No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Transition between sensorimotor and symbolic activities in nursery-reared chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
Abstract
Bates's (1979) and Piaget's (1945) work with infants have demonstrated that language is not the only form of symbolic activity. These researchers however, have done more than identify other forms of symbolic behavior, they have suggested that some particular behaviors such as tool-use, object permanence and deferred imitation play a major role in the emergence of symbols.If language is only one form of symbolic activity, then it becomes possible to study other forms of symbolic behavior such as the one displayed in symbolic play. Some researchers (Dasen et al., 1978; Inhelder et al., 1972) have studied the emergence of functional play and the beginnings of symbolic play. The results of these studies provide a framework of the human child's behavior during the period of transition between the sensorimotor and symbolic activities.On the other hand, the observation of chimpanzees in their natural environment and in captivity have shown that most of the behaviors identified as prerequisites in the emergence of language (e.g. tool-use, object permanence, etc …) are already present in this species. Until now however, studies have been oriented around language acquisition rather than on other forms of symbolic behavior.The purpose of this research is to determine if nursery-reared chimpanzees can display any type of symbolic behavior as human children do when they are interacting with objects normally present in their environment. Three different experiments were conducted over a four year period using a methodology for human children. The four subjects, however, were exposed to modeling sessions before each of the videotaping sessions in the last experiment because of their low levels of functional play in the previous experiments.Results have shown major differences between the chimpanzee and the human child. More specifically, the chimpanzee does not seem to reach the stage of transition between the sensorimotor period and the symbolic activity because of its low levels (when compared with the human child) of: (i) conventional use of objects; (ii) activities with two objects or more; (iii) ambiguous activities. Morcover, symbolic play is never observed during the experiments. Deferred imitation (e.g. conventional use of objects) thus seems to be the highest level of cognitive complexity displayed by the chimpanzee in the context of free play.
... The Kellogs concluded "we are accustomed to regard the chimpanzee, as a splendid imitator... yet the child is a more versatile and continuous imitator than the animal" (Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933 p. 230). Mignault (1985) described how young enculturated chimpanzees imitated humans using a variety of objects (such as a hair brush). Tomasello (1990) criticized this study as no control group was used. ...
... At nine months, human infants are capable of deferred imitation, a Piagetian Stage 6 achievement. Mathieu & Bergeron (1981) and Mignault (1985) found chimpanzees are also able to display deferred imitation. However, there has not been any systematic experiment on deferred imitation in monkeys. ...
... A number of investigators have sought to determine the course of Piagetian sensorimotor stages in chimpanzees. Nearly all of them have concluded that although chimpanzees and orangutans pass through the initial four stages at roughly the same rate as human infants, Stages 5 and 6 are delayed and may not be completed until 5-8 years of age (Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1983;Mathieu & Bergeron, 1981;Mignault, 1985), which is precisely the age at which we detected a developmental transition in which the majority of chimpanzees were diagnosed as capable of recognizing themselves in mirrors. 8 However, it is premature to conclude anything about the exact nature of the relation between sen-sorimotor intelligence and self-recognition, other than that if they remain linked across species in this fashion, the construction of the self-conceptual capacity underlying selfrecognition may be organized in such a fashion that it requires as a basis some of the skills inherent in some subset of the later stages of sensorimotor intelligence. ...
Investigations of mirror self-recognition (SR) in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have had small samples and divergent methods. In Experiment 1, 105 chimpanzees (10 months to 40 years of age) were observed for signs of SR across 5 days of continuous mirror exposure. In Experiments 2 and 3, negative SR adult and adolescent chimpanzees were saturated with mirror exposure in efforts to facilitate SR and a longitudinal study was conducted with a number of young subjects. In Experiment 4, mark tests were administered to groups of positive SR, negative SR, and ambiguous SR subjects. In Experiment 5, we explored whether previous positive SR reports in young chimpanzees were artifacts of increased arousal during mirror exposure. Results suggest that SR typically emerges at 4.5–8 years of age, at the population level the capacity declines in adulthood, and in group settings SR typically occurs within minutes of a subject's exposure to a mirror.
... Combinatory manipulation can be defined as an object manipulation in relation to other objects or individuals and it is a precursor of tool-use behavior -a milestone in physical/cognitive development. Previous studies have reported that combinatory manipulation emerges at approximately 10 months of age in humans, but, in a group of captive-reared chimpanzees its emergence was delayed and did not appear until after 1 year of age (Mignault, 1985;Potì & Spinozzi, 1994;Vauclair, 1984). In contrast, Hayashi and Matsuzawa (2003) reported that mother-reared chimpanzees started to exhibit combinatory manipulation at 8-11 months of age, which is comparable to humans. ...
We review studies on mother–infant interactions in chimpanzees, our closest living relatives, in captive and wild environments. Infant cognitive development is formed through mother–infant interactions during the long dependent period, which is approximately 5 years. Patterns of interaction between mothers and infants are different from those observed in adult chimpanzees. Mother–infant interactions are relatively altruistic, although solicitation by infants is almost always required. Active teaching has rarely been reported in chimpanzees; instead, infants socially learn new skills through long-term observation. Case studies describing rearing of a disabled infant by a multiparous but inexperienced chimpanzee, and the carrying of dead infants in the wild chimpanzees of Bossou reveal the strong affectionate bond between mothers and infants. Characteristics of human mother–infant interaction are highlighted through comparisons with chimpanzees.
... Although there is ample evidence supporting children's facility in seriating objects in a set, the age at which they become proficient seriators is debatable and appears to be contingent on the nature of the objects and research methodology employed (Inhelder and Piaget 1964; Greenfield et al. 1972; Sugarman 1983; DeLoache et al. 1985; Ciancio et al. 1999). Given that manipulative propensities of many species of nonhuman primates rival that of children (e.g., Mignault 1985; Torigoe 1985; Takeshita and Walraven 1996 ), a matter of interest to comparative psychologists is whether seriation of objects is within apes' and monkeys' abilities, and if so, how their performance compares with that of children. To address this issue, we reviewed findings from comparative and developmental studies that have been conducted with children, chimpanzees , bonobos, and capuchin monkeys using tasks that require seriating objects. ...
The ability to seriate nesting cups as a sensorimotor task has posed interesting questions for cognitive scientists. Greenfield et al. [(1972) Cognit Psychol 3:291-310] found parallels between children's combinatorial activity with nesting cups and patterns of phonological and grammatical constructions. The parallels suggested the possibility of a neurally based developmental homology between language and instrumental action [Greenfield (1991) Behav Brain Sci 14:531-595]. Children who predominantly used subassembly, a hierarchical method of combining cups, succeeded at seriating nesting cups more often than those who did not. Greenfield and others [e.g., Piaget and Inhelder (1969) The psychology of the child. Basic Books, New York; DeLoache et al. (1985) Child Dev 56:928-939] argued that success in seriation reflects the child's growing recognition of a reversible relationship: a particular element in a series is conceived of as being smaller than the previous element and larger than the subsequent element. But is a concept of reversibility or a hierarchical form of object manipulation necessary to seriate cups? In this article, we review studies with very young children and nonhuman primates to determine how individuals that do not evidence conceptual reversibility manage the seriation task. We argue that the development of skill in seriation is experientially, rather than conceptually, driven and that it may be unnecessary to link seriation with cognitive conceptions of reversibility or linguistic capacities. Rather, in ordering a set of objects by size, perceptual-motor learning may enable contemplative refinement.
... There have been very few experiments on imitation in great apes. Four Piagetian-style studies have reported the ability for stage 6 deferred imitation in four chimpanzees (MATHIEU & BERGERON, 1981;MIGNAULT, 1985), one orangutan (MILES et al., 1992), and one gorilla (CHEVALIER-SKOLNIKOFF, 1977). However none of these experimental reports provide adequately detailed descriptions of the apes' behaviour. ...
Contrary to recent scepticism, systematic use of an experimental approach suggested by HAYEs & HAYEs (1952) shows that chimpanzees can imitate novel actions. Two chimpanzees imitated 13 and 17 novel arbitrary gestures, respectively. They were first taught to reproduce 15 gestures on the command, ''Do this!'', and then presented with 48 novel items. Using a rigourous coding system, two independent observers correctly identified a significant number of the chimpanzees' imitations (p < 0.0001). We conclude that after a period of tuition chimpanzees can go on to imitate arbitrary actions, providing evidence of a basic cognitive capacity for perspective-taking and cross-modal matching.
... There are few cases of play behavior in chimpanzees and other species that can be taken as prima facie evidence of imaginative play, even at the rudimentary level of cued representation (i.e., feature-dependent make-believe) seen in 2-year-old humans. The only controlled laboratory experiment on imaginative play in chimpanzees revealed no evidence of the behavior (Mignault 1985). But there are some anecdotal reports that are not easily dismissed. ...
The present theoretical article addresses the empirical question of whether other species, particularly chimpanzees, have the cognitive substrate necessary for experiencing theistic and otherwise non-natural (i.e., non-physical) percepts. The primary representational device presumed to underlie religious cognition was viewed as, in general, the capacity to attribute unobservable causal mechanisms to ostensible output and, in particular, a theory of mind. Drawing from a catalogue of behaviors that may be considered diagnostic of the secondary representations involved in theory of mind (or at least theory of mind precursors), important dissimilarities between humans and other species in the realms of the animate-inanimate distinction (self-propelledness versus mental agency of animate beings), imaginative play (feature-dependent make-believe versus true symbolic play), and the death concept (biological death conceptualization versus psychological death conceptualization) were shown. Differences in these domains support the claim that humans alone possess the foundational and functional representations inherent in religious experiences.
... It is possible that the gorilla's accelerated sexual and physical maturation (especially in the 295 I Modern bird (adult) ffi MH domain of independent locomotion) may interfere with future maturation in cognitive structures that were only allowed for in the great apes and their ancestors due to extended periods of immature development. This seems all the more likely because lensorimotor intelligence in apes (at least, in chimpanzees and orangutans) appears not to close until 6-8 years of age (Chevalier-Skolnikoff, lggg; ltlithieu & Bergeron, 1981; Mignault, 1985), irecisely the point at which our own research has detected the developmental "-"rg"n"" of self-recognition in chimpanzees (Povinelli et al., in press). Thus, dramitic alterations in physical maturation schedules prior to this point (as is clearly the case in gbrillas), could be expected to affect later cognitive growth. ...
Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans, a collection of original articles on self-awareness in monkeys, apes, humans, and other species, focuses on controversies about how to measure self-awareness, which species are capable of self-awareness and which are not, and why. Several chapters focus on the controversial question of whether gorillas, like other great apes and human infants, are capable of mirror self-recognition (MSR) or whether they are anomalously unable to do so. Other chapters focus on whether macaque monkeys are capable of MSR. The focus of the chapters is both comparative and developmental: several contributors explore the value of frameworks from human developmental psychology for comparative studies. This dual focus - comparative and developmental - reflects the interdisciplinary nature of the volume, which brings together biological anthropologists, comparative and developmental psychologists, and cognitive scientists from Japan, France, Spain, Hungary, New Zealand, Scotland and the United States.
... Under uncontrolled and semicontrolled conditions the occurrence of imitation in monkeys (Beck 1976;Hauser 1988;Nishida 1986;Westergaard 1988), orangutans (Russon & Galdikas 1993), and chimpanzees (Goodall 1986;Mignault 1985;Sumita et al. 1985;Terrace et al. 1979; Waal 1982) has been inferred from the performance of a complex, novel, and previously observed act by a single animal or a succession of animals within a group. Even if one disregards the problem of the reliability of these observational or anecdotal data, they are not compelling. ...
We propose a naturalistic version of the “guesser–knower”
paradigm in which the experimental subject has an opportunity to
choose which individual to follow to a hidden food source. This design
allows nonhumans to display the attribution of knowledge to another
conspecific, rather than a human, in a naturalistic context (finding
food), and it is readily adapted to different species.
... In the first study 4.4% (4) and in the second study 5% (17) of the total private utterances (458) were classified as imaginary. Mignault (1985) examined the development of object manipulation in young chimpanzees with symbolic play being one type of object manipulation. In regard to symbolic play the author concluded that it was never observed during the experiments yet some behaviors were described that we would define as imaginary play. ...
Imaginary Play was studied in a group of five signing chimpanzees and it was found that chimpanzees engage in imaginary play
similar to that found in human children. Fifteen hours of remote videotapes were analyzed for instances of imaginary play.
Behaviors were defined as imaginary play by meeting a predetermined criteria which allowed them to be classified into one
of six different categories of imaginary play. Six instances of imaginary play were found and these were classified into the
two categories of Animation and Substitution. Observations of imaginary play in other research with chimpanzees were discussed.
... Aspects of symbolic capacity exist in apes, including language in a captive bonobo (Benson et al., 2002), auditory communication in wild chimpanzees (Boesch, 1991), and juvenile female chimpanzees carrying sticks as if they were infants (Kahlenberg and Wrangham, 2010). This has prompted examination of any particular aspects of symbolic behavior which may in fact be human specific (Deacon, 1997;Mignault, 1985). Because wild chimpanzees are not known to manufacture symbolic artifacts, at least this aspect of symbolic behavior seems to be exclusively hominin. ...
Evidence used to reconstruct the morphology and function of the brain (and the rest of the central nervous system) in fossil hominin species comes from the fossil and archeological records. Although the details provided about human brain evolution are scarce, they benefit from interpretations informed by interspecific comparative studies and, in particular, human pathology studies. In recent years, new information has come to light about fossil DNA and ontogenetic trajectories, for which pathology research has significant implications. We briefly describe and summarize data from the paleoarcheological and paleoneurological records about the evolution of fossil hominin brains, including behavioral data most relevant to brain research. These findings are brought together to characterize fossil hominin taxa in terms of brain structure and function and to summarize brain evolution in the human lineage.
The ‘grunt’, a laryngeal vocalization functioning communicatively in many primate repertoires, including humans’, has been implicated in both evolution and development of language. Within one month of communicative grunt onset human infants studied by McCune and colleagues transitioned to referential language. Human infants’ transition to referential language is impacted by a dynamic system of variables: mental representation, vocal motor skill, gesture, and communicative grunts, occurring in the context of affective attachment and developing inter-subjectivity with caregiver(s). Across mammalian species grunts are an initial reflex response to autonomic demand (e.g. effort). From the Darwinian notion of a behavior initially beneficial for an animal being co-opted for communicative use, the shift from autonomic to communicative grunt may act as an engine for development and evolution. Chimpanzee and vervet infants are similar to humans in the shift of grunts from effort to communication, but differ in levels of mental representation and intersubjectivity, indicating chimpanzees’ closer relationship with common ancestors to humans. Protolanguage(s) no doubt relied upon such developments in the young as a critical path to the adult repertoire. Where related species share characteristics, these are implicated for common ancestors.
We made an observational study of spontaneous imitation in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Previous studies may have underestimated great apes' imitative capacities by studying subjects under inhibiting conditions- We used subjects living in enriched environments, namely, rehabilitation. We collected a sample of spontaneous imitations and analyzed the most complex incidents for the likelihood that true imitation, learning new actions by observing rather than by doing, was involved in their acquisition. From 395 hr of observation and other reports on 26 orangutans, we identified 354 incidents of imitation. Of these, 54 complex incidents were difficult to explain by forms of imitation based on associative processes grounded in experiential learning alone; they were, however, congruent with acquisition processes that include true imitation. These findings suggest that orangutans may be capable of true imitation and point to critical eliciting factors.
Chimpanzees were tested for their ability to discriminate between accidental/inadvertent and intentional actions with equivalent adverse consequences. Subjects were first trained to `point' to human trainers in order to receive food rewards. In Experiment 1, six 5-year-old subjects were alternately presented with two unfamiliar human actors. In condition 1, each actor either started to hand a cup of juice to the trainer but then pulled it back and intentionally poured it onto the floor, or accidentally spilled it while handing it to the trainer. In condition 2, the actors either accidentally spilled it as above, or aggressively threw the juice onto the floor. The subjects were then presented with both actors and were allowed to choose between them. In Experiment 2, seven 6–7-year-old chimpanzees were confronted with unfamiliar actors who either (a) intentionally withheld and consumed food intended for the subjects, (b) attempted to hand the intended food to the subjects but were victimized by a third party who consumed the food, or (c) always succeeded in delivering the food to the subjects. In general, the subjects showed little evidence of using the accidental/inadvertent versus intentional distinction in their choices between the actors, although they did display some evidence of favoring the actor involved in the most passive role in both conditions in Experiment 1.
I made systematic observations of three infant chimpanzees aged 2-4 years, who participated in a series of diagnostic tests of combinatory manipulation. The tasks were stacking blocks, seriating nesting cups, and inserting an object into the corresponding hole in a plate or a box. These tasks were originally devised for developmental diagnosis of human infants. The chimpanzee infants displayed combinatory manipulation comparable to that of 1-year-old human infants. Common motor characteristics were observed across the tasks, namely "repetition" of actions, "adjustment" of actions, "reversal" of actions, and "shifts" of attention. Humans and chimpanzees share these actions when manipulating multiple objects to complete a task. Repetition, adjustment, and reversal of actions and shifts of attention underlie higher levels of cognition common to both species.
This chapter explores the cognitive mechanisms underlying the emergence and
evolution of cultural novelty. Section Two summarizes the rationale for viewing
the process by which the fruits of the mind take shape as they spread from one
individual to another as a form of evolution, and briefly discusses a computer
model of this process. Section Three presents theoretical and empirical
evidence that the sudden proliferation of human culture approximately two
million years ago began with the capacity for creativity: that is, the ability
to generate novelty strategically and contextually. The next two sections take
a closer look at the creative process. Section Four examines the mechanisms
underlying the fluid, associative thought that constitutes the inspirational
component of creativity. Section Five explores how that initial flicker of
inspiration crystallizes into a solid, workable idea as it gets mulled over in
light of the various constraints and affordances of the world into which it
will be born. Finally, Section Six wraps things up with a few speculative
thoughts about the overall unfolding of this evolutionary process.
The purpose of this article is to elaborate and extend some of Baldwin’s and Piaget’s ideas concerning the self-teaching functions of imitation and circular reactions. It is argued that circular reactions are evolved means for self-induced cognitive construction and that imitation is an evolved means for self-and other-induced cognitive construction. Comparative data on the taxonomic distribution of imitation and circular reactions in monkeys and apes suggest that these means for cognitive construction are rare among primates and must have evolved first in the common ancestor of great apes and humans.Copyright © 1993 S. Karger AG, Basel
We made an observational study of spontaneous imitation in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Previous studies may have underestimated great apes' imitative capacities by studying subjects under inhibiting conditions. We used subjects living in enriched environments, namely, rehabilitation. We collected a sample of spontaneous imitations and analyzed the most complex incidents for the likelihood that true imitation, learning new actions by observing rather than by doing, was involved in their acquisition. From 395 hr of observation and other reports on 26 orangutans, we identified 354 incidents of imitation. Of these, 54 complex incidents were difficult to explain by forms of imitation based on associative processes grounded in experiential learning alone; they were, however, congruent with acquisition processes that include true imitation. These findings suggest that orangutans may be capable of true imitation and point to critical eliciting factors.
62 hrs of observing 12 cebus monkeys in 3 captive groups yielded 38 series and 66 acts of spontaneous tool use. Nine monkeys used tools under 14 categories of use. Of 7 captive spider monkeys observed for 21 hrs, none used tools. Comparative observations of sensorimotor intelligence (SMI) were made using Piaget's (1951, 1952) model. Cebus monkeys showed all 6 levels of SMI, whereas the spider monkeys showed only the 1st 4 stages. 37 of the 38 tool-use series and 65 of 66 individual acts involved Stage 5 and 6 sensorimotor mechanisms (i.e., tertiary circular reactions and insight), which suggests that strong tool-using propensity among primates is due to advanced SMI rather than to fortuitous discovery. 24 commentaries follow. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
I focus on the logic of the goggles experiment, which if it as
watertight as Heyes argues, should clearly support ape theory of mind
if positive, and clearly reject it if negative. This is not the case,
since the experiment tests for only one kind of mindreading,
“experience projection”: but it is an excellent test
for this, given adequate controls.
a2 MAC Cognitive Development Unit, 17 Gordon St., London WCIH OAH, England. Electronic mail: karmiloff@euclid.ucl.ac.uk
We investigated chimpanzees’ spontaneous spatial constructions with objects. Two were common chimpanzees ages 6 and 18 years and one was an 11-year-old bonobo raised in a very enriched human environment from very early in life. Chimpanzees’ products and procedures were quite advanced when constructing functional spatial relations by placing objects in or on each other, but not when constructing nonfunctional spatial relations by placing objects next to each other. This difference was found in all their constructions, including their spatial correspondences and spatial symmetries. Compared to those of younger nonencultured chimpanzees all their spatial constructions were more advanced. Compared to human infants, their functional spatial constructions were also more advanced but their nonfunctional spatial constructions were less advanced.
I address the issue of how pretence emerged in evolution by reviewing the (mostly negative) evidence about pretend behaviour in non-human primates, and proposing a model of the type of information processing abilities that humans had to evolve in order to be able to pretend. Non-human primates do not typically pretend: there are just a few examples of potential pretend actions mostly produced by apes. The best, but still rare, examples are produced by so-called ‘enculturated’ apes (reared by humans) and among them specially those that have been systematically trained to use symbols (so-called ‘linguistic’ apes). A hypothesis that would explain the lack of pretence in apes is that they lack the mentalistic ability of theory of mind. However, in the last years apes have been demonstrated to possess relatively sophisticated social cognitive skills, some of them ontogenetically appearing in humans alongside with or even after pretend play. As a solution to the paradox, I discuss a model according to which pretence is supported by a mechanism capable of computing intentional relations with non-existing objects or properties (Intentional non-existence), as opposed to mechanisms computing intentional relations with existing, although not necessarily currently perceived, objects (Intentional availability). Apes possess the latter, which allows them to solve a variety of theory of mind tasks, but not the former, which typically prevents them from developing pretence.
Four types of specific objects: wooden spoons, metal bowls, plastic boxes, and cotton towels were introduced in a similar
setting to two captive groups of different species in the genusPan, the bonobo and the chimpanzee. In total, 582 unique manipulation forms were distinguished by a set of variables: types of
objects, motor patterns, body-parts used, the number of objects manipulated, and types of orienting manipulation. In sum,
chimpanzees and bonobos were not so different in the variety and the complexity of object manipulation forms. However, comparison
of the two species revealed significant differences as follows: (1) chimpanzees preferred to use only one hand during manipulation
of both single- and multiple-objects, whereas in the case of multiple-objects bonobos used both hands significantly more often;
(2) chimpanzees performed more orienting manipulations in single-object manipulations than did bonobos, whereas the reverse
was the case in multiple-object manipulations; and (3) chimpanzees' object manipulations were overall more substrate-oriented
than were bonobos'. The factors producing these differences are discussed in relation to positional behaviors and habitual
tool use in the two species.
I report spontaneous spatial object grouping in five chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)ranging from 1 to 4 years of age. I recorded subjects' spontaneous interactions with groups of objects, noting the spatial
relations in the groupings and the constructive processes that the subjects adopted. Though one subject developed vertical
stacks, none of them realized horizontal alignments or spatial correspondences between groups. All subjects showed consistent
trends in their constructive processes toward manipulating objects in relation to the body: they increasingly manipulated
objects globally, that is to say, they moved or held objects together with the same part of the body. They also increasingly
placed objects on the body or in correspondence to their symmetrical body parts. The increasing importance assigned by chimpanzees
to body- object relations over object- object relations contrasts with human developmental trends in the domain of manipulative
space.
Research on social learning may be of use in the conservation of primates, especially great apes, through (a) promoting their public image, (b) identifying specific adaptations, and (c) devising reintroduction training programs. We surveyed all the instigated social learning studies in primates published since 1950 in order to assess their usefulness to devise reintroduction training programs. We identified 99 publications containing 130 data sets from 27 species of primates. Great apes produced significantly more positive social learning effects than either cercopithecines or cebids. There was also an enhanced social learning effect when skilled demonstrators were used. Our survey indicates that the scientific understanding of many aspects of primate social learning relevant to conservation, including its function, learning spatial route plotting, food and sleeping site location, predator avoidance and detection, and the effect of model and tutee status, would benefit from greater research. Future instigated studies on primate social learning would be most informative for reintroduction if they included ecologically valid tasks presented to ≥2 similarly composed social groups, one of which functioned as a control, i.e., without being exposed to a model.
This chapter provides history of the ape language research, indicating past and current work. It raises some relevant theoretical issues and relates the research to investigations or issues in the fields of experimental and developmental psychology, linguistic analysis, anthropology, and ethology. The ape language projects are best considered in their relation to the issue of mental continuity between man and animal. They reveal a potential bridge between ape abilities that may be precursors to man's linguistic and cognitive abilities. Communicative media utilized in the projects are hand signing. The signing projects, pioneered by the Gardners, have the advantage that the full repertoire of vocabulary items is available to the apes at all times. Therefore, the apes have more opportunity for creative productions to describe and name objects and events in the environment and, potentially, to create grammatically novel sentences. The signing projects share a number of methodological and interpretative problems. The chapter discusses some of the difficulties related to the process of acquiring data, such as the use of daily diaries, the procedures for conducting reliability tests, and anecdotal reporting of novel word use and combinations.
Studied Piagetian causality in a 2.6-yr-old male and a 1.1-yr-old female chimpanzee. Tasks were administered every 6 mo, 3 times for the female and 2 times for the male. Data show that tests of causality are adaptable to chimpanzees. Responses similar to those of human infants were observed. In the female, it was possible to observe a developmental sequence from Stage IV to VI of sensorimotor development of causality. Both Ss reached Stage VI. Attainment of mental representation is discussed. (French abstract) (22 ref)
Characteristics of object manipulation are discussed for the sensori-motor intelligence of human and non-human primates. The generality of the concept of object permanence, as well as the complex level of spatial relations realized by non-human primates, requires a separation between these behaviors and social acquisitions like imitation and combinatorial play. The human specificity of complex object manipulation is recognized and assessed by comparing differ-ences in functioning of the maturing brain of human infants with other primates. Other peculiarities of the human environment and training which act upon the social and cognitive development of the infant are also identified. It is hypothesized that these maturational characteristics play a major role in the emergence, stabilization and differentiation of the forms of object manipulations. This paper advocate that complex manipulative behaviors be considered in the assessruent of similarities and differences between man and other primates.
Investigated the development of the object concept in 3 infant male squirrel monkeys as it related to response training in a Wisconsin General Test Apparatus. Piaget's methods for testing children were adapted to produce 2 behavioral tests: an object-permanence task and an object-overpermanence task. Results support the following conclusions: (a) the typical Wisconsin General Test Apparatus response-training procedures assume that the S, from the outset, has a fully developed object concept; (b) the object concept develops in the infant squirrel monkey; and (c) the development of object permanence in the infant squirrel monkey generally follows along the sequence described by Piaget. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Videotapes of play behavior were made each month for a year at the homes of 5 girls, ages 14–19 mo. S's play with a standard set of toys was scored using a scale of 8 categories of realism vs symbolism based on Piaget's description of the process of cognitive development. Ss' play progressed from realistic to symbolic stages at different ages, but followed the same orderly sequence of stages. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Investigated the development of object permanance in a longitudinal study of 2 infant rhesus monkeys in 1 human and 2 subhuman analog testing situations. The ages at which certain object-related behaviors were demonstrated by the Ss as stable responses were found by the presentation of tasks that involved various manipulations of objects. In each testing situation a sequence of development of object permanence was found that was very similar to the one described by J. Piaget for the child, and in each case the sequence culminated in behaviors nearly as complex as those described by Piaget for the 2-yr-old human infant. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Object permanence was assessed for cats and dogs, using tasks analogous to those typically employed for human infants. Neither
species solved all of the problems correctly when rewarded only by the discovery of a hidden toy. However, both species showed
that they had fully developed concepts of object permanence when the problems were changed so that the animals had to search
for hidden food in an odor-control procedure. These results indicate that sensorimotor intelligence is completely developed
in these nonprimates.
Sixty-four infants, eight boys and eight girls at each of four ages, months, were observed during a 15-minute free play session. Three types of play (stereotypical, relational, and functional) and the number of appropriate uses for specific realistic toys were recorded. Stereotypical play (87% of total active play at months) gave way to relational (35% at months) and functional play (52% at months) as the dominant activity. Both functional play and the number of different appropriate uses of toys were rare at months, appeared reliably at months and increased lineraly through months. A change in the quality of play from indiscriminate mouthing, waving, banging, and fingering of objects to the matching of appropriate uses for a large array of toys indicates that the child's manipulations become more object specific and functional over this 6-month age span. Among possible explanations for the linear increase in the frequency and diversity of appropriate toy uses is the suggestion that an important cognitive change occurs toward the end of the first year of life. A case study is presented to illustrate the application of the play procedure for both assessment and treatment.
This chapter focuses on the biology of symbols. The chapter reviews the stages in the development of tool use in one situation. Rather than describing the sequence of developments in means-end relations from 9 to 13 months in abstract terms, it is more useful to examine the same sequence within a single problem-solving situation, with a task that is eventually solved by many 1-year-olds and by Kohler's chimpanzees—discovery of an intervening support, for example, a stick, to rake in an object that is out of reach. This kind of problem-solving situation requires three phases of analysis: (1) noticing the problem, (2) isolating the missing means, and (3) locating a substitute means. In tool use, where the object must be adequate if the goal is to be met, the set of possible substitutes will usually be maximally constrained. In language, insofar as language is being used as a means to communicative goal, the constraints of the goal situation will depend on the listener's skill in decoding utterances that bear an unconventional relationship to the situation in which they are used.
In this paper we propose a typology for classifying object manipulation and tool use. We then classify tool use as context specific or intelligent tool use on the basis of criteria drawn from Piaget's Sensorimotor Intelligence Series in human infants. In an extension of Hamilton's hypothesis we argue that intelligent tool use and tertiary sensorimotor intelligence in cebus monkeys and great apes is an adaptation for feeding on a variety of seasonally limited embedded food sources, while context specific tool use is an adaptation for feeding on one class of embedded food sources. We also argue that the evolution of specific object manipulation schemata must be considered separately from the evolution of intelligence.
During the first 18 months of life, gorilla and human infants follow much the same course of psychological development, but the nonhumans embark on this sooner, and generally finish sooner. Exceptions to this arise in areas of reciprocal and constructive play with objects, for here, the human subjects excelled and the gorillas appeared to be uninterested.
Pre-verbal, sensory-motor intelligence progresses to where the child needs some kind of representation for further cognitive progress and where his cognitive structures make such representation possible. Observational research shows that early symbolic behaviour occurs only after objects have been endowed with certain physical and conventional properties and after certain kinds of creative organizational behaviour have appeared. The beginnings of language can be studied as part of representational behaviour and may show such object-and subject-oriented duality in lexical and syntactic components.L'intelligence pr-verbale, sensori-motrice, progresse jusqu'au point o une reprsentation devient ncessaire pour que le dveloppement cognitif puisse continuer, et o la structure cognitive rend possible l'avnement de la fonction symbolique. Des recherches montrent que des conduites symboliques s'installent aprs l'attribution aux objets de certaines proprits physiques et conventionnelles et l'apparition d'activits organisatrices. Le langage se prsente comme une des manifestations de la fonction symbolique et peut reflter une orientation bipolaire (vers les objets ou vers le sujet) dans ses composantes lexiques et syntaxiques.
Object-permanence was studied with one chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and two New World monkeys (Lagothrica flavicauda and Cebus capucinus). The chimpanzee and the capucinus attained stage VI, while Lagothrica reached stage Va. The data show that tests of object-permanence are suitable for comparison among species. This study also attempts to propose an experimental scheme that could allow for a more valid comparison among species. Use of an operant conditioning procedure is suggested and discussed.
Thèse (M. Sc.)--Université de Montréal, 1983. "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître ès sciences (M. Sc.)."
Naissance de l'inteUigenee ehez l'enfant baoutd de C~te d'Ivoire
- P Dasen
- B Inhelder
- M Lavall~e
- J Retschitzki
Dasen, P., Inhelder, B., Lavall~e, M. & Retschitzki, J. (1978). Naissance de l'inteUigenee ehez l'enfant baoutd de C~te d'Ivoire. Vienne: Hans Huber.
Intelligence without language: Piagetian assessment of cognitive development in chimpanzce
- Mathieu
Mathieu, M. (1982). Intelligence without language: Piagetian assessment of cognitive development in chimpanzee. Paper presented at the Congress of the International Society of Primatology in Atlanta, August 1982.
La formation du symbole chez l'enfant. Paris: Delachaux et Niestl~ La psychologie de l'enfant. Collection Que sais-je? Paris: Presses
- J Piaget
Piaget, J. (1945). La formation du symbole chez l'enfant. Paris: Delachaux et Niestl~. Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. (1966). La psychologie de l'enfant. Collection Que sais-je? Paris: Presses Universitaire de France.
Language in the great apes: a critical review The transition from sensory-motor behaviour to symbolic activity
- C S Ristau
- D Robbins
Ristau, C. S. & Robbins, D. (1982). Language in the great apes: a critical review. In (J. S. Rosenblatt, R. A. Hinde, C. Beer & M. C. Busnel, Eds) Advances in the Study of Behavior, Vol. 12, pp. 141-255. New York: Academic Press. Sinclair, H. (1970). The transition from sensory-motor behaviour to symbolic activity. Interchange 1, 119-126.
Les b~bgs et les choses
- H Sinclair
- M Stambak
- I L6zine
- S Rayna
- M Verba
Sinclair, H., Stambak, M., L6zine, I., Rayna, S. & Verba, M. (1982). Les b~bgs et les choses. Paris: Presses Universitaire de France.