Judicial Review in Spain: The Constitutional Court

Abstract

This Article aims to briefly describe and analyze the constitutional conflicts that have arisen in Spain since the establishment of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 (the "Constitution"). In doing so, I will discuss the primary points of contention within the Spanish constitutional model. The objective is to illuminate these issues to readers who are not necessarily familiar with the recent legal-political history of Spain. Part I addresses the introduction of constitutional rights and protections in Spain. Part II then analyzes the aspects of Spain's constitutional system that are affected by its institutional organization. Parts III, IV, and V outline the most important doctrines of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional (the "Constitutional Court" or "Court") regarding the guarantee of a constitutional form of government, the protection of fundamental rights, and the resolution of conflicts between the state and Spain's autonomous communities. Part VI illuminates other significant constitutional issues specific to Spain, such as the government's ability to enact emergency legislation, the constitutional impact of Spain's membership in the European Union, and the effects of the Constitutional Court's decisions. In Part VII, I note some problems that affect the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court but argue in Part VIII that the Court is ultimately a positive and active part of Spain's constitutional system.

Full text

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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SPAIN:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Enrique Guillén López∗
This Article aims to briefly describe and analyze the
constitutional conflicts that have arisen in Spain since the
establishment of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 (the
“Constitution”). In doing so, I will discuss the primary points of
contention within the Spanish constitutional model. The objective is
to illuminate these issues to readers who are not necessarily familiar
with the recent legal-political history of Spain.
Part I addresses the introduction of constitutional rights and
protections in Spain. Part II then analyzes the aspects of Spain’s
constitutional system that are affected by its institutional
organization. Parts III, IV, and V outline the most important
doctrines of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional (the “Constitutional
Court” or “Court”) regarding the guarantee of a constitutional form
of government, the protection of fundamental rights, and the
resolution of conflicts between the state and Spain’s autonomous
communities. Part VI illuminates other significant constitutional
issues specific to Spain, such as the government’s ability to enact
emergency legislation, the constitutional impact of Spain’s
membership in the European Union, and the effects of the
Constitutional Court’s decisions. In Part VII, I note some problems
that affect the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court but argue in
Part VIII that the Court is ultimately a positive and active part of
Spain’s constitutional system.
I. THE INTRODUCTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES IN SPAIN
After General Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, the transition of
Spain’s government to a democracy revealed the need for a system
∗ Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Granada, Spain; e-mail address:
enriqueg@ugr.es.

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of constitutional protections in Spain. While there was interest in
following the traditions of the Second Spanish Republic, which had
relied on an independent Court of Constitutional Guarantees, there
was also a need after Franco’s death for constitutional authority to be
separated from ordinary judicial power. This separate constitutional
body would be able to protect the guarantees of the Constitution in a
similar fashion to the systems of constitutional oversight employed
in Italy and particularly Germany.
These countries simultaneously reintroduced constitutional
democracy after the Second World War with systems that were
influenced by North American constitutionalism.1 Yet, the branch of
government tasked with final constitutional oversight in these
countries was highly influenced by the political theories of Hans
Kelsen,2 who proposed a concentrated-control model quite different
from that used in the United States. The constitutional courts in
these concentrated-control systems are considered fundamental to the
political stability of their respective constitutions3 because they were,
to a large extent, responsible for the social acceptance of these texts
(the so-called “constitutional feeling” in Germany). Consequently,
Spain incorporated a constitutional court into its new political
structure due in part to the extremely positive reception of such
courts in Italy and Germany.
Many scholars have detailed this influence on the development
of the Spanish constitutional system. Eduardo García de Enterría’s
scholarship in particular stands out as an important work on the
symbiotic relationship between Spain’s Constitution and its
1. North American constitutionalism was an important contribution to the reconstruction of
the Atlantic civilization. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 139–78 (1963)
(discussing the influence that the American revolution had on European revolutions and vice
versa and arguing the American revolution was successful in establishing revolutionary liberty
because the colonies engaged in constitution-making immediately following the violent struggle).
2. HANS KELSEN, QUIÉN DEBE SER EL DEFENSOR DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN? (Roberto J. Brie
trans., Tecnos 1995) (1931).
3. It is important not to forget the unusual circumstances in which the Fundamental Law of
Bonn was approved because no referendum was held. Thanks to the Bundesverfassungsgericht
(German Federal Constitution Court) and, especially, thanks to its jurisprudence about
fundamental rights, the German Constitution was considered the property of the German people,
not the product of an occupying power. See PETER HÄBERLE, LA LIBERTAD FUNDAMENTAL EN
EL ESTADO CONSTITUCIONAL 56 (Carlos Ramos trans., fondo Editorial de la Pontíficia 1997)
(1993).

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Constitutional Court.4 Enterría, an enormously prestigious and
important professor of public law,5 provided essential arguments
supporting the necessity of a constitutional court. Indeed, his
commentary on the work of John Hart Ely and Peter Häberle helped
bring Spain into the modern legal debates taking place in the United
States and Europe.6 Following in the wake of Enterría’s scholarship,
other experts in public law have gone even further in examining the
static and dynamic aspects of Spain’s constitutional system.7
II. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE COURT’S ROLE THROUGH THE
CONSTITUTION AND ORGANIC LAW
Once consensus was reached on the importance of a separate
constitutional court in Spain, it was necessary to specify the Court’s
role in the Constitution of 1978. The Constitutional Court appears in
Part IX of the Constitution,8 clearly separated from the general
judicial authority detailed in Part VI.9 This separation of
constitutional oversight from regular judicial power is an important
4. See EDUARDO GARCÍA DE ENTERRÍA, LA CONSTITUCIÓN COMO NORMA Y EL
TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL (Civitas, 3d ed. 1985).
5. Enterría has exceeded the grade of importance usually attributed to the scientific
community. Among his many achievements, Enterria was President of the Board of Experts in
the field of autonomies, which helped guide the first steps of the Spanish federal state in its early
years.
6. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(Harvard Univ. Press 1980); PETER HÄBERLE, DIE VERFASSUNG DES PLURALISMUS: STUDIEN
ZUR VERFASSUNGSTHEORIE DER OFFENEN GESELLSCHAFT (Verlag GmbH 1980).
7. See, e.g., FRANCISCO RUBIO LLORENTE, LA FORMA DEL PODER: ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA
CONSTITUCIÓN (Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993); JAVIER PERÉZ ROYO, TRIBUNAL
CONSTITUCIONAL Y DIVISIÓN DE PODERES (Tecnos, 1988); PEDRO CRUZ VILLALÓN, LA
FORMACIÓN DEL SISTEMA EUROPEO DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD (1987). See also
JAVIER JIMÉNEZ CAMPO, ESCRITOS SOBRE JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL (1998); ENRIQUE
ALONSO GARCÌA, LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN (1984). The reception of foreign
doctrine about constitutional jurisdiction has been consistent until the present with few
interruptions. For representative authors in Spain, see VICTOR FERRERES COMELLA, JUSTICIA
CONSTITUCIONAL Y DEMOCRACIA (Centro de Estudios Polìticos y Constitucionales, 1997);
MIGUEL BELTRÁN DE FELIPE, ORIGINALISMO E INTERPRETACIÓN: DWORKIN V. BORK, UNA
POLÉMICA CONSTITUCIONAL (1989). MARIAN AHUMADA RUIZ, LA JURISDICCÌON
CONSTITUCIONAL EN EUROPA (2005). In addition, see MIGUEL BELTRÁN DE FELIPE ET AL., LAS
SENTENCIAS BÁSICAS DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA (2006).
The study of the more specific aspects of the Spanish Constitution has been carried out by a range
of lecturers linked with the courts in which they have worked as lawyers. See FRANCISCO
CAAMAÑO DOMÌGUEZ ET AL., JURISDICCIÓN Y PROCESSOS CONSTITUCIONALES (1997);
MANUEL PULIDO QUECEDO, LA LEY ORGÁNICA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL: ANOTADA
CON JURISPRUDENCIA (1995).
8. CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] arts. 159–65 (Spain).
9. Id. arts. 117–27.

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feature of the Constitution, demonstrating Spain’s adoption of a
concentrated-control model established according to Kelsenian
principles and similar to the Italian and German models.
In deciding between the vague-control model of the United
States and the European concentrated model, there is no doubt that a
country like Spain, which needed to confirm the fundamental
character of its new democratic Constitution, could not leave the
Constitutional Court in the hands of judicial authorities because
many members of the judiciary had been educated in the legal
dogmas of Franco’s regime.10 However, a system of cooperation was
established between the judicial branch and the Constitutional Court
whereby questions on the constitutionality of laws are submitted to
the Constitutional Court when such issues arise in judicial cases.11
A. Composition, Statute, Term of Office, and Renewal
The Constitutional Court consists of twelve magistrates, one of
whom is the President of the Court.12 The President is an
extraordinarily important figure on the Constitutional Court because
he or she possesses the right to cast the deciding vote in the event of
a tie.13 This places the President in a uniquely powerful position,14
which explains the ongoing battles concerning the appropriate
method for electing the Court’s President.
Article 9 of the Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitutional
(“L.O.T.C.”) [Organic Law of the Constitutional Court] establishes
that the President shall be elected by a majority vote of the members
of the Constitutional Court.15 In the event of a tie, the voting will be
repeated.16 If the tie vote cannot be resolved, the presidency will
pass to the magistrate who has served the longest and, in the event of
equal tenures, the oldest magistrate.17 Recently, a proposal was put
forward to amend the L.O.T.C. to extend the current president’s
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. C.E. art. 163.
12. Id. art. 160.
13. LEY ORGANICA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTIONAL [L.O.T.C.] art. 90 (Spain); see also
Marian Ahumada Ruiz, La regla de la mayoría y la formulación de doctrina constitucional,
REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, Jan.–Apr. 2000, at 155.
14. See infra Part VII.
15. L.O.T.C. art. 9.2
16. Id.
17. Id.

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tenure until after renewal elections for the magistrates, in order to
ensure that the president had the support of a majority of the court.18
This proposal created a significant political storm,19 however,
because the Conservative Party considered it to be an ad hoc measure
to ensure that current President María Emilia Casas, who is felt to be
ideologically linked with the Socialist Party, would still hold the
presidency when the Court hears an upcoming controversial appeal
regarding the Statues of Autonomy,20 allowing her to cast the tie-
breaking vote if necessary.
The magistrates of the Constitutional Court serve nine year
terms of office, and one-third of the Court comes up for renewal
every three years.21 The objective of these rules is to separate the
election of the magistrates from the elections for the legislature in
order to preserve the Constitutional Court’s independence from
politics. With the same aim, the L.O.T.C. also establishes guidelines
under which magistrates should recuse themselves or be barred from
hearing certain cases,22 although the current system sometimes leads
to surprises.
18. Id. Article 16.3 states that magistrates of the Constitutional Court serve nine-year terms
with a third of the Court being renewed every three years, at which time the President and the
Vice President will be elected in accordance with Article 9. If the three-year term of office in
which they have been appointed as President and Vice-President did not coincide with the
renewal of the Constitutional Court, the term of office will be postponed to occur at the moment
when the renewal is produced and the new magistrates take power. See generally FRANCISCO
BALAGUER CALLEJÓN ET AL., LA NUEVA LEY ORGÁNICA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL
(2008).
19. This storm was also legal. On appeal, the Constitutional Court found the amendment to
the L.O.T.C. to be constitutional. S.T.C., Apr. 9, 2008, No. 49.
20. The statutes establish the Autonomous Communities and define their power. See, e.g.,
C.E. art. 147.
21. C.E. art. 159.3; L.O.T.C. art. 16.3. Unlike justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, this post
is not held for life. The renewal elections have caused some problems resulting from a lack of
consensus among political forces, but the appointment of successors, per L.O.T.C. art. 17.2, has
allowed magistrates to keep their functions over quite a long time. See Francisco Rubio Llorente,
El Tribunal Constitucional, REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, May–Aug.
2004, at 11, 13–15 [hereinafter Llorente, El Tribunal Constitucional]. On one occasion, two
separate candidates who did not express a wish to sit on the Court were selected by the
legislature, and when they found out the news in press, they surprisingly refused the offer.
Agustin Yanel, PP y PSOE confían en el profesor Garrorena para poder renovar por fin el
Constitucional, EL MUNDO, Nov. 30, 1997, available at
http://www.elmundo.es/1998/11/30/espana/30N0037.html.
22. The grounds sufficient for a magistrate of the Court to be removed from hearing a case
are the same as those used in regular judicial cases. L.O.T.C. art. 80. This scenario is manifestly
inappropriate, as discussed below. See infra notes 40–45 and accompanying text.

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There are some significant differences, however, between the
political affiliation restrictions placed on judges in the judicial
branch and those placed on magistrates of the Constitutional Court.
Members of the regular judiciary cannot belong to political parties or
unions.23 In contrast, magistrates of the Constitutional Court are only
prevented from simultaneously serving in any political role with
executive functions.24 As such, it is possible to belong to a political
party, albeit without serving in a significant role, while being a
magistrate of the Constitutional Court.
B. Appointment
The magistrates of the Constitutional Court are nominated from
four different segments of the government: four are nominated by the
Congress of Deputies where they must receive a 60 percent majority
vote of its members; four are nominated by the Senate, again with a
60 percent majority vote; two are nominated by the executive branch
of the Government; and two are nominated by the General Council
of the Judiciary with a 60 percent majority vote.25 This process
emphasizes the pre-eminence of the representative bodies in the
appointment of the members of the Constitutional Court.26 This
approach, consistent with Kelsen’s proposals,27 is justified by the fact
that the main function of the Constitutional Court is the examination
of the constitutionality of laws. Such a task requires special care,
23. C.E. art. 127.
24. Id. art. 159.4.
25. Id. art. 159.1. The Spanish Constitution states that magistrates of the Court will be
appointed by the King at the suggestion of these organs, but this parliamentary monarchy, as it is
known, bars any possibility of direct intervention by the King in the exercise of these
appointments. As the Spanish proverb states, “The King reigns, but he doesn’t govern.” (“El rey
reina, pero no gobierna.”)
26. It has been recognized for a long time that the Autonomous Communities need to
participate in appointments to the Court since resolution of territorial conflicts is one of the
Court’s most important duties. The consideration of territorial interests could be significant in
the selection of the four magistrates by the Spanish Senate, which the Spanish Constitution
defines as la Cámara de Representación Territorial (the House of Territorial Representation).
C.E. art. 69. The problem is that the Spanish Senate is really more a chamber of secondary
significance than a federal senate like the Bundesrat, for example. For this reason, the strongest
autonomous communities have always tried to influence directly the appointment of magistrates
of the Constitutional Court. The most recent amendment to the L.O.T.C. states that the
magistrates proposed by the Senate will be elected among the candidates presented by the
Legislative Assemblies of the Autonomous Communities in the terms determined by the
regulations of the chamber. L.O.T.C. art. 16.1.
27. KELSEN, supra note 2, at 30.

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and it is logical that the bodies that draft the laws should also be
responsible for the appointment of those individuals who will judge
their constitutionality.
In the same sense, it is also clear that the political branches
involved with selecting magistrates for the Court seek candidates
with qualifications beyond those of traditional judges.28 Essentially,
the examination of a law’s constitutionality is not a common judicial
function (i.e., it does not consist of assigning a legal consequence to
a set of facts based on an applicable rule). Accordingly, Spanish
legislators tend to trust jurists who are familiar with other kinds of
methodologies, particularly legal scholars (we could say more “open-
minded” without underestimating judges in general). However, there
is also an important legal presence on the Court because the
magistrates elected by the General Council of Judicial Power are
qualified judges.29
Since magistrates nominated by the legislative branches require
a 60 percent majority for appointment,30 successful candidates should
theoretically have consensus support from the main political forces
in the legislature. Recently, the L.O.T.C. was amended to require
that candidates being considered by the Congress and Senate appear
at a hearing as part of the nomination process.31 The reason for this
practice is to avoid subsequent controversies that might affect the
usual work of the Court and ultimately the Court’s legitimacy.
However, the political parties have circumvented this
requirement of consensus support by distributing the selection of
candidates (once the list of acceptable candidates is narrowed down)
according to each party’s level of representation.32 The results are
obvious: the magistrates are identified immediately with the party
28. C.E. art. 159.2. This trend has reversed since 1990. See Llorente, supra note 21, at 16–
17 (discussing the reasons for the reversal). Currently, there are five lecturers for every seven
judges or lawyers on the Constitutional Court.
29. This circumstance has marked in great measure the doctrine of the Court, in which the
academic background of its members is appreciable. C.E. art. 159.2. This situation reflects in
great measure the teaching character of the members of the Constitutional Court. Id. (identifying
university professors among those who should be named to the Constitutional Court). Indeed,
there are opinions from the Court that mention, for example, Kelsen or principles from Germany
(e.g., Vertrauenschutz—the protection of confidence). See MIGUEL AZPITARTE SÁNCHEZ,
CAMBIAR EL PASADO (forthcoming 2009).
30. C.E. art. 159.1.
31. L.O.T.C. art. 16.2
32. Llorente, El Tribunal Constitucional, supra note 21, at 16.

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that supported them. Consequently, the Court is divided along clear
political lines, leaving any contested decision by the Court open to
political attack.
In theory, the required qualifications for potential magistrates
that are included in the Constitution ensure that magistrates of the
Constitutional Court are from a pool of jurists of recognized
competence, no matter their origins.33 These qualifications must be a
protective shield for the magistrates’ independence, guaranteeing that
they are not mere functionaries carrying out the wishes of those who
appointed them.
Recently, an interesting controversy has emerged about how to
evaluate the qualifications of potential magistrates, particularly
university professors.34 Legal scholars, who are and have been
members of the Constitutional Court, are often constitutionalists. In
the first years of the Court, some of the magistrates came from exile,
such as former President Manuel García Pelayo.35 Later magistrates
were academics and other legal professionals who had built up their
prestige by writing doctrinal works and reports in which they gave
their opinions about the most problematic aspects of the Spanish
constitutional model, from fundamental personal rights to the
territorial division of power.36 This circumstance has caused a series
of recent controversies because it has created a supposed conflict of
interest for some magistrates, and parties have successfully
petitioned to have them removed from hearing certain appeals.37
There has been significant conflict over this issue because the same
standards for determining when a regular judge should be removed
33. C.E. art. 159.2 (“The members of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed from
among Magistrates and Prosecutors, University professors, public officials, and lawyers, all of
whom must be jurists of acknowledged competence with at least fifteen years of professional
experience.”).
34. STC, Feb. 5, 2007 (No. 26).
35. See generally MANUEL GARCÍA PELAYO, OBRAS COMPLETAS (1991) (discussing his
personal and professional biography).
36. André Lecours, Regionalism, Cultural Diversity and the State in Spain, 22 J.
MULTILINGUAL & MULTICULTURAL DEV. 210, 213 (2001).
37. Pablo Pérez Tremps was forced to recuse himself because of a report he had written
before his appointment to the Court. Maria Peral, El Constitucional acepta la recusación del PP
contra Pérez Tremps en el recurso del Estatut, EL MUNDO, Feb. 6, 2007, available at http://
www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2007/02/05/espana/1170703376.html. The Spanish newspaper El
Mundo supported the Constitutional Court’s ruling, which contradicted a previous decision. El
Constitucional Confirma la recusación de Pérez Tremps, EL MUNDO, Mar. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2007/03/22/espana/2101285.html.

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are used to determine when a magistrate on the Constitutional Court
should be barred from hearing an appeal. Using the same standards
is wholly inappropriate because magistrates on the Court who
determine the constitutionality of legislation serve a distinctly
different function than regular jurists who act as traditional triers of
fact. Yet, Spain’s Popular Party recently convinced the Court to
prevent Magistrate Perez Tremps from hearing the upcoming appeal
regarding the Statutes of Autonomy—a critical moment in the
history of Spain’s Constitution38—because he acted as an advisor to
the regional government of Catalonia before his election to the
Court.39
This situation creates a paradox in that any qualified candidate
for the Court with a background in constitutional law will have
participated in some manor in the central legal-political debates of
the day. Yet, in expressing their point of view on these issues, such a
candidate will have potentially established grounds preventing them
from hearing future cases.40
As a result, the classic debate between Kelsen and Carl Schmitt
that questions whether the essence of constitutional justice is
political or constitutional41 takes on an important meaning here.
Although settling this question is not my intention, it seems clear that
Spain’s constitutional model does not assume the postulates of
Schmitt, in either the political and legal sense.42 The model is
Kelsenian, although Schmitt is always lying in wait.
38. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBE RAL REVOLUTION 46–68 (1999)
(discussing the window of opportunity for constitutionalizing revolutions).
39. See Peral supra note 37 and accompanying text.
40. Some of the Spanish Constitutional Court magistrates are important figures in the
country’s different schools of constitutional thought (separated more by methodological
principles than by political principals). After serving as members of the Court, some former
magistrates, such as Luis López Guerra, Secretary of Justice in Rodriguez Zapatero’s
government, have played a more political role. Others, like Franciso Rubio Llorente who is the
current President of the Council of State—the supreme consultative body of the government—
have continued to build their legal career.
41. See, e.g., Sylvie Delacroix, Schmitt’s Critique of Kelsenian Normativism, RATIO JURIS,
March 2005, at 30.
42. See Elen Kennedy, Hostis Not Inimicus: Toward a Theory of the Public in the World of
Carl Schmitt, in LAW AS POLITICS: CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 92 (David
Dyzenhaus ed., 1998).

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C. Organization
The Spanish Constitutional Court will consider some matters as
a full twelve-member en banc panel, while others are heard by partial
panels of six magistrates.43 The en banc panels carry out the most
distinctive function of the Constitutional Court by hearing appeals
involving the constitutionality of certain acts and statutes.44 These
full panels also hear cases where laws are alleged to violate basic
rights and freedoms.45
In turn, the Court is divided into two sections to hear certain
appeals, forming two distinct panels with six members each.46 The
first panel is presided over by the President of the Constitutional
Court, and the second panel is presided over by the Vice-President.47
The main task of these smaller panels is to hear individual appeals
for protection (recurso de amparo), which represent the majority of
constitutional proceedings in the Constitutional Court.48 Each of
these smaller panels is composed of two sub-sections of three
members who make initial determinations regarding whether the
Court will hear the appeal.49
With regard to published opinions, it is important to point out
that from the beginning, the Spanish Constitutional Court avoided
mimicking the style and format of other judicial opinions. The Court
tried to better explain its reasoning and avoid the usual archaic
language often found in judicial decisions.
43. C.E. art. 159.1.
44. Id. art. 161.1.
45. For this reason, the leading constitutional cases are particularly suitable for resolution by
en banc panels. If we accept the idea that the main task of the Constitutional Court is to pacify
competiting constitutional principles, it will be easier to provide legitimacy to a difficult decision
if all of the magistrates are present. One example of this is the resolution of the appeal for
protection of judgment. STC, July 18, 2002 (No. 154). According to this judgment, the religious
freedom of two married Jehovah’s Witnesses was violated when they were found guilty of
murder with extenuating circumstance in the death of their son. Id. As a result of an accident, the
son required a blood transfusion. Id. On religious grounds, the parents initially refused to allow
the transfusion, and the son ultimately died after he also objected to the procedure. Id. In a
controversial judgment, the Constitutional Court overturned the murder conviction, specifically
noting that the parents rescinded their initial opposition and that the child was 13, an age that the
Constitutional Court found allowed him to discern the consequences of his decision. Id.
46. L.O.T.C. art. 7.1.
47. Id. arts. 7.2, 7.3.
48. LEY ORGANÍCA 2/1979, DE 3 DE OCTUBRE, DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL (2007),
available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/tribunal/leyesacuerdos/Texto%20consolidado
%20nueva%20LOTC.pdf.
49. L.O.T.C. art. 8.

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To set out the factual background of the cases, a court clerk
provides a detailed report of the problem leading to the judgment and
summarizes the aims of the parties, as well as the legal arguments
put forth. The next common section of a decision by the Court, the
fundamental points of law, outlines the main legal elements, defining
the controversy in terms of legal reasoning.50 To facilitate this
summary of the arguments, the fundamental points are divided into
specific legal questions.51
In contrast to the material included in decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court, the judgments of the Spanish Constitutional Court
contain neither footnotes nor doctrinal quotes. The internal
references in the decisions are the previous judgments of the Court
itself (or occasionally the judgments of other courts, such as the
European Court of Human Rights). It is common for the
fundamental points of law of Spanish judgments to be very long and
occasionally confusing.52
After the factual background and fundamental points of law, the
judgment finishes with a ruling, whose content will vary depending
on the constitutional questions involved and the result. The Spanish
Constitution also requires that the Court’s decisions include
information about dissenting votes,53 which enables magistrates to
explain their reasons for dissenting.54
The issue of dissenting opinions is considered to be an open
wound within the Court. However, the argument for their inclusion
in final judgments was that these dissenting votes could increase the
opportunity for future adaptation of constitutional doctrine,
improving doctrinal coherence, internal consistency, and doctrinal
evolution.55 The practice has shown that such hope was not
50. Id. art. 48.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Llorente, El Tribunal Constitucional, supra note 21, at 23.
53. C.E. art. 164.
54. See GREGORIO CÁMARA, VOTOS PARTICULARS Y DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES EN LA
PRÁCTICA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL ESPAÑOL: 1981-1991 (1993); Francisco Rubio
Llorente, Sobre la relación entre el Tribunal Constitucional y poder judicial en el Ejercicio de la
Jurisdiccion Constitucional, REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, Jan.–Apr.
1982, at 35.
55. There is always the hope of the appearance on the Court of a Justice Holmes, whose
dissenting opinions were recently translated into Spanish. See LOS VOTOS DISCREPANTES DEL
JUEZ O.W. HOLMES: ESTUDIO PRELIMINAR Y TRADUCCIÓN (Cesar Arjone Sebastià trans., 2006).

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groundless, but it is important to point out that it has created disputes
within the Constitutional Court.
D. Functions
The Spanish Constitution entrusts powers to the Constitutional
Court that are fundamental to the integration of democracy in Spain
and the strength of the Constitution. It mandates that the
Constitutional Court guarantee the supremacy of the Constitution
through two distinct judicial processes: appeals challenging the
constitutionality of new legislation and questions from regular courts
regarding the constitutionality of laws at issue in other litigation.56
This opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of government
acts is the defining function of every Constitutional Court, its raison
d’être, which traces its roots back to Marbury v. Madison.57
The Spanish Constitution also establishes the right to request
protection against the violation of fundamental rights.58 This right
consists of an appeal along the lines of the German
Verfassungsbeschwerde (“constitutional complaint”), in which the
Constitutional Court is a mechanism used when the ordinary
protection of rights fails.59
Third, the Constitutional Court is entitled to solve conflicts of
jurisdiction between the state and the self-governing communities.60
The applicable constitutional provision grants the Court the ability to
56. Dennis P. Riordan, The Rights to a Fair Trial and to Examine Witnesses Under the
Spanish Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
373, 383 (1999). Claims can either be brought immediately after constitutionally suspect
legislation is enacted (el recurso de inconstitutionalidad) or during litigation, whereby the citizen
challenges the “facial validity of a statute” and the presiding judge refers the questión de
inconstitucionalidad to the Constitutional Court. Id.
57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding that the province and duty of the judiciary is to
“say what the law is” and to invalidate laws repugnant to the United States Constitution).
58. See C.E. art. 161(b).
59. See C.E. art. 53.2 (“Any citizen may make a claim to the liberties and rights recognized
in Article 13 and the first Section of the Second Chapter before the regular courts through a
process based on the principles of preference and speed and through the recourse before the
Constitutional Court. This last recourse shall be applicable to objections of conscience recognized
in Article 30.”).
60. C.E. art. 161(1)(c). Spain is comprised of seventeen separate autonomous regions and
two autonomous cities.

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clarify the division of power among the autonomous regions—
without a doubt the most controversial aspect of the Constitution.61
In 1979, the first Organic Law was enacted to establish the
Constitutional Court.62 Subsequently, the L.O.T.C. has been
amended to expand the Court’s jurisdiction over conflicts involving
questions of local autonomy. However, these new areas of the
Court’s jurisdiction have not been significantly tested, and the
Court’s ultimate role regarding them has not been defined.63 In
general, these changes have contributed nothing new to the
Constitution’s original definition of the Court’s constitutional
jurisdiction.64
III. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT:
THE WARRANTY OF THE CONSTITUTION REGULATION
The Court’s first task in 1981 was to convince a legal and
political class already influenced by the Franco dictatorship that the
Constitution was a true legal standard and that the Constitutional
Court was its main defender. Indeed, there was an attempt to weaken
the new democracy by devaluing the Constitution itself, which was
considered, even by the Supreme Court, to be more a statement of
principles that needed to be clarified through further legislation than
a absolute declaration of fundamental rights.65
The preconception of many was that a standard as ambiguous as
the Constitution could not produce viable legal outcomes.66 The
Court forcefully countered this attack from the outset. This effort
can be observed in judgments such as 15/1982,67 which granted
protection to a citizen whose right to refuse military service as a
61. Pedro Cruz Villalón, La estructura del Estado o la curiosidad del jurista persa, REVISTA
DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE , 1981, at 58-82. It is
important to note that Cruz was a President of the Constitutional Court.
62. L.O.T.C. art. 1 (1979).
63. See ANGEL J. GÓMEZ MONTORO, EL CONFLICTO ENTRE ÓRGANOS CONSTITUCIONALES
(1992); JÓSE MARÍA PORRAS RAMÍREZ, EL CONFLICTO EN DEFENSA DE LA AUTONOMÍA LOCAL
ANTE TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL (2001).
64. L.O.T.C. arts. 59–75.
65. JUAN ANTONIO SANTAMARÌA PASTOR ET AL., DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVE: LA
JURISPRUDENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO 17 (1989).
66. STS May 26, 1979.
67. STC, Apr. 23, 1982 (No. 15).

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conscientious objector68 had not been recognized because a civil
service substitute for military service had not yet been put into law.69
In this case, the Court strongly asserted that when the Constitution
acknowledges a right, a strong inference in favor of legal protection
of that right is assumed and cannot be undercut by legislative delay.70
Therefore, the Spanish Constitution is the supreme legal standard,
and the Constitutional Court is its main interpreter.71
One of the first questions that the Constitutional Court had to
consider was who could evaluate the constitutionality of laws
enacted before the 1978 Constitution.72 While the Court established
its jurisdiction to overturn such laws if they violated the 1978
Constitution, the Court also allowed ordinary judges to evaluate the
constitutionality of these pre-1978 laws.73 In this way, the
Constitutional Court maintains its ultimate control over the review of
such laws’ constitutionality but shares its monopoly with regard to
pre-constitutional standards with ordinary judges.
68. See GREGORIO CÁMARA VILLAR, LA OBJECIÓN DE CONCIENCIA AL SERVICIO MILITAR
(LAS DIMENSIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DEL PROBLEMA) (1991).
69. C.E. art. 30.2 (“The law shall determine the military obligations of Spaniards and shall
regulate, with all due guarantees, conscientious objection as well as other causes for exemption
from compulsory military service, and it may, when appropriate, impose a substitute social
service.”).
70. STC, Nov. 29, 1982 (No. 15) (“Y, puesto que la libertad de conciencia es una concreción
de la libertad ideológica, que nuestra Constitución reconoce en el artículo. 16, puede afirmarse
que la objeción de conciencia es un derecho reconocido explícita e implícitamente en el
ordenamiento constitucional español, sin que contra la argumentación expuesta tenga valor
alguno el hecho de que el artículo. 30.2 emplee la expresión [la Ley regulará], la cual no significa
otra cosa que la necesidad de la interpositio legislatoris no para reconocer, sino, como las propias
palabras indican, para [regular] el derecho en términos que permitan su plena aplicabilidad y
eficacia.” [“And since freedom of belief is the essence of the ideological freedom embodied in
Article 16 of our Constitution, it is clear that the right to conscientiously object is both an explicit
and implicit right recognized by the Spanish Constitution. Although this notion may appear to
conflict with the fact that Article 30.2 uses the expression [the Law will control], such an
expression should not be interpreted as the need of the interposition legislatoris to recognize, but
rather, in the words of the Constitution, [regulate] the right in a way that allows its full
application and effectiveness.”]).
71. L.O.T.C. art. 1.
72. See STC, Feb. 2, 1982 (No. 4).
73. Id. At the beginning of the current Spanish democracy, there was controversy over
reforming or breaking from Spanish tradition. Despite the legal subtleties related to legislation,
the Spanish Constitution was the result of a real constitutional moment that gave light to the
freedom to set up a new constitutional model with aims of permanency. It was a revolution
according to Hannah Arendt’s well-known work and all the oversights that made it fail
(especially the political parties). See ARENDT, supra note 1, at 215.

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In evaluating the constitutionality of government acts and laws,74
the Court looks to both the text of the Constitution and other
accepted legal agreements that make up the so-called “block of
constitutionality.”75 One of the main sources to bear in mind are the
Statutes of Autonomy,76 which are a significant reference point in the
broader interpretation of the Constitution.
Similar to the separate constitutions of the individual states in
the United States, the statutes are comprised of the individual
agreements made between the national government and the various
autonomous regions and communities comprising Spain as a nation.77
According to Article 147 of the Spanish Constitution, the statutes
establish the basic institutional structure governing each autonomous
region.78 Especially noteworthy is the degree of legislative
independence granted to the autonomous region within this
constitutional framework.79 For this reason, the statutes themselves
are absolutely crucial to the overall interpretation of the Constitution.
Since the Constitution only includes general principles and
procedures (known as principio dispositivo), the statutes detail
regional-specific provisions, which could not reach wider agreement
in constitution.80
74. See STC, Feb. 2, 1982 (No. 4); see also STC, Feb. 12, 2007 (No. 38) (clarifying the
possibility of the Court to control the constitutionality of the international treaties).
75. L.O.T.C. art. 28. The block of constitutionality is a legal term found in French doctrine.
The term refers to a series of absolute constitutional mandates not included in the Constitution of
1958. This is the case with the Bill of Rights and the preamble of the Constitution of 1946. The
concept was spread in Spain thanks to the work of Louis Favoreu, a jurist who made an effort to
bring the Spanish and French constitutional cultures closer through his team in Aix-en-Provence.
One example of this is the Spanish contribution to the Annuaire Internationnal de Justice
Constitutionnele and the translations of his work. See LOUIS FAVOREU, CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS (Alain A. Levasseur & Roger K. Ward trans., 2001) (comparing the form and function of
various European constitutional courts).
76. L.O.T.C art. 28. Spain is comprised of 17 autonomous regions and two autonomous
cities, which have each been incorporated into the Spanish state while maintaining a significant
degree of autonomous rule.
77. C.E. art. 81 (requiring majority votes for approval, modification, or repeal of these laws).
Not all the Statutes follow the same procedure of drawing up and reform. To know about the
Statutes of Autonomy, see FRANCISCO BALAGUER CALLEJÓN, FUENTE S DEL DERECHO (1991).
78. Id. art. 147 (“[T]he statutes shall constitute the basic institutional rules . . . .”).
79. Id. art. 148.
80. See ENRIC FOSSAS ESPALADER, EL PRINCIPIO DISPOSITIVO EN EL ESTADO
AUTONÓMICO (2007). It should be put on record that the Spanish constitutional process tried to
incorporate the wishes of all the important political forces in the history of Spain, especially the
nationalists of Catalonia and the Basque Country. The Catalonian nationalists carried out positive
work throughout the transition, but the nationalists of the Basque Country have been a Trojan
horse, pressuring for their interests and then disassociating themselves once they obtain them,

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The statutes are fundamental to the Spanish democratic model.
Their drafting began right after the passing of the Spanish
Constitution with the first statutes drafted at the beginning of 1979.81
Today, Spain faces a very important national moment as most of the
statutes are being reformed, giving a new boost to the federal nature
of Spain’s government (a trend that almost no one denies).82
The statutes regarding the autonomous communities of
Valencia, Catalonia, Andalucía, Aragón, Islas Baleares, and Castilla-
León have already been re-drafted, and the reforms of most the other
autonomous communities are practically finished.83 It was almost
unanimously believed that the statutes needed an aggiornamento
(modernization) after almost thirty years of legal effect. In
combination with the prior decisions of the Constitutional Court,
these reforms should clarify the separation of powers between the
national government and the autonomous regions in such a way that
considering them inadequate. See, e.g., JAVIER CORCUERA ATIENZA, POLÍTICA Y DERECHO. LA
CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA AUTONOMÍA VASCA (1990); MEREDITH WEISS, THE BASQUE
NATIONALIST MOVEMENT (2002), available at http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globalization/
basque.pdf; MEREDITH WEISS, THE CATALAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT (2002), available at
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globalization/catalon.pdf. One example of this is the survival of
a financing system, which clearly benefits the Basque Country and Navarre (under the Additional
Provision 2 of the Spanish Constitution, which “protects and respects the historic rights of the
territorial charters”). C.E. Disposiciones Adicionales, art. 1; Javier Corcuera Atienza, La
constitucionalización de los derechos históricos, REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL, May–Aug. 1984, at 11.
81. See ELISEO AJA, EL ESTADO AUTONÓMICO: FEDERALISMO Y HECHOS DIFERENCIALES 71
(Alianza 2d ed. 2003) (1999).
82. See, e.g., Ministerio do Administraciones Publicas, Reforma de los Estatutos,
http://www.map.es/inciativas/nueva_agenda_territorial/reforma_estatutos.html (last visited Feb.
23, 2008).
83. A special case is that of the autonomous region of the Basque country that submitted,
during the previous government, a reform declaration for its statute before Parliament. Eduardo
Vírgala Foruria, La reforma Ibarretxe: Una auténtica ruptura estatutaria, in EL ESTADO
AUTONÓMICO “IN FIERI”: LA REFORMA DE LOS ESTATUTOS DE AUTONOMÍA 401, 401-40 (Manuel
José Terol Becerra ed., 2005). The Basque Parliament had passed the declaration by an absolute
majority, but the declaration was rejected by almost half of the members of Parliment. It is
surprising that the reform process of the statutes requires a very qualified majority to start, since
in the Basque Country this percentage is reduced to the absolute majority. Therefore, one
majority can assert itself over another. It is also surprising that the declaration was clearly
unconstitutional and was rejected by the Congress of Deputies in the debate to take it into
account. It is necessary to add that the relations between the Basque Country and Spain are
significantly affected by the terrorist violence of Euskadi Ta Askatasura (“ETA”), which has
recently broken another truce in a new attempt to blackmail Spanish democracy. In 1996 the
ETA murdered university professor F. Tomás y Valiente, who also served as President of the
Constitutional Court. See José J. Jiménez Sánchez, Nationalism and the Spanish Dilemma: The
Basque Case, 34 POL. & POL’Y 532, 534–35 (2006) (presenting this problem in the English
language from a very pessimistic point of view).

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law-making will not fall on the Court until the need to answer a clear
constitutional question (e.g., questions related to state powers in the
areas of education or public health).
Conservative political forces, however, believe that these
reforms will ultimately expand the influence of the Constitutional
Court beyond advisable limits. In their view, these reforms have
gone beyond the needed modernization of the statutes and threaten to
violate the national unity of Spain by granting significant
independent authority to some of the autonomous regions and
allowing others to establish themselves as near independent nations.84
For this reason, appeals have been filed challenging the
constitutionality of these statutes.85 The resolution of these
challenges will be a crucial moment in the political development of
Spain and will present an important test for the Spanish
Constitutional Court.
An appeal of unconstitutionality is a direct appeal that can be
lodged against acts and statutes having the force of law in the three-
month period of time following their passage.86 The right to file such
an appeal, however, is limited to specific political representatives:
fifty members of Congress, fifty senators, the Prime Minister, the
executive body of an autonomous region and its assembly, and the
Defender of the People (Defensor del Pueblo).87
This type of appeal has some defining elements that separate it
from other legal actions. First, it is abstract in character, requiring
the Court to assess the constitutionality of the act without reference
to any specific circumstances. On the other hand, it is also an appeal
with a clear political element. Thus, those who can lodge it are
politicians, with the exception of the Defender of the People.88
With this type of appeal, minority political factions can continue
a legislative battle lost in Parliament by asking the Court to overturn
84. See, e.g., Generalitat de Catalunya, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006, Preamble,
available at http://www.gencat.net/generalitat/eng/estatut/preambul.htm (“In reflection of the
feelings and the wishes of the citizens of Catalonia, the Parliament of Catalonia has defined
Catalonia as a nation by an ample majority. The Spanish Constitution, in its second Article,
recognises the national reality of Catalonia as a nationality.”).
85. See, e.g., STC, July 20, 2006 (No. 240); STC, July 6, 2006 (No. 222).
86. L.O.T.C. art. 33.
87. Id. art. 34.
88. See C.E. art. 54; JOSÉ MANUEL VERA SANTOS, EL DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO EN LA
CONSTITUCIÓN Y EN LOS ESTATUTOS DE AUTONOMÍA (2002).

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legislative decisions of the majority. The Court’s rulings resolve
such conflicts once and for all and have important effects on public
opinion. Were it not for the significant delay involved with deciding
most cases (up to ten years from the filing of an appeal), such effects
could substantially threaten the Court’s legitimacy. Yet, since so
much time passes, the original controversy is diminished, and the
Court is able to deliberate without the pressure of political
consequences for its decisions.89 However, the way in which the
right to appeal is structured essentially establishes that various
political factions will try to overturn the legislative choices of other
legislative factions through the intervention of the Court: members of
Parliament seek to appeal national laws,90 the prime minister seeks to
appeal laws passed by the self-governing regions, members of the
legislative assemblies of self-governing regions seek to appeal
national laws, and the Defender of the People is left to appeal
decisions by any of these groups affecting personal liberties. Under
Spain’s model, unlike under other models, an individual citizen
cannot contest the constitutionality of legislation and must rely upon
the Defender of the People or other political branches to raise
constitutional objections.91
Article 163 of the Constitution provides another procedure for
judicial review of government acts.92 Under this procedure, the
judicial branch and the Constitutional Court cooperate to purge
unconstitutional legislation. If judges in the course of deciding a
case93 must evaluate the constitutionality of a government act in
order to render an opinion, the judicial body should refer the
constitutional question to the Constitutional Court.94 The
89. Compare FRANCISCO RUBIO LLORENTE, LA FORMA DEL PODER: ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA
CONSTITUCIÓN 573–603 (1993) (claiming that political contamination of the Court through the
appeal was inevitable, making it better to leave the question as a unique mechanism of objective
purge of code), with JOSÉ ANTONIO MONTILLA MARTOS, MINORÍA POLÍTICA Y TRIBUNAL
CONSTITUCIONAL (2002) (asserting that it is absolutely necessary to keep open that proceeding as
a mechanism for minorities to defend their vision of constitutionality).
90. Presently, there is a lack of mechanisms for self-governing members of parliament to
appeal the acts of a self-governing community.
91. This situation leaves social groups without significant political representation
defenseless against discriminatory legislation.
92. C.E. art. 163.
93. Not in the case of other procedures.
94. Dennis P. Rioran, The Rights to a Fair Trial and to Examine Witnesses Under the
Spanish Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
373, 382–83 (1999).

41-2LOPEZ.DOC
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Constitutional Court then informs the judge that brought the matter
of their opinion and allows the original judge to resolve the case
according to the content of the ruling.95
This mechanism is very different from the appeals received from
the political branches because of two circumstances: (1) the
institution that urges the matter and (2) the issue that starts the
matter. Since the constitutional question originates from the judicial
branch, the motives underlying the referral will be of a legal nature.
Further, unlike an appeal, a referral case is linked to a specific
controversy and specific set of facts. In other words, it is a
constitutional problem linked to a broader issue.
The ramifications of this procedure can be enormous. If a judge
finds enough reasons to question an act’s constitutionality, the act
will have to pass the Constitutional Court. In this way, judges
remain as key elements in the judicial review process in Spain,
despite the role of the Constitutional Court. The main problem with
this process is that the authority to refer cases rests exclusively with
the original court hearing the case, with no right of appeal on a the
judge’s decision not to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court.
This scenario gives rise to some judges referring matters about acts
that other judges consider perfectly constitutional, causing damage to
some citizens that is hard to correct.96
IV. COURT DOCTRINE:
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Due to the distinctive character of fundamental rights in Spain’s
democratic model, the Spanish Constitution establishes special
channels in order to protect such rights. One of these fundamental
rights is ordinary legal protection,97 regulated recently through
several procedural acts.98 Another fundamental right is protection by
95. FAVOREU, supra note 75, at 99. In practice, however, the underlying proceeding often
continues without guidance from the Constitutional Court. Id.
96. It has occurred, for example, that some citizens have suffered financial damage caused
by an unconstitutional act because the parties did not raise the constitutional issue and the judge
did not lodge the matter with the Court. The only procedure later found to resolve the situation is
to estimate the demand for financial responsibility lodged by the affected party according to the
unconstitutional law.
97. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVA art. 29 (1998); LEY DE
ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL art. 1 (2000); TEXTO REFUNDIDO DE LA LEY DE
PROCEDIMIENTO LABORAL (B.O.E. 1995, 2).
98. STC, Jul. 6, 1995 (No. 113).

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the Constitutional Court, which is considered a subsidiary and
unusual appeal.99
As outlined in Article 53 of the Constitution, certain rights are
given broader constitutional protections: the fundamental rights that
appear in Articles 15 through 19, the right to equal protection under
the law in Article 14, and the right to conscientious objection to
military service in Article 30.2.100 Accordingly, this mechanism does
not protect rights related to such issues such private property (Article
33) as well as it protects the social rights enumerated in Articles 39
through 52. The protected social rights are programmatic character
standards that provide rights according to the acts developing
them.101 An appeal can be directed against any government act that
causes a break-down in these rights.
Initially, many appeals for protection arrived at the
Constitutional Court,102 most of them claiming violations of the rights
granted under Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution: effective
protection from judges. Accordingly, the Court became the place
where judges’ actions are corrected. Yet, the ongoing consolidation
of Spain’s democracy has led to the widespread conviction that
ordinary judges are perfectly able to carry out the protection of
fundamental rights without help from the Constitutional Court.
In regard to the general protection of rights, the Court has faced
difficult cases that often hinge on the Court’s constitutional
jurisdiction. Some of the most difficult cases have addressed
abortion,103 euthanasia,104 forced-feeding of prisoners,105 limits on
99. C.E. art. 53.2.
100. ELENA MERINO-BLANCO, SPANISH LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM 202–03 (2d ed. 2006).
101. They do not, however, lack normative force. See Francisco Balaguer Callejón, Las
relaciones entre el ordenamiento estatal y los ordenamientos autonómicos: Una reflexión a la luz
de la regla de supletoriedad, REVISTA DE DERECHO POLÍTICO, 1998, at 285 (discussing how
social values are integrated into a system of laws).
102. FAVOREU, supra note 75, at 97 (noting that 28,247 appeals for protection were filed
between 1980 and 1994).
103. STC, Apr. 11, 1985 (S.T.C. 53/1985).
104. STC, June 27, 1990 (S.T.C. 120/1990).
105. Id.

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freedom of expression,106 character of representation,107 and the scope
of freedom of religion.108
Particularly with respect to rights like freedom of expression,
Spain may soon experience significant constitutional developments if
the specific circumstances in which these were first doctrines
developed are analyzed.109 First, Spain has tried to maintain a similar
doctrinal position as the “preferred position” given to freedom of the
press in the United States.110 Proponents claim that a strong
democracy requires the media’s independent content and distribution
to inform public opinion.111 This necessity has placed freedom of
expression in a unique position when compared to other rights that
are not as essential for democracy, such as honor or privacy.
Evidence that half of the Spanish media have become business
giants112 whose primary interest is to seek easy profits has
subsequently cast this view into doubt. Once one realizes that half of
the media look out for their own interests, not for the public interest,
the “preferred position” system becomes meaningless.
Probably one of the most important problems that threatens the
Spanish Constitutional Court is the excess work that results from the
overload of protection appeals. Every year, thousands of protection
appeals arrive at the Court, but only a few are processed and even
106. STC, Oct. 15, 1982 (S.T.C. 62/1982).
107. STC, Feb. 21, 1983 (S.T.C. 10/1983).
108. STC, July 18, 2002 (S.T.C. 154/2000); see also Javier Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of
Religion in the Case Law of the Spanish Constitutional Court, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 711, 714–15
(2001) (discussing the legal status of churches and religious groups and the protection of
individual freedom of conscience).
109. See FRANCISCO J. BASTIDA FREIJEDO, EL RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LA COMUNICACIÓN
SOCIAL (1994) (analyzing how this right is exercised in practice).
110. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (“Freedom of press, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”).
111. “In 2005, the Spanish Constitutional Court registered 9708 appeals: 9476 of them were
individual appeals for protection of the so-called recurso de amparo, 222 appeals against
unconstitutionality, 8 conflicts of jurisdiction between the State and the Autonomous
Communities and 2 conflicts of jurisdiction lodged by the local governments. On the other hand
‘only’ 6339 cases were finally settled . . . (most of them, again, individual appeals for protection
of fundamental rights).” Posting of Luis Gordillo Perez, Report from Spain, to The Court (Jun. 2,
2007), http://www.thecourt.ca/2007/06/02/report-from-spain-may-2007/. The complete statistics
are available at Tribunal Constitucional de España, http://www.tribunalconstitucional.
es/memorias/2005/memo05_anexo03.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
112. BBC Monitoring, The Press in Spain, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/
4470002.stm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).

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fewer are adjudicated.113 Some solutions to this problem have been
inspired by foreign systems,114 but an ultimate solution has been
postponed until the reform of the L.O.T.C.115
The proposed new law assumes, as the doctrine intended, that
ordinary judges have an undeniable link with democracy, the
Constitution, and fundamental rights that perfectly enables them to
repair violations of those rights. On the other hand, Spanish judges
have been constricted by more than twenty-five years of
Constitutional Court jurisdiction that has precluded judges from
hearing any potential conflict over constitutional rights.116 The
solution does not mean removing constitutional protection but rather
limiting it to those plaintiffs who can prove the importance of their
cases by showing the absolute novelty of the issues or new
perspectives arising in those cases.117
V. COURT DOCTRINE:
TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
Article 161 of the Constitution calls for the Constitutional Court
to arbitrate territorial conflicts.118 As discussed earlier, territorial
distribution of power is one of the matters that the Constitution could
not finalize. As such, the Constitution was limited on this issue to
general principles and guidelines.119 The generality and vagueness of
this territorial model governing relations between self-governing
communities and the state led the Constitutional Court to become the
real helm of constitutional development. In this aspect of its
jurisprudence, it is clear that the Constitutional Court has not limited
its role to a mere defender of the Constitution but rather has
advanced extended interpretations of it.
113. See the complete statistics at Tribunal Constitucional, www.tribunalconstitucional.es/
(last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
114. See generally Maria Angeles Ahumada Ruiz, El “certiorari”: Ejercicio discrecional de
la Jurisdicción de apelación por el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos, REVISTA
ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, May–Aug. 1994, at 89 (discussing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s discretion in hearing appeals).
115. L.O.T.C. art. 6.
116. See generally FRANCISCO RUBIO LLORENTE, DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES Y PRINCIPIOS
CONSTITUCIONALES: DOCTRINA JURISPRUDENCIAL (1995) (discussing important themes in
Constitutional Court decisions).
117. L.O.T.C. art. 49.1.
118. C.E. art. 161.
119. See ESPALADER supra note 80 and accompanying text.

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The specific constitutional process foreseen for the resolution of
territorial matters is called the “conflict of competences” (although
when a conflict of competences originates from an act, it is dealt
with as an appeal of unconstitutionality).120 Only the government of
the state and those of the self-governing communities121 are able to
lodge this kind of appeal.122 However, the position of these
authorized entities is not the same: the government of a community
has to ask the state to stop the encroachment of their authority before
going to the Constitutional Court. The national government can
choose between doing what is requested or lodging the appeal.123
This procedure for addressing such conflicts has a significant
influence on the Constitutional Court’s resolution of matters of
provincial authority. It is important to note that the governments of
the communities usually will only object to encroachments by the
national government when they are controlled by different political
parties. With the exception of the Basque country and Catalonia, the
self-governing communities are not effectively independent from the
politics of the national parties in Spain.124 This political connection
means that the Socialist Party currently controls the national
government as well as the regions of Andalucía, Extremadura,
Castilla-La Mancha, and Baleares. When the Popular Party was in
power, it also held the reins in Galicia, Castilla-León, and the
autonomous community of Valencia.125 In this way, preservation of
the presence of the party is more important than defense of the
autonomous community.
As mentioned above, Catalonia and the Basque country are
special cases. They are communities that have special party systems
dominated by nationalist parties that have ruled, until just recently in
Catalonia, since the beginning of the autonomous community
120. L.O.T.C. art. 67.
121. These are the parties in a supposedly “positive” dispute. In so-called “negative”
disputes, they are the citizens. There is practically no reporting about these kind of disputes.
122. C.E. art. 162, § 1(a).
123. L.O.T.C. arts. 62–63.
124. See Begona Annue Vgante & Santíago Pérez-Níevas, Moderate Nationalist parties in the
Basque County: Partido nacionalista vasco and eusko alkantausuna, in REGIONALIST PARTIES IN
WESTERN EUROPE 87 (Lieven De Winter & Hunt Türsan eds., 1998); Juan Mancet & Jandí
Angelaguet, Nationalist Parties in Catalonia: convergéncia democrática de catalunya and
esquema republicania, in REGIONALIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, at 70.
125. Regional parliaments: political representation 2007, http://www.typicallyspanish.com/
news/publish/article_12246.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).

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system). This situation has created a controversy that has fluctuated
in spite of the virtue of some elements of the systems.
For example, there was an ongoing dispute during the years that
the PSOE (socialist party) used its absolute majority in the national
government to try to change the country.126 After the party lost its
absolute majority in the general elections of 1993, the PSOE had to
negotiate with the nationalists from Catalonia for their support in
Parliament.127 When these nationalists gave their support, they did so
in order to guarantee their vision of their community, resulting in a
determined decrease in the number of disputes brought before
Constitutional Court.
A similar scenario played out during the first term of office of
the right-wing Partido Popular from 1996 to 2000.128 The party
needed the support of nationalists from Catalonia in order to confirm
José María Aznar as prime minister, so disputes were at a
minimum.129
Disputes with the Basque country are different. The brand of
nationalism found in this region is less pragmatic than in Catalonia,
and Basque separatists have tried to keep the area wholly
independent from the national state through continuous criticism of
national institutions. As a result, the Basque country has excluded
itself from the processes of the Constitutional Court, which its
leaders have labelled an “organ of Madrid.”
The Court’s main points of constitutional dispute in territorial
matters are as follows: (1) the concept of self-government; (2) the
supremacy of national law over regional law; (3) the concept of basic
government services (4) the reach of the Harmonization Act; and (5)
the content of supplemental state law. Regarding the first, the Court
defined the outlines of provincial self-governance early on,
conceiving it as a right of each region limited by the unity principle
126. Derek de Villiers, Spain: A Model Transition to Democracy—Lessons for South Africa,
POLITEIA, 1999.
127. Encylopedia Britannica Online, Spain: Year in Review 1993, http://www.britannica.
com/eb/article-9115240 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
128. Barry James, Basques and Catalans Drive Tough Bargain with Aznar, INT’L HERALD
TRIB. (Apr. 30, 1996), http://www.iht.com/articles/1996/04/30/spain.t_3.php.
129. Increases in government financing to Catalonia occurred in this time period. Francisco
Balaguer Callejón, La Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas, in ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL: HOMENAJE AL PROF. DR. D. JOAQUÍN GARCÍA MORILLO 477-92 (Luis López
Guerra ed., 2001).

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of the Constitution.130 As such, it is indisputable that regional
autonomy was always “taken seriously” by the Court.
The rest of the Court’s doctrine on territorial matters is
consistent with this view. With its very important 76/1983 ruling,131
for example, the Court held that territorial disputes should always be
solved using the jurisdictional principles in the Constitution, relying
upon the regional authority outlined there and in the relevant
community statute.132 This decision meant virtually eliminating the
use of the supremacy principle (also outlined in Article 149.3 of the
Constitution), which involved the immediate pre-emption of
community law by national law where there was conflict. After this
ruling, there was no clear indication how the Court would rule on
issues involving “concurrent” matters.133 The self-governing of the
autonomous communities was not affected by the potential for
legislative pre-emption by the national government.
A critical area where the autonomous communities began to
develop independent authority involved the clarification of basic
governmental services. Under Article 149.1 of the Constitution,
basic governmental services, like public education and health care,
were to be under the jurisdiction of the national government, and the
communities could expand upon these basic services according to
their political choice. Due to the lack of clarity in the definition of
these roles, the early period of autonomous rule for these regions was
not easy. Attempts were made to delay self-government in the
regions under the argument that the national government had not yet
announced basic regulations required before the regions could take
any action on their own.134
The Constitutional Court defused this confrontation through the
development of the judicial concept of “basic principles,” which
allowed the autonomous communities to infer or deduce the
boundaries of their basic governing authority from pre-existing
130. C.E. art. 2.
131. STC, Aug. 5, 1983 (No. 76).
132. Id.
133. “Concurrent” matters are those over which the autonomous communities and the state
would have had identical authority to control. In Spanish legislation only the “culture” issue is of
this type. The rest are divided between the state and the autonomous communities, but their
faculties are differentiated with categories such as “development bases” or “legislation—
realization.”
134. C.E. arts. 149.1.13, 149.1.23, 149.1.30.

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regulations.135 This doctrine increased the degree to which the
autonomous communities could manage basic governmental services
in the early years of the new Spanish Constitution.136 Along the same
lines, the Court further increased the independent authority of the
regions through its decision in STC 76/1983137 involving the
Harmonization Law from Article 150.3 that allowed the national
government to dictate laws in areas delegated to the regions when
necessary to ensure conformity across the country.138 The Court
ruled that the Harmonization Law is an exceptional constitutional
mechanism that the national government may only use in cases
where no other appeal is possible because it means an intervention
by the national government into areas of autonomous provincial
authority.139 Finally, the Constitutional Court affirmed in STC
61/1997 that although national law can pre-empt that of the self-
governing communities, the national government has limited powers
as declared in Article 149.3 of the Constitution,140 and the national
government is not authorized to enact laws on matters outside its
jurisdiction.141
In all, constitutional law on territorial issues has been very
respectful of the principle of self-government. However, some
communities have raised objections over the Court’s decisions
restraining the extent to which they can affect basic government
services in their region.142
135. STC, July 28, 1981 (No. 32); see Javier Jiménez Campo, ¿Qué es lo básico? Legislación
compartida en el Derecho Autonómico, REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL,
Sept.–Dec. 1989, at 39. Javier Jiménez Campo has been the General Secretary of the
Constitutional Court for many years.
136. However, this is an interpretation contemporaneously linked to the beginning of the
autonomous state. Today, a different interpretation prevails, which demands that the state fix the
basic principles in norms preferably of legislative nature. See José Antonio Montilla Martos, Los
elementos formales en el proceso de producción normativa de lo básico, REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE
DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, May–Aug. 2003, at 89.
137. STC, Aug. 5, 1983 (No. 76).
138. C.E. art. 150.3.
139. STC, Aug. 5, 1983 (No. 76).
140. C.E. art. 149.3 (“The matters not attributed expressly to the state by this Constitution
belong to the Autonomous Communities by virtue of their respective statutes.”).
141. See Callejón, supra note 101 at 285-305. See also Juan Francisco de Asis Sánchez
Barrilao, La regla de supletoriedad a propósito de la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional
61/1997, REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLITICOS, Mar. 20, 1998, at 281-302.
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.

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VI. COURT DOCTRINE: SOURCES OF LAW, RELATIONS
AMONG LEGAL SYSTEMS & EFFECTS OF SENTENCES
In the context of legal theory, the decree-law doctrine of the
Spanish Constitution is very important. Established in Article 86 of
the Constitution, this doctrine is a source of heightened legislative
power for the prime minister to govern through decree during
extraordinary and urgent circumstances.143 Although decrees do not
carry the same weight as other laws, courts can treat them as
emergency bills.144 The Congress of Deputies must ratify or repeal
the decree within thirty days of its enactment.145
In a leading case on the issue, the Constitutional Court held that
the executive branch, as the institution in charge of political
administration,146 should decide when these extraordinary and urgent
needs arise.147 Logically, prime ministers have used this doctrine to
143. C.E. art. 86.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. art. 97.
147. STC, Mar. 28, 2007 (No. 68) (“Es evidente que el concepto ‘extraordinaria y urgente
necesidad’ que se contiene en la Constitución no es, en modo alguno, una cláusula o expresión
vacía de significado dentro de la cual el lógico margen de apreciación política del Gobierno se
mueva libremente sin restricción alguna sino, por el contrario, la constatación de un límite
jurídico a la actuación mediante Decretos-leyes. Y en ese sentido, sin perjuicio del peso que en la
apreciación de lo que haya de considerarse como caso de extraordinaria y urgente necesidad haya
de concederse al juicio puramente político de los órganos a los que incumbe la dirección del
Estado, en especial en el caso de las actuaciones desarrolladas en los ámbitos de la política social
y económica, es, sin embargo, función propia de este Tribunal Constitucional ‘el aseguramiento
de estos límites, la garantía de que en el ejercicio de esta facultad, como de cualquier otra, los
poderes se mueven dentro del marco trazado por la Constitución,’ de forma que ‘el Tribunal
Constitucional podrá, en supuestos de uso abusivo o arbitrario, rechazar la definición que los
órganos políticos hagan de una situación determinada’ y, en consecuencia, declarar la
inconstitucionalidad de un Decreto-ley por inexistencia del presupuesto habilitante por invasión
de las facultades reservadas a las Cortes Generales por la Constitución. Una vez comprobado
que, en el caso de la norma analizada, el Gobierno no ha aportado ninguna justificación que
permita apreciar la concurrencia del presupuesto habilitante requerido, no cabe sino estimar los
recursos de inconstitucionalidad acumulados . . . .” [It is evident that the Constitution’s concept of
“extraordinary and urgent necessity” is not, in any way, a clause or expression void of meaning.
The phrase embodies the logical margin of the Government’s political appreciation of the desire
to move freely: the discovery of a legal limit to using Decretos-leyes as a means of governing.
(S.T.C. 182/1997, of October 28, FJ 3; 11/2002, of January 17, FJ 4; 137/2003, of July 3, FJ 3; y
189/2005, of July 7, FJ 3). And, therefore, without the prejudicial weight that in appreciation
what should be considered a case of extraordinary and urgent necessity, the State’s purely
political bodies must concede to the judiciary. This practice should occur especially in
enactments developed in social and economic political situations. It is, however, this
Constitutional Tribunal’s unique function to “ensure those limits and the guarantee that in
exercising this power, like any other, the powers that move within the frame of the Constitution,”

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enact dozens of decree-laws every year on matters that would have
involved intense, prolonged parliamentary debate.148 A recent
change in this doctrine has forced the prime minister to justify this
decision to a greater extent.149
Since the admission of Spain into the European Union in
1986,150 the Court has had the opportunity to make declarations on
the relationship between the European and Spanish legal systems,
although it has avoided doing so whenever possible.151 The Court
started by maintaining that European law does not override Spanish
constitutional provisions152 and has recently stated that there are no
inherent conflicts between the European constitutional treaty and the
Spanish Constitution itself.153 However, the laws of the European
Union are taken up by the Court because the Spanish Constitutional
Court is considered the ultimate guardian of constitutional
interpretation in instances of potential conflict.154
In this context, the application of Constitutional Court orders has
caused problems on more than one occasion. The Spanish
Constitution does not mention many procedural requirements, and it
is necessary to wait for the L.O.T.C. to ratify them.155 The most
problematic procedural issues come from the fact that despite
language in the L.O.T.C., legislation held to be unconstitutional has
so that “the Constitutional Tribunal will be able to, when it suspects abusive or arbitrary use of
power, reject political entities’ interpretation” (S.T.C. 29/1982, de 31 de mayo, FJ 3) and, as a
result, declare the Decreto-ley unconstitutional on the grounds that these political entities have
assumed the General Courts’ constitutionally guaranteed power. Once it has been confirmed that,
the Government has not provided any justification for the law that would permit the required
assumed authorization, the only option is to consider appeals recursos de inconstitucionalidad
. . .”] (S.T.C. 68/2007 at 66)).
148. ANA M. CARMONA CONTRERAS, LA CONFIGURACIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL DEL DECRETO-
LEY (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales 1997).
149. STC, Mar. 28, 2007 (No. 68).
150. See Treaty on the Accession of Spain and Portugal, art. 1, Nov. 15, 1985, 1985 O.J. (L
302).
151. Only two such declarations have been made. See infra notes 154-155.
152. DTC, Jan. 7, 1992 (No. 1).
153. DTC, Dec. 13, 2004 (No. 1).
154. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. I-6, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C
310) 12. For the latest developments in the European constitutionalization process after the
failure of the Constitutional Treaty, see Francisco Balaguer Callejón, La constitución europa tras
el Consejo Europeo de Bruselas y el Tratado de Lisboa, REVISTA DE DE RECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO, July-Dec. 2007, at 11.
155. Ramón Punset Blanco, Las sentencias declaratorias de la inconstitucionalidad de las
leyes: consideraciones sobre la posible reforma de los artículos 49.1 y 40.1 de la LOTC, 7
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL Y PARLAMENTARIO 33 (1995).

41-2LOPEZ.DOC
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not always been found by the Court to be void as to its prior
enforcement.156 For instance, the Court has found tax measures
unconstitutional but not required refunds to taxpayers where it would
have created a budget crisis for the government.
On occasions, however, the Constitutional Court has declared
some tributary laws unconstitutional to avoid forcing the state to
refund money to taxpayers, which could cause serious economic
damage to the state.157 In relation to appeals for protection (recursos
de amparo), the challenge is balancing the obligation to restore
appellants’ rights158 with the consideration that ordinary judges are
the guarantors of the rights of the citizens.159
VII. CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY PROBLEMS
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Constitutional courts periodically face serious crises that affect
their own place in the government. All important courts have
suffered such identity crises.160 The first time the political
impartiality of the Spanish Constitutional Court was questioned took
place in 1983, when the constitutionality of a decree-law was
questioned.161 The goal of the decree-law was to expropriate a
holding company called Rumasa.162 This was one of the first
measures undertaken by the Spanish socialist party of Felipe
González, and Spain’s conservative political sectors were fearful of a
communist influence on economic policy.
The most important legal problem was that while Article 86 of
the Constitution established that decree-laws may not affect the
156. L.O.T.C. art. 39.
157. STC, Feb. 20, 1989 (No. 45).
158. L.O.T.C. art. 50.
159. Id. art. 54. The concurrent jurisdiction of ordinary judges and the Constitutional Court in
the protection of fundamental rights has created more than a small conflict between these two
entities. In 2006, more than a third of the appeals for protection (recursos de amparo) were
formulated after the Supreme Court intervened. Tribunal Constitucional de España,
http://www.Tribunalconstitucional.es/memorias/2006/memo06_anexo03.html#CuadroDest14
(last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
160. We cannot forget the current situation in the United States and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
response every time President George W. Bush loses his way. See generally BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court’s failure to
challenge presidential authority).
161. STC, Dec. 3, 1983 (No. 111).
162. Id.

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rights, duties, and freedoms contained in Title I of the Constitution,163
the decree-law in question amounted to an expropriation—a violation
of property rights defined in Title I.164 The Court was clearly
divided,165 and the vote of then-President Manuel García Pelayo
tipped the balance in favor of the socialists.166 The majority’s
interpretation of Article 86 prohibited a general regulation through
decree-law of provisions contained in Title I but did not prohibit
actions occasionally affecting one right, as was the case.167 This
controversial decision aroused all kinds of suspicions about the
Court, especially the fear that the Court had been pressured by the
government. President García Pelayo, who had returned from exile
in Venezuela and had been a prestigious jurist and author of
fundamental works for the training of Spanish constitutionals,168 died
shortly after the decision.
After this controversy and subsequent decisions involving issues
of moral significance (e.g., abortion and sterilization of mentally
disabled people), the Constitutional Court has been undergoing a
period of great tension, particularly during the process of reforming
the Statutes of Autonomy.169
In fact, the ultimate constitutionality of the new statutes will be
substantially impacted by three key factors: (1) the conflict between
the centrist vision of Spain held by the right-wing PP Party and the
federalist view of the Spanish socialist PSOE Party; (2) the fact that
the Court is essentially split in two groups, conservative and
progressive; and (3) the indeterminacy of the sections of the
Constitution regarding the territorial distribution of power. These
issues have put the Court under significant pressure, which in part
163. C.E. arts. 10–55, 86.
164. STC, Dec. 2, 1983 (No. 111).
165. The division did not entirely correspond to the ideology of the Court’s members. For
example, F. Rubio Llorente, current President of the Council of State and considered a
progressive, voted against the constitutionality of the decree.
166. STC, Dec. 2, 1983 (No. 111).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., MANUEL GARCÍA-PELAYO, Derecho constitucional comparado, in OBRAS
COMPLETAS 223 (1991); MANUEL GARCÍA-PELAYO, Las transformaciones del estado
contemporáneo, in OBRAS COMPLETAS.
169. STC, July 14, 1994 (No. 215) (discussing the constitutionality of anti-abortion laws);
STC, Apr. 11, 1985 (No. 53) (discussing the constitutionality of sterilizing the mentally disabled).

41-2LOPEZ.DOC
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led to the decision to bar Magistrate Pérez Tremps from hearing the
upcoming appeal on the statutes.170
These pressures do not come solely from political parties but
also from powerful media groups in Spain.171 The criticism of the
Court by these new mass-media conglomerates may ultimately leave
the Court in an untenable position, harming Spain’s democratic
system in ways these companies do not seem to appreciate. One can
only hope that new jurists coming to the Court will be able to
overcome these challenges and protect the Court’s constitutional role
through their jurisprudence.
VIII. THE SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TODAY
In light of my prior discussion, I will now turn to an analysis of
the main characteristics of the Spanish constitutional model–a model
linked with what are now practically universal tendencies in
contemporary democracies. The Constitution as a concept does
recognize frontiers, just like democracy and the Constitutional Court.
Surely, the challenge for the Spanish Court is to join the ranks of
established constitutional courts in other democracies, although this
is not an easy task. As political theorist Hannah Arendt reminded us:
Political passions—courage, the pursuit of public
happiness, the taste of public freedom, an ambition that
strives for excellence regardless not only of social status
and administrative office but even of achievement and
congratulation—are perhaps not as rare as we are inclined
to think, living in a society which has perverted all virtues
into social values; but they certainly are out of the ordinary
under all circumstances.172
The Spanish Constitutional Court has performed a vital function
in the development of constitutional government in Spain. In
reviewing the role the Court has played, I want to emphasize several
of its characteristic features that involve positive action. As I have
tried to show, Spain is not recognizable without the Constitutional
170. See, e.g., ElPaís.com, El Constitucional acepta la recusación de Pérez Tremps planteada
por el PP, May 2, 2007, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/constitucional/acepta/recusacion/
Perez/Tremps/planteada/PP/elpepuesp/20070205elpepunac_11/Tes.
171. See, e.g., INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, SPAIN—ATTACKS ON JU STICE 5 (2002),
http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/spain.pdf (discussing media pressure on jurists).
172. ARENDT, supra note 1, at 280.

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Court. As such, the Court is not merely based upon negative
authority. It possesses an active power that drives the Constitution
and constitutional developments in a specific direction. The more
open the constitutional principles embraced by the Court, the more
relevant the Court becomes. From its interpretation of Article 149 to
the Harmonization Law, the Court’s many significant decisions
affecting autonomous regions bear out this point.
The Court is an active power that has established a particular
view of the Constitution, one that is open to its citizens and
characterized by dialog with other constitutional courts. This is
why, for example, the Court in STC 119/2001 considered how noise
can influence the inviolability of homes under the European Court of
Human Rights Sentences of December 9, 1994 and February 19,
1998.173
The Court is an active power when the representative authorities
are in crisis. The Court represents the law against politics: what
political leaders cannot do (or do not want to do) is requested from
the Constitutional Court, leaving the institution weaker at times as a
result. As Professor Joseph Weiler noted in commenting about the
Court of Justice of the European Union, the primacy of the Union’s
laws, their direct effects, the union members responsibilities for the
failure to comply with community law, and the recognition of
fundamental rights throughout the union are the result of the
decisions of the Court of Justice, not the representative authorities.174
Constitutional courts possess an active power, which in secured
democracies does not answer to direct infringements of the
Constitution but discusses the meaning of the constitutional precepts
in light of constitutional doctrine.175
The Court is a compulsorily active power because constitutional
courts do not have the authority to avoid problematic issues, much
like the U.S. Supreme Court. Nevertheless, in practice, the Spanish
Constitutional Court is avoiding (and sometimes solving) problems
173. STC, May 24, 2001 (No. 119). On the dialog of our Court with other constitutional
Courts, see Angel Rodríguez, Las resoluciones del Tribunal Constitucional español previas a las
sentencias condenatorias del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (Primeras reflexiones
sobre las dificultades de un diálogo), in DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL Y CULTURA: ESTUDIOS EN
HOMENAJE A PETER HÄBERLE 517 (Francisco Balaguer Callejón ed., 2004).
174. JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, EUROPA, FIN DE SIGLO (1995).
175. See MARIA ANGELES AHUMADA RUIZ, LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL EN EUROPA
49 (2005).

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by delaying their decisions. Yet as it has been stated, a recent reform
of the L.O.T.C. has the aim to limit appeals to the Court over
fundamental rights to controversies that are based on substantial
facts.
The Court is an active power that is very politically visible.
Therefore, some maintain that it is better to limit the Court’s
jurisdiction to legal controversies, removing party controversies from
its docket. As it is impossible to identify judges who are completely
free from prior opinion on significant legal issues, the challenge is to
choose the Court’s magistrates appropriately and remove procedures
that cause the main political parties to select magistrates according to
their political affiliation.176
The Court is an active and constructive power: constructive for
the Constitution and for the law by seeking pragmatic solutions to
constitutional conflicts. The Spanish Constitutional Court has also
been characterized as controlling the interpretation of
constitutionality. The presumption that laws are constitutional is
prevalent in European models of democracy, and this is where the
use of interpretative constitutional decisions comes from. The aim is
to save the law by pointing out which interpretation must prevail in
order for the law to be in compliance with the Constitution.
The Court is an active power that governs in a fragmentary way.
Its decisions on issues are necessarily limited, contrary to what
happens with parliamentary enactments.177 The essence of
constitutional jurisdiction is in the structural tension between the
Court and the law: 178 the new-method constitutionalism adds to the
old rivalry between gubernaculum and iurisdictio,179 as long as the
Court’s position is not mistaken.
176. One of the problems of this practice is that while it provides an incentive for those jurists
who aim at being part of the Court to join the sphere of one or other party, instead of exercising
their duties independent of political influence. See id. at 173–74.
177. See Francisco Balaguer Callejón, Niveaux et techniques internes et internationaux de
réalisation des droits en Europe, 1995 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 675.
178. See ELISEO AJA, LAS TENSIONES ENTRE EL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL Y EL
LEGISLADOR EN LA EUROPA ACTUAL (1998).
179. See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUCIONALISMO ANTIGUO Y
MODERNO (Juan Jose Solozabal Echavarría trans., 1991).

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IX. CONCLUSION
The Spanish Constitution established the Constitutional Court
with the objective of guaranteeing the Constitution and its more
distinctive elements: the fundamental rights of citizens and a
regionally based structure of power. The Court is a separate branch
from the ordinary judiciary, following the European model of
judicial review. With respect to the Court’s composition and
appointment, the Constitution tries to establish mechanisms to
guarantee the independence of the magistrates, although
developments have made that goal more challenging.
The Court’s decisions have been true to Spain’s constitutional
model, and its judgments affecting Spain’s federal system have been
especially important. The Court has faced moments during which
political factions and Spain’s citizens have seriously criticized it, but
until now, the Court has been able to maintain its prestige and
independence in the face of these challenges. However, Spain has
reached a new moment of crisis with the coming changes to the
Statutes of Autonomy. To maintain its critical constitutional role in
the face of those who would attack its authority, the Court will have
to exercise great care to protect the delicate political balance that
underlies Spain’s Constitution and democratic system.