The Moral Obligation to Obey Law
Abstract
Partisan d'une desobeissance selective a la loi, l'A. examine le processus evaluatif qui justifie l'idee d'une obligation morale d'obeissance. A travers l'exemple d'un chemin universitaire traversant une propriete privee, l'A. montre que les arguments de loyaute, gratitude et consentement, n'ont aucune force de decision dans le raisonnement pratique qui conduit a violer ou non la loi.
... Therefore, law indifference, according to Gur (2013:341), is not a behavior that those subject to these laws should aspire to have. In an attempt to further identify the normative approach, Tunick (2002) distinguishes between the contagion and the political argument. The contagion argument, in Tunick's view, implies that obeying the law is the right thing to do in order to prevent the spread of disobedience, possibly resulting in widespread lawlessness, whereas the political argument entails that as members of a political community we ought to obey its rules. ...
This article discusses the relationship between the private international oil company (IOC) Royal Dutch Shell and Russia as an oil producing and oil exporting state during a period when oil prices were moving towards unforeseen heights (2005-2007). By examining this dynamic relationship, this study aims to contribute to an understanding of Russia’s discursive and culturally produced history. The history of a state-oil company interaction has shown that the use of legal instruments is a good indicator to determine the nature of the relationship between oil-producing states and IOCs – a relationship that often has been characterized by periods of cooperation or conflict.At the centre of inquiry is how the oil major understands the law in Russia, and in particular the enforcement of the country’s formal written rules during legal conflicts over the development of the Sakhalin-II oil and gas fields (in which Shell until December 2006 controlled a majority stake). After identifying the violations of formal laws, I conclude that Shell understands that the formal rules of the game are subordinate to the unwritten laws of energy politics and in particular the informal demands of contemporary Russian society. The article also illustrates that oil-producing states have the upper hand in conflicts over the development of oil and gas resources.
Trespassing is a legal term that can refer to a wide variety of offenses against a person or property. Trespass is broadly divided into three groups: trespass to the person, trespass to property, and trespass to land.
It is often argued that retributivists must oppose the entrapment defense for various reasons (such as that entrapped defendants have nonetheless broken the law), but this chapter explores some reasons why a retributivist can support an entrapment defense. First, entrapped defendants may be less culpable than the "privately enticed" insofar as they do not cause harm: since the police control the situation, no actual harm is caused, which may bear on one's culpability. Furthermore, if one's predisposition were weak and required substantial police coaxing to be triggered, we might say that the police action and not the defendant caused the crime in the relevant sense. Also, using Robert Nozick's account of coercion in a novel way, entrapped defendants may be less culpable insofar as their action was not fully voluntary; unlike in private enticement cases, they necessarily underestimate the probability of being caught before making their choice.
Combining rigorous philosophical analysis with a deep knowledge of law, this study of agreements illuminates legal doctrine by philosophical theory and vice versa. Against the prevailing philosophical view of agreements, the book argues that they are to be understood in terms not of promises but of offer and acceptance. Topics covered include the obligations associated with agreements; the practical reasoning that leads parties to make and perform agreements; the relation between agreement and intention; and the reasons the State has to intervene in agreements. There are also separate chapters devoted to doctrines of agreement in the laws of contract, competition and conspiracy.
Joseph Raz’s theory of authority has become influential among moral, political, and legal philosophers. This article will provide an overview and accessible explanation of the theory, guiding those coming to it for the first time as to its theoretical ambitions within the wider issues of authority, and through its intricacies. I first situate the theory among philosophical examinations of authority, and then explain the theory itself in detail.
Philosophy, despite its typical attitude of detachment and abstraction, has for most of its long history been engaged with the practical and mundane-seeming question of whether there is a duty to obey the law. As Matthew Kramer has recently summarized: “For centuries, political and legal theorists have pondered whether each person is under a general obligation of obedience to the legal norms of the society wherein he or she lives. The obligation at issue in those theorists' discussions is usually taken to be prima-facie, comprehensively applicable, universally borne, and content-independent.” This essay is a commentary on the current state of discussion of this perennial philosophical topic.
Political obligations vary in force. Though we have strong obligations to obey certain laws, our obligations to obey others appear to be considerably weaker. Because the weakness of the obligations to obey certain laws has been employed as an argument against the existence of general prima facie political obligations, an adequate theory of political obligation must account for this. By employing the obligation to keep promises as a model, I sort out the factors that contribute to the force of prima facie political obligations. Their varying force can be explained according to a general theory of political obligation founded on the principle of fairness.
Chapter 1 New Introduction Chapter 2 Preface Chapter 3 Political Obligation Chapter 4 The Principle of Fairness Chapter 5 Political Precepts Chapter 6 Discretionary Public Goods Chapter 7 Fairness Theory Chapter 8 Fairness, Utilitarianism, and Consent Chapter 9 Appendix I: Parfit's Moral Arithmetic and the Obligation to Obey the Law Chapter 10 Appendix II: The Principle of Fairness and Political Attitudes Chapter 11 Bibliography Chapter 12 Index
The Obligation to Obey the Law
- Richard Wasserstrom
Richard Wasserstrom, "The Obligation to Obey the Law," UCLA
Law Review 10 (1963):791-93;
Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation
- See George Klosko
See George Klosko, "Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation," Philosophy
and Public Affairs 16, no. 3 (Summer 1987):241-59.
Political Obligation and the Argument from Gratitude Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law? " 953–54. See also George Klosko Political Obligation and Gratitude Obligations of Grati-tude and Political Obligation
- D M Walker
D. M. Walker, " Political Obligation and the Argument from Gratitude, " Philosophy and Public Affairs 17, no. 3 (Summer 1988):191–211, at 192, 205, 207. 16 M. B. E. Smith, " Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law? " 953–54. See also George Klosko, " Political Obligation and Gratitude, " Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 4 (Fall 1989):352–58, at 354–58 (but see Walker's response, " Obligations of Grati-tude and Political Obligation, " Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 4 [Fall 1989]:359–64, at 363–64);