Defining Coercion: An Application in Interrogation and Plea Negotiation Contexts

Abstract

Confessions and guilty pleas carry significant weight in the criminal justice system, and it is legally required that these admissions of guilt be made voluntarily (Boykin v. Alabama, 1969; Haynes v. Washington, 1963). Despite these legal requirements, however, no clear understanding of voluntariness and its antithesis, coercion, exists in the literature. For example, the legal requirements for plea voluntariness have been described as “exceedingly ambiguous” (Becker, 1987; Davis, 1972; Enker, 1967). Additionally, the Supreme Court’s definition for the voluntariness of confessions has been criticized for being “vague and imprecise” (Wakefield & Underwager, 1998, p. 436; see also, Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985; Sheldon, 2016). Without a clear understanding of coercion in these similar yet distinct settings, the legal requirements for voluntariness cannot be properly applied to confessions and guilty pleas. The present review synthesizes multidisciplinary definitions of coercion and proposes a theoretical definition of coercion to be tested in interrogation and plea negotiation contexts. Individual interrogation and plea negotiation techniques are reviewed, and the aspects that make them potentially coercive are explored by applying the proposed definition. Finally, research and policy implications are discussed.

Full text

Psychology, Public Policy, and Law
Defining Coercion: An Application in Interrogation and Plea Negotiation
Contexts
Samantha Luna
Online First Publication, March 24, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law0000345
CITATION
Luna, S. (2022, March 24). Defining Coercion: An Application in Interrogation and Plea Negotiation Contexts. Psychology,
Public Policy, and Law. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law0000345

Defining Coercion: An Application in Interrogation and Plea Negotiation
Contexts
Samantha Luna
Criminology, Law, and Society, George Mason University
Confessions and guilty pleas carry significant weight in the criminal justice system, and it is legally
required that these admissions of guilt be made voluntarily (Boykin v. Alabama, 1969;Haynes v.
Washington, 1963). Despite these legal requirements, however, no clear understanding of voluntariness
and its antithesis, coercion, exists in the literature. For example, the legal requirements for plea voluntar-
iness have been described as “exceedingly ambiguous”(Becker, 1987;Davis, 1972;Enker, 1967).
Additionally, the Supreme Court’sdefinition for the voluntariness of confessions has been criticized for
being “vague and imprecise”(Wakefield & Underwager, 1998, p. 436; see also, Kassin & Wrightsman,
1985;Sheldon, 2016). Without a clear understanding of coercion in these similar yet distinct settings,
the legal requirements for voluntariness cannot be properly applied to confessions and guilty pleas. The
present review synthesizes multidisciplinary definitions of coercion and proposes a theoretical definition
of coercion to be tested in interrogation and plea negotiation contexts. Individual interrogation and plea
negotiation techniques are reviewed, and the aspects that make them potentially coercive are explored
by applying the proposed definition. Finally, research and policy implications are discussed.
Keywords: coercion, interrogation, plea negotiation, voluntariness
Admissions of guilt in the criminal justice system, which
include both confessions and guilty pleas, are incredibly power-
ful.
1
Confession evidence, when presented at trial, often outweighs
all other types of evidence (Kassin & Neumann, 1997;Leo, 2009),
and guilty pleas contribute to the vast majority (.95%) of crimi-
nal convictions carried out in the United States each year (Bureau
of Justice Statistics, 2010;Jones et al., 2018). Given the weight of
these admissions, it is important—and legally required—that con-
fessions and guilty pleas be made voluntarily, that is, on one’s
own free will (Boykin v. Alabama, 1969;Haynes v. Washington,
1963). Despite the legal requirements that admissions of guilt be
made voluntarily, no clear understanding of voluntariness and its
antithesis, coercion, exits in the literature. For example, the legal
requirements for plea voluntariness have been described as
“exceedingly ambiguous”(Becker, 1987;Davis, 1972;Enker,
1967; see also United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., 2002). Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court’sdefinition for the voluntariness of
confessions has been criticized for being “vague and imprecise”
(Wakefield & Underwager, 1998, p. 436; see also, Kassin &
Wrightsman, 1985;Sheldon, 2016).
It is important to note at the outset that two schools of thought
exist on the relationship between voluntariness and coercion. One
school views the two concepts as closely related, with coercion
equivalent to legal involuntariness (Brunk, 1979;Kipnis, 1976).
The other school of thought, however, argues that coercion alone
is not sufficient to render an agreement legally involuntary and
treats the two concepts as separate and distinct (Philips, 1984).
Philips (1984) asserts that “a coerced agent is presented with
unwanted, unpleasant alternatives, but is free to choose and to act
upon the least obnoxious of them. He is a victim of imposed con-
ditions of choice, but still he may choose”and argues that “This is
not so in the case of an agent who acts involuntarily.... His will is
overborn. He is incapable of making a rational choice or of acting
on one”(p. 134).
The present review treats coercion and voluntariness as two end
points on the same continuum. The main reason for this is that the
legal system has tended to do the same, that is, to treat coercion as
the antithesis of voluntariness. For example, with regard to confes-
sion evidence, the Supreme Court asserted in Colorado v. Con-
nelly (1986) that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate
to finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’” (p. 479 U.S. 157),
and explicitly stated that “the voluntariness determination...is
designed to determine the presence of police coercion”(p. 479 U.
S. 168). Further, when recognizing the ambiguity of the voluntari-
ness standard, the Court in United States v. Speed Joyeros (2002;
see below) discussed voluntariness and coercion in terms of
Samantha Luna https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5607-4824
The ideas presented in this article have not been previously published or
disseminated. I thank Dr. Allison Redlich for her support and guidance.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Samantha
Luna, Criminology, Law, and Society, George Mason University, 4400
University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030, United States. Email: sluna2@gmu
.edu
1
The term confession is used throughout the manuscript to refer to
extra-judicial confessions made in the context of interrogations, and not to
include guilty pleas.
1
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law
©2022 American Psychological Association
ISSN: 1076-8971 https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000345
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differences in degree, not kind. In other words, the Court did not
question whether coercion rendered a plea agreement involuntary;
rather, the Court questioned what degree of coercion was neces-
sary for a finding of legal involuntariness. Therefore, arguably, a
clearer understanding of what constitutes the necessary elements
of coercion in interrogation and plea negotiation contexts will also
contribute to the understanding of confession and plea voluntari-
ness. It is also important to note here that while the voluntariness
of a decision can be affected by intoxication and mental illness in
the absence of coercion, this article is about coercion and voluntar-
iness as two ends of the same continuum.
The purpose of this article is to (a) develop a definition of coer-
cion that can be tested in multiple contexts, (b) apply this defini-
tion to interrogation and plea negotiation contexts, and (c) identify
underlying aspects that may increase interrogation and plea nego-
tiations coerciveness, which may be distinct in these two settings.
The article will first begin with an overview of admissions of guilt
in the criminal justice system, why they are important, and the
rules that govern them. Multidisciplinary perspectives of coercion
will then be explored and synthesized to develop a proposed, de-
fensible definition of coercion that can be applied to differing con-
texts. Next, specific interrogation and plea negotiation tactics will
be reviewed and the aspects that make them potentially coercive
will be explored by applying the proposed definition of coercion.
Finally, research and policy implications will be discussed.
Confessions and Guilty Pleas
Although confessions and guilty pleas both involve taking
responsibility for criminal acts, it is important to distinguish
between the two. One of the most significant differences between
confessions and guilty pleas are the consequences of such admis-
sions. Although a confession greatly increases the chance of con-
viction (Drizin & Leo, 2004;Leo, 2009), it does not equate to a
conviction in the same way that a guilty plea does (Wilford &
Wells, 2018). Those who confess can still choose to exercise their
right to trial and retain the constitutionally afforded safeguards
built into the trial process, such as the presumption of innocence
(Redlich, 2016); by opting for trial, the possibility of acquittal
remains. Additionally, it is possible for someone who confesses to
retract their confession before trial (Gudjonsson & MacKeith,
1988). In contrast, when a guilty plea is accepted, defendants are
by definition convicted without the benefit of the constitutionally
afforded safeguards at trial (see Redlich & Bonventre, 2015;
Reimelt, 2010). Additionally, interrogations and plea negotiations
differ in terms of actual versus perceived leniency (Redlich,
2010). While suspects may perceive leniency in interrogations, for
example, via pragmatic implications (see below), police are not
legally permitted to explicitly promise leniency and those who
confess are often treated harshly at trial (Leo & Davis, 2010;Red-
lich, 2010). For example, juries will sometimes convict on the ba-
sis of confession evidence alone (Drizin & Leo, 2004). In contrast,
the leniency attached to plea deals is not only perceived by defend-
ants but is legal and actually occurs in the form of reduced senten-
ces, charges, and so forth (Redlich, 2010).
Despite the differences between these admissions, however,
there are similarities between interrogations and plea negotiations.
For one, interrogations and plea negotiations share similar situa-
tional factors; in both contexts state representatives attempt to
secure admissions from individuals (Wilford & Wells, 2018). Sec-
ond, confessions and guilty pleas are often obtained with similar
social influence factors (e.g., authority, reciprocity, scarcity; Red-
lich, 2010), even if the precise techniques used in the two contexts
differ. Additionally, the same dispositional risk factors that place
suspects at risk for confessions also place defendants at risk for
guilty pleas (Kassin et al., 2010;Redlich et al., 2017).
Although there are many aspects of the criminal justice system
that are arguably coercive, such as characteristics of bail, carceral
settings, and mandated treatment (e.g., Parhar et al., 2008), the
focus here is on interrogations and plea negotiations. Despite the
cornerstone protection against self-incrimination, admissions in
the form of confessions to the police and guilty pleas are quite
prevalent. As mentioned, guilty pleas account for about 95% of
convictions (and are the outcome of about 65% of arrests; see Red-
lich et al., in press) and about two thirds of suspects confess to the
police. Confessions and guilty pleas also carry significant conse-
quences for suspects and defendants. Very little, if any, evidence
is more persuasive to criminal justice officials and juries than an
admission of guilt (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004;McCormick,
1972). Additionally, it is almost impossible to “unring a bell,”or
to take back an admission of guilt without consequence. For exam-
ple, confessions, even retracted ones, can lead to investigative tun-
nel vision, and confirmation bias (e.g., seeking out evidence that
points to a suspect’s guilt while discounting evidence that points
away from it; Leo & Cutler, 2016;Leo & Davis, 2010). Perhaps
the most significant consequence of involuntary admissions, how-
ever, occurs when innocent individuals are coerced into admitting
to crimes that they did not commit.
The exoneration of more than 2,800 innocent individuals has
exposed the risk of innocent suspects and defendants admitting to
crimes they did not commit (National Registry of Exonerations,
2021). It is important to note, however, that false (i.e., unreliable)
admissions and coerced (i.e., involuntary) admissions are not one
and the same (Leo et al., 2006). True (i.e., reliable) admissions can
be coerced, rendering them legally involuntary. Conversely, false
(unreliable) admissions can be made voluntarily in the absence of
coercive pressure. Furthermore, false (unreliable) admissions can
be coerced, and true (reliable) admissions can be voluntary.
As of August 2021, false confessions were present in about
12% of all known exonerations and false guilty pleas were present
in about 20%, with 2.7% of exonerations involving both a false
confession and false guilty plea (National Registry of Exonera-
tions, 2021). These exonerations have contributed to the identifica-
tion and critique of several factors that limit voluntariness and
contribute to false admissions of guilt such as psychologically
manipulative interrogation tactics (e.g., minimization), prosecuto-
rial leverage (e.g., overcharging), and time pressured deals (Cald-
well, 2011;Kassin & Kiechel, 1996;Redlich et al., 2017;Zottoli
et al., 2016). However, a consensus on whether these critiqued tac-
tics are coercive does not exist. For example, whereas most con-
fession experts agree that the use of minimization tactics (e.g.,
implied promises of leniency) are coercive and increase the risk
for false confessions (see Kassin et al., 2018), courts have gener-
ally ruled that minimization tactics are not coercive (e.g., Miller v.
Fenton, 1986;United States v. Jacques, 2014). Therefore, the
underlying aspects of what actually makes interrogation and plea
negotiation methods coercive needs further exploration. Without a
clear and defensible definition of coercion, and the identification
2LUNA
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of these underlying aspects, our ability to theoretically understand
and empirically test coercion in the criminal justice system is
limited.
Defining Coercion
Although confessions and guilty pleas are distinct admissions in
the criminal justice system, legally both types of admissions must
be made voluntarily (Boykin v. Alabama, 1969;Haynes v. Wash-
ington, 1963). However, despite voluntariness being an integral
requirement for the admissibility and acceptance of admissions of
guilt in the criminal justice system, what constitutes coercion in
both interrogation and plea negotiation contexts remains relatively
unclear, largely subjective, and contested. Theory and empirical
research from various disciplines, however, suggests that a clearer
definition of coercion is possible with a multidisciplinary lens.
Legal, philosophical, and psychological definitions of coercion
specifically provide a strong foundation for understanding coer-
cion in interrogations and plea negotiations (see Table 1 for an
overview).
Legal Foundations
Confessions
As provided by the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of due
process, the government may not coerce confessions from sus-
pects. Further, U.S. Code § 3501 for the admissibility of confes-
sions states that a confession (including any self-incriminating
statement) may only be “admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given”(Title 18 of the United States Criminal Procedure Code).
Rules to exclude coerced confessions were first developed at the
end of the 19th century in response to concerns that confessions
obtained through inducements or threats of harm could contain
unreliable information. In 1884 the Supreme Court adopted the
common law rule and held that, given the weight of confession
evidence, confessions must be made freely and voluntarily (Hopt
v. Utah, 1884). In its decision in Hopt v. Utah (1884) the Supreme
Court provided a legal definition for evaluating involuntary con-
fessions. The Court affirmed that
a voluntary confession of guilt is among the most effectual proofs in
the law, but the presumption upon which weight is given to such evi-
dence, namely that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or
prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confes-
sion appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements
of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge
preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of
such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused,
in reference to the charge, deprives him of that freedom of will or self-
control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning
of law. (Hopt v. Utah, 1884; emphases added)
This opinion by the Court highlights several important elements
of coercion. First, the Court recognized that a coercer is in a posi-
tion of authority over a coercee. Second, coercion can occur as the
result of either inducements, threats, or promises made by a
coercer. Third, coercion occurs by operating on the fears or hopes
of a coercee. Finally, the Court qualified this definition by includ-
ing that these elements, while necessary, must also deprive a sus-
pect of “freedom of will or self-control”to render a confession
involuntary.
It was another 50 years, however, until the use of physical coer-
cion to obtain confessions was expressly prohibited. In the unani-
mous ruling in Brown v. Mississippi (1936), the Court reasoned
that the use of physical coercion violates suspects’fundamental
rights and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Examples of physically coercive interrogation tactics include kick-
ing suspects, beating suspects with anything from nightsticks to
baseball bats, and placing lighted cigars against suspects’bodies
(Leo, 2008).
The protection of the Due Process Clause was then extended by the
Supreme Court in 1944 to include psychological coercion. In Ashcraft
Table 1
Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Defining Coercion and Voluntariness
Discipline Approach
Legal
definitions
Confessions Guilty pleas
Coercer is in a position of authority “No clear single definition of voluntary”
Coercion can occur as the result of inducements, threats,
or promises made by a coercer
“Unclear whether voluntary means free from any coercion or whether it
means freedom from ‘wrongful’or ‘undue’coercion”
Coercion occurs by operating on the fears or hopes of the
accused
“Did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises made in
the plea agreement”
“Forced,”“coerced,”“involuntary,”“extorted,”“loss of
freedom of will”
Philosophical
definitions
Pressure approach Enforcement approach
Focuses on the use of threats to pressure an individual to
do something they do not wish to do
Focuses on the differences in power used to constrain the choices of an indi-
vidual
Offers as well as threats can be coercive
Psychological
definitions
Threat of punishment approach Constraint in response choices approach
Coercion is the opposite of freedom, where freedom
occurs in the absence of contingencies using aversive
control
Argues the possibility of choice is a characteristic of freedom, where the pos-
sibility of choice consists of options that allow for escape and access to crit-
ical consequences
Coercion is greatest when only one option is available to obtain critical
consequences
DEFINING COERCION 3
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v. Tennessee (1944) the Court ruled that a confession obtained after 36
straight hours of interrogation violated Ashcraft’s Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights and reasoned that a “situation such as that here shown by
uncontradicted evidence is so inherently coercive that its very exis-
tence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom by a lone
suspect against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear”(p.
322). Some two decades later, in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) the Court
also recognized the “inherently coercive”nature of custodial interroga-
tion and ruled that certain procedural safeguards were necessary to pro-
tect defendants’Fifth Amendment Rights. Specifically, the Court ruled
that law enforcement officials must inform suspects of their rights to
remain silent and to obtain an attorney while in police custody. While
questionable tactics are still used to elicit confessions in the United
States (see below), confessions should be considered coerced and ruled
inadmissible if they are obtained by brute force, by explicit threats of
punishment or promises of leniency, by deprivation (e.g., food, sleep,
biological needs), or without notifying in-custody suspects of their
Miranda rights (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004).
Today, courts determine the voluntariness of a confession based on
the totality of circumstances surrounding an interrogation and by con-
sidering additional elements (Haynes v. Washington, 1963), such as
physical abuse, psychological abuse and manipulation, characteristics
of the interrogation (e.g., length and location), the presence of an attor-
ney, defendant characteristics (e.g., age and education), procedural reg-
ularity, and necessity (Marcus, 2006). Although presumed present, if
challenged, the burden to establish voluntariness falls on the prosecu-
tion and must be proven by a “preponderance of evidence”(Lego v.
Twomey,1972). However, in evaluating voluntariness, courts have
“used different terms to express the test by which to judge the inadmis-
sibility of a confession, such as ‘forced,’‘coerced,’‘involuntary,’
‘extorted,’‘loss of freedom of will’” (Ashcraft v. Tennessee,1944,p.
322), which may point to the lack of a universally accepted definition.
Indeed, a United States District Court has stated that “There is no sin-
gle clear definition of ‘voluntary’for all legal purposes”and it is
“unclear whether ‘voluntary’means freedom from any coercion or
whether it means freedom from ‘wrongful’or ‘undue’coercion”
(United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., 2002, p. 14). Although state and
federal courts are generally able to agree that coercion occurs in instan-
ces involving physical force, whether psychological coercion occurs
during specific interrogations is far more ambiguous and open to inter-
pretation. Consider for example the following excerpt from Justice
Jackson’s dissent in Ashcraft v. Tennessee (1944):
The Court bases its decision on the premise that custody and examina-
tion of a prisoner for thirty-six hours is “inherently coercive.”Of
course, it is. And so is custody and examination for one hour. Arrest
itself is inherently coercive, and so is detention. When not justified,
infliction of such indignities upon the person is actionable as a tort. Of
course, such acts put pressure upon the prisoner to answer questions,
to answer them truthfully, and to confess if guilty. (p. 322)
Guilty Pleas
For guilty pleas to be considered valid, courts are tasked with
ensuring that pleas are entered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily
and with a factual basis of guilt prior to being accepted (see Boykin
v. Alabama,1969;Brady v. United States, 1970). Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 for Pleas (b)(2) similarly states that pleas may
only be accepted if they are made voluntarily and “did not result
from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agree-
ment).”The legal requirement for the voluntariness of a plea decision
is similarly unclear. In fact, a United States District Court has stated
that if only a pristine definition of no coercion were to be used, most
plea bargains would be precluded from going forward (United States
v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., 2002,p.14).
The determination of whether defendants actually enter voluntary
pleas is primarily assessed via the oral plea colloquy and must be pre-
served on the court record (Boykin v. Alabama, 1969;Redlich &
Bonventre, 2015). During the oral colloquy, which consists of a
judge asking defendants a series of questions or statements, voluntari-
ness questions are meant to address if any threats of promises were
made in exchange for the plea (Boykin v. Alabama,1969;Redlich,
2016). Often voluntariness is concerned with ensuring that the plea
decision did not result from promises, force, or threats (Redlich &
Summers, 2012). However, as with evaluating the voluntariness of
confessions, the voluntariness standards for guilty pleas become am-
biguous when more subtle forms of psychological coercion are pres-
ent. This uncertainty surrounding what makes an admission, whether
occurring in the interrogation room or in response to plea offers, vol-
untary leaves room for wide interpretation and error.
Philosophical Foundations
The concept of coercion has historically received a considerable
amount of philosophical attention. However, it was not until 1969
that a deeper understanding of coercion was given significant theo-
retical attention by philosophers. Prior to this time, discussions of
coercion revolved around its function, necessity, and effect on a
coercee’s responsibility, without significant attention given to the
nature of coercion (Anderson, 2017). For example, in the Doctrine
of Right, Kant (1996/1797) posited that coercion hinders freedom,
but that it is a necessary tool used by the executive authority to
prevent other rights’violations.
Nozick (1969) developed a framework that provides a founda-
tion for examining coercion in interrogation and plea negotiation
contexts. According to Nozick (1969) there are conditions that
must be met to establish that coercion has occurred. He argued
that Pcoerces Qonly if:
1. Paims to keep Qfrom choosing to perform action A;
2. Pcommunicated a claim to Q;
3. P’s claim indicated that if Qperforms A, then Pwill bring
about some consequence that would make Q’sA-ing less
desirable to Qthan Q’s not A-ing;
4. P’s claim is credible to Q;
5. Qdoes not do A;
6. Part of Q’s reason for not doing Ais to lessen the likeli-
hood that Pwill bring about the consequence announced
in (3) (see Anderson, 2017,p.7;Nozick, 1969).
Nozick’s (1969) framework has two important components that
set it apart from earlier discussions of coercion. First, unlike earlier
theories that include direct uses of force or violence, Nozick’s
framework only associates coercion with conditional proposals (e.
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g., conditional threats). Second, it requires that the coercee gives
in to the coercer’s proposal and focuses the analysis of coercion
on how the coercee is affected by it, and not on the actions of the
coercer (Anderson, 2017). Although theorists have generally
accepted that conditional threats should be considered in the analy-
sis of coercion, there has been some debate concerning whether
conditional offers and direct force (e.g., physical violence) should
also be included (Anderson, 2017).
Debate surrounding conditional proposals has focused on a
“baseline”analysis of threats and offers, with many reasoning that
threats coerce and offers do not, simply because threats propose to
make the coercee worse off, whereas offers do not. Reliance on a
baseline approach to determine coercion is often associated with
the pressure approach of defining coercion (Cratsley, 2015). The
pressure approach, in line with Nozick’s framework, focuses on
the use of threats to pressure an individual to do something they
do not wish to do (Cratsley, 2015;Goltz, 2020). However, others
suggest that there are some offers that can be so potent that an
individual cannot reasonably refuse them, and conditional offers
should therefore be included in discussions of coercion (see
Anderson, 2017;O’Neill, 1991). Additionally, Zimmerman (1981)
argues that conditional offers should be considered coercive if a
proposal maker actively hinders a coercee from obtaining a situa-
tion for himself/herself that would be better than the situation
offered by the proposal maker. However, others note that it is not
the offer specifically that needs to be looked at, rather it is the
offerer’s actions (e.g., taking advantage of power differentials)
that inhibit the coercee from reaching a better bargaining state
(Anderson, 2017). For example, McGregor (1988–89) argues that
by looking at a baseline distinction, we ignore the power relation-
ships that occur when a coercee and a coercer have significantly
different bargaining strengths.
The enforcement approach of defining coercion is an alterna-
tive to the pressure approach and focuses on the differences in
power used to constrain the choices of an individual (Anderson,
2010;Goltz, 2020). Rather than taking a coercee-focused
approach, the enforcement approach focuses more on the powers,
activities, and intentions of the coercer. Anderson (2008) argues
that a coercer-focused account of coercion is necessary, because
it accounts for the fact that coercion originates with the coercer.
At the epicenter of coercion is the coercer’s power to constrain a
coercee’s situation. Anderson (2008) theorizes that an individu-
al’s ability and willingness to use unchecked force and violence
against another is the type of power pertinent to understanding
coercion.
In addition, Brunk (1979) argues that Nozick’s (1969) frame-
work, by focusing exclusively on threats, does not capture the
full extent of coercion. According to Brunk (1979),whowas
addressing the guilty plea context specifically, coercive induce-
ment occurs when one person leads another to carry out an
action they do not want to do, because of the constraints
imposed by the other person. Contrary to the baseline approach,
he argues that even if an end is desired by the individual, it does
not necessarily follow that the means to achieve those ends were
desired by the individual. Further, Brunk (1979) asserts that an
offer can be so constrained by an individual’s situation that it
cannot be psychologically refused or reasonably rejected (e.g.,
offering a poor plea deal to a defendant who wishes to avoid the
death penalty or selling the only available insulin to a diabetic
in exchange for his estate). Therefore, offers as well as threats
under certain circumstances can be coercive. Using the guilty
plea context, Brunk (1979) outlines coercion as occurring if:
1. P(the coercer) has introduced or proposed to introduce
(by threats or offers) considerations into Q’s(the coer-
cee’s) situation that alter the desirability to Qof doing B
(e.g., taking the plea) (or not doing B).
2. The choice situation that Qfaces as a result of P’sinter-
vention is less desirable to Qthan the choice situation Q
would face in the normal or expected course of events.
3. The choice situation Qfaces is either
a. less desirable to Qthan the choice situation Qwould
have faced if Phad not intervened or
b. such that Qcannot (physically or psychologically) re-
fuse to do B.
4. Qchooses to do B.
5. Except for P’sintervention Qwould not have chosen to
do B(i.e., gone to trial). (Brunk, 1979, p. 541).
2
The philosophical definitions of coercion discussed above, and
the frameworks developed by Nozick (1969) and Brunk (1979),
provide a strong foundation for understanding the fundamental
elements necessary for coercion to occur in interrogation and plea
negotiation settings. However, the addition of psychological
theory and empirical research are necessary to extend our under-
standing of the choice situations faced by coercees, as well as to
better understand the authority and power held by coercers.
Psychological Foundations
Definitions of coercion in the psychological literature tend to
take one of two approaches to defining coercion (Baum, 2017;Cat-
ania, 1980;Goldiamond, 1976;Skinner, 1971). In the behavioral
analysis literature, definitions of coercion generally involve either
the threat of punishment approach or the constraint in response
choices approach (Goltz, 2020). The threat of punishment approach
is similar to the philosophical pressure approach to defining coer-
cion and views coercion as the opposite of freedom. Freedom,
according to Skinner (1971), occurs in the absence of contingencies
using aversive control. However, the view that coercion is the oppo-
site of freedom has been criticized for failing to account for a target
of coercion (i.e., coercee) having some freedom to respond to an
attempted influence (Goltz, 2020). Therefore, a different approach
is to look at coercion from the perspective of the relative choices of
responses available to respondents.
The constraint in response choices approach, similar to the phil-
osophical enforcement approach and Brunk’s (1979) definition of
coercion, argues that the possibility of choice is also a characteris-
tic of freedom (Goltz, 2020). The possibility of choice consists of
2
The letters in this model slightly differ from the original to make the
letters consistent across the models presented in this article.
DEFINING COERCION 5
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options that allow escape and options that provide access to criti-
cal consequences (Baum, 2017;Goldiamond, 1976). Critical con-
sequences, according to Goldiamond (1976), are consequences (e.
g., food for the starving and social support for the isolated) that
when made contingent on any particular behavior have a powerful
control over that behavior. Goldiamond (1976) viewed greater
freedom as occurring when a greater set of alternative contingen-
cies are available to provide access to critical consequences. Free-
dom, according to Goldiamond (1976), is the number of true
choices available to a respondent minus one. Therefore, coercion
is the greatest when freedom is zero, meaning that only one option
is available to obtain critical consequences (Goldiamond, 1976).
Goltz (2020) also proposed adding two extensions to the defini-
tions of coercion present in the behavioral analysis literature. The
proposed additions include the removal and/or neglect to provide
resources and nontransparent architecture systems. Goltz (2020)
argues that coercion occurs when a respondent is not provided
with adequate resources to create a response necessary to obtain
desired outcomes and when an environment is designed in a way
to encourage certain choices without an individual’s prior consent.
According to Goltz (2020), positive freedom requires both main-
taining individual control over one’s actions and having the
resources necessary to produce those actions. Additionally, Goltz
(2020) argues that the structuring of choices alone can be viewed
as coercive from a negative freedom point of view; where negative
freedom is freedom from interference with one’s actions.
In addition to these definitions of coercion, there are a number
of psychological foundations that can be applied to better under-
stand how social influence works in interrogations and plea nego-
tiations. The psychological concept of social influence refers to
changes in behavior directly resulting from interpersonal interac-
tions and can be broken down into conformity, obedience, and
compliance (Chaiken et al., 1996;Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004;
Turner, 1995). Research surrounding obedience specifically pro-
vides an empirical basis for understanding how subtle forms of
coercion may work in interrogation and plea negotiation settings.
Studies of obedience have focused on how authority figures and
power holders can impact the behavior of subordinates.
Authority
By the very nature of their positions interrogators and prosecu-
tors have authority over suspects and defendants, contributing to
the power dynamics present in interrogation and plea negotiation
settings. Milgram's (1963) now classic study of obedience to
authority is perhaps the most well-known and replicated test of the
effect of authority on the behavior of others. Milgram (1963)
found that nearly two thirds of participants in his study obeyed an
authority figure when they were told to shock someone (who they
believed to be another participant complaining of pain and a heart
condition) to the maximum voltage possible. In subsequent repli-
cations, similar results and deference to authority was also found
indicating that authority is a strong social force (Burger, 2009;
Milgram, 1965). One particularly important finding from Mil-
gram’s (1965) replication for understanding interrogations con-
texts specifically (see below), was that the proximity of the
authority figure impacted obedience. He found that the closer the
authority figure was to the participant, the more likely the partici-
pant would obey. The Supreme Court in its decision in Hopt v.
Utah (1884) recognized that authority is a necessary (albeit not
sufficient) component of coercion; this classic research on obedi-
ence highlights the power an authority figure has to impact
behavior.
Power
Power is an essential element of coercion and has been defined as
the amount of force one individual can induce on another (Lewin,
1941) and as control over valued resources, such as reward and pun-
ishments (Keltner et al., 2003). Without actual or perceived power, it
is unlikely that a potential coercer would be able to persuade an indi-
vidual to behave in a desired way. Social psychologists have recog-
nized that power comes in many forms and operates via perception.
French and Raven (1959) identified fives bases of power. The first
base of power, legitimate power, comes from a target’s perception of
the other’s right to influence. This type if power may be present in
both interrogation and plea negotiation contexts given the official
positions that interrogators and prosecutors hold. However, legitimate
power cannot be assumed in these contexts given the potential for
low perceived legitimacy of criminal justice institutions (see LaFree,
2018). The second base of power, reward power, comes from the
perception that the other person controls benefits. Additionally, the
third base of power, coercive power comes from the perception that
the other controls punishments. Whereas conditional offers should be
associated with reward power, conditional threats should be associ-
ated with coercive power. The fourth base of power, referent power,
comes from the target identifying with the other. Finally, expert
power comes from the target perceiving the other to be knowledgea-
ble. Raven (1965) also later added informational power as a sixth
base of power, which is the ability to control the information another
needs to accomplish something.
In addition to identifying various sources of power, researchers
have examined how power affects both the powerful and the power-
less. One particularly important finding for the purposes of examin-
ing the impact of coercion on decision-making is that having less
power is correlated with low performance during complex tasks and
can impair executive functioning (Park et al., 1994;Smith et al.,
2008). In a series of four experiments, Smith et al. (2008) found that
those placed in low power conditions (i.e., those assigned to be sub-
ordinates) were less effective at updating, inhibiting, and planning
than those in high power conditions (i.e., those assigned to be superi-
ors). Updating refers to the monitoring of information that is relevant
to a present goal and inhibiting involves the suppression of unwanted
or irrelevant responses that can interfere with a present goal. Smith et
al. (2008) reasoned that their results were consistent with Keltner and
colleagues’(2003) theory that those who lack power view them-
selvesasameansforothersandtendtobeguidedbysituationalcon-
straints and circumstances, rather than their own goals and values.
These findings have important implications for understanding how
coercive situations, in which a coercer holds considerable power over
another, can impair a coercee’s ability to make decisions that are
goal consistent and in their best interests.
Proposed Definition and Model of Coercion
By incorporating and building upon legal, philosophical, and
psychological perspectives we can begin to develop a more con-
cise and defensible definition of coercion that can be applied in
interrogation and plea negotiation settings. Because the Supreme
6LUNA
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Court has explicitly stated that confessions and guilty pleas are in-
valid when they are made as the result of force, threats, or prom-
ises, a definition of coercion in each of these settings should
incorporate the use of both direct force and conditional offers.
Therefore, building on Brunk’s model (see above), a proposed def-
inition of coercion would be the use of power to constrain an indi-
vidual’s situation, to impose one’s will on that individual via the
use of force or conditional proposals (to include both threats and
offers).
Figure 1 illustrates a basic model of coercion. In the model P(i.
e., the coercer) is in a position of power and communicates a con-
ditional offer and/or threat to Q(i.e., the coercee) who is in a con-
strained situation created by P. The communicated conditional
offer by Pindicates that if Qchooses B(confessing or accepting a
plea deal) then Pwill bring about an offer that will make confess-
ing or accepting a plea deal more desirable, while also constrain-
ing Q’s situation by making it (a) less desirable to Qthan the
choice situation Q would have faced if Phad not intervened or (b)
such that Qcannot (physically or psychologically) refuse to do B
(confess or accept the plea deal). Part of the constrained situation
is that access to critical consequences and choosing to deny
involvement or go to trial without negative consequences (i.e.,
unattainable choices) are limited by P’s power and therefore
unavailable to Q. The communicated threat by Pindicated that if
Qchooses to do A(deny involvement or go to trial) then Pwill
bring about some consequence that would make denying involve-
ment or going to trial less desirable to Qthan choosing B(confess-
ing or accepting the plea). Qmust perceive Pto have power,
specifically coercive power for the conditional threat and reward
power for the conditional offer. If Qchooses to do A(i.e., deny
involvement in the crime or go to trial) despite their situation, the
choice is not coerced. However, if Qchooses to do B(i.e., confess
or accept the plea) as a result of P’s constraint and conditional
threats/offers, the choice is coerced. A situation should still be
considered coercive, however, even if Qdoes not cede to the coer-
cion, when the necessary elements of coercion are met (i.e., power,
conditional threats, and/or constraints and conditional offers).
It is important to note that although conditional threats alone
can produce coercive situations according to this model (assuming
perceived power), conditional offers need to be combined with
constraints to be theoretically coercive. As noted above, whether
conditional offers are inherently coercive has been heavily
debated. Some argue that conditional offers cannot constitute coer-
cion because they do not worsen the situation an individual was in
prior to the proposal (Nozick, 1969). In contrast, others argue that
coercive inducement can occur via conditional offers when one
person leads another to carry out an action because of the con-
straints imposed by the other person (Anderson, 2017;Brunk,
Figure 1
Proposed Model of Coercion
Note. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
DEFINING COERCION 7
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1979;Zimmerman, 1981). This model follows the latter and con-
siders conditional offers theoretically coercive when combined
with constraints, given that the legal system has recognized the co-
ercive potential of promises (Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11 for Pleas (b)(2); Haynes v. Washington, 1963).
Applying the Proposed Definition of Coercion to
Methods to Obtain Criminal Admissions
Methods to obtain criminal admissions have received consider-
able empirical attention, and several tactics have been labeled as
coercive by social scientists and legal scholars. To my knowledge,
however, a theoretically defensible definition of coercion has not
been applied to the interrogation and plea negotiation methods
opined to be coercive in the academic literature. For interrogation
settings specifically, sociologist Albert Biderman (1957) devel-
oped a framework for understanding psychological coercion and
outlined eight coercive methods used to establish compliance.
Biderman’s framework is first reviewed and then compared with
modern accusatorial interrogation methods. The most widely used
accusatorial method of interrogation in the U.S., developed by
Inbau and Reid (1962), is a nine-step process generally referred to
as the “Reid Technique”of interrogation (see Kassin et al., 2010).
Interrogation Method
Biderman’s Interrogation Framework
The eight methods in Biderman’sBiderman (1957) framework
include isolation, monopolization of perception, induced debilita-
tion and exhaustion, threats, occasional indulgences, demonstrat-
ing “omnipotence”and “omniscience,”degradation, and enforcing
trivial demands. Isolation involves the deprivation of all social
support and makes a suspect dependent on an interrogator. Modern
interrogation methods (e.g., Reid Technique) are designed to make
suspects feel as though they have no control over their situations
and employ several techniques in the domain of context manipula-
tion (Kelly et al., 2013). For example, police training manuals
offer suggestions for how interrogation rooms should be set up to
maximize control while making suspects feel completely isolated
(Costanzo & Leo, 2007;Driver, 1968). Interrogators are advised
to maintain eye contact and invade a suspect’s personal space;
suggested control of interrogation rooms goes as far as removing
any familiar surrounding (e.g., the ability to look out of a window)
that could provide suspects with some form of psychological com-
fort or relief from tension (Inbau et al., 2013). A fundamental
human motive is a need for both belonging and affiliation, espe-
cially in times of stress (Baumeister & Leary, 1995;Driver, 1968;
Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). Therefore, prolonged isolation is a
form of deprivation for suspects (Kassin, 2014). Additionally,
because of the proximity of interrogators to suspects, obedience to
authority may be especially influential during interrogations (Mil-
gram, 1965). Irving and Hilgendorf (1980) identified that, in custo-
dial situations, the physical characteristics of the environment,
social isolation from peers, and submission to authority are three
stressors that can have an adverse effect on suspects’mental state
and decision-making capabilities.
Relatedly, the purpose of the second method identified by
Biderman (1957), monopolization of perception, is to fixa
suspect’s attention on his or her immediate predicament. Monopo-
lization of perception is also achieved by physical isolation and ec-
ological control (e.g., darkness or bright light). By fixing a
suspect’s perception on their current situation, interrogators can
further persuade suspects that it is most important to escape their
current situation by confessing, even though it may be at the
expense of maximizing their own long-term outcomes. The third
method identified by Biderman (1957), induced debilitation and
exhaustion, weakens a suspect’s mental and physical ability to
resist and can be achieved by prolonged interrogation and in
extreme cases sleep deprivation. Sleep deprivation strongly
impairs human functioning and can lower suspect’s complex deci-
sion making and ability to resist influence (Blagrove, 1996;Harri-
son & Horne, 2000). Although the Supreme Court has ruled a
confession obtained after 36 straight hours of interrogation coer-
cive and a violation of suspects’Fourteenth Amendment rights,
there are no clear laws limiting the length of interrogations (Ash-
craft v. Tennessee, 1944). Despite the lack of clear guidelines,
interrogations in excess of six hours have been described as coer-
cive by a former Reid investigator (see Kassin et al., 2010). The
typical interrogation in the United States is estimated to last
between 30 minutes to just over four hours (Feld, 2013;Kassin et
al., 2007;Leo, 1996). However, the average interrogation length
in proven false confession cases (when length was available) was
just over 16 hr (Drizin & Leo, 2004).
Biderman (1957) also lists threats and demonstrating “omnipo-
tence”and “omniscience”as coercive methods. Threats are meant
to cultivate anxiety and despair, whereas demonstrating “omnipo-
tence”and “omniscience”is meant to suggest futility of resistance.
Taken together these methods identified by Biderman (1957)
reflect current maximization techniques outlined in the Reid Tech-
nique. Maximization generally involves the use of techniques that
are designed to emphasize the seriousness of an offense via harsh
confrontational techniques (Horgan et al., 2012;Kassin & McNall,
1991). Although explicit threats are not supposed to be used in
interrogations, scare tactics and implied threats are allowed.
Expressing absolute certainty of a suspect’s guilt, handling all
denials by the suspect, exaggerating the seriousness of the offense,
and presenting false evidence are all forms of permissible maximi-
zation techniques. The Reid Technique trains interrogators to
begin interrogations with direct accusations of guilt (by citing real
or fabricated evidence) and to challenge, cut off, and dismiss all
denials made by the suspect. These components work together to
increase the suspect’s feelings of anxiety and hopelessness. Past
research also has demonstrated that while maximization techni-
ques may not involve direct threats (which are impermissible
under the law), these methods do communicate a threat of punish-
ment via pragmatic implications (Kassin & McNall, 1991;Rus-
sano et al., 2005). Kassin and McNall (1991) randomly assigned
participants to read interrogation transcripts in which one of five
methods was used to elicit a confession from suspects (a promise
of leniency, a threat of punishment, minimization, maximization,
or none of the above), and then asked them to report their impres-
sions of the suspect’s sentencing expectations. The authors found
that although participants did not view the evidence against the
suspect as any stronger in the maximization condition, sentencing
expectations were highest in the maximization condition (Kassin
& McNall, 1991; see also, Redlich et al., 2020).
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Biderman (1957) also includes occasional indulgences as a coer-
cive method in his framework. In contrast to the harsher techniques
included in his frame, occasional indulgences can include things
such as occasional favors, fluctuations of interrogators’attitudes,
and reward for partial compliance. According to Biderman (1957),
occasional indulgences are meant to provide those being interro-
gated with positive motivation for compliance and to hinder their
adjustment to deprivation. Whereas threats and demonstrating “om-
nipotence”and “omniscience”are reflective of current maximization
techniques, occasional indulgences are in line with minimization
techniques. Minimization involves a gentler and (feigned) friendlier
approach than maximization, during which an interrogator attempts
to gain a suspect’s trust and minimize the seriousness of the offense
(Horgan et al., 2012;Kassin & McNall, 1991). Stressing the impor-
tance of cooperation, blaming the victim, expressing sympathy, and
providing face-saving excuses of the crime are all examples of mini-
mization. For example, interrogators who question a suspected rapist
may offer excuses and victim blaming such as “she was asking for
it.”Additionally, interrogators may identify with the suspect and
indicate that they would have done similar things in the same situa-
tion. By attempting to minimize the suspect’s culpability and pro-
vide face-saving excuses for the crime, interrogators imply that
those making judgements about the crime (e.g., a judge or jury)
would be likely to recommend lenient treatment. Kassin and McNall
(1991) found that minimization was just as effective at communicat-
ing leniency as explicit promises. Additionally, by offering suspects
“morally justified”excuses for committing a crime, interrogators
can essentially offer suspects a limited choice: committing the crime
for a “good”reason or for a “bad”reason. For example, Reid and
Associates advises interrogators to ask alternative questions, such as
“Did you steal that money to buy drugs and booze, or was it used to
help out your family?”that offer suspects moral justifications while
also making it so that either choice results in an admission (Inbau et
al., 2013;Reid, 2004). However, it is important to note that not all
minimization techniques have the same effect on suspects’perceived
consequences (Kelly et al., 2019). Kassin and colleagues (2010)
identified three forms of minimization techniques: those that mini-
mize moral consequences, those that minimize psychological conse-
quences, and those that minimize legal consequences.
In addition, by offering suspects a face-saving excuse for the
crime, interrogators may also be using a type of foot-in-the-door
technique. The foot-in-the-door technique is a well-established social
influence strategy for eliciting compliance indicating that an individ-
ual will be more likely to comply with a large request once they have
already agreed to a smaller request (Burger, 1999;Dillard, 1991;
Freedman & Fraser, 1966). Interrogators can encourage suspects to
accept full responsibility for a crime (i.e., a large request) by first get-
ting them to accept a face-saving excuse for the crime (Hartwig et
al., 2005). When combined with the suspect’s physical isolation, the
interrogator’s ecological control over the interrogation, and the use of
maximization techniques, suspects may become persuaded that the
only way to escape their situation is to accept the face-saving excuse
for the crime provided by the interrogator. Because research suggests
that those who lack power are guided by situational constraints and
circumstances at the expense of their own goals and values, suspects’
decision-making capabilities can be considerably hindered by their
situations (Keltner et al., 2003;Smith et al., 2008). Further, lying
about evidence can contribute to suspects’hopelessness to escape an
interrogation situation and has been found to increase the risk that
innocent individuals will confess to crimes that they did not commit
(Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). Together these interrogation techniques
essentially back suspects into a hypothetical corner, in which confes-
sion is the only way out.
3
Applying the Proposed Definition
The definition of coercion proposed here and illustrated in Fig-
ure 1 can be applied to interrogations involving the techniques
described above to provide a structure for how coercion theoreti-
cally occurs in these settings (see Table 2). Interrogators (P) hold
power over suspects (Q) and in certain situations may hold all six
base types of power reviewed above (French & Raven, 1959;
Raven, 1965). Interrogators, by the nature of their positions, have
the potential to hold both legitimate and expert power over sus-
pects, the caveat of course is that power works via perceptions and
suspects must perceive interrogators to have this power (French &
Raven, 1959). Additionally, interrogators have the potential to
hold both reward and coercive power over suspects. As previously
discussed, maximization techniques can communicate a threat of
punishment to suspects via pragmatic implication and can there-
fore give suspects the perception that interrogators hold coercive
power. Conversely, minimization techniques can communicate
implied promises of leniency and can therefore give suspects the
perception that interrogators hold reward power. In addition, mini-
mization techniques have the potential to lead to perceptions of
interrogators holding referent power. Referent power comes from
the target identifying with the other, and minimization techniques
are designed to gain a suspect’s trust, express sympathy, and pro-
vide face-saving excuses for the crime (e.g., an interrogator sug-
gesting he might have done the same thing). Finally, interrogators
have the potential to hold informational power over defendants.
For example, interrogators are legally allowed to bluff and tell sus-
pects that they have evidence against them, even if untrue (Frazier
v. Cupp, 1969;Oregon v. Mathiason, 1977).
Additionally, interrogators (P) attempt to keep suspects (Q)
from denying involvement in a crime (A). Through the use of max-
imization and minimization techniques, interrogators (P) commu-
nicate to suspects (Q) via pragmatic implications that (a) if they
continue to deny involvement (A) the suspect will face harsh pun-
ishments for the crime and (b) if the suspect confesses (B) those
making judgements about the crime (e.g., a judge or jury) are
likely to recommend lenient treatment. Throughout the interroga-
tion process suspects’(Q’s) situations are constrained by interrog-
ators (P) in the form of physical isolation and ecological control.
Biderman’s (1957) framework of coercive methods and modern
interrogation techniques, such as the Reid Technique, are built
upon the isolation of suspects and interrogators’ecological control
over the situation. By isolating suspects and exercising this eco-
logical control, interrogators keep suspects from obtaining critical
consequences (e.g., social support for the isolated) and can lead
suspects to believe confession is their only means of escape. Coer-
cion, according to Goldiamond (1976), is greatest when there is
only one option available for an individual to obtain critical
3
Biderman (1957) also included degradation via the use of demeaning
punishments and the prevention of personal hygiene, as well as the
enforcement of trivial demands via the enforcement of minute rules as
coercive interrogation methods. However, these methods arguably do not
reflect modern interrogation tactics.
DEFINING COERCION 9
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consequences. Interrogators are trained to lead suspects to believe
that their best option is confession (Inbau et al., 2013).
Additionally, similar to the constraint in response choices approach,
Ofshe and Leo (1997) decision-making perspective on police interrog-
ations suggests that certain tactics used by interrogators are designed
to manipulate suspects’perceptions of their available choices. Accord-
ing to Ofshe and Leo (1997), interrogators use a two-step process to
influence suspects to confess. During the first step (maximization),
interrogators make suspects feel that their situation is hopeless and
lead them to believe that denying the crime is not a means of escape.
Then, in the second step interrogators motivate suspects to reevaluate
their decision to deny responsibility by offering incentives for con-
fessing (e.g., implied promises of leniency, improved self-image, the
interrogator’srespect).Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1996) found that
escape from police pressure was the most frequently cited reason for
making false confessions in a self-report study with prison inmates.
Additionally, Pearse and Gudjonsson (1999) observed real-life inter-
rogations and found that the three most prominent techniques associ-
ated with breaking down suspects’resistance were Intimidation (e.g.,
emphasizing the seriousness of the offense), Robust Challenge (e.g.,
challenging that the suspect is lying), and Manipulation (e.g., mini-
mizing the seriousness of the offense). The decision to confess is
determined by subjective assessments by the suspect (e.g., probabil-
ities of relative short-term and long-term consequences) and by maxi-
mizing the cost of denial and/or minimizing the costs associated with
confessing, interrogators manipulate suspects’subjective assessments
(Hilgendorf & Irving, 1981).
To summarize, according to the proposed definition (see Figure
1), coercion in the interrogation setting would then occur if an
interrogator’s(P’s) claim is credible to the suspect (Q), the suspect
confesses (B), the suspect would not have confessed if not for
police intervention, and part of the suspect’s reason for confessing
(B) is to lessen the likelihood of harsh punishments and/or the sus-
pect (Q) confessed because the interrogator (P) actively con-
strained the suspect’s situation and hindered the suspect from
obtaining a situation more desirable than the implied promise of
leniency attached to the confession.
Plea Negotiation Method
Applying the Proposed Definition
The plea-bargaining process itself has been described by many
as inherently coercive because it offers defendants a forced choice
(Kipnis, 1976). When the proposed definition of coercion is
applied to plea bargaining it is easy to see why the process in and
of itself is considered coercive (see Table 2). During plea negotia-
tions prosecutors (P) hold considerable power over defendants
(Q). Arguably prosecutors, like interrogators, have the potential to
hold most, if not all, bases of power identified by French and
Raven (1959) and Raven (1965). By the very nature of their posi-
tions, prosecutors can hold both legitimate and expert power. Pros-
ecutors are in a unique position to hold expert power over
defendants because they are both more familiar and knowledgea-
ble about the criminal justice system than defendants (Caldwell,
2011). Importantly, when thinking about power during plea nego-
tiations it is necessary to consider that plea negotiations are some-
times conducted between prosecutors and defense attorneys
without the defendant present. A defense attorney negotiating on a
defendant’s behalf will likely impact the power differential
between defendants and prosecutors. However, defendants still
make the final decision, and prosecutors hold reward and coercive
power over both defense attorneys and defendants. Prosecutors
have incredible discretion when making charging decisions and
have the ability to offer defendants plea deals with considerable
discounts (reward power), while also having the ability to over-
charge and recommend maximum sentences (coercive power; Gif-
ford, 1983;Pfaff, 2017). Further, in certain jurisdictions,
prosecutors have the potential to hold informational power over
defendants and defense attorneys by deciding which discovery
materials (if any) to turn over to the defense. Per the Supreme
Table 2
Coercive Elements Present in Interrogation and Plea-Negotiation Contexts
Element Interrogation Plea negotiation
Power Authority
Legitimate
Expert
Coercive
Reward
Referent
Informational
Authority
Legitimate
Expert
Coercive
Reward
Informational
Constraints Ecological control
Restricted access to critical consequences
Removal of psychological comfort
Isolation
Monopolization of perception
Overcharging
Pretrial detention
Restricted access to critical consequences
Costs associated with trial
Conditional threats Maximization
Implied threats via pragmatic
implications
Lying to suspects about incriminating
ievidence
Over recommending
Additional charges
Additional enhancements
Seeking more time
Conditional offers Minimization
Implied leniency via pragmatic
implications
Exceedingly large “trial penalties”or “plea
discounts”
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Court’s ruling in Brady v. Maryland (1963), prosecutors are
required to turn over material evidence pointing to a defendant’s
innocence (i.e., exculpatory evidence) in the context of trials.
However, the Supreme Court has not made clear whether prosecu-
tors are required to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense
before a plea is entered, meaning that defendants in most states
can enter legally valid pleas without access to the state’s inculpa-
tory or potentially exculpatory evidence against them (Luna &
Redlich, 2020;Zottoli et al., 2019).
In addition, during plea negotiations prosecutors (P) generally
desire to keep defendants (Q) from going to trial (A) and instead
accept a plea deal (B). The criminal justice system is overbur-
dened, and prosecutors simply cannot try every criminal case,
resulting in an extremely high percentage of cases resolved
through plea bargaining (Alschuler, 1968;Bibas, 2004;Burke,
2007). In plea negotiations this preference can be communicated
to defendants in a number of different ways. For example, prose-
cutors (P) have the discretion to overcharge and communicate to
defendants (Q) that if they choose to go to trial (A) they will add
additional charges, enhancements, or seek more time (Alkon,
2017). Overcharging gives prosecutors leverage, control, and bar-
gaining strength during plea negotiations. Caldwell (2011) argues
that overcharging alone “sets the stage for coercive pleas by virtue
of the very leverage unduly obtained”(p. 84). By overcharging,
prosecutors also constrain defendants’situations in ways that
make it difficult to obtain outcomes more desirable than the plea
deal offered. This constrained situation can be especially problem-
atic for innocent defendants who fear losing at trial and risking
harsh sentences (Bibas, 2004), and can also lead to guilty defend-
ants accepting deals with sentences that are disproportionate to
their actual criminal conduct (Caldwell, 2011). Research on de-
fendant decision-making has demonstrated that the possibility of
harsh punishment increases defendants’decisions to plead guilty
(Bordens, 1984;Gregory et al., 1978).
Additionally, prosecutors (P) can communicate this claim by
telling defendants (Q) that if they accept a plea deal (B) they will
drop charges and/or recommend a reduced sentence, while con-
straining the defendant’s situation (Caldwell, 2011). A prominent
critique of plea bargaining is that this “trial penalty”or “plea dis-
count”can be so large that it can compel defendants to waive their
right to trial (Dervan, 2012;Redlich et al., 2017;Zottoli et al.,
2016). Significant plea discounts may make it so that a defendant
cannot psychologically refuse to accept a plea deal. Additionally,
the main theory of plea decision-making, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Trial, predicts that prosecutors offer larger discounts
when successful conviction at trial is uncertain and smaller dis-
counts when substantial evidence of guilt exists (Bibas, 2004).
Zottoli and colleagues (2016) interviewed youth and adults who
pleaded guilty to felonies in New York City and found that most
defendants in their sample received substantial plea discounts,
with discounts reaching above 80% for adults and 95% for youth.
Defendants’situations can also be constrained by pretrial deten-
tion and the costs associated with going to trial. Pretrial detention
weakens defendants’bargaining position during plea negotiations
and can lead to defendants pleading guilty as a way to avoid time
in custody (Dobbie et al., 2018;Fellner, 2010). Kellough and
Wortley (2002) examined prosecutorial decisions, finding that pre-
trial detention “appears to be a rather important resource that the
prosecution uses to encourage (or coerce) guilty pleas”(p. 187).
Additionally, Dobbie et al. (2018) found that being detained prior
to trial increased defendants’likelihood of conviction, primarily
via increased guilty pleas. The majority of those in custody cannot
afford to post bail, and while in custody defendants face the poten-
tial of lost wages, employment, and social support (Leslie & Pope,
2017). As noted, Goldiamond (1976) argued that coercion is high-
est when only one option is available to obtain critical consequen-
ces; for defendants detained prior to trial the only option available
may be the acceptance of a guilty plea. Many scholars agree with
the assertion that the choice between remaining in jail while await-
ing trial or receiving a reduced sentence (or probation) by accept-
ing a guilty plea is a coerced choice (Langbein, 1992).
Social Influence
There are also a number of social influence concepts that can be
applied to better understand how defendants’behaviors may be
influenced during plea negotiations. As previously mentioned,
prosecutors by the very nature of their professional positions hold
authority over defendants during plea negotiations. Pressure from
prosecutors is a prominent factor in defendant’s decisions to plead
guilty (Bordens & Bassett, 1985). Additionally, the principle of
reciprocity aligns well with the quid pro quo nature of the plea-
bargaining process (Redlich et al., 2017). Reciprocity is a social
norm that involves the exchange of benefits for like benefits and
may influence defendants’willingness to accept plea deals in
response to prosecutorial offers of concessions (e.g., reduced sen-
tence lengths; Cialdini & Trost, 1998).
Relatedly, if prosecutors initially overcharge defendants and
then appear to make concessions by reducing plea deals to more
reasonable offers (i.e., the door-in-the-face technique), defendants
may be similarly influenced by reciprocity. In contrast to the foot-
in-the-door technique, the door-in-the-face technique begins with
a requester making a large request and then moderating it down to
one that is more reasonable (O’Keefe & Hale, 2001). Finally,
time-limited plea deals can increase the perceived scarcity of a
particular deal and influence defendants’willingness to accept
guilty pleas. According to the principle of scarcity, we tend to
value commodities that are rare and will try harder to obtain items
we think may become unavailable (Cialdini, 1993). There is a
dearth of research on the actual amount of time that defendants
have to make plea decisions; however, legal scholars commonly
suggest that time pressures can be a potentially coercive factor
during plea negotiations (Caldwell, 2011;Dervan, 2012). Zottoli
et al. (2016) found that nearly a third of the adults in their sample
of defendants who pleaded guilty to felonies in New York made
their plea decisions in less than an hour. To some, having to make
what is often a life-altering decision in such as brief amount of
time is unduly coercive (Rapping, 2012).
Overall, coercion, according to the proposed definition built
from the philosophical and psychological frameworks reviewed
above and illustrated in Figure 1, will occur if a prosecutor’s(P’s)
claim is credible to a defendant (Q), the defendant (Q) chooses not
to go to trial (A), and part of the defendant’s(Q’s) reason for not
going to trial is to lessen the likelihood of receiving additional
charges, enhancements, or additional time and/or part of the
defendant’s(Q’s) reason for accepting the plea deal was that the
prosecutor (P) constrained his or her situation and hindered the de-
fendant (Q) from receiving a situation that was more desirable
DEFINING COERCION 11
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than the plea deal (B) made by the prosecutor. This theoretical
model of coercion, which can be applied regardless of context,
increases our understanding of coercion by identifying the theoret-
ically fundamental elements of coercion and incorporating how
individual tactics fit within those elements.
Research and Policy Implications
The theoretical definition of coercion proposed here indicates that
modern interrogation and plea negotiation practices have high poten-
tial to place suspects and defendants in coercive situations. Although
the Supreme Court has recognized the “inherently coercive”nature
of interrogations specifically (Miranda v. Arizona,1966, p. 533), it
has also upheld the basic practice of both interrogations and plea bar-
gaining, indicating that these practices will not soon disappear. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has placed restrictions on and required
safeguards for interrogation and plea negotiation practices, indicating
that guidelines and limitations informed by research may be the best
avenue to reduce the coercion present in these situations. An impor-
tant question for future research is when does the coercion present in
interrogation and plea negotiation settings become unduly coercive?
In other words, when should coercion reach the level of legal imper-
missibility and lead to suppressed admission statements or overturned
convictions? Because interrogations and plea negotiations currently
practiced in the United Stated can be coercive in and of themselves,
determining the threshold for unduly coercive or legally impermissi-
ble practices is a largely subjective undertaking.
To a certain degree, evaluations of coercion will always be subjec-
tive and individual discretion will be used. However, empirically sup-
ported measures for evaluating coercion have the potential to make
voluntariness determinations more equitable. Currently, evaluations
of voluntariness rely on precedent and on evaluators’own interpreta-
tion of what constitutes coercion in interrogation and plea negotiation
contexts; as discussed, legal definitions offer little clarity as to what
constitutes coercion, beyond the presence of force, threats, or prom-
ises in these situations. For interrogations specifically, Kaplan and
colleagues (2019) recently developed the Coercion Assessment
Instrument (CAI), which uses software to code for specificitems
associated with coercive pressure in videotaped interrogations and
tallies the items to produce a coercion score. The items in the CAI
were included and weighted based on ratings of coercive potential
given to interrogation techniques and environmental factors by social
scientists and criminal justice officials (Kaplan et al., 2019).
Although the validity of the CAI has yet to be fully evaluated, it
could prove to be a promising tool for evaluating interrogation coer-
cion in a more objective way.
The theoretical definition of coercion proposed in this review also
has the potential to provide the foundation for an empirically testable
coercion framework that could be applied in interrogation and plea
negotiation contexts, as well as other criminal justice settings.
Although interrogations and plea negotiations involve distinct tactics
and occur under varying levels of social contact/isolation, the theoret-
ically fundamental elements of coercion do not change in these two
contexts. The model of coercion offered in this review advances our
current understanding of coercion by proposing four theoretically
fundamental elements of coercion that can be empirically tested in
multiple contexts, such as interrogations, plea negotiations, and other
potentially coercive criminal justice settings (e.g., mandated treat-
ment). The four fundamental elements of coercion according to the
proposed definition are: (a) power, (b) constraints, (c) conditional
offers, and (d) conditional threats. These elements may appear in the
form of different tactics in the interrogation versus plea negotiation
contexts, but the underlying elements of the definition are the same.
The individual tactics that fit within these elements should be empiri-
cally tested to better understand how they interact to impact the deci-
sion-making of suspects and defendants. Defining what the necessary
elements of coercion are and how they impact decision-making is a
necessary first step for decreasing the subjectivity and vagueness sur-
rounding voluntariness determinations, which will remain in the dis-
cretion of judges and other decision-makers. Additionally, using the
model of coercion proposed here, future researchers could explore
how these fundamental elements apply to other potentially coercive
criminal justice settings (e.g., mandated treatment).
The use of an empirically tested framework for evaluating coer-
cion would, at the very least, ensure that theoretically and empirically
fundamental elements of coercion are considered during evaluations
made by judges, prosecutors, expert witnesses, and so forth. Cur-
rently, no clear understanding of what constitutes coercion in inter-
rogation and plea negotiations exists, and the definition proposed
here offers a theoretical, to-be tested model for understanding the
necessary elements of coercion in these contexts. Future research
could also examine whether the use of the proposed definition of
coercion leads to more agreement among social scientists, criminal
justice personnel, and jury-eligible individuals when assessing coer-
cion in interrogation and plea negotiation settings.
Additionally, a coercion framework could be applied to the rea-
sonable person standard when making voluntariness determina-
tions. The reasonable person standard, for example, is currently
used when making custody determinations related to Miranda and
is meant to objectively assess whether a “reasonable person”
would have considered themselves confined under similar circum-
stances to those in question (see Thompson v. Keohane, 1995). In
practice, however, the reasonable person standard assumes that
most individuals process situations in the same way and does not
take, for example, diminished capacity and culture into account.
The proposed definition of coercion could be used to create theo-
retically coercive situations that could be empirically tested on
multiple subpopulations. Cultural and individual susceptibilities to
coercion (e.g., a person’s age) could then be explored using these
theoretically coercive situations and the findings could be built
into an empirically valid reasonable person standard for coercion.
Conclusion
Legal standards for voluntariness and its antithesis, coercion,
have been criticized for being unclear in interrogation and plea
negotiation settings (Becker, 1987;Davis, 1972;Enker, 1967;Kas-
sin & Wrightsman, 1985;Wakefield & Underwager, 1998). Addi-
tionally, both interrogation and plea negotiation methods have been
criticized for limiting voluntariness and contributing to false admis-
sions of guilt (Dervan, 2012;Kassin et al., 2010). This review has
proposed a defensible definition of coercion based on multidiscipli-
nary theories and applications of coercion. It is not intended to offer
a bright line rule for when the coercion present in interrogation and
plea negotiation contexts reaches the point of being legally imper-
missible. Rather, the proposed model of coercion identifies ele-
ments of coercion (i.e., power, constraints, conditional threats/
proposal). How, under what circumstances, and for whom these
12 LUNA
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elements impact the decision-making of suspects and defendants,
however, needs to be empirically tested. Such undertakings will
help to better understand how specific tactics that fall within the
theoretically fundamental elements of coercion impact the decision-
making of individuals from varying subpopulations, and in turn,
better inform voluntariness and admissibility determinations.
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Received May 22, 2021
Revision received January 3, 2022
Accepted January 4, 2022 n
DEFINING COERCION 15
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