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The Cold War in Indonesia, 1948
Abstract
Existing accounts of the Madiun incident or revolt of September 1948 suggest that it was a mainly domestic incident, with little direct link to international communism, whether through instructions or the international communist line. This paper argues that there were in fact strong links to both. The revolt was closely linked to the return of veteran communist Muso, who arrived from Europe after discussions with communists there, and with a mandate to help the PKI to reform its policies.
... On the other hand, the communists were anti-fascists and saw Imperial Japan as a bigger evil than the Dutch. During the short-lived Japanese occupation in 1942-1945, the Dutch also provided financial support for Indonesian communist party cadres to organize resistance to Japanese occupation (Poeze 2009). Nevertheless, when the independence of Indonesia was proclaimed, all of these groups sided with the Republic. ...
... Contrary to the expectations of the Dutch, Indonesian communists preferred to support the Republic and even participated in the cabinet. Amir Sjarifuddin, a prominent Indonesian communist, took a position at the Ministry of Information in 1945 and later become Indonesia's prime minister in August 1947 (Poeze 2009). ...
... The CPN was afraid that without such an arrangement, Indonesia's independence would lead to dwindling support from Dutch CPM workers because they were afraid of unemployment caused by independence. The CPN proposal caused heated debate between De Groot, the CPN leader, and Muso, the PKI leader in 1948 (Poeze 2009). ...
Why did the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) pursue a nonviolent, collaborative, and parliamentary path to power? How did it secure major electoral successes? The answers to both queries have much to do with the PKI's adaptation of Maoism. Although scholars recognize that Maoism was influential on PKI theory and praxis, they have hitherto underevaluated the extent to which PKI leaders, notably Dipa Nusantara Aidit and Muhammad Hatta Lukman, engaged with Mao's ideas and how such ideas informed policy. Through textual exegesis of PKI leaders’ writings and speeches, our article argues that the PKI's “Indonesianization” of Marxism–Leninism drew from several Maoist texts, but differed in its composition in a number of important ways. “Indonesianization” entailed cross-class alliances, the political agency of the peasantry, willingness to cooperate with parties across the political spectrum, and, most innovatively, a nonviolent agenda. The PKI also demonstrated an adaptive willingness to learn from all, while remaining beholden to none. Our goal is to show how PKI leaders spoke back in their dialectical engagement with Maoism, as Maoism, for them, did not constitute a static, orthodox, or monolithic “thing.” Instead, Maoism was for Aidit and Lukman an ideological system within which lay an ideological discourse, critical interpretive paradigm, historical revolutionary experience, military strategy, and blueprint to socialist development against which to juxtapose their ideas and grand visions.
This study identifies Tan Malaka's ideas in the perspective of Civic Education by exploring his great idea of Gerpolek which had published in a book. The published book supported by several other works, then analyzed in the context of Citizenship Education. Based on the results of the study shows that each of Tan Malaka's revolutionary ideas from the perspective of Citizenship Education has real contribution in the relation to build citizenship and the state, whether it seen from the context of nationalism, economics, politics, and human rights. Through Citizenship Education, it is appropriate that Tan Malaka placed in line with the national founders. His work becomes a reference in order to build the nation for the better future.
Diese Seminararbeit zeichnet die Lokalisierung von "1965/66" innerhalb der indonesischen Erinnerungskultur und ihre Funktion für die Suharto'sche Geschichtspolitik nach und zeigt Kontinuitäten und Wandel der Narrative in der medialen Berichterstattung im deutschsprachigen Raum auf. Hierzu wird das offizielle "PKI-Putsch"-Narrativ des Regimes anhand der Dioramentexte im Pengkhinatan-PKI-Museum (Jakarta) rekonstruiert und mit der Berichterstattung des Wochenmagazins Der Spiegel kontrastiert, um die jüngsten Veränderungen in diesen transnationalen Kulturen der Erinnerung sichtbar zu machen.
This paper investigates the extent to which the Madiun Uprising of 1948 shaped the Cold War in Indonesia. The uprising resulted in severe and lasting antagonisms between the Indonesian Communist Party and members of the Islamic Party Masyumi due to reprisals against Masyumi members after the failure of the uprising and the death of key members of the Communist Party at the hands of the Republic. Although 1948 can be seen as an important flash point in the Cold War for Indonesia, it was not a significant turning point because the communist party recovered from this episode. After surveying a range of interpretations of the Madiun uprising and its significance internationally, this paper provides an overview of the ongoing significance of the Madiun uprising to the image of the Indonesian Communist Party in the 1950s and 1960s. The paper examines an early history war between the Communist Party and Masyumi over how the events at Madiun would be remembered. These debates signal continuing and intense hostility towards the communist party from Masyumi supporters, which endured throughout and even after the 1965–1966 anti-communist killings.
Recently declassified documents from the archives of the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)-CC AUCP(B) have shed quite a new light on the relations between Indonesian Communists, especially Musso, with comrades from other communist parties: the All Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks-AUCP(B) and the Communist Party of the Netherlands-CPN. The present work is based on materials and documents from the Archives of the Foreign Relations Department of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B). The archival documents concerning Indonesia, available to the researcher, can be divided into three groups. Tne first group includes documents and materials of internal correspondence of the Foreign Relations Department. Mostly these are notes of officials of South-East Asian sectors directed to higher party bureaucracy of the same Department. This group of documents permits us to follow the process of determination and formulation of the CC AUCP(B) position concerning the situation in Indonesia and its communist movement. The second group comprises information materials, including some of the documents prepared by Musso, as well as his letters to the CC AUCP(B) written in the last period of his stay in Moscow and during his long journey from the USSR to Indonesia. This group of archival documents gives a clear idea about Musso's views on the main problems and tasks of the Indonesian communist movement as well as his attitude to the positions of Soviet, Chinese and Dutch communists on the Indonesian question. The third group consists of documents connected with the Communist Party of the Netherlands. These are information materials prepared by the Foreign Relations Department of the CC AUCP(B), letters of the CPN leader Paul de Groot to Indonesian communists, to CC AUCP(B), a report of his meeting and conversation with CC AUCP(B) Secretary A.A. Suslov, who was in charge of AUCP(B) foreign affairs. The last portion of the archival documents permits us to make more accurately many points connected with interrelations among the three communist parties-PKI, CPN, and AUCP(B).
- Poeze