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Vol.:(0123456789)
Journal of Chinese Political Science
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-021-09726-7
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RESEARCH ARTICLE
To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic
oftheUS’s China Strategy inthePost-Cold War Era
XiaodiYe1
Accepted: 21 January 2021
© Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2021
Abstract
The United States’ (US) changing policy towards China has become one of the
most attractive issues in contemporary international politics. To explore the rea-
sons underlying these changes, existing studies adopt four schools of explana-
tion, i.e., status competition, institutional competition, failure of engagement,
and domestic factors. Each school provides valuable theoretical insights. How-
ever, existing studies have obvious problems with single attribution and, thus,
fail to formulate a causal mechanism explaining the long-term trajectory of the
US’s China strategy. By recategorizing America’s unilateral perception of China
as reformist, revolutionary, status quo and positionalist, which extends beyond
the revisionist-status quo dichotomy, this article develops a systemic explana-
tory model and process tracing of the transition of US’s China policy during the
post-Cold War period to explain the theoretical logic underlying the changes.
This article argues that the positional change and the US’s unilateral percep-
tion of China are the two main factors triggering changes in the US’s China
strategy. China’s foreign behavior, as the intervening variable, strengthens or
weakens the government’s perception of China and, thus, determines the US’s
strategic choices, i.e., whether to pursue a policy of containment, competition,
precaution, congagement, engagement, or accommodation. Four comparative
case studies are presented to demonstrate how this article’s explanatory model
can be applied.
Keywords Sino-US relations· Engagement· Containment· US China strategy·
Strategic transition
* Xiaodi Ye
derekye8912@163.com
1 School ofInternational Relations, Guangdong University ofForeign Studies, Guangzhou Higher
Education Mega Centre, Xiaoguwei, Panyu District, GuangzhouCity, GuangdongProvince,
China
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Introduction
Whether to continue to engage or attempt to contain a rising China is a crucial
strategic question facing the United States (US) government during the post-Cold
War period. A new round of strategic debate concerning the US’s China strategy
has been in progress since 2015. China’s increasingly confident behaviors in the
wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, including its strengthening military
capability, assertive positive towards maritime disputes, and growing demands to
reshape international institutions, have led many American strategists to recon-
sider the current approach and propose alternatives [15, 23]. The need for this
strategic debate is reinforced by President Trump’s efforts to fulfill the promises
he made during his campaign to modify Sino-US relations, thus bringing the
US’s China strategy into the postengagement period [41]. On July 24, 2020, in
the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared
that the engaging China strategy over the past 40years had been a dismal failure,
thus officially terminating the strategy of engagement [39]. As the most impor-
tant bilateral relationship in contemporary international politics, a transition in
the US’s China strategy could not only have a great impact on Sino-US relations
but also have wide-ranging effects on both regional and international orders. The
significance of the US’s China strategy prompts us to ask the following important
questions: Why is the US government changing its traditional China strategy?
How are such strategic changes playing out? What are the causal mechanisms
affecting the US’s China strategy?
Existing studies, which are based on different variables, can be categorized into
four schools to explain the US’s changing strategy towards China. These schools
include status competition, institutional competition, failure of the engagement
strategy, and domestic factors. While each school provides theoretical insights that
are valuable for understanding this interesting phenomenon, these studies share
the common problem of single attribution; thus, these studies fail to develop a full
explanatory mechanism underlying the transition in the US’s China strategy. More
importantly, as the gap in material capabilities between the US and China has rap-
idly narrowed in recent years, the US government has paid increasing attention to
China’s real intentions. Based on this understanding, this article attempts to develop
a new explanatory model by treating power position and America’s unilateral per-
ception as two independent variables. Consistent with realpolitik, this article argues
that the change in the relative power positions between the US and China and
America’s unilateral perceptions of China (i.e., revolutionary, reformist, status quo
and positionalist perceptions) are the two main factors leading the US to change its
China strategy. Chinese foreign behavior at certain stages serves as an intervening
variable that may strengthen or weaken the US government’s unilateral perception.
These independent variables and intervening variables determine the US’s strate-
gic choices regarding China and include containment, competition, precaution, con-
gagement, engagement, and accommodation.
To develop a new explanatory model and casual mechanism and understand
the logic of the US’s China strategy, this article is organized as follows. The
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
second section conducts a critical review of existing studies and highlights their
theoretical inadequacies. Based on the literature review, the third section con-
structs a new explanatory model by conceptualizing and operationalizing the two
independent variables and then demonstrating the operational logic underlying
the new model. Comparative case studies of the US’s China strategy during the
Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump periods are used to illustrate the application of
the explanatory model and its logic in the fourth section. A brief conclusion is
provided in the final section.
Existing Literature Concerning theUS’s Changing Strategy towardsChina
Four explanations have been proposed to account for the US’s changing strategy
towards China, including status competition, institutional competition, failure of
engagement, and domestic factors. It may be helpful to highlight the inadequacies
of existing studies through a critical literature review before proceeding with the
theoretical discussion.
First, status competition is a theoretical extension of structural realism aiming to
understand strategic competition in great-power politics. William Wohlforth applies
the term ‘status’ to understand the interactions between great powers in a unipolar
system and contends that great powers care about their status in the international
system [95]. Status is particularly important for the US and China because on the
one hand, the US may be anxious about the attenuation of its hegemonic power posi-
tion due to the narrowing gap in material capabilities between the US and China; on
the other hand, due to its growing confidence, China may pursue a higher position in
the power configuration, which may trigger a status competition between these two
great powers. Similarly, Ward [93] argues that China’s outstanding status ambition
could eventually lead to the failure of America’s strategy of accommodation. Onea
[54] suggests that a hegemonic power is more concerned about its power status in
the international system, triggering insecurity in the hegemonic power in the realms
of economics, security, and prestige. Such anxieties may increase the hegemon’s
willingness to take assertive or aggressive action against a rising power, which could
drive the US to shift from a policy of engagement to a policy of competition with
China because of the rapidly narrowing power position gap between the two coun-
tries. Thus, the status competition argument maintains that the quest for hegemonic
status is the major force driving the US government to change its traditional China
strategy.
Second, institutional competition is a byproduct of the transition in the inter-
national system from an offensive world to a defensive world [71]. This transi-
tion dramatically raises the cost of war, leading great powers to seek alternative
approaches for their strategic competition. Similarly, institutional competition is
conceptualized as a type of power in international politics [2]. Morse and Keo-
hane [49] propose the concept of contested multilateralism to describe institu-
tional competition and argue that great powers dissatisfied with existing institu-
tions will create alternative institutions through regime shifting and competitive
regime creation to pursue policies and practices that maximize their national
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interest. In the case of China, Keohane notes that the Chinese government, on
the one hand, has conducted regime shifting to enhance its influence in exist-
ing institutions and, on the other hand, has attempted to create new multilateral
institutions, such as AIIB and the BRICS bank. He [24] also suggests that com-
petitive regime creation, as an alternative to the traditional balance of power, pro-
vides the Chinese government a new approach to achieve institutional balancing
against America’s hegemonic position. The US government views this approach
as a competitive action by China’s, leading to an assertive shift in the US’s China
policy.
Third, in addition to the explanations by the structural perspective, increasing
attention is currently devoted to rethinking and reassessing the efficacy of the tra-
ditional China strategy; this approach constitutes the failure of engagement school.
Mearsheimer [45] proposes that while confronting a rapidly rising China, the US
should adopt a policy of strategic containment rather than adhering to a policy of
engagement. Friedberg [16] contends that China’s development has far exceeded
America’s expectations and that the Chinese government seeks to demonstrate its
confidence and assertiveness due to its rapid growth in relative capability. Based on
this observation, Friedberg [14] suggests that the US government should adopt buck-
ing China as an alternative to engaging China. Similarly, Waldron [87] notes that
the growth of China’s economic and military power is not conducive to America’s
national interest; the US government should dramatically revise its policy towards
China by focusing on addressing the rise of China. The reassessment of China’s
policy has extended into policy circles. Ford [13], who is currently the Assistant
Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation, argues that the
traditional China strategy has seemingly lost efficacy because engagement has not
produced the anticipated benefits. In brief, the failure of engagement explains Amer-
ica’s changing China strategy from a self-reflective perspective.
Fourth, the existing literature attempts to understand the changing dynamics of
the US’s policy towards China by exploring domestic factors [22]. Sutter [70] ana-
lyzes America’s assertive shift towards China from a congressional perspective. He
contends that Trump’s adjustments of the US’s China strategy are largely shaped
by conventional Republican congressional views, which emphasize the importance
of Asian allies, nuclear weapon nonproliferation, and China’s regional influence
[70]. Schweller [65] emphasizes the importance of nationalism in the US and China.
More specifically, Schweller [65] argues that nationalism produces wholly differ-
ent foreign policy orientations in rising and declining powers as follows: the former
embraces an outward-looking, extroverted foreign policy of expansion, while the
latter adopts an inward-looking, introverted foreign policy of restraint and retrench-
ment. Thus, Schweller views Chinese outward-looking nationalism as the cause of
the change in the US’s China strategy. Wang [91], who is an Associate Professor at
Fudan University, proposes that the assertive shift in Trump’s China strategy is an
immediate response to his election promises to reduce America’s trade deficit and
counter the negative effects of globalization.
To gain a better understanding of existing studies, this article summarizes these
studies while paying attention to several criteria, including the level of analysis, core
variables, actors, causal mechanisms, and strategic results (see Table1).
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
Table 1 Summary of existing studies
Source: The Author
Level of Analysis Core Variable Actor Causal Mechanism
Status Competition Systematic Level Relative Capability China and US China’s Growing Capability→The Rising Power Position→Challenge
America’s Hegemony→Contain China
Institutional Competition Systematic Level Regime Creation China and US China’s Growing Capability→Rising Demand for Regime
Creation→Proposing Alternative Institutions→Institutional Competition
Failure of Engagement State Level Strategic Perception China and US The Reassessment of Engagement→Confirm Low Efficacy→Strategic
Debates→Contain China
Domestic Factors Domestic Level Consensus of Political Elites Political Elites The Consensus of Political Elites→The Change in America’s Strategic
Orientation→Transition of China’s Policy
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While the existing literature provides valuable insight into why and how Ameri-
ca’s China strategy is changing, there are still some theoretical inadequacies, which
can mainly be considered from two aspects. The first inadequacy is the problem of
single attribution as follows: existing studies adopt the perspectives of status com-
petition, institutional competition, failure of engagement, and domestic factors to
explain the reasons for America’s changing China strategy by exploring a certain
variable. However, these efforts are seemingly divorced from realpolitik. In status
competition, China’s relative capability in both hard and soft power is still far from
that of the US, indicating that China is still unable to compete with the US glob-
ally. The institutional competition school of thought argues that China attempts to
enhance its discourse power by offering alternative institutional choices, but as the
beneficiary, China has less incentive to overturn existing international institutions
and order. The failure-of-engagement line of argument emphasizes the low efficacy
of America’s traditional China strategy, but such a results-oriented conclusion is not
helpful for researchers seeking to understand the inherent logic of the formulation of
America’s China strategy. The causality provided by domestic factors in explaining
the changing China strategy is questionable because it is difficult to assess the power
of voters in determining America’s foreign policy. The second problem is related
to the first problem as follows: a single attribution can only explain the reason for
America’s changing China strategy but is unable to provide an explanation of how
such changes operate or the underlying inherent logic. Thus, existing studies do
not provide a firm theoretical basis for answering the above questions, and there is
room for a new theoretical approach. This article proposes that in addition to being
considered from the material dimension, the transition in America’s China strategy
should be understood from an ideational perspective.
Theoretical Framework oftheUS’s China Strategy
This article combines the material and ideational dimensions and constructs a theo-
retical framework with dual variables. Given the significance of relative capability,
the gap in power positions between the US and China is considered the most impor-
tant variable. This article also considers the ideational factor, i.e., the US’s unilateral
perception of China, in understanding the logic of the US’s China strategy.
Power Position inStructural Realism
According to Waltz’s definition, the structure of international politics comprises
three basic elements, i.e., ordering principles, the character of the units, and the
distribution of capabilities [88]. The distribution of capabilities is the only variable
structural factor because strong or weak relative capabilities determine a high or a
low position, respectively, in a certain international system. These positions are con-
sidered power positions. Generally, a state with a stronger relative capability will
earn a higher power position, and its security pressure will accordingly be lower,
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
and vice versa. Waltz [89 , p. 329] further stresses that a change in the power posi-
tion will generate a stronger impact than ideological or domestic factors on a state’s
behavioral patterns. Given the significance of power positions in structural realism,
scholars surmise that such positions are scarce resources and that the pursuit of
power positions will lead states into a zero-sum-game ‘positional competition’ [64].
Following the same logic, Mearsheimer [44] argues that a state can achieve maxi-
mum security only when it becomes a regional hegemon and then the status quo
power. Thus, the offensive realism perspective considers states ‘position proctors’.
Therefore, it can be argued that a state is positionalist [21].
Consistent with structural realism, a state’s foreign behaviors are simply deter-
mined by its power position in the international system, and a higher position can
offer the state more strategic space. However, this logic has been criticized by many
scholars, who propose that the overemphasis on the systemic factor has trapped
structural realism in naturalism, ahistoricism, and determinism; these characteris-
tics weaken this logic’s explanatory power vis-à-vis dynamic and political phenom-
ena, such as the transition of the international system, the US’s loss in the War on
Terror and the imbalance of China’s rise in the twenty-first century [34]. Regard-
ing the US’s China strategy, structural realism cannot answer why US engagement
lasted so long, particularly during the post-Cold War period, because China’s power
position has been rising. Before the Trump administration, the Bush and Obama
administrations maintained an engagement policy towards China. Thus, there should
be another key variable influencing the transition in the US’s China strategy. One
scholar notes that a power position should be understood not only from a material
perspective but also based on the perception of other states in the international sys-
tem [56]. In the case of China’s rise, recognition from a hegemonic power, such
as the US, may be one of the most significant factors because the US’s perception
affects not only the US’s China strategy but also other state actors that may adjust
their China policies to coordinate with those of the US government.
Typology ofAmerica’s Unilateral Perception ofChina: Beyond theRevisionist-Status
Quo Dichotomy
Generally, existing studies explaining America’s strategic perception of China fol-
low the basic logic of the revisionism-status quo dichotomy, which plays an impor-
tant role in contemporary international relations theory, particularly in power tran-
sition theory and hegemonic stability theory [25]. In hegemonic stability theory,
defining states as having revisionism or status quo orientations helps explain and
predict whether the international system undergoes a general transformation caused
by a hegemonic war between a hegemon and an emerging power. In power tran-
sition theory, a hegemonic power relies on its dominant material capabilities to
establish the rules of the game and provide public goods, which are usually security
and trading systems, to other state actors to obtain their support and recognition
and, in turn, reinforce its authority and legitimacy, which is conducive to main-
taining its hegemonic position [5, 51]. Thus, the international order mandates the
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nature of the status quo of the hegemonic power because all rules, laws and norms
are constructed based on its strategic interest [55].1 Therefore, the hegemon is natu-
rally considered a status quo power, and its counterpart, i.e., an emerging power, is
usually defined as a revisionist in the international system, particularly during the
unipolar era [66].
The development of dichotomies is common practice in the international rela-
tions literature to provide simplified theoretical frameworks with which to observe
and understand complicated political phenomena. Following this logic, contempo-
rary scholarship attempts to understand revisionism and its opposite, i.e., the sta-
tus quo, to determine the extent to which states are satisfied or dissatisfied with the
existing order and world affairs. However, such scholarship suffers serious draw-
backs because opposite terms in any dichotomy are only extremes on a spectrum.
Scholars usually place the revisionism-status quo dichotomy on one side of a one-
dimensional continuum to indicate the costs a state will bear to alter or defend the
status quo [9]. This dichotomy proposes the following two extreme deductions: total
revisionist states seek to change at any cost, and status quo states pay any price to
maintain the existing order in the international system. If we move right or left from
the two extreme points in the continuum, the intensity of satisfaction or dissatisfac-
tion undergoes incremental changes, which may affect states’ willingness to pay the
price. For example, Schweller [62] offers the following typical explanation of the
one-dimensional dichotomy: the revisionist and status quo orientations are mainly
driven by a single variable, i.e., a state’s willingness to pay to change or defend the
status quo.
However, this unidimensional dichotomy leads to more confusion than clarity.
First, it is difficult to identify rigid indicators for the measurement of a state’s revi-
sionist orientation. Power transition theorists emphasize that a state’s dissatisfaction
with the existing international system should be a core variable, but these theorists
largely ignore the measurement of willingness/intention in empirical studies, which
is an ad hoc explanation for theorists to avoid criticism [85]. Some scholars attempt
to summarize indicators, including military expenditure in bilateral relations, the
similarity of alliances, and the participation of international governmental organiza-
tions [30, 33]. Other scholars extract indicators from the issue of China’s rise and
conclude that attitudes towards the power distribution in the international regime,
performance in territorial disputes and operational codes influence leaders’ beliefs
[12, 29, 31]. While scholars provide various indicators to measure the revisionist
orientation, their efforts suffer from internal inconsistencies and selection bias.
Second, limited by the first problem, the traditional revisionism-status quo
dichotomy cannot explain the dissatisfaction of a revisionist state. The indicators
mentioned above reflect scholars’ theoretical consciousness in systemizing the
measuring the revisionist orientation, but very few studies elaborate on the causal
relations between a state’s dissatisfaction and its foreign behaviors. How does
1 Organski pointed out that the international order produces the anticipations of states’ foreign behav-
iors, rules and patterns, which may be gradually accepted by the state actors to maintain the stable inter-
state relations.
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
dissatisfaction produce a state’s revisionist strategies? Third, the unidimensional
logic does not consistently distinguish the revisionism-status quo orientation.
In the traditional disposition of the dichotomy, an emerging power is naturally
defined as only a potential revisionist state because a hegemon should be the sta-
tus quo to maintain the international system. However, we should not exclude the
possibility that a hegemon adopts a revisionist orientation to seize and maximize
its strategic interests by adjusting power relations and modifying the international
norms and rules. This possibility may be the highest under unipolarity. Jervis [28]
notes that the US government cannot resist the temptation of unbalanced power,
which drives the US towards constant expansion to avoid a loss of benefits in the
future.
Given the serious drawbacks of one-dimensional logic, some scholars have begun
to revise the dichotomy by adding other key variables to construct a two-dimensional
conception of the revisionist-status quo orientation. Several scholars have used mil-
itary expenditure and alliance portfolios to infer states’ revisionist and status quo
orientations [40, 94]. However, their efforts largely blur valid interpretations due
to multicollinearity mainly because both military spending and alliances are used
to measure national power, and thus, states’ revisionist and status quo orientations
are conflated with their power [8]. Allan etal. [1] construct a new analytical lens
that incorporates power transition theory and constructivism. These authors argue
that China’s orientation should be examined in light of not only material power but
also the distribution of identity across great powers [1]. Ward [92, 93] distinguishes
between distributive dissatisfaction (the desire to acquire material resources, such
as military power and economic influence) and normative dissatisfaction (discon-
tent with norms, rules and institutions). Following the same logic, Cooley etal. [9]
provide a more operationalized two-dimensional conception. These authors contend
that a state’s revisionist orientation or the opposite, i.e., the status quo orientation, is
determined by the following two main elements: balance of power and international
order.
By operationalizing these two elements as supporting or opposing the balance
of power and the international order, Cooley etal. [9] presents a new typology that
includes reformist, status quo, revolutionary and positionalist orientations and
extends beyond the revisionism-status quo dichotomy (see Table 2). More specifi-
cally, the reformist orientation combines the desire to change the order with sat-
isfaction with the current power distribution. In contrast, the positionalist orienta-
tion accepts the current international order but attempts to change the existing power
Table 2 Revised typology of the revisionism-status Quo dichotomy
Source: [9, p. 8]
The Attitude towards the Interna-
tional Order
Anti-order Pro-order
The Attitude toward the Current Balance of Power Support Reformist Status Quo
Oppose Revolutionary Positionalist
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distribution. In brief, the reformist orientation is order-revisionist, and the position-
alist orientation is power-revisionist. A revolutionary state demonstrates a strong
orientation to modify the balance of power and international order simultaneously,
while a status quo state is satisfied with the power distribution and current order.
This typology helps clarify several important intermediate forms on the revisionism-
status quo spectrum.
Although this typology mainly focuses on explicitly distinguishing debates
regarding revisionist hegemons, it is logically relevant to how the US government
perceives its major rival., i.e., the rising China in contemporary international sys-
tems. Cooley’s typology overlooks the hegemonic position under unipolarity, which
gives the US the special right to subjectively formulate strategic perceptions of other
state actors in the international system and allows the US government to define a
certain state as reformist, revolutionary, status quo or positionalist. Monteiro [47]
presents a similar argument using this logic and suggests that the understanding
of the dynamics of unipolar systems depends on how the dominant actor, i.e., the
US, views the status quo. Therefore, Cooley’s typology can be logically extended to
America’s unilateral perception of China and provides a more detailed and accurate
specification than the traditional dichotomy.
Theoretical Framework andits Casual Mechanism
Based on the previous theoretical discussions, this article defines power positions as
state actors’ higher or lower positions in the international system. These positions
are largely determined by states’ relative material capabilities, and stronger material
capabilities place state actors in higher positions. America’s unilateral perception
gives the state a higher position, rendering its subjective perception on the lower
side. Eventually, this perception will come into force, even though the lower side
rejects it.
In addition, we attempt to operationalize the two variables. This article opera-
tionalizes the gap in power positions between the US and China as large or narrow.
Accordingly, as mentioned above, America’s unilateral perception of China can be
operationalized as reformist, revolutionary, status quo or positionalist. Consistent
with the above operationalization, the two independent variables constitute a 2 × 4
matrix (see Table3). Relying on this explanatory model, this article proposes eight
scenarios related to the US’s China strategy. One may contend that an explanatory
model with eight substrategies is too complex to have explanatory power because
according to Kenneth Waltz, theory construction should simplify rather than com-
plicate the real world. Elman [11] developed a method to simplify theoretical frame-
works that involves rescaling, indexing, logical compression, empirical compression
and pragmatic compression. In this article, logical compression and pragmatic com-
pression are selected to reorganize the explanatory model. We can delete two cells
produced by impossible or highly incompatible combinations of variables. First, it
is unlikely that the US government views a much weaker China as a reformist that
aims to revise or modify the existing order. Moreover, in light of the realpolitik, Chi-
na’s reasonable choice is to be engaged and integrated into the international order to
serve its domestic economic development. Thus, the combination of the large gap
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
Table 3 Explanatory model
Source: The Author
America’s Unilateral Perception of China
Reformist Revolutionary Status Quo Positionalist
The Gap in Power Position between US and China Huge Strategic Inconsistency Precaution Engagement Strategic Inconsistency
Narrowing Competition Containment Accommodation Congagement
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and the reformist perception of China demonstrates strategic inconsistency. Second,
the combination of the large gap and the positionalist orientation presents strategic
inconsistencies. Consistent with realists, a rational state will not radically oppose
the existing power distribution before it accumulates enough power resources in the
international system. Meanwhile, the large gap in power positions may not trigger
the hegemon’s anxiety to consider the weak power as a positionalist that intends to
redistribute the power configuration.
After the two cells of strategic inconsistencies are deleted, the two variables con-
stitute six potential strategic choices for the US to adopt in its relations with China
during the post-Cold War period. Scenario 1: When the gap in power positions is
narrowing and the US perceives China as a reformist power, competition should
be the first choice. Scenario 2: When the gap is narrowing and the US perceives
China as a revolutionary power, containment is the most likely choice. Scenario 3:
When the gap is large but the US perceives China as a revolutionary power, precau-
tion is the most likely choice. Scenario 4: When the gap is large and the US per-
ceives China as a status quo power, engagement is the most likely choice. Scenario
5: When the gap is narrowing and the US perceives China as a status quo power,
accommodation is the most likely choice. Scenario 6: When the gap is narrowing
and the US perceives China as a positionalist power, congagement is the most likely
choice. Notably, although this article proposes six strategic trajectories for the US’s
China policy, the trajectories are ideal types because they do not present all details
or aspects of political phenomena. Some scholars suggest that ideal types are con-
structed to create an idealization of a phenomenon’s characteristics that can then be
compared against others and related to empirical instances [27]. Thus, ideal types
could never accurately and exhaustively demonstrate the concrete manifestations of
a specific phenomenon but provide a benchmark for an analytical comparison of real
phenomena [26].
The relationship between the two aforementioned variables must be further
elaborated. Generally, one may argue that the gap in power positions should be the
dominant variable and that America’s unilateral perception of China should be the
secondary variable. Thus, this logic emphasizes that America’s unilateral perception
of China might shift into a negative orientation when the gap in power is narrowed.
However, regarding the realpolitik in US-China relations during the post-Cold War
period, America’s perception of China has changed several times insituations of
both large power gaps and narrowed power gaps, indicating that the US govern-
ment exaggerates or underestimates the so-called China threat through its unilateral
perception to meet strategic needs in different phases. Specifically, the relationship
between power positions and America’s unilateral perception should be character-
ized by covariation.
Before we perform an empirical test of the explanatory model, we should pre-
sent the definitions of the previous strategic choices. Generally, a hegemon’s strate-
gic choices with respect to a rising power can be approximately divided into stran-
gling (not allowing any possibility of power transition) and abstention (voluntarily
transferring the hegemonic position to the rising power). In reality, more specific
choices need to be added to the strategic menu. Scholars conceptualize several stra-
tegic choices for a hegemon to adopt in its relations with rising powers, including
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
preemptive war, balancing, bandwagoning, binding, engaging, buck-passing, and
distancing [63]. Based on this typology, this article recategorizes the strategic
choices according to the hegemon’s perception of the rising power. As shown in
Fig. 1, preemptive war, containment, competition, and precaution are categorized
as choices related to the revisionist orientation, while engagement, accommodation,
shared governance, and demising are categorized as choices related to the status
quo orientation. Congagement is set as the relative neutrality point between the two
extreme strategic choices.
Moreover, some invalid strategic choices can be removed from the discussion.
First, although we cannot eliminate the possibility of war in the contemporary
world, direct military conflict between a hegemon and a rising power is largely
limited by the mutually assured destruction (MAD) logic of a world with nuclear
weapons. Thus, preemptive war can be excluded. Second, given that a state, particu-
larly a hegemon, is eternally pursuing a power position, it is nearly impossible for a
hegemon to pass power to a challenger. Therefore, demising is also excluded. Third,
shared governance is the preliminary stage of demising, suggesting that a hegemon
needs to cooperate with a rising power to govern the world. While such a concept
appears to be present in the G2, the US government apparently rejects shared gov-
ernance with China. Thus, this article proposes the following six appropriate strate-
gic choices: containment, competition, precaution, congagement, engagement, and
accommodation.
More specifically, containment refers to the strategy of using any means but war
to limit a rival’s power expansion. For example, George Kennan’s suggestion of
conducting military, economic, and ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union
is widely regarded as a strategy of containment [18]. Compared with containment,
competition is a lower-intensity choice referring to the US government attempting
to impose restrictions on China’s expanding regional influence by upgrading its
alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region. This strategy is also defined as balanc-
ing without containment [73]. Competition, which is as an intermediary approach,
may occur during the transition in America’s perception of China from considering
China a status quo power to considering China as a revisionist power. Precaution
implies that the US government attempts to adopt preventative measures to avoid
a worse situation [90]. The choice of engagement implies that the US government
encourages Beijing to be a benign actor and build a mutually beneficial partnership
Fig. 1 US’s China strategy. Source: The Author
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of peace and prosperity by incorporating China into the existing international order
[67]. The choice of accommodation implies that the US believes that Beijing’s long-
term ambitions are limited but that the shifting distribution of power will ultimately
favor the PRC, indicating that the US government should share more strategic space
to increase Beijing’s international obligations [19, 20]. Congagement refers to a mix-
ture of containment and engagement, which could provide the flexibility to adjust
the balance between the two contradictory strategic choices. Khalilzad [32] elabo-
rates that congagement encompasses twelve tenets, including strengthening Amer-
ica’s overall economic and military power, pursuing a balance of power strategy in
Asia, expanding political, military and cultural relations with China, and increasing
regional cooperation.
In addition, we need to further clarify the causal mechanism in the explana-
tory model. As shown in Fig.2, the gap in power positions between the US and
China and America’s perception of China are the two independent variables,
resulting in the four perceptions of China as reformist, revolutionary, status quo
or positionalist. Moreover, given the importance of China’s foreign behaviors
in shaping America’s perception of China, this article considers this variable
the intervening variable in the causal mechanism. As the intervening variable,
China’s foreign behaviors may strengthen or weaken the US’s unilateral per-
ception of China. One may argue that China’s foreign behaviors should be the
independent variable rather than the intervening variable in shaping the US’s
China policy. From the analytical level of strategic interaction among the actors,
it is reasonable to consider China’s foreign behaviors the independent vari-
able because such behaviors exert a powerful impact on Washington’s strategic
choice [38]. However, the two independent variables mentioned above belong to
the systemic level. More specifically, as previously conceptualized, the power
position is derived from structural realism, which determines its systemic level
of analysis. Similarly, the existing hegemon in a unipolar system mandates that
the United States has a special right to subjectively formulate its strategic per-
ception of other states regardless of strong disagreements from the target states.
Thus, America’s unilateral perception of China is logically considered the unit
Fig. 2 Causal mechanism of the explanatory model. Source: The Author
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
of the systemic level. Moreover, the latest development of neo-classical real-
ism demonstrates the causal linkage of the “cross-level of analysis” by arguing
that one state tends to design a strategy based on a calculation of its adversary’s
strategy or adjust its strategy after its adversary makes a move [42]. This inter-
active process should be included as a variable in the cross-level of analysis.
Therefore, China’s foreign behaviors have a theoretical basis to serve as an inter-
vening variable. In summary, the covariation effect generated by these variables
will trigger an incentive for the US to change its China strategy. Meanwhile, the
US government will consider its strategic needs in China, which may also affect
policy choices. Based on these calculations, the US government can choose
strategies that rank in intensity from high to low as follows: containment, com-
petition, precaution, congagement engagement, and accommodation.
Empirical Studies: The US’s Changing China Policy inthePost‑Cold War Period
(1992–2019)
By relying on the previous theoretical construction, this article attempts to verify
the causal mechanism through empirical studies that mainly focus on the US’s
changing China policies during the post-Cold War period. This full coverage of
case studies helps the verification avoid selection bias. Moreover, to evaluate the
gap in power positions between the US and China, this article uses the GDP and
military expenditure in the two countries as indicators. The author also cites the
credit of Sino-US relations calculated by the Institute of International Relations,
Tsinghua University to demonstrate the great impact of the US’s changing China
strategy. According to these criteria, the relational status can be divided into
adversarial (−9 to −6), tense (−6 to −3), discord (−3 to 0), normal (0 to 3), fine
(3 to 6), and amity (6 to 9).
US’s China Policy During Clinton’s Terms: Enlarging Engagement
The collapse of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War but also man-
dated that the US be the sole superpower in the international system, introducing
the world to a unipolar moment [35, 36]. America’s unipolar position also cre-
ated an impassable gulf for China in relative material capabilities. During Clin-
ton’s terms, although China’s GDP witnessed steady growth, its proportion of the
US GDP increased from only 6.54% to 11.8% in 2000 (see Fig.3). In military
expenditure, the US government maintained an average of 280 billion US dol-
lars per year during Clinton’s terms, while China’s military expenditure during
the same period was less than one tenth of that figure (see Fig.4). Supported by
absolute predominance in material power, the Clinton administration did not con-
sider China to have the capability to change the power distribution or America-
led international order during the early stage of the post-Cold War era, although
some strategists proposed the “China threat” to predict future US-China inter-
actions [59]. Moreover, in Clinton’s view, China was a country that needed to
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be enlightened by America’s democratic values and Western economic system.
Given China’s substantial economic size and potential growth rate, the US gov-
ernment realized its giant interest in engaging China in the economic system and
bilateral cooperation concerning other issues, such as regional security affairs,
transnational crimes, and environmental protection. This view guided Clinton’s
perception of China towards a status quo orientation. The Clinton administra-
tion proposed a “comprehensive engagement” strategy in late 1993. According to
Anthony Lake, the increased engagement encompassed the following two major
objectives: enlarging the liberal market and expanding democracy to nondemo-
cratic and nonliberal market countries. Thus, the US government attempted to
gradually transform China into a democratic state by engaging China in the lib-
eral economic system.
Based on these understandings, Clinton’s administration began to reinforce all-
round interactions and communications with China. On November 19, 1993, Presi-
dent Jiang Zemin and President Clinton met in Seattle during the Informal APEC
Economic Leader’s Summit, marking the first meeting between the countries’ presi-
dents since 1989. After the meeting, Clinton expressed that his conversation with
Fig. 3 China’s share of the US GDP (%). Source: The World Bank, https ://data.world bank.org.cn/indic
ator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&locat ions=CN-US&start =2001
Fig. 4 Comparison of military expenditures (USD Billions). Source: SIPRI, https ://www.sipri .org/datab
ases/milex
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
President Jiang was constructive and productive and served was a running start for
further cooperation between the two countries in international security and economic
development. In 1994, the US Commerce Secretary and Defense Secretary visited
China to sign a series of agreements on nonproliferation and intellectual property,
thus deepening cooperation in addressing economic and security issues. Warren
Christopher, the Secretary of State, gave an important speech on the Council of For-
eign Relations in 1996 to establish three principles of the US’s China policy, which
strengthened Clinton’s engaging China strategy [17].2 In July 1996, Anthony Lake,
the National Security Advisor, visited Beijing. Lake’s trip was widely regarded as
the turning point for the rapprochement of US-China relations during the post-Cold
War era. Relying on previous arrangements, President Jiang Zemin made his his-
toric visit to the US in October 1997. Jiang and Clinton issued a joint statement to
build the US-China relations as a “constructive strategic partnership facing the 21st
century”, officially formulating America’s status quo perception of China.3 A few
days before the meeting, Clinton addressed several concrete approaches to expand
cooperation with China, including promoting a peaceful world, keeping peace and
stability in Asia, maintaining nonproliferation, and liberalizing global trade. Among
these approaches, inviting China to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) was
the most important approach to further opening China’s market, producing a liberal-
izing effect on China.
However, China’s foreign behavior during this period served as an intervening
variable that accelerated or slowed the formulation of the US’s China policy dur-
ing this stage. In the general foreign strategy, the major principle that diplomacy
and national defense served domestic economic growth and modernization did not
change during the post-Cold War period. Thus, breaking the economic sanction
caused by the Tiananmen Incident from Western countries and continuing to par-
ticipate in the liberal economic system were the priority foreign considerations of
the Chinese government [100]. To achieve these goals, maintaining cooperative
relations with the United States became the most crucial point. Thus, the third-gen-
eration leader, Jiang Zemin, proposed the following basic principle in strategically
interacting with the United States: “increase trust, reduce trouble, develop coopera-
tion and avoid confrontation”. This statement delivered the benevolent intention that
China intended to be a part of rather than distort the US-led international order.
Moreover, the Chinese government exerted some effort to improve the human
rights issue to meet America’s requirement. Driven by the influence of “the end of
history”, the Clinton administration paid more attention to China’s human rights
issue and linked human rights to the Most-Favored-Nation, which caused turbulence
in US-China relations, but this turbulence lasted only one year partially because US
2 The three principles include: (1) a stable, open and successful China meet America’s interest; (2)US
supports China to engage in the international society; (3) Solving the divergences through communica-
tion.
3 Although a constructive strategic partnership should be promoted by both sides, it was difficult to
image that such a relationship could be achieved without Washington’s recognition. Thus, if Clinton’s
administration did not perceive China as a status quo power at this stage, the concept of a constructive
strategic partnership would not appear.
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businessmen confronted the competition from competitors from European countries
and Japan, and the economic opportunities were diverted to Japanese and European
businessmen. More importantly, China demonstrated a strong willingness and effort
to restore US-China relations and integrate into the world economic system, which,
combined with US businessmen’s economic incentive to become a bidirectional
force, led the US government to delink Most-Favored-Nation and China’s human
right situation. Since adopting the Open and Reform policy, particularly after Deng
Xiaoping’s southern speech tour, the Chinese government reaffirmed that economic
development and modernization were the central goals, which required a favorable
external environment. Guided by this orientation, the Chinese government exerted
some efforts to improve the human rights situation. China’s effort was appreciated
by Stapleton Roy, the American ambassador to China, who noted that the human
rights issue in China has been largely improved and suggested abandoning the
linking of China’s trading status to its human rights record [81]. In May 1994, the
Clinton administration terminated the linkage, which helped China become deeply
engaged in the liberal economic system. However, the crisis occurring in Taiwan
Strait slowed the process of the engagement strategy. In 1995, the US government
allowed the Taiwanese leader, Lee Teng-hui, to make a personal trip to the US, and
Lee delivered a speech at Cornell University to express his view of cross-Strait rela-
tions. To deter Lee’s pro-independence actions, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
launched a series of joint military exercises in the Taiwan Strait from July 1995 to
March 1996, causing rapid growth in the intensity of US-China relations. Stoked by
the Taiwan crisis, America’s status quo perception of China (the constructive strate-
gic partnership) was in place until late 1997.
Despite the various divergences between the US and China, due to the large gap
in power positions, status quo perceptions, and China’s effort to participate in the
US-led liberal economic system, the US government adopted an engaging China
policy during Clinton’s two terms. This policy led to US-China cooperation in vari-
ous realms. In the security realm, the defense ministers in the two countries signed
the Agreement on the Establishment of a Consultative Mechanism to Strengthen Mil-
itary Security at Sea, which enabled more than 50 warships, 62 aircrafts and 22,500
army members to replenish in Hong Kong [72]. Additionally, Washington and Bei-
jing achieved a series of agreements regarding solving regional security problems,
including the North Korea nuclear issue and the South Asian crisis caused by India
and Pakistan’s nuclear test. In the economic realm, in addition to China’s participa-
tion in the WTO, the bilateral trade volume between the US and China grew from
20 billion US dollars in 1990 to 116.4 billion US dollars in 2000, rendering China
the fourth-largest trade partner of the US and rendering the US the second-largest
trade partner of China. In addition, the value of US investment in China increased
from merely 430 million US dollars in 1990 to 4.3 billion US dollars in 1999, rep-
resenting a tenfold increase over nine years. Driven by Clinton’s engagement strat-
egy, Sino-US credit witnessed an upward trend from −1.04 in 1993 to 2.8 in 1998,
achieving a peak during the post-Cold War period.
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
US’s China Policy During Bush’s Terms: From Precaution toEngagement
Entering the twenty-first century, the gap in power positions between the US and
China was still large. Although China’s economy experienced dramatic growth, its
GDP share of the US was merely 12.6% in 2001. By the end of Bush’s terms, this
figure increased to 35.4% in 2009, representing only one-third of America’s GDP
(see Fig.3). To proceed with the “war on terror”, the Bush administration dramati-
cally increased military expenditure from 432.9 billion US dollars to 747.9 billion
in 2009, while China’s number reached 100 billion in 2008 (see Fig.4). However,
this large gap in power positions did not lead Bush to adopt a status quo orienta-
tion towards China. Instead, he quickly formed a revolutionary perception of China
before the 9/11 attacks.
In an interview with CNN in August 1999, the then-governor of Texas George
Bush criticized Clinton’s constructive strategic partnership with China and argued
that such perception of China was a major strategic miscalculation. Three months
later, George Bush delivered a speech in the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
to elaborate his foreign policy vision of “American internationalism”, emphasizing
that China was a strategic competitor rather than a partner [98]. In accordance with
Bush’s perception of China, the election program of the Republican Party modified
its vision of US-China relations, considering China the first challenger in Asia.4 In
addition, the prevailing neoconservationism among American political elites pro-
vided theoretical support for Bush’s negative shift. For example, Kristol and Kagan
[37] published an article titled Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy on For-
eign Affairs to suggest that the US needed neo-Reganism to maintain its hegemonic
position through the absolute preeminent advantage of military strength; the rise of
China should be contained. In 1997, the two scholars established a neoconserva-
tionist think tank, i.e., The Project for the New American Century, to promote their
beliefs and ideas. Importantly, 7 of 25 original members of this think tank joined the
Bush administration. In 2000, Rice [58] further contended that China would change
the existing power distribution in Asia rather than being a status quo state. Influ-
enced by this neoconservationism, President Bush immediately overturned Clinton’s
constructive strategic partnership with China and replaced it as a strategic competi-
tor when he formally came to power [58]. Such perception indicated that the Bush
administration regarded China as a potential challenger to both the existing power
distribution and international order, which was consistent with the definition of the
revolutionary perception.
Consistent with the abovementioned explanatory model, the perception of China
as a revolutionary country with a large gap in power positions may have shifted the
US’s China policy into precaution. This precaution quickly appeared early in Bush’s
4 Notably, while Bush never claimed his “strategic competitor” perception of China in official docu-
ments, such as the National Security Strategy Report or National Defense Strategy Report, the Bush
administration applied this revolutionary perception to Washington’s China policy before 911, which was
vividly demonstrated in several key incidents, including the US’s determination to defend Taiwan at any
cost.
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term before the 9/11 attacks. In diplomatic areas, Bush initiated a hotline with more
than 20 leaders, emphasizing the importance of allies in Asia. However, he inten-
tionally avoided a hotline with Chinese leaders and positioned China behind Japan,
South Korea, Russia and India, thus demonstrating his precaution towards China.
Even after a military plane collision occurred in April 2001, the Bush administration
still rejected direct communication with President Jiang Zemin. In security areas,
the Bush administration highlighted the security commitment to defending Taiwan
against an attack from mainland China, thus transforming America’s Taiwan policy
from strategic ambiguity to “whatever it takes” [3]. Furthermore, China was listed
as a potential target of a nuclear attack. Thus, President Bush’s China policy before
the 9/11 attacks was consistent with the definition of precaution as the policy mainly
aimed to prevent a worse situation of China becoming a major challenger to the US
hegemony. Sino-US credit was −0.5 in 2001.
However, the 9/11 attacks dramatically reshaped Bush’s foreign strategy from
competition with great powers to the defense of homeland security and the fight
against global terrorism. More importantly, while encountering terrorism, the Bush
administration realized that the US could not singlehandedly eliminate global ter-
rorism. Based on this understanding, the Bush administration attempted to obtain
strategic support from allies and other major powers by strengthening alliance sys-
tems and developing new strategic partnerships. Consequently, China became one
of the US’s partners in anti-terrorism. Only one day after the 9/11 attacks, President
Jiang Zemin was invited by President Bush to hold a hotline conversation to discuss
cooperation in anti-terrorism. This action initiated Bush’s changing perception of
China. On October 19, 2001, Bush suggested that China was an important partner in
the global coalition against terror and that Washington sought a candid, constructive
and cooperative relationship with Beijing [82]. Bush’s status quo shift was further
highlighted in his National Security Strategy Report in 2002, in which the US gov-
ernment asserted that the emergence of a strong, peaceful and prosperous China was
an important part of America’s strategy to promote a stable Asia-Pacific region [75].
In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick presented a speech
to the National Committee on US-China relations. In his speech, Zoellick proposed
a new concept to define America’s perception, arguing that the US urged China to
become a responsible stakeholder in the international system because China had
a responsibility to strengthen the international system that had enabled its success
[105]. Zoellick’s concept was written in Bush’s National Security Strategy Report in
2006, becoming Washington’s new perception of Beijing. This perception was well
received by the Chinese government. During President Hu Jintao’s visit to Wash-
ington in the same year, he reiterated that China and the US should be not only
responsible stakeholders but also constructive cooperators. Some studies may be
concerned that the interpretation of responsible stakeholders may be too optimistic
because Zoellick listed various US dissatisfactions with China [96]; however, the
realpolitik indicated that this change in perception had some positive effects on US-
China relations.
In addition, China’s foreign behavior strengthened Bush’s status quo perception
during the post-9/11 period as it was consistent with Washington’s strategic need for
anti-terrorism. In its general foreign strategy, the Chinese government proposed the
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
“peaceful rise/development” thesis to explain the intentions and future directions of
the rising China. Zheng Bijian, a key advisor to the Chinese central leadership, elab-
orated this thesis in Foreign Affairs. In his article, Zheng asserted that China would
not follow the path of Germany leading to World War I or the paths of Germany and
Japan leading to World War II; instead, China would transcend ideological differ-
ences to strive for peace, development and cooperation with all countries worldwide
[104]. Moreover, in addition to providing strategic support for global anti-terrorism,
two specific cases, i.e., the North Korea nuclear crisis and the Taiwan problem,
demonstrated China’s active role in being a responsible power in addressing regional
security issues.
First, the new round of the North Korea nuclear crisis occurred again during
Bush’s term, and the US government defined North Korea’s government as the “axis
of evil” in 2002. To resist security pressure, North Korea restarted a nuclear reactor
and decided to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, aggravating the
crisis situation of the Peninsula. While confronting the increasing tension between
the US and North Korea, the Chinese government conducted “shuttle diplomacy” to
establish the mechanism of “Six Party Talks” and led the next six rounds of meet-
ings to resolve the crisis. Relying on the Six Party Talks mechanism, the US gov-
ernment terminated the Trade with the Enemy Act, stopping economic sanctions.
Accordingly, Pyongyang agreed to disable its nuclear weapons, gradually realizing
denuclearization. China’s efforts were considered by the Bush administration reflec-
tive of a responsible great power as China helped the US achieve its strategic needs
in preventing nuclear proliferation [46]. Second, Chen Shui-bian and his Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) initiated a radical pro-independent policy, causing turbu-
lence in cross-Strait relations. However, while confronting Chen’s irrational policy,
mainland China did not respond through military deterrence without triggering
another crisis across the Taiwan Strait mainly because the Bush administration wor-
ried that the US could be involved in a direct conflict with mainland China caused
by Chen’s pro-independence. In response to Bush’s major concern, the Chinese gov-
ernment adopted a policy that required the US not to release error signals to Taiwan
and suppress Chen’s radical movement, which largely satisfied Washington’s stra-
tegic needs. Therefore, in December 2007, President Hu Jintao and President Bush
reached the consensus that conducting containment on Chen’s radical pro-independ-
ence was helpful for maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region. This choice
led to a new status in cross-Strait relations in which Beijing and Washington jointly
managed Taiwan’s pro-independent movement.
Driven by the large gap in power positions, Bush’s changed perception of the
status quo, and China’s cooperative foreign behaviors to meet America’s strategic
needs during the post-9/11 period, the US government shifted from precaution to
continuing engagement, which was displayed in the following aspects. In high-
level communication, the leaders of the two countries preserved a close connection
in addressing bilateral, regional and global affairs by holding several meetings in
international conferences. In 2005, Beijing and Washington initiated a strategic dia-
logue mechanism, and this type of dialogue was held 5 times during Bush’s terms.
These two countries further proposed another mechanism, strategic economic dia-
logue, in 2006; this type of dialogue was held 6 times. In 2009, the two dialogues
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were integrated into the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Regarding the
Taiwan problem, the Bush administration transformed its previous security commit-
ment to Taiwan to “oppose the unilateral changes on status quo in cross-Strait rela-
tions”, which aimed to control Chen Shui-bian’s radical pro-independent movement
and avoid direct conflict with mainland China. Regarding economic issues, the Bush
administration advocated free trade to promote economic connections with China,
leading the US and China to be each other’s second-largest trade partners during
Bush’s terms. The impacts of Bush’s return to engagement were also reflected in
Sino-US credit, which increased from −0.11 in 2002 to 1.56 in 2007 (see Fig.5).
US’s Policy During Obama’s Terms: From Accommodation toCompetition
Barack Obama’s changing China policy can be divided into the following two
phases: 2009–2011 and 2012–2016. When Obama came to power, the US was
trapped in a dilemma caused by a financial crisis. During the crisis, the US’s GDP
growth declined to −0.137% and − 2.537% in 2008 and 2009, respectively, but
China maintained growth rates of 9.654% and 9.4% in these respective years. Conse-
quently, China’s GDP as a proportion of the US’s GDP rose from 35.4% in 2009 to
nearly 50% in 2011; thus, China overtook Japan to become the world’s second-larg-
est economy in 2010 (see Fig.3). Regarding military expenditure, China’s spending
steadily increased from USD 108.5 billion to USD 161.8 billion within five years
(see Fig.4). Supported by China’s growing economic and military power, the gap in
power positions between the US and China rapidly narrowed.
However, Obama perceived China as a status quo power during his first three
years as president; this perception was repeatedly displayed in several important
speeches, joint statements, and strategic reports. During his election campaign,
Obama presented his view in Foreign Affairs that the US would compete with
China in some areas and cooperate in other areas [52]. This view of ‘coexistence
Fig. 5 Credit of Sino-US relations. Source: The Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University,
http://www.imir.tsing hua.edu.cn/publi sh/iis/7522/2012/20120 41518 38095 61499 053/20120 41518 38095
61499 053_.html
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
of competition and cooperation’ was based on the idea that the US and China had
a common interest in the fields of economic cooperation and regional security [68].
Following this logic, Obama reaffirmed his perception during a telephone hotline
conversation with Chinese President Hu Jintao and stressed that the US wanted
to develop more constructive relations with China because US-China cooperation
would be beneficial to the world. To shape a favorable political atmosphere for the
coming meeting with Hu Jintao in 2009, Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State,
declared that the US and China would cooperate on questions of common interest
and that Washington was willing to share power with Beijing [84]. This political
message revealed that the Obama administration formulated a clear strategic per-
ception of China, which helped US-China relations avoid the fluctuations usually
associated with the rotation of the ruling party. Thus, on November 17, 2009, the
US and China issued a joint statement about growing a partnership between the two
countries to meet common challenges to contribute to world peace, stability, and
prosperity [77]. By 2011, US-China relations were further upgraded to a coopera-
tive partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit to address the twenty-
first century’s opportunities and challenges in another joint statement [78]. Thus, the
strategic perception of China during Obama’s first three years was consistent with
the perception of China as a status quo power.
In addition, China’s foreign behaviors reinforced Obama’s status quo percep-
tion of China by satisfying America’s strategic needs in addressing the side effects
caused by the global financial crisis. The serious damage to America’s economic sit-
uation generated great impacts on its foreign strategic design and affected the US’s
perception of China, producing a strategic need for China’s help to facilitate the
world’s recovery from the economic recession. Domestically, the Chinese govern-
ment launched a 4 trillion yuan stimulus package to boost domestic demand, reduce
the impact of negative export growth, and promote steady and rapid economic
growth [48]. Internationally, in addition to abiding by the promise to not allow the
RMB depreciate to stabilize the exchange rate, the Chinese government was devoted
to upgrading the mechanism of global governance from G7 to G20, demonstrating
China’s strong willingness to pursue a greater role in the existing economic system
[10].
Although the gap in the countries’ power positions was rapidly narrowing, the
Obama administration not only maintained the traditional China strategy but also
adopted a more conciliatory approach to addressing the rise of China. This approach
was determined by the US’s perception of China as a status quo power and Chi-
na’s coordinative behaviors in eliminating the negative impact of the financial cri-
sis. Obama elaborated on this view in a speech by arguing that power did not need
to be a zero-sum game and that nations need not fear the success of one another
[76]. Driven by the abovementioned variables, Obama’s China strategy shifted to an
accommodation strategy as demonstrated by his greater willingness to share power
with China. In the first National Security Strategy Report, the Obama administration
proposed that the US should welcome the rise of China as China played a respon-
sible role and cooperated with the US in addressing economic, climate change,
and security issues. This message indicated that the US not only accepted China’s
rise but also viewed the Chinese government as an important actor in undertaking
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international responsibility, which is consistent with the definition of accommoda-
tion. Under the guidance of accommodation, the US government increased the sig-
nificance of China’s role in the reform of the IMF and the World Bank. While shift-
ing to accommodation did not indicate the elimination of structural contradictions,
the US and China generally had a pattern of benign interactions, which led the credit
of Sino-US relations to rise from 1.04 in 2009 to 1.95 in 2011 (see Fig.5).
The speed of the narrowing gap in power positions did not slow over the next five
years (2012–2016) despite the economic recovery in the US. As shown in Fig.3,
China’s share of the US GDP was 57.6% in 2013 and grew to 60.1% in 2016. The
US’s military expenditure significantly decreased from USD 768.5 billion in 2010
to USD 600.1 billion in 2016. Meanwhile, China’s military expenditure steadily
increased to reach USD 216 billion in 2016, representing 30% of the US’s military
spending. Consistent with the explanatory model, if Obama’s perception of China
changed, the US’s China strategy might have transformed accordingly.
Indeed, the negative elements in Obama’s perception of China grew in his second
term as illustrated by the following three main aspects. The first aspect is Obama’s
passive reaction to the ‘new type of great power relations’ proposed by the Chinese
government. Based on Obama’s accommodative shift towards China, the Chinese
government attempted to promote more constructive Sino-US relations by provid-
ing the concept of a new type of great power relations [102]. However, the response
from the Obama administration was fairly passive. For instance, during his visit to
Beijing, Obama did not directly react to this concept even though President Xi Jin-
ping repeatedly advocated for the new type of great power relations, which reflected
the divergence between these two countries. The second aspect was Obama’s con-
cern about China’s growing material capability. In his second National Security
Strategy Report, Obama strongly criticized China’s overseas behaviors. The Obama
administration reminded its allies that the Chinese government might resolve ter-
ritorial disputes through its growing military power and then claimed that the US
government would manage US-China relations by powerful strength, compelling
China’s foreign actions to accord with international rules and norms and constrain-
ing China’s expanding regional influence. Thus, the development of US-China rela-
tions was seemingly trapped in a period of stagnation, and there was no further joint
statement signed between the two great powers. Third, in addition to the growing
negative elements at the governmental level, the American domestic debate regard-
ing China policy influenced Obama’s perception of China. In 2015, American politi-
cal elites launched a wide-range reflection of the efficacy of engaging China over
the past 40 years. Several scholars and strategists, including Tellis and Blackwill
[74], presented an important strategic report called Revising US Grand Strategy
towards China. These scholars noted that the traditional approaches to Beijing, such
as engagement and accommodation, had severe limitations for US national inter-
ests and suggested that the US government should reinforce containment on China
by strengthening military expenditure, constructing Indo-Pacific partnerships, etc.
[74]. This domestic debate provided crucial theoretical support for the government’s
negative shift with respect to China. Based on the above discussion, Obama’s per-
ception of China deviated from the status quo perception to the reformist perception,
leading the US government to pay more attention to China’s growing dissatisfaction
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
with the existing international order. This perception was elaborated in Obama’s
view regarding the approval of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in
2015, when he contended that the US, but not countries such as China, should write
trade rules [86]. Therefore, Obama’s perception of China in 2012–2016 shifted from
status quo to reformist.
Meanwhile, China’s foreign strategic transition further reinforced Obama’s
reformist perception of China. In China’s general foreign strategy, the country’s
foreign strategic thinking experienced a great transformation from “keeping a low
profile” (Taoguangyanghui) to “striving for achievement” (Fenfayouwei), a term
President Xi Jinping proposed at a diplomatic work conference with neighboring
countries in October 2014 [57, 99]. This term not only indicated China’s changing
strategic objectives with its growing economic power but also displayed that China
wanted to be a great power with prestige and influence. Motivated by this strate-
gic orientation, China’s foreign behaviors became increasingly proactive, especially
while working to establish China-led regional and international institutions. Among
them, the One Belt One Road Initiative (or BRI) and Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB) were widely interpreted as two typical cases that targeted Ameri-
ca’s geopolitical strategy and regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific region. On the
one hand, the BRI was China’s way to seek a larger strategic space to avoid the
geopolitical competition caused by Obama’s rebalancing strategy and was a great
initiative that aimed to produce powerful trans-Eurasian influence, challenging the
US’s hegemony in the two key geopolitical zones. On the other hand, the proposal
of the AIIB created a global economic effect, attracting 57 countries to be founding
members. In 2020, the number of formal members of the AIIB increased to 103,
including 4 permanent members of the Security Council, 5 G7 countries and 16G20
countries. Therefore, the AIIB was viewed by the US government as an alternative
to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) at the current stage and an alternative to the
World Bank in the future. Therefore, the US government began to suspect that there
were strategic intentions behind the BRI and the AIIB.
Driven by the abovementioned variables, Obama’s China strategy became
increasingly competitive. In the security realm, the US accelerated the materializa-
tion of the rebalancing strategy by enhancing Japan’s strategic autonomy to trans-
form the traditional hub-and-spoke system into a multilateral and networked alli-
ance system, which could generate greater strategic pressure on China’s rise [6]. In
the economic realm, to restore its dominant position in leading the economy in the
Asia-Pacific region, the Obama administration proposed the TPP. This economic
framework attempted to rebuild international trade from a ‘global model’ to a ‘club
model’, aiming to exclude China through America-led high standards [53]. In the
ideological realm, in addition to reinforcing human rights diplomacy, the Obama
administration advocated the concept of the Pacific Dream through which the US
government attempted to transform democratic values into unprecedented security,
economic, and social cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
The negative element and suspected intentions behind China’s proactive foreign
behaviors shifted the perception beyond the status quo to the reformist perception,
and China was considered a challenger to the US-led international order. As the ele-
ments that allowed China to be considered a status quo power were lost, the strategic
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1 3
incompatibility between the US and China grew quickly, leading to an increased
incentive to change the US’s China strategy. In contrast to the first three years,
Obama paid growing attention to the US’s status as the dominant power and its lead-
ing role in the Asia-Pacific region. He launched a series of policies to compete with
China, indicating that the US’s China strategy had extended beyond accommodation
and entered reinforcing competition. Accordingly, the credit of Sino-US relations
dramatically decreased from 2.06 in 2013 to 0.325 in 2016 (see Fig.5). Therefore,
the transition in Obama’s last five years vividly confirms the causal mechanism of
the explanatory model and demonstrates its internal logic.
US’s China Policy During Trump’s Term: From Competition toContainment
When Donald Trump was inaugurated as president, the gap in power positions was
still narrowing. As shown in Fig.3, China’s share of the US GDP increased from
60.01% to 66.3% in 2018, a rise of 6% within two years. In military expenditure (see
Fig.4), US spending increased from USD 600.1 billion in 2016 to 648.8 billion in
2018. Meanwhile, Chinese military expenditure steadily increased, rising to USD
249.9 billion in 2018, representing 38.7% of the US’s expenditure. Under this cir-
cumstance, the strategic perceptions of the US determined its strategic choices with
respect to China. Indeed, the Trump administration perceived China in a negative
light from the very beginning.
First, during the campaign period, Trump demonstrated his assertive stance
regarding China when he was interviewed by The New York Times. Regarding the
South China Sea, he suggested that the US government should rebuff China’s over-
seas behavior. Regarding regional influence, Trump indicated that he believed that
the US caused the rise of China. Regarding trade, Trump contended that the US
was losing the competition with China due to terrible trade policy [50]. These dec-
larations conveyed the impression that Trump was inclined to address relations with
China through powerful strength rather than institutional management. Second, dur-
ing his period as president elect, Trump affirmed his assertive stance towards China.
After becoming president elect, Trump had a direct call with Tsai Ing-wen, thus
challenging the political basis of US-China relations. In a later interview, Trump
explained that he understood the importance of the ‘One China strategy’ but was
confused about why the US government had to accept such a policy before trade
issues were settled [4]. Third, Trump’s shift towards perceiving China as a revo-
lutionary power was demonstrated in his first National Security Strategy Report in
2017. In the report, the Trump administration contended that the US would respond
to the growing political, economic, and military competition in the contemporary
world and that China and Russia were considered the greatest challenges to Ameri-
can power, influence, and interests because these two countries attempted to erode
American security and prosperity [79]. Based on this understanding, the Trump
administration defined both China and Russia as strategic rivals that the US govern-
ment would address with competitive approaches. In a later National Defense Strat-
egy Report, China was further defined as a revisionist power that threatens Ameri-
ca’s safety and prosperity.
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
In addition to the shift at the national level to considering China a revolutionary
power, the reflection on the US’s traditional China strategy had shifted to attempt-
ing to establish which China strategy is the most effective. For example, Schell and
Shirk [60] suggested that the basic principle of the US’s China strategy should be
‘reciprocity’, which was mentioned more than 20 times in their policy report. Rely-
ing on this principle, the two authors presented another strategic report in 2019 in
which they argued that the Trump administration should respond to China’s rise
with a course correction, altering the mix of cooperation and pressure to more
strongly emphasizing pressure and deterrence [61]. These policy reassessments and
new ways of thinking about the US’s China strategy provided the necessary theo-
retical support for Trump’s assertive shift with respect to China, strengthening the
intensity of Trump’s strategic choice. In 2020, the Trump administration released
a report titled United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China.
In this report, the US government clearly asserted that China not only undermined
the sovereignty and integrity of countries worldwide through its expanding eco-
nomic, political and military power but also exploited the free and open rules-based
order and attempted to reshape the international system in its favor [80]. Therefore,
the Trump administration formally formed a perception of China as a revolution-
ary power unsatisfied with both the power distribution and the existing international
order, which was the basis of his China policy [97].
China’s foreign strategic design may have also strengthened Trump’s revolution-
ary perception of China. In general, regarding its foreign strategy, although the Chi-
nese government still defined itself as the largest developing country, the strategic
objectives paid more attention to “great power diplomacy” and “great power rela-
tions”, which were mentioned several times in the report of the 19th National Con-
gress of CCP. This focus indicated China’s growing need for great-power status in
the international system. More importantly, the US grew increasingly anxious over
China’s strategic design to achieve its great power status. In a report issued in the
19th National Congress, the Chinese government proposed a two-stage plan for the
realization of national rejuvenation. During the first stage (2020–2035), China will
attempt to materialize the modernization of socialism based on the completion of
the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects. During the second
stage (2035–2050), China will become a modern socialist great power with prosper-
ity, strength, democracy, and harmony. This grand strategic design further demon-
strated China’s ambition to be a great power with prestige and influence, which was
obviously contradictory to Trump’s objective of maintaining America’s hegemony.
Driven by these variables, reinforcing containment became the first choice of the
Trump administration. In the security realm, the Trump administration proposed
replacing Obama’s rebalancing strategy with an ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ that linked
the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean due to the need for geopolitical competi-
tion [101]. In the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report issued on June 1, 2019, the Trump
administration emphasized that the US should constrain China’s expanding regional
influence through preparedness (a posture with combat-credible forces aligning
with allies and partners, ready to fight and win), partnership (a network of allies and
partners as a force multiplier for peace and interoperability), and promoting a net-
worked region (a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression,
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1 3
maintaining stability and ensuring free access to common domains) [83]. In the eco-
nomic realm, the decoupling trend in US-China trade relations was becoming appar-
ent. Beginning with the ‘Section301 investigation’ in 2017, the Trump administra-
tion imposed a 10–25% retaliatory tariff on Chinese goods worth between USD 60
billion and 200 billion. According to the statistics provided by China’s Ministry of
Commerce, influenced by trade friction, China’s nonfinancial investment in the US
reached only USD 1.96 billion in the first half of 2019, a nearly 20% year-on-year
decrease. Similarly, consistent with the data reported by China’s General Adminis-
tration of Customs, ASEAN replaced the US as China’s largest trade partner, which
led to an 8% decline in Chinese exports to America and a 31% decrease in imports
from America. In the realm of humanities and technology, the Trump administra-
tion first investigated the Confucius Institutes and then investigated Chinese-Ameri-
can scholars who held ‘Changjiang’ or ‘Thousand Talents’ titles. Moreover, Trump
acted against ZTE and Huawei by preventing the transfer of core technology to
ensure that the US maintained its dominance, which broadened the trade frictions to
the humanities and technology realms.
The strategic intention behind Trump’s China strategy was not only focused on
the balance of interest to align with the America First principle but also an attempt
to constrain China’s accumulation of power and interrupt the process of China’s
rise through deweaponized approaches. Trump’s China strategy is consistent with
the definition of containment, proving the failure of engagement and accommoda-
tion. The credit of Sino-US relations declined from −1.45 in 2017 to −5.36 in 2019,
reaching its lowest point in the twenty-first century (see Fig.5).
Conclusion
The US’s rising concerns about China’s intentions indicate that material-based
explanations are inadequate, and existing studies have not formulated a theoretical
basis for understanding the long-term transition in the US’s China strategy during
the post-Cold War period due to the single attribution problem. Therefore, this arti-
cle attempts to extract two independent variables, i.e., power position and America’s
unilateral perception, to construct a new explanatory model combining the material
and ideational dimensions. Based on this new explanatory model, we summarize the
logic of the US’s China strategy as follows: on the one hand, the strategic pressure
produced by the rapidly narrowing gap in power positions should trigger the US
government’s willingness to contain China’s rise; on the other hand, the US govern-
ment forms several degrees of strategic perceptions of China, i.e., reformist, revo-
lutionary, status quo and positionalist, partially depending on America’s strategic
needs and China’s foreign behaviors. The consistency and divergence between the
material and ideational dimensions constitute the major impetus underlying the tran-
sition of the US’s China strategy, thus leading to different strategic choices, i.e., con-
tainment, competition, precaution, congagement, engagement and accommodation.
To verify the explanatory model and its causal mechanism, this article conducts
a review of the transition of the US’s China strategy throughout the post-Cold War
period, including during the Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump terms (see Table4).
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
Table 4 Summary of comparative case studies
Source: The Author
Variables Periods and Scenarios The Choices of US China Policy
Power Position America’s Perception Accommodation Engagement Congagement Precaution Competition Containment
Huge Status Quo Clinton’s Two (Scenario 4) Enlarging Engagement
Huge Revolutionary Bush before 911 attack (Scenario 3) Turning to Precaution
Huge Status Quo Bush before 911 attack (Scenario 4) Returning to Engagement
Narrowing Status Quo Obama (2009–2011) (Scenario 5) Taking Accommodation
Narrowing Reformist Obama (2012–2016) (Scenario 1) Turning to Competition
Narrowing Revolutionary Trump (2017–2021) (Scenario 2) Upgrading to Containment
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These cases cover several scenarios in examining the transitional logic of the US’s
China strategy.
In Clinton’s case, the large gap in power position and Washington’s strong will-
ing to transform China into a democratic state led the Clinton administration to per-
ceive the Chinese government as a constructive strategic partnership, which is a
typical status quo perception. This perception resulted in enlarging engagement as
Clinton’s major strategic choice in addressing the relations with China. Although
the U.S.-China relations encountered some turbulences due to the 1995–1996 cri-
sis in Taiwan Strait and accidental bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade, the
engagement was still the core of Clinton’s China strategy. Clinton’s case provides
an empirical test of Scenario 4 mentioned above. Entering the twenty-first century,
the Bush administration quickly overturned his predecessor’s status quo perception
of China and shifted its view of China as a strategic competitor, i.e., a potential revo-
lutionary power that would challenge the power distribution and international order
despite the large gap in power position. This negative shift drove the Bush admin-
istration to take precaution against China. Thus, Bush’s China strategy before the
911 attack verifies the logic of Scenario 3. The 911 attack not only reshaped Bush’s
grand strategy but also transformed his perception of China accordingly to status
quo, formulating the candid, constructive and cooperative perception and responsi-
ble stakeholder in 2001 and 2005, respectively. Along with China’s support in anti-
terrorism and the North Korea Nuclear crisis and the relative gentle reaction to Chen
Shui-bian’s radical pro-independent movement, which largely met America’s strate-
gic needs, the Bush administration modified its precaution and returned its strategy
to engagement. The strategic transition during Bush’s terms reconfirms the validity
of the logic of Scenario 4.
While confronting the rapid narrowing gap in power position, the Obama
administration did not adjust the China strategy to containment during his ear-
lier term (2009–2011). Instead, Obama treated China’s growing power as an
important contribution to the existing international order by viewing the Chinese
government as “a partnership to cope with common challenge” and “a coopera-
tive partner that respect each other”, mainly because the Obama administration
needed China’s support to alleviate the negative impact on the world economy
produced by the global financial crisis in 2008–2009. Additionally, China’s strong
cooperative willingness to address the side effects of the financial crisis satisfied
Obama’s strategic necessity. The combination of these factors drove the Obama
administration to adopt the accommodation strategy towards China. This period
provides verification of Scenario 5. However, from 2012 to 2016, Obama’s stra-
tegic choice extended beyond accommodation and shifted to reinforcing strategic
competition as the negative element of Obama’s perception of China apparently
rose. Moreover, the transition of China’s foreign strategy and its growing active
role in establishing alternative international institutions further triggered Obama’s
suspicions of China’s real intentions and accelerated the formulation of a reform-
ist perception. Thus, Obama’s China strategy shifted to competition, which veri-
fied the logic of Scenario 1. In Trump’s case, the perception of China continued
to evolve into a revolutionary power as the Trump administration defined China
as a strategic competition rivalry and revisionist power attempting to shift the
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To Engage orNot toEngage? Explaining theLogic oftheUS’s China…
power distribution and international order to its favor. In addition, China’s desire
and strategic design for achieving a great power status, which was contradictory
to Trump’s hegemonic maintenance, reinforced America’s revolutionary percep-
tion of China. Driven by these factors, Trump’s China strategy was upgraded to
containment, providing an empirical test of Scenario 2.
Given the complexity of US-China relations, a transition of the US’s China
strategy will reoccur in the future [7]. Theoretically, the explanatory model
allows for a more focused and coherent discussion of these policy alternatives,
which appear to be increasingly competitive and inclined towards conflict. The
power and perception distinction acknowledges inherent constraints and dilem-
mas and enables us to observe the long-term transition of the US’s China strat-
egy and clarify viable US policy options. In policy terms, the explanatory model
offers some implications for observing the dynamic change in China-U.S. rela-
tions during Biden’s term. More specifically, compared with Trump’s revolution-
ary perceptions of China and Russia, Biden articulated different views regarding
the two great powers. On September 18, 2020, the then Democratic presidential
nominee Biden asserted that Russia was an opponent, who attempted to break up
NATO, while China was a serious competitor, which required the Washington
government to reinforce its relationships and alliances in Asia [43]. An opponent
seemingly complies with the definition of revolutionary, but a serious competi-
tor may match the reformist perception. Following this perception, we can expect
that the Biden’s administration will not stop the assertive turn on China, but the
approaches will return to the multilateral orientation, i.e., rejoining the inter-
national institutions and restoring the alliances relations, which will return the
US’s China strategy back to the “co-existence of competition and cooperation”,
even though competition may play a much larger role than cooperation in future
China-U.S. relations [69].
Additionally, the explanatory model combined with the material and ideational
factors provides some implications for China’s US strategy while mainly focusing
on the following two questions: (1) How could China, as a rising power with a lower
position, effectively manage the inevitable strategic competition with the United
States? (2) While facing US’s growingly negative perception of China, how could
the Chinese government alleviate its anxiety to ease confrontation in U.S.-China
relations? Indeed, although the Trump administration officially declared that the
engaging China policy in the past four decades suffered dismal failure and set con-
tainment as a priority in its China strategy, the Chinese government still searched for
a new dynamic equilibrium framework to control U.S.-China relations. For example,
in response to Pompeo’s declaration, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted
that both sides should establish a new framework based on the following princi-
ples: reconfirming the bottom line, avoiding confrontation, rejecting decoupling and
maintaining cooperation (mingque dixian, bimian duikang, jujue tuogou, baochi
hezuo). Based on the clarification of the logic of the US’s China strategy during
the post-Cold War period, the emphasis of future studies will be on how to limit the
strategic interactions between US and China in inclusive competition while avoiding
another tragedy of great power politics leading to the Thucydides Trap [103].
X.Ye
1 3
Acknowledgements The author would like to express gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers for their
valuable suggestions and feedback concerning the article.
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Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.
Xiaodi Ye is an assistant professor in the School of International Relations, Guangdong University of
Foreign Studies, China. He received his PhD degree in Political Science (International Politics) from
National Taiwan University in 2019. His research interests include International Relations theory, Chi-
nese foreign policy, and cross-strait relations. His previous article appeared in China Review, Journal of
Current Chinese Affairs, Mainland China Studies, and Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies.
