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Bandura's theory of self-efficacy: A set of common sense theorems
Abstract
Bandura's (1977) theory of self-efficacy is translated into non-technical language and is shown to consist of logically necessary rather than empirically testable statements. As an alternative to the dominant empiricist view, it is argued that valid theories in psychology are explications of conceptual relationship imbedded in ordinary language (common sense). This conceptual network is anterior to both observation and theorizing. The analogy between the tasks of pre-Euclidean geometry and contemporary psychology is explored. The tasks are seen as involving explication of our implicit concepts of respectively space and people. One consequence of the stated view is that much psychological research is pointless since it attempts to verify logically necessary statements by empirical methods.
... Why, in the preceding example, does it make no sense to say that if a person wants to do something, and he can do it, that he won't do it? In this case and others, Smedslund (1978) argues that we are compelled by common sense understandings within the culture. Yet, how did these understandings come into being? ...
... Interestingly, one of Smedslund's (1978) demonstrations of Bandura's common sense assumptions provides a clue to an alternative. In this formalization of a Bandura proposal, "If P believes he is capable of handling S and if no other circumstances intervene, then P will behave assuredly" (p. ...
... This inquiry into the relationship of language to psychological explanation began by recounting Smedslund's (1978) ground-breaking demonstrations of the common sense underpinnings of hypothesis testing. As he proposed, experiments do not test hypotheses about the relationship between psychological process and behavior because any failure to verify would defy cultural understanding. ...
This chapter extends the early work of Smedslund on the common sense underpinnings of hypothesis testing in psychology. As Smedslund argued, experiments do not test hypotheses about the relationship between psychological process and behavior because any failure to verify would defy cultural understanding. Here I propose that the intelligibility of psychological explanations does not rest so much on cultural understandings as tautological language use. The reliance on tautology is born of the impossibility for ostensively defining the states of mind presumably giving rise to action. The result is reliance on a logic of originary resemblance, that is, explaining a given behavior in terms of a “miniaturized” form of itself, displaced within the mind. Further, because each definition of a mental term relies on another mental term for its meaning, we enter a condition of semiotic slippage. It is thus possible to account for psychological explanations far removed from simple or transparent tautology. By drawing on extended definitional sequences, we find that any given behavior (or its negation) can be explained by virtually any randomly drawn motive or trait. This includes otherwise counter-intuitive or paradoxical explanations. These developments bear importantly on the potentials of psychological research, mental and diagnostic testing, and psychotherapy.
... Why, in the preceding example, does it make no sense to say that if a person wants to do something, and he can do it, that he won't do it? In this case and others, Smedslund (1978) argues that we are compelled by common sense understandings within the culture. Yet, how did these understandings come into being? ...
... Interestingly, one of Smedslund's (1978) demonstrations of Bandura's common sense assumptions provides a clue to an alternative. In this formalization of a Bandura proposal, "If P believes he is capable of handling S and if no other circumstances intervene, then P will behave assuredly" (p. ...
... This inquiry into the relationship of language to psychological explanation began by recounting Smedslund's (1978) ground-breaking demonstrations of the common sense underpinnings of hypothesis testing. As he proposed, experiments do not test hypotheses about the relationship between psychological process and behavior because any failure to verify would defy cultural understanding. ...
Extending early work on the limits of hypothesis testing, I propose that psychological explanations for behavior draw their intelligibility from tautology. A reliance on tautology is born of the impossibility for ostensively defining the explanans (e.g., the state of mind presumably giving rise to action). Thus, one makes psychological sense by explaining a given behavior in terms of a “miniaturized” form of itself. Further, because each definition of a mental term relies on another mental term for its meaning, we enter a condition of unbridled diffusion of definition. We may thus account for psychological explanations far removed from simple or transparent tautology. Through extended definitional sequences, we find that any given behavior can be explained by virtually any randomly drawn motive or trait. This includes otherwise counter-intuitive or paradoxical explanations. These developments bear importantly on the grounding assumptions for psychological research, mental and diagnostic testing, and psychotherapy.
... Although written in very abstract terms, it struck me as expressing self-evident common-sense truths. This motivated me to write a paper entitled "Bandura's theory of self-efficacy: A set of common sense theorems" (Smedslund, 1978). In this article, I first translated Bandura's theory into ordinary English and then organized it into 36 propositions, each of which was shown to be logically provable on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the everyday terms involved. ...
... Since the degree to which P believes Q determines the degree to which P is influenced by what Q tells him, the theorem follows.fs24 148 Many of the common-sense theorems proposed in Smedslund (1978) are more complicated than this one, but they are all proven. ...
... It appears to me that there is an analogy here to modern psychology: Psychological journals from the last hundred years are also filled with allegedly empirical findings and absolutely no use of logical proof. Only recently has the work on psycho-logic begun to reveal vast numbers of pseudoempirical studies with main hypotheses that can be logically proved-see the example of Bandura referred to above (Smedslund, 1978). ...
Fritz Heider pointed out that common-sense psychology contains many analytic propositions. This discovery opened up the possibility that many scientific psychological hypotheses are also analytic and that the ensuing studies are pseudoempirical, that is, they only test the truth of auxiliary hypotheses. This appears to frequently be the case. The reason may be that hypotheses involving semantically related variables are plausible but nonempirical, whereas empirical hypotheses involving logically independent variables do not make sense. The discovery of numerous analytic propositions in common-sense psychology led to construction of an axiomatic system called psycho-logic. The undefined concepts of this system are semantic primitives assumed to be common to all human languages. Hence, Heider’s discovery of analytic propositions of common-sense psychology led to a new view of psychology.
... Bröder, 2011), whether a causal conclusion can be drawn depends on the character of the stimulus material and the psychological system under investigation. Smedslund (1978) showed that experiments 'confirming' Bandura's 'self-efficacy theory' do just reveal 'necessarily true cultural psychologies' akin to common sense. Others, using variants of this argumentation, have critically discussed causality assumptions in 13 rational systems in a similar vein (Brandtstädter, 1982;Greve, 2001;Holzkamp, 1986). ...
... Following this lead I expanded Smedslund's (1978) argument to the field of Social Representation Theory where, rhetorically, behaviour is tightly linked to representations but not a causal effect of mental states (Wagner, 1994). Himmelweit (1990, p. 30) roughly makes this point when she states, "a social representation worth studying is one that makes a noticeable difference to the reactions of those accepting the representation compared with their beliefs and conduct before such acceptance." ...
Behaviour and action Of ducks and men My office window opens on to a large pond where ducks, swans, coots and the occasional bird-loving person with an interest in feeding them can be observed. As soon as a bird lover approaches the rim of the pond and opens a paper bag, a lot of birds start eagerly moving in the direction of the rustling sound produced by the bag. Once there, both the birds and the man or woman providing dry bread appear to be happily united in a pattern of animal and human behaviour. I find this pattern of human behaviour and the complementary waterfowl behaviour quite instructive: first, it illustrates the conceptual difference between behaviour and action; second, it highlights a widely distributed – but in my opinion wrong – belief of attitude and intention ‘causing’ behaviour; and third, it is a nice example of how behaviours happen in concert. Each of these points will be discussed in the sections that follow. The term ‘behaviour’ is obviously an observer term applied to an organism's activity that we do not or cannot deeply empathize with. On the other hand, if a person describes what he or she is doing or has done, the person will say that he or she ‘acted’. Hence, ‘action’ is an actor's term or a term used in talk about another person one can empathize with. This concurs with a host of experimental findings in attribution theory where the perspective of actors makes them explain their behaviour by external, situational factors in contrast to internal, personality-related causes, as observers tend to do. The actor has a more intimate knowledge of the reasons relating to his or her behaviour, while observers are deprived of this knowledge. Consequently, in the case of our university pond, we would talk about the ducks as behaving. The persons' feeding of the waterfowl will be imagined as an action. The crucial difference is the justification an actor – if asked for – can provide for his or her actions that, even with a considerable stretch of imagination, birds cannot provide.
... The social cognition paradigm neatly mirrors the zeitgeist, which holds that human behavior is controlled by cognitive processes, beliefs, and attitudes internalized in the mind of a responsible consumer. As early as 1978, biting criticism was launched by J. Smedslund (1978), alleging that Bandura's theory of selfefficacy was really a set of commonsense, tautologous theorems of the type "All people are humans" (for a reply, see Bandura, 1978). The ancient Greek, Dale Carnegie, power of positive thinking idea that "to achieve, you must believe" is as old as the hills. ...
... As already noted, some critics claim that social cognition theories are tautological and irrefutable (e.g., G. Smedslund, 2000;J. Smedslund, 1978). If valid, no real progress in understanding has followed or ever will follow the social-cognitive route. In a damning indictment, critical health psychologists Murray and Campbell (2003, p. 231) commented that social cognition theories have even hindered rather than helped efforts to stop the spread of AIDS: ...
“No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent” (John Donne). This overview of health psychology gives an account of health in the context of society and culture. A multidimensional definition is helpful in conceptualizing the “continent” of health. Each person has a unique makeup of age, sex, and hereditary factors. Each person's health is a multidimensional state of balance with physical, mental, psychosocial, educational, economic, cultural, and spiritual aspects. The principle of compensation enables any one element that is relatively strong to compensate for a relative lack in another element. Thus a balance between the different dimensions is as important as strength in any particular set of these. The cult of individualism spawned the questionable construct of the “anything in moderation” responsible consumer. Alternative theories and approaches must be tried to enable faster results and more efficient use of assets and resources than was possible in the campaign to reduce smoking. The endemic toxicity of the physical and social environment is extended to all of the major determinants of health and well-being, including obesity, sexual health, and stress. Qualitative, community, and critical perspectives are offering alternative methods for research and intervention. Conceptual clarification to radically alter current theories and methods with large-scale evaluation studies is needed. Health psychology can contribute toward health improvements in the context of the sociopolitical struggles of yesterday, today, and tomorrow.Keywords:health psychology;multidimensional theory of health;principle of compensation;individualist paradigm;responsible consumer;community paradigm;the qualitative turn;social justice
... The self-efficacy concept was proposed by Albert Bandura (1997) as one of the most eminent parts of the "social-cognitive theory" or so-called "social learning theory." Bandura refers to people's beliefs that determine their decisions on whether they try or how much they will keep trying when encountering obstacles and undesirable experiences (Smedslund, 1978). Bandura postulated beliefs as major mediators of behavior (Betz and Hackett, 1997), and when people have confidence in their abilities, it has a beneficial impact and improves performance (Laurencelle and Scanlan, 2018). ...
The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between teacher candidates' academic self-efficacy, self-directed learning, and future time perspective. A dual-stage analytical approach, utilizing both traditional structural equation modeling (SEM) and Machine Learning Classification Algorithms, was employed to test the proposed hypotheses. The study included a sample of 879 teacher candidates. The SEM analysis revealed that self-directed learning had a significant positive effect on academic self-efficacy. Furthermore, future time perspective was found to significantly predict academic self-efficacy. The combined endogenous constructs accounted for a substantial portion of the explained variance. Additionally, the study employed LMT and Multiclass classifiers from Machine Learning algorithms to predict academic self-efficacy. In summary, the findings of this study suggest that self-directed learning and future time perspective are significant factors in predicting teacher candidates' academic self-efficacy. The study utilized both traditional SEM and Machine Learning algorithms to provide a comprehensive analysis of the relationships between these variables.
... The theory has been criticized for its exclusive focus on rational reasoning, excluding unconscious influences on behavior (Sheeran, Gollwitzer & Bargh, 2013) and the role of emotions beyond predicted affective results (Conner, Gaston, Sheeran, & Germain, 2013). Researchers have also questioned whether the hypotheses derived from the model are open to empirical falsification, or whether they are essentially common-sense statements that cannot be falsified (Smedslund, 1978). Despite these weaknesses and criticisms of the theory, the Theory of Planned Behavior is adopted to be used in this current study as most studies (e.g. ...
The purpose of the study is to examine the effects of Covid-19 risk perceptions on international tourists' travel intentions to Tanzania. Data was collected using a structured questionnaire administered to 114 international tourists; and was analysed using Structural Equation Modelling through Smart PLS 3.0. The findings reveals that perceived behavioural control and subjective norms have a significant positive influence on the travel intention whereas the Perceived risk has no influence on travel intention. The study contributes to the existing literature on tourist travel during the novel Covid-19. It also sheds light on possible areas to be improved by destination managers and other tourism stakeholders in the country on strategies to adopt in promoting the tourism sector amidst health-related crises.
... However, much of social psychology at present does seem resolved either to study common-sense or else to ignore it, as for example in research on attitudes and 'attribution theories on the one hand and studies of social interact~on and non-verbal communication on the other. (For explications and discussions of common-sense psychology see Heider, 1958;Smedslund, 1978;Furnham, 1983;and Fletcher, 1984). Since these topics between them cover all the major areas of the subject it is hardly surprising the saying was coined that· "two thirds of social psychology is common-sense and the other third is nonsense". ...
... While recognising its relative utility, some researchers see SCT as a collection of logical statements that are difficult to test empirically (Smedslund, 1978). Other researchers see its constructs as based on variables that are not well defined and cannot be observed and assessed (Lee, 1989). ...
Novel technologies, such as smartphones or virtual reality, are seen as attractive tools with high potential to trigger behavioral change. Therefore, they are embraced enthusiastically by both business and academia. Interventions using technology as tools can be expected to further increase their popularity in the near future.
A large amount of contemporary research seems to focus on examining user experience and technology acceptance. Such a focus is a natural first step in understanding a novel technology. At the same time, much less is known about the actual effectiveness of novel technologies in interventions. This limited knowledge represents a potential challenge to researchers when deciding which particular technology example to choose for their work.
This theoretical study proposes an informed approach to making that choice, particularly for road safety interventions. The approach is grounded in the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Criteria are suggested for initial technology impact evaluation, which should help researchers and practitioners compare different technology examples. Further criteria are touched upon in relation to practicalities around using technologies in interventions. The proposed framework may help future research of technology effectiveness by saving stakeholders' time to decide which technology they should adopt and test.
... The next step occurred when I read Albert Bandura's newly published theory of Self-Efficacy (Bandura, 1977). I translated Bandura's technical language into ordinary English, and concluded that the entire theory consisted of a set of logically necessary statements, effortlessly provable from the meanings of the terms involved (Smedslund, 1978). This was an exciting discovery, and led me to suspect that psychological literature was filled with similar logically necessary statements and hypotheses. ...
Modern psychology has aimed at being a natural science. This has been difficult because psychological processes are influenced by indefinitely complex, irreversibly changing contexts. Attempting to circumvent these obstacles, one has resorted to a group level methodology yielding small statistical differences and correlations that fail to provide sufficient support for theoretical and practical advance. Turning from this “psycho-demography” to person-centered psychology involves a change from statistical analysis of group-averages to logical analyses of personal communications, and from studying causation (what leads to what?) to studying implication (what follows from what?) also called psycho-logic. Since communications depend on trust, this replaces statistics, both in research and practice. It is concluded that psychology can only be about the concrete, and that future advances may lie in developing psycho-logic in terms of semantic non-numerical computer algorithms.
... Over more than three decades now, Jan Smedslund has been publishing a series of studies on pseudoempiricality (Smedslund, 1978(Smedslund, , 1987(Smedslund, , 1988(Smedslund, , 1994(Smedslund, , 1995(Smedslund, , 2012(Smedslund, , 2015. Through his analysis of psychological experiments and measurement instruments, he has shown how we are already in possession of the knowledge that the studies claim to uncover. ...
Empirical research has shown how semantic algorithms can often predict the statistics of survey data a priori, particularly in topics like “leadership” and “motivation.” In those cases, the survey data reflect the language usages of respondents, not the attitudes toward the topics in question. While this fact seems to bewilder researchers, it opens a computational tool for exploring our semantic construction of psychological reality. Using Dennett’s concept “competence without comprehension,” this article discusses how humans are trapped in a semantic network that we ourselves struggle to understand. Since Smedslund’s work and the language algorithms have common roots in formal logics, the computational algorithms may help us explore the cognitively challenging area of a priori assumptions in psychological research. There may be a computational way to test and explore Smedslund’s ideas of “pseudo-empiricality,” helping science explore the complex area among empirical, logical, and psychological phenomena.
... Since the 1970s, Smedslund (1978aSmedslund ( , 1978bSmedslund ( , 1979Smedslund ( , 1988Smedslund ( , 1991Smedslund ( , 1994Smedslund ( , 1995Smedslund ( , 2002Smedslund ( , 2008 has made a compelling case that many, if not most, empirical claims derived from psychological research are already established by prior conceptual relationships and, consequently, should be seen as only "pseudo empirical." According to Smedslund, what often are taken to be empirical findings from psychological research are the misleading result of confusing "analytic" with "arbitrary" aspects of research design. ...
The chapter presents a critique of “psychologism” as a “style of reasoning” that has dominated disciplinary psychology from its inception and set the course for how psychological phenomena are made intelligible and investigated. Styles of reasoning comprise distinct disciplinary frameworks for scientific argumentation that set the terms for how phenomena are identified, defined, and understood, thus circumscribing the kinds of questions that can be posed about them and kinds of answers that can be justified. Psychologism as a style of reasoning holds that thought and experience are reducible to internal mental properties, in turn, taken to be manifestations of more primary biochemical and neurophysiological structures and processes. An explanation of styles of reasoning and their common features is followed by description of the characteristics and assumptions of psychologism, how it functions as a style of reasoning, and the ways it creates conditions of possibility in which psychological properties become articulated and attain ontological status. Subsequently, Smedslund’s analysis of psychological pseudoempiricism and, particularly, his insights concerning the miscasting of analytic claims as empirical ones derived from psychological experimentation are discussed in light of the ways they align with and support the account of psychologism provided. An illustration of the applicability of the analysis is given using the psychological study of self-regulation.
... Testing the replicability of the findings would be beside the point, if the research questions are illposed or the methods are inappropriate. Such possibilities are considered by writers whose work addresses the foundations of psychological research, including Jan Smedslund (Smedslund 1978(Smedslund , 1979(Smedslund , 1987(Smedslund , 1991(Smedslund , 1997a(Smedslund , 2012b(Smedslund , 2016see also, e.g., Billig 2013;Giorgi 2013;Hibberd 2014;Lamiell 2003;Mammen 2017;Slaney 2017;Teo 2006, Teo 2018Tissaw and Osbeck 2007;Valsiner 2012Valsiner , 2017Wallach and Wallach 2001). Smedslund has called for a more reflective approach to psychology and its relation to common sense. ...
This chapter outlines a critique of experimental psychology, based on Jan Smedslund’s work on the epistemic status of common-sense psychology. The critique is fleshed out with several examples from experimental research on cognitive control, cheating, self-reference bias, and sense of agency. Claims about discovery of surprising or general findings, at least in some cases, depend on neglecting or distorting common-sense psychology. Attention to psychological common sense, therefore, can sensitize us to certain types of error (e.g., pseudo-empirical research, over-generalization), similar to how attention to quantitative research can sensitize us to certain types of error (e.g., the so-called type I and type II errors). I consider possible objections from the standpoint of experimental researchers, as well as reasons for a prolonged neglect of common-sense psychology.
... And ideally, scientific conceptualizations of a phenomenon, such as hope, should converge with lay beliefs about the phenomenon. As Smedslund (1978) stated, 'common-sense psychology' can be understood as 'the network of concepts pertaining to psychological phenomena, imbedded in ordinary language' (p. 10). ...
Although the theory of hope proposed by Charles R. Snyder is the dominant perspective in hope psychology, scholars have questioned whether it adequately represent laypeople’s understanding of hope. Accordingly, this mixed-methods study (N =298) explored U.S. college students’ lay beliefs about hope. Participants provided written responses to eight open-ended prompts on their beliefs about hope. A directed content analysis of participants’ qualitative responses identified interpersonal relationships, optimism, work, spirituality, and positive emotions as the five most prevalent beliefs about hope, whereas beliefs associated with Snyder’s theory of hope (agency and pathways) were rarely mentioned. The authors also investigated whether these five beliefs and two other beliefs – materialistic perspective on hope and belief in the unconditional nature of hope – predicted well-being outcomes. Multiple regression analyses indicated that belief in the unconditional nature of hope was the most robust positive predictor of well-being outcomes, followed by belief about the spiritual nature of hope.
... In the 1970s, the American ethology scholar representative Bandura proposed social cognition theory[1]. He believes that in the process of change people's behavior, cognitive factors play a big role, and self-efficacy is one of the main ways of cognitive factors. ...
... 12 Turned into a labelled entity. 13 Jan Smedslund has been criticizing this aspect of psychology's methodology-its pseudoempiricism-systematically over the past 40 years (Smedslund, 1978(Smedslund, , 1980(Smedslund, , 1997(Smedslund, , 2009(Smedslund, , 2012)-but to no avail. The factory of "measurement" in psychology guarantees its continued pseudo-empiricis m well into the 21 st century. ...
Extrospection is introspection turned outward—from the experiencer (ordinary observer or scientist). Its process is thus similar to that of introspection—it is constructive of the knowledge of the object of extrospection. In the human world of experiencing, the results of the extrospection become introspectively consolidated. A questionnaire is an extension of the interview that excludes the direct presence of the researcher from the process of responding. Independent of its administration (on paper, individually or in a group, on computer screen, via Facebook, etc.) or format (open answers, Likert scales, sentence completion tasks, yes/no answers, etc.), it involves the immediate nonavailability of the researcher. The chapter includes the focus on two inductions (C. L. Morgan). The three-step interviewing tactic, double-blank sentence completion tests are outlined. A special analysis of the qualitative structure of Solomon Asch’s conformity experiment is included. The contrast between various methods that is basic is that between stability-oriented and process-oriented kinds. The methods described in this chapter were all process oriented in their nature. This follows the general assumption of the open-systemic nature of all psychological phenomena where even stability is dynamic (steady state).
... Analyticity. Smedslund (1978aSmedslund ( , 1978bSmedslund ( , 1979Smedslund ( , 1988, Brandstätter (1982), Holzkamp (1986) and more recently Wagner (1994) and Greve (2001) initiated a discussion which is about the problem of analyticity of theoretical clauses -those which establish the empirical connections between psychological variables. The argument of the authors is that (a) claims of psychological theories which invoke rational reasons to explain actions (Greve, 2001;Holzkamp, 1986), or (b) theories which state empirically testable hypotheses, but merely describe relationships that are already embodied in the universe of everyday knowledge (Brandstädter, 1982;Smedslund, 1978;Wagner, 1994), are in fact not empirically provable. ...
... Analyticity. Smedslund (1978aSmedslund ( , 1978bSmedslund ( , 1979Smedslund ( , 1988, Brandstätter (1982), Holzkamp (1986) and more recently Wagner (1994) and Greve (2001) initiated a discussion which is about the problem of analyticity of theoretical clauses -those which establish the empirical connections between psychological variables. The argument of the authors is that (a) claims of psychological theories which invoke rational reasons to explain actions (Greve, 2001;Holzkamp, 1986), or (b) theories which state empirically testable hypotheses, but merely describe relationships that are already embodied in the universe of everyday knowledge (Brandstädter, 1982;Smedslund, 1978;Wagner, 1994), are in fact not empirically provable. ...
... They direct our attention to the social, moral, political, and economic institutions that sustain and are supported by current assumptions about human activity. Constructionist inquiry has further been directed to the axioms or fundamental propositions underlying descriptions of persons in present-day society (Davis & Todd, 1982; Gergen, 1984a; Ossario, 1978; Semin & Chassein, in press; Shotter& Burton, 1983; Smedslund, 1978). It is first asked whether the folk models of mind within a culture necessarily determine or constrain the conclusions reached within the profession. ...
Discusses the social constructionist movement in modern psychology, noting that social constructionism views discourse about the world not as a reflection or map of the world but as an artifact of communal interchange. Both as an orientation to knowledge and to the character of psychological constructs, constructionism presents a significant challenge to conventional understanding. Although the roots of constructionist thought may be traced to long-standing debates between empiricist and rationalist schools of thought, constructionism moves beyond the dualism of these traditions and places knowledge within the process of social interchange. Although the role of psychological explanation is problematic, a fully developed constructionism could furnish a means for understanding the process of science and invites the development of alternative criteria for the evaluation of psychological inquiry. (100 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
... Second, there is considerable doubt whether the majority of psychological theories and laws can be considered synthetical. Thorough analyses of psychological theories have shown that many can be reformulated as common-sense theorems and that many involve implicit rational assumptions (Elejabarrieta & Wagner, 1992; Holzkamp, 1986; Smedslund, 1978 Smedslund, , 1988). Both, their conforming to common-sense as well as their implicit everyday rationality, imply an analytical and not a synthetical character of such theories which prohibits their interpretation as deductive-nomological causal explanations. ...
... Thus, a personal psychology is about conceptual relationships between beliefs, values, emotions, and actions. The misinterpretation of these conceptual relations between personal concepts can easily lead to pseudoempirical research (Brandtstädter, 1982;Smedslund, 1978;see also Brandtstädter, 1998). Dennett (1987) compared the intentional stance (i.e., the personal psychology stance) with a calculus, in particular the calculus of forces in the parallelogram of forces: It is an idealized level of abstraction, but not, for instance, a real mechanical linkage of rods and pivots. ...
... No. 2 is to 'find' an order in the data and to present it as a 'scientific discovery'. (This is done textually, in a number of different ways, usually by relating the data to the supposed 'empirical' implications of a particular theory -but see Smedslund (1978), who shows such implications to be also purely linguistic.) No. 3 is where the order is now 'explained' as being due to a certain causal agent, something within us which 'rules' our conduct. ...
... This did not prevent all item relationships from being semantically related to each other and to the MLQ items. The relationships between such scales are thereby computable a priori and hence what Smedslund (1978Smedslund ( , 1987Smedslund ( , 1988 has called «pseudo-empirical». ...
People may confuse leadership with heroism due to the semantic overlap between their descriptions. This may explain some facets of fascination with leadership and obstructions to differentiated viewpoints of leadership as a group phenomenon. Building on the semantic theory of survey response (STSR), we are able to show how prevalent measures of charisma and transformational leadership are semantically tied to concepts of heroic behaviours and qualities. Due to the semantic overlap between heroism and leadership (outlined in the classic works of Carlyle, Weber and Burns), we hypothesized and found that many people have unrealistic expectations of leaders. Heroic expectations seem to be linked to representations and ideals of the self, which may create notable derogatory attitudes towards actual managers. Correlations with age suggest that experience will reduce this tendency. STSR analysis shows how leadership research is vulnerable to semantic overlaps in central concepts. Possible explanations and consequences are discussed.
... Smedslund has been criticizing this aspect of psychology's methodology-its pseudo-empiricism-systematically over the past 40 years (Smedslund, 1978(Smedslund, , 1980(Smedslund, , 1997(Smedslund, , 2009(Smedslund, , 2012)-but to no avail. The factory of ''measurement'' in psychology guarantees its continued pseudo-empiricism well into the 21st century. ...
This Editorial is a "leftover"-or maybe a "dessert"-from my recent treatise on how cultural psychology can lead the rest of the discipline out of the loops of "dust-bowl qualitative empiricism"1 that is beginning to take form in the social sciences. Cultural psychology of today operates at the intersection of these social tendencies, running the risk of being caught in the middle. One of the results of active "positivism-bashing" and witch-hunt on "dualisms" that has gone on for the past half-century is a "qualitative turn" in the social sciences. While that turn restores the focus on context-bound original phenomena as its empirical object, it remains as uninventive in the theoretical realm as its declared opponents ended up being. It has simply replaced the focus of the inductive generalization exercise from the field of quantified phenomena (as data) to that of qualitative descriptions (some "rich," some "poor") that leave the illusion of understanding based on our common sense, but do not lead the field into new theoretical breakthroughs. The unique feature of cultural psychology-in all of its various versions-is the focus on complex human meaning systems. Analysis of such systems requires a new look at methodology. It is demonstrated how this new look is actually a historically old one-replacing the primacy of inductive generalization by the dynamics of generalization that takes place between deductive and inductive lines, with a special hope for the use of abductive processes. © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav.
... Others have also questioned whether the hypotheses derived from the model are open to empirical falsification, or whether they are essentially common-sense statements which cannot be falsified (Ogden, 2003;Smedslund, 1978). Indeed, findings under ceteris paribus conditions suggesting that individuals are more likely to engage in behaviours that they enjoy less, feel incapable of doing or do not intend to do seems implausible and would cast doubt on the data more than on the underlying theory. ...
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17437199.2013.869710
... Self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977) is a means of trying to understand the effects of success or failure on an individual's motivation. Many of its critics have pointed out that it consists of a large number of self-evident truths (Smedslund, 1978)acceptability, appropriate difficulty level and proximity if they are to serve as a stimulus for self-evaluation and produce higher levels of selfefficacy and self-motivation (Bandura and Simon, 1977; Hollenbeck and Klein, 1987; Locke et al., 1981 ...
Lack of motivation in clients has been traditionally taken to indicate a failure of adjustment to visual loss. The loss model implicit in this view is questioned on theoretical and empirical grounds. An alternative model is presented in which self-efficacy is regarded as the primary factor in adjustment, and theoretical and empirical arguments are advanced to support the view that early skill-oriented intervention can prevent loss of competence and foster a sense of personal control essential to successful rehabilitation.
... Therefore, very different views about psychology as common sense exist within the academic community. (Smedslund, 1978). ...
This paper reports on two studies in which different adult populations who had not formally studied psychology completed multiple-choice tests derived from general psychology textbooks to evaluate specific knowledge of the discipline. The aim was to determine to what extent psychology was "common sense" and which personal characteristics, such as sex, education, and age, best predicted correct answers. In the first study, 114 students about to start a psychology degree, and 222 nonstudent adults, completed a 106-item questionnaire taken from a standard textbook. There was considerable variability in the extent to which participants checked the correct answer, with an overall average of only 56% (just above chance). There was no statistical difference between the two groups in knowledge overall or in any particular areas. A regression showed books read and belief in the scientific nature of psychology to be the best predictors of overall knowledge. In the second study, 94 first-year students at the beginning of their course and 136 student applicants completed a 114-item questionnaire derived from a different textbook, this time focusing on child development. There was no difference in the correct responses between a psychology-student and nonstudent group, with both groups . . .. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
... These include theories of motivation and action (e.g., Ajzen, 1991;Bandura, 1997), cognitive emotion theories (e.g., Lazarus, 2001;Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988), and trait theories of personality (e.g., John & Srivastava, 1999). More generally, any scientific psychological theory formulated on the "intentional level" of cognitive system analysis (Dennett, 1971) -the level of beliefs and desires -is a prima facie candidate for being an explication of folk psychology, although this relationship is sometimes difficult to recognize because of the use of a highly technical terminology (see Smedslund's 1978critique of Bandura, 1977). ...
This special issue of
Social Psychology commemorates the 50th anniversary of Fritz Heider's 1958 book
The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. The contributions to the special issue address the history and current state of attribution research, or illustrate contemporary research in the field. The historical articles document that Heider's analysis of causal attribution and of common-sense psychology was significantly influenced by his academic teachers Alexius Meinong and Ernst Cassirer. We distinguish between the mainstream reception of Heider's book, which has given rise to an extensive empirical research program, and a minority reception by authors who emphasized aspects of Heider's thinking not well represented in mainstream psychology. Currently, there are indications of a "back to Heider" movement in social psychology. This new phase of attribution research is inspired by a fresh reading of Heider's book, and is marked by an interdisciplinary orientation. The articles illustrating current attribution research address both classic and novel topics: the causality implicit in language, the role of causal attribution in hindsight bias, the justification of actions, and the attribution of mistakes in organizational contexts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
First, I describe the early development of my position, influenced by, among others, Piaget, and leading to the formulation of a circular relation between logic and understanding. I, then, describe three debates with Stanford psychologists: I tried to show that Albert Bandura’s theory of Self-Efficacy is necessarily true, whereas Bandura maintained that it was empirical. I still think that the core hypotheses are necessarily true, but that the concrete predictions from the theory are empirical, in so far as they always involve auxiliary hypotheses. I criticized Tversky and Kahneman’s distinction between fallacy and misunderstanding, because the concepts mutually presuppose each other, and we cannot understand the illogical (fallacy). I still think that errors must always be understood as misunderstandings, but in some contexts (e.g., teaching) they may, for practical reasons, be treated as fallacies. Against Ross, I argued that, for many reasons, practitioners cannot profit from empirical research. I still maintain that this is generally the case, but concede that one can find exceptions, notably when it comes to large-scale interventions. Finally, I summarize the content of recent formulations of my position, notably why psychology cannot be an empirical science, and why the practitioner has to work as a bricoleur (maximally open-minded and creative).
I begin by summarizing why empirical research cannot support psychological practice. After presenting the nonempirical approach of psychologic and the accompanying bricoleur model, I focus on the central role of trust in psychological treatment. To trust is to think that a person will not harm you. There are five necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of trust: care, understanding, own control, self-control, and relevant know-how. I discuss some of the challenges that may be encountered in attempting to build trust. The first four conditions are reasonably well defined and in principle manageable. However, since we cannot know the relevant composition of context-bound know-how (skill), we must conclude that we cannot know fully how to teach students to become good psychologists. The task may even be unsolvable, because treatment outcomes depend on indefinitely numerous, variable, and partly random conditions.
Jan Smedslund of the University of Oslo and the late Peter G. Ossorio of the University of Colorado both created innovative conceptual systems for use by behavioral scientists. Smedslund named his system “Psycho-logic” and described it as an axiomatization of “what persons take for granted about every person” (2012c, p. 661). Ossorio called his system the “Person Concept” and characterized it as a formal system providing access to all the facts and possible facts concerning persons and their behavior. My aim is to show the similarities and differences between these systems with respect to methodology, primary concept, and universality, and to place them in a wider, historical context. Hopefully the paper will contribute to an appreciation of the value of systematic delineation of fundamental concepts in behavioral science, as well as an understanding of two different ways of going about the task.
Educated intuition is at the very core of all science. The first question for a researcher is—what research questions are worthwhile to ask in the first place. Intuition here comes first—yet it is educated, not naïve and not “pure.” There are many layers of personal-cultural needs that turn an ordinary person into a scientist. Here the scientist and artist function similarly—the emergence of an idea is hidden somewhere in the internal infinity of our mind. Methodology is at the center of our knowledge creation. Yet it is an ambiguous term—often considered to be a synonym of “method.” This reduction is not allowable. Here we insist upon strict but inclusive separation of the two—“method” is part of Methodology Cycle and has no existence outside of that cycle. The chapter includes exposition of the whole Methodology Cycle and its various transformations.
This manuscript addresses some theoretical elements that converge with the epistemology of social representations. Its links and structure are discussed following specific examples surrounding the debate on social knowledge accounting for the difficulties in explaining human conduct and the relations between what is shared and what is consensual. Also, we put this forward as a paradigm to interpret group behaviour relative to a specific object, considering its dynamic potential, and how it may be used in processes of mathematical teaching and learning.
In the wake of pioneering research on societal psychology (Himmelweit and Gaskell, 1990) and widespread beliefs (Fraser and Gaskell, 1990), there has been an increase in interest in the representational processes underlying social order and political legitimacy during the last two decades (Doise, 1990; Duveen, 2001a, 2008; Elcheroth, Doise and Reicher, 2011; Gillespie, 2008; Joffe and Staerklé, 2007; Jovchelovitch, 2007; Moscovici, 1988; Sammut, 2011; Staerklé, 2009; Staerklé, Clémence and Spini, 2011; Wagner, Holtz and Kashima, 2009). Even though social representations research specifically addressing social order is scarce, many empirical studies (e.g. Howarth, 2006a; Liu and Hilton, 2005; Sarrasin et al., 2012; Staerklé., Likki and Scheidegger, 2012) speak directly to issues of social order and social change. The theory of social representations offers many insights into the conditions and processes that uphold or contest social order, especially when understood in conjunction with conversion and minority influence theory (Moscovici, 1980). This chapter outlines a social representations approach to social order from a societal perspective (Doise and Staerklé, 2002; Staerklé, 2011); such an account is necessarily rooted in systems of power and in the analysis of relations within and between social groups (Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clémence, 2001). A first section briefly describes some historical foundations of common social order thinking. I then describe central aspects of the social representations approach to social order and apply the distinction between the three communication modes described by Moscovici (1961/1976) – diffusion, propagation and propaganda – to account for three interrelated systems of legitimation and transformation of social order. In particular, I argue that attempts to stabilize and to challenge social order are shaped by communication processes between minority and majority groups trying to influence each other. Consensus and conflict in explanations of social order At the heart of the issue of social order stands the question that has eluded philosophers for centuries: what is the glue that holds a human community together? Why is an organized collective of individuals – a polity – stable and viewed as legitimate by its members?
Positive psychology is one of the biggest growth industries in the discipline of psychology. At the present time, the subfield of “positive education” seems poised to take the world of education and teacher training by storm. In this first book-length philosophical study of positive psychology, Professor Kristján Kristjánsson subjects positive psychology's recent inroads into virtue theory and virtue education to sustained conceptual and moral scrutiny. Professor Kristjánsson's interdisciplinary perspective constructively integrates insights, evidence, and considerations from social science and philosophy in a way that is easily accessible to the general reader. He offers an extended critique of positive psychology generally and “positive education” in particular, exploring the philosophical assumptions, underpinnings, and implications of these academic trends in detail. This provocative book will excite anyone interested in cutting-edge research on positive psychology and the on virtues that lie at the intersection of psychology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, education, and daily life.
Theoretischer Hintergrund der vorliegenden Arbeit bildet das Persönlichkeitskonstrukt der Kontrollüberzeugungen (locus of control). Es wurde im Rahmen der sozialen Lerntheorie von Rotter (1954, 1966) entwickelt und beinhaltet generalisierte Handlungs-Ergebnis-Erwartungen. Die zunächst eindimensionale Erfassung der internalen versus externalen Kontrollüber-zeugungen erfuhr – nicht zuletzt aufgrund widersprüchlicher empirischer Befunde – durch Levenson (1972) eine Differenzierung in eine sozial bedingte und eine fatalistische Externalität. In Bezug auf die Vorhersage des Behandlungserfolgs bei Alkoholabhängigkeit hat sich in bisherigen Studien die mehrdimensionale, bereichsspezifische Erfassung der Kontrollüberzeugungen etabliert. In den zahlreichen Untersuchungen, die sich in ihrer Methodik stark voneinander unterscheiden, stellte sich eine höhere Internalität als prädiktiv für eine günstige, eine erhöhte fatalistische Externalität hingegen als prädiktiv für eine ungünstige Prognose heraus. Dabei wird von einem umgekehrt u-förmigen Verlauf eines günstigen Kontrollüberzeugungsstils ausgegangen, wonach sowohl eine zu hohe als auch eine zu niedrige Internalität zu einer inadäquaten Wahrnehmung der eigenen Kontrollmöglichkeiten führen. In dieser Arbeit interessieren die Veränderungen in den generalisierten und bereichsspezifischen Kontroll- und Kompetenzüberzeugungen bei stationär behandelten alkoholabhängigen Patienten. Unter Berücksichtigung weiterer Variablen wie Therapiemotivation, psychopathologische Symptombelastung, Suchtverlangen und komorbide depressive Erkrankung sollen Prädiktoren für die Rückfälligkeit während der Behandlung sowie bis zu einem Jahr danach identifiziert werden. Im Weiteren werden bedeutsame Zusammenhänge zwischen der Ausprägung der Kontrollüberzeugungen und kognitiven Leistungsbeeinträchtigungen vermutet. Externale Kontrollüberzeugungen werden dabei mit Leistungsdefiziten in Verbindung gebracht. Zur Untersuchung der Frage, ob eine hohe Internalität mit einer generellen Überschätzung der eigenen Fähigkeiten und damit einem ungünstigeren Behandlungsergebnis einhergeht, soll die Selbsteinschätzung in fünf neuropsychologischen Testverfahren herangezogen werden. Es wurden 102 alkoholabhängige Patienten in die Studie eingeschlossen. 81 davon konnten sowohl am Anfang als auch am Ende einer durchschnittlich zehnwöchigen stationären Behandlung untersucht werden. 51 Patienten wurden zusätzlich nach einem Jahr schriftlich befragt. Während der Behandlung konnten bei der gesamten Stichprobe, insbesondere bei Patienten mit einem ungünstigeren Kontrollüberzeugungsstil, Veränderungen in die gewünschte Richtung beobachtet werden: Das Selbstkonzept und die Internalität nahmen zu, während sich die sozial bedingte und fatalistische Externalität verringerten. Als einziger signifikanter Prädiktor für die Ein-Jahres-Abstinenz stellte sich das bereichsspezifische, prospektiv ausgerichtete Selbstkonzept zu Beginn der Behandlung heraus. Die bei Behandlungsende erhobenen Variablen besassen keinen Vorhersagewert. Insofern kann angenommen werden, dass die Veränderungen während der Behandlung in nicht unerheblichem Masse durch kurzzeitige Hospitalisations- und soziale Erwünschtheitseffekte beeinflusst worden sind. Patienten, die bereits während der Behandlung rückfällig wurden, zeichneten sich im Vergleich zu abstinenten Patienten bereits zu Beginn durch ein niedrigeres Selbstkonzept, eine niedrigere Internalität sowie eine erhöhte fatalistische Externalität aus. Sie waren psychisch belasteter, hatten ein grösseres Suchtverlangen und wiesen häufiger eine komorbide depressive Störung auf. Bezüglich der bereichsspezifischen, nicht jedoch der generalisierten Kontrollüberzeugungen unterschieden sie sich am Ende der Behandlung noch deutlicher von abstinen-ten Patienten. Die Differenzen blieben bis zur Ein-Jahres-Katamnese bestehen. Insgesamt stellten für die Rückfälligkeit während der Behandlung ein ungünstigerer Kontrollüberzeugungsstil, eine depressive Erkrankung, ein hohes Suchtverlangen und kognitive Leistungseinbussen Risikofaktoren dar, die sich wechselseitig beeinflussten. Patienten mit sehr hoher Internalität zeichneten sich durch eine generelle Überschätzung ihrer kognitiven Leistungsfähigkeit aus. Übereinstimmend damit schützte eine sehr hohe Internalität nicht vor Rückfälligkeit. Eine niedrige Internalität ging hingegen mit einer Unterschätzung der Leistungsfähigkeit in zwei von fünf Tests einher. Die Ergebnisse entsprechen grösstenteils den Erwartungen. Sie werden abschliessend unter Berücksichtigung der methodischen Stärken und Schwächen der vorliegenden empirischen Untersuchung erörtert, in den aktuellen Kenntnisstand eingeordnet und im Hinblick auf zukünftige Forschungsperspektiven diskutiert.
I artikkelen kritiseres det tradisjonelle, empiristiske grunnsynet på psykologien, og det argumenteres for at psykologi må forstås som en disiplinert klargjering, systematisering og anvendelse av dagliglivets menneskekunnskap (common sense), dvs. av den psykologiske forståelse som ligger innebygd i dagligspråket og kulturen. SUMMARY Common-sense psychology is introduced as an alternative to the traditional natural-scientific approach to psychology, which is sketched and briefly criticized. Common-sense psychology is defined as the systematic explication—to be achieved by means of conceptual analysis—of the psychological understanding constituted by the everyday language of a given culture. Common-sense psychological theory, as the only general psychological theory possible, consequently consists of necessary true statements reflecting the logical relations between the psychological concepts in this language. Two examples of common-sense psychological theory—concerning emotions and depression respectively—jure briefly reviewed, and the advantages of this kind of theory are made out by equating it with Euclid's geometry. From a common-sense psychological point of view empirical research may have heuristic, diagnostic and descriptive functions, but cannot be aimed at testing generally valid theories. Finally, some relationships between common-sense psychology, hermeneutics, phenomenology and linguistic philosophy are pointed out.
How do societies reproduce? Berger and Luckmann (1966) popularized the idea of a continuous reconstruction of society; they showed the importance of education of individual members in this reproductive reconstruction. Societies are enacted and reproduced by human behaviour, through practice. Societies are not static; new objects are constructed, new phenomena occur. Tony Giddens’ structuration theory highlighted the two sides of this continuous reconstruction: while individual behaviour results from societal structure, human action also reproduces (that is, sustains and modifies) the structure (Giddens, 1984). In this reproduction process through which successive generations reproduce and Gradually modify society, representations play an important role. Earlier, Moscovici had shown in his seminal work on psychoanalysis (1961/1976) how the process of social construction operates on the psychological level. He discovered the mechanism by which new social ‘objects’ emerge: anchoring their representation in previous cultural notions, through debate between stakeholders, until they become reified ‘social representations’ which in turn may serve as anchors for future cultural innovations. This chapter focusses on the specific role social representations plays in the larger chicken and egg societal evolution outlined above. It does so via a pragmatic perspective (installation theory), which attempts to explain the phenomenon but also to provide the tools for regulators and change agents. The first part of the chapter provides a framework – installation theory – to describe how societies scaffold, shape and control individual behaviour and the specific role of social representations in that framework. Human behaviour is determined at three levels: affordances of the environment; embodied competences in actors; social influence and rules by other actors and institutions. An installation will be defined as a socially constructed system with three such layers, which guides a specific activity by suggesting scaffolding and constraining what society members can/should do in a specific situation (Lahlou, 2008, 2011a). Installation theory is a theory for nudging (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
: The concept of a situation underlying the debate between moral situationists and dispositionists conceals various underexplored complexities. Some of those issues have been engaged recently in the so-called psychology of situations, but they have been slow to receive attention in mainstream philosophy. I invoke various distinctions among situations, and show how situationists have selectively chosen certain types of situations that, for conceptual reasons, skew the argument in their favour. I introduce the concept of a ‘virtue-calibrated situation’, and argue that if the person–situation debate is to move forward in philosophy as it has in psychology, it must focus on such situations. I bring to bear evidence from analytic and continental philosophy, as well as from social and personality psychology.
This manuscript addresses some theoretical elements that converge with the epistemology of social representations. Its links and structure are discussed following specific examples surrounding the debate on social knowledge accounting for the difficulties in explaining human conduct and the relations between what is shared and what is consensual. Also, we put this forward as a paradigm to interpret group behaviour relative to a specific object, considering its dynamic potential, and how it may be used in processes of mathematical teaching and learning.
The vast majority of social constructionist writings have been critical of psychological science-on both ideological and conceptual grounds. The constructionist emphasis on microsocial processes also functions oppositionally to psychological accounting. The existing animus grows, however, from a realist metaphysics and a correspondence view of language, neither of which constructionism endorses. Viewing the relationship between constructionism and psychological science in more pragmatic terms, we find three significant ways in which constructionism contributes to a more fully enriched and broadly effective psychology. First, critical constructionism functions to denaturalize psychological accounts, opening them to reflexive deliberation, and democratizing the field more generally. Second, constructionist metatheory invites a resuscitation of marginal or suppressed discourse within the field, and invigorates societally engaged efforts to forge new and more useful discourses of the mind. Finally, social constructionism offers the possibility for a fundamental reconceptualization of the self. Illustrative is the family of theories conceptualizing the self as either constituted by or constituting relationships.
A bricoleur is a resource person enlisted when conventional procedures in daily life fail to work, and who utilizes whatever is at hand in the given situation to effect a solution. The psychologist-cum-bricoleur relies on three sources of knowledge: what we all know about being human because we are human, what we know about some others because we participate in particular shared meaning systems (language and culture), and what we know about unique persons. Psychological treatment is seen as composed of three interacting part projects, namely building trust between psychologist and client, modifying the client’s behavior, and modifying the client’s surroundings. Actual interventions are formed by the concrete treatment situations. Finally, the differences between the bricoleur model and the standard scientist-practitioner model are examined.
An explication of common sense is an attempt to formulate a part of the ordinarily unformulated system of implications shared by all members of a given culture, familiar with a given context. Thirty-six alleged common sense formulations relating to Bandura's theory of self-efficacy were used. Students were asked 1) to give a prediction involving each theorem, 2) to judge whether or not an alternative prediction is conceivable, 3) to judge whether or not an explanation based on the theorem is acceptable, and 4) to judge whether or not an explanation based on the negation of the theorem is acceptable. The average consensus on these four types of judgments was respectively 93%, 80%, 92%, and 96%. A group of respondents were interviewed about the shortcomings of the formulations. The theorems were revised to incorporate these criticisms and, hence, are expected to yield higher consensus.
Presents an integrative theoretical framework to explain and to predict psychological changes achieved by different modes of treatment. This theory states that psychological procedures, whatever their form, alter the level and strength of self-efficacy. It is hypothesized that expectations of personal efficacy determine whether coping behavior will be initiated, how much effort will be expended, and how long it will be sustained in the face of obstacles and aversive experiences. Persistence in activities that are subjectively threatening but in fact relatively safe produces, through experiences of mastery, further enhancement of self-efficacy and corresponding reductions in defensive behavior. In the proposed model, expectations of personal efficacy are derived from 4 principal sources of information: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and physiological states. Factors influencing the cognitive processing of efficacy information arise from enactive, vicarious, exhortative, and emotive sources. The differential power of diverse therapeutic procedures is analyzed in terms of the postulated cognitive mechanism of operation. Findings are reported from microanalyses of enactive, vicarious, and emotive modes of treatment that support the hypothesized relationship between perceived self-efficacy and behavioral changes. (21/2 p ref)
• As the title suggests, this book examines the psychology of interpersonal relations. In the context of this book, the term "interpersonal relations" denotes relations between a few, usually between two, people. How one person thinks and feels about another person, how he perceives him and what he does to him, what he expects him to do or think, how he reacts to the actions of the other--these are some of the phenomena that will be treated. Our concern will be with "surface" matters, the events that occur in everyday life on a conscious level, rather than with the unconscious processes studied by psychoanalysis in "depth" psychology. These intuitively understood and "obvious" human relations can, as we shall see, be just as challenging and psychologically significant as the deeper and stranger phenomena. The discussion will center on the person as the basic unit to be investigated. That is to say, the two-person group and its properties as a superindividual unit will not be the focus of attention. Of course, in dealing with the person as a member of a dyad, he cannot be described as a lone subject in an impersonal environment, but must be represented as standing in relation to and interacting with another person. The chapter topics included in this book include: Perceiving the Other Person; The Other Person as Perceiver; The Naive Analysis of Action; Desire and Pleasure; Environmental Effects; Sentiment; Ought and Value; Request and Command; Benefit and Harm; and Reaction to the Lot of the Other Person. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
• As the title suggests, this book examines the psychology of interpersonal relations. In the context of this book, the term "interpersonal relations" denotes relations between a few, usually between two, people. How one person thinks and feels about another person, how he perceives him and what he does to him, what he expects him to do or think, how he reacts to the actions of the other--these are some of the phenomena that will be treated. Our concern will be with "surface" matters, the events that occur in everyday life on a conscious level, rather than with the unconscious processes studied by psychoanalysis in "depth" psychology. These intuitively understood and "obvious" human relations can, as we shall see, be just as challenging and psychologically significant as the deeper and stranger phenomena. The discussion will center on the person as the basic unit to be investigated. That is to say, the two-person group and its properties as a superindividual unit will not be the focus of attention. Of course, in dealing with the person as a member of a dyad, he cannot be described as a lone subject in an impersonal environment, but must be represented as standing in relation to and interacting with another person. The chapter topics included in this book include: Perceiving the Other Person; The Other Person as Perceiver; The Naive Analysis of Action; Desire and Pleasure; Environmental Effects; Sentiment; Ought and Value; Request and Command; Benefit and Harm; and Reaction to the Lot of the Other Person. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This book presesents the Messenger Lectures at Cornell University for 1928-1929 and focuses on human learning. The author hopes that those who heard and read the lectures will find them a useful account of fundamental facts and principles of human learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The present article presents an integrative theoretical framework to explain and to predict psychological changes achieved by different modes of treatment. This theory states that psychological procedures, whatever their form, alter the level and strength of self-efficacy. It is hypothesized that expectations of per- sonal efficacy determine whether coping behavior will be initiated, how much effort will be expended, and how long it will be sustained in the face of ob- stacles and aversive experiences. Persistence in activities that are subjectively threatening but in fact relatively safe produces, through experiences of mastery, further enhancement of self-efficacy and corresponding reductions in defensive behavior. In the proposed model, expectations of personal efficacy are derived from four principal sources of information: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and physiological states. The more de- pendable the experiential sources, the greater are the changes in perceived self- efficacy. A number of factors are identified as influencing the cognitive processing of efficacy information arising from enactive, vicarious, exhortative, and emotive sources. The differential power of diverse therapeutic procedures is analyzed in terms of the postulated cognitive mechanism of operation. Findings are reported from microanalyses of enactive, vicarious, and emotive modes of treatment that support the hypothesized relationship between perceived self-efficacy and be- havioral changes. Possible directions for further research are discussed.
Empirical studies of technical and therapist variables in treatment cannot yield valid generalizations because of the uniqueness of each case. Professional practice must, instead, be seen as an application of a psychological “calculus”, which follows logically from definitions of given concepts. Seven necessary rules are suggested for psychological treatment: 1. Regard the client-in-her/his-surroundings-system (cs-system) as your unit of reference and get to know this system. 2. Tolerate initial ambiguity and do not generalize from other persons in other life situations. 3. In matters relevant for treatment, do not objectivize, i.e. pronounce something to be true or false, good or bad, right or wrong, but always subjectivize, i.e. emphasize that FOR P something is true or false, etc. 4. Maintain your independence relative to the cs-system you work with. 5. Understand the persons in the cs-system. 6. Respect the persons in the cs-system. 7. Care for the persons in the cs-system.