual feedback present, this difference in grip aperture disappeared. These results showed that negative emotion influences both perceived size and grip aperture, but in opposite directions (larger perceived size but smaller grip aperture) and its influence on grip aperture could be corrected by visual feedback, which revealed different effects of emotion to perception and action. Our results have implications on the understanding of the relationship between perception and action in emotional condition, which showed the novel difference from previous theories.
... ception (Jeannerod, 1997 the 'egocentric space' (Trehub, 1991). ...
Sentience is defined as the capacity of feeling that —
according to the target paper in this journal issue — is biologically
marked by the presence of ionic waves in neural tissue and the
‘lactate shuttle’ that provides fuel for the increase in wave amplitudes
during wakefulness. Conscious experiences are proposed to be dyna
mic and relational phenomena, depending on the tuning of internal
dispositions of sentience (the affective drive) and affordances that
arise in the domain of interaction of the agent with the physical and
social environment. The expression of the capacity of feeling involves,
besides sensations and emotions, two other types of mental function
and respective neural correlates: cognitive and enactive. Focusing on
the example of a virtual reality roller coaster (VRRC) conscious
experience, I combine my first-person experience of feeling dizzy in a
VRRC ride with third-person scientific experimental results about its
neural correlates, involving the vestibular system and the direct
perception of a visual cliff, to provide an explanation as to why some
people feel dizzy during the downward phase of the ride, while others
do not. The proposed explanation illustrates how affective, cognitive,
and enactive functions are integrated in the formation of conscious
episodes.
... Enactivism also works with findings from neuroscience, where mental imagery is characterized not as a representational process, but as a motoric, bodily process involving neuronal activation and engaging bodily movements (Jeannerod, 1997;Driskell et al., 1994;Guillot et al., 2012;see Gallagher & Rucińska, 2021). Available proposals for embodied and enactive imagination (Hutto, 2015;Hutto & Myin, 2013Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2017;Medina, 2013) treat imagination as a form of action that is strongly integrated with perceiving, involves implicit embodied sensorimotor processes, and is densely textured in a cross-modal (kinetic, tactile, kinesthetic and olfactory) way. ...
The project of this paper is to synthesize enactivist cognitive science and practice theory in order to develop a new account of pretend play. Pretend play is usually conceived of as a representationalist phenomenon where a pretender projects a fictional mental representation onto reality. It thus seems that pretense can only be explained in representationalist terms. In this paper, we oppose this usual approach. We instead propose not only new explanatory tools for pretend play, but also a fundamental reconceptualization of the phenomena of pretend play, that is, of the very explanandum of theories of pretense. To do so, we suggest combining the turn to action and embodiment in the cognitive sciences with the practice turn in the humanities. From our point of view, pretend play has to be seen in its role in human life as a whole, which is to help children to learn to master the complex sociocultural contingencies of the manifold social practices that make up social reality. Pretend play should therefore be conceived as alternative sense-making that is always related, in varying ways, to ordinary social practices. Pretenders do not need to project mental representations onto reality, but make sense of their surroundings in different ways than encultured adults in ordinary practices. In the paper, we spell out this view and show how it enables an enactivist reconceptualization of imagination, intentions and knowledge, which are usually thought of as being available only to representationalist accounts of pretense.
... Moreover, a comparison of the RT for the hand laterality judgment task and the alphanumeric rotation task across angles showed that the former was significantly longer than the latter. Since the time taken to perform a mental task is an index of the cognitive processes underlying that mental task, a higher time requirement in the hand laterality judgment task might suggest the use of a KMI strategy (Jeannerod, 1997;McAvinue & Robertson, 2008). ...
Functional equivalence hypothesis and motor-cognitive model both posit that motor imagery performance involves inhibition of overt physical movement and thus engages control processes. As motor inhibition in internal motor imagery has been fairly well studied in adults, the present study aimed to investigate the correlation between internal motor imagery and motor inhibition in children. A total of 73 children (7-year-olds: 23, 9-year-olds: 27, and 11-year-olds: 23) participated the study. Motor inhibition was assessed with a stop-signal task, and motor imagery abilities were measured with a hand laterality judgment task and an alphanumeric rotation task, respectively. Overall, for all age groups, response time in both motor imagery tasks increased with rotation angles. Moreover, all children’s response times in both tasks decreased with age, their accuracy increased with age, and their motor inhibition efficiency increased with age. We found a significant difference between 7-year-olds and 9-year-olds in the hand laterality judgment task, suggesting that the involvement of motor inhibition in internal motor imagery might change with age. Our results reveal the underlying processes of internal motor imagery development, and furthermore, provide practical implications for movement rehabilitation of children.
This paper discusses the dawn of cognitive neuroscience in management and organizational research. The study does that in two tiers: first, it reviews the interdisciplinary field of organizational cognitive neuroscience, and second, it analyzes the role organizational cognitive neuroscience (OCN) could play in reducing counterproductive workplace behaviors (CWB). Theoretically, the literature has established the benefits of a neuro-scientific approach to understanding various organizational behaviors, but no research has been done on using organizational neuroscience techniques to study counterproductive work behaviors. This paper, however, has taken the first step towards this research avenue. The study will shed light on this interdisciplinary field of organizational cognitive neuroscience (OCN) and the benefits that organizations can reap from it with respect to understanding employee behavior. A research agenda for future studies is provided to scholars who are interested in advancing the investigation of cognition in counterproductive work behaviors, also by using neuroscience techniques. The study concludes by providing evidence drawn from the literature in favor of adopting an OCN approach in organizations.
Context
Psychological skills training improves performance in athletes. However, few studies have looked at the efficacy and satisfaction of mental skills training programs for collegiate athletes.
Objective
We aimed to evaluate satisfaction of collegiate athletes with a 6-session mental skills course, and to assess changes in mental toughness and coping skills before and after the course.
Design
Prospective cohort study following collegiate female athletes through a 6-session mental skills course.
Setting
Division 1 collegiate athletic teams
Patients/Participants
54 Division I female athletes (mean age =19.8) participated in the program and 42 (77.7 %) completed pre-course assessments, which subsequent evaluations were matched to.
Main Outcome Measures
The Athletic Coping Skills Inventory (ACSI, range=0-84) and Mental Toughness Index (MTI, range=8-56) assessed coping skills and mental toughness pre-course, immediate post-course and 4-month post course. Satisfaction was assessed on a 10-point scale.
Results
For participants with paired pre- and immediate post-course data (n=37, 68.5%), MTI scores improved by a mean 2.6 points (95% CI=1.1-4.1; p=0.001) and ACSI scores improved by a mean 4.0 points (95% CI=0.6-7.4; p=0.02). At four-month follow-up (n=25, 46.2%), no change was detected from pre-course in mean MTI score (p=0.72), but there was a significant increase of 3.4 points in mean ACSI (95% CI=0.4-6.4; p=0.03). Overall satisfaction had a median score of 9/10 (IQR, 8-10) at post-course, and eighteen participants (48.6%) shared positive free-text comments regarding course delivery, content, and impact. No negative feedback was reported.
Conclusions
Mental toughness and coping skills scores significantly improved at post-course assessment, with coping skills scores maintaining their effect at four months. The improvements identified spark the question of the potential impact of mental skills training programs when studied in larger athlete populations or over more sustained periods of time. Athletes reported being highly satisfied with course content and reported overall positive experiences.
Three experiments tested the hypothesis that response selection skill involves associations between individual stimulus features and responses. The Orientation group in Experiments 1 and 2 first practiced responding to the orientation of a line stimulus while ignoring its color, and the Color group practiced responding to the color of the line while disregarding its orientation. When in the ensuing test conditions the Orientation group responded to the color of the line, RTs and errors increased when the then irrelevant line orientation was inconsistent with practice. This confirmed that during practice, Orientation participants had developed orientation feature-response associations they could not fully inhibit. Yet, evidence for color feature-response associations was not observed in the Color group. This was attributed to orientation identification being faster than color identification, even after having practiced responding to colors. Experiment 3 involved practicing to three line stimuli with unique orientation and color combinations. It showed evidence for the independent development of orientation feature-response associations and color feature-response associations. Together, these results indicate that the typical RT reduction with practice in response selection tasks is caused in part by the capacity of participants to learn selecting responses on the basis of the stimulus feature that becomes available first.
p>This paper discusses the dawn of cognitive neuroscience in management and organizational research. The study does that in two tiers: first, it reviews the interdisciplinary field of organizational cognitive neuroscience and second, it analyzes the role organizational cognitive neuroscience (OCN) could play in reducing counterproductive workplace behaviors (CWB). Theoretically the literature has established the benefits of a neuro-scientific approach towards understanding various organizational behaviors but no research has been done on using organizational neuroscience techniques to study counterproductive work behaviors. This paper however has taken the first step towards this research avenue. The study will shed light on this interdisciplinary field of organizational cognitive neuroscience (OCN) and the benefits that organizations can reap from it with respect to understanding employee behavior. A research agenda for future studies is provided to scholars who are interested in advancing the investigation of cognition in counterproductive work behaviors, also by using neuroscience techniques. The study concludes by providing evidences drawn from the literature in favor of adopting an OCN approach in organizations. </p
The intelligibility of a performance of improvised dance does not reside in the rehearsed execution of a pre-existing script, nor does it result from a sustained verbal interaction between the dancers. Many aspects of the speechless performance obviously play an important role in the achieved intelligibility of the dance: a dancer is seen moving on and from a ground, on a stage, in a space delimited by walls, illuminated by spotlights, sounded by music, in front of an audience. And of course with other dancers, whose joint gestures and moves give shape to a choreography by providing pace, rhythm and sequences, thereby constituting a narrative or fragments thereof. This paper addresses the manufacture of this witnessable order, by presenting some results of an ethnographic inquiry. The investigation will be focused on how, in an improvised duet, each dancer interacts with the other, and more specifically how she or he positions her- or himself in relation to the other, from distance to proximity and touch. This work of distance management is the dance, whose choreographic accountability is produced and structured by dancers staying at a distance, getting closer and touching each other. The analysis shows that distance management is oriented to as relevant by the dancers and that it has consequences on their improvised duet. It is also what makes their performance analyzable by distant observers.
Mental skills training is an essential component of sport performance. Mental skills training with youth athletes has great potential, as sport often serves as a place where they formulate facilitative—or alternatively, debilitative—views of success and failure. Athletes who engage in mental skills training learn concrete strategies to better navigate the mental landscape of performance. This chapter seeks to explore various mental skills applications (e.g., stress management, imagery, self-talk, and goal setting) through the use of a case study. Evidence-based research supports the mental skills consultant’s applied approach, allowing for creativity and flexibility to best support the athlete’s needs.KeywordsSport psychologyMindsetYouth sportSport performanceStress managementImagerySelf-talkGoal setting
In autism, motor impairments are extremely common and often herald the emergence of ubiquitous atypical development. Few studies so far have explored the autistic motor difficulties. Our work aims to investigate the level motor management of adolescents with autism spectrum disorder, compared to typically developing children. The motor management was realized, in different imitative conditions. We assume that pragmatic sensorimotor management would be functional both in adolescent with autistic spectrum disorder and typical children. However, if high-level cognitive semantic management is gradually acquired in the typical children, it would be deficient in the adolescents with autism spectrum disorder. Our results confirm and justify the selective impairment of symbolic semantic functions of the motor achievements of atypical with autism spectrum disorder.
Here is a widespread but controversial idea: those animals who represent correctly are likely to be selected over those who misrepresent. While various versions of this claim have been traditionally endorsed by the vast majority of philosophers of mind, recently, it has been argued that this is just plainly wrong. My aim in this paper is to argue for an intermediate position: that the correctness of some but not all representations is indeed selectively advantageous. It is selectively advantageous to have correct representations that are directly involved in bringing about and guiding the organism's action. I start with the standard objection to the claim that it is selectively advantageous to represent correctly, the ‘better safe than sorry’ argument gand then generalize it with the help of Peter Godfrey Smith's distinction between Cartesian and Jamesian reliability and the trade‐off between them. This generalized argument rules out a positive answer to our question at least as far as the vast majority of our representational apparatus is concerned. But this argument fails to apply in the case of the correctness of a special kind of representation, one that is directly involved in bringing about, and in guiding, actions. We can still maintain that it is selectively advantageous to have a reliable mechanism for producing representations of this kind.
The sense of self as a covert agent is a key component to the sense of self. This paper focuses on covert action as a preparation to interact. This activates the entire motor system, including the gamma motoneurons innervating the muscle spindles. The proprioceptive stimulation is fed back to the network of origin, contributing to a sense of self as generating the covert activity. A study of motivated behavior in the rat is presented to clarify how the motivation potentiates actions in the body. This is set into Panksepp’s subcortical action system of emotional circuits, where the motivation arises. This sets the motor tone for the planned action. This picture is interpreted with Ellis’s and Newton’s model portraying how emotional motivation can lead to phenomenal consciousness. It is proposed that no motor imagery occurs without involving the body. The higher levels of awareness depend on the subcortical bodily intentionality.
What is free will? Can it exist in a determined universe? How can we determine who, if anyone, possesses it? Philosophers have been debating these questions for millennia. In recent decades neuroscientists have joined the fray with questions of their own. Which neural mechanisms could enable conscious control of action? What are intentional actions? Do contemporary developments in neuroscience rule out free will or, instead, illuminate how it works? Over the past few years, neuroscientists and philosophers have increasingly come to understand that both fields can make substantive contributions to the free-will debate, so working together is the best path forward to understanding whether, when, and how our choices might be free. We therefore asked leading philosophers and neuroscientists which questions related to free will they would most like the other field to answer. Those experts then voted on the 15 most important questions for each field to answer. This book is a collection of the answers to those questions along with follow-up questions from world experts in the neuroscience and philosophy of free will. These varied perspectives will fascinate, illuminate, and stimulate students from both fields, along with anyone who wants to be brought up to date on these profound issues.
Conceptualizing:
The next patient interaction is logical, essential, and largely done intuitively.
Main purpose:
To design and test a succinct learning guide for student guidance and student-faculty interaction in conceptualizing the next patient interaction.
Methods:
In 2021 and 2022, faculty scored questions from 1-5: Recognize deviation from the ideal? Articulate how and how much the situation deviated? Gage consequences of the situation? Assess own capabilities? To what extent does the student have a clear grasp of the procedural outcome? Faculty were also given open-ended questions.
Results:
Forty-eight reports were completed, 25 D3 and 23 D4. Three hundred thirty-five faculty entries were made in the questions calling for a 1-5 response out of a possible 336 responses. Statistically significant differences were noted. Students were better able to recognize the situation as different from ideal than to articulate how and how much the situation deviated. Students were better able to grasp how and how much this situation differs from the ideal than to assess own capabilities. D4 students were better able to recognize deviation from the ideal and to articulate how and how much the situation deviated than were D3 students. For open-ended questions, more students were scored as "Prepared" than were scored as "Unsure" and "Missed" combined.
Conclusions:
The exercise is seen as a succinct and constructive (nonjudgmental) path to guide the student's conceptualization of the next patient encounter before the encounter begins. Next steps will be incremental for wider use in a clinical teaching environment.
Experiments suggest that conscious decisions to act may be initiated by unconscious neural events that precede the decision. Some have concluded that unconscious neural events are sufficient to cause both the decision to act and the action, so consciousness has no causal efficacy in producing the action. Here, I explain why this reasoning is fallacious in terms that apply to all mental events, using a variety of examples in which the conscious aspect of a mental event has a different and even an “opposite” effect on behavior from the unconscious aspect. These cases provide vivid illustrations of the distinct causal contributions of conscious and unconscious aspects of a mental event to behavior. One conclusion is that the neuroscience of decision has been overly focused on binary “go/no go” contents, obscuring the ways in which conscious and unconscious contents can make distinct contributions to decision and to action.
Neuroethik ist eine Disziplin der angewandten Ethik, die sich mit der Praxis und den Folgen neurowissenschaftlicher Forschung beschäftigt. Philosophie des Geistes und Ethik reagieren seit der Antike auf naturwissenschaftliche Herausforderungen. Bis zum 17. Jahrhundert ist das im Wesentlichen in der Perspektive allgemeiner naturphilosophischer Reflexionen erfolgt.
Presence, flow, narrative absorption, immersion, transportation, and similar subjective phenomena are studied in many different disciplines, mostly in relation to mediated experiences (books, film, VR, games). Moreover, since real, virtual, or fictional agents are often involved, concepts like identification and state empathy are often linked to engaging media use. Based on a scoping review that identified similarities in the wording of various questionnaire items conceived to measure different phenomena, we categorize items into the most relevant psychological aspects and use this categorization to propose an interdisciplinary systematization. Then, based on a framework of embodied predictive processing, we present a new cognitive model of presence-related phenomena for mediated and non-mediated experiences, integrating spatial and temporal aspects and also considering the role of fiction and media design. Key processes described within the model are: selective attention, enactment of intentions, and interoception. We claim that presence is the state of perceived successful agency of an embodied mind able to correctly enact its predictions. The difference between real-life and simulated experiences (“book problem,” “paradox of fiction”) lays in the different precision weighting of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals.
What is the mental representation that is responsible for implicit bias? What is this representation that mediates between the trigger and the biased behavior? My claim is that this representation is neither a propositional attitude nor a mere association (as the two major accounts of implicit bias claim). Rather, it is mental imagery: perceptual processing that is not directly triggered by sensory input. I argue that this view captures the advantages of the two standard accounts without inheriting their disadvantages. Further, this view also explains why manipulating mental imagery is among the most efficient ways of counteracting implicit bias.
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