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Government vs. Private Control, Political Loans, and the Privatization of Korean Banks
Abstract
This paper compares the performance of banks with and without effective government control in appointment of chief operating officers in Korea using panel data. A privatization program succeeded in spreading ownership of banks widely among the public. Government retention of an ownership stake in an institution meant de facto control by government, decision-making subject to political objectives, and lack of government respect for investors' property rights following privatization. A model is presented in which political loans are a constraint on banks subject to government control. It is found that banks controlled by government, despite charging lower loan rates, experienced disproportionately bad loan performance, and were inefficient compared to privately controlled banks.
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The authors study the political economy of bank privatization in Argentina. The results of their study strongly support the hypothesis that political incentives affect the likelihood of privatization. They find that: a) provinces whose governors belonged to the fiscally conservative Partido Justicialista were more likely to privatize; b) fiscal and economic crises increased the likelihood of privatization; and c) poorly performing banks were more likely to be privatized. They tested the hypotheses for a specific industry in a specific country, making it possible to control for enterprise performance and institutional characteristics. It seems reasonable to expect that similar results might hold in other industries and countries.
Agency issues associated with different types of firm ownership are an area of concern in many banking systems where state-owned banks operate alongside mutual and private-sector institutions. This paper uses a variety of approaches to model cost and profit inefficiencies as well as technical change for different ownership types in the German banking market. We find little evidence to suggest that privately owned banks are more efficient than their mutual and public-sector counterparts. While all three bank ownership types benefit from widespread economies of scale, inefficiency measures indicate that public and mutual banks have slight cost and profit advantages over their private sector competitors.
In this paper, we investigate a neglected aspect of financial systems of many countries around the world; government ownership of banks. We assemble data which establish four findings. First, government ownership of banks is large and pervasive around the world. Second, such ownership is particularly significant in countries with low levels of per capita income, underdeveloped financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Third, government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development. Finally, government ownership of banks is associated with lower subsequent growth of per capita income, and in particular with lower growth of productivity rather than slower factor accumulation. This evidence is inconsistent with the optimistic "development" theories of government ownership of banks common in the 1960s, but supports the more recent "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
Based upon results from country case studies, many researchers have claimed that political constraints affect bank privatization transactions, which in turn affect the postprivatization performance of the banking sector. However, no paper has either econometrically tested how political constraints affect bank privatization transactions or theoretically modeled the privatization transaction. In this paper, we present a simple theoretical framework which models the inherent tradeoffs faced by governments and potential buyers in privatization transactions involving banks. The potential buyer is concerned about the probability that the bank will remain solvent, the profits that it will earn following privatization and the price paid for the assets and liabilities. In addition to price received for the assets, the government is concerned about layoffs and service coverage follo wing privatization. We apply this framework to study provincial bank privatization transactions in Argentina, finding that contract features varied systematically with some factors captured in the theoretical model. In particular, provinces with high fiscal deficits were willing to accept layoffs and to guarantee a larger part of the privatized bank's portfolio in return for a higher price.
In this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm.1 In addition to tying together elements of the theory of each of these three areas, our analysis casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature, such as the definition of the firm, the “separation of ownership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an optimal capital structure, the specification of the content of credit agreements, the theory of organizations, and the supply side of the completeness-of-markets problem.
The banking panic of 1930 has special significance for assessing the causal role of money during the Great Depression. A detailed examination of the panic-induced bank closings in November reveals that poor loans and investments in the 1920s was the principal factor contributing to the accelerated rate of bank suspensions. These findings are consistent with the. Friedman-Schwartz interpretation of the 1930 banking panic as a purely autonomous disturbance largely unrelated to the decline in economic activity. It is inconsistent with Peter Temin's conjecture that declining prices of lower-grade corporate bonds and the agricultural situation played an important causal role.
New panel data for a large random sample of Estonian firms are used to examine the incidence and dynamics of ownership structures that have occurred since privatization. While there is much path dependence in ownership structures, considerable changes in ownership have also taken place. Econometric findings indicate that (i) inertia in ownership distributions is important, (ii) big firms and capital intensive firms are more likely to be owned by outsiders, (iii) economic performance does not play a decisive role, and (iv) large minority ownership stakes increase the probability that initial majority ownership will change, and, compared to minority ownership by insiders, when outsiders acquire minority ownership positions they are much more likely to eventually assume majority ownership. These results do not confirm the view that there would be a rapid movement toward efficient ownership structures, which underlies much conventional theory on privatization.J. Comp. Econom., September 1999, 27(3), pp. 422–441. Hamilton College, Clinton, New York 13323; and Center for East European Studies, Copenhagen Business School, Dalgas Have 15, 2000, Frederiksburg, Denmark.
Although case studies suggest that political constraints affect bank privatization transactions, these constraints have been neither theoretically modeled nor econometrically tested. This paper presents a simple model of the tradeoffs governments and buyers face during these transactions. In addition to price, the buyer is concerned about solvency and profitability following privatization. Similarly, politicians are concerned about layoffs and service coverage. We apply the framework to provincial bank privatizations in Argentina, finding that provinces with fiscal problems were willing to accept more layoffs and guarantee more of the privatized bank's portfolio in return for a higher price.
Economists have long been concerned with the incentive problems that arise when decision making in a firm is the province of managers who are not the firm's security holders. One outcome has been the development of “behavioral” and “managerial” theories of the firm which reject the classical model of an entrepreneur, or owner-manager, who single-mindedly operates the firm to maximize profits, in favor of theories that focus more on the motivations of a manager who controls but does not own and who has little resemblance to the classical “economic man.” Examples of this approach are Baumol (1959), Simon (1959), Cyert and March (1963), and Williamson (1964b). More recently the literature has moved toward theories that reject the classical model of the firm but assume classical forms of economic behavior on the part of agents within the firm. The firm is viewed as a set of contracts among factors of production, with each factor motivated by its self-interest. Because of its emphasis on the importance of rights in the organization established by contracts, this literature is characterized under the rubric “property rights.” Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976b) are the best examples. The antecedents of their work are in Coase (1937, 1960). The striking insight of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976b) is in viewing the firm as a set of contracts among factors of production.
This paper compares the performance of privatized and state firms in the transition economies of Central Europe, while controlling
for various forms of selection bias. It argues that privatization has different effects depending on the types of owners to
whom it gives control. In particular, privatization to outsider, but not insider, owners has significant performance effects.
Where privatization is effective, the effect on revenue performance is very pronounced, but there is no comparable effect
on cost reduction. Overlooking the strong revenue effect of privatization to outsider owners leads to a substantial overstatement
of potential employment losses from postprivatization restructuring.
There has been a notable debate in the banking literature on the impact of bank competition on financial stability. While the dominant view sees a detrimental impact of competition on the stability of banks, this view has recently been challenged by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) who see the reverse effect. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this literature by providing the first empirical investigation of the role of bank competition on the occurrence of bank failures. We analyze this issue based on a large sample of Russian banks over the period 2001-2007 and in line with the previous literature we employ the Lerner index as the metric of bank competition. Our findings clearly support the view that tighter bank competition enhances the occurrence of bank failures. The normative implication of our findings is therefore that measures that increase bank competition could undermine financial stability.
The process of selling assests and enterprises to the private sector raises questions about natural monopolies, the efficiency and equity of state-owned versus privately owned enterprises, and industrial policy. This comprehensive analysis of the British privatization program explores these questions both theoretically and empirically.
A speech given at the Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, May 15, 1986
This study compares the pre- and postprivatization financial and operating performance of sixty-one companies from eighteen countries and thirty-two industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990. The authors' results document strong performance improvements, achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security. Specifically, after being privatized, firms increase real sales, become more profitable, increase their capital investment spending, improve their operating efficiency, and increase their work forces. Furthermore, these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout. Finally, the authors document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization. Copyright 1994 by American Finance Association.
This study surveys the literature examining the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) We review the history of privatization, the theoretical and empirical evidence on the relative performance of state owned and privately owned firms, the types of privatization, if and by how much privatization has improved the performance of former SOEs in non-transition and transition countries, how investors in privatizations have fared, and the impact of privatization on the development of capital markets and corporate governance. In most settings privatization "works" in that the firms become more efficient, more profitable, and financially healthier, and reward investors.
This paper was developed with financial support from the SBF Bourse de Paris and the New York Stock Exchange, and the assistance of George Sofianos, Bill Tschirhart, and Didier Davidoff is gratefully acknowledged. We appreciate comments received on this paper from Anthony Boardman, Bernardo Bortolotti, Narjess Boubakri, JeanClaude Cosset, Kathy Dewenter, Alexander Dyck, Ivan Ivanov, Ranko Jelic, Claude Laurin, Marc Lipson, Luis Lopez-Calva, John McMillan (the editor), Harold Mulherin, Rob Nash, John Nellis, David Newberry, David Parker, Enrico Perotti, Annette Poulsen, Ravi Ramamurti, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Nemat Shafik, Mary Shirley, Aidan Vining and three anonymous referees. Additionally, we appreciate comments received from participants at the NYSE/Paris Bourse Global Equity Markets conference (Paris, December 1998), the Harvard Institute for International Development Privatization Workshop (June 2000), the International Federation of Stock Exchanges' Third Global Emerging Markets Conference (Istanbul, April 2000), four World Bank and/or International Finance Corporation meetings, two OECD conferences (Paris and Beijing), the 1999 Conference on Privatization and the Kuwaiti Economy in the Next Century, the 1998 Financial Management Association meeting, the 1999 European Financial Management Association meeting, the Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FFEM), the Swiss Banking Institute and Credit Suisse, and seminars at the City University Business School (London), London Guildhall University and the University of Oklahoma. All remaining errors are the authors' alone. Please address correspondence to: William L. Megginson Price College of Business 307 West Brooks, 205A Adams Hall The University of Oklahoma Norman, OK 73019-4005 Tel: (405) 325-2058; Fax: (405) 325-1957 e-mail:...
This paper analyzes the survival of organizations in which decision agents do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. This is what the literature on large corporations calls separation of "ownership" and "control." Such separation of decision and risk bearing functions is also common to organizations like large professional partnerships, financial mutuals and nonprofits. We contend that separation of decision and risk bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the benefits of specialization of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective common approach to controlling the implied agency problems. In particular, the contract structures of all these organizations separate the ratification and monitoring of decisions from the initiation and implementation of the decisions. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXVI, June 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control * Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen Journal of...
- Kookmin Government
Kookmin
Government (17.08), Korea Inestment Trust
(6.24), Daehan Investment Trust (3.80)
GCB
1995
Long Term Credit Bank (6.57), Dongwon Group (5.80) PCB 1991
- Hana Kyobo Group
Hana
Kyobo Group (6.79), Long Term Credit Bank
(6.57), Dongwon Group (5.80)
PCB
1991
Doosan Group (7.46), Korong Group (5.80) PCB
- Lg Boram
- Group
Boram
LG Group (7.58), Doosan Group (7.46),
Korong Group (5.80)
PCB
1991