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Technical Note
Conceptual Model for Developing Resilient Safety Culture
in the Construction Environment
Minh Tri Trinh1; Yingbin Feng, Ph.D.2; and Xiaohua Jin, Ph.D.3
Abstract: A positive safety culture is crucial for improving the safety performance in construction workplaces. Although there are substantial
efforts to achieve a high level of safety culture, the traditional approaches may not be sufficient to ensure the sustained improvement of the
safety performance due to the complex nature of construction projects. This technical note aims to discuss the concept of resilient safety culture
and its application in the construction environment. A conceptual model for a resilient safety culture was developed on the basis of the safety
culture theory, the resilience engineering theory, the latent failure model, the human error theory, the high reliability theory, and the normal
accident theory. The conceptual model proposes a measurement method for the resilient safety culture of construction projects and explains
how a resilient safety culture can be created in a construction organization. This paper also proposes hypotheses regarding the effect of the
project complexity and resilient safety culture on the safety performance of construction projects, on the basis of the normal accident theory.
The model may serve as the theoretical basis for establishing an ultrasafe construction organization that is expected to achieve a consistently
high safety performance regardless of the changing complexity levels and conditions of its construction projects. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)
CO.1943-7862.0001522.© 2018 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Construction; Project complexity; Resilience; Safety; Safety culture; Safety performance.
Introduction
Construction is one of the most hazardous occupations worldwide
(Brunette 2004). Developing and maintaining a positive safety cul-
ture has been widely recognized as a critical approach for improving
the safety performance of construction organizations (Fang and Wu
2013).
In recent years, safety risks have seemed more difficult to man-
age because they have emerged from the increasingly complex
nature of sociotechnical systems. The increase in the inherent com-
plexity of these workplace environments has led to the changing and
somewhat unpredictable shapes of safety risks (Shirali et al. 2015).
Traditional approaches tend to become institutionalized through
the policies, plans, procedures, and processes for safety manage-
ment, and they are not easily adaptable to the natural and inevitable
changes in the work that is conducted and the safety risks that are
encountered (Wachter and Yorio 2014). Consequently, although
there are substantial efforts to achieve a high level of safety culture,
the traditional safety culture approach may be insufficient to ensure
a sustained improvement of the safety performance. In the contextof
the construction industry, the problem is more complicated because
all construction projects are unique in term of their complex envi-
ronmental, organizational, and technical characteristics (Bosch-
Rekveldt et al. 2011). Against this background, this paper aims to
discuss the notion of resilient safety culture and its application to the
construction industry, and it contrasts the concept with other theo-
ries and notions of safety in construction. This paper also presents
a conceptual model for developing a resilient safety culture for
construction projects. The proposed model is then discussed to dem-
onstrate its innovation and applicability.
Key Concepts
Safety Culture
Safety culture has often been acknowledged as a subset of organi-
zational culture, in which the beliefs and values refer specifically
to the matters of health and safety (Clarke 1999). A review of the
safety culture literature by Wiegmann et al. (2004) identified a set of
critical features, without regard to any particular industry, from
the various definitions of safety culture. These critical features in-
cluded: (1) shared values; (2) a concern with formal safety issues in
close relation to the management and supervisory systems; (3) the
involvement of all members; (4) the impacts on employees’work
behavior; (5) its reflection in the organization’s policies, procedures,
and systems; (6) the culture’s reflection in the organization’s
willingness to learn from errors, incidents, and accidents; and (7) a
culture that is enduring, stable, and resistant to change (Wiegmann
et al. 2004). The triad models of safety culture have been widely
used as a framework for measuring safety culture and examining the
reciprocal interactions among the psychological, behavioral, and
managerial factors in various settings (Cooper 2000;Geller 1994).
Resilient Safety Culture
The notion of resilience provided a new way of thinking about safety
and accidents in complex sociotechnical systems (Akselsson et al.
2009;Shirali et al. 2016). The traditional approaches largely took the
form of prevention and protection, and the effectiveness of these
approaches was limited by the uncertainty associated with complex
1Ph.D. Candidate, School of Computing, Engineering and Mathematics,
Western Sydney Univ., Locked Bag 1797, Penrith, NSW 2751, Australia.
2Senior Lecturer, School of Computing, Engineering and Mathematics,
Western Sydney Univ., Locked Bag 1797, Penrith, NSW 2751, Australia
(corresponding author). Email: yingbin.feng@gmail.com; y.feng@uws
.edu.au
3Senior Lecturer, School of Computing, Engineering and Mathematics,
Western Sydney Univ., Locked Bag 1797, Penrith, NSW 2751, Australia.
Note. This manuscript was submitted on September 5, 2017; approved
on February 7, 2018; published online on May 11, 2018. Discussion period
open until October 11, 2018; separate discussions must be submitted for
individual papers. This technical note is part of the Journal of Construc-
tion Engineering and Management, © ASCE, ISSN 0733-9364.
© ASCE 06018003-1 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2018, 144(7): 06018003
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systems (Mitropoulos et al. 2005). From the perspective of resilience
engineering, an accident does not represent a failure of systems in
dealing with risks, but rather it implies that the systems have failed in
the adaptations necessary to cope with the real-world complexity
(Woods 2010). Resilience engineering involves developing an
organization’s capability to create foresight and to recognize and an-
ticipate the changing shape of risks before any adverse consequences
occur (Woods and Hollnagel 2006).
On the basis of the concept of the safety culture and resilience
engineering approach, Akselsson et al. (2009, p. 4) defined a resil-
ient safety culture as “an organizational culture that fosters safe
practices for improved safety in an ultrasafe organization striving
for cost-effective safety management by stressing the resilience en-
gineering, organizational learning, and continuous improvements.”
The concept of a resilient safety culture may address the limitations
of the traditional safety culture approach by responding to the
changing and unforeseen safety risks associated with the unique and
complex nature of construction projects.
Conceptual Model Development
Dimensions of Resilient Safety Culture
Organizational resilience is multidimensional (Lengnick-Hall et al.
2011;Pillay et al. 2010). A review of the literature by Pillay et al.
(2010) identified three dimensions of organizational resilience: the
cognitive, the behavioral, and the contextual. Previous studies on
safety culture models recognized the interactive relationships among
the psychological/cognitive, managerial/contextual, and behavioral
factors, which had been accepted as the three dimensions of meas-
uring safety culture (Choudhry et al. 2007;Cooper 2000;Fang and
Wu 2013;Geller 1994). A comparison of the safety culture dimen-
sions and organizational resilience dimensions reveals a similar
structure of factors for both concepts, and therefore it can be inferred
that the concept of a resilient safety culture can also be measured
and examined under the framework of the psychological/cognitive,
behavioral, and managerial/contextual factors.
The fundamental idea behind resilience engineering is that in a
world of limited resources, irreducible unpredictability, and multiple
conflicting goals, an organization must continually manage the
safety risks and create a safety-via-resilience process that includes
anticipating (knowing what to expect), monitoring (knowing what to
look for), responding (knowing what to do), and learning (knowing
what can happen) (Pęciłło2016;Shirali et al. 2015). Resilience
engineering theory enhances the concept of safety culture by offering
organizations four resilience processes for managing safety.
In this study, resilient safety culture is defined as an organiza-
tion’s psychological/cognitive, behavioral, and managerial/con-
textual capabilities to anticipate, monitor, respond and learn in order
to manage the safety risks and create an ultrasafe organization.
Accordingly, a resilient safety culture is measured in the following
three dimensions: (1) psychological/cognitive resilience; (2) mana-
gerial/contextual resilience; and (3) behavioral resilience. Under the
conditions that are disruptive, uncertain, surprising, and potentially
jeopardizing to the organization’s long-term survival, the psy-
chological/cognitive resilience is an organizational capability that
enables an organization to notice shifts, interpret unfamiliar situ-
ations, analyze options, and figure out how to respond; the behav-
ioral resilience comprises the established behaviors and routines that
enable an organization to learn more about a situation, implement
new routines, and fully use its resources; and the managerial/con-
textual resilience is the combination of interpersonal connections,
resource stocks, and supply lines that provides a foundation for
quick actions (Lengnick-Hall et al. 2011).
Drivers of Resilient Safety Culture
The theory of safety culture suggests that a safety culture aims to
create a self-sustaining environment based on a comprehensive
understanding of the causes of workplace safety performance or
the lack thereof (DeJoy 2005). In addition, resilience engineering
theory suggests that identifying the threats against which the resil-
ience protects has implications for developing resilient systems
(Westrum 2006). To create an ultrasafe working environment char-
acterized by a resilient safety culture, it is necessary to systemati-
cally address the potential threats to the state of workplace safety.
Westrum (2006) classified threats to the resilience system into three
types: the regular threat, the irregular threat, and the unprecedented
event. Accordingly, the workplace safety literature shows that the
state of workplace safety in an organization is impacted by three
types of potential threats, including safety hazards, human errors,
and unexpected failures (International Labour Office 1970;Kerr
1957;Reason 1990;Rochlin 1996). Therefore, the three drivers of
resilient safety culture are identified by responding to the three
types of potential threats on the basis of the latent failure model
(Reason 1990), human error theories (HET) (International Labour
Office 1970;Kerr 1957), and high reliability theory (HRT) (LaPorte
and Consolini 1991;Rochlin 1996).
Hazard Prevention Practice
The latent failure model (metaphorically called the Swiss cheese
model) was developed by Reason (1990). According to this model,
organizations make efforts to prevent accidents by defenses (slices of
cheese) in order not to allow the hazards to become losses. The holes
in each slice of cheese indicate that none of these defenses are
perfect. Therefore, when these holes line up, accidents occur. In ad-
dition, Reason (1990) used the term failures to refer to the imper-
fections of each defense, namely the active and latent failures.
The term latent failure refers to the failures of a system that produce
a negative effect but from which the consequences are not activated
until other enabling conditions are met, whereas the active failures
are unsafe acts by workers of which the negative consequences are
easily noticed. The concept of defenses in Reason’s(1990) latent
failure model implies that accidents can be prevented by the imple-
mentation of hazard prevention practices, which aim to detect and
control the inherent project hazards and their safety risks before they
combine with the unsafe behaviors of workers.
Error Management Practice
Rigby (1970) defined human error as any set of human actions that
exceed some limit of acceptability. The HET considered the human
aspects to be the main causes of accidents. The HET could be cat-
egorized in two main approaches: the behavior models and the
human factor models (Abdelhamid and Everett 2000). The behavior
models studied the tendency of humans to make errors under vari-
ous situational conditions, and they identified human characteristics
as the main cause of errors [for example, the accident proneness
theory (International Labour Office 1970) and the goals freedom
alertness theory (Kerr 1957)]. The human factors models posited
that extreme environmental characteristics and the over loading
of human physical and psychological capabilities were the factors
that contributed to human error [for example, Ferrell’s human error
theory as referenced in Heinrich et al. (1980)]. The HET enhanced
Reason’s(1990) latent failure model by providing the understanding
of how active failures (or unsafe acts of workers) occurred within a
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hazardous working environment. Those theories implied that human
error is an object that needs to be managed by an error management
practice in order to prevent accidents in the workplaces.
Mindful Organizing Practice
Although Reason’s(1990) latent failure model acknowledged that
none of the defenses were perfect, it did not explain how the failures
at different layers of defense came into existence. Accidents still oc-
curred, because unexpected failures are produced without awareness.
The HRT might address the limitation of Reason’s(1990) latent fail-
ure model by enhancing the organization’s capability of anticipating
and controlling the unexpected failures. The HRT began with studies
exploring a distinct and special class of organizations that operate in
hazardous conditions (LaPorte and Consolini 1991;Rochlin 1996).
From the most effective practices in high-reliability organizations and
accident investigations, the HRT assumed that mindfulness was the
key concept for organizations to sustain their safety performance
(Weick et al. 1999). Mindfulness was defined as a conceptual mecha-
nism allowing organizations to maintain a continuing awareness,
recognize what should receive attention, and inform how to process
the information gathered (Weick et al. 1999). The state of mindful-
ness was created by a mindful organizing practice (Sutcliffe 2011;
Weick et al. 1999).
Relationships among Resilient Safety Culture, Project
Complexity, and Safety Performance
Baccarini (1996, p. 202) defined project complexity as “‘consisting
of many varied interrelated parts’and can be operationalized in
terms of differentiation and interdependency.”Williams (1999)
specified that overall project complexity could be characterized
by structural complexity (that is, the number of elements and inter-
dependence of the elements) and uncertainty (that is, the uncer-
tainty in goals and uncertainty in methods). Bosch-Rekveldt
et al. (2011) classified project complexity elements into three
aspects: technical, organizational, and environmental. The normal
accident theory (NAT) assumed that accidents involved the unan-
ticipated interaction of a multitude of events in a complex system
rather than the result of a few or a number of component failures.
Accordingly, Perrow (1994) identified two interacting variables
that specified a space that fully characterized accidents, namely,
coupling and complexity. The NAT postulated that the more tightly
coupled and complex a system is, the more vulnerable it is to ac-
cidents (Perrow 1994).
The NAT implies that the inherent safety risks level of construc-
tion projects is positively associated with the complexity of the
project. As discussed earlier, the resilient safety culture aims to de-
velop an ultrasafe organization that is characterized by the continuous
improvements of safety performance and the capability of creating
the foresight to recognize and anticipate the changing shape of safety
risks in the complex sociotechnical systems. The negative impact of
project complexity on safety performance is therefore likely to be
moderated by the resilient safety culture of the organization. Conse-
quently, the following hypotheses are proposed:
1. Project complexity has a negative impact on the safety perfor-
mance of construction projects (shown in Fig. 1as H1);
2. A resilient safety culture has a positive impact on the safety per-
formance of construction projects (shown in Fig. 1as H2); and
3. The impact of project complexity on safety performance be-
comes weaker when there is a higher level of resilient safety
culture (shown in Fig. 1as H3).
By integrating the dimensions and drivers of a resilient safety
culture and the relationships among a resilient safety culture, the
project complexity, and the safety performance, a conceptual model
for a resilient safety culture was developed and described (Fig. 1).
The model recognizes: (1) how a resilient safety culture is mea-
sured (shown in Fig. 1as Zone 1); (2) what drives the development
of a resilient safety culture (shown in Fig. 1as Zone 2); and (3) what
the role of resilient safety culture is in construction safety (shown in
Fig. 1as Zone 3).
Innovation of the Conceptual Model
Since the 1980s, numerous studies have been conducted to examine
the concept and theoretical models of safety culture (Choudhry et al.
2007;Cooper 2000;FangandWu2013;Geller 1994). However,
these models have failed to address the organization’s capabilities
to adapt, learn and anticipate in dealing with the safety risks that
emerge as the result of the increasingly inherent complexity in
Zone 3
H3
H2
Resilient
safety culture Zone 1
Safety
performance
Project
complexity H1
Level 1: Hazard
prevention practice
Level 2: Error
management
practice
Level 3: Mindful
organizing practice
Zone 2
Behavioral
resilience
Psychological/
cognitive
resilience
Managerial/
contextual
resilience
Anticipating
Monitoring
Responding
Learning
Fig. 1. Conceptual model for resilient safety culture.
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J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2018, 144(7): 06018003
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technology, work tasks, and organizational structures (Bergström
et al. 2015;Dekker 2012). As a result, resilience engineering has
been advocated as a solution to address the limitations of the tradi-
tional approaches.Research has been conducted (Azadeh et al. 2014;
Dinh et al. 2012;Shirali et al. 2015) to examine the developmentand
measurement of the organizational resilience level. The resilient
safety culture has been proposed as a promising concept for achiev-
ing an ultrasafe organization (Akselsson et al. 2009;Shirali et al.
2016). Shirali et al. (2016) attempted to measure the resilience safety
culture in a petrochemical plant and identified 13 indicators.
Although the previous research has made significant contribu-
tions in introducing resilience into workplace health and safety and
developing the concept of resilient safety culture, there are still sev-
eral theoretical issues with the concept of resilient safety culture
that need to be addressed. These issues include that (1) the dimen-
sions of resilient safety culture are not identified and defined; (2) it
remains unclear how a resilient safety culture impacts the safety
performance under the changing complexity level and conditions
of construction projects; and (3) it is not clear how resilient safety
culture is developed in construction organizations.
The conceptual model developed in this study is innovative be-
cause it provides a theoretical framework to systematically address
these three issues. First, the measurement method reflects the def-
inition of resilient safety culture by integrating the approaches of
measuring the safety culture and resilient systems. Second, the
model explains how a resilient safety culture can be created in a
construction organization by systematically responding to the po-
tential threats against which resilience protects. Third, this paper
proposes hypotheses regarding the effect of the project complexity
and a resilient safety culture on the safety performance of construc-
tion projects, based on the implications of NAT. The conceptual
model and hypotheses developed in this study may further develop
the theory of safety culture by integrating the resilience dimension
into existing safety culture models.
Current Research at Western Sydney University
The conceptual model presented in this technical note offers an in-
tegrative framework to explore the concept of resilient safety culture
and its application in the construction environment. Following the
guidance of the conceptual model, empirical research was conducted
at Western Sydney University (Australia) to quantitatively examine
the measurements of a resilient safety culture, the drivers of resilient
safety culture, and the impacts of resilient safety culture on construc-
tion safety performance. The initial results indicated that the model
was successful in providing new insights and guidance on how an
ultrasafe construction organization could be achieved. Specifically,
the measurement of resilient safety culture was useful to assess
the organizations’capabilities to anticipate, monitor, respond, and
learn, in order to manage the safety risks and create an ultrasafe
organization. The drivers of the resilient safety culture were helpful
in identifying the best strategies to build up such capabilities. In an
examination of the hypotheses proposed in this technical note, the
preliminary results indicated that the project technical and environ-
mental complexities were sources of the changing and unforeseen
safety risks and that the impact of the project complexity on the
safety performance became weaker when there was a higher level
of resilient safety culture. The findings of the empirical research will
be reported in separate research papers.
Conclusions
This technical note reported the development of a conceptual model
for the resilient safety culture of construction projects on the basis
of an extensive review of the pertinent literature. According to the
conceptual model, a resilient safety culture is reflected in three in-
teractive aspects: psychological/cognitive resilience, behavioral
resilience, and managerial/contextual resilience; and a resilient
safety culture can be developed by implementing hazard prevention
practices, error management practices, and mindful organizing
practices. It is hypothesized that the relationship between the
project complexity and the safety performance is moderated by
a resilient safety culture. The model may serve as the theoretical
basis for establishing an ultrasafe construction organization that
is expected to achieve consistently high safety performance regard-
less of the changing complexity levels and conditions of its con-
struction projects.
Data Availability Statements
No data were generated or analyzed during the study. Informa-
tion about the Journal’s data sharing policy can be found here:
http://ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/%28ASCE%29CO.1943-7862
.0001263.
Acknowledgments
This research is jointly supported by the Ministry of Education
and Training, Vietnam, and Western Sydney University (Project
P00022974).
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