It's about Time: An Overview of the Dynamical Approach to Cognition
... Team cognition research, from this dynamical perspective, has developed consistent with the dynamical hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that cognitive systems, such as teams and their individual and collective cognitive processes and states, are dynamical systems (van Gelder, 1995(van Gelder, , 1998van Gelder & Port, 1995). Put differently, cognitive systems, consisting of multiple interacting components that change over time and across multiple levels to adapt to the system's environment, are dynamical systems (Kelso, 1994). ...
... Team cognition research, from this dynamical perspective, has developed consistent with the dynamical hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that cognitive systems, such as teams and their individual and collective cognitive processes and states, are dynamical systems (van Gelder, 1995(van Gelder, , 1998van Gelder & Port, 1995). Put differently, cognitive systems, consisting of multiple interacting components that change over time and across multiple levels to adapt to the system's environment, are dynamical systems (Kelso, 1994). ...
... In addition to change over time across multiple levels and self-organization, cognitive systems have also been found to exhibit other key properties of dynamical systems (e.g., see Gorman, Dunbar, Grimm, & Gipson, 2017;van Gelder & Port, 1995), such as multistability. Ranges of stable values (e.g., of team coordination), which occur more regularly, represent stable states, of which multiple tend to be present for dynamical systems. ...
The dynamical hypothesis claims that cognitive systems, such as teams, are dynamical systems (i.e., an interdependent collection of individuals and their technology that change together over time). Following this hypothesis, team researchers have adopted dynamical approaches to better understand the team cognitive processes and states that form team cognition, as well as how they emerge over time. One approach focuses on team coordination dynamics, which examines the coupling of signals between interacting individuals in various modalities, and has been shown to reflect aspects of team functioning including team cognition. However, how changes in team coordination relate to high-level team cognitive processes and states, as well as important events, are not yet fully understood. To this end, we advance a methodological framework for researching team cognition under the dynamical hypothesis. Subsequently, we provided an empirical case-study application of this framework. Thereby, this work contributes methodologically and empirically to a deeper understanding of team cognition, the dynamical hypothesis, and the synergy between them.
... neuronal activation) to another as a pinball bounces around in a pinball machine 12 , but rather, it is due to the evolution of the overall state space, which cannot be attributed to a sequential order of events but to the smooth transition of the space of possibilities. In the words of van Gelder and Port (1995), "In the dynamical conception, any such sequential character is something that emerges over time as the overall trajectory of change in an entire system (or relevant subsystem) whose rules of evolution specify not sequential change but rather simultaneous, mutual coevolution" (p. 13). ...
... In other words, they describe the cognitive act in terms of the time scales that they use to describe physical processes because, for them, the timing of a cognitive act is defined by the rates of physical events. As Van Gelder and Port (1995) state, "This is really just an obvious and elementary consequence of the fact that cognitive processes are ultimately physical processes taking place in real biological hardware" (p. 19). ...
Phenomenology refers to a study and methodology often associated with Edmund Husserl who outlined the need to focus on essences of perception or consciousness. Husserl was a strict anti-naturalist who believed one must begin with experience before assuming any of the ontological or epistemic claims found in the natural sciences. However, certain perspectives within cognitive science (such as those presented by Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud, and Jean-Michel Roy in their 1999 book Naturalizing Phenomenology) have recently acknowledged Husserl’s efforts and admitted the importance of adopting a phenomenological perspective. As such, they have advocated the ‘naturalization’ of phenomenological accounts such that the natural sciences and phenomenology might be held in mutual regard. One prominent example of this endeavour can be seen with Francisco Varela’s 1999 publication “The Specious Present: A Neurophenomenology of Time Consciousness”. This thesis will provide a short description of time-consciousness as described by Husserl followed by an explanation of Varela’s naturalization. Subsequently, there will be an analysis and critique of Varela’s model, citing his ascription to neural correlates and use of clock time as problematic for phenomenology. The final subchapter will discuss the incompatibility between the method of phenomenology and the method of its naturalization. Ultimately, the version of naturalization suggested by Petitot et al. (1999) and exemplified by Varela (1999) will be rendered inadequate in this thesis.
... This observation became known as 'the butterfly effect', pointing out that even the flapping wings of a butterfly in Brazil can set off a tornado in Texas. From this time on, this term was associated with chaos theory, emphasising how a small change can cause a chain of events leading to something extensive like a tornado (van Gelder & Port, 1995). However, chaos, in this sense, does not equal complete disorder but an unpredictable systematic behaviour that suddenly appears in a non-linear, dynamic system (Cameron & Larsen-Freeman, 2008, p. 4). ...
... Motivation explains why people make certain choices, why they take an interest in something, and why they put time and energy into an activity; therefore, it is a complex issue consisting of several dimensions. Dörnyei and Ushioda (2011) narrowed down the definition to two dimensions including the direction and magnitude of human behaviour, which is "the choice of a particular action, the persistence with it and the effort expended on it" (Dörnyei & Ushioda, 2011, p. 4). ...
Preface
Dear Reader,
It is with great relief that we herald the publication of this collection of papers after seeing the University of Pécs Round Table (UPRT) conference and e-book series being brought to a halt by the pandemic and its aftermath. Poetically speaking, working on the volume was like watching a phoenix struggle to rise anew from its ashes—as we watched our long-standing biennial conference being left behind with the ashes; therefore, we were all the more determined to keep the UPRT tradition alive by bringing together new empirical studies in the field of English applied linguistics.
As evidence for the continued relevance and success of this endeavor, we firstly welcome contributions coming from a young generation of researchers in the field of English applied linguistics, TEFL/TESOL, and language teacher education (see Chapters 1, 4, & 6). Secondly, we are glad to acknowledge that the work of our new and our experienced authors continues to span across such a wide spectrum of English applied linguistics, both in focus and methodology. To say it specifically, we and our authors offer insights into identity-focused approaches as tools for exploring the complex developmental trajectories of foreign language learners (Chapters 1 & 4), teachers (Chapter 3), and other professionals (Chapter 2); online education as a site for language exchange programs (Chapter 5) and a factor to consider in language testing (Chapter 8), corpus building and analysis as gateways to effective instruction in English for specific purposes (Chapter 9), and university instruction as a site for improving intercultural competencies (Chapter 7) as well as pronunciation learning and teaching (Chapter 6).
With all this ahead, we wish you a fruitful reading experience and look forward to future contributions along the lines started now or picked up from our previous volumes.
Sincerely,
the Editors
... Another influential theory that has arisen in recent years is Dynamic Interactive Theory of Personal Construal (from here on DIPT). DIPT builds on ideas from connectionism (Read and Miller, 1993;Kunda and Thagard, 1996;Read et al., 1997;DeCoster, 1998, 1999;Zebrowitz et al., 2003;Van Overwalle, 2007; Van Overwalle and Labiouse, 2013) and dynamical systems theory (Rumelhart et al., 1986;Smolensky, 1990;Van Gelder and Port, 1995;Rogers and McClelland, 2004). In essence, DIPT assumes that perception of others is gradually built up via cyclical interactions between "categories, high-level cognitive states, and the low-level processing of facial, vocal, and bodily cues" (Freeman and Ambady, 2011, pp. ...
Hierarchical predictive processing provides a framework outlining how prior expectations shape perception and cognition. Here, we highlight hierarchical predictive processing as a framework for explaining how social context and group-based social knowledge can directly shape intergroup perception. More specifically, we argue that hierarchical predictive processing confers a uniquely valuable toolset to explain extant findings and generate novel hypotheses for intergroup perception. We first provide an overview of hierarchical predictive processing, specifying its primary theoretical assumptions. We then review evidence showing how prior knowledge influences intergroup perception. Next, we outline how hierarchical predictive processing can account well for findings in the intergroup perception literature. We then underscore the theoretical strengths of hierarchical predictive processing compared to other frameworks in this space. We finish by outlining future directions and laying out hypotheses that test the implications of hierarchical predictive processing for intergroup perception and intergroup cognition more broadly. Taken together, hierarchical predictive processing provides explanatory value and capacity for novel hypothesis generation for intergroup perception.
... Although EM is a thesis about the constitution of cognition, including action and perception, appeals to causal coupling lie at the heart of most arguments for EM. Consider the following representative quote from Van Gelder (1995): ...
... Another central point of contention between symbol theorists and connectionists is which representational format is most appropriate and adequate for the basic understanding of neurocognition. Cognitive scientist Tim Van Gelder [26,27] notes the following: "[T]he pivotal issue here is probably the role of time. (...) Details of timing (durations, rates, synchronies, etc.) are taken to be essential to cognition. ...
... These debates hinge on whether we ought to interpret the brain as a computational system that operates over mental representations, or instead as a complex embodied and embedded dynamical system whose behaviour is best explained via the application of particular kinds of mathematical formalisms (with Dynamical Systems Theory being one that is frequently proposed). For additional details on this debate, see: Chemero (2009);Eliasmith (1996); Hutto and Myin (2014); Raleigh (2018); Taylor (2022);Van Gelder (1995); Van Gelder and Port (1995). ...
It is traditionally thought that integration in cognitive science requires combining different perspectives, elements, and insights into an integrated model or theory of the target phenomenon. In this paper I argue that this type of integration is frequently not possible in cognitive science due to our reliance on using different idealizing and simplifying assumptions in our models and theories. Despite this, I argue that we can still have integration in cognitive science and attain all the benefits that integrated models would provide, without the need for their construction. Models which make incompatible idealizing assumptions about the target phenomenon can still be integrated by understanding how to draw coherent and compatible inferences across them. I discuss how this is possible, and demonstrate how this supports a different kind of integration. This sense of integration allows us to use collections of contradictory models to develop a consistent, comprehensive and non-contradictory understanding of a single unified phenomenon without the need for a single integrated model or theory.
There is a distinction between two kinds of explanation by content-involving states, a distinction that emerges most clearly when we consider explanations that involve representation by magnitudes. I illustrate the distinction, which is applicable to a wide variety of kinds of psychological states and processes, and applies also beyond the cases of representation by magnitudes. The distinction allows a new defence of the special kind of explanation by imagistic representation, and gives new reasons for rejecting Zenon Pylyshyn’s rejection thereof. Once the distinction is appreciated, we can articulate a new position on the decades-old dispute about whether perception has a nonconceptual content. A new Eirenic position emerges under which perceptions and judgements have the same kind of content. The genuine insights that motivated the postulation of nonconceptual content in perception are instead captured by noting the features of one of the two kinds of explanation. The Eirenic position is compared and contrasted with the various positions of Tyler Burge, John McDowell, and an earlier stance of Christopher Peacocke.
The main proposal of this paper is that boundary objects and the trading zones in which they occur are the analogue of pheromone trails in the foraging of a termite colony. The colony can be construed as a stigmergic system where the traces of the actions of individual termites coordinate their further actions without the existence of any central control or planning structures. The coordinated systems approach proposed by this paper lends support to the idea that such a system is minimally cognitive in the sense that it is responsible for goal-directed behaviour. Boundary objects and trading zones in scientific practice play a similar functional role to pheromone traces because they are responsible for the same kind of coordination. This approach therefore provides a cognitive account of the social notions of boundary object and trading zone without making representationalist or computationalist assumptions. Moreover, it is scale-invariant—the same analytical technique can be applied at multiple scales simultaneously. It therefore provides a framework for an understanding of the complementarity of cognitive and social approaches to scientific investigation and points to areas for further ethnographic research.
This chapter questions the causal-constitution fallacy raised against the extended mind. It does so by presenting our signature temporal thesis about how to understand constitutive relations in the context of the extended mind, and with respect to dynamical systems, more broadly. We call this thesis diachronic constitution. We will argue that temporalising the constitution relation is not as remarkable (nor problematic) as it might initially seem. It is (arguably) inevitable, given local interactions between microscale and macroscale states of (coupled) dynamical systems. We focus primarily on the metaphysics of the extended mind in this paper. However, we also show how our account of diachronic constitution has important implications for the metaphysics of dependence relations more generally as well as an emerging literature on inter-level explanations in the mechanistic framework applied to the discussion over extended, enactive and embodied cognition.
Decision field theory provides for a mathematical foundation leading to a dynamic, stochastic theory of decision behavior in an uncertain environment. This theory is used to explain (a) violations of stochastic dominance, (b) violations of strong stochastic transitivity, (c) violations of independence between alternatives, (d) serial position effects on preference, (e) speed–accuracy tradeoff effects in decision making, (f) the inverse relation between choice probability and decision time, (g) changes in the direction of preference under time pressure, (h) slower decision times for avoidance as compared with approach conflicts, and (i) preference reversals between choice and selling price measures of preference. The proposed theory is compared with 4 other theories of decision making under uncertainty.
This volume is based on contributions to the second Brain Dynamics Conference, held in Berlin on August 10-14, 1987, as a satellite conference of the Budapest Congress of the International Brain Research Organization. Like the volume resulting from the first conference, Dynamics of Sensory and Cognitive Processing by the Brain, the present work covers new approaches to brain function, with emphasis on electromagnetic fields, EEG, event-related potentials, connectivistic views, and neural networks. Close attention is also paid to research in the emerging field of deterministic chaos and strange attractors. The diversity of this collection of papers reflects a multipronged advance in a hitherto relatively neglected domain, i. e., the study of signs of dynamic processes in organized neural tissue in order both to explain them and to exploit them for clues to system function. The need is greater than ever for new windows. This volume reflects a historical moment, the moment when a relatively neglected field of basic research into available signs of dynamic processes ongoing in organized neural tissue is expanding almost explosively to complement other approaches. From the topics treated, this book should appeal, as did its predecessor, to neuroscientists, neurologists, scientists studying complex systems, artificial intelligence, and neural networks, psychobiologists, and all basic and clinical investigators concerned with new techniques of monitoring and analyzing the brain's electromagnetic activity.
Stuart Kauffman here presents a brilliant new paradigm for evolutionary biology, one that extends the basic concepts of Darwinian evolution to accommodate recent findings and perspectives from the fields of biology, physics, chemistry and mathematics. The book drives to the heart of the exciting debate on the origins of life and maintenance of order in complex biological systems. It focuses on the concept of self-organization: the spontaneous emergence of order widely observed throughout nature. Kauffman here argues that self-organization plays an important role in the emergence of life itself and may play as fundamental a role in shaping life's subsequent evolution as does the Darwinian process of natural selection. Yet until now no systematic effort has been made to incorporate the concept of self-organization into evolutionary theory. The construction requirements which permit complex systems to adapt remain poorly understood, as is the extent to which selection itself can yield systems able to adapt more successfully. This book explores these themes. It shows how complex systems, contrary to expectations, can spontaneously exhibit stunning degrees of order, and how this order, in turn, is essential for understanding the emergence and development of life on Earth. Topics include the new biotechnology of applied molecular evolution, with its important implications for developing new drugs and vaccines; the balance between order and chaos observed in many naturally occurring systems; new insights concerning the predictive power of statistical mechanics in biology; and other major issues. Indeed, the approaches investigated here may prove to be the new center around which biological science itself will evolve. The work is written for all those interested in the cutting edge of research in the life sciences.