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Abstract

If people favor their ingroup, are especially concerned with their own group, and attribute different essences to different groups, itfollows that their essence must be superior to the essence of other groups. Intelligence, language, and certain emotions are all considered to be distinctive elements ofhuman nature or essence. The role ofintelligence and language in discrimination, prejudice, and racism has already been largely investigated, and this article focuses on attributed emotions. Specifically, we investigate the idea that secondary emotions are typically human characteristics, and as such, they should be especially associated with and attributed to the ingroup. Secondary emotions may even be denied to outgroups. These differential associations and attributions of specifically human emotions to ingroups versus outgroups should affect intergroup relations. Results from several initial experiments are summarized that support our reasoning. This emotional approach to prejudice and racism is contrasted with more classic, cognitive perspectives.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright ©2000. All Rights Reserved.
... I nfrahumanization, the subtle perception of out-group members as less human than ingroup members, is crucial due to its prevalence and impact on intergroup relations. It provides insights into how individuals dehumanize others, who are dehumanized, and the situational factors promoting such perceptions (Haslam and Loughnan, 2014;Leyens et al., 2000). ...
... The attribution of less humanity to other people and groups is a phenomenon of research interest (Caesens et al., 2017;Haslam et al., 2008;Haslam and Loughnan, 2014;Leyens et al., 2007). The main hypothesis of the theory of infrahumanization is based on the different attribution of primary and secondary emotions to members of an outgroup and claims that people attribute more "secondary emotions" or humanity to their group, compared to the outgroup, to which they restrict the possibility of experiencing these human emotions (Caesens et al., 2017;Haslam and Loughnan, 2014;Leyens et al., 2000;Leyens et al., 2001). This is because "secondary emotions" are a type of emotions that underlie emotional states which are particular to human beings, for example, happiness, pride, or spite. ...
... Research on intergroup infrahumanization examines how people tend to attribute more humanity, particularly secondary emotions, to their ingroup while excluding these emotions from the outgroup. Key characteristics include its subtlety (Leyens et al., 2000), and dependence on the context of the outgroup, with a stronger association between secondary emotions and the ingroup in pleasant contexts compared to unpleasant ones (Leyens et al., 2001). Familiarity with a context also influences infrahumanization, as the outgroup is more likely to be infrahumanized in a familiar context (Delgado Rodríguez et al., 2012;Arriagada-Venegas et al., 2021a, 2021bAriño-Mateo et al., 2024). ...
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Infrahumanization means considering the other or the outgroup as less human than oneself or the ingroup. However, little attention has been given to the variables that determine the selection of which outgroups may be subjected to infrahumanization and the variables that might be moderating this process. This research aims to analyze the role that the relationship with the outgroup plays in the attribution of secondary emotions and the moderator role of organizational dehumanization. Participants (N = 338 students) completed a structured questionnaire that took 15 min. The results show that there is an attribution of humanity to the outgroup when the relationship between ingroup and outgroup is closer. Furthermore, organizational dehumanization had a moderator role between the relationship with the outgroup and the infrahumanization, which shows that when the ingroup perceives that it is being dehumanized by its organization, it attributes less humanity to the outgroup. Our research extends the theoretical understanding of infrahumanization and suggests that the relationship between the outgroup and the organizational dehumanization impacts the attribution of humanity.
... Conversely, when participants were forced to process faces in a piecemeal fashion by presenting them inverted faces, these faces were less often categorized as human and ascribed fewer humanrelated traits (Hugenberg et al., 2016). This perceptual dehumanization (Fincher et al., 2017) could be seen as a face perception variant of infrahumanization, which is more commonly operationalized as ascription of less secondary (i.e., uniquely human) emotions to outgroups than to ingroups (Leyens et al., 2000). Thus, the other-race effect could also be associated with a humanization disadvantage in the perception of Black faces in the ascription of secondary emotions. ...
... For the infrahumanization measure, participants were shown each portrait and asked, "To what extent is this person, in general, likely to experience the following emotions?" (Leyens et al., 2000). Then, they rated the portrait on four primary (fear, panic, happiness, excitement) and four secondary emotions (shame, hope, melancholy, regret) on 7-point Likert scales from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much (Bilewicz et al., 2011). ...
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White people confuse Black faces more than their own-race faces. This is an example of the other-race effect, commonly measured by the other-race face recognition task. Like this task, the “Who said what?” paradigm uses within-race confusions in memory, but to measure social categorization strength. The former finds a strongly asymmetrical pattern of interrace perception, the other-race effect, yet the latter usually finds symmetrical patterns (equally strong categorization of own-race and other-race faces). In a “Who said what?” meta-analysis, racial categorization and individuation across races were only weakly asymmetrical (Study 1, n = 2,669). We aimed to resolve this empirical misalignment. As tested in other-race face recognition tasks, the weak asymmetry was not due to the limited number of portrait stimuli (Study 2, N = 99) nor to the longer duration of stimulus presentation in the “Who said what?” task (Study 4, n = 358). Pairing portraits with statements reduced the other-race effect (Study 3, n = 126). Showing each portrait repeatedly also reduced the other-race effect (Study 4, n = 358; Study 5, n = 470) but did not decrease infrahumanization of Black portraits (Study 6, n = 487). Consequently, presenting portraits only once in the “Who said what?” paradigm (Study 7, N = 112) resulted in strong interrace categorization and individuation asymmetries. This finding bridges a central conceptual gap between the other-race effect and social categorization strength.
... -Granit Kurti, Kosovo-Albanian journalist (2022) In post-conflict societies, intergroup relations are shaped profoundly by societal beliefs, group-based emotions, and episodes of violence between groups (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2007b. The enduring impact of past conflicts, including war and human loss, fosters widespread dehumanization, where people are motivated to consider outgroup members (i.e., former opponents) as inferior human beings-a process known as blatant dehumanization (Borinca et al., 2024;Borinca et al., 2023;Haslam, 2015)-and deny their capability to experience emotions unique to humans-a process known as infrahumanization (Čehajić et al., 2009;Castano and Giner-Sorrolla, 2006;Leyens et al., 2000). Therefore, social psychological interventions such as meta-humanization-the belief that outgroup members humanize one's ingroup (Borinca, Tropp, and Ofosu, 2021;Kteily, et al., 2016: Pavetich andStathi, 2021)-are necessary to reduce infrahumanization and blatant dehumanization in order to enhance conciliatory attitudes and intergroup negotiations. ...
... We assessed the attribution of secondary emotions to the outgroup with a six-item scale adapted from Č ehajić et al. (2009) and Kteily et al. (2015). Because secondary emotions occur independently of valence (e.g., Haslam and Loughnan, 2014;Leyens et al., 2000), we asked participants to indicate only the extent to which they associate various secondary emotions with the outgroup in general (e.g., Č ehajić et al., 2009;Castano and Giner-Sorrolla, 2006). We presented them with six secondary emotions balanced by valence: three positive emotions (i.e., compassion, tenderness, hope; α = 0.89; M = 3.84, SD = 1.96) and three negative ones (bitterness, contempt, and guilt; α = 0.79; M = 4.78, SD = 1.70). ...
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Relations between groups are particularly sensitive in post-conflict societies where tensions persist, and reconciliation remains unlikely. The present research investigated whether believing or learning that an outgroup humanizes the ingroup (i.e., meta-humanization) enhances conciliatory attitudes and intergroup negotiations. In three studies conducted in the post-conflict context of Kosovo (N = 1,407), we investigated whether metahumanization, in comparison to meta-dehumanization (i.e., the belief that outgroups dehumanize the ingroup) or a control condition wherein no information related to (de)humanization is provided, impacts various intergroup outcomes through the attribution of secondary emotions (i.e., the tendency to deny outgroups the capability to experience human emotions) and blatant dehumanization (i.e., the tendency to overtly or explicitly regard outgroup members as being less than fully human). Using correlational data, Study 1 revealed that blatant dehumanization, but not the attribution of secondary emotions, mediated the effect of meta-humanization on conciliatory attitudes, including support for the outgroup, openness to future contact, and feelings of peace with outgroup members. However, this pattern did not extend to intergroup negotiation, as none of the indirect effects through both the attribution of secondary emotions and blatant dehumanization were significant. Using experimental data, Study 2 demonstrated that participants in the meta-humanization condition exhibited lower levels of blatant dehumanization towards the outgroup, increased support for the outgroup, greater openness to intergroup contact, and reported feeling more at peace with outgroup members compared to those in both the meta-dehumanization and control conditions. However, participants in the meta-dehumanization and control conditions showed greater support for intergroup negotiation than those in the meta-humanization condition. Moreover, Study 2 indicated that blatant dehumanization, rather than the attribution of secondary emotions, mediated the effect of meta-humanization on all these outcomes—except for intergroup negotiations. Finally, Study 3 replicated the findings observed in Study 2 regarding the effect of meta-humanization (vs. metadehumanization and control) on conciliatory attitudes and intergroup negotiation while controlling for metaprejudice. Furthermore, Study 3 revealed that both blatant dehumanization and the attribution of secondary emotions mediated the effects of meta-humanization on all these outcomes. In sum, this set of studies shows that meta-humanization promotes reconciliation, especially via reduced blatant dehumanization, but these beneficial effects do not extend to support for intergroup negotiation.
... An example of the former is the study by Roccas, Klar and Liviatan (2006), in which the separation of attachment and glorification was complemented by considering the nature of intensity, thus interpreting the pattern of group identification in a four-dimensional typology. 3 In the latter case, Leyens et al. investigated an extreme form of devaluation of external groups, the phenomenon of infrahumanisation, and the associated exculpatory (and selfjustifying) strategy (Leyens, Paladino et al., 2000). ...
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Balázs Kézdi, in his work entitled Identity and Culture (2001), draws attention to the fact that the concept of identity is ambiguous and overdetermined not only in social science discourse but also in psychology because the concepts of "self" and selfdefinition are often mixed up with the concepts of self-definition. Different theories emphasise different characteristics depending on whether the self is a personal or a social self-definition and whether the process of identification is interpreted as static or situational. Over the last few decades, the psychological literature on identity has increasingly emphasised the narrative nature of identity. This means that people form their interpretations of the world through narratives (including self-narratives), and these narratives are inseparable from the concept of self-determination (László, 2005). The following paper discusses the particular case of collective identity and significant group identification, including the issue of national identity and the role of collective memories. Accordingly, it focuses first on the psychological and cultural approach to the process of peer self-determination, followed by the group history and the resulting theoretical considerations.
... This demarcation, which resonates with findings that robots are typically perceived as out-group members by humans (e.g., [47]), may point to a form of 'synthetic otherism' that highlights the distinctiveness of human nature. Outgroup members are frequently attributed fewer uniquely human characteristics [48][49][50]. ...
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Using the N400 component of event-related brain potentials, a neurophysiological marker associated with processing incongruity, we examined brain responses to sentences spoken by a robot that had no arms or legs. Statements concerning physically impossible actions (e.g., knitting) elicit significant N400 responses, reflecting that participants perceived these statements as incongruent with the robot’s physical condition. However, this effect was attenuated for participants who indicated that the robot could have hidden limbs, indicating that expectations modify the way an agent’s utterances are interpreted. When it came to statements relating to emotional capabilities a distinct pattern was found. Although participants acknowledged that the robot could have emotions, there were significant N400 responses to statements about the robot’s emotional experiences (e.g., feeling happy). This effect was not modified by participants’ beliefs, suggesting a cognitive challenge of accepting robots as capable of experiencing emotions. Our findings thus point to a boundary in human acceptance of artificial social agents: while physical attributes may be negotiable based on expectations, emotional expressions are more difficult to establish as credible. By elucidating the cognitive mechanisms at play, our study informs the design of social robots that are capable of more effective communication to better support social connectivity and human well-being.
... It may seem extreme, but dehumanization is a common process in our daily lives and does not apply only to violent conflicts; dehumanization can also occur in interpersonal contexts (Bastian et al. 2014;Leyens et al. 2000). Bastian and Haslam (2010) found that victims of ostracism saw their perpetrators as less human when they were asked to recall a situation in which a person socially excluded them in contrast to the memory of everyday interaction with another person. ...
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Humans are social creatures who need to respect certain norms and practice social responsibility for the well-being of everyone, but many people transgress these norms. Behaving uncivilly may lead to the transgressor being seen as someone unable to live in society and not as human as others. However, not all transgressors are perceived and evaluated equally. The purpose of this research was to verify the relationship between incivility and lack of humanness, and identify how racial belonging influences the perception of uncivil transgressors. In three studies (N = 450), we wanted to confirm the association between (in)civility with blatant and covert dehumanization and explore how the racial belonging of uncivil agents may affect the way they are perceived. Results show that the agents who behave uncivilly are dehumanized blatantly and covertly (Study 1). Additionally, White uncivil agents are perceived and evaluated more harshly than Black uncivil agents by people of their same racial group (Study 2a). Additionally, Black uncivil agents were dehumanized less than White uncivil agents by people of their same racial group (Study 2b). Our findings confirm the relationship between incivility and lack of humanness and show a racial bias is present in the application of social norms.
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Within the cognitive paradigm, metaphors are said to play a key role “not just in language but in thought and action” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: p. 3). As a form of action, genocide in recent human history has been incited by metaphor, with Holocaust Jews as “parasites” (Musolff 2010), Iraqis as “rapists” (Lakoff 1991), Rwandan Tutsis as “cockroaches” (Hintjens 1999; Mowarin 2014), Bosnians as “Islamic fundamentalists” (Karčić 2022), etc. The aim of the present study is to investigate the ongoing genocide committed by Israel against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip by bringing political ideology to bear on cognition both in thought and action (Gibbs 2017). In particular, it will be shown that the conceptual metaphor POLITICS IS RELIGION (Charteris-Black 2004) in the Christian Zionists’ in-group’s socio-cultural cognition, acts in tandem with and motivates the “animalized dehumanization” (Sevillano and Fiske 2023) of Palestinians. Such an ideology, which is tainted by psychological essentialism (Leyens et al. 2001) of the Jews supremacy, is instrumentalizing the deliberate, superordinate conceptual metaphor (Steen 2023) HUMANS ARE ANIMALS and other basic-level metaphors such as PALESTINIANS ARE RATS, ANTS and COCKROACHES, therefore stripping the Palestinian outgroup of their humanity (Leyens et al. 2000; Leyens et al. 2003; Haslam 23.2.2024, 2006; Haslam, Loughnan and Sun 2011; Harris and Fiske 2011) in order to legitimize the Palestinian genocide. Animalized dehumanization, which is a blue print for genocide, will be accounted for using Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) Conceptual Theory of Metaphor together with Lakoff and Turner’s (1989) Great Chain of Being Metaphor.
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This article aims to critically discuss racial categorizations by problematizing (1) their nature, namely through an ontologically based discussion; (2) their genealogy, using a historically oriented critique and (3) the problems posed by their current applications, which means taking into account their identificatory breadth. Consequently, the article advances three overarching claims that question the use of racial categories: (1) they represent the legacy of a complex system institutionalizing the notion of race, which initially led to economic separation and subsequently pseudo-scientifically categorized populations for the purposes of subjugation and exploitation; (2) even with the provision for self-identification, the employed categories are those that sustained a colonial structure, and the apparent autonomy implied by the suffix ‘self’ effectively aligns with these existing structures in operational terms and (3) they run counter to the prevailing trend embracing multiplicity and the ‘trans’ suffix as a means of transcending hyphenated identities.
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Dans la mesure où la place des robots sociaux croît rapidement, leur intégration soulève des questions d’actualité à la fois psychologiques, sociales et éthiques. Cet article propose une réflexion sur les enjeux de leur adoption. Conçue pour accompagner et soulager, leur adoption donne lieu à des bénéfices notables dans différents domaines. Leurs avantages demeurent toutefois insuffisants pour compenser les menaces qu’ils représentent et les freins possibles à leur adoption. Les déterminants et les conséquences des avantages, menaces, freins et dérives sont individuels, sociaux, sociétaux. L’objectif de cette réflexion est double : d’une part, s’interroger sur les enjeux à ne pas les utiliser et, d’autre part, mieux comprendre les risques et dérives afférents à leur introduction. Ce double objectif s’inscrit dans une réflexion sur ce qui est accepté et sur ce qui est acceptable en matière de robotique sociale.
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Social psychology has devoted much effort to the exploration of various social representations in the form of beliefs and attitudes, which serve to characterize social categories of individuals within the context of intergroup relations (Hamilton, 1981; Stephan, 1985). One outcome of this effort has been extensive study of two social representations — stereotypes and prejudice. Stereotypes are beliefs about another group in such terms as personality traits, attributions, or behavioral descriptions (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Hamilton, 1981). Prejudice refers to negative attitudes toward another group that express negative affective or emotional reactions (Allport, 1954; Jones, 1972; Pettigrew, 1971; Stephan, 1985). Both categories, being loosely defined, are highly general concepts that lack explicit specifications regarding their outcomes in terms of the nature of intergroup relations. Thus, the contents of stereotypes are of a wide scope, ranging from descriptions with negative to positive connotations (e.g., lazy, superstitious, industrious, shrewd — see Katz & Braly, 1933). Likewise, although the conception of prejudice implies negative affective reaction, it does not specify the intensity of such reactions, and, therefore, may range from mildly to extremely negative. In addition, the two concepts focus mainly on cognitive and affective components of intergroup relations, and do not necessarily specify their role in guiding actual behavior towards the other group.
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Throughout our history, white Americans have singled out Afro-Americans for particularly racist treatment. Of all the many immigrant nationalities that have come to these shores since the seventeenth century, Afro-Americans have consistently attracted the greatest prejudice based on their group membership and have been treated in the most categorically unequal fashion.
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