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QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS173 Page 1
Working paper Number 173
Rituals of Royalty and the Elaboration of Ceremony in Oman:
View From the Edge
Dawn Chatty
1
Ceremonial and elaborate protocols are commonly associated with kingship, authority and
power and imbued with a sense of an ancient past. Yet traditions, particularly as pertaining to
European practices, are often made up, choreographed and then formally instituted in a
matter of a few years. Throughout Europe and the developing world, traditions have been,
and continue to be, invented and kingship, oligarchy, and other institutions are set up,
supported and occasionally simply maintained by such ceremony. Once established these
rituals tend to take on a life of their own, sometimes thriving in an inverse relationship to the
actual realities of power and authority.
In the Middle East few studies exist which examine the study of royal rituals – invented and
derived. Morocco, perhaps more than any other state, has been the focus of a number of such
studies a few others considered aspects of ceremonial and monarchy in Jordan. In the case of
Oman, however, there are no studies at present which consider the relationship between
created ceremonial in the consolidation of power and authority in the perception of the
citizens of that state. This article will briefly explore the creation and elaboration of
ceremonial and court ritual in the Sultanate of Oman after the accession of Sultan Qaboos bin
Said in 1970. It will attempt to show that while the creation of rituals of royalty were
important for building a sense of national belonging among even the most remote
communities in the country, these same ceremonials and created traditions developed lives of
their own, stultifying courtly behaviour, and contributing little to the organic sense of Omani
citizenship.
May 2009
1
Dawn Chatty is Reader in Anthropology and Forced Migration, and Deputy director of the Refugee Studies
Centre, Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS173 Page 2
Rituals of Royalty and the Elaboration of Ceremony in Oman:
View From the Edge
In the early months of 1980, shortly after my arrival in the Sultanate of Oman, I was offered
an opportunity to join a small convoy of vehicles crossing the deserts of Oman. The trip was
to take a week and would start in Salalah, the capital of Dhofar, the southern region of Oman,
and end up in Muscat. It was not quite the retracing of the steps of the English explorers
Bertram Thomas in the 1930s and Wilfred Thesiger in the 1940s, but it felt like it. We
travelled in four-wheel drive vehicles instead of on camel, as Thomas and Thesiger had done,
and we had access to some graded roads as well as the recently-opened 1,000 kilometre
tarmacked dual-carriageway connecting Muscat with Salalah; but the landscape was the
same, vast tracts of seemingly untouched open scrub, gravel, rock and sand. The purpose of
the journey was largely to permit a medical team to trace several lapsed tuberculosis patients
from tribes in the interior and to provide immunization vaccines to the children of these
communities. Several days into our journey, and half way across our proposed itinerary, we
came across a small group of nomadic pastoral Harasiis tribe families preparing to attend a
wedding. We stopped and took the opportunity to seek their permission to begin a course of
immunization for their children “Why”, we were asked, “did we want to do this”? Our reply
was, “The Sultan of Oman wishes to see all Omanis immunized against these diseases”.
“Why”, they continued, “should he want to do this for us”? We were initially lost for an
answer, having assumed that the sense of belonging to one nation, and the obligations of
leadership had reached these parts of the country. They had not.
1
.
Ceremony and elaborate protocols are commonly associated with kingship, authority and
power. The pageantry, for example, which is associated with the British monarchy in its
public ceremonials, is imbued with a sense of an ancient past. Yet, these traditions are recent
inventions derived from the late Victorian period
2
. Traditions, particularly as pertaining to
European practices are often made up, choreographed and then formally instituted in a matter
of a few years, rapidly gaining a sense of permanence
3
. Sometimes entirely new symbols and
devices are made up to confirm gravitas, substance and rallying points for the new entity (e.g.
Marianne, John Bull or Uncle Sam). Traditions have been, and continue to be, invented and
kingship, oligarchy, and other institutions set up, supported and occasionally simply
maintained by such ceremony. Once established, these ceremonial rituals tend to take on a life
of their own, sometimes thriving in an inverse relationship to the actual realities of power and
authority. Created or invented rituals and traditions serve several purposes: they may
establish or symbolize legitimate relations of authority; or particular institutions; or they may
be used to inculcating a certain set of beliefs systems and conventions of behaviour
4
. While
the first two purposes were commonly used in British and French colonial contexts in Africa
5
and South Asia
6
, the third purpose generally characterized the inventions of rituals in the
Middle East and North Africa. In this region, the general socialization of highly fragmented
sets of societies and cultures was enhanced by the marking out of rituals, ceremony and new
traditions. The creation of such practices, which included processions, bands, regalia and
anniversaries worked to give the state and its often oligarchic leadership greater legitimacy
while at the same time creating a sense of commonality among the diverse peoples in the
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS173 Page 3
country.
In the Middle East few studies exist which examine the rituals of royalty – invented
and derived. Morocco has been the focus of a number of studies examining the longevity of
Moroccan kingship
7
. For centuries, Moroccan monarchs have conducted royal progressions
(harkas) with elaborate entourages throughout the country embodying in their person and their
companions royal authority and power
8
. In Jordan, a few studies have emerged considering
aspects of ceremonial, monarchy and national identity
9
. In the Gulf States the relationship of
the rulers to local merchants and the later effort to create a ‘national identity’ have also been
explored
10
. In the case of Oman, however, there are no studies at present which consider the
relationship between ceremony in the consolidation of power and authority and the perception
of the nationals of that state
11
. This article explores the creation and elaboration of certain
ceremonials and court rituals in the Sultanate of Oman after the accession of Sultan Qaboos in
1970. It seeks to determine the relationship between the development of these ceremonial and
ritual events and the perception of leadership and authority in the person of the Sultan as well
as the development of a sentiment of common nationality. Its ethnographic underpinning is
the most remote and marginal of Oman’s people, the nomadic pastoral Harasiis tribe of the
central desert of Oman
12
. It attempts to show that, while the creation of rituals of royalty were
important for building a sense of national belonging among this most cut-off and distant of
communities in the country, these same ceremonies and created traditions developed lives of
their own. Over time these rituals ossified Sultanic courtly behaviour, contributing little to the
organic sense of Omani citizenship, and eventually disillusioning some of these marginal
groups.
Background to the Dearth of Ceremony in Recent Al Bu Saidi Courts
The Al Bu Said Dynasty came to power in 1744
13
. Over the centuries this dynasty underwent
swings in authority and power
14
. The mid 19
th
century saw a rapid decline in Al Bu Said
fortunes and British interests in Oman came to be directed and managed from Delhi rather
than from Whitehall. For the whole of the 20
th
century and into the 21
st
century, Oman has
had only four rulers: Faysal (1888- 1913), Taymur (1913-1932), Said (1932 -1970) and
Qaboos (1970 to the present). All four rulers owed their position to British support in one
way or another.
The indigenous population of the country was relatively large and markedly
heterogeneous. In the north it included a small, elite urban merchant class with strong cultural
ties and trade links with India and the coast of East Africa. Along the coast, subsistence
fishing settlements were common, and in the mountains and intervening valleys, terraced
farming communities maintained ancient systems of water collection and distribution
15
. The
few towns in the interior were centres of regional trade as well as of religious learning. The
population of the south of the country, in Dhofar, was distinctly of South Arabian or
Himyaritic descent sharing a distinct culture, history and language base. In the middle of the
country’s central desert, hundreds of kilometres from agrarian and urban settlements, were a
number of nomadic pastoral tribes some with cultural and social links derived from central
Arabia and others from Himyaritic Yemen. This thinly-populated desert region played only a
marginal role in Omani dynastic history. Until recently these pastoral tribes of the interior of
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS173 Page 4
Oman had little knowledge of the secular government of the Sultan on the coast; some were
only marginally more physically connected with the Ibadi Imam in the Jebel Akhdar of Oman.
By the 1920s, the Omani coastal strip under the control of the Sultan was increasingly
in debt to the Indian merchants of Muscat. Loans were secured from the British government
to free the Sultan from dependence on these Indian merchants. But these loans carried with
them a growing dependence on Great Britain and its political and civil service. In 1925, for
example, Bertram Thomas was seconded to Oman as the British Financial Advisor for
Muscat. In actual fact, he assumed the position of Prime Minister and virtually ran the
government during Sultan Taymur’s frequent absences abroad.
By the time Said was formally recognized as the ruler of Oman in 1932, the 21 year-
old had inherited a country riddled with financial difficulty. Only through frugal, nearly
parsimonious, budgeting over the next 38 years was the Sultan able to repay the British their
loans and thus wrestle some control of the state back into his own hands. Eradicating the
Sultanate’s long-term public debt through unenviable economizing was to set a pattern for
economic management. In the late 1930s and 1940s Sultan Said was able to implement a
modest modernization programme and he cooperated completely with the British during
World War II.
Oil exploration commenced in Oman during the 1930s. In the central desert of Oman,
both the Harasiis and the Jeneba nomadic pastoral tribes were affected by these activities.
Interviews with these tribesmen indicated that these incursions into their traditional territory
were the first occasions many had had with Europeans. The Jeneba tribe living between the
Indian Ocean and the edge of the Jiddat il-Harasiis closely watched the oil exploration
activities and then formally laid claim to the Jiddat maintaining that it was their land which
they merely permitted the Harasiis to occupy. Sultan Said and his advisor, Bertram Thomas,
decided, however, that occupancy was the determining factor in land right issues and
dismissed the Jeneba claim. Wilkinson, moreover, suggests that the Sultan’s true motive in
coming down on the side of the Harasiis was his confidence that the Harasiis were potentially
stronger allies in his claim to future oil rights in the central desert interior
16
. Pastoral tribes in
the north of the country, such as the Duru, bordering on areas under the control of the Ibadi
Imam were increasingly being drawn into the political and armed conflict between the Sultan
on the coast and the Ibadi Imam in the interior.
In 1955 an exploratory search party landed at Duqm on Oman’s eastern coast and
made its way across the Jiddat il-Harasiis to arrive at Fahud in Duru tribal territory. Sultan
Said, determined to consolidate his area of interests and sovereignty over this region,
contended in his negotiations with the oil concerns, that the Harasiis tribe in the interior and
the Jeneba tribe along the coast near Duqm had no relationship with the Ibadi Imam in the
north and were, by default, part of his domain. For the Jeneba, this was a problematic
assertion as their leader maintained a residence in an area within the Ibadi Imamate
17
. For the
Harasiis, however, there was no strong link either to the Imam or to the Sultan; neither had a
representative or local governor (wali) in the Harasiis tribal territory. The Harasiis were, at
that time, marginal to the extent and administration of the Sultan’s government
During this period, Sultan Said’s relationship with Great Britain was cemented by two
near simultaneous crises. In 1952, Saudi Arabia attempted to occupy part of Oman in the al-
Buraymi Oasis
18
. In the same year, the Imam (who allied himself with Saudi Arabia)
launched his rebellion which spilled over into a contestation over ownership of any oil finds
by oil company exploration teams. In 1959 a combined assault by the Sultan’s forces and
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS173 Page 5
those of the British on the Jebel Akhdar ended with the defeat and retreat of the Ibadi Imam
and his rebels. The success of the 1959 campaign heralded a period of uncontested and
genuinely close cooperation between the Sultan and British authorities.
This period also saw Sultan Said search for ways to develop the country without
‘modernizing’ it. He prohibited the general importation of cars. He banned sunglasses and
torches and insisted that the gates of the capital of Muscat be closed at sunset. He permitted
only three schools to operate over the entire country admitting 100 boys a year, who he
personally chose. For most of the 1960s, Said withdrew to his palace complex in Salalah,
Dhofar. The Harasiis and Jeneba leaders, as well as other prominent tribal members from the
interior deserts made annual trips to Salalah to receive monetary gifts from the Sultan in
recognition of their political importance to him. However, his increasingly petty and eccentric
behaviour and occasionally outlandish rules for his subjects resulted in growing discontent
and sporadic outbreaks of violence against him and his rule
19
.
Yet Sultan Said, himself, was a cultured and cosmopolitan man. Throughout the
1950s and 1960s he made annual trips to the United Kingdom, generally in the summer
20
. He
was a keen music lover and enjoyed opera. His summer sojourns were often passed in
London where he frequently met and negotiated expenditure for military hardware and troops
with British politicians and Foreign Office officials. During this time, British concerns over
the Sultan’s isolation in his palace in Salalah culminated in the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, pointedly informing him that the Queen did not spend all her time in
Balmoral Castle
21
.
In 1964, oil was discovered in the central desert of Oman and, by 1967, it began to be
exported. Projected revenues jumped dramatically, but even then Said remained cautious
about spending money he did not yet have. Thus, although he commissioned plans for a new
port at Muscat and a hospital in Ibri among other projects, he took his time giving the go-
ahead to implement these works. Until his overthrow by his son, Qaboos, Said continued to
act and behave with the shrewdness and calculation of someone always on the edge of
financial ruin. His household and his retainers were kept under very tight fiscal control, no
excess or flourish in décor or entertainment was tolerated. His hold over authority and power
revolved around his relations with his armed forces and his British political agents and not
upon any pomp or ceremony to celebrate or consolidate his reign or impress his fellow
Omanis.
The unrest and growing unpopularity of the Sultan was compounded by a rebellion in
the mountains above Salalah supported by the neighbouring People’s Democratic Republic of
Yemen. By the summer of 1970, fearful that the Marxist-Leninist rebellion might become
successful, British forces quietly instigated and supported a coup d’etat led by his son,
Qaboos. Unlike his father, and grandfather before him, Qaboos was not educated in India or
Baghdad. The only son of a Qara, Dhofari tribeswoman, he had remained in Salalah until the
age of 16, never once having visited the north of the country. At this point in Qaboos’ life, his
father agreed to dispatch him to the United Kingdom to complete his education. He was sent
first to the home of Philip Romans in Bury St Edmunds, East Anglia. Philip Romans was the
retired Head Master of Baroda College of the University of Bombay who had established a
school for students from the Arabian Gulf called Feltsham House. Upon leaving Feltsham
House he was enrolled in the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. He graduated in 1962 and
became an officer of the British Army’s Scottish Rifles (the Cameronians), serving in
Germany for one year. The next year, the Foreign Office secured for him several months at the
Bury St Edmunds Council to observe public administration and accounting. During this
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS173 Page 6
intense residency in the UK, Qaboos, not surprisingly, began a lifelong love affair with
military pageantry.
The years in the UK and, in particular, in the British Military deeply affected the
young man. In 1964, after a world tour chaperoned by retired British General, F.C.L.
Chauncy and his wife, Qaboos returned to Dhofar and was placed under a virtual ‘house
arrest’ in the Royal Palace of Salalah by his father. There he was instructed to study Islamic
Law but denied any opportunity to take up an active administrative role in the government.
Some scholars believe that, as the rebellion in Dhofar grew in intensity the British began to
work surreptitiously towards a ‘quiet’ Palace Coup. Others saw instead, that Qaboos, chaffing
at his house arrest, began to make cautious inquiries through carefully screened personal
visitors as to whether the British would support the overthrow of his father
22
. On the night of
July 23
rd
, July 1970 Qaboos launched a nearly bloodless palace coup; a small group of
supporters stormed through the palace doors and up into Said’s apartments. There they were
met by a fusillade fired by Said and his personal slaves. Sultan Said was wounded in the foot.
Peterson maintains that this was a self-sustained injury which occurred when Said cocked one
of two pistols he used to defend himself
23
. Said was flown out of Salalah by the British RAF
to Bahrain, where his wounds were dressed, and then taken on to the United Kingdom where
he lived out the last years of his life in a suite at the Dorchester Hotel on London’s Park Lane.
After the palace coup of 1970, Sultan Qaboos encouraged all Omanis living abroad to
return to the country to help build a government infrastructure nearly from scratch
24
. The
advisors to the new Sultan set about distancing the royal son from his father by over-stating,
exaggerating and occasionally distorting known facts about the father’s ‘miserliness’ and
eccentricities
25
. In the early years of Qaboos’ reign, this information was used to distinguish
the old order of Sultan Said from the ‘New Dawn’ of Qaboos. It remained, for many years,
generally understood that the father’s eccentricities had been damaging to the Oman people
and thus justified the palace coup which brought the modern, British educated son to power.
In a very short period of time, the armed forces, the police force, the internal security
service, the civil service, and government ministries of health, education, social affairs and
labour, agriculture and fisheries, water and electricity, communications and roads among
others were rapidly set up. The trappings of a modern state were put into place almost
overnight. Thousands of miles of roads were tarmacked, and Muscat was connected for the
first time by a modern road network to Salalah. The social and economic transformations of
the coastal areas and the mountains behind in both the north and the south of the country,
funded mainly by petroleum wealth, were enormous. The same was not true of the interior
desert areas of the country which remained isolated from the rapid political, social and
economical transformation taking place along the coastal region of Oman and Dhofar.
Recognizing the Need to Create Traditions
When Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970, there was a decided lack of public ceremonial or
palace ritual associated with monarchy in the 20
th
century. This fact was played up and used to
lay the groundwork for the elaboration of new rituals and traditions associated with the Sultan
Qaboos’ court as well as the development of a cult of personality far removed from the
established eccentricities of his father. There was only one residence in Muscat for the Sultan
(which had lain unoccupied for the previous 12 years) and another compound in Salalah.
Rituals of hospitality were simple and reflected general Omani culture found throughout the
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS173 Page 7
country. Protocol for the occasional state visitor to Muscat remained peculiarly lacking in
substance and lustre as states in other parts of the world came to increasingly sport a
competitive inventiveness to ceremonially enhance the position of the head of state.
Until the late 1960s, most state visitors to Oman arrived by boat and were greeted on
shore by a small representation of family members and others from Muscat’s small merchant
elite appointed by the Sultan for the occasion. An internal British government memorandum
from the British Consul General Phillips in Muscat dated August 27
th
, 1960 revealed British
Government concern for what seemed to be a questionable ‘national salute’ or anthem. The
letter contends that the national salute was written by “the bandmaster of a cruiser in about
1932", and that the only band in Oman which might have been able to play it was “now
disbanded in or around 1937 (Muscat Infantry Band)”. There were no occasions, according to
General Phillips, at which the ‘Salutations’ was now officially played.
Even after the Palace purse was no longer so meagre
26
, Sultan Qaboos’ father was
loathe to develop too much elaboration around the court ceremonials or occasions of state
arrivals and departures. He did, however, decide to purchase a twelve-man whaler for use in
Muscat harbour to ‘meet and greet’ important guests. Working with the offices of Charles
Kendall and Partners in London, he commissioned a new conveyance for ceremonial
occasions which conceptually had significance not unlike a new state carriage for the British
monarch
27
. As the order neared completion, Sultan Said was asked by John Kendall – the son
of the founder of the firm - what kind of dress/uniform he wished for his oarsmen in Muscat to
wear. Sultan Said replied none, just the white long dress (dishdasha) commonly worn by all
men in Oman. John Kendall, taking on much the same role as that of Reginald Brett, the
‘eminence grise’ in British governing circles at the beginning of the 20
th
century’, pushed for
some greater identifying marker for these men to show that they belonged to the Royal
Palace
28
. Kendall continued the conversation making the suggestion of a ceremonial uniform
of white dishdasha but with straightforward waist-coats and braid. Still the Sultan declined to
order any special uniform or ‘dress’ for these oarsmen, explaining, that such elaboration
would be pompous in his mind and not suitable to his Sultanic court
29
.
Sultan Qaboos came to the throne with vastly different experience and perspectives.
Unlike his Anglo-Indian educated father and grandfather, Sultan Qaboos had no experience of
the world outside of Dhofar until he was sent to the United Kingdom. Adding to this
background would have been his years at Sandhurst and a further year with the Scottish
Rifles. Thus, in a very short time, a young man from the south Arabian coast town of Salalah
with practically no international experience would develop a love of many things Western,
and particularly British: classical music, military pageantry, horsemanship, and bagpipes.
After the coup which brought him to power, Sultan Qaboos had to set about uniting the
disparate elements of his country - the interior with the coast and the north with the south.
This unity, which he recognized would centre upon the person of the Sultan, needed new
traditions to support it.
Sultan Qaboos was befriended by the Shah of Iran and King Hussein of Jordan – both
of whom sent significant troop numbers to Dhofar to help Qaboos put down the rebellion in
the mountains by the mid -1970s. King Hussein, also a Sandhurst graduate about six years his
senior, developed a particularly close relationship with Qaboos. The King frequently visited
the Sultan and it was said by many close to the Royal Court that he also tutored the Sultan in
‘monarchic’ protocol. One story which circulated for years was that King Hussein advised the
young Sultan that it was befitting his status to keep his guests and petitioners waiting; the only
exception to this rule was never to be late for the British monarch, Queen Elizabeth II.
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS173 Page 8
Setting up the Structures to Elaborate Ceremony and Ritual
Within a month of the coup d’etat, Sultan Qaboos appointed his uncle Prime Minister and he
immediately set about creating the core structures of a ‘modern’ state. All British government
employees - with the exception of those in the Defence Department - were replaced and
Omanis were appointed as the new ministers and other high-level government post holders
30
.
The Sultan embarked on a programme designed to reinforce and celebrate his reign. The old
Beit al-‘Alam Palace in Muscat was demolished and replaced by the new and spectacular
Palace, Qasr al-‘Alam. Used for ceremonial occasions and state visits rather than as a regular
residence, it was a symbol of the privileged ‘renaissance’ of the Al Said dynasty. In addition, a
building programme of palaces and royal guest houses commenced so that by the early 1980s,
Sultan Qaboos had at least three residences both in the north and the south of the country
befitting his role of political leader of the nation. By the beginning of the 21
st
century Sultan
Qaboos had at least seven royal residences in the north and three in the south as well as
residences and estates in the United Kingdom and in Germany.
31
By naming roads, ports, schools, hospitals, mosques, sports stadiums and residential
areas after him, Sultan Qaboos was inscribing his presence upon the national geography
32
.
His concern for ‘his people’ was affirmed by the constant repetition of his name on radio and
television, by the hanging of his photographs – each in a similar poised attitude of hands
crossed across his lap - in a variety of national dress or military uniform on the walls of
offices, businesses and private. The written press and television coverage of all the Sultan’s
meetings, his comings and goings, the telegrams of greetings and congratulations from other
heads of state was a daily diet consumed by all Omanis. The linking of his name with all that
was new, modern and progressive was in many ways like the official discourses found in
support of state leaders in other countries of the region. One examples of such linkage of the
state with the person of the ruler is in the Syrian Arab Republic. Here, the regular depiction of
Hafez al-Asad in the decades before his death in 2000, as the omnipresent and omniscient
leader was an attempt to control the symbolic world of Syrian society. Official rhetoric and
images operated as a form of power helping to enforce and sustain the reign of Hafez al-
Asad
33
. Thus in Oman, we can see that symbols, rhetoric, pageantry and ceremony worked to
not only represent the person of the Sultan, but also to produce and consolidate his political
power.
Creating the Glue that Binds
Sometimes symbols, created traditions and pageantry have been used to create a separation
between one ruler and the state or to totally break from the government of the past as, for
example, in Iran and in the Former Soviet Union. In Oman, however, the continuity of the
ruling dynasty was unquestioned even if the personality and approach to rule was regarded as
diametrically opposed. Sultan Said was replaced by his son, Qaboos. There was no immediate
break with the past or profound change of direction which the elaboration of new ceremonials,
traditions and pageantry confirmed. Rather it was the recognition that the parsimonious and
miserly qualities of the previous leadership had resulted in an almost total lack of ceremony of
statesmanship which needed to be corrected and elaborated in the effort to unite a country
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS173 Page 9
which had seen two serious insurrections in the previous two decades. The country of Muscat
and Oman needed to be glued together and this required the entry of the new Sultan and his
iconography into the religiously infused mountains of the north of the country as well as the
secessionist-leaning south.
The consolidation of the Sultan Qaboos’ secular leadership with the spiritual or
religious aspects of the society was problematic, as the decades-old division between the
Sultan and the Ibadi Imam in the Interior had created a disjuncture in the way in which the
religious and the political were regarded by most Omanis
34
. Gradually, through a concerted
programme of building mosques – many named after him - and establishing his presence in
these places of worship each Friday, Sultan Qaboos made his leadership felt. The splendid
main mosque in Ruwi and the mosque of Nizwa were the first two mosques to be built by the
Sultan
35
. This programme of building religious establishments continued throughout the
following decades and culminated with the inauguration of the Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque
in Bausher on May 4, 2001. This immense structure covers an area of 416,000 square metres.
With its minarets and domes, it echoes the heights of the Ottoman Empire. Its five minarets –
each representing one of the pillars of Islam – thus surpass even the three minarets of the
Grand Umayyad mosque of Damascus.
Creating Ceremonials and Elaborating State Occasions
In the year following his accession (1971), a new celebration - perhaps inspired by British
royal birthday tradition - became an important symbol of national unity. The Sultan’s
birthday took on significance beyond the personal. It came to be a marker for national
celebration. The actual date of the coup which brought him to power was July 23
rd36
. This
unfortunately fell during one of the hottest months of the year. Sultan Qaboos decided instead
to celebrate this important marker of his power in November, a relatively cooler time of the
year which was also his birthday. November 18
th
, 1971 was the first official birthday
celebration of Sultan Qaboos and became known as ‘National Day’ (Queen Elizabeth II’s
birthday also formally moved from April 21
st
to June in the UK to accommodate the
possibility of better weather). It was marked by a formal tea party in the gardens of his
residence for senior Omani dignitaries and military personnel, the diplomatic corps, foreign
professionals, advisors and consultants as well as senior palace staff.
For most Omanis, however, the tea party was of little significance. Relatively few
were invited in any one year. For the masses – even from the remote interior - it was the
ceremonial military parades held in newly constructed stadiums, the precision military drill
teams, and the show of fighting strength of the new military units (Air Force, Army and Navy)
under the command of Sultan Qaboos which mattered. These spectacles and the invitations to
attend them were eagerly anticipated each year. In the first decade of his reign the public
responded to these events with fascination and astonishment. But by the early 1980s Omani
nationals began to expect greater showmanship and extravagance particularly at the National
Days marking five year intervals. The celebrations for the 5
th
, 10
th
, 15th, were each outdone
by the next with the apex being reached at the 20
th
year celebrations in 1990 marked by a
spectacular laser light show over the town of Muscat. The fact that the 25
th
anniversary
celebrations in 1995 did not surpass those of the 20
th
was widely remarked upon with
disappointment by many
37
.
Interwoven in the fabric of these newly created National Day celebrations was the
incorporation and ‘modernization’ of the traditional camel races of the interior of the country.
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS173 Page 10
els
g
Sultan
They had long been popular as a local and seasonal tribal activity. However, with the
introduction of vehicles and the increasing obsolescence of camels as beasts of burden
38
,
camels came to be seen as imbued with cultural symbolism of revival based on the
racetrack
39
. Regional races were held to determine which camels should be brought to the
capital area to compete in the annual races sponsored by the Sultan. For the first 15 years of
Sultan Qaboos’ reign these races were held on a simple open gravel plain near Seeb Palace. In
1991 this track was converted into a formal race course especially designed to hold cam
within its boundary. The camel race had become part of the established tradition of markin
Omani unity and nationhood. Its formal audience was the dignitaries and guests of the
marking each annual National Day. But it was the months-long build-up of qualifying
regional trails to the National Day event which both united and captured the attention of the
camel- owning population of the country - mainly the nomadic and recently settled pastoral
communities of Oman.
Creating Military Pageantry, Emblems, Decorations and Medals
Gradually over this first decade of Sultan Qaboos’ reign, an elaborate structure of ceremonial
units emerged. In 1970, the Dhofar Force, a private army acting as personal bodyguards to the
Sultan in Dhofar, was incorporated into The Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF). Shortly thereafter
the Royal Guard Regiment
40
was formed, taking on protection as well as ceremonial duties
covering investitures and state dinners, as well as guards of honour for visiting dignitaries
41
both in the north and the south of the country and abroad on his travels. This necessitated the
creation of all the trappings which underpinned such ceremonial occasions: royal bands,
mounted bands, the designing of uniforms, regimental colours, badges, emblems, flags and
medals. By 1975 with the assistance of a succession of British advisors, regimental colours,
facings of uniforms, berets and other requirements of ceremony had been determined. In rapid
succession, the Royal Guard Regiment formed the Royal Band South and the Royal Band
North and later the Royal Mounted Band. In 1978, a full mounted band performed on a
National Day event
42
.
Along with the creation of special military units with ceremonial functions came the
requirement to create a national emblem which set Sultan Qaboos’ reign apart and gave it
distinctiveness from previous Al Said rulers. The Al Said dynasty’s emblem, later called the
National Emblem or Royal Arms of Oman is a device consisting of crossed Omani swords
with a superimposed dagger (khanjar), a local Arab curved dagger which is worn on a waist
belt and placed centrally in front of the body
43
. This National Emblem formed the cap badge
of the entire Sultan’s Armed Forces until 1977 when different unit and services badges were
introduced, designed, or at the very least, approved, by the Sultan himself
44
. These Royal
Arms or National Emblems continued to feature in all Armed Forces cap badges and were
used in many other badges. The National Emblem of crossed khanjars was later surmounted
by a crown and used for directly ‘royal’ entities, such as on the cap or rank badges of all the
Sultan’s uniformed forces including the Royal Guard of Oman, Royal Yacht Squadron, Royal
Army of Oman, Royal Air Force of Oman, Royal Navy of Oman, the Sultan’s Special Forces,
Royal Oman Police and the Royal Flight. This National Emblem and the various service cap
badges and medals were familiar to most Omanis, including those in the interior of the
country, from where serving soldiers and policemen were often recruited.
The evolution of medals in Oman mirrored the diversification in the Armed Forces.
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS173 Page 11
The first medals in Oman emerged as a result of the Jebel Akhdar campaign in 1958/59. It was
a Campaign Medal and was directly modelled on the British style of campaign medals
45
. In
1960 a Gallantry Medal was inaugurated and in 1965 a General Service Medal was instituted.
But it was not until after the accession of Sultan Qaboos that this tradition of creating
ceremonial awards was given real expression. Immediately after coming to power, Sultan
Qaboos commissioned the Accession Medal and Order of Oman. This was followed by the
Order of Renaissance
46
or Unity Medal, the Endurance Medal commemorating the end of the
Dhofar War as well as a series of Anniversary and National Day medals to commemorate the
1980 anniversary of the Sultan’s accession on 23
rd
July 1970 and later the National Days of
1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. In 1976 an overall ‘order of wear’ was agreed by the
Sultan encompassing the Orders and Medals to the Armed Forces. This was a simple list
spanning five different categories. The more recent order of precedence (1995) produced by
the Palace Office encompasses 26 different categories
47
.
As the offices of government became established and the National Day celebrations
came to be expected and regarded as ‘traditional’, Sultan Qaboos searched for a more
ceremonial and monarchic emblem to symbolically draw the Al-Said dynasty closer to with
the elements of the modern state of Oman. In 1977 Sultan Qaboos requested from John
Kendall of Charles Kendall and Partners, some drawing or sketches for a royal or sultanic
crown from which he might select a standard pattern for all future requirements
48
. John
Kendall commissioned J.R. Gaunt and Sons in Birmingham to carry out this request and in
August of 1977 two sketches by one of the company’s commercial illustrators, a Ms. Garner,
were sent to Muscat for Sultan Qaboos to review
49
. These sketches were based on the St.
Edward’s Crown. The Sultan selected one which was then integrated into the emblems and
decorations of all his uniformed units, armed forces, and special service units. This newly
adopted crown symbolizing the power of the national sovereign enveloped and surrounded the
earlier imagery of the young ruling monarch
(insert figures A and B here. Caption: stylized rendition of the Sultanic crown).
Meeting and Uniting the Omani People
For Sultan Qaboos, the north of the country was new territory and its people were unfamiliar
to him. From the earliest days of his rule, he made regular efforts to meet with people in
Muscat and elsewhere. It was not unusual to find him inspecting, without warning, a ministry
office building early in the day to see which employees were on time and busy, reprimanding
those caught doing nothing or reading the newspapers. He also took to viewing new
development projects at night when no one was around
50
. In these early years, Sultan Qaboos
frequently made short trips into the interior of the country to visit schools, government offices
and to meet with the people. In 1977 he made his first full crossing of the country from
Salalah to Muscat on a tour of several weeks accompanied by units of the Royal Guard and
the Royal Flight. He camped out in the desert and had set up at each campsite an elaborate
circular tent for receiving foreign and national guests, as well as local petitioners. At first,
these annual trips had an open and spontaneous quality to them. Omanis from all walks of life
could approach these campsites and request an audience with the Sultan. Unlike the rulers of
the other Gulf States, Sultan Qaboos did not have a tradition of a weekly majlis (an open
forum) where men came forward with their requests, complaints and petitions. These convoys
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS173 Page 12
through the country became instruments for keeping in touch with local people and for
measuring the public mood and sentiment. Tribal leaders and commoners, old and young,
could and did approach the Sultan on these occasions to air their grievances, present requests,
or give their felicitations.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s these annual trips, sometimes as long as 4 or 6 weeks
duration, became important rituals marking the transformation of the young monarch into the
mature sovereign of the state
51
. Although the actual camp residence of the Sultan on these
tours was kept simple, the accompanying security and service provisions gradually became
more elaborate. When the camps were some distance from the Capital, visiting dignitaries
were transported to the Sultan’s camp by helicopters of the Royal Flight. The Sultan used to
take as many ministers with him as possible. Others ministers were summoned to these Royal
camps by the Sultan after hearing local complaints or in order to put them into the line of fire
when a particular disgruntlement was highlighted. Nearly each of these annual convoys
would camp for a week or more on the edge of the rose-coloured sand dunes of the Empty
Quarter in the Haylet il-Harashif of the Jiddat il-Harasiis. This remote campsite 500
kilometres from Muscat and Salalah put the Sultan in the middle of tribal homelands and gave
these communities special access to the Sultan’s court. Instead of an annual trip to Salalah by
the tribal leaders to receive gifts for their allegiance, the tribes were ‘hosting’ the Sultan.
Ironically, unlike the tribally-based Gulf States, where the royal courts had become urban-
based and fixed, the Royal Court of the Sultan was developing a mobile dimension. Here,
under the reign of Qaboos, the leader of the nation came to the tribal interior and camped in
their midst, demonstrating his accessibility while cementing their sense of loyalty and
nurturing their allegiance.
For the Harasiis tribe and other marginal and remote communities in the interior these
annual tours and week-long national day celebrations established and consolidated the sense
of obligation and the duties of the tribal community to the sovereign. Their emerging sense of
‘Omaniness’ was built upon, and enhanced by, these invented and ceremonial acts which took
on the appearance of long-held traditions. By the mid-1980s and onwards, Harasiis speech
was peppered by references to the Sultan and the debt owed to him by the people of Oman -
including the tribes of the interior. All discussion of programmes, services and anticipated
development was prefaced with the expression ‘thanks to His Majesty the Sultan’. And
although an element of this speech was due to the formality of the language, the sentiment, in
large measure, was sincere. The “Why does the Sultan want to do this” of a decade earlier,
was now replaced by the acceptance and recognition of their place in the order of things in
Oman. These communities knew they had access to their Sultan. He regularly visited and
camped out among them. Their interests were addressed on these occasions and many
problems actually solved. This contact between the subject and ruler, coupled with the
elaboration and invention of ceremonies and rituals of monarchy that had developed over the
previous two decades contributed significantly to the consolidation of the perception of the
Sultan, by the various tribal peoples in the interior of the country, as ruler of Muscat and
Oman, the sovereign of a state which encompassed Dhofar as well as the north of the country.
Only in the last decade has tradition and ceremonial started to become overgrown,
intricate and incapable of flexibility. The renaissance has moved into a baroque stage which
by its formality and tortured protocol is gradually cutting people off from real access to the
ruler and placing him on a pinnacle of power and authority. From an assured recognition of
the whereabouts of the Sultan between two palaces in the north and the south of the country
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS173 Page 13
or else on convoy to meet the people, has developed a complex pattern of movement between
numerous palaces and frequent road convoys and ‘desert encampments’. In recent years the
Sultan has taken to moving on convoy and camping in the interior of the country for at least
four months of the year, the rest of the time is spent in one of his near dozen or more
residences spread out around the country
52
. Even his palace compound in Muscat – once a
discrete part of a traditional Muslim town - has sprawled over the entire town obliterating
much of the old city including the traditional suq (market) and many of the former homes of
British political advisers, the British and American Embassies, as well as homes once
belonging to his uncles, nieces and nephews. This baroque growth, the creation of vast open
spaces for royal displays, national day events and armed forces ceremonial activities (parades,
tattoos, and celebrations with fireworks exploding from ramparts) has transformed a place
once of much charm into a set location for the execution of the Sultan’s newly created royal
traditions. These public spaces, then, have become fields of performance, appearances, images
and displays reproducing the power relations and authority of the Sultan
53
.
The association of ceremonial with actual authority and power is becoming less
certain, and the cult of the person of the Sultan is increasingly supporting the further
elaboration of rituals. The ‘Meet the People’ convoys now number more than 500 vehicles and
when camped resemble massive caravan parks. More significantly, it is no longer possible for
the local Omani to gain access to the Sultan directly. The once privileged tribesmen of the
interior desert are also unable now to directly access the Sultan. They, like all others, must
make a written request of the wali or local governor. If it is approved, the petitioner is then
permitted entry to a ‘large majlis tent’ where a Ministry of Interior representative holds
audience.
The ideal of accessibility by a ruling monarch who moves around the country to meet
his people has been undermined by the sheer numbers of people who now follow the convoys
in an effort to reach out to the Sultan. Today, the police barricades are too deep, and the
number desiring a hearing too great to be accommodated. The eagerly anticipated annual
convoy of the early decades for meeting the people of Oman and supported by near-
continuous live media coverage, has now become a set of carefully planned and
choreographed road trips with hundreds of vehicles. Contemporary media coverage makes
much use of archival footage of earlier trips.
Ever more frequently now, the Sultan sends out his ministers to hear his people’s
grievances and to take up the topics the community wishes to discuss. More often than not,
these grievances are filtered and little of the substance of these urgent matters or complaints
reach the Sultan’s ears. Protocol and ritual elaborated and choreographed for one end, the
socialization or inculcation of a value system and perceptions revolving around the notion of a
single and coherent state or Sultanate of Oman seem to have become means unto themselves –
the maintenance and continuity of the offices of the Royal Court. As Geertz has suggested
before, such ceremonials and spectacles are not merely representations of state power, but
become instances of that power
54
.
As the new traditions and ceremonials elaborated around the rule of Sultan Qaboos
take on more formality and are increasingly rigidly interpreted by the supporting bureaucracy
of the Royal Court, the very measures set up to unite the population and give legitimacy to a
young ‘untested’ monarch are beginning to alienate and drive away the least-connected and
marginal elements of the population
55
. The same Harasiis people who so enthusiastically
welcomed the Sultan as their ruler in the 1980s and 1990s and adopted clear expressions and
behaviours of national identity are now being driven away by both the barriers to access as
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS173 Page 14
well as the decreasing cultural resonance of the more recent ceremonials and displays
surrounding the Omani Royal Court. The seeming disappearance of the Sultan behind police
barricades and the mile-long convoys coupled with the fanciful architecture, the elaborate
flyovers, landscaping and other trappings related to the modern Omani state has meant that for
some, especially the marginal tribal nationals discussed earlier, the patriarchal father figure
has become too remote and culturally distant
56
.
Among the Harasiis tribe this has meant that other traditions, more in keeping with
their own customs, are resurfacing and gaining prominence. The demand for respect for their
mobility, regard for their land use and water rights, and equality of status among men are
being expressed outright. This has driven some families to move their primary households
cross the Omani border into the United Arab Emirates (UAE) - often leaving satellite camps
of herds of camels and goats behind in the care of hired Baluchi and Indian imported herders.
There, the UAE rulers have built several new ‘towns’ to house these and other nomadic
tribesmen emigrating from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other points north. Housed in free, well-
planned and widely spaced low-lying bungalows which suit their lifestyles, these mobile
pastoral peoples receive subsidies for their livestock; and their access to local health and
education services is not marked by discriminatory or patronizing practices. One recent
Harasiis arrival told me, “Here no one treats you like dirt. You are respected and your
requests for assistance are not regarded as begging. But still the Jiddat is better, because
without all our people together, our children will soon lose their Harsuusi language”
57
. Where
once these Harasiis families did not know why the Sultan of Oman would want to immunize
their children, they are now acutely aware that they have been prevented from approaching
him with petitions or grievances. It is as though the Sultan - in the distances which have been
created by the elaboration of rituals - can now longer be their tribal paterfamilias. These
observations derive, not from ignorance of their surroundings as may have been the case in the
recent past, but rather from sophisticated observation of contemporary conditions
58
. Their
temporary or permanent migration to these new ‘towns’ has been noted by the Omani Royal
Court
59
.
Conclusion
Traditions and ceremonies have always been invented, elaborated and refined to meet the
needs of those in power or to support perceptions of social cohesion, group membership as
well as to legitimize particular relations of authority. The invented ceremonies and traditions
of the British monarchy are particularly exemplary of this process in their growing splendour,
popularity and public appeal. Although originally elaborated to mark the power of the
sovereign particularly in its development and display in Victorian India, these ceremonials
eventually took on a life of their own. The awarding of medals and ceremonials, the creation
of grand traditions and other ritualistic aggrandizements came to be possible only because of
growing royal weakness. In Great Britain, it can be argued that enhanced ceremonials were
made possible as the power of the monarchy was exchanged for the popularity of the reigning
sovereign. The less power retained in the hands of the monarch, the more the rituals and
ceremonials around the royal household took on a life of their own defining and unifying a
perception of national identity. So too in Oman, the traditions multiplying and growing
becoming more elaborate and fanciful year after year incorporating celebratory military
parades, decorations and tattoos, national orchestral pieces, camel races, and laser light shows.
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS173 Page 15
The Sultan remains the national figure of unity, elaborated out of the wealth of invented
ceremonials and created traditions. The cult of personality around the person of the Sultan
remains a popular one but the supporting rituals are ossifying and losing the element of
purpose in underpinning a sense of social cohesion and unity in Oman. As the Sultan has
consolidated his hold on Oman, the ceremonials and rituals which he created have lost the
sense of being accompaniments of his power. Instead, the Sultan is becoming distant and
inviolate; the over-elaborated trappings of power no longer serve to unite, but now instead set
him apart and isolate him from his people. The increasing remoteness of the Sultan and his
apparent ‘disappearance’ behind the walls of his many palaces is a reminder, a throwback to
the days of his father’s reign. For many Omanis this is an awkward link with the past. But for
the increasingly marginalized nomads, this loss of contact is acutely felt. A few have voted
with their feet and moved out of his orbit of influence. For all the new ceremonies and
traditions, military pomp and ingenious media presentation of the Sultan’s meetings with his
people, the general withdrawal of the person of the Sultan from the public is generally
recognized and regretted. Perhaps still holding some remnant attitude of gratitude for the
rapid social and economic improvements in their lives, most – but not all - the people of
Oman recognize their ‘Omaniness’ and passively accept the barriers to contact which these
rituals and ceremonies now create.
Footnotes
1
Excerpt from Field Notebook I May, 1980 at the commencement of anthropological
research to support a United Nations Development Programme project in the Jiddat il-
Harasiis, Oman between 1981-1985. I continued a longitudinal study of the Harasiis tribe
until 1994.
2
David Cannadine, “The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: the British Monarchy
and the ‘Invention of Tradition’, c.1820-1977” in The Invention of Tradition, eds. Eric
Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 101-164.
3
Elaborated rituals are generally taken to mean a “set of practices, normally governed by
overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition which automatically implies continuity
with the past.” Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition, 1
4
Hobsbawn and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, 9.
5
Ibid., 211-262.
6
Bernard Cohen, “Representing Authority in Victorian India” in Hobsbawn and Ranger, The
Invention of Tradition, 165-210.
7
M. Elaine Combs-Schilling, Sacred Performances: Islam, Sexuality and Sacrifices (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968); Ernest Gellner, Saints of the Atlas (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS173 Page 16
1969); Abdellah Hammoudi,” “Sainteté, pouvoir, et société: Tamgroutx aux XVII and XVIII
siècles”, Annales économies, sociétés, civilisation 35 (1980) 615-649.
8
Dale Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, “The Public Sphere and Muslim Identities” in
Arch.europ.sociol., XLIII, I (2002), 92-115.
9
Linda Layne, Home and Homeland: the Dialogics of Tribal and National Identities in
Jordan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects: The
Making of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Andrew
Shryock, Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority
in Tribal Jordan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
10
Crystal, in her study of Kuwait and Qatar details the way the rulers transformed their
families into core institutions of the state by investing them with powerful, executive positions
(Jill Crystal, Oil and politics in the Gulf: Rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
11
Eickelman, in his study of Oman’s first modern state consultative council, only touches
upon the developing “absolutist view that the monarch is the state” (Dale Eickelman, “Kings
and People: Oman’s State Consultative Council” in The Middle East Journal, Vol 38 (1984)
51.
12
A full ethnography of the Harasiis tribe can be found in Dawn Chatty, Mobile
Pastoralists: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996.
13
The Ibadi sect of Islam had its origins in Basra at the end of the 7
th
century when
opposition emerged to the transfer of leadership from Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet
Mohammad, to the Umayyad dynasty in Damascus.
14
Until late in 18
th
century, Oman was ruled by an Ibadi Imam and the state was called an
Imamate. However in 1792, Sultan bin Ahmad was recognized as the secular ruler of Muscat
(and the coastal areas), while his brother, Said was allowed to keep the office of Imam in the
interior of the country (see John Wilkinson, “The Origins of the Omani State”, in Derek
Hopwood, ed., The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics, London, George Allen and
Unwin, 1972, 73-4).
.
15
John Wilkinson, Water and Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia: a Study of the Aflaj of
Oman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
16
John Wilkinson, The Imamate Tradition of Oman (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987). 296-297.
17
Ibid., 297.
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS173 Page 17
18
They withdrew in 1955.
19
Many Omanis came to believe that the Sultan had died in an assassination attempt and that
the British only claimed that he was alive so as to keep control over the promising oil
revenues (Eickelman, “Kings and People”, 54).
20
Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 102.
21
Ibid., 161-162.
22
Peterson, Oman in the Twentieth Century, 200-2.
23
Ibid., 214.
24
Educated and skilled Omanis, who had migrated to Zanzibar and East Africa to escape
the oppression of the former Sultan’s reign, returned in large numbers. By 1975, between
8,000 and 10,000 ‘Zanzibari Omanis had entered the country (Madawi Al-Rasheed,
“Transnational Connections and National Identity: Zanzibari Omanis in Muscat” in Paul
Dresch and James Piscatori, eds., Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the
Arab States of the Gulf, London, I.B. Tauris, 2005, 101).
25
Fred Halliday, for example, described Said as ‘one of the nastiest rules the world has seen
for a long time…Under the guise of respecting Ibadhism a savage regime was upheld. Said’s
rule prevented Omanis from leaving the country; discouraged education and health services,
and kept from the population a whole series of objects, including medicines, radios,
spectacles, trousers, cigarettes and books (Fred Halliday, Arabia without Sultans. London:
Saqi Books, 1974, p 275). Such analyses permitted the advisors of the new sultan to present
Qaboos as the champion of his people “come to rescue them from the tyranny of his father”
(Ibid., p 289).
Such perceptions, however, ignored the skills Said displayed in re-integrating the northern
Omani interior into the Sultanate as well as the development planning he had already
approved for the country (see Barbara Wace, ‘Master Plan for Muscat and Oman’,
Geographical Magazine, September 1969).
26
Peterson, Oman in the Twentieth Century, 85.
27
Charles Kendall and Partners was founded in 1946 and three years later negotiated a
contract with the Sultan to take on professional buying and recruitment for the Sultan.
28
Reginald Brett was responsible for the overall planning of every great state pageant from
the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria to the funeral of Edward VII (Cannadine, “The
Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual”, 135).
29
Interview, John Kendall, London, August 2001.
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS173 Page 18
30
A few British expatriates who had served Sultan Said were kept in positions of power as
‘advisors’ to the new Sultan on matters related to information, the environment, and national
security.
31
In Oman, these included al-Alam Palace, Seeb Palace, Bayt al-Barka, Sayq House, Izz
House, and Sur House in the north with al-Husn Palace, Rabat Palace and the Ma’murah
Compound in the south. His overseas residences included numerous properties in the UK as
well as in Garmish Partenkirchen in Bavaria, Germany.
32
Eickelman, “Kings and People, 51. For similar measures in Qatar also see Crystal, 162.
33
Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in
Contemporary Syria (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999, 2).
34. After the failed attempt to secede in the 1950s, the last Ibadi Imam went into exile and the
spiritual leadership of the community was left in limbo.
35. These projects were strikingly similar to the1920s efforts of the Trans-Jordanian Emir
Abdullah to impose his presence on his new capital, Amman through two major construction
projects: the main ‘Umari mosque (later al-Husayni al-Kabir) and the Raghdan Palace
(Eugene Rogan, “The Making of a Capital: Amman 1918-1928” in Jean Hannoyer and
Seteney Shami, eds., Amman: The City and Its Society (Beirut: Centre d’Études et de
Recherches sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain,1996) 102.
36
July 23
rd
was not completed discarded; it came to be recognized as a minor holiday and is
known as ‘Renaissance Day’, a further testimony to the contribution of Qaboos to his country.
37
The 20
th
year national Day Celebrations were magnificent by any standard – and
undoubtedly expensive to mount. Succeeding National Day celebrations were less theatrical
suggesting that the country was entering either a more mature stage in its political
development or a period of austerity related to oil prices.
38
Dawn Chatty, From Camel to Truck: the Bedouin in the Modern World (New York:
Vantage Press, 1986).
39
Sulayman Khalaf, “Camel Racing in the Gulf: Notes on the Evolution of a Traditional
Cultural Sport” in Anthropos, 94 (1999) 85-106.
50. The Royal Guard had its origins in the Oman Gendarmerie. It then became His Majesty’s
Body Guard, then the Royal Guard Squadron and in 1975, the Royal Guard Regiment
responsible for the security of His Majesty, security of His Majesty’s guests, and the
protection of the Royal property (Ashley R. Tinson, Orders and Medals of the Sultanate of
Oman [London: Spinks and Son, Limited,1995] 11). In the 1990s it became known as the
Royal Guard of Oman (RGO).
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS173 Page 19
41. In 1974, the Royal Guard officer, Abdul Alim, was sent to the United Kingdom. During
this visit he watched the Household Cavalry and the London Scottish Regiment Household
Division take part in the Changing of the Guard at Buckingham Palace. The combination of
protection and public duties of these units had a significant impact on him which he translated
into created, borrowed and reworked Royal Guard staging of public ceremonial activities
associated with the Sultan and the Royal Court.
42. In 1985 Sultan Qaboos asked the Commander of the Royal Guard to create a national
symphony orchestra made up entirely of Omani youth. The Oman Symphony Orchestra made
its first public performance in the Oman Auditorium on 1
st
July 1987.
43
This emblem of crossed khanjars predates Qaboos’ reign. It may have dated back to the
reign of Taymur bin Faysal if not Faysal bin Turki. Personal communications, John Peterson,
August, 2006.
44. From 1975, Roger Linford in close collaboration with Spinks and Sons Limited was
regularly commissioned to create cap and rank badges and medals. The latter included the
Accession Medal and Order of Oman, the Order of Renaissance, the Order of Al Said, the
Unity Medal, the As-Sumood [Endurance] Medal, the General Service Medal, Qaboos Police
Medal, as well as the Oman Peace Medal (see Tinson, Orders and Medals for more detail).
Interview, Roger Linford, Buckinghamshire, June, 2001.
45
Ibid., 21.
46. There was an earlier Order of Oman dating back to about 1900 which was a family order,
the Order of Al-Said. This was reintroduced by Sultan Qaboos in time for his State visit to the
United Kingdom in 1982. This order was worn by Queen Elizabeth during the visit (Ibid.,
22).
47. Ibid., 26. There are also 30
th
and 35
th
Anniversary medals.
48. The tradition of kingship or monarchy does not have a long history in Middle East, first
being introduced in 1921 in the British-mandated territories of Iraq and later that decade when
Saudi Arabia was declared a kingdom. The Emirate of Trans-Jordan (1921-1946) was
transformed into the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan in 1946 and then became the Kingdom of
Jordan in 1949. The Saudi monarchy does not use a crown as a symbol of the state. Only the
Jordanian monarchy does and it too is based on the St. Edward’s Crown.
49
Interview, John Kendall, London, August 2001.
50. King Abdullah of Jordan was reported to have made similar kinds of inspections of
government offices, hospitals and clinics throughout Jordan in the first few years after coming
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS173 Page 20
to office.
51
During these years, the Sultan’s convoy visited just about all parts of the country including
the Sharqiyya, Buraymi, as well as the Musandam which he reached by Royal Yacht.
52
Sultan Qaboos generally spends one month each year on convoy and interior encampment
during the Muslim Eid il-Fitr holiday and a second month during the Eid al-Adha holiday
marking the end of the Pilgrimage to Mecca. Then another two months are spent moving
between the north and south of the country each year.
53
See Alev Çinar, Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places and Time
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005) 33-52.
54
Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in 19
th
century Bali (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1980) 120.
55
Nearly forty years after the introduction of mass education, 80% of Oman’s population
currently has basic literacy skills; the young generation has near-universal literacy and is able
to communicate in ‘modern standard’ Arabic. One outcome of this laudable development
achievement is that state sanctioned and directed discussion [generally on sectarian issues and
politics] is now frequently subverted by the use of text, mobile phones and internet
communications. Although the monarchy is certainly not endangered, mass education and
modern media have combined to create among the younger generation new knowledge and
awareness of alternatives to state dogma and doctrine (see Dale Eickelman, ‘Kings and
People: Information and Authority in Oman, Qatar and the Persian Gulf, Joseph Kechichian,
ed., London, Palgrave, 2001, 193-209; for further discussion on education, youth and
‘reinvented’ political tradition see Marc Valeri, Le sultanat d’Oman: Une revolution en
trompe-l’oeil, Paris, Karthala, 2007).
56
For many, the new grand mosque commissioned and paid for by the Sultan no longer has
the spirit of Ibadi asceticism and simplicity. It is more like a show piece in keeping with the
new baroque traditions of contemporary Oman.
57
The Harasiis tribe, numbering about 4,000, people speaks Harsuusi, one of six South
Arabian languages still spoken in Oman. The other languages are Shehri, Jebali, Batahiri,
Mahri, Socotri (See T.M. Johnstone, Harsusi Lexicon, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1977). The reference to the Harsuusi language in this interview is a reflection of the tribally
heterogeneous and thus Arabic-speaking base of these new towns. For further discussion of
Harasiis concerns over the transmission of the Harsuusi language see my chapter, ‘Boarding
Schools for Mobile People: the Harasiis in the Sultanate of Oman’, The Education of Nomadic
Peoples: Current Issues, Future Prospects, Caroline Dyer, ed., Oxford, Berghahn Books,
2002, 212-230.
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58
During my interviews with these tribal families living in the United Arab Emirates in
February 2006, I was constantly interrupted by individual Harasiis and asked to comment on
the scandal surrounding the Danish cartoons of Mohammed which had just broken in the
international press a few days earlier.
59
In the past decade, some 200 households from a number of pastoral tribes in Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and Oman have moved to the United Arab Emirates. It was reported that Sultan Qaboos
sent his Minister of the Royal Court to the Emirates to demand that these people be returned to
Oman. To date, none of them have (interview with tribal family heads, Wogan, Abu Dhabi,
February 2006).
