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China’s new security concept: India, terrorism, China’s geostrategic interests and domestic stability in Pakistan

September 2019
The Pacific Review 33(1):1-31

September 2019
33(1):1-31

DOI:10.1080/09512748.2019.1663902

Authors:

Shanghai International Studies University

The paper seeks to provide an answer to the question which has hitherto not been significantly explored in the relevant academic scholarship: Why did China block India’s (and other countries) attempts to designate Masood Azhar – head of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM/Jaish) as terrorist under UN Security Council 1267 committee rules? According to the extant literature, China's actions are explained broadly by India-China rivalry and India-Pakistan rivalry resulting in a strategic and ‘all weather partnership between China and Pakistan against their common enemy India. This study argues that China’s actions are also explained by its New (Asian) Security Concept and the ensuing China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), domestic (in)stability in Pakistan and China’s geo-strategic interests. China is deeply perturbed by the socio-economic-political instability in Pakistan. China was concerned that if Masood Azhar was designated as a terrorist under UNSC 1267 Committee rules, Jaish and other terrorist organizations would take up arms against the Pakistani state (as in the past) which will create further instability in Pakistan and undermine CPEC and China’s geo-strategic interests. Thus, the paper provides a more comprehensive and nuanced grasp of China’s reluctance to designate Masood Azhar as a terrorist.

Terrorist organizations and political parties in Pakistan and their religious orientation.

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China’s new security concept: India, terrorism,

China’s geostrategic interests and domestic

stability in Pakistan

Raj Verma

To cite this article: Raj Verma (2020) China’s new security concept: India, terrorism, China’s

geostrategic interests and domestic stability in Pakistan, The Pacific Review, 33:6, 991-1021, DOI:

10.1080/09512748.2019.1663902

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1663902

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China’s new security concept: India, terrorism,

China’s geostrategic interests and domestic

stability in Pakistan

Raj Verma

a,b

Associate Professor, School of International Relations, Huaqiao University, Xiamen,

China;

Head of Research and Senior Fellow, Asia Pacific, Intellisia Institute,

Guangzhou, China

ABSTRACT

The paper seeks to provide an answer to the question which has hitherto not

been significantly explored in the relevant academic scholarship: Why did

China block India’s (and other countries) attempts to designate Masood Azhar

–head of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM/Jaish) as terrorist under UN Security

Council 1267 committee rules? According to the extant literature, China’s

actions are explained broadly by India-China rivalry and India-Pakistan rivalry

resulting in a strategic and ‘all weather partnership between China and

Pakistan against their common enemy India. This study argues that China’s

actions are also explained by its New (Asian) Security Concept and the ensu-

ing China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), domestic (in)stability in Pakistan

and China’s geo-strategic interests. China is deeply perturbed by the socio-

economic-political instability in Pakistan. China was concerned that if Masood

Azhar was designated as a terrorist under UNSC 1267 Committee rules, Jaish

and other terrorist organizations would take up arms against the Pakistani

state (as in the past) which will create further instability in Pakistan and

undermine CPEC and China’s geo-strategic interests. Thus, the paper provides

a more comprehensive and nuanced grasp of China’s reluctance to designate

Masood Azhar as a terrorist.

KEYWORDS India; China; Pakistan; New (Asian) Security Concept; terrorism; CPEC; Gwadar; ISIS

Introduction

JeM/Jaish, the terrorist organization supported by Pakistan’s Army and

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), came into the limelight after the attack on

the Indian Parliament in December 2001 (with the help of Lashkar-e-Taiba

(LeT)) (Clark and Levy 2017). After Hafiz Saeed, head of LeT was listed as a

CONTACT Raj Verma rajneeshverma2000@gmail.com No.668 Jimei Avenue, Xiamen, Fujian

361021, China

ß2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

THE PACIFIC REVIEW

2020, VOL. 33, NO. 6, 991–1021

https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1663902

terrorist under the UN Security Council (SC) 1267 Committee rules in

December 2008 for LeTs role in the Mumbai terror attacks in November

2008 which killed more than 200 people (QDi.263, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed,

n.d.), in 2009, India approached the UNSC 1267 committee to ban Maulana

Masood Azhar, head of JeM as a terrorist (Jaish was banned under UNSC

1267 in 2001). However, China blocked India’s attempts to list Masood

Azhar as a terrorist under 1267 committee rules.

Jaish once again hit the headlines in India in 2014 when three terrorists

were killed in Baramulla district in northern Indian Kashmir (Verma, 2017).

Since January 2016, Jaish has been increasingly involved in terrorist strikes

on Indian security forces in Kashmir. In January 2016, Jaish attacked the

Pathankot Air base. According to the National Investigation Agency, India’s

foremost anti-terrorism agency, there is sufficient evidence against Masood

Azhar and his brother, Rauf Azhar for their involvement in the Pathankot

attack (Pathankot attack, 2016). In August 2017, Jaish attacked the district

police line in Pulwama district (Jammu and Kashmir, 2017). In January 2018,

five Jaish fedayeen attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp in

Awantipora in Indian Kashmir (Yasir, 2018). Reports stated that during this

period, Masood Azhar was openly addressing rallies and exhorting people

in Pakistan to join jihad in Kashmir. Masood Azhar confessed that Jaish was

behind numerous terrorist attacks in India including the attack on the CRPF

camp. Moreover, he has threatened to undertake more attacks in Kashmir

(JeM Chief, 2017).

In February 2016, India solicited the UNSC 1267 Committee to consider

banning Masood Azhar for his alleged involvement in the Pathankot attack.

All the members of the UNSC Committee were willing to designate Masood

Azhar as a terrorist except China. China used ‘technical hold’

twice—in

March 2016 and October 2016 to block the ruling and in December 2016,

used its veto to ensure Azhar is not designated as a terrorist. In February

2017 and in August 2017, China employed a ‘technical hold,’and in

November 2017, used its veto to block a proposal put forward by the US,

the UK and France. Jaish has also claimed responsibility for the Pulwama

attack in Indian Kashmir in February 2019 which led to death of more than

40 Indian security personnel. In wake of the Pulwama attack, in March

2019, France put forth a proposal backed by the US and the UK to list

Masood Azhar as a terrorist under UNSC 1267 rules. China once again

blocked the proposal to designate Azhar as a terrorist.

In May 2019, China agreed to list Masood Azhar under the UNSC 1267

committee rules only after the mention of Kashmir and Pulwama attack

was removed from the proposal. This was after the US threatened to table

the proposal in the UNSC where China would find it extremely difficult to

publicly defend Masood Azhar not being a terrorist. China was concerned

992 R. VERMA

that it would be diplomatically isolated. France took the issue to the

European Union and also levied national level sanctions against Azhar

(Bagchi, 2019; Zheng, 2019). According to Shashank, former Foreign

Secretary, Government of India (GoI), ‘Pakistan has come under

pressure …China was getting lonely protecting Masood Azhar and the

Pakistanis in the UNSC’(Masood Azhar’s blacklisting, 2019).

Analysts aver that India-China diplomacy and growing world consensus

on counter-terrorism may also have had an impact on China’s decision.

Foreign Secretary, GoI Vijay Gokhale’s visit to Beijing paid dividends

(Chinoy, 2019; Zheng, 2019). According to Zhang Jiadong, former Chinese

diplomat in India and now at Fudan University, ‘This is a diplomatic conces-

sion from China for India, a signal of diplomatic support …At the same

time, it was also driven by the global anti-terrorism trend. Without the

February terrorist attack in Kashmir, China may not have agreed to India’s

request’(Zheng, 2019). Some including Roderick Macfarquhar, Harvard

University aver that the Wuhan Summit in April 2018 fostered better rela-

tions between India and China and ‘helped Modi by ensuring Chinese

cooperation ahead of the 2019 general election’(Daniyal, 2019). According

to Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, Director, Society for Policy Studies and a

prominent Indian defense expert, the bomb attacks in Sri Lanka and India-

China diplomacy led China to review its decision. ‘My conjecture is that

China may have arrived at a quiet quid pro quo with both India and

Pakistan …My sense is that China has reviewed its position particularly after

the Sri Lanka terror attacks’(Masood Azhar’s blacklisting, 2019). Others

opine that Azhar is seriously ill and might no longer be useful to Pakistan’s

military-security establishment. Pakistan conveyed to China that it is not

opposed to his listing (Kugelman, 2019).

Despite the numerous terrorist attacks perpetrated by non-state actors

(NSAs) facilitated by the military-security establishment in Pakistan, China

continues to shield Pakistan from global reproach and diplomatic pressure.

Despite the fact that Masood Azhar’s links with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda

are well established (Hussain, 2014) and he has confessed to his links (The

1267 Committee, 2017), China was disinclined to designate Masood Azhar

as a terrorist. This leads to a question which has hitherto not been signifi-

cantly explored in the relevant academic scholarship: Why did China block

India’s (and others) attempts to designate Masood Azhar as an inter-

national terrorist?

According to the extant literature, China’s unwillingness to designate

Masood Azhar as a terrorist under the UNSC 1267 Committee rules is

explained by inter-state or great power rivalry. The narrative states that

India-China ‘protracted rivalry’and India-Pakistan ‘enduring’and ‘intractable

rivalry’has resulted in a strategic and “all weather partnership”between

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 993

Pakistan and China against their common enemy India. According to this

narrative, the fundamental rationale for India-China rivalry is the pursuit for

great power status by the two countries—based on the belief that their

countries are destined to play a major role in world affairs influenced by

their great civilizational and historical past. The two countries also fought a

border conflict in 1962 in which India was defeated. The border conflict

sowed the seeds for antagonistic relations between the two countries. The

‘perpetual rivalry’has exhibited itself in numerous spheres: the disputed

border, Tibet and Dalai Lama issue and search for strategic space and influ-

ence in East Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean (Fair, 2014; Garver, 2001;

Small, 2015).

Some scholars have described India-Pakistan rivalry as an ‘enduring

rivalry’(Paul, 2005) and ‘intractable rivalry’(Fair, 2014) because it has per-

sisted since independence. Various reasons have been postulated for the

rivalry. For instance, the idea of a separate Muslim state (Fair, 2014;

Ganguly, 2016), ‘mutually exclusive identities’(Basrur, 2016), Kashmir and

the rivalry will not end until the dispute is resolved (Rubin and Rashid,

2008), Pakistan is a revisionist state and a greedy state which is committed

to seizing the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir (Fair, 2014), and its

rivalry with India cannot be explained by security dilemma –both deter-

rence and spiral model (Ganguly, 2016) among others. The rivalry has led to

four wars between them –1947–48, 1965, 1971 and Kargil War in 1999—

and cross border firing and attacks on the border are perennial. Both India

and Pakistan have accused each other of supporting terrorism, subversion

and separatist activities in the other’s territory.

China-Pakistan strategic partnership is geared towards balancing and

containing India. India’s rise poses a challenge to China’s ambitions of

being the pre-dominant power in Asia. China needs Pakistan to balance

India in South Asia to ensure that the latter is distracted, kept off balance

and enmeshed in South Asian affairs. Pakistan needs China’s assistance to

resist India’s hegemony in the region and beyond, and prevent it from

achieving great power status. NSAs fostered by Pakistan provide China with

a low-cost option to ensure that India is wary of its western neighbor and

its political, military and diplomatic energies are fixed on Pakistan. This pre-

vents India from focusing its resources towards China, prevents India’s rise

and its ability to challenge China in Asia and beyond ( Small, 2015; Garver,

2001; Fair, 2014; Indian scholars, analysts, government officials, retired dip-

lomats and journalists, personnel communication, New Delhi, April–-May

2017 and Beijing, July 19, 2018 ).

However, the paper argues that China’s actions are also explained by its

NSC and the ensuing CPEC, domestic (in)stability in Pakistan and China’s

geo-strategic interests. This study—using primary data including interviews

994 R. VERMA

with Indian and Chinese scholars, government officials and former diplo-

mats—provides a more comprehensive and nuanced grasp of China

defending Pakistan on terrorism and its unwillingness to list Masood Azhar

as a terrorist under the UNSC 1267 Committee rules.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section one briefly discusses China’s NSC

and President Xi’s New Asian Security Concept (NASC). It discusses the evo-

lution of NASC by discussing various facets of China’s foreign policy from

1996-present. It highlights the key features of NSC and NASC and China’s

strategy to bring regional stability in the Asia-Pacific region especially

South and Central Asia with a focus on Pakistan (and Afghanistan) through

economic growth and development. Section two explicates the significance

of CPEC for the two countries. It highlights how CPEC might benefit

Pakistan and provide economic, political and social stability. It also illus-

trates how CPEC might help China in realizing its geo-strategic interests.

Section three discusses the reasons for hostility towards CPEC in

Balochistan and targeting of CPEC projects and Chinese citizens by Baloch

insurgents/separatists, killings of Chinese nationals by Islamic terrorist

organizations and China’s security concerns. The following section discusses

the links between the myriad terrorist organizations and the military-secur-

ity apparatus in Pakistan and explicates how designation of Masood Azhar

as a terrorist under the UNSC 1267 might exacerbate political instability in

Pakistan which is contrary to China’s NASC and geostrategic interests. The

conclusion summarizes the argument and discusses questions with signifi-

cance for policy.

Evolution of China’s NASC

First proposed in 1996 at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), China has

propagated and implemented NSC to enhance its security through increas-

ing economic and diplomatic interactions (Larus 2005). China argues that

the after the end of the Cold War, the focus should be on peace and devel-

opment. Based on this concept, China has to play an increasing role in East

Asia—its historical sphere of influence. It should act as the key player for

regional diplomatic and political activities, promote regional stability, drive

regional integration, serve as an engine of growth for the region, and

attract other states to its culture, political system and values by utilizing its

soft power. The NSC espouses ‘liberal security concepts of common com-

prehensive and cooperative security …Cooperative security emphasizes

dialogue among all members for mutual confidence and trust, and cooper-

ation on security issues, including social and economic problems as well as

military threats’(Larus 2005, p. 222).

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 995

NSC is deeply rooted in traditional Chinese culture (Larus 2005; Chinese

scholars, analysts and former diplomats, personnel communication, Beijing,

January–July 2018). The core of NSC includes equality, mutual benefit,

mutual trust and coordination. Mutual benefit implies ‘All countries should

meet the objective needs of social development in the era of globalization

…’ (Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Foreign Ministry (n.d.)). One of the

principles that NSC emphasizes to achieve is domestic and international

security that is ‘Non-traditional security areas such as combating terrorism

and transnational crimes, in addition to the traditional security areas

like preventing foreign invasion and safeguarding territorial integrity’

(PRC, Foreign Ministry (n.d.). Thus, NSC treats economic security on par

with traditional security and high politics. Moreover, it lays more emphasis

on the relationship between internal and external security challenges

(Thayer, 2003).

Under the aegis of NSC, China propagated multilateralism in East Asia

and Eurasia in the 1990s and 2000s (Takahara, 2012). The 2002 Defense

White Paper cited the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO) in 2001 as a success of NSC. It also declared support for

ARF and called for strengthening of ‘dialogue and cooperation in the polit-

ical and security fields with regional states’(Thayer, 2003, p. 92). China

espoused to develop ‘strategic partnerships’with ASEAN countries and pro-

vided economic assistance to ASEAN countries worst hit by the Asian finan-

cial crisis to bring stability (Thayer, 2003).

China merged the NSC with its notion of ‘China’s peaceful rise’around

2002 or 2003 (Larus 2005). In 2003, Zheng Bijian coined the term ‘peaceful

rise’(Zheng, 2005). ‘Peaceful rise’became the official policy during Hu

Jintao’s presidency. It was used to confute the ‘China threat theory’. The

main tenet is that China’s development will neither threaten nor seek to

overthrow the established world order. It sought to characterize China as a

responsible global player, emphasized China’s soft power and promulgated

that China was committed to economic growth and development and

improving the standard of living of its people before it would interfere in

global affairs (Zheng, 2005). However, the term ‘rise’led to assertions and

fears that ‘China’s rise’was a threat to the world. Since it sounded provoca-

tive, in 2004, peaceful rise was changed to ‘peaceful development’. Scholars

assert that ‘peaceful development’is deeply rooted in China’s reform and

opening up in the 1980’s and is a road map to China’s return to the inter-

national society as a great power (Buzan, 2014).

Additionally, China embarked on ‘good neighborhood policy’or

‘neighborhood diplomacy’. It emphasized friendship and partnership with

China’s neighboring countries with China’s huge market and economy pro-

viding opportunities for economic growth and development, mutual

996 R. VERMA

benefit and win-win cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. According to this

notion, China will develop peacefully and will help in maintaining peace

and security in the Asia-Pacific in line with Confucian tradition. This will

increase China’s soft power, moral authority and influence in global affairs

(Chung, 2009).

After the 2008 global financial crisis, China concluded that the West was

in decline and followed an assertive foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific espe-

cially with respect to territorial disputes with neighboring countries and

flexed its military muscle in the South China Sea. China’s leaders put forth a

new concept of ‘new type of great power relations.’In May 2010, during

the China–US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, State Councillor Dai

Bingguo proposed this concept marked by ‘mutual respect, harmonious

existence, and win–win by states of different social systems, cultural tradi-

tions, and levels of development’(Qi, 2015: p. 350). In February 2015, on his

visit to the US, Vice President Xi Jinping again proposed the concept to the

US. In May 2012, during the fourth China–US Strategic and Economic

Dialogue, President Hu Jintao put forth five recommendations for laying

the foundations for ‘new type of great power relations.’In June 2013,

President Xi summarized the new relations in three points: ‘“no conflicts or

confrontations, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation,”which later

became the official definition of the new type of great power relations’(Qi,

2015: p. 350). China believed that it had risen and had arrived at the world

stage. It wanted to be recognized as a major player and play an important

role in global affairs by being a norm and rules shaper rather than a taker

(Zeng and Breslin, 2016).

The term ‘new type of great power relations’is cloaked in ambiguity.

Scholars and analysts have come up with their own interpretations. China

and the US also differ on the meaning, acceptance and applicability of the

term. While China wants to achieve increased influence and status in the

Asia-Pacific and the world, the US interpretation is more akin to cooper-

ation to solve global problems (Qi, 2015). The proposal was neither fully

embraced not totally rejected by the Obama administration. The phrase

was in vogue in China till 2015 but has not been raised since then in

US–China dialogue.

In September and October 2013, during his visits to Kazakhstan and

Indonesia respectively, President Xi Jinping announced China’s strategic

framework to revive the ancient ‘Silk Road’trade route by building an over-

land ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road,’ini-

tially called as ‘One Belt One Road’but later renamed as BRI. Being

trumpeted as the ‘project of the century’by President Xi, BRI presents a

development framework that emphasizes equality and mutual benefit,

inclusiveness and mutual coordination, and ‘win-win cooperation’to

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 997

promote the common development of all countries including China.

Through BRI, China aims to promote economic development, trade and

regional connectivity in Asia, Africa and Europe and their adjacent seas

through investment in infrastructure development. With more than US$1

trillion proposed investment in infrastructure development, BRI aims to pro-

mote the globalization of Chinese economy by ‘connecting 65 countries, 62

per cent of world’s total population and 40 per cent of global gross domes-

tic product’(Mendi and Wang, 2018).

BRI consists of six main corridors including the China-Pakistan Economic

Corridor (CPEC) –discussed in more detail below. Since its announcement,

BRI has transformed into the centerpiece of China’s foreign policy. It con-

sists of five key components: infrastructure development, strengthening of

political cooperation, uninterrupted trade ties, financial integration, and

people-to-people exchanges. The significance of BRI needs to be under-

stood in the context of President Xi’s‘China Dream’that is rejuvenation of

Chinese nation that is prosperous and engaged internationally. If China

Dream is the vision or goal, then BRI is instrument or means to achieve it

(Mendi and Wang, 2018; Callahan, 2016). Asian Infrastructure Investment

Bank and Silk Road Fund among others were launched by China to achieve

the goal (Cai, 2019).

In April 2014, at the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and

Confidence Building Measures in Asia held in Shanghai, President Xi propa-

gated the NASC. Xi’s NASC calls ‘for a concept of common, comprehensive,

cooperative and sustainable security, and a path of security featuring wide

consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits in the Asia-Pacific

region …Comprehensive security means upholding security in both trad-

itional and non-traditional fields …Cooperative security means promoting

the security of both individual countries and the region as a

whole …Sustainable security means that we need to focus on both devel-

opment and security so that security would be durable …Development is

the foundation of security, and security the precondition for development.

For most Asian countries, development means the greatest security and the

master key to regional security issues’(What is Asian, n.d.). NASC is also dis-

cussed in China’s 2015 Defense White Paper (PRC, Ministry of National

Defense, 2015) and the white paper on China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific

Security Cooperation published in January 2017 (PRC, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, 2017).

Scholars assert that NASC is an updated version of NSC (Dittmer, 2015)

with China being the preeminent power in Asia. Moreover, President Xi’s

‘China Dream’and ‘Asia-Pacific Dream’have been merged with NASC.

There is consensus among scholars that China believes that ‘development

is the greatest form of security’(Cohen, 2014) based on its own

998 R. VERMA

development experience. In an interview with the Financial Times, Jin

Liqun, President of China’s newly established Asia Infrastructure Investment

Bank stated, ‘The Chinese experience illustrates that infrastructure invest-

ment paves the way for broad-based economic social development, and

poverty alleviation comes as a natural consequence of that’(Kynge, 2016).

All the Chinese scholars, analysts and former diplomats interviewed by the

author agree that China’s own stability and security will be enhanced if

Asia-Pacific especially Central Asia and South Asia are politically, economic-

ally and socially stable. China believes that through NSC, NASC and BRI,

economic growth and development will reduce radicalization, fundamental-

ism and extremism because poverty is the root cause for the youth to join

fundamentalist organizations and adopt terrorism and violence (Markey

and West, 2016; Chinese scholars, analysts and former diplomats, personnel

communication, Beijing, January–July 2018).

CPEC, domestic stability in Pakistan and China’s

geo-strategic interests

In the 21st century, China–Pakistan relationship has transformed into an

economic centric relationship although military and technological deals still

exceed economic relations. Trade between the two countries has not flour-

ished despite the political, diplomatic and military cooperation and collab-

oration (Ali, 2017; Small, 2015). Since 2012, China has emerged as the

largest trading partner but bilateral trade has been more beneficial to

China. In 2018, China’s exports to Pakistan increased to US$15.7 billion. In

2018, Pakistan’s exports to China increased from US$1.7 billion to US$1.9

billion. Consequently, the trade deficit crossed US$14 billion (State Bank of

Pakistan (SBP) 2018). Although China wanted to increase investment in

Pakistan from 2001-2013, it did not materialize due to lack of infrastructure

and electricity, corruption and lack of accountability and inadequate secur-

ity among others in Pakistan (Garlick, 2018; Small, 2015).

Significance of CPEC for Pakistan

In May 2013, China proposed CPEC to strengthen the economic relation-

ship. It connects Xinjiang in China with Balochistan province in Pakistan.

CPEC is the flagship project of China’s BRI. In 2017, approved investments

under CPEC increased from the initial US$46 billion to US$62 billion (Lim,

2017). By 2017, Chinese investment in Pakistan exceeded US$25 billion

(Chung, 2018). According to officials from Pakistan and China, the primary

objective of CPEC is to increase economic growth in Pakistan and Xinjiang

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 999

in China, and to enhance trade between Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea

and Kashgar in Xinjiang (Rafiq, 2017).

Economic growth is extremely pertinent for Pakistan which is split by

political, ethnic and sectarian cleavages with rampant networks of militants

and extremists. CPEC aims to create jobs for the youth—64 per cent of the

population in Pakistan is below 30 years (Kundi, 2018)—and reduce anti-

state sentiment, thus providing political and social stability, which will fur-

ther enhance growth. Ceteris paribus, economic growth will enhance the

resources available to the Pakistani state and strengthen it against anti-

state elements and improve the law and order situation (Markey and West,

2016). Analysts hope that CPEC will help in easing the internal conflicts and

social, religious and ethnic divisions in Pakistan. They hope CPEC will act as

a demonstration effect. It will indicate to investors that Pakistan is stable,

safe and appealing destination for investment thus protecting Pakistan

from international isolation which will further enhance political, economic

and social stability (Strasser, 2016).

China seeks to provide security and stability in Pakistan (and

Afghanistan) through economic growth and development. According to a

leading Chinese scholar, ‘CPEC is China’s attempt to provide security

through development to Pakistan. We hope that infrastructure develop-

ment will open Pakistan to the outside world. We hope its remote areas will

become more accessible and hopefully it will become a moderate state’

(personnel communication, Beijing, January 29, 2018). According to a lead-

ing Chinese scholar specializing on Pakistan and terrorism, ‘There are differ-

ent kinds of development. China is investing in Pakistan (and Afghanistan)

to make the countries stable. Economic growth will provide resources and

strengthen the state to tackle terrorism and fundamentalism and increase

China’s security’(personnel communication, Beijing, July 16, 2018).

China’s interests and CPEC

A better comprehension of CPEC is provided by first and most pressing, the

slowdown in China’s economy necessitating China to support its state-

owned enterprises (SOEs) due to overcapacity (excess of supply over

demand). Laying of millions of workers in SOEs when economic growth is

slow will create social and political stability and undermine CCP’s regime

legitimacy. This necessitates revival of economic growth, to sustain and

generate employment leading to prosperity of its citizens. BRI and CPEC

provide an excellent opportunity for China to find new markets for goods

and services and an outlet for SOEs suffering from excess capacity to find

new markets especially in the heavy industries such as iron and steel con-

struction of dams, power grids, roads, railways, ports and shipbuilding

1000 R. VERMA

among others. Most of the construction projects in CPEC (and BRI) are to

be undertaken by Chinese companies, financed by Chinese state banks and

employing predominantly Chinese workers.

CPEC also has geostrategic significance for China. In light of China’s stra-

tegic interests and how these have been challenged by the US (along with

its allies), China hopes to head west to expand its strategic space (Shi and

Lu, 2016; Chinese scholars, analysts and former diplomats, personnel com-

munication, Beijing, January–July 2018). CPEC allows China to expand its

influence in South Asia (especially Pakistan and Afghanistan), West Asia and

Eurasia. China has stepped in to fill the vacuum after the drawdown of

forces from Afghanistan by Western countries, especially the US, from 2015,

and diminished interest of the US in its relationship with Pakistan. CPEC is

an international expansion of China’s endeavor to promote economic

development through win-win cooperation. It seeks to not only promote

and expand China’s trade with Pakistan, Middle East and Africa, but also to

serve as the regional geographical node of the BRI. By linking the Chinese

city of Kashgar to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan’s Gwadar port, CPEC

might help China to enhance its energy security by escaping the Malacca

Dilemma (Ali, 2017).

CPEC might also help China to advance its geostra-

tegic plans of containing India’s rise and US influence in the Indian Ocean

region (Brewster, 2017).

CPEC is the most advanced part of BRI in South Asia (if not Asia). In

Pakistan, China has approved massive investments and accrued out projects

on its own terms making CPEC the show case for the BRI. The success of

CPEC will exhibit China’s success in Pakistan where decades of aid from the

US has failed in enhancing its economic growth and uplifting its potential,

and act as an illustration which can be replicated in other countries. It will

also bring further credence to China’s capabilities and capacities in general

and BRI in particular, further enhancing China’s profile as a promoter of

win-win cooperation and as a global power. On the other hand, the failure

of CPEC will undermine the credibility of BRI and cast China in a bad light.

Attacks on Chinese citizens and interests in Pakistan

and China’s security concerns

Chinese citizens have been frequently kidnapped and killed in Pakistan and

it has developed a reputation for being one of the most dangerous coun-

tries for overseas Chinese. Insecurity has delayed various Chinese projects

(even those with huge investments), and in some instances China has also

threatened to pull each and every worker out of Pakistan if the security for

Chinese citizens is not improved. This has posed a serious risk to the whole

economic relationship (Small, 2015). The targeting and killing of Chinese

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 1001

nationals in Pakistan have increased significantly since 2003. There are con-

cerns that more Chinese citizens will be targeted by different groups which

poses a serious risk to CPEC, BRI, NASC and China Dream .

Balochistan and attacks against CPEC projects and Chinese citizens

Although there is a consensus amongst all the major political parties in

Pakistan regarding the development of CPEC, it has generated controversies

in federal-province and inter-province relations with the provincial govern-

ments objecting against the implementation of the CPEC route and distri-

bution of economic benefits from the project. The greatest resentment

against Islamabad, Beijing and CPEC is in Balochistan province, the largest

and the most underdeveloped province in Pakistan. The ethno-nationalist

insurgency in Balochistan is a longstanding problem since Balochistan was

incorporated into the Pakistani federation in 1948. There have been numer-

ous insurgencies in Balochistan, the most recent starting in 2005. However,

the advent of CPEC has led to fresh demands from Baloch nationalists for

greater autonomy or complete independence from Pakistan. Baloch nation-

alists have historically opposed steps by Islamabad especially the mega

development projects in the province, and viewed them as efforts by

Islamabad to colonize the province.

Baloch nationalists have termed CPEC as Islamabad’s design to further

exploit Balochistan’s natural resources and extend the political and eco-

nomic marginalization of Balochistan (CPEC and Balochistan, 2018; Notezai,

2018). Baloch separatist groups have threatened to attack ‘anyone and

everyone who is somehow linked to the development of the corridor’

(Jamal, 2016). Chinese workers have been regularly targeted by Baloch

insurgents in Balochistan province as early as May 2004 when three

Chinese workers were killed and nine injured in a remote-controlled bomb

explosion (3 engineers killed, 2004). However, in the last couple of years,

Baloch insurgent groups have repeatedly targeted a number of develop-

ment projects, blown up government installations including gas pipelines,

targeted local labourers and civilians, and more importantly in the context

of CPEC, attacked Chinese engineers working on the Gwadar project

(Ramachandran, 2018).

More recently, in May 2017, Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), an insurgent

group killed at least ten labourers working on a CPEC project (Shah, 2017).

In October 2017, 26 Chinese workers were wounded in an attack in Gwadar

(Chen, 2018). In August 2018, three Chinese engineers and three security

personnel were injured in a suicide bomb attack claimed by the Baloch

Liberation Army (BLA) on a bus carrying the Chinese engineers in Chagi dis-

trict in Balochistan. In November 2018, three heavily armed BLA militants

1002 R. VERMA

attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi resulting in the death of two

police officers and two visa applicants. Many analysts have argued that the

attack on the consulate was to spread panic among the Chinese officials

and BLA was successful in achieving its goal to some extent (Notezai, 2018).

In light of the attacks by Baloch separatist organizations, Shi and Lu (2016)

stated, ‘China should abandon its traditional way of dealing only with the

Pakistani government and instead get in contact with local communities to

better accommodate local interests so that more Pakistani people can

benefit from the CPEC.’Reports suggest that China has been holding talks

with Baloch separatist leaders for the last five years to ensure security for

CPEC. However, China, Pakistan and the Baloch’s have denied these reports

(Notezai, 2018).

Killing of Chinese nationals by Islamic terrorist organizations

In June 2007, seven Chinese nationals were beaten and kidnapped by a

vigilante group based in ‘Lal Masjid’(Red Mosque)

in Islamabad. Although

the Chinese nationals were released, Chinese government demanded action

against the kidnappers. On 3 July 2007, Pakistani forces attacked ‘Lal

Masjid.’Three Chinese engineers were killed in revenge killing in Peshawar

on 8 July 2007 (Peshawar killing evokes, 2007). A senior journalist from

Peshawar stated, ‘The militants were offended. …The feeling among them

was that it would not have happened if the Chinese had not demanded

action’(Small 2015, p. xv). To prevent further attacks on Chinese citizens

and projects, China tried to distance itself from the ‘Lal Masjid’episode by

stating that China’s foreign policy was not to interfere in the domestic

affairs of another country. On 29 August 2007, two Chinese engineers work-

ing for Chinese company ZTE were kidnapped in Swat Valley by Tehrik-e-

Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in retaliation for Chinese pressure leading to the

assault on Lal Masjid. China demanded that the situation should be

adequately addressed and raised the possibility of curtailing all its eco-

nomic projects (China may raise, 2008).

Due to lack of security during President Zardari’s term in office, all

the mega projects such as the Karakoram Highway expansion, Gwadar

and enormous new hydro-electric dams among others were temporarily

suspended. A former Chinese diplomat stated, if projects ‘are threatened

by insecurity, it’s easy: we stall them’(Small 2015, p. 115). In 2011,

Kingho Group, the largest private sector miner in China decided to pull

out of a US$19 billion deal citing security concerns due to frequent

bombings in numerous cities in Pakistan (Wright and Page, 2011). On

24 June 2013, ten foreigners including two Chinese mountain climbers

were killed by terrorists (Khan, F. A., 2014). This demonstrated that

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 1003

attacks can take place in close proximity to rebuilding of the Karakoram

Highway and the newly proposed hydro-electric dams and more import-

antly that no part of Pakistan is safe for Chinese citizens. According to

a former Chinese official, ‘Above all, security. If terrorist attacks like the

one last month continue, the corridor will be impossible to realize’

(Small 2015, p. 174). In a meeting with Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar

Ali Khan on 14 October 2015, China’s Ambassador to Pakistan Sun

Weidong ‘demanded the provision of fool-proof security to all Chinese

workers associated with the CPEC’(Sindhi nationalists, 2016).

In June 2017, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS/IS/Daesh) kidnapped

and killed a young Chinese couple who were preaching Christianity under

the guise of teaching in a language school in Quetta (Lim, 2017). President

Xi refused to meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the SCO Summit in

Astana in June 2017 as a response to the killing of the Chinese nationals

(Dasgupta, 2017). In February 2018, after a Chinese national was killed in

Karachi, China demanded that Pakistan ensure the security of its nationals.

Intelligence agencies have warned of more strikes against Chinese nationals

(Khan, F., 2018). CCP asserts that it faces increasing pressure from domestic

public opinion to protect Chinese businesses and citizens abroad, and the

pressure intensifies with every violent incident (Murphy, 2017). According

to a leading Chinese scholar on India-China-Pakistan with close connections

with Chinese leadership,

Chinese people expect the government to provide security to its citizens.

News of death of Chinese citizens abroad and in Pakistan puts a lot of

pressure on the government to act. Nationalism is on the rise in China. It is

difficult for the government to ignore public opinion. The government has

been targeted by the nationalists on social media. (personnel communication,

Beijing, June 11, 2018)

Pakistan has promised to do all that is needed to provide security to

Chinese workers. Pakistan’s interior ministry has announced the formation

of Special Security Division comprising 15,000 troops –9,000 army and

6,000 para-military –for the security of CPEC (Khan, R., 2016). In December

2016, Pakistan’s Navy revealed the commissioning of a special Task Force –

88 comprising warships, unmanned aerial vehicles, attack helicopters and

surveillance equipment to protect Gwadar (Conrad, 2017). Additionally, the

government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has announced the creation

of a provincial special security force of 4,200 personnel to provide security

to Chinese workers, China’s investments and CPEC projects (Pakistan’s

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, 2017). Analysts aver that CPEC security through these

forces is feasible in the short term but as CPEC progresses, the presence of

Chinese citizens will increase across Pakistan and it will be difficult to pro-

vide security to all of them. Shi and Lu (2016) aver,

1004 R. VERMA

Over time, it will become more difficult for Pakistan to guarantee the

security of the CPEC’s growing transportation networks, which will require

increasing investments of security personnel and material support. It will

likely become uncertain in the future whether Pakistan can maintain a

strong enough military presence to ensure the security of all these

transportation routes.

Masood Azhar and domestic (in)stability in Pakistan

Maulana Masood Azhar is an Islamic ideologue, and a ‘global jihadist.’

Masood Azhar has partaken in myriad jihadist undertakings such as organiz-

ing and planning terrorist attacks among others for jihad. He travelled to

Saudi Arabia, Zambia, Abu Dhabi, the UK, Mongolia, Albania and Kenya to

spread jihad, recruit fighters and raise funds (Jaleel, 2016). He is a brilliant

orator, and an accomplished negotiator and administrator. He is also a pro-

lific writer and has written numerous books on jihad (Verma, 2017). He has

been credited to be the first to spread jihad in the UK and radicalize numer-

ous British Muslims through Deobandi mosques. Investigations have also

revealed links between Jaish and British born suicide bomb attackers

responsible for the 7 July 2005 attacks in the London underground

(Azhar, 2016).

After his release from Indian prison in 1999 in exchange for safe passage

of the passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines flight IC-814, Masood

Azhar travelled to Afghanistan and is supposed to have met Al-Qaeda

Figure 1. Terrorist organizations and political parties in Pakistan and their religious

orientation.

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 1005

leaders including Osama bin Laden and the Afghan Taliban. In 2000, Azhar

established JeM with massive funding from ISI, Al-Qaeda and Afghan

Taliban. JeM also receives funding from other Deobandi groups such as

Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) (Garge and

Sahay, 2018). According to Rehman Malik, former Interior Minister of

Pakistan, JeM is allied to the Deobandi Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network,

anti-Shi’a groups such as SSP and LeJ, TTP and the Al-Qaeda (Mir, 2011).

Additionally, All Pakistan Ulema Council and Ansar ul-Islam and political

parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and radical political parties such as

Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islam Fazal-ur-Rehman faction (JUI-F)

have close relations

with JeM, LeT, SSP and LeJ among others in Pakistan, and also Afghan

Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Pakistan’s control over various terrorist organizations

In its quest to achieve national strategic and security goals especially with

respect to India and Afghanistan, Pakistan has supported numerous terror-

ist organizations operating in Kashmir and India and in Afghanistan (at least

since 1960’s if not before). These organizations can be categorized based

on areas of operation (India particularly Kashmir, and Afghanistan), ethnic

constitution (Kashmiri, Pakhtun or Punjabi Taliban), sectarian orientation

(Shia such as Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan, Sunni Deobandi such as Jaish,

LeJ, TTP and Afghan Taliban and Ahl-Hadith such as LeT) and preferred

techniques of attack (See Figure. 1; Fair, 2014). There is a very close nexus

between Pakistan’s military-security apparatus and numerous terrorist and

religious organizations operating in and from Pakistan. However, Pakistan’s

military security establishment has varying levels of influence/control over

these militant organizations.

LeT

Pakistan military-security establishment has considerable influence over

LeT, the leading terrorist group in South Asia which has logistical bases in

Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka among other countries. It is

Pakistan’s most preferred anti-India terrorist outfit. LeT has intimate rela-

tions with Pakistan’s’Army and ISI. It receives substantial assistance from

the Pakistani state and citizens. Although some analysts have stated that

LeT has links with Al-Qaeda, LeT is not organizationally linked to Al-Qaeda.

LeT has also disowned TTP and has never taken up arms against the

Pakistani state. However, Christine Fair (2014: 227) avers, ‘While LeT has dis-

avowed the TTP, individual LeT fighters have joined the ranks of Deobandi

militant groups, and some members have even provided assistance to

Al-Qaeda.’

1006 R. VERMA

Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network

Pakistan also has significant influence over the Afghan Taliban and the

Haqqani network –an Afghan Taliban faction which has close ties with Al-

Qaeda and TTP—based in North Waziristan and headed by Siraj-ud-Din

Haqqani (now one of the two deputies of Maulvi Haibatullah Akhundzada,

the head of Taliban). Admiral Mike Mullen, former Joint Chief of Staff, US

stated that Pakistan continues to support the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani

network is ‘veritable arm of the ISI’(Haqqani network is, 2011). However,

Pakistan’s influence over Afghan Taliban has declined in recent years. This

is due to new leadership which is less bestowed towards Pakistan because

of their age –they were children when ISI was fostering the Taliban in the

1990’s—and change in tribal foundation in Afghanistan (Fair, 2014). Since

2015, Afghan Taliban have minimized their sole reliance on Pakistan and

have diversified relations with other countries especially Iran and Russia

which has further reduced Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban. Iran has

provided weapons, finances, shelter and medical facilities to Taliban. Russia

launched its own diplomatic peace initiative since 2016. It has developed

closer ties with Taliban because of its concerns regarding the spread of IS

in Afghanistan

and as a proxy against US military presence in

Afghanistan. Reports indicate that Russia is also arming the Taliban (South

Asia: Afghanistan, 2018).

Deobandi groups: TTP, JeM, LeJ, SSP and others

According to Fair (2014), Pakistan’s influence and ability to control the vari-

ous Deobandi groups seems variable and is perhaps at best tentative. Of all

the Deobandi groups, Jaish is most likely the most strongly controlled by

Pakistan. But in the past, Jaish has split into various factions and attacked

domestic and foreign targets along with LeJ (South Asia, 2018). Pakistani

state has no control or influence over the TTP and it is highly unlikely that

it will have it in the future. Since 2007, TTP has been conducting attacks

against the Pakistani state. For instance, the attack on Pakistan Army

Headquarters in Rawalpindi in October 2009, attack on Mehran naval sta-

tion attack in Karachi on May 22, 2011 in which attackers were looking for

Chinese citizens working in the base (Bansal, 2012), Peshawar school mas-

sacre on December 16, 2014 (Dreams turned into, 2017), suicide bombing

on Easter Sunday on March 27, 2016 (Saifi, 2016) and suicide bomb attack

on Awami National Party’s rally in Peshawar in July 2018 (Firdous and

Khattak, 2018) among other attacks.

In consonance with other analysts (Fair, 2014; Roggio, 2017), Chinese

analysts also believe that Pakistan’s overall strategy is pro-jihadi. Pakistan

does not have the political will and ability to force the TTP and other

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 1007

anti-state militants to follow the writ of the state. It will be unable or unwill-

ing to eliminate these groups because of the coinciding membership of the

groups which Pakistan still considers as assets which can be used against

India and the fervently anti-state Deobandi groups and the TTP (Chinese

scholars, analysts and former diplomats, personnel communication, Beijing,

January-July 2018).

Daesh in Afghanistan and Pakistan

More pertinent and worrisome for China is that Pakistan’s military-security

establishment has no control over Daesh both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Daesh first emerged in Afghanistan in 2014. It has exhibited resilience and

has grown strong due to easy availability of radicalized youths in

Afghanistan, disenfranchised members of the Afghan Taliban and other

regional militants including TTP who have been pushed into Afghanistan

by Pakistan Army’s operations in Federally Administered Tribal Areas

(FATA). Battle hardened and ideologically driven Daesh fighters from the

Middle-East have also reached Afghanistan. This is illustrated by its strong

presence in Nangarhar and Kabul, recent gains in Jazwan province in north-

ern Afghanistan (Gannon, 2018; Kugelman, 2018). According to different

estimates there are approximately 1,000–5,000 ISIS fighters in Afghanistan

(Stanzel, 2018). ISIS has conducted numerous attacks in Afghanistan espe-

cially in the capital Kabul. There are also reports that Daesh has outsourced

its attacks in Afghanistan against the US and Afghan national forces to TTP

and other local groups (Paton, 2017).

Although, Daesh’s presence in Pakistan is not as well established as in

Afghanistan, it is expanding to China’s great consternation. Daesh first

appeared in Pakistan in Baluchistan province in 2014 (Bhojani, 2017). In

October 2014, TTP also pledged its support to Daesh (Mehsud and

Golovnina, 2014) and in January 2015, Hafiz Saeed Khan who headed TTP’s

Orakazi division, was appointed head of IS-Khurasan (IS-K). Subsequently, a

Taliban spokesman and five Taliban commanders pledged loyalty to Al-

Baghdadi and defected to IS-K. Daesh has gained strength and visibility due

to its local affiliates Jamat-ul-Ahrar (a splinter group of TTP) (Pakistan

Security Report 2017, 2018) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami which have

undertaken high profile and mass casualty attacks on Sufi shrines and

minorities in major cities like Lahore (South Asia: Afghanistan, 2018). Jamat-

Ul-Ahrar headed by Omar Khaled Khorasani—a former member of Jaish—

has developed links with LeJ and LeT (Gannon, 2016). Since its emergence

in Pakistan, Daesh has been responsible for the deaths of 800 civilians

(Bhojani, 2017). Lt. General Asim Saleem Bajwa, the former official spokes-

person of the Pakistani military’s media wing, stated that “309 ISIS members

1008 R. VERMA

have been arrested by Pakistani law enforcement and paramilitary forces”

(Zahid, 2017).

In January 2016, Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in the UK,

published a report stating Daesh has 2000–3000 members in Pakistan

(Giustozzi, 2016). Analysts agree that Daesh’s threat in Pakistan is ‘real and

rising.’Reports also suggest that LeJ, LeT and TTP have also overlapped

with Daesh (Zahid, 2017). According to a report by Pakistan Institute for

Peace Studies, Daesh’s footprint is increasing in Baluchistan and Sindh

(Pakistan Security Report 2017, 2018). Moreover, a great cause of anxiety is

that young educated youth and even Pakistani women are getting lured by

Daesh’s ideology (Asad, 2016).

Analysts aver that Pakistan is an ideal place for Daesh to mushroom

given its youth bulge, economic backwardness, political instability and

proximity to Afghanistan (Parvez, 2016; Zahid, 2017). Additionally, the struc-

ture of the IS-K shura might lead Daesh to sooner or later becoming

increasingly engaged in Pakistan relative to Afghanistan. Of the 12 member

IS-K shura, nine are from Pakistan. Pakistani members linkages and influ-

ence with the tribes in FATA might be significant in building a permanent

base in Pakistan. For instance, Omar Mansoor, a member of the shura has

ties to the Lal Masjid which has extensive links with Deobandi groups

(which are inclined to Daesh’s anti-Shia ideology) and other militants oper-

ating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lal Masjid can aid Daesh in developing

links with numerous terrorist groups and also provide a base to recruit

fighters form Deobandi Madrassas throughout Pakistan (Parvez, 2016).

China’s apprehensions regarding Masood Azhar and domestic

(in)stability in Pakistan

Some analysts aver that support of radical religious organizations and mili-

tant groups is indispensable for the success of CPEC and other Chinese

projects in Pakistan (Verma, 2017; Zahid, 2017). There is also a consensus

amongst Chinese scholars, analysts and former diplomats interviewed by

the author (personnel communication, Beijing, January-July 2018) that CPEC

and other Chinese projects in Pakistan (and Afghanistan) will not be suc-

cessful if militants and religious groups in Pakistan turn against China and

Chinese interests. According to a leading Chinese scholar on India-China-

Pakistan with close connections with Chinese leadership,

If militants/terrorists and religious groups oppose CPEC, it cannot work.

Pakistan is trying its best but we do not think Pakistan has the capacity and

capability to reign in the terrorists. China wants peace with terrorists and

religious groups. China needs their support. Attacks will delay or completely

derail CPEC. (Chinese analyst, personnel communication, June 11, 2018)

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 1009

China is concerned that designation of Masood Azhar as a terrorist by

UNSC and action against him and JeM by Pakistan would have serious con-

sequences for the stability and unity of Pakistan. After General Musharraf

decided to join the US ‘global war on terror’against the Afghan Taliban,

terrorist organizations in Pakistan—especially JeM—were livid at Musharraf

for abandoning their Deobandi brethren. Numerous attacks were carried

out by splinter groups or factions of JeM, members of the LeT and other

Sunni terrorist organizations against Pakistani state and military security

establishment. After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, JeM acti-

vists returning from Afghanistan aroused sectarianism across Pakistan by

targeting Christians, Shias and diplomatic missions. In December 2003, two

assassination attempts were made on General Musharraf which were traced

back to JeM and Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islami. The suicide bombers had fought in

Afghanistan with the Taliban. Moreover, the explosives for the attacks were

traced to Al-Qaeda camps in South Waziristan in FATA. The rebellious fac-

tions in JeM later aligned themselves with TTP (Popovic, 2015).

JeM once again came into the limelight when Pakistani security forces

launched an operation on Lal Masjid in July 2007. Reports suggest that JeM

was actually in control of Lal Masjid, whose students had kidnapped the

Chinese citizens and where they were being held hostage. Azhar himself

made a speech against President Musharraf from Lal Masjid. It is also alleged

that ‘the person ideologically controlling Lal Masjid militants is Masood

Azhar’s brother, Mufti Abdur Rauf’(Siddique, 2008: 39). Experts also aver that

Pakistani government officials claimed that Abdul Aziz, the chief cleric of the

mosque was in constant contact with Jaish activists who were acting like his

chief advisors (Siddique, 2008).

The assault on the ‘Lal Masjid’by Pakistan’s security forces was employed

as a rallying cry by extremists who argued that the military had betrayed

them. The aftermath was numerous attacks and bombings across Pakistan.

After the Lal Masjid episode, JeM decided to join the TTP to fight against

the Pakistani Army to seek revenge against the security forces for killing

their Deobandi brethren. This allowed JeM access to FATA. Six JeM militants

arrested in Bahawalpur had links with Baitullah Maehsud of TTP (Popovic,

2015). According to experts, Jaish and LeJ undertake attacks in the name of

the TTP and have attacked numerous Ahmedi, Shia and Sufi shrines and

civilians across Pakistan especially in Punjab. Moreover, these groups form

the backbone of the TTP (Roggio, 2010). In June 2008, in a meeting organ-

ized by numerous militant groups in Pakistan and attended by members of

JeM, the groups agreed to cooperate and pool resources for the Afghan

conflict. From 2008-2014, JeM changed its center of operation to

Afghanistan and recruited fighters to fight the US and western forces

(Garge and Sahay, 2018). In 2010, Rehman Malik, Pakistan’s Interior Minister

1010 R. VERMA

stated, ‘“JeM, along with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan,

were allied to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda”…A“syndicate”of militant groups

wanted to see ‘Pakistan as a failed state”’ (Wade, 2009).

After the Pathankot attack in 2016, in an article in al-Qalam, Masood

Azhar (using his pseudonym ‘Saidi’) warned the Pakistan government that

action against jihad, mosques and JeM will be counterproductive for peace,

security, integrity and unity of Pakistan (Action against Jaish-e-Mohammad,

2016). China was concerned that if Masood Azhar is designated as a terror-

ist under UNSC 1267 Committee rules, Jaish and other terrorist organiza-

tions will take up arms against the Pakistani state which will create further

instability in Pakistan and undermine CPEC and China’s geo-strategic inter-

ests (Chinese scholars, analysts and former diplomats, personnel communi-

cation, Beijing, January–July 2018; Kermani, 2019; Stanzel, 2018).

According to a leading Chinese expert on South Asia,

China is concerned that designating Masood Azhar as a terrorist will be

counterproductive in the fight against terror. The security situation in

Pakistan has improved although it is still unstable. We believe that JeM will

take up arms against Pakistan. Azhar is very well connected. Other

organizations will also join which will undermine the state and create more

instability in Pakistan. China does not want that. (personnel communication,

Beijing, January 26, 2018)

According to a leading Chinese expert,

Masood Azhar has very strong influence in society. He has to be supported.

If not, Pakistan will suffer. Pakistan’s unity and stability will be severely

affected. Consequently, China’s interests especially CPEC and BRI will also

suffer. This is against China’s interests. (personnel communication, Beijing, 1

February, 2018)

Another Chinese analyst avers, ‘CPEC will be threatened by the Masood

Azhar issue. China-Pakistan have an understanding on this issue and over

terrorism in the region’(personnel communication, Beijing, January

29, 2018).

Chinese scholars, analysts and former diplomats interviewed by the

author are unanimous that China’s top priority is political stability in

Pakistan. China does not want an unstable Pakistan. China’s biggest con-

cern is that domestic instability in Pakistan will spill over into Afghanistan

(and vice versa). China is concerned that political instability in Pakistan may

lead to increase in violence against the Chinese citizens and may lead to

delaying or halting of CPEC. China is also concerned that since JeM and

other Sunni terrorist organizations have close links with Afghan Taliban and

Al-Qaeda, Chinese interests in Afghanistan will also be at risk. China is

deeply perturbed that rising fundamentalism and domestic instability in

Pakistan (and Afghanistan) will provide a breeding ground for terrorists of

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 1011

all forms and colors including ISIS which will further weaken the Pakistani

state and hamper Chinese interests. China does not want additional con-

frontation with Islamic terrorist groups. Thus, instability in Pakistan will

undermine CPEC, BRI, NASC and China Dream. Failure or slowdown of CPEC

and BRI would lead to further slowdown of the Chinese economy and put

the CCP under extreme pressure. This does not augur well for China and

Chinese people (Chinese scholars, analysts and former diplomats, personnel

communication, Beijing, January–July 2018).

Conclusion

On 1 May 2019, after more than a decade and four attempts, Maulana

Masood Azhar, head of JeM (proscribed by the UN as a terrorist organiza-

tion in 2001) was designated as a terrorist under UNSC 1267 rules. China

used ‘technical hold’and its veto as a permanent member of the UNSC to

block proposals put forth by India, the US, the UK and France to list

Masood Azhar as a terrorist. China finally wilted and agreed to list Masood

Azhar as a terrorist. Various reasons have been given for change in China’s

stance. First is fear of diplomatic isolation in the UNSC where China would

be hard pressed to defend Azhar as not being a terrorist. Second, improve-

ment in India-China relations post Wuhan Summit in April 2018. Third, glo-

bal sentiment against terrorism. Fourth, the scale of the terrorist attack

leading to the death of more than 40 Indian security personnel. Finally, the

deteriorating health of Masood Azhar. In light of this, Pakistan conveyed to

China that is was not against his listing as a terrorist under UNSC

1267 rules.

The study seeks to provide an answer to the question: Why was China

reluctant to designate Masood Azhar, head of Jaish as a terrorist under the

UNSC 1267 Committee rules? The extant literature states that China’s

defense of Pakistan is based on geo-political considerations. China needs

Pakistan to balance India in South Asia. Pakistan needs China’s assistance to

resist India’s hegemony in the region and beyond and prevent it from

achieving great power status. This has led to an ‘all weather’strategic part-

nership between the two countries geared against India.

This study provides a more comprehensive explanation for the above

phenomena. It argues that China’s NSC/NASC and the concomitant BRI and

CPEC, China’s concerns regarding political stability in Pakistan and China’s

geo-strategic interests also explain China’s actions. CPEC is intended to pro-

vide security and stability to Pakistan through economic growth based on

China’s NSC/NASC. ‘Beijing identified ‘political instability as the highest risk

factor’challenging CPEC’(Rafiq, 2017).

China’s unwillingness to designate Masood Azhar as a terrorist under

UNSC 1267 Committee was because of its concerns that this would

1012 R. VERMA

enhance political instability in Pakistan. It will also exacerbate social, eco-

nomic, religious and ethnic divisions and unity of Pakistan. Masood Azhar is

a religious ideologue and has connections with a host of terrorist organiza-

tions in Pakistan and Afghanistan. China was concerned that these organi-

zations will turn against the state which will not only jeopardize CPEC and

BRI but also China’s interests in Afghanistan. Moreover, political instability

in Pakistan will spill over into Afghanistan and the two countries will

become a fertile breeding ground for jihadists and terrorists. ISIS might also

firmly establish itself in the two countries. This will stymie and/or prevent

China from realizing President Xi’s‘China Dream’and ‘Asia-Pacific Dream,’

and China’s quest for global power status.

The paper also highlights an inherent contradiction in China’s NSC/

NASC. On the one hand, China wants to contain India’s power in South Asia

by strengthening Pakistan in strategic and military terms despite the fact

that Pakistan supports terrorist organizations in India and Afghanistan. On

the other hand, it seeks to promote regional stability to curtail the influence

of Islamic terrorists. Although China wants to achieve political, social and

economic stability in South Asia, Central Asia and beyond under the aegis

of NSC/NASC, China’s inability to pressurize Pakistan on terrorism targeted

towards India and Indian interests in Afghanistan is not only creating

instability in South Asia but also in Central Asia, and China is also

being affected.

Afghan-Pak region is becoming the epicenter of regional and global ter-

rorism. Afghanistan has become a hub on international terrorism with ter-

rorist of all forms and colors including battle hardened Deash fighters

seeking and/or having found refuge in Afghanistan. Daesh is also spreading

steadily in Pakistan. Additionally, Al-Qaeda has resurfaced in Pakistan and is

trying to extend its influence in South Asia and beyond (Al-Qaeda In The,

2018). Growing instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan seeks to undermine

BRI—President Xi Jinping’s brainchild—CPEC, China Dream and China’s

quest for great/superpower status. Thus, China’s policy is actually backfiring

not only against Pakistan but also against China. The ‘genie’that is Islamic

fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism is out of Pakistan’s and

China’s control.

Although Masood Azhar has been designated as a terrorist under UNSC

1267 rules, India is apprehensive that it will not lead to end of terrorist

attacks by JeM in Indian Kashmir. India is aware that even after Hafiz Saeed,

head of LeT was proscribed as a terrorist under UNSC 1267 rules in 2008,

LeT continues operate and undertake terrorist attacks in Indian Kashmir.

Moreover, Hafiz Saeed is opening addressing rallies in Pakistan and even

tried to contest the election in Pakistan in 2018. India has vowed that it will

continue to put political and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan until it stops

THE PACIFIC REVIEW 1013

supporting terror targeted towards India. For instance, diplomatic initiatives

undertaken by India leading to criticism of Pakistan by the US, the UK,

France, Germany, Russia, Iran and other countries for abetting terrorism,

UNSC condemning Pakistan for terrorist attacks in India and Pakistan being

wary of being black listed by the Financial Action Task Force (Pulwama

attack, 2019; Wary Pak wants, 2019). India is also on a diplomatic offensive

to achieve greater accountability and transparency in the workings of the

UNSC 1267 Committee which will help it in listing of terrorists from

Pakistan (India seeks transparency, 2018).

India wants amicable relations with Pakistan. It does not want Pakistan

to be designated as state sponsor of terrorism (Home Ministry opposes,

2017). It wants Pakistan to stop providing support to NSAs and stop terror-

ist strikes in India as a pre-condition for amiable relations. It wants China to

put pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting terrorism targeted towards

India. However, China not only perceives Indian actions as attempts to

demonize China and Pakistan, but also to drive a fissure between the ‘all

weather friends’(Chinese scholars, analysts and former diplomats, person-

nel communication, Beijing, January-July 2018). Thus, there is an impasse.

The question arises can this logjam be broken? It will be better if India

and China have candid talks and resolve the issue. However, given the lack

of trust between the two countries due to India-China rivalry and China-

Pakistan strategic partnership, it is highly unlikely that this will happen.

Thus, the deadlock between India, China and Pakistan and terrorism tar-

geted towards India by JeM and other groups is most likely to continue.

This will sow seeds for more distrust and rivalry between the two ‘rising

Asian giants’leading to a downward spiral in bilateral relations which does

not augur well not only for South Asia and the Asia-Pacific but the

entire world.

Notes

1. Under UNSC 1267, ‘technical hold’is valid for six months and can be extended again

for three months. After that, a country will have to resort to the use of its veto to

block a proposal.

2. Kugelman (2019) argues that because of global concerns regarding terrorism and

India-China diplomacy, in February 2018, China did not oppose the Financial Action

Task Force’s decision to put Pakistan on the gray list for its failure to reduce terror

financing. Pakistan has been placed on the gray list since June 2018. Also, at the Heart

of Asia Summit in July 2018, China condemned JeM and LeT by name.

3. China’s shielding Pakistan on terrorism can also explicated by China’s concerns

regarding Xinjiang and East Turkestan Islamic Movement/Turkestan Islamic Party.

However, the paper focuses on China-India-Pakistan relationship.

4. The Trump administration views US-China relations in terms of geopolitical

competition rather than cooperation which is a far cry from the ‘new type of great

power relations’envisaged by the Chinese leadership.

5. Although Pakistani government is very optimistic regarding CPEC being a ‘game

changer’for Pakistan, analysts have criticized CPEC for lack of transparency,

environmental standards, economic viability and neo-colonialism among others with

1014 R. VERMA

some analysts labelling it as ‘another East India Company.’There are also concerns of

Pakistan falling into a vicious ‘debt trap.’

6. See Garlick, 2018 for why China might be unable to overcome the ‘Malacca Dilemma.’

7. Lal Masjid was a recruiting ground for mujahideen in the anti-Soviet campaign. During

late 1990’s to 2007, it had close links with the Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.

8. Many Taliban leaders received education in madrasas run by JUI. It split into two

factions in the 1980’s - JUI-F and JUI-S. In 2008, there was a minor split in JUI-F

leading to the formation of JUI-N.

9. For links between JUI, Afghan Taliban and Osama Bin Laden, see Joseph, 2011;

Shahzad, 2006.

10. Russia is concerned about the returning ISIS fighters from Russia, North Caucus and

Central Asian republics who have moved to Afghanistan from the Middle-East.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on Contributors

Raj Verma is Associate Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy,

School of International Relations, Huaqiao University. He is also the Head of

Research and Senior Fellow Asia Pacific, Intellisia Institute. He is Series Editor of

'Routledge Series on India-China Studies.’His research focuses on India's and

China's foreign and security policy, India-China-US relations, grand strategy and

emerging world order and IR theory.

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THE PACIFIC REVIEW 1021

CHINA’S DEJA VU IN AFGHANISTAN?

Article

Dec 2023

Raj Verma

This article argues that the formation of the second Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) is a case of déjà vu for China and that, despite its engagement with the new government, Beijing will be unable to meet its geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic and national security goals with the new Taliban-led government. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, similarly to the situation under the first IEA, the Taliban are finding it difficult to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The security situation will remain perilous due to persistent attacks by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP). Secondly, and also just as during the first IEA, the Taliban cannot be relied upon as allies in China’s ‘war on terror’. This is due to the Taliban’s ideological beliefs, decades of ties with the Uyghur militants in Afghanistan and concerns about reputational damage if it breaks links with Islamist groups or undertakes counterterrorism operations against these groups which may undermine the second IEA.

India–China Standoff in Ladakh and China’s Dilemma

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2023

Raj Verma

This article seeks to provide an answer to the question which has not been explored in the relevant academic scholarship: What are the merits and demerits of China restoring status quo ante or maintaining status quo along the disputed Line of Actual Control and why? This article argues that status quo renders China multiple geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic advantages: restoring its 1960s claim line and tactical and strategic gains along the LAC, security of Aksai Chin and inhibiting India’s rise. However, it also creates prospects for India–China conflict/war which will curtail (a victorious) China’s quest to become the pre-eminent global power. And a defeat/stalemate in conflict/war with India will impact China’s standing in global affairs, and repercussions for Communist Party of China’s regime stability and regime survival. On the other hand, restoring status quo ante also has tactical and strategic costs, and can also have domestic political costs for President Xi Jinping.

RUSSIA’S FALIN–KVITSINSKY ENERGY DOCTRINE: HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE APPLYING TO SELECTED CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2023

This article discusses the evolution of the energy security of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), in terms of natural gas supplies. Instead of framing energy dependencies on Russia in a descriptive way, this article shows the empirical validation of the Falin–Kvitsinsky doctrine, which includes the use of energy resources as tool in foreign policy. Therefore, the authors propose a three-element Falin–Kvitsinsky doctrine indicator to measure the power of this doctrine using the yearly data for 1991–2021. Authors argue that the impact of this doctrine should be assessed through the lens of energy supply security and then measured by appropriate indicators. This approach might be seen as opposite to the mainstream publications which are mostly descriptive in this field. In the article, the authors provided clear evidence of the Falin–Kvitsinsky doctrine existence until the end of 2021, which was applied during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Actions taken by Russia over the years were aimed at making Central European countries dependent on natural gas supply, which would then prompt these countries to limit their aid to Ukraine during the conflict that began in 2022. In conclusion, Russia is able to pursue its political goals in the manner suggested by the Falin–Kvitsinsky doctrine as long as each Central European country tries to ensure its own energy security. However, the Falin-Kvitsky doctrine did not fully meet its objectives, as Central European countries, as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, were able to quickly take steps to diversify the sources and directions of natural gas supplies by taking comprehensive measures and strengthening cooperation.

INDO-FRENCH BILATERAL DEFENCE PARTNERSHIP AND QUESTION OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2023

Mukesh Shankar Bharti

The article aims to describe the regional security challenges and major threats for India in South Asia. Since 1947, India has been suffering from external security threats such as a form of proxy warfare and terrorism from neighbouring countries. For this purpose, the article also examines recurring issues where India has major border issues with China in the Himalayan terrain to the Eastern region. India has been facing bigger security threats from China and Pakistan in the South Asia region. This article looks at defence cooperation between India and France through the prism of India's serious security threats in the South Asian region. India's soft power policy is reflected in a neo-realist approach and expanded by its long-standing defence cooperation with France. Therefore, India has been receiving support from the French government whenever the country needs defence equipment and other assistance. The article uses case studies and discourse analysis methods to answer the questions and draw the main findings and conclusions of the study. Finally, as a result of the survey, India's serious security threats in the South Asian region are pushing the country to purchase defence equipment from France. The relationship between India and France is strengthening bilateral cooperation at a broader level and shaping a robust strategic partnership by uniting in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Leadership as Rocket Science and Descent of the Nigerian Nation to the State of Nature

Preprint

Full-text available

Sep 2023

This research article delves into the intricate interplay between leadership complexities and the sociopolitical regression of the Nigerian nation, drawing parallels to the metaphor of rocket science and the state of nature theory. The study dissects the root causes of Nigeria's descent into a state of nature characterized by institutional decay, socioeconomic disparities, and governance deficits. By examining contemporary leadership practices in the country, the research uncovers systemic failures in leadership selection, decision-making processes, and accountability mechanisms that have collectively contributed to the nation's tumultuous development-journey. The study invokes the state of nature theory, first conceptualized by political philosophers, to highlight the erosion of social contracts and the erosion of citizens' trust in institutions. The cascading effects of inadequate leadership on national cohesion, economic development, and societal well-being are explored in the paper. The article offers a plausible framework to comprehend the intricate web of leadership dynamics that have propelled the Nigerian nation toward a state resembling the hypothetical "state of nature." The analysis underscores the urgency for transformative leadership reforms, institutional overhauls, and civic engagement to arrest the declining trajectory and to foster a sustainable ascent toward prosperity and stability.

MEDZINÁRODNÉ VZŤAHY SLOVAK JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Article

Full-text available

Jun 2024

Temitope Peter Ola

Competing for Advantage - The Chinese Communist Party, Statecraft, and Special Operations

Book

Full-text available

Mar 2024

This edited volume highlights key challenges the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faces in its rise and contextualizes the potential contributions of special operations to compete for advantage based on the CCP’s interests and vulnerabilities. Competing for advantage means accruing power and influence in such a way that the adversary’s plans cannot be realized. This volume focuses primarily on appreciating the CCP’s worldview, interests, and political culture while promoting a strategic vision for the future—a future where SOF will need to reinterpret their value from providing a military effect to providing a political effect through military means.

India's Quest for Status and Neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine War: BRICS, a Case Study

Article

Dec 2023

Raj Verma

Employing BRICS as a case study, this paper argues that India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is not influenced by its quest for status via BRICS because a souring of the India-Russia bilateral relationship will not affect India's quest for status through the BRICS. First, India and Russia have joined and co-developed BRICS to achieve their national and foreign policy goals such as great power status, challenging US hegemony and achieving a multipolar world order, reform of the liberal international order and Bretton Woods institutions and other objectives. Both countries have much to lose by allowing their problematic bilateral relationship to adversely impact the BRICS. Second, the BRICS is structured in such a way that its operating procedures/principles including consensus-based decision making and intentionally omitting controversial issues implies that bilateral problems between member states are not tabled and they do not make the group dysfunctional.

Reviewing terrorism threat on China after the cold war

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2023

Over the past three decades, terrorism has directly threatened China's national security and has played a key role in its foreign policy. The nature of terrorism in China is changing, as is the Chinese government's response to the threat. Despite the issue's importance, there is still little knowledge about the changing face of terrorism in China. Thus, this study fills the gap in the literature on this subject by reviewing the terrorism threat against China after the Cold War from 1989 through 2020, based on the global terrorism database (GTD). The study's main findings reveal that China is not a significant target of terrorism when compared to other powers. Terrorism in China is domestic and concentrated in four specific districts, chiefly caused by the Uyghurs Uprising. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the BRI did not cause a dramatic increase in terrorist attacks against Chinese citizens outside China.

Indo-French Defence and Security Partnership

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2023

Mukesh Shankar Bharti

The article aims to describe the regional security challenges and major threats for India in South Asia. Since 1947, India has been suffering from external security threats such as a form of proxy warfare and terrorism from its neighbouring countries. To this purpose, the article also examines recurring issues where India has major border issues with China, in the Himalayan terrain to the eastern region of India. This article looks at the defence cooperation between India and France through the prism of India’s security threats in the South Asian region. India's soft power policy reflected in a neo-realist approach and expanded its long-standing defence cooperation with France. Therefore, India has been receiving support from the French government whenever the country needs defence equipment and other assistance. The article uses empirical and discourse analysis methods to answer the questions, and to draw a proper conclusion to the study. Finally, as a result of the study, we can see that India’s serious security threats in the South Asian region are pushing the country to purchase defence equipment from France. The relationship between India and France is strengthening bilateral cooperation at a broader level and shaping a strong strategic partnership by uniting South Asia and the Indo-Pacific as well.

China-Pakistan Relations: A Historical Analysis

Book

Full-text available

Feb 2017

Ghulam Ali

Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War

Book

May 2014

Carol Christine Fair

The One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Beijing’s New Strategy of Geoeconomics and Geopolitics

Article

Jul 2018

Kevin G. Cai

While generally seen as China’s foreign economic initiatives designed to promote regional and global economic cooperation, the One Belt One Road (OBOR) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have been launched by Beijing as a grand economic and diplomatic strategy, which is designed and pursued not only to overcome the nation’s domestic economic problems but also to help promote Chinese influence in the region and beyond, weaken the US dominance in the regional and global economy, and minimize the effects of Washington’s policy of containing China. The OBOR and AIIB initiatives will inevitably bring significant impact on the economic architecture in multiple important areas, which would in turn have strategic implications in the region and beyond.

Deadly Impasse: Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century

Book

Jan 2016

Sumit Ganguly

What ails the Indo-Pakistani relationship? Rivalry between the two states has persisted since the partition of the British Indian Empire in 1947, and despite negotiations, four wars and multiple crises, India and Pakistan remain locked in a long-standing dispute. Evaluating relations from 1999 through to 2009, Sumit Ganguly seeks to understand this troubled relationship and why efforts at peace-making and conflict resolution, which have included unilateral Indian concessions, have not been more fruitful. Charting key sources of tension throughout the decade, including the origins and outcomes of the Kargil War in 1999, developments in the Indian-controlled portion of the state of Kashmir, the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 and the onset of the 2001-2 crisis, Deadly Impasse sets out to discover whether the roots of this hostile relationship stem from security dilemmas or reflect the dynamics between a status quo power and a predatory state.

8. China’s ‘New Security Concept’ and Southeast Asia: Policy Challenges

Chapter

Dec 2003

Carlyle Thayer

Deconstructing the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pipe Dreams Versus Geopolitical Realities

Article

Feb 2018

Jeremy Garlick

Intense interest in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was stimulated when US$46 billion of investment agreements were signed in April 2015, a sum which two years later increased to US$62 billion. A major focus of CPEC is on developing overland transportation and pipeline links from the port of Gwadar to the Chinese province of Xinjiang as a land-based alternative to the maritime ‘chokepoint’ of the Straits of Malacca. This article assesses the viability of pipelines connecting China to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan via a close analysis of evidence obtained from both primary and secondary sources. It concludes that the overland connection is beset with difficulties because of geographical, economic and security problems, and that China’s long-term motivations for maintaining a presence in Pakistan are likely to be chiefly geopolitical rather than geo-economic. In fact, China’s primary aim with CPEC and other investments is to hedge against India by establishing a physical presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), a strategy which is herein referred to as geo-positional balancing.

The Moving Border of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Article

Oct 2017

Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim

This article will read the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), whose infrastructure and installations are currently being built across Pakistan, as a moving border-making event which inscribes difference within Pakistan. The article will begin with a discussion of borders and border-making. The discussion will then turn to the different registers of difference that will be created in Pakistan through CPEC. The article will conclude with a speculative look at how Pakistan and the wider region may be impacted once the construction of CPEC is complete.

What are the strategic and economic implications for South Asia of China's Maritime Silk Road initiative?

Article

Sep 2017

Chien-peng Chung

This article focuses on South Asia's role in China's Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative. Given the saliency of this MSR enterprise as part of ChinesePresident Xi Jinping’s “One-Belt-One-Road” strategy, how this ambitious scheme impacts China’s relations with South Asian states along the MSR’s route, i.e. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh, merits investigation. The fate of the MSR will be determined by China’s relations with these states, since South Asia is in the middle of major sea-lanes between East/Southeast Asia and Middle East/Europe. The study examines the intentions and executions of China’s MSR projects in South Asia, evaluates the political and economic calculations of participating in the MSR for regional states, and identifies actions taken by them that can decide the initiative’s success. Politically, reactions of South Asian states to the MSR are explained as: fear of expanding Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean for India; and attempts by which Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh use China to counteract possible domination by India. Economically, two MSR pathways for South Asian states are analyzed: increases in Chinese infrastructure investments; and expansion in South Asia-China trade; both of which are reducible by loans owed to China, or “strings”/conditions attached.

China's Access to Gwadar Port: Strategic Implications and Options for India

Article

Jan 2017

Portia Conrad

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1951, Pakistan's desire for strategic parity with India and China's efforts to propel Pakistan as a strategic balancer to India have been the overarching factors for the emergence of a security centric Sino–Pak relationship. Over the years, it has diversified into an economic-centric relationship. Although military and technological transactions continue to dominate the economic relationship, China began gradually pledging increased investment in Pakistan's economy and infrastructure. China became the primary investor for building the Gwadar deep-sea port in 2002. Both sides signed a free trade agreement and agreed to link China's rail network to Gwadar Port through the Karakoram Highway in 2008. The commitment to develop Gwadar Port is a good indicator of the steady expansion of Chinese maritime interests and strategic influence in India's neighbourhood. This paper attempts to analyse the significance and implications of the development of Gwadar Port for Pakistan, India and the region as a whole.

Patients’ Responsibilities in Medical Ethics

Article

Sep 2016

Zhu Fengqing

China’s new security concept: India, terrorism, China’s geostrategic interests and domestic stability in Pakistan

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