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Gone fishing: Tool use in animals
Abstract
Chimpanzees impress and fascinate us with their use of tools, including twigs to 'fish' for termites and leaves to soak up liquids. But there are many intriguing examples of tool use described across the animal kingdom. Ants use grain to carry honey, and elephants can grip fly switches in their prehensile trunks. Even animals without limbs may use tools.
... Behavioral and observational studies of the African elephant have revealed some exceptional capacities, including ultra-low frequency sound communication [Garstang, 2004] with seismic aspects [O'Connell-Rodwell et al., 2006], exceptional long-term memory [Markowitz et al., 1975], complex social structures [Payne, 1998;McComb et al., 2000McComb et al., , 2001, and basic tool construction and use [Anderson, 2002;reviewed in Hart et al., 2008]. For the most part, these behavioral studies do not refer to the structure (and inferred functional capacities) of the brain or other body parts of the elephant, as the information required to make this sort of interpolation is just not available. ...
... This large temporal expansion, containing the highest retinal ganglion cell density, appears to be specialized for acquiring visual information from the region of space associated with movement of the trunk, as suggested by Stone and Halasz [1989]. Given the importance of the trunk in the acquisition of food and the vast majority of mechanical manipulation of the environment, including the manu-facturing and use of simple tools [Anderson, 2002], this temporal expansion would likely be the major source of input to the elephant visual system. The Asian elephant appears to have the ability to accommodate the eye up to 3D, and Murphy et al. [1992] suggest that this accommodative mechanism may allow the focusing of accurate images of the trunk onto the retina. ...
The eyes of three adult male African elephants were examined, the retinas were whole-mounted, stained and analyzed to determine visual acuity. A range of small to large ganglion cell types were observed across the retinas. We observed three regions of high ganglion cell density, one in the upper temporal quadrant, a visual or horizontal streak and a smaller region at the nasal end of the horizontal streak. The peak density of ganglion cells observed was 5,280/mm(2), and our calculations indicate that the elephant has a maximal visual acuity of between 13.16 and 14.37 cycles/degree. We observed a heterogeneous structure of a tapetum lucidum, the cells of which were found to be most strongly aggregated behind the temporal and nasal densities of retinal ganglion cells. The strength of the tapetum lucidum was weaker posterior to the density of ganglion cells forming the horizontal streak. The morphology of the elephant eye appears to be such that it reflects: (1) the importance of trunk-eye co-ordination for feeding; (2) the importance of 24-hour vigilance for either predators or conspecifics, and (3) the arrhythmic nature of the daily activity of this animal, being useful both diurnally and nocturnally.
... Oprócz przeglądu i próby usystematyzowania wiedzy na ten temat Beck pokusił się o pierwszą dość powszechnie zaakceptowaną i wciąż cytowaną definicję (np. Anderson, 2002). Jego zdaniem narzędziem możemy nazwać wydzielony z otoczenia obiekt, za pomocą którego zwierzę dąży do zmiany formy, położenia lub stanu innego obiektu bądź organizmu, przy czym używany obiekt musi mieć odpowiednią orientację i ułożenie, aby osobnik mógł wykorzystać jego cechy. ...
Monografia jest próbą przedstawienia aktualnego stanu wiedzy z zakresu psychologii porównawczej oraz etologii poznawczej. Maciej Trojan skupia się szczególnie na pięciu obszarach: komunikacji i języku, kompetencjach numerycznych, użyciu i wytwarzaniu narzędzi, teorii umysłu oraz mentalnych podróżach w czasie. Podejmuje też kwestię budzącą powszechne zainteresowanie: problem świadomości i samoświadomości u zwierząt.
... His volume not only offered more precise definitions for tool use and tool manufacture, but also presented a catalog of animal true and borderline tool use and tool manufacture — an update of which has not been attempted until now. While many researchers have utilized and simply restated Beck's (1980) tool use definition over the years (e.g., Anderson, 2002), others have made modifications. For example, Pierce (1986: 96) excluded social tool use and included " structurally modified inanimate environmental object(s) " , which allowed the inclusion of nest and burrow building by insects. ...
Despite numerous attempts to define animal tool use over the past four decades, the definition remains elusive and the behaviour classification somewhat subjective. Here, we provide a brief review of the definitions of animal tool use and show how those definitions have been modified over time. While some aspects have remained constant (i.e., the distinction between 'true' and 'borderline' tool use), others have been added (i.e., the distinction between 'dynamic' and 'static' behaviours). We present an updated, comprehensive catalog of documented animal tool use that indicates whether the behaviours observed included any 'true' tool use, whether the observations were limited to captive animals, whether tool manufacture has been observed, and whether the observed tool use was limited to only one individual and, thus, 'anecdotal' (i.e., N = 1). Such a catalog has not been attempted since Beck (1980). In addition to being a useful reference for behaviourists, this catalog demonstrates broad tool use and manufacture trends that may be of interest to phylogenists, evolutionary ecologists, and cognitive evolutionists. Tool use and tool manufacture are shown to be widespread across three phyla and seven classes of the animal kingdom. Moreover, there is complete overlap between the Aves and Mammalia orders in terms of the tool use categories (e.g., food extraction, food capture, agonism) arguing against any special abilities of mammals. The majority of tool users, almost 85% of the entries, use tools in only one of the tool use categories. Only members of the Passeriformes and Primates orders have been observed to use tools in four or more of the ten categories. Thus, observed tool use by some members of these two orders (e.g., Corvus, Papio) is qualitatively different from that of all other animal taxa. Finally, although there are similarities between Aves and Mammalia, and Primates and Passeriformes, primate tool use is qualitatively different. Approximately 35% of the entries for this order demonstrate a breadth of tool use (i.e., three or more categories by any one species) compared to other mammals (0%), Aves (2.4%), and the Passeriformes (3.1%). This greater breadth in tool use by some organisms may involve phylogenetic or cognitive differences — or may simply reflect differences in length and intensity of observations. The impact that tool usage may have had on groups' respective ecological niches and, through niche-construction, on their respective evolutionary trajectories remains a subject for future study.
... Object manipulation and tool use is also an important diagnostic feature for comparative studies of animal behavior, especially those comparing the sensorimotor and cognitive skills of humans with other primates (Parker and Gibson, 1977;Torigoe, 1985;Vauclair, 1982Vauclair, , 1984Vauclair and Bard, 1983). It is known, for example, that a number of animals regularly use and even manufacture tools in their natural environments (Anderson, 2002;Brosnan, 2009;Goodall, 1963Goodall, , 1968. However, the human ability and propensity for tool use far exceeds that observed in other animals (Boesch and Boesch, 1993;Povinelli, 2000;Schick et al., 1999;Toth et al., 1993;Vauclair, 1984;Visalberghi, 1993). ...
Human sensorimotor control has been predominantly studied using fixed tasks performed under laboratory conditions. This approach has greatly advanced our understanding of the mechanisms that integrate sensory information and generate motor commands during voluntary movement. However, experimental tasks necessarily restrict the range of behaviors that are studied. Moreover, the processes studied in the laboratory may not be the same processes that subjects call upon during their everyday lives. Naturalistic approaches thus provide an important adjunct to traditional laboratory-based studies. For example, wearable self-contained tracking systems can allow subjects to be monitored outside the laboratory, where they engage spontaneously in natural everyday behavior. Similarly, advances in virtual reality technology allow laboratory-based tasks to be made more naturalistic. Here, we review naturalistic approaches, including perspectives from psychology and visual neuroscience, as well as studies and technological advances in the field of sensorimotor control.
... Behavioural studies of African elephants have demonstrated some exceptional capacities, including ultra-low frequency sound communication (Garstang, 2004), exceptional long-term memory (Markowitz et al., 1975), very complex social structures (Payne, 1998;McComb et al., 2000McComb et al., , 2001, and even basic tool construction and use (Anderson, 2002). For the most part, these behavioural studies do not refer to the structure (and inferred functional capacities) of the brain, as the information required to make this sort of interpolation is just not available. ...
The current correspondence describes the in situ perfusion-fixation of the brain of the African elephant. Due to both the large size of proboscidean brains and the complex behaviour of these species, the acquisition of good quality material for comparative neuroanatomical analysis from these species is important. Three male African elephants (20-30 years) that were to be culled as part of a larger population management strategy were used. The animals were humanely euthanized and the head removed from the body. Large tubes were inserted into to the carotid arteries and the cranial vasculature flushed with a rapid (20 min) rinse of 100 l of cold saline (4 degrees C). Following the rinse the head was perfusion-fixed with a slower rinse (40 min) of 100 l of cold (4 degrees C) 4% paraformaldehyde in 0.1M phosphate buffer. This procedure resulted in well-fixed neural and other tissue. After perfusion the brains were removed from the skull with the aid of power tools, a procedure taking between 2 and 6h. The brains were immediately post-fixed in the same solution for 72 h at 4 degrees C. The brains were subsequently placed in a sucrose solution and finally an antifreeze solution and are stored in a -20 degrees C freezer. The acquisition of high quality neural material from African elephants that can be used for immunohistochemistry and electron microscopy is of importance in understanding the "hardware" underlying the behaviour of this species. This technique can be used on a variety of large mammals to obtain high quality material for comparative neuroanatomical studies.
Longstanding scientific efforts have been dedicated to answer why and how our particular intelligence is generated by our brain but not by the brain of other species. However, surprisingly little effort has been made to ask why no other species ever developed an intelligence similar to ours. Here, I explore this question based on genetic and paleontologic evidence. Contrary to the established view, this review suggests that the developmental hurdles alone are not high enough to explain the uniqueness of human intelligence (HI). As an additional explanation I propose that HI is normally not retained by natural selection, because it is, under most conditions, an intrinsically unfavourable trait. This unfavourableness, however, cannot be explained by physical constraints alone; rather, it may also be rooted in the same emotional and social complexity that is necessary for the development of HI. Thus, a major obstacle towards HI may not be solely the development of the required physical assets, but also to cope with harmful individual, social and environmental feedback intrinsically associated with this trait.
Longstanding scientific efforts have been dedicated to answer why and how our particular intelligence is generated by our brain but not by the brain of other species. However, surprisingly little effort has been made to ask why no other species ever developed an intelligence similar to ours. Here, I explore this question based on genetic and paleontologic evidence. Contrary to the established view, this review suggests that the developmental hurdles alone are not high enough to explain the uniqueness of human intelligence (HI). As an additional explanation I propose that HI is normally not retained by natural selection, because it is, under most conditions, an intrinsically unfavourable trait. This unfavourableness, however, cannot be explained by physical constraints alone; rather, it may also be rooted in the same emotional and social complexity that is necessary for the development of HI. Thus, a major obstacle towards HI may not be solely the development of the required physical assets, but also to cope with harmful individual, social and environmental feedback intrinsically associated with this trait.
Longstanding scientific efforts have been dedicated to answer why and how our particular intelligence is generated by our brain but not by the brain of other species. However, surprisingly little effort has been made to ask why no other species ever developed an intelligence similar to ours. Here, I explore this question based on genetic and paleontologic evidence. Contrary to the established view, this review suggests that the developmental hurdles alone are not high enough to explain the uniqueness of human intelligence (HI). As an additional explanation I propose that HI is normally not retained by natural selection, because it is, under most conditions, an intrinsically unfavourable trait. This unfavourableness, however, cannot be explained by physical constraints alone; rather, it may also be rooted in the same emotional and social complexity that is necessary for the development of HI. Thus, a major obstacle towards HI may not be solely the development of the required physical assets, but also to cope with harmful individual, social and environmental feedback intrinsically associated with this trait.
Once considered only a human behavior, reports of tool use by a variety of animals have accumulated. Likewise, various definitions of tool use have also amassed. Although some researchers argue that understanding the evolutionary drivers of tool use is more important than identifying and describing these behaviors, the central issue of defining what constitutes tool use has not been fully addressed. Here we analyze prominent definitions of tool use and review the application of these definitions in scientific and educational literature. We demonstrate that many behaviors recently described as tool use do not meet criteria for prevalent definitions, while other neglected behaviors may constitute a form of tool use. These examples show how the use of inconsistent definitions of tool use in research can result in different conclusions from the same observations. Our aim is to demonstrate that a universally acceptable definition of tool use based on traditional, evolutionary, and operational understanding of behavior is needed. The rationale is that this review will stimulate the consistent and explicit use of specific terminology in tool use research. This would help define specific examples of each natural observation from a common measuring stick, allowing better comparative studies and classification of these unique behaviors.
What happens in our brain when we use a tool to reach for a distant object? Recent neurophysiological, psychological and neuropsychological research suggests that this extended motor capability is followed by changes in specific neural networks that hold an updated map of body shape and posture (the putative "Body Schema" of classical neurology). These changes are compatible with the notion of the inclusion of tools in the "Body Schema", as if our own effector (e.g. the hand) were elongated to the tip of the tool. In this review we present empirical support for this intriguing idea from both single-neuron recordings in the monkey brain and behavioural performance of normal and brain-damaged humans. These relatively simple neural and behavioural aspects of tool-use shed light on more complex evolutionary and cognitive aspects of body representation and multisensory space coding for action.
Florida harvester ants, Pogonomyrmex badius, transported a honey solution to their nest in saturated sand pellets which the ants formed.
Four species of myrmicine ants, Aphaenogaster rudis , A. treatae , A. tennesseensis , and A. fulva , use pieces of leaf, mud, and sand grains as tools to carry soft foods from distant sources to the colony. Tools are tended on the food and removed by colony members without regard to which individual brought the tool. Food is gathered more efficiently by tool use than by internal transport. Tool-using behavior may increase the competitive ability of A. rudis in an interspecific dominance hierarchy.