Toygar T. Kerman

Corvinus University of Budapest · Institute of Economics

Reinsurance is one of the most important tools to be used by insurance companies, for managing risks. This is an effective way; however, there are situations where reinsurance is insufficient, such as the occurrence of a natural hazard. When a natural hazard occurs, many insured experience loss at the same time, which drains the reinsurance market...

We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe private correlated signals that are contingent on the true state of the world. We show that, while necessary, Bayes plausibility is not sufficient for a distribution over posterior belief vectors to be inducible, and we provide a characterization of in...

This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with receivers who have homogeneous beliefs and aligned preferences. The sender wants to implement a proposal and commits to a communication strategy which sends private (possibly) correlated messages to the receivers, who are in an exogenous and commonly...

We consider a sender who wishes to persuade multiple receivers to vote in favor of a proposal and sends them correlated messages that are conditional on the true state of the world. The receivers share a common prior, wish to implement the outcome that matches the true state and have homogeneous preferences, but are heterogeneous in their voting we...

A sender wants to persuade multiple homogeneous receivers to vote in favor of a proposal. Before the vote sender commits to a signal which sends private, potentially correlated, messages to receivers that are contingent on the true state of the world. The best equilibrium for sender in the resulting incomplete information game is unappealing: all r...

We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different dimensions. The receiver is a naive agent who has a simplistic worldview: he ignores the dependency between the two dimensions of the state. We provide a characterizatio...

We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe private correlated messages that are contingent on the true state of the world. Our focus lies on the beliefs of receivers induced via the signal chosen by the sender and we provide a comprehensive analysis of the inducible distributions of posterior b...

X-self selectivity of a social choice function is defined as being self selective relative to the set of test functions X and all of its subsets. We explore the self-selectivity of social choice functions which satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, against different kinds of sets of test functions. We observe that testing against a small...