Sylvain Ferrières

Université de Franche-Comté | UFC · CRESE Center de Recherche sur les Strategies Economiques

A coalitional ranking problem is described by a weak order on the set of nonempty coalitions of a given agent set. A social ranking is a weak order on the set of agents. We consider social rankings that are consistent with stable/core partitions. A partition is stable if there is no coalition better ranked in the coalitional ranking than the rank o...

We introduce a new family of values for TU‐games with a priority structure, which both contains the Priority value recently introduced by Béal et al. and the Weighted Shapley values (Kalai & Samet). Each value of this family is called a Weighted priority value and is constructed as follows. A strictly positive weight is associated with each agent a...

We study cooperative games with a priority structure modeled by a poset on the agent set. We introduce the Priority value, which splits the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition among the set of its members over which no other coalition member has priority. This allocation shares many desirable properties with the classical Shapley value: it is effic...

Presentation during SING13 in Paris.

We introduce the class of tree TU-games augmented by a linear order over the links, which reflects the formation process of the tree. We characterize a new allocation rule for this class of cooperative games by means of three axioms: Standardness, Top consistency and Link amalgamation. Then, we discuss both a bargaining foundation and two possible...

We provide characterizations of the equal division values and their convex mixtures, using a new axiom on a fixed player set based on player nullification which requires that if a player becomes null, then any two other players are equally affected. Two economic applications are also introduced concerning bargaining under risk and common-pool resou...

We study a non linear weighted Shapley value () for cooperative games with transferable utility, in which the weights are endogenously given by the players' stand-alone worths. We call it the proportional Shapley value since it distributes the Harsanyi dividend () of all coalitions in proportion to the stand-alone worths of its members. We show tha...

The dissertation provides four contributions on the axiomatic method. The first three chapters deal with cooperative games with transferable utility. In the first two chapters, a systematic study of the nullification operation is done. The removal axioms are translated into their nullified counterparts. Some existing characterizations are revisited...

Many axiomatic characterizations of values for cooperative games invoke axioms which evaluate the consequences of removing an arbitrary player. Balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980) and balanced cycle contributions (Kamijo and Kongo, 2010) are two well-known examples of such axioms. We revisit these characterizations by nullifying a player instead...