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Anonyme Online-Wahlen - Lösungsansätze für die Realisierung von Online-Wahlen.
... According to Ullmann/Koob/Kelter (2001) no process is known, which can assure the high degree of anonymity of votes for an unlimited period of time. Figure 2 shows that a strong interaction between these task areas IS needed. ...
This paper is about the challenge of online voting. First it illustrates why we should put effort into this subject, and it describes the security requirements which have to be achieved. Then it discusses an approach to achieve online voting step by step, and evaluates experiences gathered in pilot projects being conducted so far. Further on the German discussion on online voting is reflected, and it is emphasised that online voting is not at all only a technical challenge. More interdisciplinary research and a widespread public discussion is needed, which could be reached e.g. by a technology assessment. The last section gives a short prospect to e-democracy on the whole, and why online voting has to be embedded there.
... 1. Secrecy of the vote has to be guaranteed during the casting, transfer, reception, collection and tabulation of votes. Very important in this point is that the secrecy must also be ensured at any time in the future [12] at least when talking about parliamentary elections. In certain environments it might be possible to limit this condition to a certain period after the election. ...
Internet-based elections have become more and more popular. In future a lot of people are probably going to cast their ballot over the Internet. This could be a great benefit. But at the same time new possibilities to manipulate the election will arise: Besides other network specific attacks, sniffing of the network traffic becomes interesting. This paper identifies the problems with respect to temporal unlimited election secrecy against sniffing on the network. The problem is the voter's IP address and the fact that in practice, there is no anonymous communication channel. Thus the voter's anonymity can be broken in future. However, the attacker will not be able to proof his knowledge about the voter's decision. We figure out how this vulnerability is prevented with state of the art technologies.
During the boom of the New Economy, it was impossible to sufficiently applaud the possibilities offered by the Internet: particularly euphoric were the hopes and expectations that it could shape a more democratic society and activate a democracy initiated by its citizens. This also includes ideas about electronic marketplaces where everyone would be able to vote, as in the times of the Ancient Greek agora. However, do these ideas show a realistic picture of the future, or will online political elections remain Utopia for quite some time to come?
Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag gibt einen überblick der technischen Anforderungen bei der Einführung von Internetwahlen zu staatlichen Parlamentswahlen.
Dabei wird deutlich, dass es trotz erheblicher Forschungsarbeit insbesondere im Bereich der kryptographischen Wahlprotokolle
noch einige zum Teil sehr technische Probleme zu lösen sind, um Internetwahlsysteme bei den Wahlen von staatlichen Volksvertretungen
einführen zu können.
Automation of the way we pay for goods and services is already underway, as can be seen by the variety and growth of electronic banking services available to consumers. The ultimate structure of the new electronic payments system may have a substantial impact on personal privacy as well as on the nature and extent of criminal use of payments. Ideally a new payments system should address both of these seemingly conflicting sets of concerns.