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Klein Heidelberg–a WW2 bistatic radar system that was decades ahead of its time

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Abstract

We present a description and analysis of the German WW2 bistatic radar system Klein Heidelberg. A brief account is given of the nature of the electronic war between the Allied bomber aircraft and the German air defence system, to show the context in which the Klein Heidelberg system evolved. This is followed by a description of the development of Klein Heidelberg, a technical description, and an assessment of its performance. Next, a discussion of its operational significance, of what happened after WW2, and finally some conclusions and some lessons learned that may be relevant to the development of present-day bistatic radar systems. In particular, we show that its performance was impressive, yielding detection ranges of Allied bombers in excess of 300 km, but that it became operational too late to make any significant difference to the course of WW2. 1. CONTEXT The term bistatic refers to a radar in which the transmitter and receiver are in separate locations (Figure 1). In practice this means that they are separated by a considerable distance, usually understood to be of the order of the target range, so as to distinguish it from smaller separations designed only for receiver isolation from the transmit signal, and this gives bistatic radars some different and distinct properties compared to conventional monostatic radars [2, 3]. Bistatic radar is presently a subject of significant interest and research in many countries worldwide, which is reflected in the large volume of publications in academic journals and at conferences.

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Article
Unless the separation between transmitter and receiver is small compared with ranges of interest, bistatic radars have a number of properties which differ significantly from the monostatic equivalents. Some of these produce operational advantages which provide a motivation for deployment, while others merely bring trouble and expense. The paper considers the basic bistatic properties which depend on the target range and direction relative to the baseline. Appropriate formulas are given and comparisons with monostatic radar are made, pictorially wherever possible. The topics covered are (i) the lower-level cover obtained on a curved earth, (ii) contours of constant `range¿ and echo power, (iii) the effects of beamwidths on resolution cells and the permissible pulse repetition frequency (PRF), and (iv) the width and direction of the receiving arc.
Article
We present a description and analysis of the German WW2 bistatic radar system Klein Heidelberg (KH). A brief account is given of the nature of the electronic war between the Allied bombers and the German air defense system, to show the context in which the KH system evolved. This is followed by a description of the development of KH, a technical description, and an assessment of its performance. Next, a discussion of its operational significance, of what happened after WW2, and finally some conclusions and some lessons learned that may be relevant to the development of present-day bistatic radar systems. In particular, we show that its performance was impressive, yielding detection ranges of Allied bombers in excess of 300 km, but that it became operational too late in WW2 to significantly improve German air defense operations.
Article
In the planning of Operation Overlord, the D-day invasion of 1944, it was essential that the enemy should be deceived regarding the time and place of the sea-borne assault. Deception plans ensured that the enemy's forces were deployed in several possible invasion zones so as to minimise the expected opposition to the invasion. Many of the deception plans were highly effective. Of particular note, radio technology enabled the German early warning radar system to be almost completely paralysed, and led to the simulation of invasion convoys heading for the Boulogne and the Fe´camp regions of France to create confusion as to the places of the real landings. It is remarkable that, though the planning of Overlord and the assembly of the vast forces of men and materials necessary for its implementation occupied many months, the invasion should come on the enemy as a surprise both in time and place. This paper considers some aspects of the art and technology of deception as applied to safeguard the Allied invasion of France in June 1994
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