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Projects, politics and professionals: Alternative approaches for project identification and project planning
Abstract
In the 1970s agricultural and rural development projects were believed to be on ‘the cutting edge’ of initiatives to improve rural livelihoods. However, subsequent evaluations have concluded that many projects have produced poor results. One response to these negative findings has been the generation of a large number of disparate ideas about how projects could be better identified, planned and managed. Despite the efforts devoted to drawing up these alternative approaches they are little known to the majority of planners. This paper reviews these alternative approaches by presenting a framework for their classification and comparison. It concludes that there is no optimal model for planning agricultural or rural projects but, rather, a set of alternatives that should be considered depending on the specific context and objectives of an intervention. Projects seeking to improve the living conditions of the rural poor, however, are likely to perform better when the conventional approach to project planning is put aside.
... They are the means by which knowledge brokers are able to translate international concepts, ideas and policies into reality within recipient countries in the Global South (ibid.). However, among practitioners, policy-makers and instrumental researchers, conservation and development projects are framed as a rational and logical sequence of events that have been derived from normative policy models, in pursuit of achieving a set of stated objectives (Hulme 1995). Projects are designed by international conservation and development professionals to fulfil a range of different objectives and therefore vary in scope, but they often share key characteristics in their design (Hulme 1995;Cusworth and Franks 2013). ...
... However, among practitioners, policy-makers and instrumental researchers, conservation and development projects are framed as a rational and logical sequence of events that have been derived from normative policy models, in pursuit of achieving a set of stated objectives (Hulme 1995). Projects are designed by international conservation and development professionals to fulfil a range of different objectives and therefore vary in scope, but they often share key characteristics in their design (Hulme 1995;Cusworth and Franks 2013). They are temporally and spatially bound, involve the introduction of new activities, and are designed to deliver specific outcomes; for example creating a new management institution or constructing assets such as a well in a rural village (Cusworth and Franks 2013). ...
... Among conservation development professionals and within the instrumental literature, projects are typically framed as linear, following what is termed as a project life cycle (Mosse 2005;Hulme 1995). This project life cycle implies a 'step by step' progression: identification of the problem, development of a policy to tackle this problem, implementation, outcomes and evaluation of outcomes (Long and van der Ploeg 1989: 227). ...
Pilot projects are used as tools to test new solutions to global environment and development concerns including climate change and natural resource management. They are framed as mechanisms that provide evidence of 'what works' in order to improve policy and practice. However, despite the widespread use of pilot projects, their dynamics, impacts and implications are not well studied. Drawing on political ecology, social anthropology, science and technology studies, social justice theory, and policy studies literature, this thesis critically explores the phenomenon of pilot projects using a case study of REDD+ in Tanzania. An interpretivist-constructivist, actor-based approach to research is taken, using ethnographic data that includes over 150 narrative interviews with conservation and development professionals and actors involved in district and village-level pilot projects. Findings are presented in three analytical chapters. The first unpacks the relationship between pilot projects, policy and practice. A contradiction is identified between the design of the pilot projects as experimental and outside of the constraints of existing institutions, and the ability of the projects to have meaningful, longer-term influence. The second analytical chapter explores the complex dynamics and implications of expectations in pilot projects, identifying a trade-off between fully piloting new initiatives and raising expectations. The final analytical chapter uses a recognition justice lens to explore pilot project evaluations, finding that the ways of knowing, values and perspectives of some actors are discursively reproduced through the process, excluding and delegitimizing alternative perspectives. These results contribute to critical debates on international environment and development policy and practice by arguing that rather than delivering innovation and learning, pilot projects reproduce and reinforce the status quo. As such, this thesis reconceptualises pilot projects as agents of social change that cannot be contained within project objectives and timelines. This has significant implications for the continued use of pilot projects and raises questions about responsibility and accountability for their outcomes.
... The conventional and indeed critical PM literatures have paid relatively little attention to ID projects (notable exceptions being Diallo and Thuillier, 2004;Ika, 2012;Ika et al., 2010;Khang and Moe, 2008;Landoni and Corti, 2011;Youker, 1989). Similarly, although much has been written about ID management (Cooke and Dar, 2008;Curtis and Poon, 2009;Thomas, 1996Thomas, , 2000, the ID literature has rarely analysed in detail the nature of projects and PM (here, exceptions include Biggs and Smith, 2003;Gow and Morss, 1988;Hirschman, 1967;Hulme, 1995;Khwaja, 2009). ...
... These project cycles have been around in ID for more than 40 years; they have been promoted by aid agencies; and they have been the subject of many ID textbooks. Although they are somewhat different, they share the same essential characteristics (Landoni and Corti, 2011); they are normative or ideal; they rely upon logically ordered sequences of activities which are determined by a known and explicit objective or set of objectives; they are rational since their objectives constrain the analysis of options and risks; their planners are professional and, as such, are expected to act rationally, suppressing subjective considerations (Hulme, 1995). ...
... Also, early evaluations of the infrastructure projects of the 1950s and 1960s and the agricultural/rural projects of the 1970s have concluded that many projects have produced poor results (Hulme, 1995;Tacconi and Tisdell, 1992). The well-known Howell report demonstrates that, based on a rate of return criterion below 10%, 54% of the World Bank rural ID projects in the early 1970s in Africa were failures (Howell, 1990). ...
This article aims at making international development (ID) projects critical. To that end, it shows that project management (PM) in ID has evolved as an offshoot of conventional PM moving like the latter, but at varying speeds, from a traditional approach suited to blueprint projects where tools matter (1960s–1980s); towards eclectic and contingent approaches suited to process projects where people matter the most (1980s–now); and finally pointing towards the potential contribution of a critical perspective which focuses on issues of power (1980s–now). Consequently, it points to a confluence between the Critical Project Studies movement and Critical Development Studies movements. More specifically, it argues that the postdevelopment, the Habermasian, the Foucauldian and the neo-Marxist lenses may be effectively called upon in that scholarship. Thus, it suggests a framework to encourage project actors to reflect on their personal positions in light of the power relations which shape PM in ID.
... In the 1970s, it was believed that rural development projects were at the forefront of initiatives to improve rural livelihoods. However, subsequent evaluations and studies showed rural development projects in a bad light [37]. In response to the poor results, this second period saw an extensive debate on how to improve rural development planning with new approaches and methodologies for working with communities and promoting people's participation. ...
... In WWP approach, the origin of knowledge is observation and experience. This innovation as a learning process is especially important in the sustainable rural development projects, where it is demanded that the rural population change from being an object to being a subject of the projects and processes [37]; is also needed «putting the first last» [39]. ...
The contribution of academics and researchers to the discussion around sustainable rural development planning and its impact on rural communities has grown exponentially in recent years. Understanding trends in sustainable rural development research requires considering the different factors involved and affecting people from a holistic approach. This review examines, through bibliometric studies, the scientific knowledge generated on sustainable rural development planning in the last 50 years, analysing 6895 articles published in journals between 1970 and 2020. The results reveal the existence of three clusters, and important growth is observed to respond to the continuous needs in relation to sustainable rural development. This research shows the evolution of a new approach for the planning of sustainable rural development projects in postmodernity: Working with People (WWP). This WWP model, as a conceptual framework from social learning, has been validated as a novel proposal in numerous contexts. The bibliometric analysis shows an evolution in “From Putting the Last First” to “Working with People in Rural Development” research and the contributions of influential teachers, such as Chambers and Cernea. These bibliometric analyses demonstrate the correct approach of the WWP model and open new fields of research in the planning of sustainable rural development projects.
... Consequently, PMs tend to blame bad planning for project failure and project supervisors blame bad implementation. Thus, there are escape hatches for both project supervisors and managers, but not for the beneficiaries (Hulme, 1995). Since PMs have to request a no-objection for anything that affects implementation, and it is obtained only by toeing the line, they come to practice project management as the art of not violating procedures. ...
... Their key preoccupation was "high-level monitoring" (mean of 5.5 out of 7; Ika et al., 2012). Third, given their lack of latitude, PMs may still contend -should the project fail -that it is because of the overall project plan (Hulme, 1995). ...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to improve understanding and practice of project management by assessing whether two of its core myths also prevail in international development (ID): first, that project managers (PMs) plan fully for project success, including implementation success and end‐user satisfaction; and second, that they can focus on “getting things done”, free of concern for strategic issues.
Design/methodology/approach
The analysis of a high‐profile World Bank project and of the policies and rules under which their PMs operate serves as a means to carry out the research. The authors uncover certain “facts” that challenge the myths that prevail in standard project management. Furthermore, they examine how these facts and the corollaries they produce guide the behaviours of PMs differently in the ID field.
Findings
In the ID field, and contrary to the standard practice in project management, it is found that: PMs are not involved in overall planning, and are limited to implementation planning, because they lack the necessary latitude. Hence, they practice project implementation as the art of avoiding making mistakes as they juggle donor procedures and guidelines. Second, PMs are well informed about the overall strategy of their project, which is articulated by the donors and the beneficiary country, but they are limited in their ability to contribute directly to its success. Thus, they may fail to deliver the intended development strategy even if they “get things done”.
Research limitations/implications
This paper argues that these two core PM tenets are convenient myths at best, given the asymmetrical distribution of power, the strong front‐end activity, and the procedures orientation of international development projects.
Practical implications
This paper addresses questions regarding the nature and the content of the work of PMs in the context of ID. In contrast to other sectors, projects are found to be linked more clearly to the higher strategic issues, and yet PMs are less empowered to contribute to them. Thus, all stakeholders may have to revise their expectations regarding what PMs can realistically do in ID. These findings are relevant to scholars and practitioners alike.
Originality/value
The value of this paper lies in examining the basic question of “what PMs do”. Although ID has been project‐oriented since the 1950s, this question has not received much attention in standard PM literature. In assessing “what PMs do”, the paper also brings into question “ what project management is ”.
... Similar to standard project management , project management in ID seems to be dominated by a prescriptive, rational, and instrumental one-size-fitsall approach that is grounded in the tradition of fields such as engineering, architecture, and economics and that assumes that all types of projects and project models share the same characteristics (Baum, 1970, 1978; Ika et al., 2010; Ika & Hodgson, 2010; Johnson, 1984; Picciotto & Weaving, 1994). As noted in Ika and Hodgson (2010, p. 8), " They (models) are normative or ideal; they rely upon logically ordered sequences of activities which are determined by a known and explicit objective or set of objectives; they are rational since their objectives constrain the analysis of options and risks; their planners are professional and, as such, are expected to act rationally, suppressing subjective considerations " (Hulme, 1995). The World Bank, for example, has standard procedures that all its projects must follow no matter their size and content. ...
... One cannot continue to overlook, ignore, or suppress the intrinsically political nature of projects in favor of an idealized , apolitical, and neutral rationalism (Ika & Hodgson, 2010). In that regard, hybrid and contingent models at the midpoint between the traditional and the political approaches, in which projects are both technocratic exercises and political arenas for conflict, bargaining, and trade-offs, in which data and technical tools, power, and skill are used to manipulate the agenda, to block a potential item, or to withhold information that does not suit the holder's needs are worth contemplating (Hulme, 1995; Ika & Hodgson, 2010). Bond and Hulme (1999, p. 1354) note, " The approach best suited to any particular circumstance is dependent on the objectives of the intervention and the specific context. ...
This article discusses international development (ID) projects and project management problems within ID in Africa and suggests they may fall into one or more of four main traps: the one‐size‐fits‐all technical trap, the accountability‐for‐results trap, the lack‐of‐project‐management‐capacity trap, and the cultural trap. It then proposes an agenda for action to help ID move away from the prevailing one‐size‐fits‐all project management approach; to refocus project management for ID on managing objectives for long‐term development results; to increase aid agencies' supervision efforts notably in failing countries; and to tailor project management to African cultures. Finally, this article suggests an agenda for research, presenting a number of ways in which project management literature could support design and implementation of ID projects in Africa.
... Cette perspective orthodoxe est basée sur des concepts tels que la rationalité formelle et le réductionnisme du mandat et a tendance à mettre l'accent sur ce qui devrait être plutôt que ce qui est (Hulme, 1995;Ika et Hodgson, 2010). Dans pareille conception du projet, s'il échoue, c'est parce que la planification ou bien la réalisation n'a pas été maîtrisée (Ika et Hodgson, 2010). ...
... In these arenas, the objectives are not only seldom precise but multiple; some of the objectives are visible and many other are hidden…As no starting point exists for the project cycle, and there is no clean state, parties compete to set and manipulate the agenda for public discussion in terms of their self-interests; trade-offs between the interests of different parties are commonly but informally agreed. In such arenas, the search for a consensus is hence a permanent quest in the 'chaos of purposes and accidents' before any agenda receives a serious consideration (Hulme, 1995;Ika et Hodgson, 2010, p. 13). ...
Dans l'ensemble, la gestion de projet souscrit à une perspective rationnelle et objective selon laquelle l’organisation est relativement libre de tensions politiques, psychosociales, et culturelles. Si ces hypothèses semblent être adéquates dans le cadre de la gestion quotidienne et routinière de l'organisation, elles peuvent être irréalistes et mêmes trompeuses dans le contexte de projets où les enjeux sont multiples et complexes et dans lesquels des individus et des organisations provenant de disciplines et d'horizons très divers sont appelés à travailler ensemble. En sortant ainsi des sentiers battus, cet article fait ressortir certaines insuffisances de l’approche rationnelle qui domine en gestion de projet et propose une lecture plurielle à travers le prisme orthodoxe rationnel du mandat, le prisme politique du mandant et le prisme psychosocial du mandataire. Nous illustrons ces perspectives et leur apports distinctifs en examinant des faits saillants qui ont marqué les jeux olympiques d’hiver de Vancouver en 2010, un projet connu et de grande envergure. Il en ressort que la perspective rationnelle du mandat ne s’avère appropriée que lorsque les critères d’efficience prévalent ex ante dans les organisations parente et cliente. Par contre, le gestionnaire aura plutôt intérêt à prendre en considération la perspective politique axée sur les mandants, lorsque les organisations sont elles-mêmes très politisées et ont des attentes divergentes à l’égard du projet; et, finalement, une perspective psychosociale axée sur les mandataires, lorsque les membres qui participent au projet jouissent de beaucoup d’autonomie et peuvent exercer un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire, sans craintes de représailles. In the main, project management subscribes to a rational and objective view of the organization, relatively free of political, psychosocial and cultural tensions. While these assumptions may be adequate for the day-to- day routine management of the organization, they may be unrealistic and misleading in the context of projects where the stakes are numerous and complex, and in which individuals and organizations from various disciplines and backgrounds are thrust together. On these unchartered paths, some of the shortcomings of the rational approach that prevails in project management come to light, as this paper takes successive outlooks on the project, viewed through the traditional prism of the rational mandate, the political prism of the principals and, finally, through the socio- psychological prism of the agents. We illustrate these three perspectives and their distinctive contributions by revisiting some controversial events that marred the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, a large and well- known project. What emerges is that a rational mandate perspective is appropriate when the criterion of efficiency prevails in both the parent and the client organizations. However, the project manager would be better served to take into consideration the political perspective —based on the principals— when the parent organizations are themselves highly politicized and have differing expectations regarding the project; and finally, a psychosocial perspective —based on the agents— should be undertaken when members participating in the project enjoy a great deal of autonomy and can exercise some discretionary power, without fear of reprisal.
... So, to bring about social change, instead of implementing a preplanned intervention, development agencies need to be learning organisations engaged in a process of knowledge-building, institution-building and action-taking. Also, as much as the blueprint, or what Hulme (1995) terms the orthodox, project model seems rational and 'clean' and the project identification and cycle a non-competitive process, in reality projects should not be taken as a technocratic exercise but rather as arenas characterised by conflicts and bargaining used as tools for identifying likely outcomes (Hulme, 1995, pp. 54-56). ...
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a post-war country in which continuous development efforts have been made over the past two decades to help the country to recover and transition to capitalism and liberal democracy. Taking place in a complex context they encompass reforms in the political, economic, institutional and social realms.
Health reform is part of these efforts. As such, it involves a number of programmes and projects in different fields and at different levels aimed at achieving a better quality, higher efficiency, and sustainability of the health system. However, after so much time and efforts, their success and sustainability do not seem quite satisfactory. This study has therefore set out to examine inter-organisational relationships between different stakeholders to determine their implications for the success and sustainability of development health programmes and projects. Since values, meanings and perceptions influence these relationships, a qualitative data research was applied using a participatory method.
The findings suggest that for the success and sustainability of programmes and projects, besides political, economic, social and cultural factors, the type and quality of inter-organisational relationships are important. These not only concern relationships between international and national stakeholders, but also those within these groups including personal-level relationships. Affecting them, and affected by them, are concepts such as unequal power relations, project management models, participation and institutional capacity.
To make health programmes and projects more meaningful and sustainable to an extent possible, recommendations are made for both international and national stakeholders aimed at improving their design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. For the international development interveners they include a more detailed knowledge of the local context and needs, inclusion of sustainability considerations in all phases of the project lifecycle and participatory evaluation. For the national health authorities, recommendations refer to the improvement of communications channels within the health system, provision of project management training for those engaged in development projects, and state-level monitoring and implementation mechanism.
... Mechanisms of this contribution and their complications, for example in terms of the revise-ability of consensus in review arrangements, have not been examined in a focused study yet (see Margerum, 2002;Neuman, 2003). So this study aims to test a hypothetical model consisting of the following: (a) the clarification of costs and benefits in project identification causes conflict in the strategic planning arena (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012;Bachmann, 2007); (b) disinterest in leaving the comfort zone, especially among stronger players, is likely to result in the application of the orthodox (quantitative) model of project identification to settle the conflict (Hulme, 1995; see also Dong & Xu, 2016); (c) political steer of the orthodox model will provoke the losers to put aside caution, challenge power differentials and seek authentic dialogue in which stakeholders and projects are acknowledged to be partisan and subjective (see Innes, 2004;Schaffer, 1984;Van den Belt, 2004); (d) if projects require network power, dominant actors will take up the challenge for authentic dialogue (Booher & Innes, 2002), otherwise political deadlocks are expected (Ziafati Bafarasat & Baker, in press). In the former case, the potential for an 'exchange' system or vote trading is likely to lead to consensual contracts (El-Hakim, 1978) and (e) the making of consensual contracts implies that a new stronger comfort zone has formed. ...
This paper discusses three normative standpoints on conflict in strategic spatial planning: no conflict, conflict for consensus and conflict for meta-consensus on the validity of dispute. These views apply to the questions of whether and why projects, as a major source of conflict, should be identified in the process of strategic planning. In their approaches to these questions, the performance school advocates the production of general guidelines to avoid conflict, the collaborative perspective supports the identification of projects in strategic planning in order to utilize their potential in a conflict-to-consensus journey and the conflict-oriented perspective favours the identification of projects in strategic planning in order to arrive at meta-consensus on the immediate disputability of robust agreements. Reflecting on the collaborative perspective, this paper tests a hypothetical model of how conflicts created in the face of project identification can feed in making consensual strategies. Findings in the North West region of England support the model and suggest some difficulties with reviewing such consensus around which a resistance network forms. The paper puts forward some recommendations for overcoming the review challenge.
... As argued before, collaborative regional institutions are likely to avoid project negotiations for the fear of collapse of high level ties and agreements where resource displacement between partners is often the outcome of consensus. This could, however, be meta-governed since "the system is open to any new fad that does not appear to threaten stability or which might offer additional resources to bargain over" (Hulme, 1995;216). It is thus hypothesized that the existence of manage-rial regional institutions with central resources can create political courage for collaborative regional institutions to step out of their 'comfort zone' (Albrechts, 2010) and discuss projects that might be incorporated and taken forward by the former. ...
Reflecting on the concepts of meta-governance and soft projects, this study involves testing a hypothetical model for regional policy integration which incorporates three core assumptions: (a) collaborative regional institutions are likely to step out of their comfort zone and engage in project discussions where there are managerial regional institutions which have the potential to incorporate such projects and take them forward; (b) soft projects, like regional parks, unleash such potential since they can involve a wide range of objectives and activities and thus provide an opportunity for managerial regional institutions to procure legitimacy by wider inputs at low cost; and (c) collaborative regional institutions tend to overcome their initial internal differences about such projects in order to develop network power in relation to managerial regional institutions. This hypothetical model is supported by case study findings in the North West region of England, feeding in a discussion about some priorities for future research.
... ''Commitment'' is developmentÕs latest holy grail. Along with the presumed synonyms of ''will'' and ''ownership,'' we find it in discussion of rural development (Clay & Schaffer, 1984;Hulme, 1995); macroeconomic management (Killick, 1998); public enterprise reform (Campos & Esfahani, 2000); civil service reform, the focus of this article (Nunberg, 1997); and no doubt elsewhere. It is a particular feature of donor documents. ...
We now move from the Mediterranean state of Morocco to a small landlocked country in Africa’s southern cone: by a quirk of colonial cartography, Swaziland’s eastern border stops a tantalizing hundred kilometres short of the Indian Ocean, so that it finds itself hemmed in on three sides by South Africa and on its eastern frontier by Mozambique. Swaziland had a population of roughly 1.1 million in 2003, projected to reach 1.5 million by 2015. Having been ranked 112th in 2000, by 2003 it had slipped to 137th out of 177 countries on UNDP’s Human Development Index, as we saw in Chapter 1, mainly owing to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Unusually for Africa, it is a virtually monoethnic state. That, together with its monarchy, an institution that straddles the colonial period, and its relative prosperity have given it considerable stability: its ranking on this factor is higher than on any of the other factors in the World Bank’s governance index (again, see Chapter 1).
... The very essence of RBM calls for measurement of actual results achieved against objectives set. Therefore, the design phase in RBM should be given the highest priority since without the diligent design work there is a high likelihood of project failure (e.g., Smith, 1988;Tacconi and Tisdell, 1992;Hulme, 1995). ...
Results Based Management (RBM) has been too focused on the old paradigm of demonstrating results. There is a need to refocus RBM on the new paradigm of managing objectives. In this regard the function of management-for-results in RBM needs to incorporate Millennium Development Goals, key success criteria and factors, cost-benefit comparisons.
... The first is the strategic definition in which the project team identifies the processes to be revised. Since the beginning it was clear that the political nature of commitment (D1), as reported also by many authors [24][25][26], is a first important difference. ...
Project management strategy in the public sector has attracted the interest of many scholars since the late 1980s, following the growing pressure on governments to abandon bureaucratic organisations in favour of leaner structures. Though Italy is considered a late developer in this movement, its scope, speed and consistency of reforms is considered remarkable [OECD, (2001), Reviews of Regulatory Reform in Italy]. Within this context many projects have been undertaken trying to implement the ideas of New Public Management (NPM) [Public Administration (1991) 69:3; Accounting, Organizations and Society (1995) 20:93]. This paper reports on a reengineering project carried out at the Italian Ministry of Treasury which tested a methodology drawn from the literature of process engineering. Multiple dimensions and actions proved to be crucial in managing the project: the paper discusses them and their relative importance over the life of the reengineering project.
... These are questions which have no universal answers. Extension is but one example of this issue which is central to the overall re-assessment of the roles of the State, civil society and donors in all sectors (Hulme, 1994;Farrington and Bebbington, 1993). ...
... Building on the various frameworks of sustainable livelihoods, a number of attempts have been made to derive sets of " livelihoods principles " which guide the practical application of the theoretical concepts of livelihoods (for example, Carney 2002, Khanya 2002). These sustainable livelihoods principles have their foundations in 'learning process approaches' (Korten 1980; Korten 1988; Hulme 1995; Bond and Hulme 1999). Thus the evolution of sustainable livelihoods approaches can be seen as a continuation of the debate surrounding the most effective format for and management of development intervention. ...
The research goodbye to projects grew out of the increasing interest in sustainable livelihoods approaches (SLA) and growing disillusion with projects as mechanisms for addressing the development needs of the poor. Its aim was to investigate the implication of the adoption of SLA on the management of development interventions and in particular of the future of development projects. The underlying research questions were: a) How are elements of the sustainable livelihoods principles being applied in practice b) What are the problems and challenges for managing livelihoods-oriented development interventions? c) What is the future for development projects, given the increase in direct budget and sectoral assistance?
... ''Commitment'' is developmentÕs latest holy grail. Along with the presumed synonyms of ''will'' and ''ownership,'' we find it in discussion of rural development (Clay & Schaffer, 1984;Hulme, 1995); macroeconomic management (Killick, 1998); public enterprise reform (Campos & Esfahani, 2000); civil service reform, the focus of this article (Nunberg, 1997); and no doubt elsewhere. It is a particular feature of donor documents. ...
Lack of political commitment has been seen as a principal reason for the failure of development programs, and is the pretext for calls for “selectivity” in the allocation of donor aid. A new model of commitment is proposed, and applied to a case study of civil service reform in Swaziland. The failure of repeated reform attempts there is indeed due to a lack of commitment that has its roots in Swaziland’s unusual political system, in which ‘traditional’ rulers have effective power. Prospects for reform therefore depend either on fundamental political change, or on engaging with those rulers’ fear that reform represents a threat to their interests. Applying the model of commitment to the case study highlights the importance of a political analysis, and suggests constructive forms of engagement with uncommitted governments that go beyond the minimal involvement that the selectivity approach advocates. The model may represent a tool for predicting, and helping to generate, a government’s commitment to a given policy proposal.
... Gow and Morss [11] identify "nine notorious" elements that create discomfort in the project environment and implementation process; macro constraints, institutional realities, personnel constraints, technical assistance shortcomings, decentralization and participation, timing, information systems, differing agendas, and sustainability. Political influence, defined by Hulme [12] as pressure from politicians, bureaucratic politics, and professional self-interest, is one of the impairments of project implementation. Because of politics, even a technically sound or well implemented project may be perceived to be a failure by the intended users [13]. ...
Having a reliable voter list for conducting free and fair elections in Bangladesh was earlier considered unachievable due
to political instability, widespread corruption, and weak and demoralized leadership. However, in 2008 the PERP project succeeded
in building the world’s currently largest biometric database covering the entire Bangladeshi voting age population, 80 million
people. This paper describes the PERP project as well as the history of failed projects and analyses success factors based
on the IS implementation literature. This is an interpretive case study where both primary and secondary data have been used.
The key finding is that the major reason behind the success was to get the project done in a ‘politically controlled’ environment
where the people worked in a highly structured management system following a concrete and realistic roadmap. The implications
of this finding are discussed.
CDD (Community Driven Development) is an approach of development project, where a project operated by a group of people living in the same place or area solve common problems. World Bank and other donor agencies are operating development projects in CDD model. In CDD model, community is allowed to take initiative in choosing their development projects reflecting their desires and needs. Although various development models were experimented to reduce poverty, in many projects elite groups dominated the important decisions and targeting of poor communities and delivery of resources was manipulated.Project quality was found poor. CDD, on the other hand, was successful in reducing communication Gap between donor agencies, government and targeted local groups.Sustainability was improved, and local people understood easily the objectives and activities of the project as the project was originated from their own project, ideas. It also improved fund management efficiency and effectiveness with the mobilization of local resources WorldBank increased its budget in CDD projects in every year. The main attraction to Donor agencies in this model was participation of local people in the project, maximum participation of women and vulnerable groups, cost reduction, avoidance of excessive influences of elite groups and reduction of corruption. CDD achieved more than 40%participation of women and people belonging to vulnerable position, with higher IRR rate in projects operated by World Bank. Now a days, women, minorities and vulnerable groups can raise their voices regarding their needs and rights when participating in community meeting. In year 2019 World Bank alone supported 219 CDD projects in 79 countries. CDD approach was found out to be useful where the government was weak in-service delivery and monitoring of projects implementation process. CDD is now employed by many developing countries allocating more fund from national budget. By running CDD projects, local community is accumulating experience in poverty reduction project management from planning to evaluation stage.
Key words: CDD (Community driven development), World Bank Operation, Adoption by National government, good governance, Investment efficiency, Participation, Social Capacity development.
Despite the role that non-government organisations, including community development organisations, play in social transformation, their approach to managing projects has received little attention. Employing a processual approach and participatory methodology, this paper investigates how a small, distributed, community-based organisation negotiates the challenges associated with managing its geographically dispersed development projects. It examines lessons that this organisation’s project management approach offers for managing projects at a distance in ways that encourage community ownership, partnership with project beneficiaries and their maximum participation in the process. The paper underlines the need for positioning people’s participation in development projects as a key component of development, rather than as a tool for project implementation. It concludes by advocating a blend of participation and empowerment with technical assistance for recipient communities.
The integration of economic, social and environmental concerns in people-centred projects is now considered as the optimum approach to sustainable development. There is also increasing recognition of the desirability of integrating the efforts of state, civil and commercial sectors in the development process. How then can project planning and management cope with such exacting new demands? These issues are explored conceptually and through a case study of the ‘Area-Based Growth with Equity’ programme in Sri Lanka where orthodox approaches were rejected and a process approach was taken in the preparation of a series of investments aimed at building regional capacity to plan projects inter-sectorally and according to sustainable development principles.
This article calls for a new focus in the design, implementation and evaluation of projects, moving away from an abstract conception of “the project” and the goods it is intended to deliver, to a more meaningful concept of people as agents of change. Participation in a project leads to empowerment when people are self-motivated and involved in processes that they value, which achieve outcomes that they value. The article proposes a “human autonomy effectiveness” criterion relevant for sustainable human development; and then develops an analytical approach to assess a project's influence on human autonomy, with reference to changes in the determinants of autonomy (agency powers, access to resources and socio-structural contexts) and to relevant decision-making practices during the project.
Useful lessons can be drawn from international involvement in development and peacebuilding in Aceh, 2005–2006. Over this period, Aceh emerged from decades of internal conflict through a peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (or GAM). Although political shifts across Indonesia are widely accepted as the main reason why the agreement has held to date, international bodies played valuable supporting roles in brokering talks, monitoring progress, and providing development aid. This paper builds on ground-level experiences of what worked and what did not, finding that the process of devising and implementing international interventions confronted various barriers, including: limited scope for international actors to affect critical, domestic conditions; divergent interests and incentives that international agencies responded to; and institutional limits and constraints on what those international agencies could deliver. The most effective interventions in Aceh built on agencies' core strengths rather than aiming to implement global ‘best practice’, and forged relationships with domestic interests. It is suggested that understanding of these ground realities is not always evident in international policymaking, and greater recognition would help improve peacebuilding interventions in future.
The failure of ‘blueprint’ development interventions to deliver substantive improvements in poverty reduction has been well recognised over the last twenty years. Process approaches seek to overcome the rigidity and top-down operation of much aid-funded intervention. Sustainable livelihoods approaches (SLA) are one of the latest additions to this family of approaches. As a theoretical framework and as a set of principles for guiding intervention, sustainable livelihoods thinking has implications for development management. Drawing on research exploring the application of sustainable livelihoods principles in 10 development interventions, this article considers how these principles have evolved from continuing debates surrounding process and people-centred (bottom-up) approaches to development management. This research suggests that whilst these principles can improve the impact made by interventions, the effective application of sustainable livelihoods and other process approaches are fundamentally restricted by unbalanced power relationships between development partners. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
There is a gap between the methods and techniques discussed in planning and management literature, and practitioners’ experiences
of agricultural research and extension. This gap is attributable to the fact that outcomes of research and extension (R&E)
initiatives are shaped by the interactions of contending coalitions that form around issues or approaches and promote or oppose
them. This framework is used to elucidate the development of technologies and methodologies in the past. Implications are
drawn for future planning and management, based on seeing the use of methods and techniques in terms of the broader social
and political contexts of research and development.
Calls for “process projects” in the 1980s led to the development of a body of knowledge about process approaches and the implementation of innovative programs and projects. During the 1990s the focus has moved on to the narrower subject of beneficiary participation and much potential learning about how to promote development is being lost. This paper reviews the notion of process approaches and produces a conceptual framework that synthesizes these ideas. It then uses this framework to analyze 12 years of experience of a NORAD-financed IRDP in Sri Lanka. The findings point to the continued relevance of deepening the theory and practice of process approaches in development.
The role of local service institutions is not a major focus of current discourse on humanitarianism and complex emergencies. These institutions, in the few places where they are mentioned, are usually presented as either the seed of civil society and future democracy, or as pawns and components of the predatory economic, political and military élites. Few would deny that examples can be found which conform to both of these stereotypes. This simplistic representation of local institutions ignores the perspectives of the actors themselves — the nurses, extension agents, school teachers and others who actually staff most NGO-supported projects. The debate has focused on what ‘we’ should do; the moral dilemmas of aid agencies and their expatriate staff, inevitably leading to the question of whether or not humanitarian workers should stay or leave situations in which aid may be causing more harm than good.
The groundbreaking first edition of Sustainability Indicators reviewed the development and value of sustainability indicators and discussed the advantage of taking a holistic and qualitative approach rather than focusing on strictly quantitative measures. In the new edition the authors bring the literature up to date and show that the basic requirement for a systemic approach is now well grounded in the evidence. They examine the origins and development of the Systemic Sustainability Analysis (SSA), which has been developed in practice in a number of countries on an array of projects since the first edition. They also look at how SSA has evolved into Systemic Prospective Sustainability Analysis (SPSA) and now into IMAGINE, and they provide an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of projects that undertake work in the general field of sustainable development, and, in particular, how a wide range of participatory methodologies have been adopted over the years.
This paper focuses on the contradictory relationship between tools, always open to criticism as technocratic and mechanistic, and processes of development. It focuses on the tools often known as Logical Framework Approach (LFA) which are increasingly used as process tools by many different agencies, including those who espouse values of participation and empowerment. We assess the tools from the perspective of their use in public action-based approaches, as a means to improve clarity and focus in multi-actor interventions. No one tool can fulfil the range of tasks required in complex situations and LFA is useful as one of various options. We consider two of its limitations. First, it can be used in many different styles, including as a means to analyse public interest as contested terrain, or as a technocratic tool. Second, the focus on viewing assumptions as immutable can limit the effectiveness of interventions.
A variety of codes and standards for humanitarian assistance have been put forth in recent years. Many NGOs have agreed to abide by these codes. There is uncertainty, however, about if and how these codes are actually being put into practice. Have we moved from words to action? One response to this concern has been a proposal to establish a humanitarian ombudsman. This paper analyses two choices facing an eventual ombudsman: whether to attempt to take punitive actions to enforce the codes and standards, or whether instead to facilitate agencies' own internal efforts to improve accountability to their beneficiaries. It proposes a pluralistic approach, wherein a variety of methods, structures and local perceptions are accepted as potentially appropriate, but where a clear moral stance is still maintained. Some suggestions are outlined for how flexible forms of policy analysis may be used to combine an acceptance of the validity of a vast range of humanitarian actions while still retaining a strong stance against practices that may harm beneficiaries or feed the causes of conflict. Realism about each agency's room for manoeuvre is essential, especially local institutions. A modest but principled stance will involve helping actors to consider the impact of their work on conflict and to find ways to improve the quality of their interventions as perceived by beneficiaries.
This paper looks at aspects of offence and defence in negotiation over projects in their appraisal and evaluation stages. It draws on experiences with project planning as encountered both in the world of government and consultancy, and that of universities and textbooks; and tries to illuminate the gap between these 2 worlds, of tradesmen and of theorists.-from Author
At the heart of a misleading conceptualisation of policy practice is what we refer to as the ‘common-sense’, ‘mainstream’ or ‘linear’ model of public policy. This model represents public policy as a dichotomous linear process, of two distinct but sequential phases. The process begins with a decision or a sequence of activities which culminate in a decision. The decision also constitutes a ‘policy’. Then there is a break. On the other side of the divide is ‘policy implementation’ … the unthinking acceptance of the mainstream model in policy analysis has … important and dangeous consequences (Clay and Schaffer, 1985, p.3).
This paper describes the experience of an ODA funded Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) in Northern Zambia over the period 1980–86. In contrast to existing Zambian IRDPs it chose to follow a ‘learning process’ approach in working as a facilitator with three District Councils. The start of the programme coincided with the passing of decentralisation legislation in 1980. Thus the programme was drawn very much into the practicalities of helping the newly constituted Councils work out effective administrative structures and systems for rural development including planning, co-ordination, project implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The emphasis of the programme was on institution building through ‘learning by doing’ utilising donor funds for the construction of essential infrastructure. The programme subsequently evolved to cover the operational programmes of District Departments and the development of systems for the rehabilitation and maintenance of infrastructure.
The experiences are viewed from four perspectives – the District Authorities, the Donor, the Central Zambian Government and the IRDP team, all of which had to accept change as the process put pressures on them. Considerable success has been achieved at District level; the donors have demonstrated a new flexibility and confidence; the IRDP team have learnt a great deal about the facilitation process; Central Government, despite its early commitment is now faced with the implications of it's policy which mean giving real power to the Districts.
Through case studies, explores the roles of some of the various organizations involved in development, and what might be done to increase their effectiveness. Common instruments of intervention, including the budget, special planning units, targetted programmes, and expert reports are illustrated from Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, and the Asian Development Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. These studies show that the mainstream model of policy making which sees the process as a dichotomous linear process beginning with a decision, then a gap, then implementation leads to dangerous consequences. Once this model is accepted, there is an inevitable reduction or avoidance of responsibility for what goes wrong with the policy. Concludes that there is always something that can be done if the people involved in the policy making are self-aware and responsible.-from Editors
Efforts to improve the outcomes of development projects require that a fuller understanding of actual processes, as well as normative models of project planning, be achieved. This paper takes an exploratory step in that direction by examining conflicting images of the nature of project planning. The courses of action open to those involved in project design work, and particularly those seeking to improve the identification process, are examined. Three broad categories of response are recognised - leaving things as they are, modifying the existing models or rejecting orthodox frameworks and proposing an alternative. In conclusion, the paper argues that for rural development initiatives a hybrid model, incorporating elements of the political and orthodox models, offers the greatest opportunities for the production of more effective planning and information methodologies in the future. -from Author
A man's none the less an official because he's irresponsible. Wells, Tiu New Machia Introduction The whole of this chapter draws on the findings in the previous chapters. It begins with a description of what we call the common-sense mainstream model of policy (section I). It then considers how that model is unhelpful as a version of what actually happens. In particular the chapter demonstrates how the mainstream treatment reduces any possible room for manoeuvre towards alternative and better policies. The chapter proceeds to deal with two of the main problems in relation to crucial aspects of policy practice as revealed in our cases. The first problem (section II) is the treatment of policy as verbal, voluntaristic and decisional, in contrast to actual practice which concerns decisions, agendas and establishments. The second problem (section III) is the treatment of policy as mere utterances, separate from implementation so that whole zones of policy practice are ignored, with important consequences. The chapter then considers (section IV) why it is apparently so difficult to secure alternative treatments of public policy using policy disciplines. It shows why and how that matters with practices such as sectoralism. The chapter then looks (section V) at the reiteration of policy habits and outcomes, like institutional scarcity. The question is whether those reiterations provide the possibility of alternatives. It goes on (section VI) to display ways in which implications of such reiterated habits provoke the use of escape rout by the policy makers themselves. The concluding section (VII) faces three crucial issues. One of them is the ways in which public policy is presented, in contrast to, and as part of, its practice. A second issue concerns the possible grounds for other ways of treating, participating in, and therefore affecting, policy. The third issue is the difficulties in occupying such ground.
The new World Bank‐sponsored and funded Training and Visit system of agricultural extension represents a major attempt by the Bank to promote institutional development. The very considerable investment has in fact resulted in little change or improvement in the quality of extension. The reasons lie in failure to analyse the cause of the weakness of the previous extension systems, inherent defects of the Training and Visit system, and the way in which it has been introduced into India. These failures in turn can be explained by the interests and the politics underlying the programme.
Project identification is the process of generating the primordial ideas of development projects. An idealised model of the complex system formed by the project designer and the community of intended beneficiaries is developed. This is used to elucidate some of the sources of failure in projects identified by the means currently in use; to explain the failure of feasibility studies to recognise infeasible projects; and to design a better project identification methodology. Practical implications of this are explored.
The theme of learning from experience as a means of improving the effectiveness of rural development projects and programmers has been common in recent years. Considerable effort has been put into refining, monitoring and evaluation systems to enhance organizational learning processes. However, an emphasis on normative approaches to evaluation and learning from experience has led to the neglect of research into the actual processes by which rural development agencies utilize experience. The case study presented here points to the shortcomings of such approaches and illustrates the partisan manner in which individuals and organizations treat the lessons of experience. Actively ‘not learning from experience’ is as much a part of organizational processes as learning from experience. This paper examines the implications of this finding and reviews alternative approaches to improving experiential learning in rural development activities. It is found that such a perspective does not generate the innocuous technical prescriptions characteristic of conventional approaches, but a number of useful directions for further research can be identified.
Cost-benefit analysis tries to rationalize planning by giving notional monetary values to the factors involved, such as safety, health, convenience or environment. In reality no-one can say what human life, health, quiet, or even time are worth, and the assigned monetary values merely reflect the planner's prejudices. As well as positive deception, cost-benefit analysis misleads by importing so much complexity into planning as to conceal the fact that public authorities and their somewhat less visible backers often worsen the life of many in the interests of a few. Instead of current cost-benefit analysis, which is often just SOSIPing, statisticians, economists and OR workers should concentrate on multivariate cost-benefit analysis. This displays clearly the costs, advantages and disadvantages of alternative schemes, including not having a scheme, so that decision-makers and public can see clearly who is being planned for and who is being planned against.
Integrated rural development in the Philippines has had mixed results. While some donors (notably the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development) have virtually abandoned it, others have continued to assist the Government but have moved to smaller-scale, more experimental IRDs. The paper argues that the latter is the most appropriate course for other countries which should seek to learn from their IRD experience, rather than abandon the approach altogether.
Though many national and international agencies claim commitment to participative approaches to helping the rural poor, little progress has been made in translating ambitious plans into effective action. The record of earlier community development and cooperatives efforts is largely a history of failure, resulting more often in strengthening the position of traditional elites than in integrating poorer elements into the national development process. Many current calls for involvement of the rural poor are little more than wishful thinking, inadequately informed by past experience as to the investments in institutional innovation required to give reality to an important idea. The prevailing blueprint approach to development programming with its emphasis on detailed pre-planning and time bounded projects is itself cited as an important impediment. Examination of a number of Asian programs suggests that the more successful grew out of village experience. Consequently they were able to achieve an unusual degree of fit between beneficiary needs, program outputs, and the competence of the assisting organization. The key was not preplanning, but an organization with a capacity for embracing error, learning with the people, and building new knowledge and institutional capacity through action. A model of the learning process approach to building program strategies and appropriate organizational competence suggests a new program should progress through three developmental stages in which the focal concern is successively on learning to be effective, learning to be efficient, and learning to expand. Implications for the role of the social scientist and for action by funding agencies are discussed.
Short courses, books, and articles exhort administrators to make decisions more methodically, but there has been little analysis of the decision-making process now used by public administrators. The usual process is investigated here-and generally defended against proposals for more "scientific" methods. Decisions of individual administrators, of course, must be integrated with decisions of others to form the mosaic of public policy. This integration of individual decisions has become the major concern of organization theory, and the way individuals make decisions necessarily affects the way those decisions are best meshed with others'. In addition, decision-making method relates to allocation of decision-making responsibility-who should make what decision. More "scientific" decision-making also is discussed in this issue: "Tools for Decision-Making in Resources Planning."
Projects have become an important instrument of international assistance and of development administration because they seem to offer major advantages over other forms of planning and management. But projects have also come under increasing criticism in recent years. The benefits they offer to various interests involved in development ensure, however, that they are unlikely to be abandoned or to diminish in importance in the near future. Thus, ways must be found to make them more flexible and responsive methods of planning and managing social and human development activities. This can be done by planning, appraising and implementing projects as policy experiments, making their design and administration more learning-oriented, and using them as instruments of strategic planning and management.
Many development initiatives fail because of the way the basic concepts of development relating to the stimulation of agricultural production are generated. The problem with the conventional approach to project identification is that it fails to take into account key decision-makers (local farmers and other interested groups) and to address the problem of rationality. The accurate identification of farmers' constraints is crucial to the design of projects if these are to have the desired results. Problems resulting from the current approach to project identification are illustrated by the group farming projects in Uganda, and tubewell projects in Bangladesh. The activities of the typical project cycle are unfavourably compared with a decision paradigm, and are related to professional bias, semantic confusion and ‘groupthink’. Nine workable prescriptions are offered.
This paper discusses the problems faced by non-socialist developing countries in evolving successful systems of comprehensive public expenditure planning and makes a series of proposals designed to avoid some of these problems, e.g. by outlining precise processes, mechanisms and institutions which might generate and maintain political and bureaucratic support and correspond to a more realistic view of politics, as well as developing a framework within which public expenditure proposals can be consistently compared. The paper refers throughout to the experience of Papua New Guinea.The evaluation of the approach and processes of public expenditure planning in Papua New Guinea is divided into two parts. The first part assesses the system's achievements, costs and weaknesses and then considers the impact which the system itself has had on framing and developing new policy. In the second part, the general lessons which may be learned from Papua New Guinea's experience are discussed.
Policy studies institute Incluye bibliografía e índice
Describes events on a large Australian-funded rural development project, the Magarini Settlement Project in Coast Province, Kenya, and attempts to explain why it failed to fulfil even its minimum goals. The authors begin with an appendix giving a full chronology of events at Magarini between 1976 and 1989. The second chapter outlines the historical background to the project, while the third continues the scene-setting with an account of the agricultural activities and needs of the Giriama people. Chapter 4 reviews the use of cost-benefit analysis in the 1984 appraisal of Magarini and demonstrates how the management of the project became increasingly control-oriented in a futile effort to reduce the level of uncertainty which accompanies a rural development intervention. The next chapter examines the experience and impact of NGOs in the project and raises broader issues regarding their strategy and comparative advantage. The sixth chapter contrasts the way that Giriama people deal with uncertaintly with the approach taken by the development agents employed on the project. Finally, the authors summarise their concerns about current development practice, and argue that it must become more pluralist-oriented, accept uncertaintly and welcome diversity. -M.Amos
Originally published: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1990. Revision of the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--Harvard University, 1985. Includes bibliographical references (p. 304-313) and index.
Many obstacles face the selection of effectively poverty-focused rural projects. Poor rural people are hard to reach. The small projects often required may conflict with donor and political needs for big projects. The complex appraisal procedures of social cost–benefit analysis obscure the basis for decisions, are in practice abused, and both neglect and pre-emt scarce administrative capacity. They can lead to dependence, delays and pressures to spend. They can bias project selection away from the poorer rural people and the poorer countries.Selection can be improved through decentralizing project selection, presenting information clearly for decision-making, improving the judgement of decision-makers through direct rural exposure, and inventing and adopting procedures based on the principle that simple is optimal.
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