Unpacking legitimacy in regional development: asymmetric justification and the functioning of regional development agencies

Abstract

In recent years, policy-makers and researchers have identified regional development agencies as the most suitable actors to carry out public tasks. One of these tasks has been the coordination of regional development processes. Both practitioners and researchers argue that legitimacy is a prerequisite for these regional actors to function properly. Although legitimacy is a key issue, little is known about the challenges that arise while producing it. Selecting six regional development agencies in Switzerland and applying an interview-based research method, this explorative study analyses how regional development agencies deal with legitimacy issues. The findings indicate that the main problem with which regional development agencies struggle is not procedural rightfulness but means-end coordination. By proposing a clear distinction between legitimacy and justification, we aim to stimulate the debate on how to operationalize legitimacy and further the discussion of the functioning of regional development agencies. Consequently, we introduce the concept of 'asymmetric justification' to the debate on regional development processes in order to shed a light on the functioning of regional development agencies.

Full text

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rtep20
Territory, Politics, Governance
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rtep20
Unpacking legitimacy in regional development:
asymmetric justification and the functioning of
regional development agencies
Yasmine Willi , Marco Pütz & Joost Jongerden
To cite this article: Yasmine Willi , Marco Pütz & Joost Jongerden (2020): Unpacking legitimacy
in regional development: asymmetric justification and the functioning of regional development
agencies, Territory, Politics, Governance, DOI: 10.1080/21622671.2020.1805352
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2020.1805352
Published online: 14 Sep 2020.
Submit your article to this journal
View related articles
View Crossmark data

Unpacking legitimacy in regional development:
asymmetric justification and the functioning of
regional development agencies
Yasmine Willi
a
, Marco Pütz
b
and Joost Jongerden
c,d
ABSTRACT
In recent years, policy-makers and researchers have identified regional development agencies as the most
suitable actors to carry out public tasks. One of these tasks has been the coordination of regional
development processes. Both practitioners and researchers argue that legitimacy is a prerequisite for these
regional actors to function properly. Although legitimacy is a key issue, little is known about the
challenges that arise while producing it. Selecting six regional development agencies in Switzerland and
applying an interview-based research method, this explorative study analyses how regional development
agencies deal with legitimacy issues. The findings indicate that the main problem with which regional
development agencies struggle is not procedural rightfulness but means–end coordination. By proposing a
clear distinction between legitimacy and justification, we aim to stimulate the debate on how to
operationalize legitimacy and further the discussion of the functioning of regional development agencies.
Consequently, we introduce the concept of ‘asymmetric justification’to the debate on regional
development processes in order to shed a light on the functioning of regional development agencies.
KEYWORDS
legitimacy; justification; regional development agency; regional governance; regional development processes;
Switzerland
HISTORY Received 4 August 2018; in revised form 26 May 2020
INTRODUCTION
With the growing importance of the regional level for the coordination of development processes
(Agnew, 2017; Keating, 2017), regional actors and their behaviour are increasingly gaining the
attention of researchers and practitioners. In European countries, regional development agencies
play an important role in coordinating regional development processes and are thus understood as
key regional actors (Furmankiewicz et al., 2010; Miles & Tully, 2007; Sotarauta, 2010; Syrett &
Silva, 2001). At the same time, both researchers and practitioners identify legitimacy as one of the
© 2020 Regional Studies Association
CONTACT
a
(Corresponding author) yasmine.willi@wsl.ch
Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research WSL, Birmensdorf, Switzerland.
b
marco.puetz@wsl.ch
Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research WSL, Birmensdorf, Switzerland.
c
joost.jongerden@wur.nl
Centre for Space, Place and Society, Rural Sociology, Department of Social Sciences, University of Wageningen, Wageningen, The
Netherlands
d
Asian Platform for Global Sustainability & Transcultural Studies, Kyoto University, Wageningen, The Netherlands.
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE
https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2020.1805352

prerequisites for regional development agencies to make decisions that are widely accepted and act
upon them (Blatter, 2007; Kraft & Wolf, 2018; OECD, 2018). However, despite the acknowl-
edged importance of legitimacy for effective decision-making and coordination, little is known
about what regional development agencies actually do to legitimize themselves, what challenges
arise from these efforts and how they can be dealt with.
This paper attempts to further unpack legitimacy in regional development by analysing the
legitimacy-producing processes of regional development agencies. To identify and better under-
stand the challenges that arise in the complex regional decision-making process, we introduce
the concept of asymmetric justification next to the concept of legitimacy. Asymmetric justifica-
tion refers to a situation in the decision-making process in which local actors involved in
regional development agencies fail to justify their regional engagement to the local authorities
and organizations they represent. Unlike legitimacy, which is based on the procedural rightful-
ness of the mandate of a regional development agency, justification is based on the means–ends
coordination and on the results it yields, which can only be measured after the fact. Justification
becomes asymmetric when, for some actors, the realization of particular ends becomes more
important than for others, and efforts directed at the realization of its success also become differ-
ent. Moreover, local actors engaged within a regional development agency do not equally need
the agency to deliver, because they may be able to reach particular ends by other means. Thus,
regional development agencies can be perfectly legitimate but still not realize their ends due to
asymmetric justification.
Our understanding of asymmetric justification draws from the combination of two previously
unconnected conceptualizations of legitimacy. First, the concepts of input, throughput and output
legitimacy (Bäckstrand, 2006; Iusmen & Boswell, 2017; Scharpf, 1999,2009; Schmidt, 2013)
and, second, Arendt’s(1970) differentiation of legitimacy and justification, in which legitimacy
makes an appeal to the past, and justification takes place on basis of the rightfulness of actions
in the present or near future. By identifying key aspects of both concepts and merging them
into the concept of asymmetric justification, we are able to address three research questions:
.How do regional development agencies legitimize themselves?
.What challenges arise from these efforts?
.How can these challenges be dealt with?
We address these research questions by analysing decision-making processes in six regional
development agencies in Switzerland. For our explorative study, we apply an interview-based
research method that helps us understand how decisions are made that lead to the formulation
and implementation of regional development strategies. Based on 31 semi-structured and in-
depth expert interviews within the selected case studies, we identify several means through
which regional development agencies aim at producing legitimacy as well as deal with the arising
challenges.
This paper contributes to research and policy-making in several ways. From a scientific per-
spective, it stimulates the debate on how to operationalize legitimacy and thus to better understand
the functioning of regional development agencies. By arguing for a clear distinction between
legitimacy and justification, we intend to advance the scientific debate. From a policy-making per-
spective, the concept or asymmetric justification sheds a light on the functioning of regional devel-
opment agencies by scrutinizing the challenges that may arise when regional development agencies
–often with the aim to ensure legitimate processes –involve local state and non-state actors. A
more differentiated understanding of asymmetric justification issues can help to improve legiti-
macy-producing processes and increase the capacity of regional development agencies for self-
reflection and assertiveness.
2Yasmine Willi et al.
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

The region as the mainstay of development processes
In recent years, the regional level has been identified both by practitionersandresearchersasthe
most suitable level to carry out public tasks such as coordinating regional development processes
(Coe et al., 2004;OECD,2016,2018;Paasi,2011; Paasi & Metzger, 2017;Storper,1997;
Willi & Pütz, 2018). Correspondingly, the regional level is understood to be more efficient
‘in facing the challenges of competition and meeting citizen preferences’(Keating, 2017,
p. 10) than the national level, as it is closer to local interests and needs but not as entangled
with local issues as the municipal level (Hanssen et al., 2011). Also, regions are understood
to be ‘key institutional levels’(p. 38) for promoting economic development and implementing
regional development policies (Agnew, 2012;Hooghe&Marks,2009;Keating,2014;Morgan,
2004;OECD,2016).
In this paper, we understand regions as non-bounded and networked entities that stretch
beyond single political–administrative or territorial borders and that are constituted through reoc-
curring social practices (Allen et al., 1998; Amin, 2004; MacLeod & Jones, 2007; Paasi, 2011).
The perception of regions as social constructs is based on the understanding that a region is
not simply a territorial shape demarked with clearly defined boundaries, but rather an unbounded
entity shaped by reoccurring, everyday societal practices (Brenner, 2003; MacLeod & Jones, 2007;
Paasi, 1991). Closely related to the understanding of regions as social constructs is the assumption
that regions are relational entities. In relational thinking, regions are understood as being
embedded in broader power constellations of different institutional structures and processes con-
necting different regions with each other (Allen et al., 1998). Furthermore, regions are not con-
sidered ‘isolated, bounded islands’(Paasi, 2011, p. 11) but open entities with diffuse boundaries
that are in constant exchange with other entities, thus stretching and networking beyond admin-
istrative and territorial borders (Amin, 2004).
The emergence and strengthening of regions and the regional level can be traced back to pro-
cesses that originated in the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s, as well as in the ongoing globaliza-
tion (Agnew, 2017;Brenner,1999;Cox,1997; Jessop, 2000;Jonas&Pincetl,2006;Keating,
1998,2017). The restructuring of the national state and the decentralization of state tasks
have led to political rescaling processes in which state tasks and socioeconomic activities are
migrated from the national to the supra- or subordinate levels (Jessop, 2016;Keating,2013,
2014). It is understood that the ongoing regionalization of state power and the decentralization
of national policies ‘to the political level closest to the citizens, the local or regional level’serve to
build legitimacy at the regional level, thereby fostering ‘regional democracy’(Hanssen et al.,
2011, p. 47). Public authorities add to the legitimacy of the regional level, as they provide the
institutional framework for the emergence, maintenance and functioning of regional develop-
ment agencies.
Due to the growing importance of the regional level, many public authorities in European
countries have established regional development agencies with the mandate to initiate, coordinate,
control and implement regional development processes (Furmankiewicz et al., 2010; Miles &
Tully, 2007; Sotarauta, 2010; Syrett & Silva, 2001). These regional development agencies feature
common governance characteristics: they consist of and depend on state and non-state actors, are
weakly institutionalized, and lack legislative power (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bevir, 2011; Willi et al.,
2018). In order to adequately represent local interests, local actors representing public authorities
or the private economy are often given positions within the strategic and operational bodies of
regional development agencies. Thereby, local actors gain influence on the strategic orientation,
thematic focus and concrete projects of regional development agencies. In addition to local inter-
ests, regional development agencies also depend on formal regulations, guidelines and develop-
ment programmes issued by superordinate public authorities (e.g., Hanssen et al., 2011; Pearce
& Ayres, 2009).
Unpacking legitimacy in regional development: asymmetric justification 3
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

Legitimacy in regional development
The debate on legitimacy in the regional development literature reflects the wider debate on power
dynamics, actor constellations and decision-making processes inherent in the long-standing col-
lective action literature. In this paper, we focus on a specific aspect of collective decision-making in
regional development processes that has so far been poorly studied: the production of legitimacy by
regional development agencies. Legitimacy is regarded both by researchers and practitioners as a
prerequisite for the functioning of regional development agencies (Blatter, 2007; Kraft & Wolf,
2018; OECD, 2018; regiosuisse, 2011). As regional development agencies are often understood
as actors responsible for coordinating regional development, they need to be legitimate in order to
make decisions and implement them. Thus, understanding the challenges that emerge when
attempts are made to produce legitimacy are crucial for adequately responding to these challenges,
ensuring more effective and self-reflective regional development agencies.
From a scientific point of view, it is understood that regional development agencies as key
regional actors need to be legitimized in order to function –that is, to make decisions and act
upon them (Blatter, 2007; Foster & Barnes, 2012; Pierre & Peters, 2005). Kraft and Wolf
(2018, p. 76) emphasize that ‘without legitimacy, organisations cannot gain necessary resources
and, therefore, struggle’. However, it is not only researchers who stress the importance of legiti-
macy for regional actors. Experts from regional development practices also recognize the impor-
tance of legitimacy for the functioning of regional development agencies: ‘regional development
agencies can only successfully perform tasks if their members and supporting organizations legit-
imize them’(regiosuisse, 2011, p. 12; authors’own translation). Likewise, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) underlines the importance of legitimacy
in building trust across different governmental levels and managing uncertainty in regional devel-
opment processes (OECD, 2018).
In broad terms, legitimacy relates to the acceptance of a collective decision-making process by
those actors who are affected by it (Busscher et al., 2014; Engelen et al., 2008). In other words,
legitimacy can be interpreted as ‘the normative belief held by actors that the particular rule, insti-
tution or order ought to be obeyed’(Bäckstrand, 2006, p. 291). However, the concept remains
rather elusive, and a distinct definition of legitimacy is lacking (van Meerkerk et al., 2015).
Instead, there are a variety of ways to operationalize legitimacy, of which the conceptual frame-
work of input, throughput and output legitimacy is among the best known (Atalay, 2018; Bäck-
strand, 2006; Iusmen & Boswell, 2017; Scharpf, 1999,2009; Schmidt, 2013) and has received
widespread attention, particularly in political, environmental and planning studies. Moreover, a
growing interest in the conceptual framework has recently become particularly apparent in
regional development and regional governance studies (Birnbaum, 2016; Chatzopoulou, 2015;
Doberstein & Millar, 2014; Johansson, 2016;van Meerkerk et al., 2015). However, empirical
studies that use the conceptual framework to study the functioning of regional development
agencies are rare (Airaksinen et al., 2014). In the following, we will outline the concepts of
input, throughput and output legitimacy briefly and clarify how we operationalize them for our
analysis.
First, input legitimacy relates to an actor’s capability to create participative and inclusive
decision-making processes that are accessible to all actors potentially affected by the outcomes
of these processes (Bäckstrand, 2006; Scharpf, 1999). In line with this argument, we conclude
that regional development agencies produce input legitimacy successfully if they design
decision-making processes characterized by a balanced representation and participation of differ-
ent actors (Birnbaum, 2016; Schmidt, 2013).
Second, throughput legitimacy relates to an actor’s capability to process diverse and rich input
in a decision-making process by fostering equal participation and interaction between various
actors (Schmidt, 2013; van Meerkerk et al., 2015). In this perspective, we deduce that regional
4Yasmine Willi et al.
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

development agencies produce legitimacy by designing transparent and inclusive decision-making
processes with diverse participation opportunities in place (Doberstein & Millar, 2014; Iusmen &
Boswell, 2017).
Third, output legitimacy captures an actor’s capability to solve problems effectively (Bäck-
strand, 2006; Schmidt, 2013). Although output legitimacy is commonly understood to assess
the effectiveness of an outcome of a decision-making process, it can also be used to measure ‘insti-
tutional effectiveness’(Bäckstrand, 2006, p. 295). Institutional effectiveness describes an actor’s
capability to reach anticipated outcomes. It incorporates a variety of values, such as ‘leadership,
clear goal formulation and policy coherence’(p. 295). Unlike outcome effectiveness, which can
only be measured at the end of decision-making processes, institutional effectiveness can be
assessed during decision-making processes. Accordingly, we argue that regional development
agencies produce output legitimacy when they take clear leadership in decision-making processes
and formulate goals purposefully.
Another distinction has been made by Hannah Arendt. Her On Violence (1970) distinguishes
between legitimacy and justification. In her understanding, legitimacy is not related to outcomes,
but justification is. While an authority can be legitimized from the outset by being accepted to
carry out certain actions, it must later justify its actions and prove the rightfulness of the means
towards an end:
[Legitimacy is derived] from the initial getting together rather than from any action that then may follow.
Legitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justification relates to an end that
lies in the future …justification loses its plausibility the farther its intended end recedes into the future.
(p. 52)
According to Arendt, legitimacy is based on the procedural rightfulness of the mandate of a
regional development agency and precedes the establishment of the agency. Justification, in con-
trast, is based on means-ends coordination and on the results it yields, and thus can be measured
only after the fact. In different words, a regional development agency that does not deliver on its
promises has not a legitimacy problem but a justification problem. By making the distinction
between legitimacy and justification, we can make a distinction between the initial establishment
of a regional development organization and the actions that may follow from it. In line with
Arendt’s understanding of legitimacy and justification, we argue that regional development
agencies can be legitimated beforehand with their establishment but nevertheless need to justify
their activities on a recurring basis.
RESEARCH DESIGN
We place our analysis within the context of regional development processes in Switzerland. Study-
ing the Swiss case is highly instructive because, due to a longstanding tradition of federalism, sub-
sidiarity and decentralization of state tasks to subnational levels (cantonal, regional and
municipal), the Swiss political system is highly fragmented (Ladner, 2016). Within the national
territory of 41,300 km
2
, the population of 8.4 million inhabitants is dispersed across 26 cantons
and more than 2200 municipalities. As a consequence, the demand for coordination is high, and
thus a large diversity of regional governance forms can be studied in a comparably confined space.
This demand for coordination has been reinforced in recent years by the paradigm shift in regional
policy, which has led to today’s regional development policy approaches being even more multi-
level and multi-actor oriented.
As in other European countries, a paradigm shift in regional development has also changed the
priorities in Switzerland regarding incentives, territorial coverage and financing (Blöchliger &
Kamal-Chaoui, 2003; OECD, 2006,2016). Whereas previous regional policies focused on
Unpacking legitimacy in regional development: asymmetric justification 5
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

regional equalization and the reduction of disparities (through top-down-managed infrastructure
development programmes within single sectors), newer policies aim to promote bottom-up and
local entrepreneurship, innovation and competition among the different Swiss regions (Baumgart-
ner et al., 2010; Mayer & Baumgartner, 2014; Messerli, 2004).
In the course of this paradigm shift, regional development agencies have also gained greater
importance in Switzerland and are today seen as key players in coordinating regional development
processes (SECO, 2017; Willi & Pütz, 2018). This includes managing decision-making pro-
cesses, drafting regional development strategies, implementing projects, and organizing the
exchange among various regional and local actors in order to jointly promote regional develop-
ment. The vast majority of regional development agencies in Switzerland are organized as associ-
ations, although other legal forms, such as public-sector or private-stock corporations, do exist. As
associations, they have no formal legal power and strongly depend on their members, who are local
state and non-state actors and include representatives from local municipal councils, cantonal
authorities, private sector associations, companies and individuals.
The methodical approach of this paper is based on a qualitative case study design that allows
for an exploratory and open-research process. For this purpose, we selected the following six
regional development agencies across Switzerland: (1) Développement du Nord Vaudois
(ADNV), (2) LuzernPlus, (3) Parc Ela, (4) Regio Frauenfeld, (5) Region Oberaargau and (6)
Region Thal/Naturpark Thal (Figure 1). All selected cases are organized as associations and
located in different Swiss cantons. They also have publicly accessible regional development strat-
egies available online.
The empirical evidence of this paper is drawn from 31 semi-structured, in-depth expert inter-
views conducted between April and December 2017 with various state and non-state actors who
held various positions within the management centre or the strategic or operational bodies of the
selected regional development agencies. The interviewed experts included regional managers,
municipal councillors, local businesspeople heading large enterprises, small entrepreneurs and
Figure 1. Selected case study areas across Switzerland.
6Yasmine Willi et al.
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

self-employed persons. In total, eight of the interviewed actors were drawn from the management
centres of the regional development agencies, of which five were heads and three were in a senior
management position. At the strategic level, 10 interviewees were selected, of which five had a
state background and were either presidents (n= 4) or members of a municipal council (n= 1).
The other five interviewees on the strategic level were selected from the non-state realm. Four
of them represented local private sector associations (e.g., chamber of commerce, tourism associ-
ation). At the operative level, a total of 13 interviews were conducted. Of these interviewees, four
were state actors, who all were members of different municipal councils. Of the interviewed nine
non-state actors, four represented a local private sector association, whereas the others were either
self-employed (n= 2) or managing directors of local small and medium-sized enterprises (n= 3).
The interviews were based on a guideline that allowed the interviews to develop into a consist-
ent and structured but open conversation (Valentine, 2005). The interviewees were asked ques-
tions about the organization, structures and functioning of regional development agencies; the
decision-making processes behind the design and implementation of regional development strat-
egies; and challenges encountered during these processes. In addition, interviewees were asked if
and how these challenges were addressed.
In each case study region, the first interview was held with either the head or a senior manager
of each regional development agency in order to gain an overview of its organization, structure and
decision-making processes. During these initial interviews, further potential interviewees were
identified through the snowball system. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 3 hours
and were conducted in German (n= 29) or French (n= 4) at the working places (n= 31) or
homes (n= 2) of the interviewees. All interview quotes used for this paper were translated into
English by the authors.
Subsequently, the interviews were recorded, transcribed and qualitatively analysed for content
using MaxQDA 12.0. The applied coding system in MaxQDA was partly pre-defined by the
guiding interview questions and partly created during the coding itself. The interviews were
revised several times to ensure that the final coding system was applied to all of them. The
codes were grouped into three main categories: (1) measures to produce legitimacy; (2) conflicts
arising from producing legitimacy; and (3) measures taken by regional development agencies to
address emerging challenges.
RESULTS
How regional development agencies legitimize themselves
Based on the results, we identify several means by which regional development agencies produce
input, throughput and output legitimacy. First, to produce input legitimacy and secure a balanced
representation of different local actors, regional development agencies apply different membership
rules as a means to regulate the inclusion of both local state and non-state actors. In all except one
of the studied regional development agencies, the majority of the members are municipal coun-
cillors. This means that municipal councillors hold the largest number of votes in both the general
assembly and the board of directors. In general, the number of votes held by a single municipal
council depends on the number of inhabitants of its municipality. An exception is the ADNV,
where every delegate member has one vote each, regardless of whether that member is a state
or non-state actor. However, when voting on sensitive issues that affect the municipalities only,
such as the amount of the municipal contributions to be paid to the regional development agency,
non-state actors are excluded here as well.
Besides local state members, regional development agencies additionally target the inclusion of
non-state actors by regulating access to the regional development agencies’main bodies via mem-
bership. In three cases (ADNV, Parc Ela, Region Oberaargau), non-state actors are granted full
membership and may hold official functions, including voting rights, within the strategic bodies of
Unpacking legitimacy in regional development: asymmetric justification 7
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

the regional development agency (e.g., general assembly, executive board). Although any local
non-state actor (i.e., from legal entities such as large companies, small and medium-sized enter-
prises, associations, and interest groups to private persons and families) can become a member and
delegate, the seats on the executive board are distributed strategically among local non-state actors
with a certain reputation, either because they represent local private associations (i.e., chamber of
commerce, tourism associations) and/or because they are locally committed to promoting the cul-
tural, socioeconomic, and environmental values of the region.
As it ‘is relatively rare that someone volunteers’(municipal councillor, Region Thal/Natur-
park), regional development agencies often contact potential candidates directly and invite
them to take up a seat at the executive board, such as reported by a municipal councillor in the
Region Oberaargau: ‘The position was not advertised. You could not simply sign up just because
you were interested. Instead, you had to be requested by the region, by the management center.’
Interestingly, non-state actors often perceive it positive to hold a position within the regional
development agency strategic bodies, as it presents an opportunity to voice their opinions and con-
cerns directly to municipal councillors:
The president of the [local] economic chamber of commerce is also a member of the executive board [of the
regional development agency]. And with this, he has, somehow, a political voice. …Well, not directly, but
he can tell his opinion to the politicians, the municipal councilors, who are members of the same executive
board. (economic actor, Region Thal/Naturpark Thal)
In contrast to the regional development agencies that grant membership to non-state actors, there
are others who refrain from it (LuzernPlus, Regio Frauenfeld, Region Thal/Naturpark Thal).
However, this does not mean that local non-state actors are excluded from the decision-making
process; instead, they are often given an advisory role. This is not equally appreciated by everyone.
For some, as long as there arise no major problems, they feel satisfied with having no direct
influence:
I speak on behalf of my colleagues when I say that I don’t think that we need more influence. If there really
was something wrong, things would be different; but in general, I find the regional development agency
quite well organized and the region prospering. (economic actor, Regio Frauenfeld)
For others, having only an advisory function can be frustrating: ‘For six years, I was a member of
the executive board. And the only thing I could do was motivate them [the municipal councillors]
to be a little bit braver’(economic actor, LuzernPlus). However, frustration can also arise in
regional development agencies that grant full membership to non-state actors. Here, non-state
members report being outnumbered by state members and their greater voting power: ‘It is
obvious that it is the municipalities that decide. If they agree on something, we [the non-state
actors] do not stand much chance’(economic actor, Region Oberaargau).
Second, to produce throughput legitimacy and ensure a transparent and inclusive decision-
making process, regional development agencies try to reach out to the wider public by means of
organizing information events and workshops and using local media channels for communication.
In three regional development agencies (Region Thal/Naturpark Thal, Parc Ela and Region
Oberaargau), public workshops for strategic decision-making were organized, which were open
to local inhabitants, visitors and others interested in the region. The workshops were advertised
widely, with invitations disseminated via local newspapers and regional newsletters. However,
despite this effort, the interest from the local public remained low. The head of the regional devel-
opment agency Parc Ela reported that the response rate to the workshops was ‘relatively modest’
and explains that ‘activating people on topics concerning the region is difficult because they are
very much anchored in their village life’.
8Yasmine Willi et al.
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

To avoid open workshops that attract only small numbers from the local population, the three
regional development agencies ADNV, LuzernPlus and Regio Frauenfeld chose a different
approach. They directly invite targeted local actors to attend workshops and participate in regional
decision-making processes: ‘We have specifically selected the innovative actors of our region. Also,
we did not target the heads of individual companies but rather representatives of the trade associ-
ations or the chamber of commerce and industry’(head of regional development agency, Luzern-
Plus). However, even when actors are specifically selected, it remains a challenge to motivate local
actors to commit themselves to the activities of regional development agencies.
Third, in order to produce output legitimacy and clarify leadership roles and strategic goals,
regional development agencies chose to design and implement regional development strategies.
A strategic planning approach is now seen as increasingly important for regional development
agencies (Sotarauta, 2010). For example, the head of the regional development agency LuzernPlus
confirmed that ‘without strategy, one is lost’. Relatedly, a municipal president and member of the
ADNV highlights the added value of regional development strategies, such as that ‘the [regional
development] strategy supports cooperation between municipalities –even on issues on which we
disagree’.
The six regional development agencies’strategies differ in their degree of detail. Where four of
regional development agencies (ADNV, Parc Ela, Regio Frauenfeld and Region Oberaargau)
designed detailed and extensive regional development strategies, two (LuzernPlus and Region
Thal/Naturpark Thal) drafted short and broadly formulated ones. The detailed regional develop-
ment strategies include comprehensive descriptions of goals, project plans, and measures and
identify project-executive actors and potential donors early on. They are not necessarily very
long documents but rather condensed and rich texts: ‘Everything needs to fit on one page. …
We deliberately do not want to produce too much paper, but rather “bring projects to the ground”.
That’s our motto. In any case, there is still too much paper produced anyway’(head of regional
development agency, LuzernPlus). Designing a detailed regional development strategy is time-
consuming and resource intensive, as the involved actors must agree on potential conflictual
aspects, such as budget plans, the acceptance or rejection of projects and thematic priorities. How-
ever, once approved, detailed strategies are a powerful tool for regional development agencies to
assume leadership in performing actions towards regional development.
In contrast, broadly formulated regional development strategies comprise general goals, non-
binding visions and intended development steps, without attributing responsibility to specific
actors or concretizing details such as budget, project plans and project partners. Because poten-
tially conflictual questions (e.g., budget plans, projects) are not discussed beforehand, broadly for-
mulated regional development strategies are rather quickly approved by the different actors
involved in the strategic decision-making process. However, as neither leadership roles nor com-
petences have been clarified, implementation is often difficult because no one feels responsible for
it. This can cause misunderstandings and frustration:
People thought that the outlined project ideas in the strategy had already been approved as full projects and
would be implemented soon. We had to correct that view and explain that the project needed to be devel-
oped further and that, additionally, funding had not been secured yet. (head of regional development
agency, Region Oberaargau)
Asymmetric justification and the challenges of producing legitimacy
Having identified the several means that regional development agencies apply to produce legiti-
macy, we now turn to analyse the arising challenges. The results indicate that by attempting to
legitimize themselves, regional development agencies create challenges that amplify their malfunc-
tioning, therefore limiting their capacity to make decisions and act upon them. In the following,
Unpacking legitimacy in regional development: asymmetric justification 9
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

we show how these challenges can be attributed to what we call ‘asymmetric justification’. As dis-
cussed in the introduction, asymmetric justification refers to a situation in the decision-making
process in which local actors involved in regional development agencies fail to justify their regional
engagement to the local authorities and organizations they represent. Asymmetric justification can
hamper decision-making because the involved actors must justify their commitment at the
regional level to different bodies at the local level. However, challenges arise when the level at
which actions are aimed (e.g., regional development processes) is not congruent with the level
at which the actors involved must justify themselves. This can lead to a situation in which the
involved actors become incapable of acting or making decisions on behalf of the regional level.
As regional development agencies depend on these actors, they become incapable of acting them-
selves and ultimately fail to function.
In the following, we identify the challenges that may arise when regional development agencies
produce input, throughput or output legitimacy and show how these can be linked to asymmetric
justification. First, regional development agencies produce input legitimacy by including a variety
of local actors by either granting full membership to everyone or limiting membership to state
actors and conferring advisory roles to non-state actors. In both cases, regional development
agencies enable local actors to take over certain positions at the strategic or operational level
and thus facilitate participation in regional decision-making processes. As these local actors rep-
resent local bodies, they need to justify their engagement at the regional level to these local bodies.
However, due to the asymmetry in interests, goals and perimeter between the local and the
regional level, the appointed members of regional development agencies often find it difficult
or even fail to justify their actions to the local bodies they represent –or, as the president of
the local chamber of commerce and member of the executive board of the Regio Frauenfeld states,
‘because the perimeter of the regional development agency goes beyond ours, I cannot and do not
want to commit to activities that go beyond our perimeter’. This dilemma indicates that local
interests trump regional interests, preventing local actors from fully participating in regional
decision-making processes. In addition, it points to the clashing asymmetry in misconceptions
of a region and its border, which, in this case, prevents joint action.
This dilemma is not limited to non-state actors; municipal councillors also frequently reported
that they had difficulty justifying the decisions taken at the regional level to their fellow municipal
councillors. Although they are officially commissioned to take a seat within the strategic body of a
regional development agency, they are often confronted with scepticism by citizens and fellow
councillors. Often, it is feared that municipal interests will be undermined. In that vein, an entre-
preneur, who is a member of the executive board of LuzernPlus, observed: ‘Municipal councilors
are repeatedly summoned back and [confronted with questions such as] “Are you out of your
mind?”when they try to convince their fellow municipal councilors of the importance of realizing
regional interests.’This results in frequent delays or postponements of decisions, which ultimately
prevent regional development agencies from making decisions and acting upon them.
Second, regional development agencies produce throughput legitimacy by reaching out to the
wider public. Often, they organize workshops that are open to the general public or target selected
local actors. However, mobilizing the local public remains challenging due to the lack of interest in
regional activities, which are often perceived as vague, distant and difficult to grasp. A managing
director of a large company and chairman of the local trade association, who is involved in the
ADNV, further notes weakness of regional identity as the reason for the lack of interest in regional
issues: ‘It’s a purely administrative region. It has no sense of meaning. …It is difficult to create a
common identity here.’
As the local public is first and foremost interested in meeting local expectations and realizing
local needs, justification for engaging on the regional level is often difficult. It is particularly diffi-
cult to implement regional measures if the local public and authorities perceive it to have too little
benefit for them. For regional development agencies, it is hard to justify why inhabitants of one
10 Yasmine Willi et al.
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

municipality should commit themselves to the implementation of regional projects in the next
one.
Third, regional development agencies produce output legitimacy by designing and implement-
ing regional development strategies. Although regional development strategies are designed in a
joint effort comprising different state and non-state actors, it remains a challenge to implement
them. Again, these challenges can be linked to asymmetric justification. Often, local actors resist
implementing regional development strategies, even in cases in which they have been involved in
the decision-making processes. As an example, a few years ago the regional development agency
Parc Ela initiated a collaborative process with local bakers to create a regionally recognized speci-
alty bread. Despite their initial interest and involvement in the decision-making process, however,
most of them later lost interest in the project by arguing that they would not attract more attention
locally by promoting a regional bread.
Another challenge arises from asymmetric justification because actors who have been
appointed by local bodies as representatives (e.g., president of the local chamber of commerce,
director of a tourism association) are first and foremost accountable to implement the strategies
of these bodies. Even if these local actors are involved in the decision-making behind regional
development strategies, they do not fully acknowledge them:
I have always perceived the regional strategy as a non-binding proposal. I would never have signed a
[regional] strategy that would be binding and rigorously implemented. …The strategy that is binding
for me is the one approved by the delegates of the tourism association. (director of local tourism association,
Parc Ela)
Although regional development strategies have been jointly designed by various state and non-
state actors, they still might not be acknowledged by these actors. Also, as these actors often
represent institutions that follow their own strategies (e.g., communal strategies, business
plans), justifying why additionally a regional development strategy should be implemented can
be difficult. This lack of congruency between different regional and local development strategies
thus limits the assertiveness of the regional development strategy. As a result, regional develop-
ment agencies can become incapable of acting.
Addressing the challenges associated with asymmetric justification
In order to better understand the functioning of regional development agencies, it is necessary to
tackle the challenges associated with asymmetric justification. In our case studies, we found some
examples of how asymmetric justification can be addressed successfully. First, it is important that
local actors representing local interests in regional development agencies are given sufficient lever-
age and capacity to act by their respective local bodies and, in particular, are encouraged to adopt a
regional perspective. A good example can be found in the ADNV, in which one of the member
municipalities has a legislative programme in which municipal councillors are encouraged to
actively participate in the regional development agency. Additionally, they are granted sufficient
support to fully commit themselves to a regional perspective. For the president of this municipal-
ity, who holds a strategic position within the ADNV, this official document is a crucial source of
support and legitimacy that helps him justify his engagement with the regional development
agency: ‘I have the explicit permission of my colleagues to actively engage myself’(municipal pre-
sident, ADNV). In contrast, in the case of LuzernPlus, it is the regional development agency itself
that requires members to explicitly adopt a regional perspective. The guiding document, ‘Strategic
Planning for the Period 2014–7’states that ‘[b]oard members must regard themselves as represen-
tatives of the region and argue from a regional point of view. If a member wants to represent a
particular interest, it must be declared’(LuzernPlus, 2013, p. 3; authors’own translation). Making
the requirement of ‘adopting a regional point of view’explicit from the beginning adds to the
Unpacking legitimacy in regional development: asymmetric justification 11
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

transparency of decision-making processes and thus can make justification much easier for the
involved actors.
Second, our results highlight the need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of local actors
within regional development agencies as early as possible. The head of the Regio Frauenfeld
has identified the need for action: ‘It is not exactly chaos, but sometimes it’s not clear who has
what role and which tasks belongs in which process. However, we are currently in the middle
of clarifying this.’Also, clarifying the roles of regional development agencies could at least help
reduce the fear of some local authorities and private business of losing competences and authority.
A senior manager of LuzernPlus states that ‘it is important that we avoid taking away anything
from the municipalities if they do not agree on that. Instead, we need to provide support, and
if that works, it means that we are also accepted’. In addition, the head of Parc Ela points out
that it is important that regional development agencies, as quasi-state-backed organizations, do
not compete with private organizations and their services. Rather, regional development agencies
should confine themselves to providing assistance and guidance to local actors:
I do not think that it is our job to take on a private-sector role because we also live on public funds and thus
could compete with private companies. Instead, we should be those who initiate, support, but not necess-
arily those –or only in selected areas –who implement projects. (head of regional development agency, Parc
Ela)
Third, closely related to the need to clarify roles and responsibilities is the need to discuss and
reflect on the expectations that local actors have of regional development agencies. More often
than not, local actors have high expectations, without being aware of their role in contributing
to meeting these expectations. The head of the Region Thal/Naturpark Thal summarizes this
dilemma as follows: ‘The expectation here in the region is quite strong that we should promote
economic development. But in fact, we don’t even have an official mandate from the municipa-
lities.’Thus, local actors need to understand that regional development agencies need to be
granted sufficient decision-making capacities and resources in order to meet local expectations.
Reviewing local expectations on regional development agencies and checking whether they are
sufficiently equipped to meet these expectations should therefore become a top priority for local
actors and policy-makers on different political levels alike.
CONCLUSIONS
Both practitioners and researchers understand legitimacy as a prerequisite for regional develop-
ment agencies to function (Blatter, 2007; Kraft & Wolf, 2018; OECD, 2018; regiosuisse,
2011)–that is, to take decisions and act upon them. Taking this understanding as our starting
position, this paper aimed at investigating how regional development agencies legitimize them-
selves, what challenges arise from these efforts, and how these can be addressed. The paper
advances existing knowledge on the role of legitimacy in regional development (Bäckstrand,
2006; Keulartz & Leistra, 2008; Raitio & Harkki, 2014) by introducing and unpacking the con-
cept of legitimacy and introducing asymmetric justification. This novel concept can help further
push the debate on the functioning of regional development agencies by proposing a clear distinc-
tion between legitimacy and justification.
By conducting exploratory case studies in six regional development agencies across Switzer-
land, we discover a variety of strategies to produce legitimacy but, at the same time, observe
that it is precisely these legitimizing strategies that impair decision-making in regional develop-
ment agencies. Previous studies have associated such difficulties with a lack of financial and per-
sonnel resources (Marra, 2014; Pike et al., 2018; Rogge et al., 2013) or with dependency on other
public institutions (Hanssen et al., 2011; Wellbrock et al., 2013). In addition, this paper highlights
12 Yasmine Willi et al.
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

asymmetric justification as a further limitation that can impair the functioning of regional devel-
opment agencies. It is well known that actors based in one locality may prevent the implemen-
tation of regional actions, especially if these actions were to be manifested in a different locality
(Rutgers-Zoet & Hospers, 2018). Our results advance this finding by pointing out that this mech-
anism does not have to be seen only as a mere prevention strategy of local actors. Instead, we link
this mechanism to the realities and scope for action of regional development agencies. Our find-
ings emphasize that this mechanism may be facilitated by the obligation for regional development
agencies to legitimize themselves. Because they seek to legitimize their actions by involving local
actors, there is a potential risk that local interests undermine regional ones.
Thus, future research should be concerned with the role of regional development agencies, not
only in Switzerland but across Europe. Across many countries, development agencies operating on
the regional level have been established with the promise of being better able than local govern-
ments to deliver public goods and services, thereby increasing the competitiveness of regions
(Pearce & Ayres, 2009; Pomeranz & Decker, 2017; Sotarauta, 2010). However, it can be observed
that regional development agencies often struggle to ‘embrace and encourage more holistic econ-
omic development practices’(Miles & Tully, 2007, p. 865).
Besides focusing on the deliverables and tasks regional development agencies could fulfil in the
future, further research should aim to answer the question of whether regional development
agencies are effectively the best actors for promoting regional development and delivering regional
services. More research on this question could also help to reinforce a debate about the current
emphasis of many national regional development policies on fostering competitiveness among
regions and across countries (Iammarino et al., 2017; Pike et al., 2016). Finally, there is a need
for further research on the workings of asymmetric justification and its potential impacts on
regional development processes. An improved understanding of the difficulty of regional develop-
ment agencies to decide and act could help increase their assertiveness and capacity for self-
reflection.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
FUNDING
This work was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) [grant number
10001A_152942/1].
ORCID
Yasmine Willi http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6298-8646
Marco Pütz http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7868-6864
Joost Jongerden http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0076-732X
REFERENCES
Agnew, J. (2012). Arguing with regions. Regional Studies,47(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2012.
676738
Agnew, J. (2017). The tragedy of the nation-state. Territory, Politics, Governance,5(4), 347–350. https://doi.org/10.
1080/21622671.2017.1357257
Airaksinen, J., Härkönen, H., & Haveri, A. (2014). Perceptions of legitimacy in Nordic regional development net-
works. Public Organization Review,14(4), 457–476. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-013-0238-7
Unpacking legitimacy in regional development: asymmetric justification 13
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

Allen, J., Massey, D., & Cochrane, A. (1998). Rethinking the region. Routledge.
Amin, A. (2004). Regions unbound: Towards a new politics of place. Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human
Geography,86(1), 33–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0435-3684.2004.00152.x
Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory,18(4), 543–571. http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/jopart/mum032
Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
Atalay, Y. (2018). Understanding input and output legitimacy of environmental policymaking in the Gulf cooperation
council states. Environmental Policy and Governance,28(1), 39–50. https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.1794
Bäckstrand, K. (2006). Multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development: Rethinking legitimacy,
accountability and effectiveness. European Environment,16(5), 290–306. https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.425
Baumgartner, D., Lehmann, B., Weber, M., & Pütz, M. (2010). Entrepreneurship als lokales unternehmerisches
Potenzial für Regionalentwicklung im ländlichen Raum –Definition und Inidkatoren. Ergebnisse einer
Delphi-Studie in der Schweiz. Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie,54(1), 96–113. https://doi.org/10.1515/
zfw.2010.0007
Bevir, M. (2011). Governance as theory, practice, and dilemma. In M. Bevir (Ed.), The SAGE Handbook of govern-
ance (pp. 1–16). SAGE.
Birnbaum, S. (2016). Environmental co-governance, legitimacy, and the quest for compliance: When and why is
stakeholder participation desirable? Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning,18(3), 306–323. https://doi.
org/10.1080/1523908X.2015.1077440
Blatter, J. (2007). Demokratie und legitimation. In A. Benz, S. Lütz, U. Schimank, & G. Somonis (Eds.),
Handbuch governance: Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Anwendungsfelder (pp. 271–284). SV Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften.
Blöchliger, H., & Kamal-Chaoui, L. (2003). Regionalpolitische Wende in den OECD-Ländern. Die
Volkswirtschaft,76(2), 18–21.
Brenner, N. (1999). Globalisation as reterritorialisatioin: The re-scaling of urban governance in the European
Union. Urban Studies,36(3), 431–451. https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098993466
Brenner, N. (2003). Metropolitan institutional reform and the rescaling of state space in contemporary Western
Europe. European Urban and Regional Studies,10(4), 297–324. https://doi.org/10.1177/09697764030104002
Busscher, T., Zuidema, C., Tillema, T., & Arts, J. (2014). Bridging gaps: Governing conflicts between transport
and environmental policies. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space,46(3), 666–681. http://epn.
sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1068/a4641
Chatzopoulou, S. (2015). Unpacking the mechanisms of the EU ‘throughput’governance legitimacy: The case of
EFSA. European Politics and Society,16(2), 159–177. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
23745118.2014.974312
Coe, N. M., Hess, M., Yeung, H. W., Dicken, P., & Henderson, J. (2004). ‘Globalizing’regional development: A
global production networks perspective. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,29(4), 468–484.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-2754.2004.00142.x
Cox, K. R. (1997). Spaces of globalization: Reasserting the power of the local. Guildford Press.
Doberstein, C., & Millar, H. (2014). Balancing a house of cards: Throughput legitimacy in Canadian governance
networks. Canadian Journal of Political Science,47(2), 259–280. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423914000420
Engelen, E., Keulartz, J., & Leistra, G. (2008). European nature conservation policy making; from substance to
procedural sources of legitimacy. In J. Keulartz and G. Leistra (Eds.), Legitimacy in European nature conserva-
tion policy: Case studies in multilevel governance (pp. 3–21). Springer.
Foster, K. A., & Barnes, W. R. (2012). Reframing regional governance for research and practice. Urban Affairs
Review,48(2), 272–283. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087411428121
Furmankiewicz, M., Thompson, N., & Zielin, M. (2010). Area-based partnerships in rural Poland: The post-
accession experience. Journal of Rural Studies,26(1), 52–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2009.05.001
Hanssen, G. S., Nergaard, E., Pierre, J., & Skaalholt, A. (2011). Multi-level governance of regional economic
development in Norway and Sweden: Too much or too little top-down control? Urban Research & Practice,
4(1), 38–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/17535069.2011.550539
14 Yasmine Willi et al.
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). Does efficiency shape the territorial structure of government? Annual Review of
Political Science,12(1), 225–241. http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.041107.
102315
Iammarino, S., Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Storper, M. (2017). Why regional development matters for Europe’s
Economic Future.
Iusmen, I., & Boswell, J. (2017). The dilemmas of pursuing ‘throughput legitimacy’through participatory mech-
anisms. West European Politics,40(2), 459–478. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1206380
Jessop, B. (2000). The crisis of the national spatio-temporal fix and the tendential ecological dominance of globa-
lizing capitalism. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,24(2), 323–360. https://doi.org/10.
1111/1468-2427.00251
Jessop, B. (2016). Territory, politics, governance and multispatial metagovernance. Territory, Politics, Governance,
4(1), 8–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2015.1123173
Johansson, J. (2016). Participation and deliberation in Swedish forest governance: The process of initiating a
national forest program. Forest Policy and Economics,70, 137–146. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2016.06.
001
Jonas, A. E. G., & Pincetl, S. (2006). Rescaling regions in the state: The new regionalism in California. Political
Geography,25(5), 482–505. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.02.002
Keating, M. (1998). The new regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial restructuring and political change. Edward
Elgar Pub.
Keating, M. (2013). Rescaling the European state: The making of territory and the rise of the meso. Oxford University
Press.
Keating, M. (2014). Introduction: Rescaling interests. Territory, Politics, Governance,2(3), 239–248. https://doi.
org/10.1080/21622671.2014.954604
Keating, M. (2017). Contesting European regions. Regional Studies,51(1), 9–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/
00343404.2016.1227777
Keulartz, J., & Leistra, G. (2008). Legitimacy in European nature conservation policy. Springer.
Kraft, B., & Wolf, S. (2018). Through the lens of accountability: Analyzing legitimacy in environmental govern-
ance. Organization & Environment,31(1), 70–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/1086026616680682
Ladner, A. (2016). Gemeindeversammlung und Gemeindeparlament. IDHEAP.
LuzernPlus. (2013). Strategische Plnaung für die Periode 2014–2017.
MacLeod, G., & Jones, M. (2007). Territorial, scalar, networked, connected: In what sense a ‘regional world’?
Regional Studies,41(9), 1177–1191. https://doi.org/10.1080/00343400701646182
Marra, M. (2014). What coordination mechanisms work to manage regional development programmes? Insights
from Southern Italian regions.
Mayer, H., & Baumgartner, D. (2014). The role of entrepreneurship and innovation in peripheral regions. disP –
The Planning Review,50(1), 16–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/02513625.2014.926720
Messerli, P. (2004). Regionalpolitik zwischen Theorie und Praxis. In S. Schaltegger (Ed.), Perspektiven der
Wirtschaftspolitik (pp. 435–450). vdf.
Miles, N., & Tully, J. (2007). Regional development agency policy to tackle economic exclusion? The role of social
capital in distressed communities. Regional Studies,41(6), 855–866. https://doi.org/10.1080/
00343400601120312
Morgan, K. (2004). Sustainable regions: Governance, innovation and scale. European Planning Studies,12(6), 871–
889. https://doi.org/10.1080/0965431042000251909
OECD. (2006). The new rural paradigm: Policies and governance. http://www.oecd.org/gov/regional-policy/
thenewruralparadigmpoliciesandgovernance.htm
OECD. (2016). OECD regional outlook 2016: Productive regions for inclusive societies.
OECD. (2018). Rethinking regional development policy–making OECD multi.
Paasi, A. (1991). Deconstructing regions: Notes on the scales of spatial life. Environment and Planning A: Economy
and Space,23(2), 239–256. https://doi.org/10.1068/a230239
Unpacking legitimacy in regional development: asymmetric justification 15
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

Paasi, A. (2011). The region, identity, and power. Procedia –Social and Behavioral Sciences,14,9–16. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.03.011
Paasi, A., & Metzger, J. (2017). Foregrounding the region. Regional Studies,51(1), 19–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/
00343404.2016.1239818
Pearce, G., & Ayres, S. (2009). Governance in the English regions: The role of the regional development agencies.
Urban Studies,46(3), 537–557. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098008100994
Pierre, J., & Peters, G. (2005). Governing complex societies: Trajectories and scenarios. Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Pike, A., Coombes, M., O’Brien, P., & Tomaney, J. (2018). Austerity states, institutional dismantling and the gov-
ernance of sub-national economic development: The demise of the regional development agencies in England.
Territory, Politics, Governance,6(1), 118–144. https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2016.1228475
Pike, A., Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Tomaney, J. (2016, April). Shifting horizons in local and regional development.
3404.
Pomeranz, E. F., & Decker, D. J. (2017). Designing regional-level stakeholder engagement processes: Striving for
good governance while meeting the challenges of scale. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning,0(0), 1–16.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1523908X.2017.1417119
Raitio, K., & Harkki, S. (2014). The disappearing chain of responsibility: Legitimacy challenges in the political
governance of Finnish Forest and Park Service. Land Use Policy,39, 281–291. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
landusepol.2014.02.008
regiosuisse. (2011). Regional management, 16.
Rogge, E., Dessein, J., & Verhoeve, A. (2013). The organisation of complexity: A set of five components to organ-
ise the social interface of rural policy making. Land Use Policy,35, 329–340. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
landusepol.2013.06.006
Rutgers-Zoet, J., & Hospers, G.-J. (2018). Regional collaboration in rural areas: The case of the Achterhoek. In G.
Hospers & J. Syssner (Eds.), Dealing with urban and rural shrinkage: Formal and informal strategies (pp. 87–99).
Lit Verlag GmbH & Co. KG Wien.
Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic? Oxford University Press.
Scharpf, F. W. (2009). Legitimacy in the multilevel European polity. European Political Science Review,1(2), 173–
204. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773909000204
Schmidt, V. (2013). Democracy and legitimacy in the European Union revisited: Input, output and ‘throughput’.
Political Studies,61(1), 2–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00962.x
SECO. (2017). The new regional policy of the federal government.
Sotarauta, M. (2010). Regional development and regional networks: The role of regional development officers in
Finland. European Urban and Regional Studies,17(4), 387–400. https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776409352581
Storper, M. (1997). The regional world territorial development in a global economy. Guildford Press.
Syrett, S., & Silva, C. N. (2001). Regional development agencies in Portugal: Recent development and future chal-
lenges. Regional Studies,35(2), 174–180. https://doi.org/10.1080/00343400120033160
Valentine, G. (2005). Tell me about it..: using interviews as a research methodology. In R. Flowerdew & D. Martin
(Eds.), Methods in human geography: A guide for students doing a research project (pp. 110–126). Routledge.
van Meerkerk, I., Edelenbos, J., & Klijn, E. H. (2015). Connective management and governance network perform-
ance: The mediating role of throughput legitimacy. Findings from survey research on complex water projects in
the Netherlands. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy,33(4), 746–764. https://doi.org/10.
1068/c1345
Wellbrock, W., Roep, D., Mahon, M., Kairyte, E., Nienaber, B., Domínguez García, M. D., Kriszan, M., &
Farrell, M. (2013). Arranging public support to unfold collaborative modes of governance in rural areas.
Journal of Rural Studies,32, 420–429. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2013.10.002
Willi, Y., & Pütz, M. (2018). Governance of regional development: How can regions unlock their potential? Swiss
Academies Factsheet,13(3), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.1308822
Willi, Y., Pütz, M., & Müller, M. (2018). Towards a versatile and multidimensional framework to analyse regional
governance. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space,36(5), 775–795. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
10.1177/2399654418760859
16 Yasmine Willi et al.
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE